Contested Cities: Re-thinking the Global and Representing the Local in Rio de Janeiro and Los Angeles

by

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements........................................................................................................ 2

Introduction: World Cities and Their Representations............................................. 4

Part I: Representations................................................................................................. 16

Chapter One:
  Olympic Cities: From Los Angeles 1984 to Rio 2016..........................................17

Chapter Two:
  Cities of Exception: The Case of Rio de Janeiro.................................................46

Chapter Three:
  So-Called World Cities: The Case of Los Angeles..............................................76

Part II: Contestations.................................................................................................. 104

Chapter Four:
  Alternative Cities: Innovation and Contestation in L.A. and Rio.................105

Works Cited ................................................................................................................ 128
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Introduction:

*World Cities and Their Representations*

The inspiration for this project can be traced to 2013, when I arrived in Rio de Janeiro just weeks after massive protests swept Brazil, calling attention to the country’s urban development pains. Lamenting the massive amounts of public spending that would be funneled away from public services and into projects and planning for the 2014 FIFA World Cup, protesters were demanding transportation, hospitals, and schools “of the FIFA standard.” These pleas were particularly loud in Rio, where World Cup discontent only foreshadowed what would ultimately become a much larger struggle with “Olympic-sized problems.”¹ As the city prepared to host the 2016 Olympic Games, Rio’s residents were caught in the throes of a citywide transformation that threatened to subordinate local needs to the whims and fancies of international event planners. Meanwhile, Olympic organizers and city leaders continued to quell discontent by asking residents to consider “broader aspirations.” Rio 2016, insists the Olympic website, is an unprecedented opportunity to “hasten the transformation of Rio de Janeiro into an even greater global city.”²

What I was witnessing, therefore, was a period of active, accelerated, and contested globalization. Breaking from the dominant narrative of globalization that characterizes cities as passive recipients of global processes, Rio was engaged in an unpredictable struggle to globalize itself. Furthermore, what I witnessed in Rio also challenged the ways in which globalization narratives are ultimately about the global economy—about the ways in which transnational capital penetrates and moves, often to the detriment of the urban poor.

Undoubtedly, Rio is experiencing an influx of international investment as corporations rush in to finance its transformation into the next Olympic city. But something besides global capital has been flowing through Rio since its first round of transnational football fanatics arrived in the summer of 2014. Yes, these tourists saw shantytowns, they rode overcrowded buses, and they had to take a fair amount of detours due to unfinished construction projects. But pasted all over these imperfections were breathtaking panoramic images of the city and advertisements adorned with flags, mixed-race women, and other symbols of multiculturalism. Above all, those who visited Rio in the summer of 2014 were met with signs assuring them that the “Olympic city”—or a veritable world city—was on its way. Rio was becoming global, therefore, not just through economic transactions, but also through “the conscious management of symbols and signs.”

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Throughout my eight months of living in Rio, I witnessed a process of world city formation that was simultaneously symbolic and physical, actual and aspirational, enacted and performed. The case of Rio reveals the need to rethink globalization—to reconsider the ways in which cities globalize themselves, to re-ascribe agency to local politics, and to scrutinize these politics with an eye toward uncovering the groups, spaces, and aspirations that world city politics has most severely marginalized. This thesis is the product of my own year-long exploration of alternative ways of understanding globalization and the cities in which it takes place, with the ultimate goal of diagnosing its social consequences. Before I attempt to present my findings, I must first explain how the global-local nexus, particularly with respect to world cities, has been theorized thus far.

**The World City & The Global City:**

In 1986, John Friedmann proposed “the world city hypothesis” and became a canonical voice in theorizing the relationship between so-called world cities and the global economy. Friedmann hypothesized this relationship to be a fundamentally functional one—a world city is a place in which the “command centers” of the global economy are housed. Command centers are the corporate headquarters, financial centers, and other important sites where global capital accumulates and concentrates. These are the sites on which the global economy depends, making world cities the major drivers of the global economic system.

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8 For more on Friedmann’s world city hypothesis, see “The World City Hypothesis” (1986) and “World city formation: an agenda for research and action” (1982).
World cities, therefore, are globalization’s winners. They have earned a spot on what Friedmann popularized as a relatively fixed hierarchy of world cities whose rank is defined by the command functions it performs for the global economy. When Saskia Sassen published *The Global City* in 1991, she based her work on Friedmann’s hierarchy and reified the definition of the world city as a command center the global economy. Her work focused on the very top of Friedmann’s hierarchy. London, New York, and Tokyo, she argued in the book, are the top three world cities—more “global” in their significance than any others. Sassen’s writing solidified the idea that there is indeed a world city hierarchy, and the term “global city” came to define this hierarchy’s very apex.

Friedmann and Sassen effectively broadened the reach of world-systems theory, proving that domination in the global system is further concentrated than initially imagined—that now, global economic power is not simply concentrated in a handful of countries, but a handful of cities. Furthermore, world city theory drew the first connections between globalization and the concrete urban restructuring processes that unfold along with it as cities make room for the influx of command functions into increasingly global “citadels.” Their works, however, are predominantly concerned not only with describing the world city citadel but with problematizing what exists at its margins. Both Friedmann and Sassen posited that the urban restructuring processes that promote world city growth are necessarily accompanied by severe, class-based social polarization and devastating urban poverty.

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Friedmann and Sassen’s work, therefore, was intended as a critique of the global capitalist system and a framework for problematizing the role of the world city within this system.\textsuperscript{11} Ironically, world city theory has served to imitate this world-system in its most exclusionary tendencies: by defining and ranking world cities according to their functional role in the global economy, world city theory not only limits the scope of what is or is not considered a world city, but it encourages a type of scholarship that is preoccupied with making such distinctions. Perhaps the unintended consequence of world city theory, therefore, was an abundance of world city research that upheld Friedmann’s hierarchy, focused almost exclusively on Western cities in the global core, and allowed economic functions to surmount city politics as the decisive driver of urban change.\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{The Neoliberal City:}

Another unavoidable concept through which globalization takes shape is neoliberalism, which has more recently ascended to ubiquity in contemporary urban theory due its applicability to a wide array of places and political contexts beyond the global core.\textsuperscript{13} Like the world city, the neoliberal city has become the site of blame for uneven development and harsh inequality. However, the tendency to apply a neoliberal label to practically any city, state, or policy throughout the world reveals that, in relation to the stringency of world city theory, the neoliberalism narrative has the opposite problem: its breadth and pervasiveness has rendered it inconsistently

defined, notoriously ambiguous, and “politically unproductive” as a form of inquiry and critique.¹⁴

Neoliberalism had its first formulation as an economic ideology, advocating for the rebirth of the doctrines of classical liberalism, particularly surrounding the belief that “open, competitive, and unregulated markets, liberated from all forms of state interference, represent the optimal mechanism for economic development.”¹⁵ This reformulation of “the liberal creed”—best exemplified by the work of Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek in the 1960s—was particularly focused on rejecting Keynesian economics and its belief in the regulatory and redistributive role of the government.¹⁶

In the eighties and nineties, neoliberalism rose from ideological writing to global political prominence primarily through American politics. The ideological rejection of Keynesianism materialized in the state-retrenchment and welfare-slashing policies of Ronald Reagan, and the ideological insistence on the “elegance of markets” gave way to the 1989 Washington Consensus, which exported an array of trade liberalizing, market-centered reforms from Washington, D.C.-based global institutions to the crisis-ridden economies of South America.¹⁷ Thus, the global pervasiveness of neoliberalism as an ideology is inextricably linked to the United States’ contemporaneous ascent to global power. The result has been the conceptual

¹⁷ Peck et. al, “Postneoliberalism,” 98.
mistake of understanding neoliberalism as a singular, US-led political project that is gradually homogenizing the politics of the world. In reality, neoliberalism is not a hegemonic political project but a domineering ideational project—a “grab-bag of ideas” that exhibit an unwavering penchant for market rule yet are formed and reformed by the distinct political projects of which they become a part. Ultimately, viewing neoliberalism as a single political project serves to reify Western hegemony while hiding the actors who—on the local level—produce, renew, and contest neoliberalism.

The Entrepreneurial City:

There are now various conceptions of entrepreneurialism as it pertains to cities, the earliest of which also emanate from the West and align particularly closely with North American narratives of economic restructuring. As a form of urban planning, entrepreneurialism—or “strategic planning”—has its roots in the United States, where private enterprise has always played an important role in shaping the country’s urban development habits. When American cities were forced to respond to the deindustrialization and recession that assailed capitalist economies in 1973, the tendency toward entrepreneurialism intensified.

In the seventies and eighties, American cities were forced to become “more innovative and entrepreneurial” in order to rebound from crisis and support

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18 Peck et. al, “Postneoliberalism,” 98.
redevelopment without any funding from an increasingly neoliberal nation.\textsuperscript{22} Coded with the magic word “revitalization,” entrepreneurial urban development strategies sprung up throughout the country, characterized by new kinds of creative partnerships between city governments and the private sector.\textsuperscript{23} Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), Enterprise Zones, and a host of other “strategic urban projects” proliferated in the United States and, ultimately, around the world.\textsuperscript{24}

According to this narrative, entrepreneurial urban politics is an inevitable response to “neoliberal policy regimes,” which strapped cities for federal funds and made them desperate for other, external sources of growth.\textsuperscript{25} Yet another narrative of globalization that conforms to Western experience, this narrative also conceives of entrepreneurialism as a predetermined response to economic restructuring, not a creative action to facilitate it. However, there have been more fruitful attempts to render “urban entrepreneurialism” into a more widely applicable and politically dynamic concept. Marxist geographer David Harvey draws attention to the non-neoliberal aspects of PPPs insofar as many of these partnerships are characterized by notable public investment and, therefore, by the assumption of risk by the public sector. Furthermore, Harvey’s conceptualization of urban entrepreneurialism emphasizes the ways in which it is a creative practice—a practice of urban

development that prioritizes the decorative “construction of place” over the 
conditions—such as housing, education, or local labor markets—that exist within a place.\textsuperscript{26}

The conception of what it means to be an entrepreneurial city has now been expanded and applied to a variety of non-Western contexts, establishing ways of how any city—regardless of its size or global economic function—can market itself, tamper with its international image, and strive to become more competitive in the battle for external investment. As such, entrepreneurial cities have, in some cases, been studied in ways that acknowledge their agency as creators and facilitators of their own globalizing paths.\textsuperscript{27}

**Beyond Homogenization:**

Having outlined each of these concepts, their shared limitations become clear: all three of these dominant narratives, at least in their earliest formulations, emanate from the West.\textsuperscript{28} As such, each of these concepts has struggled with a tendency to perpetuate Western-centric narratives of economic restructuring. Furthermore, these concepts also share the habit of erasing local politics. In trying to derive local practices from purportedly global yet fundamentally Western paradigms, these three narratives run the risk of creating two, interconnected illusions—that globalization is making the world more uniform and, in turn, that it is making it more like the West.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{26} Harvey, 8.
Throughout this thesis, I will contest these homogenizing narratives not only because they exclude non-Western cities, but also based on the fact that—in choosing to focus on paradigms over politics—they misrepresent even the most well-studied cities of the West. I will use Rio de Janeiro and Los Angeles to illustrate both of these conceptual shortcomings and to argue in favor of new narratives of globalization that take their shape from local agency.

In Chapter One, I contest the assumption within the world city paradigm that globalization is functional, not aspirational. I use the Olympics to illustrate the ways in which world cities both perform and facilitate their own globalization, and I will use Rio and L.A. as examples of two Olympic cities whose local politics exhibit such agency. Furthermore, I examine two other dominant globalization narratives—neoliberalism and urban entrepreneurialism—through the lens of the Olympics in order to illustrate how world city formation is shaped both by global aspirations and local politics.

In Chapter Two, I problematize prevailing globalization narratives from the perspective of the global South. I begin my analysis on the national level in order to illustrate the impossibility of narrativizing Brazil along a core-periphery binary, and I present Brazilian politics as having a particular, hybrid form that is not gradually becoming more like the West. I argue that Brazilian politics is defined by peculiar, contradictory combinations of neoliberal and “extra-neoliberal” political projects, and that these contradictions are particularly prevalent in the city of Rio de Janeiro.30 By examining the politics of Rio’s port revitalization project, I reveal the ways in which the city’s urban development politics not only stray from global conventions but are

30 Peck et. al, “Postneoliberalism,” 96.
also characterized by major deviations from local legal and political conventions. I argue that the exceptional qualities of local politics in Rio—which pose a barrage of threats to the city’s poorest residents—are only perceptible if local politics, projects, and agents are scrutinized.

Chapter Three is concerned with challenging world city theory from the perspective of Los Angeles, a Western city and powerhouse in the global economy assumed to be well-represented by prevailing globalization research. This chapter begins by illustrating how world city formation in Los Angeles was both shaped by the global economy and defined by the political aspirations of the twenty-year period during which Tom Bradley was mayor. By opting for a historical, political, and fundamentally local narrative instead of an economic one, I reveal the ways in which Los Angeles is misrepresented by both the restructuring narrative and social polarization narrative advanced by world city theorists.

In each of these chapters, the visibility and agency of the local emerge as the important factors neglected by prevailing theories of globalization. Finally, as geographer John Rennie Short insists, a further problem with these dominant narratives is that, in obscuring sites of local agency, they have a way of “crowding out alternatives” that is ultimately disempowering to the practice of social critique and contestation.31 Chapter Four, it follows, is concerned with exposing the ways in which marginalized world city residents can and do—through contestation and innovation—shape the powers that govern them. I use case studies from both Rio and L.A. to argue for a new approach to studying social contestation that is sensitive to

both the global constraints and local potentialities that exist within world cities. Ultimately, I argue throughout this thesis for new narratives through which to understand globalization and its effects on world cities. These new narratives must take local history and politics as their starting point in order to accurately represent the global and local forces that shape world cities—as well as the actual and possible ways for shaping them otherwise.
Part I: Representations

*However the city may really be, beneath this thick coating of signs, whatever it may contain or conceal, you leave Tamara without having discovered it.*

- Italo Calvino, *Invisible Cities*
Chapter 1: Olympic Cities

*From Los Angeles 1984 to Rio 2016*

“Holding an Olympic Games means evoking history.”

--Pierre de Coubertin,
IOC Founder

The number of Olympic volumes lining library shelves, filled with case studies from across the globe, proves to many social scientists, urban scholars, and historians that Olympic history can stand in as a history of the modern world. The Olympics serve—in theory and in practice—as a “nexus between global and local” and, as such, an important method of understanding the relationship between globalization and urban change. For many scholars, studying the Olympics has become a way of studying particular cities. For cities, reaching for the Games has been a way of reaching for the world. And when these cities reach and win, it is as though the entire world has granted them approval: In 2009, when the IOC announced that Rio de Janeiro won the bid for the 2016 Games, then-President Lula rejoiced: “The world has recognized that the time has come for Brazil…I confess to you if I die now, my life would have been worth it.”

Though Lula’s statements may seem extreme, there is indeed an immense significance and prestige attached to the title of Olympic host city. Candidate cities are eliminated for “poor international recognition,” with small cities and cities in developing countries tending to be the first to go in the battle for the right to host the


Games. Rio de Janeiro will be the first South American city ever to host the
Olympics, and the city’s victory against Chicago, Madrid, and Tokyo in the bidding
process—all previous Olympic cities—was “historic.”

Capable of endowing one lucky locality with an influx of international investment, attention, and prestige, the
Olympics have become a deeply significant globalizing strategy for the cities that
aspire to host them.

However, while Rio launches an Olympic-led campaign for “a first-world
economy”—complete with first-world capital, infrastructure, amenities, and
visitors—the city is invariably missing from the pages of world city research.

Friedmann’s and Sassen’s hierarchy of world cities privileges those cities that are
“command centers” in the global economy, granting world city status based on a
range of economic characteristics that correspond almost exclusively to wealthy,
Western cities. A growing number of urban scholars—particularly those writing
from outside the Western academy—are demanding a more expansive framework for
identifying world cities and studying their globalization processes. By ranking and
sorting world cities according to their global economic functions, world city theory
has done more than exclude important, non-Western cities from its analysis: its
preoccupation with global economic functions has perpetuated highly economistic

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narratives of globalization from which other, non-economic global processes are notoriously missing.  

Olympic scholarship has been instrumental in broadening prevailing understandings of how globalization and world cities interact. In this chapter, I will expose the limitations of three dominant globalization narratives by approaching them through the lens of the Olympic Games. In the same way that Friedmann’s world cities compete for global capital, major cities worldwide compete to host the Olympic Games—using the Games to insert themselves into “global flows of culture.”

Olympic cities, therefore, are important sites of what anthropologist Arjun Appadurai terms “cultural globalization.” Appadurai defines culture broadly, considering it to encompass global flows ranging from tourists and commodities to ideas and images—all of which circulate heavily throughout an Olympic city. Ideas and images are particularly important in Appadurai’s work, which insists that the imagination is central to understanding all forms of agency in a globalizing world. The imagination, he asserts, is “the form of negotiation between sites of agency and globally defined fields of possibility.”

These two nodes of the imagination—global aspirations and local sites of agency—are missing from dominant narratives of globalization and represent the core of what Olympic studies can add to globalization research. The Olympic city is indeed marked by economic restructuring and urban change, but it is not swept

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passively through these processes. The Olympic city is a site of local agency and intervention by which imaginative “claims to global significance” become real strategies of economic growth, international investment, and globally-oriented development. Through the lens of the Olympics, the world city becomes both real and imaginary—both functional and aspirational with respect to the global economy. In every world city, beneath these global aspirations are sites of local agency from which cities—using the Olympics as leverage—facilitate their own globalization and develop their own unique strategies of reaching for the world.

**Olympic Cities as Aspiring World Cities:**

Geographer John Rennie Short, reinforcing the centrality of the imagination to the study of cultural globalization, coined the term “the global city imaginary” to refer to “the constellation of ideas and practices associated with the pursuit of global city status.” While the Olympics have always been an international affair and now sit at the heart of this “constellation,” hosting the Games has not always been such a sought after route to world city status. After almost two decades of bad Olympic memories—a massacre in Mexico City (1968), the murder of Israeli athletes (1972), massive debts in Montreal (1976), and the United States’ boycott of Moscow (1980)—Los Angeles was the only bidder for the 1984 Summer Games. A pivotal city in Olympic history, Los Angeles is credited with the onset of “a new era of intense city competition to host the Olympic Games.” The city’s 1984 Games—the

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43 Short, “the Summer Olympics,” 324.
45 Short, “the Summer Olympics” 333.
first in Olympic history to be run and financed by a private company—were an extraordinary success, and the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee (LAOOC) boasted a $225 million profit when the Games came to a close.\footnote{Burbank, Matthew, Gregory Andranovich, and Charles H. Heying. \textit{Olympic Dreams: The Impact of Mega-events on Local Politics}. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. Print. 80.}

The praise accorded to the Los Angeles Games served to reify its already-realized world city status. The Games proved that Los Angeles, like all cities atop Friedmann’s hierarchy, was an economic powerhouse driven by private sector ingenuity. The LAOOC designed an innovative Olympic strategy in which “virtually everything was available for sponsorship or naming rights” and sold, after extensive market research, for a minimum bid price to a limited number of corporate sponsors, advertisers, and broadcasters.\footnote{Grunenau, Rick, and Robert Neubauer. "A Gold Medal for the Market: The 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, the Reagan Era, and the Politics of Neoliberalism." \textit{The Palgrave Handbook of Olympic Studies}. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 1-580. Print. 147-148.} For the first time since 1896, the Olympics were carried out without government subsidies and with minimal involvement from the city government.\footnote{Andranovich, Greg, Matthew J. Burbank, and Charles H. Heying. "Olympic Cities: Lessons Learned from Mega-Event Politics." \textit{Journal of Urban Affairs} 23.2 (2001): 113-31. Web. 122.} The 1984 Games in Los Angeles were a resounding success, and they were lodged into the global city imaginary as the “corporate capitalist Olympics” from which aspiring world cities should watch and learn.\footnote{Boykoff, Jules. \textit{Celebration Capitalism and the Olympic Games}. New York: Routledge, 2014. Print. 133.}

However, while it may have been the savvy entrepreneurs of the LAOOC who pioneered a new and immensely profitable Olympic strategy, this strategy would not have been possible without an already existing local political project—then-mayor Tom Bradley’s quest to globalize Los Angeles.\footnote{Keil, Roger. \textit{Los Angeles, Globalization, Urbanization, and Social Struggles}. Chichester, West Sussex, England: J. Wiley, 1998. Print. viv.} A closer look at the role of local
politics in carrying out the 1984 Games reveals that Los Angeles—as a world city—was both highly-ranked and still aspiring: seeking international capital and international prestige, Bradley pursued the Olympics steadfastly but cautiously.

Fearful of plunging into Olympic-related debt, Bradley and his City Council challenged Rule 4 of the IOC Charter, which requires the city government to shoulder all Olympic-related financial responsibilities.\textsuperscript{51} After five months of negotiation—and a threat to pull LA’s Olympic bid from a process with no other bidders—the Bradley coalition successfully convinced the IOC to suspend Rule 4, award the Games to Los Angeles, and allow the LAOOC to take the reins.\textsuperscript{52}

The 1984 Games, therefore, must be situated in their local political context in order to uncover the ways in which they exhibit the interplay between global aspirations and local agency. Throughout his twenty years as mayor, Bradley came to be known as “the local political instrument of the globalization of Los Angeles.”\textsuperscript{53} The latter half of his mayoral tenure was particularly focused on catalyzing Los Angeles’ ascent to a top-tier world city.\textsuperscript{54} The push to host the Olympic Games was a part of this local project—one of the earliest large-scale “internationalization” strategies for which Bradley and his political coalition would be remembered.\textsuperscript{55}

Thus, despite being relatively absent from the 1984 Olympic organizing process, Bradley was instrumental in the bidding process and laid the groundwork for the LAOOC’s private model to thrive. It was Bradley who established the LAOOC as a private entity and named its members: he trusted that a committee comprised of...
local notables in business, sports, and entertainment and spearheaded by local entrepreneur Peter Ueberroth would put the city’s best face forward in the global city imaginary.\textsuperscript{56}

The 1984 Olympics reaped soaring profits for its private sector organizers, who cut costs by proposing only minor infrastructure projects and relying heavily on existing venues and facilities.\textsuperscript{57} As such, the Games’ material legacy was minimal and included a newly renovated airport and a handful of upgraded sports and entertainment venues.\textsuperscript{58} The major legacy of the 1984 Games, rather, was a symbolic one: Los Angeles revamped its international image while much of the world was watching. Having commanded the attention of $9.6 billion worth of tourists and an increasing share of the global media,\textsuperscript{59} the city was able to circulate images of itself as a phenomenal host, “the place to get things done,” and an impressive, enterprising world city.\textsuperscript{60}

The 1984 Olympics propelled Los Angeles even more decisively into the global city imaginary, and this had been Bradley’s primary intention in fighting for the first-ever private Olympic model. The Games enhanced Bradley’s reputation significantly, and his ambitious “world city project” for L.A. was endowed with a new credibility and remarkable momentum.\textsuperscript{61} For those two fateful Olympic weeks in 1984, Bradley’s political project to globalize Los Angeles “soared to symbolic heights” and inspired the mayor to spend the remainder of his time in office in the

\textsuperscript{56} Burbank, Andranovich, and Heying, \textit{Olympic Dreams}, 83.
\textsuperscript{57} Andranovich, Burbank, and Heying “Olympic Cities” 122.
\textsuperscript{58} Andranovich, Burbank, and Heying, “Olympic Cities” 125.
\textsuperscript{59} Andranovich, Burbank, and Heying “Olympic Cities” 125.
\textsuperscript{60} Burbank, Andranovich, and Heying \textit{Olympic Dreams}, 80.
\textsuperscript{61} Keil, 58.
fervent pursuit of global aspirations.\textsuperscript{62} Los Angeles during the Bradley years, therefore, was a city that both had command functions and wanted more.

The success of the 1984 Games, it follows, was both an economic victory for the L.A. business community and a political victory for Tom Bradley and his hopes for world city Los Angeles.\textsuperscript{63} Furthermore, the symbolic legacy of the Games had very real, measurable impacts on the Olympic movement. Los Angeles showed the world the profitability—and thus desirability—of both hosting and sponsoring the Olympics. As such, the IOC quickly realized just how much the Olympic brand could be worth and just how high a price sponsors would pay for exclusivity.\textsuperscript{64} The LAOOC was the first Olympic organizing committee to negotiate broadcasting and advertising rights directly with television networks and corporate sponsors, and the result was the skyrocketing value of the Games as a television program and advertising campaign.\textsuperscript{65} In 1985, the IOC moved quickly and decisively to capture this added value by creating the Olympic Partner Program (TOP), which signs four-year deals with transnational corporations, giving them exclusive copyright to the Olympic brand.\textsuperscript{66}

Since Los Angeles’ Olympic triumph and the consequent establishment of TOP, competition has escalated between the cities, companies, and products that wish to associate themselves with the Olympic brand. Today, the brand’s corporate backing continues to expand, and the TOP continues to reign as the singular body responsible for selling the Olympics to the world. It directly negotiates with anyone

\textsuperscript{62} Keil, 80.
\textsuperscript{63} Andranovich, Burbank, and Heying, “Olympic Cities” 125.
\textsuperscript{64} Gruneau and Neubauer, 154.
\textsuperscript{65} Burbank, Andranovich, and Heying \textit{Olympic Dreams} 79.
\textsuperscript{66} Short, “the Summer Olympics” 327.
who wants a share of the profitable Olympic pie: manufacturers of products and souvenirs, television networks, and corporate sponsors within the host country and around the world. In the two decades since the establishment of the TOP, the IOC’s sponsorship and marketing revenues have skyrocketed and the value of the Olympic brand continues to rise unabated.67

Today, the Olympics self-describe as “one of the most effective international marketing platforms in the world,” but they should not be understood as merely a commercial enterprise.68 While the Olympics certainly are a lucrative advertising campaign for the transnational networks and corporations that sponsor them, they also serve as an unparalleled marketing platform for the host city. By facilitating “a temporary reorganization of the flows of urban images that circulate around the world,” the Olympics present aspiring world cities with a unique opportunity to boost their international image.69 This was the opportunity that Los Angeles seized in 1984, and, in so doing, changed the fate of Olympic media.70

A strategy of both profit creation and “city image-making,” the Olympics have evolved into a simultaneously commercial and cultural enterprise.71 They have become an instrumental element in what Appadurai terms as global “mediascapes,” or the landscape of images that pass through an increasingly global media realm.72 The Olympics prove that corporate investment is not the only determinant of an aspiring world city’s development—and that most cities concerned with their economic

69 Short, “the Summer Olympics” 323.
70 Short, “Gateway Cities” 320-321.
71 Short, “the Summer Olympics,” 328.
72 Appadurai, 589.
globalization are also concerned with their international image as it flows through these global mediascapes. Thus, the Olympics support an alternate narrative of globalization that does not reduce world cities to an economic end-state. Rather, a narrative of Olympic-led, cultural globalization signifies an active process during which a city instrumentalizes its local culture in order to attain a more prestigious—and thus more profitable—international image.\textsuperscript{73}

The case of the Olympic host city, therefore, complicates highly economistic narratives of globalization—proving that a city’s globalization strategy has both economic and cultural components. As a model of Olympic-led globalization, Los Angeles’ significance is twofold: the 1984 Games tampered irrevocably with the global city imaginary by both boosting L.A.’s international image and by fundamentally altering the world’s perception of the Olympics as a viable route to world city status.\textsuperscript{74} As an Olympic host city, Los Angeles both facilitated its own globalization \textit{and} shaped the globalization of other aspiring world cities, which would now turn to the Olympics in their own quests to globalize.

**Tracing Olympic Neoliberalism:**

Through an Olympic lens, the world city transforms from an economic function to an aspiring entity—one that uses its aspirations to shape itself and, in many cases, to shape the aspirations of cities around the world. This speaks to the need for narratives of globalization that are more attentive to local agency—to the ways in which the globalization can be both enacted \textit{and} redefined on the local level. The narrative of neoliberalism that pervades globalization research was also redefined by

\textsuperscript{73} Short, “the Summer Olympics,” 322.

\textsuperscript{74} Short, “the Summer Olympics,” 326.
Los Angeles in 1984, when the success of the L.A. Games was used by Ronald Reagan—one of neoliberalism’s foremost political advocates—to legitimate neoliberal ideology in the United States and around the world.\textsuperscript{75}

The success of the Los Angeles Games came at a parlous moment during the Reagan presidency, when his pro-growth, Republican administration was practically “under siege” due to the severe economic recession of the seventies and early eighties.\textsuperscript{76} On the heels of economic crisis, the 1984 Games left their global audience with the “image of a successful capitalist Olympics,” an image which moved decisively through American mediascapes.\textsuperscript{77} Newspapers throughout the United States celebrated the first Olympics entirely run by the private sector, with the \textit{Washington Post} calling the 1984 games “the most flawless” in modern times and the \textit{New York Times} advocating that cities around the world should adopt the private model.\textsuperscript{78} Media coverage of the Los Angeles Games played right into the hands of Reagan’s neoliberal aspirations—he had the whole American press behind him as he turned the 1984 Games into an emblem of private sector perfection.\textsuperscript{79}

At a rally in September of 1984, Reagan praised the LAOOC for proving that “the profits reaped from a free economy can be used to help our young people compete on an even footing with the state-subsidized athletes of other countries.” With a neoliberal inflection, Reagan argued against government subsidies and insisted that it was the private sector that gave America its greatness—as an Olympic

\textsuperscript{75} Gruneau and Neubauer, 134-135.  
\textsuperscript{76} Gruneau and Neubauer, 146, 144.  
\textsuperscript{77} Andranovich, Burbank, and Heying, “Olympic Cities” 125.  
\textsuperscript{78} Gruneau and Neubauer , 153.  
\textsuperscript{79} Gruneau and Neubauer, 152.
In November of 1984, Reagan was re-elected—just months after the Games had harnessed support for the incumbent president and his “sweeping neoliberal political project.” An examination of Reagan’s post-Olympic campaign trail reveals how it was Reagan—not an abstract global force—that turned neoliberalism from an economic ideology into a political discourse, a political project and, upon his re-election, into policy.

The tendency to view neoliberalism as an economic process that unfolds on the global scale obscures the fact that it is a highly variable political instrument that takes its shape from the specific, local agents that wield it. Furthermore, Reagan’s wielding of the 1984 Games in favor of neoliberalism had global repercussions. Since the L.A. Games, host cities around the world have invoked a neoliberal rhetoric as a means to defend their Olympic strategies—strategies that, in recent years, have evolved to depend heavily on public spending. Mirroring many of the discursive tropes that Reagan used to promote neoliberal policies in the United States, politicians in Olympic cities insist that the benefits of public investment in Olympic-led economic growth will “trickle down.”

Importantly, however, the Los Angeles Games were the only purely neoliberal Games in Olympic history. The LAOOC relied solely on private funding and kept the local state “at an arm’s length,” while the organizers of recent Olympics

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81 Gruneau and Neubauer, 135.


83 Gruneau and Neubauer, 135.

84 Gruneau and Neubauer, 155.

85 Boycoff, 134.
invariably ask the state to come closer and spend more.\textsuperscript{86} The concept of neoliberalism, therefore, has been defined and redefined with each new host city, changing meaning depending on the distinct local political strategies of which it becomes a part.

The highly variable meaning of Olympic neoliberalism problematizes prevailing narratives of globalization that insist upon impending global “sameness.”\textsuperscript{87} Within such scholarship, neoliberalism is often understood as the political arm of globalization—the arm that ushers cities and countries down a neoliberal path and toward a global system of governance. Studying the Olympics, by contrast, proves that national and local governments continue to govern—that political globalization is not a road to a homogenous global political project. Olympic history is a history of highly variable political projects—projects that were influenced by the experiences and politics of past Olympic cities but never quite achieved the same results. The strategy pioneered by Los Angeles, Olympic scholarship generally agrees, became a blueprint for future host cities hoping for the same success. However, no city has been able to replicate the particular politics that contributed to Los Angeles’ Olympic glory, and public funding has increased with each new Olympic city.\textsuperscript{88}

The Olympic movement—which connects a network of host cities that reenact and recreate Olympic strategies of cities past—is a prime example of the globalization of politics. Because political strategies are highly variable as they move from global to local contexts, what is truly globalizing is not politics itself but

\textsuperscript{86} Andranovich, Burbank, and Heying, “Olympic Cities” 122.
\textsuperscript{87} Appadurai, 594.
\textsuperscript{88} Gruneau and Neubauer, 156.
political “ideas, terms, and images.”\(^89\) Just as the mediascape is comprised of cultural images and aspirations, Appadurai’s notion of the “ideoscapes” is used to refer to the flow of political narratives as they move around the world, causing particular, local political formations to reorient themselves according to certain policy models and political “keywords.”\(^90\) This notion of a political ideoscapes—and its prevalence throughout Olympic history—talks back to the idea that globalization and political homogenization are one in the same. Through the lens of the Olympic Games, the globalization of politics is not a recipe for political sameness. Rather, the globalization of political strategies vis-à-vis the Olympic Games is a story in which boundaries are not erased but are crossed.\(^91\)

**Locating the Entrepreneurial City:**

The crossing of boundaries by policy models and political narratives is equally exemplified by the history of Olympic “entrepreneurialism”—another important keyword upon which cities around the world are basing their political strategies. The notion of “the entrepreneurial city” is often loosely and inconsistently defined, but it generally refers to a marked shift in the priorities of city government—from managing the city and the needs of its inhabitants to enhancing the city’s competitiveness with respect to the global economy.\(^92\) As the intensifying competition to host the Olympic Games reveals, a city’s strategy for economic competitiveness typically has important cultural and symbolic elements. As such, the entrepreneurial city tends to be preoccupied with its international image and attempts

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\(^89\) Appadurai, 591.
\(^90\) Appadurai, 591.
\(^91\) Appadurai, 594.
\(^92\) Short and Kim, 117.
to enhance this image globally through various strategies of “city-marketing.” The Olympics is one such strategy, and it has been an important vehicle through which cities strive to command global attention, boost their international image, and, in so doing, attract new sources of investment. L.A.’s Tom Bradley, many Olympic scholars argue, was a quintessential city marketer—he created the LAOOC and supported a privatized Olympic Games in order to improve the international image of Los Angeles as a city of enterprise.

Another essential characteristic of an entrepreneurial city is the way in which city leaders work closely with private enterprise in order to attract international investment and promote economic growth. The more that world cities take this stance, the more inter-urban competition intensifies and compels cities to become even more entrepreneurial—and thus more closely allied with the private sector—in pursuit of economic growth. As I explained in the introduction of my thesis, an entrepreneurial turn in urban planning has its roots in the United States, where neoliberal policies—particularly during the Reagan years—made cities strapped for federal funds and desperate for other, external sources of growth. The resultant model of entrepreneurial urban planning was one that aimed to cope with neoliberal restructuring and the concomitant decline of urban industry by becoming aggressively pro-growth and pro-global.

This snippet of American urban planning history helps to situate the Los

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93 Short and Kim, 120
94 Short and Kim, 120.
97 Short and Kim, 119.
98 Short and Kim, 120.
Angeles Games in a broader context: as Reagan’s first term came to a close, American cities tried to bounce back from severe economic recession with dwindling support from the federal government. In this context, the Los Angeles Games were essentially privatized out of necessity at a time when both the state and federal government refused to lend financial support to the recovering host city.\textsuperscript{99} The LAOOC’s Peter Ueberroth was sympathetic to Los Angeles’ financial constraints, and he firmly believed that a privatized Games was the only way to break the prevailing pattern of arresting Olympic debts: “The Olympics,” he insisted, “was the perfect vehicle to join the public and private sectors in partnership.”\textsuperscript{100}

The Los Angeles Games exemplified the spirit of public-private collaboration that has come to characterize the urban planning strategy of many American cities. However, in Los Angeles in 1984, this collaboration remained in spirit—the Games were “uniquely privatized” and both the bidding and organizing of the event were entirely without public funding.\textsuperscript{101} It is important to emphasize, therefore, that the entrepreneurialism of the L.A. Games had a very particular, locally-specific meaning, and that it has yet to be replicated by any Olympic host city since. The spirit of partnership between Bradley and the privately-run LAOOC differed greatly from the forms of partnership that emerged in later Olympic projects, for which public funding has increased dramatically.

L.A.’s Olympic strategy must be understood both in a post-recession, neoliberal American context and within the context of a very unusual moment in Olympic history: As the only bidder for the 1984 Games, Los Angeles’ Mayor

\textsuperscript{99} Gruneau and Neubauer, 155.
\textsuperscript{100} Boykoff, 145.
\textsuperscript{101} Boykoff, 147.
Bradley was able to negotiate unprecedented concessions from the IOC—a feat that derived from a bargaining power that no city since has been able to enjoy. Thus, while host cities in recent decades have tried relentlessly to reproduce Los Angeles’ Olympic glory, their own Olympic projects end up looking notably different. In the context of the Olympic Games, the meaning of entrepreneurialism has “mutated substantially” since 1984, and each host city’s Olympic strategy has been defined by the global and local contexts in which it operates.102

Therefore, like neoliberalism, “entrepreneurialism” is a political keyword that has shaped Olympic strategies worldwide yet sees its meaning change with each new host city. Eight years after the L.A. Games, Barcelona breathed new meaning into the word “entrepreneurialism” as the city’s 1992 Games took hold of the global city imaginary.103 In some ways, the two cities experienced significant political overlap: by the time Barcelona launched its Olympic bid, global economic restructuring was causing urban decline in cities around the world. Many struggling world cities began to look to the American model of entrepreneurial urban planning as a means to recover from economic recession and industrial decline. Barcelona was one such city—and its planning strategy during the eighties began to actively pursue global investment and strove to stimulate growth “by any and every possible means.”104

Like Los Angeles, Barcelona turned to the Games as a city-marketing strategy that would allow the Spanish city to renovate its international image and become a more apt competitor for global capital. Barcelona’s preliminary bid was even partially

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102 Gruneau and Neubauer, 155.
103 Short and Kim, 117.
based on consultation with the organizers of the Los Angeles Games. However, the two cities’ Olympic stories diverge in fundamental ways. While the LAAOC kept the Los Angeles government at an arms length and proposed only minor infrastructural projects, Barcelona’s Olympic project was centered around four massive urban redevelopment projects that were promoted by the public sector and funded by a “mixed formula” of private and public investment.\textsuperscript{105}

Los Angeles’s Olympic story—of a privatized Olympics and a boosted city image—gives way, in Barcelona, to a story of “profound urban transformation” that was symbolic, physical, and—perhaps most significantly—governmental.\textsuperscript{106} In 1992, the entrepreneurialism of the Games became the entrepreneurialism of the city: the conventional authority of Barcelona’s city council departments was eclipsed by new partnerships, “joint ventures” and other “business-like” ways of running the city.\textsuperscript{107} Barcelona’s Olympic project became particularly famous for its expert employment of the public-private partnership (PPP), an economic partnership and institutional arrangement that used public capital to spur private investment and to catalyze the city’s ambitious, long-held redevelopment plans.\textsuperscript{108}

The 1992 Olympics left a “new Barcelona” in their wake while much of the world was watching, and the Barcelona model of urban development was born.\textsuperscript{109} Although inconsistently defined, the Barcelona model has been praised around the world as a transformative model of urban development. Although scholars and policy-makers struggle to agree upon how central the Olympics were to Barcelona’s

\textsuperscript{105} Monclús, Francisco-Javier, 231.
\textsuperscript{106} Monclús, Francisco-Javier, 219.
\textsuperscript{107} Monclús, Francisco-Javier, 230.
\textsuperscript{108} Monclús, Francisco-Javier, 232.
\textsuperscript{109} Monclús, Francisco-Javier, 155
world-famous urban transformation, the Barcelona model tends to be universally
defined as a model of “urban entrepreneurialism” and “strategic urban planning” of
which the PPP is a fundamental element.\textsuperscript{110} As I explained in my introduction, the
PPP is capable of channeling valuable new sources of external investment into urban
economic growth. However, in relying on public resources, the PPP is speculative by
design and characterized by the assumption of risk by the public sector.\textsuperscript{111} While the
risks were notable in Barcelona—the city government embarked on the risky path of
subsidizing the ‘92 Games and the handful of massive urban restructuring projects to
which the Games gave leverage—the PPPs that made Barcelona famous resulted in
significant rewards for the Spanish city and its residents.

The Barcelona PPPs are generally praised for amassing the funds to squeeze
decades of urban development into a mere six years.\textsuperscript{112} Furthermore, Barcelona’s
transportation system was revamped, its construction industry boomed, and
unemployment decreased throughout the city.\textsuperscript{113} The city also gained a new, world-
famous waterfront and saw the proliferation of commercial, sports, and leisure
facilities throughout the city.\textsuperscript{114} While these projects exemplify what Harvey
criticizes as a prioritization of “the construction of place” over the conditions—such
as housing, education, or local labor markets—that exist within a place, Barcelona’s

\textsuperscript{110} Monclús, Francisco-Javier, 218.
\textsuperscript{111} Harvey, David. “From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban
Web.
\textsuperscript{112} Monclús, Francisco-Javier, 219.
\textsuperscript{113} Boykoff, 145
\textsuperscript{114} Monclús, Francisco-Javier, 230.
Olympic project is generally praised for achieving “metropolitan-wide influence” and bringing lasting benefits to much of the city’s resident population.\textsuperscript{115}

As soon as the ’92 Games came to a close, Barcelona’s city government became actively involved in exporting its entrepreneurial policy model to the next generation of aspiring world cities: the city’s leaders created a coalition of public and private consulting agents named Tecnologies Urbanes de Barcelona SA (TUBSA)—a PPP designed to take the Barcelona model across borders.\textsuperscript{116} Once again, the world city reveals itself to be a field of local agency whereby the globalization of politics is not merely imposed by a global system but rather shaped and spread by local actors.

In 1993, TUBSA consultants traveled from Barcelona to Rio de Janeiro, where they assisted in the elaboration of Rio’s first-ever strategic urban plan—a public sector initiative that was carried out with a “marked” increase in funding and advising from local business councils.\textsuperscript{117} Through its involvement with Barcelona consultants, Rio learned major lessons in urban entrepreneurialism, and the Brazilian city saw the formation of an important PPP of its own—an Olympic bidding committee—in 1995.\textsuperscript{118} However, even with the help of consultants who were directly involved in Barcelona’s Olympic project, Rio de Janeiro did not even make the shortlist of potential host cities for the 2004 Games.\textsuperscript{119}

\textsuperscript{117} Silvestre, 7373.
\textsuperscript{118} Silvestre, 7374.
\textsuperscript{119} Silvestre, 7375.
Despite the failure of Rio’s first bid, the Barcelona experience continued to weigh heavily on the minds of leaders in the Brazilian city. A 1995 report co-written by consultants from Rio and Barcelona insisted that Rio’s dreams for an Olympic project would be realized if and when the Olympic project became “the urban project of the City.” This holistic vision of a new and improved city—and the desire to achieve it by hosting the Olympic Games—was Rio’s own interpretation of the Barcelona model: it would return in full force in 2009, when Rio won the bid to host the 2016 Games and finally captured the opportunity to implement the Barcelona model into its own Olympic strategy.

The Road to Rio:

Rio’s adoption of the Barcelona model became official on March 18, 2010 at the opening ceremony of a two-day seminar entitled “The Olympics and the City: Connection Rio-Barcelona.” During the ceremony, Rio’s mayor Eduardo Paes signed an agreement with Barcelona’s ex-mayor Pasqual Maragall, insisting that the Barcelona model—or at least his interpretation of it—would be the urban development model for Rio 2016. Speaking to a room full of city leaders, planners, and architects, Paes urged his audience to reflect upon the transformative power of the Olympics: “Barcelona transformed itself completely through the Olympic Games, simply by making this reflection.” To Paes, the Barcelona model begins and ends with the Olympics, and his comments largely overemphasize the Olympics as the defining factor of Barcelona’s world famous urban transformation. Barcelona’s

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120 Silvestre, 7376.
Olympic strategy must be contextualized and understood as the “logical conclusion” to more than a decade of redevelopment plans and small-scale urban projects—all of which laid the groundwork for Barcelona’s urban renaissance.\textsuperscript{123} The Olympics, for Barcelona, were more of a catalyst than a creator, capable of amassing the funding and consensus needed to turn long-held development desires and strategies into an ambitious project of urban transformation.\textsuperscript{124}

Paes’ discourse, therefore, is built upon his own decontextualized and “selective interpretation” of the Barcelona experience.\textsuperscript{125} He has used it to justify an Olympic strategy in Rio in which urban development is not just leveraged by the Olympic project but determined by it.\textsuperscript{126} “The Games always serve the city,” insisted Paes on the opening day of the Rio-Barcelona seminar. “The challenge is how we can make the most of this.”\textsuperscript{127}

Despite this discourse of a guaranteed Olympic legacy, there are a myriad of ways in which Rio’s Olympic project is already failing to serve the city and its people. First, it is important to acknowledge the skyrocketing bargaining power of the IOC as the number of aspiring world cities in pursuit of Olympic-led globalization increases.\textsuperscript{128} In the three decades since the Los Angeles Games, the IOC has

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\textsuperscript{123} Monclús, Francisco-Javier, 219, 235. \\
\textsuperscript{124} Monclús, Francisco-Javier, 235. \\
\textsuperscript{128} Gusmão De Oliveira, 30.
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transformed into an immense supranational power, using its growing influence to maximize its own profits and pass an increasing amount of financial risks onto its host cities.\(^\text{129}\) With each new host city, the IOC steadily expands the size, scope, and authority of its Olympic project, which for host cities worldwide has meant massive public investment, legislative changes, and new political arrangements between local leaders and Olympic organizers. The Olympics have successfully permeated the internal politics of their host cities, and host cities have increasingly seen their own particular development goals subjected to the “decisions and conditions” of the IOC and its corporate backers.\(^\text{130}\) The legacy of this Olympic power—as experienced by many recent host cities—is often a slew of undemocratic development decisions and a steady flow of public resources into a two-week long sporting spectacle.\(^\text{131}\)

While the IOC exercised considerable power over Barcelona’s Olympic project, the legacy of the 1992 Games stands out in the history of state-subsidized Olympics as one of the least expensive and most democratic. As previously mentioned, Barcelona’s Olympic PPPs did reap important benefits for many of its residents, and the partnerships relied more heavily on private investment than most of the PPPs that have succeeded them. In terms of democratic accountability and the non-exploitative treatment of taxpayer monies, therefore, the Barcelona PPPs were about “as good as it gets.”\(^\text{132}\) As Rio de Janeiro gears up for the 2016 Games, PPPs have become ubiquitous: however, they have already proven to be superficial descendants of the Barcelona model—relying much more heavily on public

\(^\text{129}\) Gruneau and Neubauer, 155.
\(^\text{130}\) Burbank, Andranovich, and Heying, Olympic Dreams, 169.
\(^\text{131}\) Boykoﬀ, 146.
\(^\text{132}\) Boykoﬀ, 145
investment. Of a projected R$28.8 billion investment in the Rio 2016 Games, only R$3.6 billion is guaranteed to come from the private sector. These numbers represent a severe discrepancy between public and private investment in the next Olympic city.\(^{133}\)

The legacy of an undemocratic Olympic project has already begun to materialize in Rio. Despite the massive amount of public funding that is being channeled into Olympic-related development projects, control over urban development in Rio has fallen into the hands of the IOC and other Olympic organizers. The Rio 2016 organizing committee (COJO) was established as a non-governmental entity, yet it is authorized to utilize public resources and, through the federal “Olympic Act,” has been guaranteed federal government coverage of all potential deficits, so long as they were incurred in the name of the Olympic Games.\(^{134}\)

Furthermore, while city-planning experts played an important role in crafting Barcelona’s renowned Olympic project, Rio-based planners have seen their authority quickly eclipsed by that of the 2016 Games’ private-sector organizers.\(^{135}\) Traditional structures of urban planning have been suspended in the name of Olympic urgency and replaced by a variety of “exceptional” structures and groups. The municipal legislature quietly passed a plan that would alter urban regulations in five neighborhoods throughout the city, and two new groups—the intergovernmental Public Olympic Authority (APO) and the federal “Brazil 2016” company—were created by executive order and granted unprecedented authority over the “planning,

\(^{133}\) Gusmão De Oliveira and Gaffney.
\(^{134}\) Gusmão De Oliveira and Gaffney.
\(^{135}\) Gusmão de Olivera and Gaffney.
coordination, and execution of projects and services” throughout the city.\textsuperscript{136}

Throughout Rio de Janeiro, urban projects and politics are effectively trapped in an Olympic grip—both in terms of the Games’ command of public resources and the influence that Olympic organizers have exerted over local development politics. While this is, in part, a global phenomenon and has to do with the rising power of the IOC, there are also particularly local factors that have allowed Olympic-centered urban development to take hold in Rio de Janeiro.

Now sitting in COJO’s executive seat is Carlos Artur Nuzman, who has served as the president of Brazil’s national Olympic Committee (COB) since 1995. From the moment he assumed COB leadership, Nuzman’s power and influence in relation to Rio’s urban development strategy grew rapidly: In 1996, after Rio’s early upset in the 2004 Olympic bidding process, Nuzman formed an active alliance with the city’s government in order to make Rio Olympic-ready. The COB launched and won a campaign to bring the 2007 Pan-American Games to Rio, and, when the event entered its planning process, Nuzman’s influence moved decisively into the realm of city planning.\textsuperscript{137}

It was the COB which—subsidized by the Ministry of Sports—contracted a study of how best to develop the urban projects necessary to host Pan 2007. And it was Nuzman who influenced then-mayor Cesar Maia to concentrate Pan-related


\textsuperscript{137} Gusmão de Olivera and Gaffney.
investment and development in Barra da Tijuca. A wealthy suburb in Rio’s West Zone, Barra da Tijuca had been the subject of much debate in 1995, when the Rio-Barcelona Consultores (RBC) were working to craft Rio’s first Olympic bid. Despite the prevailing consensus amongst local elites to build Olympic Park in Barra da Tijuca, the experts from Barcelona were wary of Rio concentrating its Olympic development so far west, in a neighborhood that would be difficult to access from the city’s major tourist hub, the South Zone. Furthermore, the consultants from Barcelona warned that the concentration of Olympic investment in Barra da Tijuca, a neighborhood primarily occupied by Rio’s most affluent, would intensify real-estate speculation and demand too many public resources for too few of the city’s occupants.

But when the consultants’ advice was taken and the COB’s bid—with its proposed Olympic Park on the city’s more central Fundão Island—failed, the closely-allied Maia and Nuzman decisively turned back to Barra da Tijuca as the answer to Rio’s Olympic dream. “The Games are, first and foremost, an economic event related to sports,” argued Maia, reflecting on the failed Fundão Island proposal. Known for viewing a city as, above all, equipment for economic development, Maia was drawn to the untapped potential in Barra for the expansion of luxury real estate.

Meanwhile, Nuzman had his eye on Barra’s civil construction and real-estate capital,

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139 Silvestre, 7374-7375
140 Ministério Do Esporte, 12; My own translation of the following quotation, originally in Portuguese: “Os jogos são, antes de tudo, um evento econômico relacionado ao esporte.”
which would be ideal sources of private financing for the future Olympic Games.

Thus, Nuzman’s COB and Maia’s City Hall worked together in 2000 to design Rio’s next Strategic Plan, which made Barra da Tijuca the regional host of the Pan-American Games and one step closer to Olympic glory.¹⁴²

Fifteen years later, as the concentration of Olympic investment in Barra da Tijuca is well underway, the Olympic project is rapidly swallowing the city’s urban development strategy. A “closed-condominium, car-dependent landscape” primarily occupied by Rio’s most affluent, Barra will receive about 70% of Olympic investments¹⁴³ and be the primary benefactor of Rio’s Olympic legacy.¹⁴⁴ Meanwhile, the majority of the city’s residents—and particularly those areas lacking basic urban infrastructure and services—“will continue to be forgotten by the public sector.”¹⁴⁵

Continuing its long history of economic prominence, Barra da Tijuca is now the home of Rio’s current mayor Eduardo Paes as well as the civil construction and real estate firms that are Paes’ biggest financiers. The region, in effect, is the headquarters of an economic elite that has always privileged the area’s development over broader, citywide needs. The concentration of Olympic interventions in Barra da Tijuca reflects a myopic Olympic strategy that is centered on the interests of local elites,

¹⁴² Ministério do Esporte, 12,15.
¹⁴³ Gaffney, “Neoliberal laboratory,” 1.
¹⁴⁵ Gusmão de Olivera and Gaffney; My own translation taken from the following quotation, originally in Portuguese: “Quanto aos subúrbios, que concentram a maior parte da população e carências da cidade, continuarão esquecidos pelo poder público nos próximos anos, quando todos os recursos serão canalizados para preparação para os Jogos Olímpicos e a Copa do Mundo 2014.”
suffers from a lack of transparency and democratic accountability, and foreshadows an urban legacy that looks unpromising for the vast majority of Rio’s residents.\textsuperscript{146}

Finally, while one of Barcelona’s legacies is that of rising rents and the gentrification of the city’s most central areas, displacement in Rio has been widespread and with a brutality beyond that of gentrification: as Olympic Park developments channel public resources toward Barra da Tijuca, Vila Autódromo—a low-income, lesser-known neighbor of the Olympic Park site—is being threatened with forcible eviction and relocation. The plight of Vila Autódromo—where removal was mandated by the Municipal Housing Secretary (SMH) and resident participation in the resettlement process was scant—is shared by more than one hundred communities throughout Rio de Janeiro.\textsuperscript{147} Rio-based scholars have already identified this to be the new ingredient of the Barcelona model as it arrives in Rio de Janeiro. To eliminate “manifestations of poverty” from the soon-to-be Olympic City, Rio’s government has chosen a strategy of urban development that depends upon the forced removal and relocation of poor communities.\textsuperscript{148}

Therefore, despite the influential role played by Barcelona consultants in shaping Rio’s urban development strategy, the tendency to view Rio 2016 as Barcelona’s offspring is seriously misguided and obscures a genuine understanding of the undemocratic, marginalizing legacies that have already begun to materialize in the next Olympic city.\textsuperscript{149} The Barcelona model is significant in urban history because it

\textsuperscript{146} Gaffney, “The Traumas and Dramas.”
\textsuperscript{147} Gusmão de Olivera and Gaffney
\textsuperscript{149} Gusmão de Olivera and Gaffney
exposes how roads to world city status are paved by both global economic imperatives and by local political agents.

However, what Olympic history proves is that—however these roads are paved—no two cities experience them in the same manner. Through an Olympic lens, globalization becomes a narrative of global impulses and local agency—a narrative in which there are as many distinct experiences of globalization as there are “globalizing agents and impulses.”¹⁵⁰ Too often, researchers seek a singular globalization—a totalizing template with which to understand the experiences of cities in a globalizing world. For the remainder of this thesis, I will challenge this tendency in order to replace narratives based on global assumptions with ones based in local realities. I will argue that theories of globalization must take local histories as their starting point—not the other way around.

Chapter 2: Cities of Exception

The Case of Rio de Janeiro

By studying globalization vis-à-vis the Olympic movement, it becomes clear that prevailing theories of globalization—world city theory, neoliberalism, and urban entrepreneurialism—fail to account for the ways in which the local receives and reshapes global processes. At the end of the previous chapter, I insisted that the study of globalization—in the name of accuracy—should take local history as its starting point. Ultimately, my intention for this approach to studying globalization is both to more accurately represent a given city and to more authentically portray its social exclusions. For those attempting to diagnose the social discontent that has followed Rio on its road to 2016, the temptation is to blame the most obvious culprit—the Olympic project—within which the city’s politics have become enveloped. However, this temptation should be reversed: it is the city’s politics that is ultimately culpable for the preeminence of the Olympic project in a city whose hasty and relentless pursuit of globalization has had brutal consequences for the urban poor.

The tendency to subordinate local politics to global power is the prevailing trend in globalization studies. The assumption that the global economy has squelched local power and that the nation-state has “wilted in the sun of globalization” gives way to a type of globalization research that strips autonomy from all that is not

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global. Rather, it is more likely that the nation-state is exercising its autonomy in different ways, with the ultimate intention of capitalizing on globalization’s benefits “where the process is most active.” In Brazil, globalization is strikingly active in the Olympic city, and Brazilian politics has effectively zoomed in on Rio. Thus, the urban politics of Rio de Janeiro must be contextualized within the politics of a globalizing nation.

The Olympic Nation:

Brazil is difficult to characterize in the global imaginary: it houses—alongside Russia, India, and China—one of the world’s most important emerging economies. Rapid industrialization, large-scale urbanization, an expanding domestic market, and an influx of “increasingly global corporations” have constituted the nation’s last century of impressive modernization and growth. When Friedmann crafted his world city hierarchy in 1986, São Paulo—the financial capital of Brazil—was one of two non-core cities to make the cut. As such, Brazil is often considered a frontrunner—particularly in terms of global economic significance—of the world’s developing nations. However, Brazil’s fast-paced road to development has not been without casualties, and many point to the nation’s “notorious and debilitating social inequalities” as signs that Brazil trails behind, even in the developing world.

154 Short, Global Metropolitan, 26.
Brazil, therefore, does not fit neatly on either side of the core-periphery binary that tends to characterize the study of globalization. The country has a clear and important function with respect to the global economy but an ambiguous reputation in the global imaginary. Importantly, it was this ambiguity—not unfettered global dominance—that inspired the IOC to turn to Brazil as the Olympic movement embarked on a new century of global prominence.\(^{158}\)

Brazilian ex-president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva—known popularly as Lula—was instrumental in the IOC’s decision, in 2009, to bring the Olympics to South America for the first time. Lula recognized that Rio’s competition during the bidding process was stiff: as a city, Rio would have to compete with Chicago, Madrid, and Tokyo—all cities in the global core. As a nation, Brazil was the obvious outlier in a group of developed nations, all of which had hosted the Olympics previously.\(^{159}\)

Fully aware of his country’s status as Olympic underdog, Lula launched an Olympic bid that drew attention to Brazil’s more peripheral status and urged the Olympic movement to expand its reach to the “promising shores of a new land.”\(^{160}\)

Throughout the bidding process, the chair of Brazil’s national Olympic committee, Carlos Artur Nuzman, also employed this trope of uncharted Olympic territory. At Rio 2016’s final bid presentation, he presented the IOC with a map of the world denoting the location of every Olympic host city since 1896. The map revealed an obvious Olympic bias: thus far, thirty Olympics had been held in Europe, twelve were hosted by North America—including eight in the United States alone—and South America remained outside of Olympic history. Nuzman insisted that, to be a true

\(^{158}\) Clift and Andrews, 221-222.
\(^{159}\) Clift and Andrews, 211.
\(^{160}\) Clift and Andrews, 221.
global phenomenon, the Olympic movement would have to explore “new territories” by bringing the Games to South America.  

When Rio emerged from this bidding process as the victor, it became clear that the IOC chose the Brazilian city *because* of its place in the global South. Lula, Nuzman, and the other key crafters of Rio’s bid had centered their campaign for Rio 2016 around appeals to the IOC to address their long history of Westerncentrism and to live up to their purported ideals of internationalism and global unity by extending the Olympics to the global South. The Rio 2016 bid, therefore, challenges the prevailing assumption within globalization scholarship that views globalization as homogenization and, implicitly, a process of becoming more like the West. Rio won the Olympic bid not by performing sameness but by appealing to what made it different from the West. Its victory, therefore, challenges assumptions that an aspiring world city must play into the hands of the global North in its quest to globalize.

The Rio 2016 bid was, at once, a display of Brazil’s national confidence and self-regard and a quest for global recognition and validation. As such, it was a manifestation of the “local-global dualism” for which Lula came to be known throughout his presidency. Having come from a working class background, Lula rose to prominence in Brazil’s Workers’ Party by championing the plight of his country’s impoverished masses. Once “the hero of the Brazilian Left,” Lula tempered

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161 Clift and Andrews, 222.
162 Clift and Andrews, 221.
164 Clift and Andrews, 222.
his fervently “anti-capitalist tone” and became an important figure in contemporary Brazilian politics who, to this day, remains indefinable.165 His political strategy was one of complex objectives that aimed to maintain a commitment to poverty eradication and social welfare while simultaneously engaging and collaborating with the global economy’s most powerful players. Lula was criticized by both Brazil’s most conservative and most progressive factions, and he became as much known for his globally-oriented neoliberal policies as for his locally-conscious Keynesian ones.166

Lula’s transformative presidency straddled the line between local needs and global objectives, and—as the Rio 2016 bid exemplifies—he refused to promote a form of globalization that would render his country an economic pawn of the global North. As such, he was committed to strengthening the autonomy of the South American economy and increasing Brazil’s engagement in “South-South” foreign trade.167 One of the most significant legacies of Lula’s presidency, in fact, was his revitalization of the economic partnership between Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay—officially known as “Mercosur”—which continues to guide these nations toward a more autonomous economic policy with respect to the global core. As of 2012, more than half of Brazil’s trade was conducted with developing nations.168

A closer look at Brazilian political history challenges dominant narratives about the ways in which neoliberalism has taken hold of countries in the global South. Undeniably, neoliberalism has exerted a significant amount of influence over

165 Clift and Andrews, 213.
166 Clift and Andrews, 213-214.
South American economic development: the neoliberal reform program promoted by the Washington Consensus became a major force in defining Brazil’s national development policy. Throughout the eighties and nineties, financial and trade liberalization and the privatization of state-owned firms throughout South America reflected the neoliberal turn of the region’s governments. In this context, Brazil has emerged as a country where the pursuit of international lending and foreign investment has become particularly influential over national politics.

However, Brazilian policymakers did not take a neoliberal turn simply because “economists in Washington D.C. told them to.” In many ways, new neoliberal policies came to Brazil from within—from important sections of the nation’s economic elite who were deeply troubled by the severity of the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s. Seeking to address the economic uncertainty that would come to define the decade, economic elites throughout Brazil began to embrace globalization and its associated neoliberal political imperatives—and they demanded that their political leaders adopt these imperatives.

Brazil’s transition to neoliberalism, therefore, was the product of global influences and local interest groups—both of which actively shaped the nation’s policy agendas. Complicating the pervasive assumption in globalization research

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172 Saad-Filho, 224.
173 Colás, 71.
that developing countries are “passive objects of global neoliberalism,” Brazilian politics cannot be understood without assigning agency on the local scale—to those powerful actors who have successfully imbued national politics with their own “interests and strategies.”

The importance of assigning political agency on the local level, however, is not merely to identify the ways in which Brazil’s powerful economic elites have shaped national politics. Because, while the “interests and strategies” of Brazil’s most powerful interest groups have tended to be compatible with the country’s neoliberal adjustment, some local agents and interest groups that have shaped national politics have done so from outside of the neoliberal consensus. During the eighties—the decade of Brazil’s democratic transition—a neoliberal turn in Brazilian politics occurred alongside the emergence of a progressive, social rights-based politics that was enshrined, in 1988, in the country’s post-dictatorship Constitution.

The result was a national political arena marked by a “strange collision between neoliberalization and democratization”—a hybrid form of national governance that was marked by both the fervent pursuit of international capital and the ideological commitment to the universalization of social rights. The politics of the Lula presidency—often characterized by the inherently contradictory label of “neoliberal Keynesianism”—perhaps best exemplifies Brazil’s political hybridity.

174 Colás, 78.
Just as Lula strove to insert Brazil more decisively into the flow of global capital, he is equally known for an array of Keynesian policies: the expansion of consumer credit, real minimum wage increases, and cash transfer programs—the most famous of which is the Bolsa Família family welfare program—were all facets of the Lula presidency that constituted his important yet indefinable political legacy.¹⁷⁸

**Neoliberalization and the Brazilian City:**

Brazilian politics at the dawn of the 21st century were characterized by a peculiar combination of pro-global and pro-poor impulses, and Lula’s presidency most clearly exemplifies the ways in which neoliberal reform and social reform can and do co-exist. The complexity of Brazilian national politics lends credence to the idea that the global spread of neoliberalism is not entirely hegemonic or homogenizing; rather, neoliberalism is better conceived as a highly-variegated, necessarily incomplete process of “neoliberalization” that is both globally prescribed and locally defined.¹⁷⁹

Understanding neoliberalization in Brazil, therefore, requires an awareness of the various interest groups and political conventions that mediate neoliberalism at it moves from the global to the local scale.¹⁸⁰ One such political convention—the Brazilian program of urban reform—is particularly relevant to an analysis of the urban politics of Rio de Janeiro. As Brazil transitioned from dictatorship to

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¹⁷⁸ Alves Dos Santos Junior, 254; Clift and Andrews, 215.


democracy during the 1980s, urban social movements throughout the country urged their new democracy to address the arresting social inequalities and conspicuous urban precarity that had accompanied decades of rapid and unregulated urbanization in Brazil.\textsuperscript{181} Hoping to reverse the political neglect of the urban poor that had characterized these decades, these social movements joined with advocacy organizations and became the National Movement of Urban Reform (MNRU). By 1988, they had successfully inserted their own vision of urban reform into Brazil’s constitution-making process.

In a chapter of the new Constitution dedicated strictly to urban policy, the MNRU’s demands were summarized by two popular amendments—Articles 182 and 183.\textsuperscript{182} These amendments were rooted in the idea that every Brazilian city should serve a social function. Although loosely defined, the city’s social function can only be realized when urban policy is oriented toward the universalization of social rights. This social rights-based urban agenda—particularly concerned with the right to secure housing and adequate urban living conditions—was explicitly concerned with Brazil’s favelas. A nationally-specific term that translates most closely to slum or shantytown, favelas are a defining feature of Brazil’s urbanization process. Providing vulnerable habitats to tens of millions of poor Brazilians, favelas are ubiquitous markers of Brazilian urban space and are typically characterized by informal and precarious access to land, housing, and services.\textsuperscript{183}


\textsuperscript{183}Fernandes, 203.
The 1988 Constitution, for the first time, recognized the Brazilian government’s intention to honor the right to housing, invest in the urbanization of favelas, and facilitate the legal and social inclusion of the urban poor into the rest of Brazilian society. Through the nineties, urban social movements continued to mobilize in order to translate these constitutional provisions into an enforceable federal law, and the result was Brazil’s pioneering City Statute. Created to regulate and enforce Articles 182 and 183, the City Statute explicitly recognizes a variety of urban social rights and contains the formal and legal groundwork for an urban reform program concerned with housing provision, the improvement of urban infrastructure and services, and the regularization of favelas. In addition, the City Statute recognizes the central role that city governments must play in facilitating urban reform, and it identifies a variety of legal, political, and financial instruments through which city governments can localize and democratize their urban planning, development, and management practices.

Mirroring the complexity and hybridity of Brazil’s national politics, Brazilian cities have also undergone a “strange collision” between neoliberalization and democratization. On the one hand, urban policy in Brazil has taken a decidedly neoliberal turn, with cities restructuring their economies to make room for global capital in their burgeoning real estate, infrastructure, and service sectors. However, while the neoliberalization of urban policy has given way to projects and policies that are oriented toward global capital and increasingly dominated by corporate control,
Brazilian cities have also been shaped by City Statute-inspired innovations and reforms. The peculiar result—perceptible in Rio as it gears up for 2016—is an array of urban policies designed to recognize the city’s social function at the exact moment when its global economic function is becoming a priority.\footnote{188}{Maricato, 22.}

As Rio 2016 rapidly approaches, many Brazilian urban scholars are focusing their work on the Olympic-led neoliberalization of Rio de Janeiro. Urban politics in Rio—as I argue in Chapter 1—has fallen into an Olympic grip, but many scholars view the city’s Olympic myopia as a symptom of its larger and longer-term transformation into a neoliberal city. Undoubtedly, neoliberal ideology has taken hold of Rio de Janeiro, and Rio’s Olympic strategy is one of the fervent pursuit of global capital and the salient corporatization of urban space.\footnote{189}{Maricato, 20.} But to view Rio’s Olympic-led urban transformation through the global lens of neoliberalism is to obscure the complexities and contradictions of Brazilian politics—particularly with respect to its major cities.

In Rio, the combination and competition of multiple political projects are shaping the city’s urban transformation, and these dynamics remain invisible if not studied through local agency.\footnote{190}{Alves Dos Santos Junior, 257.} As explained in the previous chapter, Rio’s mayor Eduardo Paes is a Barra da Tijuca native, and his biggest campaign financiers are the Barra da Tijuca-based real estate and construction firms who will benefit disproportionately from Olympic-related development projects. While pre-Olympic Rio, on the one hand, has been decisively shaped by local elites, it is also on the receiving end of new public housing developments, transportation improvements, a

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\footnote{188}{Maricato, 22.}
\footnote{189}{Maricato, 20.}
\footnote{190}{Alves Dos Santos Junior, 257.}
\end{footnotes}
plethora of so-called favela upgrading projects, and other local manifestations of pro-poor urban reform. The mere existence of such reform projects, however, must not be taken at face value: a closer look at urban development in Rio reveals that many of the city’s most promising City Statute-inspired mechanisms are actually being used to disempower the urban poor.

Rife with contradictions and complexities, urban politics in Rio is giving way to dramatic urban transformation whose legacy is illusory and ominous, particularly for the city’s poorest residents. In order to further understand the city’s pre-Olympic politics and more clearly foreshadow the legacy to which they will lead, the city’s plans, projects, and policies must be scrutinized on the local level. One such project—listed as an Olympic legacy project in Rio’s 2009-2016 Strategic Plan—is dramatically transforming the city’s port region. Local scholars and Olympic critics cite this project as emblematic of Rio’s transformation into a exclusive and undemocratic “city of exception.”

Throughout her work on the Porto Maravilha project, Olympic planning scholar Anne-Marie Broudehoux refers to Rio de Janeiro as a “city of exception” as it embarks on a fast track to Olympic-led urban transformation. This term—a metropolitan twist on Giorgio Agamben’s “state of exception”—pervades the work of Brazilian scholars who are concerned with the exceptional uses and abuses of state power that have come to characterize pre-Olympic Rio. Agamben’s work was particularly concerned with the ways in which contemporary democracies both

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transcend and rewrite the rule of law—with laws that “legalize the disrespect of the law”—yet justify this disrespect in the name of the public good. In Rio de Janeiro, the Olympic legacy has become a stand-in for the public good, and the city government has effectuated countless legal and political exceptions in the name of this purported legacy. As a result, Rio has become a city of exception in which the “bargaining power” of both global and local elites has surmounted the practice of local democracy. And it is in Rio de Janeiro’s port region that the city of exception is most portentously taking shape.

**Beyond supposed legacies:**

*Uncovering Rio, the City of Exception*

Promising to bring a transformative legacy to the Rio’s port region, the so-called Porto Maravilha project—according to official discourse—is intended to rescue a long-neglected region from decades of economic decline and urban blight. Despite this locally-conscious discourse, the project’s vision for the port zone is undeniably global. The project—whose name translates to “Marvelous Port” and references Rio’s international reputation as the “marvelous city”—is an obvious attempt to reposition the region in the global city imaginary and, as such, in the global economy. Located between Rio’s central business district and the port zone’s waterfront, the region is one of untapped potential vis-à-vis real estate, tourism, and entertainment—an ideal destination for global capital.

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193 Maricato, 22
195 Broudehoux, 560.
196 Broudehoux, 560.
Since the 1980s, city leaders and planners have attempted to cultivate this potential, but it was not until 2009, when Rio won its Olympic bid, that such a large-scale and expensive development project became feasible. Within weeks of the announcement of Rio 2016, a municipal decree passed with a breeze, making the Urban Development Company of the Port Region of Rio de Janeiro (CDURP) the first of many PPPs that would construct the next Olympic city. CDURP would be responsible for implementing a concession that would place all of the development projects and public services within the port region under the administration of a private consortium for a period of 15 years. In this time, CDURP promised, the port region would become Porto Maravilha—a “world-class living, working, and leisure environment.”

Justified by an Olympic legacy and financed through a PPP, Porto Maravilha is a superficial replica of Barcelona’s “Port Vell”—the waterfront renovation project that was central to Barcelona’s world-famous urban renaissance. However, the PPP governing Rio’s port zone is markedly different than its entrepreneurial role model. While Barcelona’s paradigmatic PPPs saw the channeling of private investment into urban areas that were managed, or at least co-administered, by the local state, the PPP designed by CDURP—reflecting the discrepancy between private and public investment that I explained in Chapter 1—is characterized by an initial, almost

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197 Broudehoux, 562.
198 Broudehoux, 660.
199 Broudehoux, 560.
exclusively public investment in an area over which the private sector has unprecedented authority.201

The initial financial plan for the project was for R$200 million in municipal resources to be supplemented with R$3.5 billion in private resources, acquired through the sale of financial instruments called CEPACs.202 An acronym for “Certificate of Additional Construction Potential,” a CEPAC is a tradable asset whose major incentive is that it grants a variety of legal exceptions to its buyer—particularly the permission to “build beyond permitted limits” in a given urban area.203 The decision to use CEPACs as funding for the Porto Maravilha project rested on the idea that, by selling them to private enterprises, the post-revitalization rise in property values in the port region could be captured in advance and used to finance the project. By selling CEPACs to multiple investors, the financial risks associated with the project would be shared and potential investors would feel more compelled to come on board.

But when the time came for the city to auction off R$3.5 billion worth of CEPACs in 2011, the only bidder was Caixa, a federal government-owned bank that used public money to purchase all of the CEPACs for the Porto Maravilha Real Estate Investment Fund (FII-PM). The true story of Porto Maravilha’s financing, therefore, is one in which the public sector assumes the brunt of the financial risks of the project. Furthermore, a 2011 analysis projected that, in order for Caixa to recover its

203 Broudehoux, 562.
investment by selling every single CEPAC to a private developer, real estate in the port region would have to sell for about US$ 5,000 per square meter—“making it some of the most expensive real-estate in Rio.” The poor and working class residents of the port area, therefore, will be displaced by skyrocketing property values as private developers building “elite housing and luxury offices” will continue to buy the right to develop beyond legal norms and local regulations. What the aggressive gentrification process that is underway in the port region fails to illustrate is that Porto Maravilha actually has its legal roots in the City Statute.

Codified into law on the heels of economic crisis and in the midst of democratization, the City Statute established a variety of mechanisms—including CEPACs and PPPs—designed to remove urban development from the grasp of government authority. By removing some of the legal parameters, urban regulations, and financial obstacles in the way of much-needed local development, these mechanisms would be able to find innovative, entrepreneurial solutions to pressing urban problems. Furthermore, the PPP model enshrined in the Statute required the partnership to be participatory and collaborative with respect to the local communities and civil society actors it would affect. Although the form and extent of this local participation requirement were never specified, it certainly fed into the legitimacy of PPPs throughout Brazil—as both instruments for efficient urban redevelopment and as “instruments for popular participation in the management of the city.”

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204 Broudehoux, 562.
205 Broudehoux, 563.
208 Oliveira Xavier, 48-49.
Both the PPP and CEPACs have taken hold of Rio’s port region arose as a feature of Brazilian urban reform. They were legislative innovations designed to remove financial and regulatory obstacles from much-needed urban renovation projects. However, these instruments for meeting local development needs were transformed through the Porto Maravilha project into market-oriented growth tactics: by providing massive public investment and granting legal exceptions to private developers, these redefined development instruments will allow the private sector to remake the entire port region.

The Porto Maravilha PPP is the largest in Brazilian history and will preside over and transform an area that spans five inner city neighborhoods. In more concrete terms, the project will replace devalued housing and industrial buildings with upscale office and residential towers, shopping malls, and art museums, endowing the five-neighborhood port region with multiple leisure and consumption districts but not a single public school district. As such, the project tends to be criticized as a heavily corporatized, “closed society” in the making—a closed society whose fifteen years of service to the international business and tourists classes will occur on the backs of local taxpayers and to the exclusion of the region’s predominately poor and working class population.

By far the biggest and most upscale real-estate operation in the Olympic city, Porto Maravilha is already being denounced as a “neoliberal” form of urban regeneration that privileges the accumulation of global capital above all else. However, the project’s large-scale privatization of urban space cannot be reduced to

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209 Oliveira Xavier, 61.
210 Broudehoux, 562.
global economic imperatives. First of all, the global narrative of neoliberal restructuring is one in which the city government, strapped for funds, turns to the private sector by necessity. The massive, up-front public investment in the Porto Maravilha project—all of which has still not been recovered—diverges significantly from this narrative.\textsuperscript{211}

Furthermore, the private actors projected to benefit most from this project are not actually global elites. CDURP’s concessionaires include two of Brazil’s most powerful construction giants—Odebrecht and OAS. Under the name \textit{Porto Novo} Consortium, these two corporations will preside over an expansive and lucrative urban transformation with an unprecedented amount of administrative authority yet an impressive dearth of financial risks.\textsuperscript{212} The local participation requisite of Brazil’s PPPs seems to have had little impact on the naming of the \textit{Porto Novo} consortium: the concessionaires’ initial proposals for the port area redevelopment appear—in some instances verbatim—in the municipal decrees that officially initiated the Porto Maravilha PPP the following year.\textsuperscript{213} In other words, Porto Novo essentially wrote the rules of the PPP for which, unsurprisingly, they became the only eligible bidder.\textsuperscript{214}

Importantly, the bargaining power of OAS and Odebrecht is a long term feature of Brazilian politics: Odebrecht has been intimately tied to Brazilian politicians—ranging from the military dictator Geisel to the purportedly leftist Lula—for more than 40 years. OAS, which remained a predominantly national enterprise

\textsuperscript{211} Broudehoux, 563.
\textsuperscript{212} Soares Gonçalves; Broudehoux, 560.
\textsuperscript{213} Broudehoux, 562.
\textsuperscript{214} Broudehoux, 562.
until 2003, has been particularly influential in Rio’s local politics and is one of the most important campaign financiers of both Eduardo Paes and Rio’s governor, Sergio Cabral.\textsuperscript{215}

Since their calculated victory in the Porto Maravilha bidding process, the corporations of the \textit{Porto Novo} consortium have done nothing to address the severe shortage of public and affordable housing in the region: instead, they are facilitating the region’s “purposeful gentrification” as a means for bolstering private investor confidence.\textsuperscript{216} But to see this gentrification as a by-product of neoliberal restructuring is to reduce to global economic imperatives what was equally a product of place-specific power dynamics.

Shaped both by global aspirations and the bargaining power of Brazil’s long-standing elite, Porto Maravilha is a project defined by contradictions. It is billed as an entrepreneurial descendent of the Barcelona model, yet relies disproportionately on public resources that have yet to be recovered through the sale of CEPACs. It has its roots in the pro-poor City Statute, yet is characterized by gentrification and social exclusion. It is driven by global aspirations, but promises accountability and a transformative legacy to the local population. The actual legacy of the project, therefore, is a complex and exceptional form of urban governance by which both global economic incentives \textit{and} local political arrangements have squelched the practice of municipal democracy. Diverging from global paradigms, corrupting a national program of urban reform, and disrespecting local laws, Porto Maravilha cannot be characterized if not by exception.

\textsuperscript{216} Brouxehoux, 563, 560.
Unpacking Favela Upgrading:

If the ultimate goal of understanding Porto Maravilha is to understand its exclusions, then it must be emphasized that those being excluded by the “closed society” of Porto Maravilha are not simply being displaced by the rising cost of land. Providência—a favela at the heart of the port region—has been subject to consistent threats of forced eviction and relocation since Porto Maravilha’s inception.217 More than 800 families have faced eviction threats from the city government, many of which—in violation of municipal law—have been characterized by a lack of information, delayed and unjust compensation, and the government’s refusal to negotiate with community organizations and other politicized groups.218 The undemocratic and forcible displacement of Rio’s poor favela residents, as I introduced in Chapter 1, is believed to be the “new ingredient” of the Barcelona model as it changes meaning in Rio de Janeiro. However, to truly understand this politics of displacement, a more complex understanding of the favela is required.219

As I have explained thus far, favelas are poor communities whose residents lack formal property rights and tend to have precarious access to sound infrastructure and basic services. Favelas have long been understood as Rio’s perennial problem, and they have steadily grown to comprise almost a quarter of the city’s population.220 Rio’s favelas have come to flow heavily through both national and international

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217 Soares Gonçalves.
218 Alves Dos Santos Junior, 254.
219 Soares Gonçalves.
mediascapes, which tend to portray the communities as hotbeds of an inexorable drug war, debilitating poverty and unrelenting violence and crime.\footnote{Edensor, Tim, and Mark Jayne. \textit{Urban Theory beyond the West: A World of Cities}. London: Routledge, 2012. Print. 244.}

In both official and popular discourse, favelas have become a conceptual category whose generalizable definition obscures the particularities of each settlement. No two so-called favela communities are equally impoverished, equally precarious, or equally violent, and the legal history and status of each community differs greatly.\footnote{Ferreira, Alvaro. "Favelas No Rio De Janeiro: Nascimento, Expansão, E Remoção." \textit{REVISTA BIBLIOGRÁFICA DE GEOGRAFÍA Y CIENCIAS SOCIALES} 14.828 (2009): n. pag. Universidad De Barcelona, 25 June 2009. Web.} The origins of the word favela trace back to the port region’s Providência: the community was formed in 1897 by soldiers who were promised land in Rio de Janeiro after serving in the Canudos War. After the war, the soldiers occupied land in front of the Ministry of War until they were moved—with a colonel’s permission but without formal title—to a hill that now supports Providência. The community, named “favela” after a type of plant, continued to grow as free slaves joined the settlements throughout the 20th century. Providência is the first in a long line of favelas whose lesser-known histories complicate popular conceptions of their supposed illegality.\footnote{Williamson, Theresa, and Maurício Hora. "In the Name of the Future, Rio Is Destroying Its Past." \textit{The New York Times}. The New York Times, 12 Aug. 2012. Web. 10 Apr. 2015.} For example, Vila Autódromo—the community that, as I explained in Chapter 1, is being threatened by Olympic Park development—was awarded a land use permit from the State of Rio de Janeiro that, starting in 1994, would be valid for 99 years. Furthermore, in 2005, Rio’s municipal
government declared part of the community to be a “Special Zone of Social Interest” and, in so doing, granted many residents extra legal protection against eviction.²²⁴

The ambiguity of favelas as a legal category continues to persist despite the City Statute’s insistence upon the legal and social inclusion of favelas into Brazilian society. Even after the City Statute’s formal recognition of the social rights of favela residents, the impulse toward favela removals in Rio is at an all time high. Unsurprisingly, favela removals have been concentrated in the city’s more central areas, in the areas beside Olympic-related development projects, and in the city’s touristic South Zone, where favelas sit atop forested mountainsides and offer world-famous, postcard views of Rio.

Due to their informal legal status, entire favela communities can technically be removed without due process, but favela removals must be shrouded in discourse in order to justify their removal within the ambit of the City Statute. In pre-Olympic Rio, these justifying discourses tend to come in two major forms. The first is a discourse of “risk” that has its origins in municipal law, which stipulates that removals can only be mandated when “physical conditions impose risk on the residents.”²²⁵ However, because Rio’s most conspicuous favelas are embedded in the mountainsides of the Tijuca National Rainforest, the legal concept of physical risk has morphed, over time, into a political discourse of “environmental risk.”²²⁶ City Hall’s environmentalist discourse was kicked into high gear in April of 2010, after heavy rains caused catastrophic landslides throughout the city. Since then, a notion of

²²⁵ Soares Gonçalves
²²⁶ Soares Gonçalves
environmental risk has accompanied a new wave of evictions citywide, and city leaders have often neglected the provisions of municipal law that require such risk to be technically-proven, rightfully-compensated, and proceeded by the full and informed participation of residents in the resettlement process.

As the Olympics approach, the indiscriminate usage of “environmental risk” as a justification for forced removals has reified the misrepresentation of favelas as a homogenous category, perpetuating broad-based assumptions that all favela residents—only some of whom live precariously on Rio’s forested mountainsides and only fewer of whom were actually affected by the 2010 landslides—pose a direct threat to the city’s human and natural environment. This environmentalist discourse has lent legitimacy to an Olympic project whose urban renovation schemes, sporting facilities, and tourist attractions are predicated on the removal of surrounding favelas. Thus, through a “perverse confluence” of environmentalist anxieties with pre-Olympic optimism, the notion of “risk” and the promise of Olympic legacy have together legitimized an urban development strategy predicated on the unjust and undemocratic displacement of the urban poor.

The second major discourse of favela removal, it follows, is an Olympic legacy discourse that promises to leave Rio transformed—for the better—when the Olympic ceremonies come to a close. Essentially a promise of urban transformation, Rio’s Olympic legacy discourse is intricately bound to Brazil’s post-City Statute political climate. As such, Rio’s social rights-based programs of urban reform—

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227 Soares Gonçalves  
228 Soares Gonçalves
particularly those focused on the provision of public housing and the urbanization of favelas—have become essential features of the 2016 Games’ purported legacy.229

The result is a citywide discourse of Olympic-led urban reform in which favela removal is unfeasible if not called by a different name: resettlement. Employing stereotypes of the precarious nature of favelas, city officials have advocated for favela resettlement as “a victory not only for the city but also for favela residents, who will be able to access more permanent and dignified living conditions” once they are relocated.230 This resettlement discourse has been prevalent in Providência, where the majority of the favela’s displaced residents will be relocated to apartments funded by a nationwide public housing program called Minha Casa Minha Vida (MCMV).231 Destined for low-income families in urban areas, MCMV is funded primarily through the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC), a federal infrastructure-upgrading program.

One the most large-scale of Brazil’s post-City Statute urban reforms, PAC has dedicated 90% of its housing resources to the upgrading and urbanization of favelas.232 However, beneath this impressive statistic is the perverse reality of favela removal in Rio de Janeiro, where the city government has transformed the PAC funded MCMV program from an empowering instrument for the democratization of

229Braathen, 8.
230Raquel Rolnik. "Megaeventos: direito à moradia em cidades à venda.” Brasil Em Jogo. São Paulo: Boitempo Editorial, 2014. 6-93. Print. 68; My own translation of part of the following quotation, originally in Portuguese: “Por serem ‘precárias,’ ganham a justificativa de que sua eliminação representará um ganho não somente para a cidade mas também para os moradores, que passarão a obter condições mais permanentes e dignas de vida.”
231The name of this program translates to: “My House, My Life.”
housing into an abusive instrument of forced removal and displacement. Over half of the new MCMV housing in Rio will be occupied by families who were forcibly relocated, many of which had higher incomes and higher quality homes than the families for whom MCMV was designed.\textsuperscript{233}

Furthermore, the construction of MCMV apartments has been heavily dependent on private developers who, seeking to maximize their profits, tend to concentrate the new apartment complexes in Rio’s devalued outskirts, where land is cheap and readily available. As such, favela residents being resettled through MCMV tend to be relegated to the city’s most peripheral areas—far from jobs and commercial centers and marked by precarious access to transport links, schools, and hospitals. Therefore, despite the stipulations within municipal law that require housing relocations to remain in very close proximity to a resident’s original home and place of work, the vast majority of favela removals in Rio are funneling poor residents from urban center to distant periphery.\textsuperscript{234}

Also resulting from MCMV’s private developers, the construction of MCMV apartments has been hasty and standardized and entire complexes are built according to a formula of “two rooms, one bathroom, and a kitchen,” failing to account for different family sizes and needs.\textsuperscript{235} In some instances, MCMV apartments have suffered from rushed, low-quality construction: in March of 2013, for example, a R$27 million MCMV housing development required immediate destruction after


\textsuperscript{234} Soares Gonçalves

huge and irreparable cracks appeared.\textsuperscript{236} Once again, the usage of MCMV apartments as the destination for Rio’s displaced favela residents proves to be an exclusionary and abusive practice masked by PAC’s stated commitment to urban reform vis-à-vis the much-needed urbanization of favelas.

By linking favela removal to established instruments of urban reform, Rio’s city government has sponsored an urban politics in which favela upgrading and favela removal are perversely conflated. Providência is a prime example of this problem, and removals in the community are being justified both through their connection to both MCMV and to another City-Statute inspired program called Morar Carioca. A municipal program echoing national impulses toward urban reform, Morar Carioca was developed in 2010 explicitly as an Olympic legacy project. Its stated goal and promised legacy was the urbanization of all of Rio’s favelas by 2020. While about 500 of the forced evictions in Providencia—as of 2013—were due to risk, the other half were vaguely defined as necessary for urbanization purposes.\textsuperscript{237} These evictions—justified by a two-prong discourse of Olympic legacy and urban reform—were legitimized by the Morar Carioca program’s official discourse, which promises “a true revolution of social integration” for Rio’s favelas.\textsuperscript{238} However, while Providencia has serious unmet needs with respect to sanitation, education, and healthcare, Morar Carioca insisted that the community’s urbanization would come in


\textsuperscript{237} Soares Gonçalves.

the form of a cable car system, road-widening projects, and other cosmetic interventions.

Despite residents’ crafting of a “urbanization, yes! Cable car, no!” campaign against the Morar Carioca program, Providência continued to be tamed, trimmed, and turned into a tourist attraction in order to compliment a burgeoning port region dedicated to leisure, consumption, and entertainment. As such, Morar Carioca’s interventions in Providência—which ultimately focused on “thinning” the favela and building the much-debated cable car system—resulted in over 300 eviction notices throughout the community.

The installation of a cable car in Providência—which would provide remarkable views of the harbor and connect the favela to one of Rio’s major tourist attractions, Samba City—was dubiously billed as a transportation improvement for the community. However, the touristic intentions behind this project are obvious, and cable-car projects continue to be proposed in favelas throughout Rio. In Rocinha, Rio’s largest favela, residents have followed in Providência’s footsteps and initiated a “sanitation, yes! Cable car, no!” campaign, and they continue to mobilize against the misuse of PAC investments toward questionable upgrading projects that the community does not want or need. As 2016 approaches, Rio’s usage of MCMV, PAC, and Morar Carioca resources to justify favela removal proves that Rio de Janeiro is a veritable “city of exception,” which governs over its favelas by either disrespecting urban law entirely or re-purposing it as a tool of displacement.

239 Broudehoux, 563.
240 Soares Gonçalves.
241 Broudehoux, 564.
The World City of Exception:

The most recent phenomenon that must be understood about Rio’s favelas, it follows, is their transformation into tourist destinations—a gradual process that can be seen in relation to the escalating popularity of “favela tours” since the 1990s. In addition to favela tours, music venues, nightclubs, and hostels are popping up in favelas throughout Rio, a phenomenon that has been feasible largely due to the implementation of Pacifying Police Units (UPPs) in various favelas since 2008. The UPP program, designed to gradually occupy the city’s favelas in order to force out drug-related violence and transform the security of favelas and surrounding communities, has made undeniable contributions to the safety and stability of many of Rio’s favelas. However, UPP, must also be understood as an integral element in the transformation of favelas—100 of which will be pacified by 2016—into domesticated and profitable tourist destinations.242

The rise of favela tourism in Rio exemplifies the contradictory nature of the city’s quest to globalize. The city government’s impulse to realize the touristic potential of favelas reflects its desire to cement Rio’s reputation in the global city imaginary as a marvelous “city of tourist attractions.”243 In this sense, favela tourism is one of the vehicles through which Rio is facilitating its own globalization. However, while favela tours are representative of Rio’s desperate attempt for global attention, they are not merely an imitative performance of the first-world city. These tours are a performance of what makes Brazil the world city’s “Other,” providing a window through which wealthy tourists can become privy to the misery of the

242 Edensor and Jayne, 248.
243 Edensor and Jayne, 257.
developing world.\(^{244}\) As such, favela tourism is a peculiar, contradictory strategy of globalization in Rio—one for which being global and being peripheral are of equal importance.

Rio proves itself to be “a world city of exception”—one that diverges from both local rules and global conventions. The Brazilian scholarship surveyed in this chapter, therefore, does not simply ask for inclusion into dominant, Western-centric narratives about globalization and its effect on world cities. Brazilian scholars argue that, despite Rio’s undeniably global aspirations, an analysis of politics on the local scale is crucial to understanding this particular Olympic city and its particular social exclusions.

The bargaining power of local elites emerges as an important driver of Rio’s urban transformation, as does the willingness of local politicians to construct a city of exception in their favor. The corporate concessionaires of the Porto Maravilha project—Odebrecht and OAS—exemplify this bargaining power, and it is because of their influence—not that of the global economy—that Rio’s port region will become an undemocratic, closed society of exception. Still, while elite power has shaped urban politics profoundly, this power is not without its constraints. The momentous passage of the City Statute in Brazil has reverberated in Rio de Janeiro for more than a decade. The result is an array of local imperatives for the promotion of municipal democracy and social rights—imperatives that both constrain local politics and, as with the case of favela removals, are constrained by it.

The city of exception, therefore, is fundamentally local and fundamentally political, and Rio makes the case for a study of world cities that begins with an

\(^{244}\) Clift and Andrews, 224.
interrogation of world city governments. In pre-Olympic Rio, Brazilian urban scholar Carlos Vainer insists, “the elected government governs, the municipal legislature legislates.” Despite relinquishing an unprecedented amount of authority to the private sector, Vainer insists, the national and local state must still be understood as autonomous, and they exercise their autonomy in the services of both global and local impulses and agents. Global hegemony and local autonomy, therefore, are co-constitutive processes, and Rio de Janeiro makes a compelling case for the need to study both.

Chapter 3: So-Called World Cities

The Case of Los Angeles

Thus far, I have argued that the Olympics provide a route to world city status—an instrument with which cities facilitate their own globalization. In so doing, I have re-inserted local agency into narratives of globalization, particularly through the cause of Rio de Janeiro. Contemporary urban and Olympic scholars have shown that—even at the moment of going global—Rio, its politics, and its social realities cannot be accurately understood or critiqued if not from a local vantage point. This assertion of local agency emerging from Rio—a city that the global lens has failed to see clearly—can also be applied to Los Angeles, a city that has always performed well when studied through a global lens. On Friedman’s world city hierarchy, Los Angeles sits at the very top: it is considered a “primary core” city and is often included in research alongside the global economy’s heavy hitters—New York, London, and Tokyo. Los Angeles is considered a powerful world city, a driver of transnational capital, and the major economic node between the western United States and the Pacific Rim. Los Angeles has become a paradigmatic world city, and even those who disagree have turned Los Angeles into a paradigmatic exception: the so-called “Los Angeles School” of urban studies has replaced the world city narrative with “an alternative grand narrative,” arguing that Los Angeles foreshadows an

247 Smith, 73.
urban future in which sprawling, multi-centered, multi-ethnic city-regions become the inevitable products of an increasingly hegemonic global economy.248

“Perhaps no metropolis in recent memory,” Smith explains, “has been subject to more labels intended to capture its essence than contemporary Los Angeles.”249

What both world city theorists and the Los Angeles School have in common, therefore, is a tendency to essentialize Los Angeles, telling different stories about the city but maintaining global capital as the protagonist. Thus, while L.A.—unlike Rio—has always been seen, it has not always been authentically understood. Scholars from Rio contend that a world city is shaped by both the hegemony of global capital and the impulses of local autonomy—and it is this attention to the local that is notoriously missing from analyses of even a most well studied, Western world city like Los Angeles.

Complicating Economic Restructuring Narratives:

World cities—at least economically speaking—are globalization’s victors. They won, the story goes, by responding quickly and adeptly to the global economic crisis of the early seventies by replacing their failing manufacturing industries with booming, transnational economies centered around finance, insurance, and real-estate (FIRE).250 According to Friedmann’s and Sassen’s narrative, the rapid expansion of FIRE capacities in certain cities is followed by the remarkable concentration and accumulation of international capital in a handful of exceedingly powerful cities that,

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249 Smith, 13.
together, drive the global economy. It is these cities that—by virtue of commanding
global power and controlling the flow of global capital—earn a spot on the world city
hierarchy.

Vexed by the deepening wealth gap in world cities, theorists like Friedmann
and Sassen have attempted to conceptualize the severe social polarization that
accompanies a city’s ascent to global prominence. According to their framework, the
rapidly growing FIRE industries that elevate a city to global dominance are also
responsible for trampling what were once thriving manufacturing economies that
provided unionized and well-paid jobs to the working classes. The result is a
restructured urban economy that forces the working class—and an increasing number
of migrant workers—into low-wage labor in “sweatshops and small industries.”

When neoliberal ideology is attached to this restructuring narrative—as it was
in the United States during the eighties—the plight of the poor intensifies. In political
terms, neoliberal reform and the slashing of Keynesian welfare policies was the
devastating blow that accompanied economic restructuring in cities throughout
America, where urban workers were left to contend with not only dropping wages and
worsening working conditions but an unraveling social safety net, as well.

These interlocking narratives of de-industrialization, economic restructuring,
and neoliberal reform have been applied fairly indiscriminately to all so-called world
cities in order to explain the harsh inequality that has come to characterize the urban
social fabric. Unsurprisingly, they have been applied to Los Angeles, a city that—

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upon first glance—is a textbook example of both global dominance and extreme social polarization.252

However, a closer historical reading of Los Angeles reveals that, while the seventies and eighties were undoubtedly a time of neoliberal restructuring in Los Angeles, the city’s particular restructuring process looked markedly different from those that were unfolding in other world cities at the same time. Firstly, Los Angeles complicates the assumed “de-industrialization” that is part and parcel of world city theory: from 1970 to 1980, while major cities throughout the United States were suffering from severe job losses and industrial decline, Los Angeles added over 225,000 jobs in its manufacturing industries alone.253 The city’s impressive and idiosyncratic industrial job growth was concentrated in its aerospace and other defense contracting industries. Importantly, until the end of the Cold War in the early nineties, L.A.’s economy relied heavily on US defense spending—and not foreign investment—as the primary engine of its local economy.254 The city’s exceptional economic growth during this time was also fueled by other industries: the local garment industry expanded employment by sixty percent throughout the decade, and high-tech industries sprung up with impressive rapidity.255 Furthermore, Los Angeles’ iconic entertainment industry was particularly resilient in the face of global economic change.256

252 Smith, 73.
253 Soja, 194.
254 Smith, 75.
255 Soja, 183-184.
Diverging from world city theory and its presumed narrative of economic restructuring, Los Angeles boasted a thriving manufacturing-centered economy that continued to reign—until the nineties—as “one of the world’s largest growth poles of industrial capitalism.”\(^{257}\) As such, it did not need to clamor for global capital to the same extent as other world cities, and thus its story strays from the other major assumption underlying world city theory—that the expansion of FIRE capacities is what makes a city truly global.

While Mayor Bradley’s aggressive downtown redevelopment efforts in the 1980s undoubtedly captured significant amounts of Pacific Rim capital—particularly from China and Japan—for the city’s real-estate market, it is important to emphasize that Los Angeles never became the “hub of international capital” that both the world city theorists and the L.A. School assume it to be.\(^ {258}\) Real estate was the city’s major globalizing sector during the seventies and eighties, and California-based banks—without much success in overseas lending—acquired almost all of their profits by financing the local real-estate boom.\(^ {259}\)

In the early nineties, this boom came to a dramatic halt—largely due to downtown overbuilding and the banks’ upmarket lending bias. This coincided fatefuly with massive cutbacks in the federal defense spending upon which the Los Angeles’ economy had remained “excessively dependent” for more than two decades.\(^ {260}\) The dominant narrative of economic restructuring that belies world city

\(^{257}\) Soja, 194.

\(^{258}\) Smith, 73.


\(^{260}\) Dymski and Veitch, 46.
theory, therefore, zooms in on the seventies and eighties—the decades of global economic crisis. In so doing, it misplaces the moment of crisis in Los Angeles, which spiraled into a severe economic crisis in the early nineties and did not have a diversity of foreign markets to fall back on.\textsuperscript{261}

Thus, a closer look at Los Angeles reveals that the city was impressively resistant to the “crisis-generated” restructuring that took place in other world cities during the seventies and eighties.\textsuperscript{262} Throughout these two decades, Los Angeles became neither a de-industrialized city nor a hub of international capital. The economic downturn in the early nineties gave way to a localized urban crisis that climaxed with an explosive round of urban unrest in what had become a severely impoverished and polarized inner city. Whatever was marginalizing the city’s poor at that time, therefore, cannot merely be blamed on an invasion of global capital. In order to understand the nature of inequality in Los Angeles, one must begin by understanding the local restructuring processes from which it derived.

**Beyond Market Rule:**

*Tom Bradley, Local Politics, and the Quest for Downtown*

In adhering to a highly economistic narrative of world city restructuring, many researchers more readily attribute social inequality to an “amorphous” group of international corporations and capitalists than to a city’s local politics.\textsuperscript{263} Prevailing narratives of neoliberal or crisis-generated restructuring fail to account for the active

\textsuperscript{261} Dymski and Veitch, 54.
\textsuperscript{262} Soja, “Los Angeles,” 426.
and creative arm of the local state as it shapes a world city’s restructuring process. While Friedmann’s conception of “world city formation” conceives of a world city’s most formative restructuring processes as fundamentally global and economic in nature, world city formation in Los Angeles corresponded closely with local politics and with the twenty year period during which Tom Bradley was mayor. Bradley’s world city project, which, as I explained in Chapter 1, is most triumphantly symbolized by the 1984 Olympic Games, is perhaps equally recognizable for its active effort to turn Downtown Los Angeles into one of the world’s great centers of finance, production, and commerce—a thriving global “citadel,” to borrow Friedmann’s term.

Bradley’s imaginative world city project was the major driver of twenty years of government-facilitated urban restructuring in Los Angeles. But it wasn’t until the 1980s—and particularly after the triumph of the 1984 Games—that Bradley’s own aspirations to erect a “world city citadel” in Downtown Los Angeles came to the forefront of local development policy. As mentioned earlier, large-scale downtown redevelopment did not take off until the mid-eighties, when the city’s downtown area had become an object of desire for primarily Japanese and Chinese investors. Throughout the 1980s, major Japanese corporations financed the development of entire office and business complexes in L.A.’s downtown area, and a corporate

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264 Keil, vi
265 Keil, 81.
267 Keil, 85, 13.
268 Dymski and Veitch, 48.
citadel began to emerge in Los Angeles as Japan’s post-war “economic miracle” ushered it along.\(^{269}\)

However, these international transactions were not purely economic: between 1984 and 1988, Tom Bradley received more than $200,000 in campaign support from Japan’s biggest companies, banks, and real estate agencies. The mayor’s alliance with Japanese capital was, in many ways, a local reflection of national politics: the US and Japanese governments were growing particularly close during the Reagan years.\(^{270}\)

L.A.’s downtown redevelopment boom, therefore, was an immensely political effort that was embedded in U.S. national affairs and spearheaded by one of Japan’s favorite American politicians, Tom Bradley.\(^{271}\) World city theory and its economistic narrative of urban change, therefore, obscures the fact that the globalization of Downtown Los Angeles was a fundamentally political process.

Furthermore, it was not merely Bradley’s personal political actions that spurred downtown redevelopment. Throughout the 1980s, many of the city’s governing institutions began to more actively pursue foreign investment—the Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA) being one of them. The CRA, while technically responsible for repairing “urban blight,” has a long history of bringing speculative urban development projects to the city’s poorest areas. Since its 1948 inception, the CRA has been greatly influenced by the bargaining power of local interest groups.\(^{272}\)

\(^{269}\) Keil, 148.  
\(^{270}\) Keil, 48.  
\(^{271}\) Keil, 68.  
\(^{272}\) Keil, 156.
Throughout the seventies and eighties, these local elites were increasingly teaming up with multinational business partners, forming a powerful front that was able to “employ the CRA as their bulldozer, financier, and scapegoat” in low-income neighborhoods. Characterized by increasingly controversial and costly projects, the CRA became an object of scrutiny under Bradley’s watchful eye. Tom Bradley, it is important to emphasize, was Los Angeles’ first black mayor and—despite his unmistakably global aspirations—he must also be remembered as an important advocate for local needs and minority interests in a political landscape that was traditionally dominated by a mostly white, property-owning elite. Thus, when the CRA became known as an “out-of-control” developer whose actions were particularly harmful to the city’s poorest residents, Bradley intervened by appointing local labor leader James Wood as the CRA chairman. The improvements throughout the next few years were only minor: there was a small increase in contracts between developers and women- or minority-owned firms, and the agency assumed a greater role in providing services to Skid Row’s homeless population.276

By 1988—improvements aside—the CRA had diverged from its mission entirely and was culpable for a net loss of more than 500 affordable housing units.277 Partially because both Bradley and Wood became preoccupied with downtown redevelopment, they failed to rein in the CRA as it began to play an active role in gentrifying the downtown area. In many ways, Bradley and the CRA had similar hopes for Downtown L.A, and Bradley supported the agency as it began to subsidize

274 Keil, 77.
275 Keil, 81.
276 Keil, 163-164.
a downtown real-estate boom, on the backs of local taxpayers and with little concern for the displaced urban poor. The CRA’s strategy with respect to the downtown area was the subject of intense, citywide criticism. While critics could tend to agree that the use of local tax money to finance the CRA reflected an “irresponsible real cut of expenses for social welfare and education,” opposition to Bradley’s vision for Downtown Los Angeles came in two very distinct forms.278

The first form of criticism against the CRA came from low-income and minority voices concerned with the agency’s tendency to channel public money into the unjust gentrification of L.A.’s urban core. The CRA’s first project in the downtown area displaced 6,000 residents in the Bunker Hill neighborhood alone, and it did so in accordance with Bradley’s vision for a world city citadel in Los Angeles.279 The second group of anti-redevelopment voices that began to target the CRA, by contrast, were not so concerned with the displacement of the urban poor: by the late-1980s, a strong coalition of middle and upper-class “slow-growth” advocates grew deeply antagonistic toward the Bradley coalition and its aspirations for Downtown Los Angeles. These advocates considered the CRA to be a frivolous misuser of public resources and viewed the downtown growth agenda as a growing threat to the prosperity of the less central—yet still affluent—residential areas on the city’s Westside.280 These slow-growth interest groups wielded significant bargaining power in Los Angeles, and Bradley was forced to attend to them.281

278 Keil, 166-167.
279 Keil, 166.
280 Keil, 23, 168.
281 Keil, 27.
The globalization of Los Angeles, once again, was a fundamentally political process. While a world city theorist might tend to categorize Bradley as a local pawn of market rule, the ex-mayor’s politics were shaped by global aspirations, local politics, and his own personal goals and intentions. Neither a market fundamentalist nor “the creature” of any one particular ruling class, Tom Bradley was a politician who struggled to realize his commitment to equitable and inclusive governing while juggling the powerful and contradicting interests of Los Angeles’ urban elite.\footnote{Keil, 79, 27.}

In the earlier years of his mayoral tenure, Bradley had—albeit incompletely—incorporated an unprecedented amount of racial and ethnic minorities into his political coalition, including the black South Central area and the Jewish Westside. Both of these groups—which, until then, had had very little political voice in Los Angeles—found themselves holding seats in the Bradley administration alongside the region’s older and more conservative elites.\footnote{Keil, 74-75.} However, while the first half of the Bradley regime saw the mayor become the statesmanlike leader of a surprisingly coherent government, his post-1980s focus on constructing world city Los Angeles brought him into an increasingly narrow alliance with his “downtown clients.”\footnote{Keil, 75.}

Furthermore, the second half of his tenure saw Bradley lose his footing as a political peacemaker as he became consumed by his own untenable ambitions for L.A.’s downtown citadel.\footnote{Keil, 82.} By the end of the 1980s, Bradley’s world city project had alienated both his low-income and minority supporters as well as his more affluent Westside allies, who were beginning to harshly criticize his development vision in
favor of a slow-growth strategy for Los Angeles.\textsuperscript{286} Middle and upper class communities—particularly on L.A.’s Westside—learned to get their way through private bargaining and “micropolitics,” and the result of this project-by-project conflict was an array of public-private consulting firms attempting to mediate between their downtown clients and powerful anti-development and slow-growth elites.\textsuperscript{287} By the end of the Bradley years, these consulting PPPs had become “the main actors of the urban development game,” giving way to an increasingly privatized local development politics from which the city’s poor communities became increasingly marginalized.\textsuperscript{288}

What world city theory and its citadel metaphor misses about Downtown Los Angeles, therefore, is the unmistakably political nature of downtown redevelopment, which relied heavily on both Japanese capital and local tax dollars, was shaped by both local agencies and local elites, and materialized in an irresponsible, imperfect, and highly contentious manner. This narrative of L.A.’s own “citadel” is both a more accurate representation of local politics and of the social exclusions to which these politics gave way: CRA-led gentrification, a highly deficient social policy with respect to the inner-city, and an increasingly fragmented and privatized urban politics were some of the Bradley regime’s more sinister legacies. Thus, while the latter half of the Bradley regime saw an increase in Asian and Latino political representation, his later years were marked by distrust from his black and inner-city constituents and his own tunnel vision, which rendered him blind to the severe social and political

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{286} Keil, 87.
\textsuperscript{287} Keil, 140.
\textsuperscript{288} Keil, 141.
\end{footnotes}
exclusions that were stemming from his world-city-in-the-making. Bradley’s coalition unraveled steadily, revealing Los Angeles to be a city of “political fiefdoms” and massive divisions both within and across class and ethnic lines. When Los Angeles erupted into urban unrest as the Bradley years came to a close, these divisions revealed themselves to be much more complicated than the class-based polarization that is narrativized by world city theory.

**Re-presenting Los Angeles, in Class and in Color:**

While world city theorists identify certain world cities as globalization’s “winners,” the most important contribution of their work to critical urban studies is their preoccupation with who exactly—within world cities—are globalization’s “losers.” Vexed by the deepening wealth gap in world cities, theorists like Friedmann and Sassen have attempted to conceptualize the severe social polarization that accompanies a city’s ascent to global prominence. Friedmann used the dichotomous metaphors of “citadel” and “ghetto” to illustrate this social polarization of the world city: in the citadel, transnational capitalists and their well-paid employees watch their wealth accumulate while the poor residents of “inner-city ghettos” and “ethnic working-class enclaves” are forced to survive in an increasingly “low-wage” job market. Sassen also theorizes that working class misery stems from the destruction of manufacturing jobs and the creation of jobs in transnational FIRE industries. To both Friedmann and Sassen, therefore, it is “class polarization”—

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289 Keil, 86.
290 Keil, 141.
292 Friedmann, 326.
fundamentally a product of economic restructuring—that has come to define the world city.

Despite its critical merit, this thesis of social polarization thesis represents a tradition of urban theory that swears by economic globalization and, in so doing, “privileges class over all other social relations.” Los Angeles is a uniquely vast and diverse metropolis with a complex array of racial, ethnic, and other social tensions that rarely fall neatly on one side of a capital-labor binary. A theoretical focus on class antagonism gives way to an understanding of urban inequality that is more likely to problematize economic structures than political actors. But it was political actions—and, often, abusive ones—that built Los Angeles, and a new narrative for Los Angeles must start from the racist and segregationist urban politics upon which it was founded.

Between World War II and 1960, blacks in Los Angeles fell prey to the same racist policies and practices that were enforcing race-based residential segregation throughout urban America. As in most major cities during this time, blacks in Los Angeles were excluded from federal loan programs and were the targets of decades of racial discrimination at the hands of local developers, real-estate agents, and property-owners. Throughout the fifties and sixties, the federal government subsidized Los Angeles’ suburbanization and worked closely with local developers and real-estate interests to ensure that the city’s black residents would be kept out of the growing white suburbs. Consequently, the population of blacks in L.A.’s central city

\[^{293}\] Smith, 10.
\[^{294}\] Anderson, 345.
reached an all-time high in 1960, and much of this population—as in other cities at the time—was crammed into impoverished, inner city ghettos.295

While the “ghetto” aspect of Friedmann’s social polarization narrative holds true—at least nominally—in Los Angeles, it was not solely a result of capital dynamics. Los Angeles was built upon the racist practices of both national and local actors, and ghetto formation far precedes the decades of presumed world city restructuring. In Los Angeles, the ghetto traces back to the 1940s, when immense political power was concentrated in a group of banks, property owners, and the L.A. Times. Together these groups comprised a formidable “real-estate lobby” that advocated against the use of federal funding for affordable public housing in the city center.296 When this lobby successfully diverted government subsidies from public housing to the suburban housing boom, Los Angeles became a role model for cities throughout America, whose own landed interests that hoped for the same success. The result of this subsidized suburbanization was a severe affordable housing deficit in L.A.’s inner city, which laid the foundation on which the ghetto would be built in the following decades.297

The polarization of L.A.’s black ghetto and white suburbs intensified during the 50s and 60s when the federal government channeled massive amounts of funding into freeway construction and suburban real estate. For whites, the city presented a thriving economy based around two major commodities—the private automobile and the single-family home.298 Simultaneously, at the height of Keynesian welfare

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295 Scott et al., The City, 345.
296 Anderson, 345.
297 Anderson, 344.
298 Keil, 53-54.
provision, even working class whites in automobile industries enjoyed better conditions, new forms of social insurance, and rising wages.

However, the Keynesian welfare practices that characterized Los Angeles before the Reagan years provided little refuge for the city’s black residents, whose marginalization was directly linked to their race. Furthermore, while highway programs and housing subsidies facilitated the suburbanization of Los Angeles’s white upper and middle classes, the construction of suburb-bound highways cut through the city’s mostly black urban core, destroying many inner-city homes in the process. The result was a large population of inner-city blacks who—after being systematically denied federal mortgages, home insurance, and other housing opportunities—were relegated to public housing projects.299 Many of these projects became the breeding grounds of black discontent and, eventually, of rebellion. In 1965, an uprising now famously known as the Watts riots revealed the plight of a black urban poor that had been hidden behind the city’s increasingly consumerist, high-wage, and mostly white working class.300

The Watts uprising revealed the intensely marginalized black population, whose race-based exclusion was a foundational feature of Los Angeles’s thriving local economy. The booming, state-subsidized real-estate market in the white suburbs—and the thriving automobile industry upon which suburbanization relied—were ultimately what led to the segregation of blacks into inner city ghettos.301 A closer look at L.A.’s history, therefore, proves that ghetto formation in Los Angeles is not a global phenomenon. While conditions certainly worsened for L.A.’s black urban

299 Keil, 61-62.
300 Keil, 54.
301 Anderson, 345.
poor as the city embarked on crisis-generated restructuring in the seventies, the “immiseration” of LA’s black urban poor started long before the city’s globally-oriented restructuring—at the hands of the local economy and the bargaining power of the local elite—and cannot, therefore, be seen as a byproduct of world city formation.302

The case of Los Angeles urges us to move beyond an economistic analysis of marginalization by revealing a poor black population that was marginalized, primarily, by politics. Furthermore, the discriminatory politics that erected the black ghetto in Los Angeles resulted in race-based—not class-based—social antagonism. By the 1980s, redlining had replaced restrictive covenants as a vehicle for maintaining black-white segregation, and many blacks responded by fleeing the city altogether. The percentage of blacks in South Central L.A. decreased by 20% in the eighties, while the neighboring counties of Riverside and San Bernardino saw their black populations increase by 99% and 134%, respectively.303 Some scholars look upon this data with a misguided optimism: with the percentage of blacks living in “all black neighborhoods” as low as 7%, some could argue that “the ghetto no longer exists.”304

However, a closer look at the social dynamics playing out in inner city Los Angeles reveals that new and equally perverse social differences were being produced in the ghetto’s place. During the 1980s—the same decade that claims to have dissolved the black ghetto—Los Angeles became “the homeless capital of the United

304 Anderson, 346.
States.” In South Central, where the city’s homeless concentrate onto what is known as “Skid Row,” those who had been “most severely marginalized” by economic restructuring and welfare state retrenchment became homeless.

Neoliberal cutbacks in federal social spending had a profound effect on Los Angeles, and the city in 1981 alone saw 38,000 welfare recipients drop from AFDC rolls, 48,000 targeted with benefits reduction, 12,000 losing their Medicaid benefits, and 7,800 rendered ineligible for food stamps. The remainder of this decade saw the slashing of the region’s health budget, the continuous closing of inner city health and psychiatry clinics, and an active assault on the city’s locally funded General Relief (GR) program, which existed to provide support for those people ineligible for federal or state support.

As the welfare state retreated from L.A.’s inner city, Skid Row remained intact as the city’s largest concentration of homelessness but saw its population expand rapidly and its demographics change significantly. What was once dominated by white alcoholic males, Skid Row in the 1980s experienced a huge increase in its population of women and children and, in a 1987 survey, found its dominant population to be black males. The “roll back” of the Keynesian welfare state in Los Angeles, therefore, played a major role in causing much of the city’s poor black population to fall into homelessness. Friedmann’s “ghetto” metaphor, therefore,

306 Wolch, 393, 394.
307 Wolch, 396.
308 Wolch, 396.
309 Wolch, 407.
310 Wolch, 411.
fails to accurately narrate both the creation of the black ghetto and its dissolution, in the 1980s, into a rapidly growing and changing homeless population.

Neither the creation of dissolution of the black ghetto in Los Angeles can be reduced to global economic change. Rather, global processes give way to local restructuring that both “exploits” already existing social differences and “produces” new ones. The further exploitation of blacks in the seventies deepened the historical divide between the city’s wealthy white and poor black populations, and the black poverty rate remained the highest minority poverty rate in Los Angeles until 1979. However, the social polarization thesis fails to accurately narrate the new social differences that were produced in Los Angeles, one of which—and arguably the most significant reason that the black ghetto ‘dissolved’ in the eighties—was the huge influx of poor Latin American immigrants that allowed Los Angeles’ inner city to become “reintegrated.”

A City of Immigrants:

Both Friedmann and Sassen conceive of immigration as an integral part of world city formation, emphasizing that “labor migration”—or the hypermobility of labor in response to economic restructuring—is an essential component of social polarization in world cities. Upon arrival in the world city, migrant laborers are faced with the world city “citadel,” whose focus on FIRE-based industries relegates

313 Anderson, 346.
314 Smith, 72.
the domestic and immigrant working class to compete for spots in an increasingly insecure, low-wage labor market.\textsuperscript{315}

Upon first glance, the flow of immigrants from Latin America to Los Angeles fits well into this narrative of “the evolution of jobs” in the neoliberal world city.\textsuperscript{316} The vast majority of Latino immigrants who arrived in Los Angeles during the seventies and eighties were forced into a rapidly expanding economy characterized by “precarious jobs and minimum wages.”\textsuperscript{317} Consequently, the city’s Latino poverty rate skyrocketed and ultimately surpassed black poverty during the 1980s.\textsuperscript{318} Latinos and blacks now live side by side in South Central, Los Angeles—the poorest area in the inner city where the percentage of the population living below the poverty line is about twice as high as it is in any other part of Los Angeles.\textsuperscript{319} It is these immigration patterns and the city’s ever-growing class of poor immigrants that have earned Los Angeles such paradigmatic treatment in the world city hypothesis. But to reduce these dynamics to the globalization of capital and labor is to obscure the cultural and political forces that have rendered Los Angeles a so-called immigrant city.

The case of Mexican migration—which accounts for a significant majority of Los Angeles’ immigrant profile—is an “old story” in the city that is far more linked to United States’ fluctuating policy creations than to global patterns of economic restructuring.\textsuperscript{320} Since Mexican workers were recruited for California’s railroad construction in the early 1990s, Los Angeles has experienced an influx of Mexican

\textsuperscript{315}Friedmann, 326.
\textsuperscript{316}Friedmann, 326.
\textsuperscript{317}Smith, \textit{Transnational urbanism}, 77.
\textsuperscript{318}Ong and Blumenberg, 327.
\textsuperscript{319}Keil, 218.
\textsuperscript{320}Smith, 77.
migrants whenever the U.S. government has deemed their labor most necessary. California growers have long relied on Mexican farmworkers, and the population of Mexican males and part-time migrant workers in Los Angeles resumed its steady growth as the 1950s repatriation campaign receded into memory.\textsuperscript{321} When the U.S. passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986—partly “at the behest” of California’s powerful agricultural interests—newly legalized Mexican workers were able to welcome their families to Los Angeles, part-time workers were able to move to the city permanently, and Mexican migration to the city increased significantly.\textsuperscript{322} While IRCA tends to be seen as a neoliberal initiative, it is more accurately understood as one moment in a long history of “bi-national relations of production, labor supply, and social network formation between California and Mexico.”\textsuperscript{323}

Furthermore, the real high time for Mexican immigration was in the nineties, and this cannot be attributed to L.A.’s functional role in the global economy. In 1994, the neoliberal agenda of the Washington Consensus culminated in the passage of NAFTA, which liberalized trade relations between the U.S. and Mexico, effectively turning Mexico into an export-oriented agriculture and manufacturing base for the rest of North America. NAFTA—drawn up and signed on the federal level—was a fundamentally political action that could not have been realized without the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{321} Smith, 76.
\item \textsuperscript{323} Smith, 77.
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collaboration of the Mexican state, which viewed export-driven development as the key to Mexico’s future.  

The passage of NAFTA resulted in the severe displacement of small-scale agriculture and manufacturing in Mexico, which, in turn, made economic survival increasingly difficult for Mexico’s middle and working classes. Once again, the economistic conception of neoliberalism that dominates narratives of global urban change obscures the political nature of globalization, reducing complex immigration patterns to the logic of capital. And if there is any city in which to consider complexity, it is Los Angeles, where immigration has given way to a uniquely diverse ethnic landscape in a relatively short amount of time. In 1970, the population of a mostly-white Los Angeles county was only 14% Hispanic and 3% Asians/others. By 1990, the Hispanic population had risen to 33%, Asian alone was up to 9%, and the urban region officially had a non-white majority. Behind these statistics is a massive array of transnational migrant groups and refugees whose migration was not simply economically driven.

Los Angeles is now home to impressive numbers of Central American and Southeast Asian refugees, fleeing their homelands in search of refuge from the violence and instability that resulted, in large part, from US foreign policy during the Cold War. Among these groups are “the largest concentrations of Koreans, Cambodians, Guatemalans, and Salvadorans outside their homelands,” an influx that

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324 Smith, 77.  
325 Smith, 78.  
326 Keil, 56.  
327 Smith, 79.
can only be explained by looking at these population’s war-torn pasts.\textsuperscript{328} Far from being painted by the dynamics of global capitalism, therefore, L.A.’s ethnic landscape can only be understood as a derivative of international and national politics.

While Sassen certainly perpetuates some of world city theory’s broad-based assumptions, it is important to credit her for calling attention to some of the complexities that fuel immigration patterns. She pays particular attention to the growth of informal and immigrant-dominated labor markets—traditionally assumed to be a feature of the global periphery—in world cities. Her 1987 work explains that the informal economy is a place where the traditional separation between capital and labor is blurred, creating entire economic sectors in which cheap labor can be exploited and working conditions can deteriorate.\textsuperscript{329} These economic realities, she argues, have emerged as profit-making strategies in world cities with severely polarizing social consequences.\textsuperscript{330}

In this analysis, Sassen acknowledges an exception to the core-periphery binary, complicating our notion of what a world city economy—and its social consequences—might look like. However, to truly understand Los Angeles—and, particularly, the city’s garment industry—one must let go of the core-periphery binary completely. As I mentioned earlier, the garment-making sector of Los Angeles’ economy was one of the industries that did not collapse—but rather grew steadily—during the city’s “restructuring” years. One of the major reasons for its resilience, importantly, was the “infusion of family capital from Korea,” which the local

\textsuperscript{328} Smith, 79.  
\textsuperscript{330} Portes and Sassen-Koob, 56.
industry’s labor needs met by an influx of migrant laborers from Latin America and Asia.\footnote{Keil, 105.}

Los Angeles’ garment industry, therefore, did not just resemble the so-called global periphery—it was financed, regulated, and essentially run by it. The industry grew at the hands of immigrant capitalists and migrant laborers, in enterprises that were supported by capital investment from outside the global “core.”\footnote{Keil (107)} This so-called “ethnic economy” clearly challenges the metaphor of the “citadel” as the place where capital internationalizes, accumulates, and produces the city’s “global control capability.”\footnote{World City-World System/Friedmann (326)} By contrast, the internationalization of capital in Los Angeles occurred, in large part, through the immigration of Korean “small capital owners” and the Korean banks that supported their entrepreneurship.\footnote{Keil (119)} A major driver of the L.A. economy, Korean-owned manufacturing enterprises are a prime example of why the analytical barriers between the global core and the global periphery—upon which world city theory is largely based—must be “torn down and reconfigured.”\footnote{Keil (107)}

The “entrepreneurial Korean population” in Los Angeles challenges world city theory’s assumptions about immigrant labor. Many Koreans immigrated to Los Angeles as educated professionals who had accumulated capital back home. They were immigrant capitalists—not poor migrant laborers—who were most marginalized in their new country by linguistic or other cultural limitations.\footnote{Smith, 84.} The “ethnic economy,” therefore, functioned for many Koreans as a cultural safe-haven—a place
that offered job security and monolingual workplaces for themselves, their families, and their co-ethnics. When Koreans fueled the growth of Los Angeles’ garment sector, therefore, the sector was fundamentally restructured along cultural and ethnic lines.  

Ethnicity, it follows, is an essential driving force of urban change in Los Angeles, and it is the only lens through which to understand not only the city’s changing garment industry but also the plight of those who have been most exploited by it. By the end of the 1980s, it was estimated that 120,000 migrant workers were employed in minimum wage positions and “sweatshop” conditions in L.A.’s garment industry. Thus, while the “ethnic economy” did provide a reliable labor market for a vast array of otherwise excluded migrant groups in Los Angeles, it also must be understood as a site of severe exploitation in which Korean-owned “sweatshops” exploited Latino migrant workers, Southeast Asian refugees and, in a few cases, other Koreans.

The Korean population in Los Angeles, therefore, does not fall neatly on either side of the capital-labor binary advanced by world city theory. While some Korean entrepreneurs successfully carve out employment enclaves for their co-ethnics, their so-called “ethnic enterprises” did not offer significant professional or economic mobility to the city’s Korean population. At the time of a 1993 report, even Korean “entrepreneurs” had a 16% poverty rate and struggled for inclusion in a polarized city. The case of L.A.’s garment sector, therefore, exposes the “contradictions of core and periphery” in a city where exploitation and polarization dominate.

338 Keil, 106.
occurs along both class and ethnic lines.\textsuperscript{339} Ethnicity emerges as a key source of social polarization in Los Angeles—a source that undeniably shaped the events of 1992, when the city was rocked by “the most violent and pervasive urban uprising” in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{340}

First of all, the unrest that rocked Los Angeles in 1992 must be understood in the context of the severe economic downturn that seized the city in 1990, when real-estate prices plummeted and revealed an over-built downtown and an unstable local economy in the place of what, according to Bradley’s promises, should have been a thriving world city citadel. This local economic crisis exacerbated the complex social tensions that would ultimately tear Los Angeles apart. The uprisings, which are often reduced to the black community’s fury with the acquittal of the four LAPD officers charged with the beating of Rodney King, began in the inner city but took place throughout the L.A. region, across geographic and ethnic lines.\textsuperscript{341} While racism and civil rights violations played a role in the uprisings, the violence also revealed “a multiethnic coalition of disenfranchised and poor people” who simultaneously lashed out at the ruling class of their city and at each other.\textsuperscript{342}

Amid the inter-ethnic violence of 1992 was the widespread looting and burning of Korean businesses, which incurred nearly half of the property damage that stemmed from a week of devastating, citywide unrest. The scene was perplexing to an American audience accustomed to understanding race in black and white: newsreels

\textsuperscript{339} Keil, 107.
\textsuperscript{340} Keil, 77.
\textsuperscript{341} Keil, 220.
\textsuperscript{342} Soja, “Los Angeles,” 459.
showed “armed Korean American merchants and their Latino employees standing
guard against the predominantly Latino and African American looters.”

The riots revealed that social polarization in Los Angeles was not merely a
general antagonism of labor and capital but rather a place-specific and complicated
set of ethnic and socioeconomic tensions. Even the Korean population was left
polarized by the end of the ’92 riots. After the riots, a transnational support network
was mobilized in order to raise money for the L.A.-based Koreans who fell victim to
property damage and personal injury. A variety of Korean business associations
emerged, and the leaders of these groups claimed to represent the whole of the city’s
riot-torn Korean population. However, when transnational relief money came in
droves in 1993, it went directly into the hands of a few associations. For years after,
working-class Koreans fought tirelessly for a more just distribution of these funds,
and the Korean community in Los Angeles suffered serious divisions along class
together.

Social polarization, therefore, cannot be studied through a solely economic
nor a solely cultural lens. The case of Koreans in Los Angeles proves that
polarization can exist both between and within class and ethnic groups. While
Friedmann’s and Sassen’s focus on class-based polarization is a well-intentioned and
useful template with which to understand growing social inequality in world cities,
this template is not well-suited to understand the interplay of class and ethnic
relations that has come to define Los Angeles. Thus, even in the age of a globalized

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344Smith, 95-96.
economy, it is not the market that has made Los Angeles, and it is not anonymous capitalists who have polarized it.

By rethinking Los Angeles from outside of the world city paradigm, a new and more accurate narrative emerges for a very well-studied city, it’s local politics, and its manifold social tensions—a narrative that more accurately represents these tensions and is better equipped to make sense of their eruption. But accuracy is not the only reason that Los Angeles needs a new narrative. In his own reimagining of L.A.’s urban history, Michael Peter Smith insists that “globalization must be located on the ground if is to have any practical meaning.” A more practical narrative for Los Angeles is one that illuminates those brief moments of “slippage” when the world city has failed to deliver. It is a narrative that strives to make sense of this failure—to identify who, within the world city, has caused it and who has been most adversely affected. Los Angeles, through this new narrative, becomes a city that was fought over and shaped on the local level. As such, it reveals itself to be both subject to contestation and subject to change.

Part II: Contestations

"It also happens that, if you move along Marozia's compact walls, when you least expect it, you see a crack open and a different city appear. I interpret it this way: Marozia consists of two cities; the second is the one about to free itself from the first."

- Italo Calvino, *Invisible Cities*
Chapter 4: Alternative Cities

Innovation and Contestation in L.A. and Rio

When the world city and global city began to take shape through Sassen’s and Friedmann’s theories, two important impulses in urban research followed. The first and most intentional legacy of the world city hypothesis was the ignition of a scholarly passion for studying world cities and the severe social polarization that arises within them. The second and perhaps unintended legacy has been a surge of scholarly criticism—particularly from outside the global core—that has problematized the world city hierarchy as overly static, Western-centric, and unproductive as a source of social criticism. These critics have attempted to construct an alternative practice of urban research that takes the limits of world city theory as its starting point and seeks to advance new perspectives on globalization and its social consequences.

Although I problematize “neoliberalism” throughout this thesis as an equally limited framework for urban research, it is important to note that the escalating popularity of neoliberal theories of urban change stemmed partly from the need for new world city narratives—particularly ones that could apply to the various market-oriented forms of “urban upgrading” taking hold in the global South. However, the concept of neoliberalism has gradually morphed into the transnational object of blame for the social consequences of urban change: as such, the concept has suffered from a

lack of clarity, a specter of inevitability, and, above all, a sense of hegemony that smothers any semblance of local agency.\textsuperscript{348}

The need to account for local variations of neoliberal hegemony has inspired a growing number of scholars to re-conceptualize neoliberalism as a highly variegated, locally-embedded process of “neoliberalization.”\textsuperscript{349} The concept of neoliberalization has been particularly useful for Brazilian scholars who, as I show in Chapter 2, insist upon the incompleteness of neoliberalization as it emerges alongside national and local political conventions and alternative forms of urban governance. However uneven and incomplete, neoliberalization continues to reproduce itself in new forms and new places, and scholars have also used the concept to contribute to debates about the “doggedness” of neoliberalism as a global paradigm.\textsuperscript{350}

Furthermore, the various forms of neoliberalism that exist between states also evolve within states, as local politics becomes characterized by both neoliberal policy-making and by creative adaptations to “earlier rounds” of neoliberal policy failure.\textsuperscript{351} The study of neoliberalization, therefore, is ultimately the study of local politics, and it strives to uncover the ways in which the idea of neoliberalism becomes embedded, reformed, and adapted over time as the local state must continually recover from the inevitable failures of market rule. In Los Angeles, the failures that stemmed from Bradley’s aggressive pursuit of global capital culminated

\textsuperscript{349} Brenner et al., “Towards Deep Neoliberalization, 43.
\textsuperscript{350} Brenner et al., “Towards Deep Neoliberalization, 43.
\textsuperscript{351} Brenner et al., “Towards Deep Neoliberalization, 32.
in 1992, when the city exploded into unrest and seemed to foreshadow the “imminent demise” of market rule.\(^\text{352}\)

However, in what can best be described as “pacified neoliberalism,” Bradley responded to one of the most dramatic urban uprisings in American history by creating a market-oriented, public-private development agency called “Rebuild L.A.”\(^\text{353}\) Chaired by Peter Ueberroth of 1984 Olympic fame, Rebuild L.A. was yet another project borne from Bradley’s world city imaginary, and it did not stray far from the city’s tradition of subordinating its inner-city poor to the “planning fantasies and speculative real estate activities” of the globally-minded corporate elite.\(^\text{354}\)

More a symbolic “series of pronouncements” than an effective agenda for rebuilding South Central’s injured economy, Rebuild L.A. “limped along” for several years as private investors lost interest in trying to bolster the struggling area.\(^\text{355}\) When the program was officially terminated in 1997, the inner city remained untransformed and deeply impoverished.\(^\text{356}\) Los Angeles continued on its neoliberal trajectory despite the economic downturn, social unrest, and political discord that it had produced in the early nineties. The case of Los Angeles, therefore, reveals the “neoliberal city” to be a dynamic and ever-changing phenomenon where neoliberal restructuring projects and policies are inevitably followed by failure and


\(^{353}\) Keil, 219.

\(^{354}\) Keil, 218.


adaptation. As such, neoliberalization is essentially a “contested, trial-and-error searching process,” the driving forces of which are predominantly local.

Neoliberalization, therefore, is a valuable tool of both representation and criticism: in addition to tracing a global ideology to more accurate representations of its local variations, it also interrogates these local variations by tracing particular, local political projects to their inevitable moments of “contestation and slippage.”

The result is a more accurate and nuanced understanding of local politics as the arena in which a global paradigm becomes a local failure—where global hegemony is reformed, regulated, and perpetuated by local experimentation.

However, even within this critical framework, the scholarly treatment of “contestations, resistances, and social antagonisms” often reduces such dynamics to mere signs of error—signs that the state will ultimately be implored to address. However valuable this political criticism, it suffers from the tendency toward a type of scholarship in which “the only role accorded to contestation can only be the negative one of an obstacle to rule.” Using rule to refer to the dominant political projects within a given territory—that is, those projects most favored by governing bodies, Pat O’Malley, Lorna Weir, and Clifford Shearing raise concern about the tendency, even in critical social theory, to dichotomize contestation and rule. The analytical subordination of contestation to rule in policy studies and social criticism,

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360 Weir, O’Malley, and Clifford, 510.
361 Weir, O’Malley, and Clifford, 510.
they argue, obscures the myriad of ways in which contestation actually shapes rule and becomes constitutive of it through “the systematic provision of alternatives.”

This analytical tendency to separate contestation from rule has “haunted” various strands of contemporary social theory, but it is particularly prevalent in theories of globalization. Because of the presumed hegemony of the global economy, social contestation tends to be reduced to a politics of obstruction by which marginalized groups can—at best—provoke a temporary interruption of an otherwise inevitable, all-powerful ruling project. Certainly, contestation often takes this form: the 1992 L.A. riots are a case in which marginalized groups presented a momentary obstacle to rule—all the while remaining outside of rule and beneath it. The riots served to destabilize Bradley’s ruling project, but it was the Bradley regime that ultimately retained the power to respond to this failure. His response came in the form of Rebuild L.A., a neoliberal policy experiment designed to correct the failure of his world city project while staying true to its major, globally-oriented and market-oriented aspirations. Contestation, in this case, was able to cause the failure of a particular political project but could not respond to it.

This is a case in which a binary distinction between contestation and rule is upheld—contestation served to signal the failure of local politics but did not play a role in correcting this failure. Without dismissing the importance of this moment in Los Angeles’ history, I will argue that this case represents only one way in which

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362 Weir, O’Malley, and Clifford, 513.
363 Weir, O’Malley, and Clifford, 511.
364 Weir, O’Malley, and Clifford, 513.
365 Weir, O’Malley, and Clifford, 510.
contestation and rule have interacted in the city. A closer look at Los Angeles reveals it to be a city full of policy experiments, not all of which derived from neoliberal mentalities or global aspirations.

Most accounts of the policy experiment to which I refer begin in 2001, when the Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice (FCCEJ)—a coalition of residents from a South Central neighborhood called the Figueroa Corridor—negotiated directly with a private developer and produced the “first full-fledged” community benefits agreement (CBA) in American history.\(^{366}\) The so-called Staples Agreement was a historical compromise in which FCCEJ negotiated with the Anschutz Entertainment Group (AEG), the owner and developer of a burgeoning sporting and entertainment complex consisting of the newly built Staples Center and its surrounding areas. By promising to support AEG’s development plans when they went under review by the city government, FCCEJ was able to negotiate an unprecedented, comprehensive set of benefits for the Figueroa Corridor community.\(^{367}\) Among these benefits were AEG’s commitments to a local hiring plan, living wage policies, affordable housing development, job training programs, and other services that would benefit the community.\(^{368}\)

The CBA model, since its initial victory vis-à-vis the Staples Agreement, has gradually transformed from a grassroots policy experiment into a US-wide urban development paradigm. CBA’s have been attempted—with varying degrees of

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\(^{368}\) Haas, 272.
success—in more than fifty different instances in cities such as San Francisco, Oakland, Seattle, New Haven, and Atlanta. About thirty of these attempted CBAs were able to acquire significant and lasting benefits for low-income communities in various cities.\textsuperscript{369} Thus, for many low-income communities, the CBA model has served as a viable political strategy through which they were able to secure greater control over urban development projects that would ultimately impact them greatly.\textsuperscript{370} However, while CBAs have proved to be effective grassroots political tools in cities throughout the United States, it is important to consider why the model had particular, pioneering success in Los Angeles.

As Chapter 3 revealed, South Central L.A. was shaped by decades of severe political, economic, and social exclusion, and the displacement of low-income communities by urban development projects was no exception. At the time of the Staples Agreement, the inner-city communities of Los Angeles were already marked by a long history of contestation—a history far too rich to be reduced to a momentary eruption in 1992. In 1985, when the city government tried to build a waste incinerator in South Central, local residents formed one of the city’s first environmental justice coalitions and effectively blocked the project.\textsuperscript{371} Furthermore, the Latino residents of South Central have challenged, time and again, the assumption in labor politics that immigrants—and particularly undocumented workers—could not be organized. South Central’s history is marked by a steady increase in the unionization of immigrant

\textsuperscript{369} Raffol, “Community Benefits.”
\textsuperscript{370} Raffol, “Community Benefits.”
labor as well as successful campaigns in which immigrant workers organized themselves.\textsuperscript{372}

The roots of FCCEJ, in fact, trace back to a group called the Coalition for a Responsible USC. The group formed in 1998 in an effort to support a three-year struggle among mostly undocumented food and service workers to unionize. These workers, most of whom were Latino residents of South Central, desired better treatment as employees of the University of Southern California (USC). A private university that sits on the other side of the Figueroa Corridor—opposite what is now the Staples Center—USC has not only employed and exploited South Central residents but threatened their communities with its ever-expanding development plans.\textsuperscript{373} As such, this coalition grew increasingly concerned about local development politics, broadening its membership, widening its scope, and changing its name to the FCCEJ. By the time that negotiations began for Staples Agreement, FCCEJ had reached an impressive breadth that included labor organizations, environmental justice groups, immigrants’ and tenants’ rights advocates, and other well-organized groups.

While the successful negotiation of the Staples Agreement is often attributed to Strategic Actions for a Just Economy (SAJE)—one of FCCEJ’s most well-known member organizations—even SAJE’s then-executive director Gilda Haas emphasizes the fact that SAJE was a “relative newcomer” to a community that was very accustomed to defending itself against large-scale development projects. The success


\textsuperscript{373} Saito, 28-29.
of the Staples Agreement, Haas argues, cannot be understood if not through a locally-specific and long-term lens. South Central is a network of communities that—through a long history of contestation—has found ways to make their goals overlap. The unprecedented breadth that FCCEJ was able to achieve is attributable to this local history. And it was this breadth that enabled the coalition to become a legitimate interest group in the eyes of City Hall, and, therefore, a strong negotiator in relation to AEG.

Thus, Haas cautions against remembering the Staples Agreement as the triumphant moment to which all CBA successes can be traced. FCCEJ and the various organized groups from which the coalition’s negotiating power derived, Haas clarifies, “were not created with the idea of producing a CBA.” Rather, they were reacting to a long-term problem of political exclusion in the best way they could—by inserting their voices and visions into local development politics. The sports and entertainment district surrounding the Staples Center was a $2.5 billion development project designed to be the “Times Square” of Los Angeles. The project—evoking one of the most emblematic images of America’s leading world city—would undoubtedly be an easy sell in an aspiring world city. Blocking the project from being implemented, therefore, was never on the table: the best that FCCEJ could do was to negotiate.

And while much of FCCEJ’s bargaining power derived from a long history of contestation and coalition building in South Central, it is important to acknowledge the ways in which the success of the Staples Agreement also depended on the

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374 Haas, 273.
375 Haas, 276.
376 Saito, 3.
developer: when AEG published a press release about the agreement, after all, it was identical to FCCEJ’s—save for the name at the top. Thus, an analysis of the agreement’s success is incomplete without an analysis of the local factors that made AEG particularly amenable to compromise.

Generally, CBA’s are most successful when private developers are most willing to negotiate—a willingness that is directly related to their need to acquire permits and subsidies from the city government. As Chapter 3 revealed, Los Angeles is a city where urban development is highly contentious—particularly between downtown elites and the city’s equally affluent slow-growth advocates. As such, developers working in Los Angeles are accustomed to conflict, and approval is often harder to come by in a city whose government must juggle competing development goals. In the case of the Staples Agreement, therefore, AEG was prepared to make concessions in order to expedite its project through a contentious political arena—particularly because a new local election cycle was set to begin later that year.

Diverging greatly from dominant narratives about oppositional politics, both negotiating parties in the Staples Agreement—not just FCCEJ—were invested in reaching a quick and satisfactory compromise. In the case of AEG’s development project, therefore, “contestation” and “rule” were not so vehemently opposed. FCCEJ’s ultimate goal was not to obstruct the project but to co-facilitate a process of negotiation and compromise. In this sense, the Staples Agreement was an exercise in the micro-politics for which Los Angeles is famous—its ultimate goal being to

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377 Haas, 275.
378 Raffol, “Community Benefits”
379 Haas, 277.
reconcile competing development visions for the Figueroa Corridor. However, the prevailing scholarly assumption that class antagonism dominates world city politics obscures the fact that the politics of negotiation that gave way to the Staples Agreement is not unlike the private bargaining strategy of Los Angeles’ slow-growth elites. As a political strategy, therefore, bargaining rules Los Angeles, and FCCEJ proved that it is not a form of contestation that is reserved for the rich.

The Staples Agreement is an important reminder that, in seeking to reinsert local agency into globalization narratives, these narratives must still resist the tendency to reserve local agency for local politicians or traditionally powerful interest groups. Los Angeles’ pioneering CBA revealed an instance when two, traditionally polarized groups—a major corporation and a poor inner-city community—sat around the same table and, together, reshaped local development politics. A case in which contestation actually became constitutive of rule, the Staples Agreement is an example of how grassroots political projects can and do become practicable techniques of rule and reform.

As I have mentioned throughout this thesis, the scholarly tendency to weigh global hegemony too heavily in analyses of local politics obscures the ways in which local power dynamics shape global processes as they arrive in world cities. In Chapter 2, I explored the ways in which Brazil challenges assumptions about neoliberal hegemony and proves that neoliberalization is an uneven, hybridizing process in which neoliberal political projects almost always co-exist with alternatives. Just as Latin America has served as a “laboratory” for neoliberal politics,\textsuperscript{380} it has also

\textsuperscript{380} Peck et al., “Postneoliberalism,” 97.
become one of the “principal proving grounds” of alternative forms of governance and “extra-neoliberal” forms of rule.\textsuperscript{381}

For the purpose of assigning agency where it is deserved, however, an analysis of Brazilian politics must not merely acknowledge the “strange collision between neoliberalization and democratization” that ultimately led to passage of the City Statute in Brazil.\textsuperscript{382} An analysis of the City Statute must acknowledge the decades of social mobilization that drove this collision, spearheaded by the grassroots actors that struggled tirelessly to insert their vision of a social rights-based program of urban reform into the national and municipal political projects that governed them.

The City Statute’s central idea that the primacy of individualistic property-based rights in cities should be subordinated to collective social rights—and that informal favela residents are particularly entitled to such rights—was not an invention of any arm of the Brazilian state. Rather, it was the primary demand of favela residents, civil society organizations, and other grassroots groups—a demand that came from the most marginal segments of Brazil’s rapidly and inequitably developing cities.\textsuperscript{383} As I explained in Chapter 2, Articles 182 and 183 of Brazil’s new constitution—the foundations of the City Statute—were the innovations of traditionally powerless groups.\textsuperscript{384} Furthermore, during the nineties—when these constitutional provisions lacked legal enforceability—these same marginalized

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groups and the NGOs that supported them reunited under the name of the National Forum for Urban Reform (FNRU) and pressed for the creation of the City Statute.\textsuperscript{385}

The urban social movements whose mobilization and innovation gave way to the City Statute, therefore, must be understood apart from the tendency to dichotomize contestation and rule. The FNRU denied their exteriority to rule until they successfully penetrated it, transforming national and urban politics irrevocably with their own alternative visions and procedures for urban governance. Since the passage of the City Statute in Brazil, mobilizations for national urban reform have emerged throughout the world, and the groundbreaking legislation has even compelled the United Nations to craft a new charter for urban social rights.\textsuperscript{386} On the global level, therefore, neoliberal hegemony has been constrained not only by a country within the global periphery, but by the most marginalized within that country—by an innovative urban reform project that now constitutes not only Brazilian politics but has also shaped the “visions of emancipation and equity” that circulate globally.\textsuperscript{387}

Notoriously missing from theories of globalization, therefore, are the ways in which even the most marginalized of local political projects have successfully inserted themselves into the global ideoscape. Traditionally powerless groups in both Rio and Los Angeles created innovative, extra-neoliberal political projects that have resounded on the local, national, and global scales. The Staples agreement created a community development paradigm that swept across the United States, and Rio’s City

\textsuperscript{386} Fernandes, “Right To the City,” 202.
\textsuperscript{387} Appadurai, \textit{governmentality}, 25.
Statute has catapulted to global significance. The marginalized, in these cases, were innovators—their contestations did not simply interrupt rule but became constitutive of it. Once again, to insist upon the subordination of contestation to rule is to insist upon a world in which the ruling powers innovate and experiment and the marginalized obstruct and resist.

However, while it is important to illuminate these significant triumphs in grassroots urban politics, narratives that aim to expose the political agency and creativity of marginalized groups must also acknowledge the persistence of systemic oppression and implacable power imbalances on a global, national, and local scale.\textsuperscript{388}

As I explained in Chapter 2, various instruments of urban reform that stemmed from City Statute—such as CEPACs, the Minha Casa Minha Vida housing program, and the Morar Carioca urbanization program—were actually used to justify forced and illegitimate favela removals throughout Rio de Janeiro. As such, the case of Rio exemplifies the harsh reality that, even where contestation triumphs, traditionally powerful groups still have the utmost authority to regulate these triumphs. Thus, even where innovative and equitable procedures of governance exist, they may be implemented exceptionally, unjustly, or not at all.\textsuperscript{389}

Vila Autódromo, the community that I introduced as the neighbor of Olympic Park, is a case of the sobering limits of contestation as an exclusive and undemocratic Olympic city takes shape in Rio de Janeiro. As I explained in Chapter 2, Vila Autódromo continues to struggle against four years of eviction threats in anticipation


\textsuperscript{389} Appadurai, governmentality, 29.
of 2016. In October of 2011, the SMH visited the community and notified its residents that mandated relocations would begin in one month, when the Olympic Park PPP—a municipal concession of public land to a group of private businesses—took effect. For Vila Autódromo, the compensation would—as for most other favelas throughout the city being threatened with removal—come in the form of a MCMV apartment complex called “Parque Carioca”.

The earliest justification for Vila Autódromo’s removal was due to its location on the margins of the Jacarepaguá Lagoon. A perceived site of “environmental risk,” Vila Autódromo is a case in point of the ways in which an environmentalist discourse has gradually and perversely morphed into a justification for Olympic development projects. Over time, Olympic Park development plans elucidated the fact that what would ultimately replace Vila Autódromo on the edge of the Lagoon would not be a more sustainable landscape, but a new network of access roads connecting Olympic Park to a new transportation hub in Barra da Tijuca. Today, the justification for the community’s removal continues to boast of an Olympic legacy, linking this legacy to post-City Statute conventions of urban reform by releasing sentimental, city-sponsored videos of Vila Autódromo residents adjusting to life in their brand new, Parque Carioca apartments.

While many residents have fought to stay in the neighborhood, some families have been happily resettled in Parque Carioca and have touted the new complex for

391 Megaeventos e Violações, 25.
its amenities, which include a community pool, close proximity to a school, and improved access to bus lines.\textsuperscript{393} Since its March 2014 opening, Parque Carioca has been regarded as a model for improving low-income housing without breaking the “social and cultural ties” that are often firmly embedded in informal housing communities. The new complex is located less than a mile from Vila Autódromo.\textsuperscript{394} However, despite its positive resolution for some, Vila Autódromo exemplifies the undemocratic violation of due process that is abusing favela residents citywide: “risk” was not proven before relocation was mandated, and participation in the resettlement process was denied.\textsuperscript{395}

In national and international media outlets, Vila Autodromo has emerged as a “symbol of resistance” in the next Olympic City.\textsuperscript{396} In reality, the community is marked by four years of sustained contestation during which major triumphs have almost invariably been followed by devastating disappointments. The community’s struggle began in October of 2011, when Mayor Paes insisted that the community would be removed unless they could come up with an alternative. Taking Paes’ advice, Vila Autódromo residents and community leaders teamed up with architects and urban planning scholars from two local universities—and the Vila Autódromo Popular Plan was born.\textsuperscript{397} The Popular Plan—containing concrete plans to address the community’s major housing, sanitation, and public service deficits—is a grassroots

\begin{footnotes}
\item[395] Megaeventos e Violações, 43.
\item[396] Tanaka, “Vila Autodromo”
\item[397] Tanaka, “Vila Autodromo”
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favela-upgrading plan claiming that, to truly align with the demands of the City Statute, the municipal government should not only grant favelas the right to urbanize but should allow them to define what their urbanization should look like.\textsuperscript{398}

The plan was the result of the tireless organization of community meetings, assemblies, and technical workshops, which allowed the community to complete a first draft of the plan in less than two months.\textsuperscript{399} As Vila Autódromo residents were putting the finishing touches on their Popular Plan, they received the official announcement, in 2012, that development plans for Olympic Park would necessitate the total removal of their community. The primary technical reason for removal of the community—none of which is within the boundaries of Olympic Park—was always to make way for wider and more extravagant access routes into the Park. This technical reason continued to be fortified by the two major discourses governing the Olympic city: one which has castigated the community as a threat to the national environment, and the other which promised the community a better life—courtesy of Olympic-led urban reform—in the Parque Carioca apartment complex.

The community’s Popular Plan had an answer that should have satisfied both of these purported reasons for removal. The “Infrastructure and Environment” section promises to bring the community back in line with the city’s environmental law—which stipulates that the Jacarepaguá Lagoon must be protected by a 15 meter margin of environmental protection.\textsuperscript{400} Furthermore, the plan proposed a comprehensive sanitation program that would address the major areas of environmental degradation


\textsuperscript{399}Tanaka, “Vila Autodromo”

\textsuperscript{400}Plano Popular, 18.
in the community and in its surrounding areas. With respect to housing, the Popular Plan politely refuses City Hall’s offers of a better life in Parque Carioca and instead includes a comprehensive plan for housing that will account for diversity in terms of family size and needs and offer relocation—within the community—for those residents whose homes are technically proven to be precarious.\footnote{Plano Popular, 18.}

Furthermore, the Popular Plan included proposals for a crèche, school, and a new public transport post that would bring necessary public services to those community members who wanted to stay put. The total cost of the Popular Plan was an estimated R$14 million, while government spending to relocate the community to Parque Carioca has already reached R$115 million.\footnote{Mendonça, Renata, and Jefferson Puff. "Riscos, Pressão, E Escombros: A Rotina De Quem Desafia as Remoções Da Rio 2016." BBC News. BBC, 9 Mar. 2015. Web. 10 Apr. 2015.} Despite earning praise as a symbol of resistance, Vila Autódromo never once attempted to obscure the Olympic Park project and is actually claiming rights to which its residents are legally entitled. In addition to possessing the right to democratic urban reform, the community, as I explained in Chapter 2, is also in possession of a more concrete right to remain where they are—a land use permit from Rio’s state government.

Despite the social and legal rights to which the community is entitled, their presentation of the Popular Plan never received a response from City Hall, and eviction threats continued. Since the announcement of the Olympic Park PPP, Vila Autódromo has been marked by “the daily presence” of city employees, reminding residents that their removal was imminent and pressuring them to sign a “unilateral document” that would put their homes and their futures in City Hall’s hands.\footnote{Tanaka, “Vila Autodromo”}

of the community resisted emphatically, continuing to mobilize around the demands laid out in the Popular Plan and, increasingly, gaining international recognition. In December of 2013 came their first major triumph: the community received the Deutsche Bank Urban Age Award, which recognized the Popular Plan as an innovative and impressive vision of democratic urban development. The award directed an $80,000 prize toward the implementation of the Popular Plan, which community leaders decided should begin with the construction of a much-needed crèche.404

But the award meant nothing to City Hall and its leaders, who continued to emphasize that the Parque Carioca complex would be complete with all the amenities—including a crèche—that its residents would need. The pressure for eviction has only mounted as civil servants continued to roam the neighborhood, tempting children with photos of the Parque Carioca swimming pool and negotiating privately with each family—often with inconsistent offers that serve to cause tensions within the community and steer many residents away from a common goal.405

Ultimately, about half of the community signed up for relocation and, in March of 2014, the bulldozers arrived. The destruction of Vila Autódromo has been rapid and severe—and City Hall has left the wreckage to prove it.406 For those who remain in the community, they must live among the fallen concrete, dust clouds, and broken

404 Tanaka, “Vila Autodromo”
406 Mendonça and Puff
glass of their neighbors’ homes. The difficulty of these living conditions continues to force people to accept relocation.\textsuperscript{407}

In early March of 2015, forty-three of the remaining 131 families declared their continuing desire to resist eviction to the Public Defender, who is prepared to challenge Rio’s City Hall on its violation of a state land-use permit. On March 20, Mayor Paes announced that he would utilize the city’s eminent domain laws to refute the Public Defender and necessitate the eviction of 58 remaining families. Since then, while some families reversed their commitment to stay and accepted relocation, others have vigorously affirmed their intention to stay: on April 3, 2015, a group of residents stopped construction workers from entering the Olympic Park site as the countdown to Rio 2016 reached 500 days.\textsuperscript{408}

Despite its award-winning strategy of contestation, its legal and constitutional backing, and proposal of a more affordable and equally accommodating alternative for local development, Vila Autódromo’s four-year struggle is coming to a laudable yet unpromising conclusion. While this case study might appear less triumphant than to deserve inclusion in this project, I have chosen to include it for precisely this reason. A scholarship insistent upon global hegemony as the driver of world cities is one in which contestation has no hope of constituting rule. As such, the forms of resistance—if any—that are included in this scholarship are those with the most

\textsuperscript{407} Mendonça and Puff

“oppositional consciousness” and the most blatantly obstructive tactics and disruptive effects.\textsuperscript{409}

My intention in choosing the aforementioned cases of contestation was neither to glorify their particular politics of accommodation and negotiation nor to denounce those contestations bent on confrontation or violence. I have not argued for the agency of marginalized groups in order to pacify their politics, but rather I hope to draw attention to the ways in which state power and systemic domination over the lives of the urban poor is often unassailable. Even Henri Lefebvre—who theorized everyday agency and self-determination as the only route to a more just city—painted “a rather bleak picture” of social contestation. In the lives of a city’s most marginalized, contestation is possible yet infrequent and exists in spaces that are “alienated, oppressive, and full of compliance with hegemonic rule.”\textsuperscript{410}

Since Lefebvre was writing in the 1970s, the global economy has concentrated its power and extended its reach. As such, his words hold an even greater weight in drawing attention to the “constant barrage of real threats to life and space that frequently assails the poor.”\textsuperscript{411} Both L.A.’s Figueroa Corridor and Rio’s Vila Autódromo exemplify these threats, and the lives of these communities are marked by the continuous need to respond to this “constant barrage” in order to minimize the real harm to which these threats might give way.

\textsuperscript{411} Appadurai, 24.
In the opening of her personal summary of the Staples Agreement, Gilda Haas introduces what is generally thought to be a renowned grassroots triumph on a peculiar note of ambivalence: “I was ambivalent [after the Staples victory] because what I really wanted—community control over development whose primary purpose is to serve human needs—was never really on the table.” She continues to write in a sobering tone, insisting that no one wants to live next to a stadium or a sporting complex, but that these developments must go somewhere. As such, Haas explains, they are directed toward those neighborhoods—like the Figueroa Corridor or Vila Autódromo—that are “invisible” in the eyes of global capital and unimportant in the eyes of the local state.

I chose to represent these communities, therefore, to highlight their agency, admire their innovation, and acknowledge the day-to-day oppression with which they invariably must contend. There is a long tradition in critical theory, argue O’Malley et al., to identify resistance at the end of each article, to judge this resistance by its success or failure, and to seek marginalized subjects “who finally come into their own, preferably heroically.” This treatment of resistance—this need for case studies of heroism, optimism, or outright reprisal—is the logical counterpart of scholarly narratives that are premised on the immovable and uncompromising nature of global hegemony. However, a scholarship centered on local agency will find value and potential in other forms of contestation—ones that effectively expand the

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412 Haas, 272.
413 Haas, 274.
414 Governmentality, Criticism, Politics, 512.
political horizon or, as Appadurai explains, “the outer limits of aspiration within which concrete plans, strategies, and hopes among the poor are nurtured.”

Under the domination of the global economy, the political horizons of the urban poor are undoubtedly constrained. The first three chapters of this thesis are, in part, intended to prove this. My intention has been to acknowledge these constraints while insisting that the global economy is not the only force doing the constraining. The goal of dissecting hegemonic narratives into political programs and local actors, therefore, is to more accurately represent local power and politics and, in so doing, to maximize the possible ways in which such power can be contested. Ultimately, I argue throughout this thesis in favor of world city narratives that take the city as their starting point. Capable of straddling the global and local and interrogating the actual and the possible, alternative world city narratives must seek to study the urban political horizon by both accurately representing its outer limits and continuing to push them further outward.

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