

The Nervous Fibres of the Individual:
Mechanisms of the Mind in
Three Mid-Eighteenth-Century English Novels

by

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Class of 2008

A thesis submitted to the
faculty of Wesleyan University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Bachelor of Arts
with Departmental Honors in History

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Acknowledgements

Don't die, Señor; your grace should take my advice and live for many years, because the greatest madness a man can commit in this life is to let himself die, just like that, without anybody killing him or any other hands ending his life except those of melancholy. Look, don't be lazy, but get up from that bed and let's go to the countryside dressed as shepherds, just like we arranged: maybe behind some bush we'll find Señora Doña Dulcinea disenchanted, as pretty as you please. If you're of sorrow over being defeated, blame me for that and say you were toppled because I didn't tighten Rocinante's cinches; besides, your grace must have seen in your books of chivalry that it's a very common thing for one knight to topple another, and for the one's vanquished today to be the victor tomorrow.

--Cervantes, *Don Quixote*, Second Part, Chapter LXXIV, p. 937

This project would not be what it is without the guidance of Cecilia Miller. In addition to doing more than any advisor should do for a thesis advisee, she introduced me to both Intellectual History and Cervantes' *Don Quixote*. Additionally, my gratitude goes to Jamie Cohen-Cole for his knowledge on the History of Science, to Suzy Taraba for both her efforts in Special Collections and her vast knowledge of the History of the Book, to Jesse Nasta in the Writing Workshop for asking good questions and providing even better feedback, to Madeleine Howenstine for her edits, but also for giving me a glimmer of hope, and to Emily Rosenberger, Lauren Rothman, and Becca Worby for their critical pens.

I owe my thanks to all those people who, like Sancho Panza, told me not to die: Those who mailed chocolate to me, called me, made dinner for me, ate ice cream with me, bought ice cream for me, commiserated with me, studied with me, left notes for me, decorated my desk, came to visit me in the basement, put up with me, brought Saturday excursions to me, and generally left me feeling like I wanted to dress up and go to the countryside.

And to my parents, for first introducing me to books.

Introduction

...it seems to me that the books called novels of chivalry are prejudicial to the nation, and though I, moved by a false and idle taste, have read the beginning of almost every one that has ever been published, I have never been able to read any from beginning to end, because it seems to me they are all essentially the same, and one is no different from another.

--Cervantes, *Don Quixote*, First Part, Chapter XLVII, p. 411¹

Reconceptualizing Enlightenment Thought

Eighteenth-century British thinkers, particularly early anatomists and social theorists, were intensely concerned with the brain, or in its more philosophical form, the mind. Anatomists dissected and named even the most minute pieces of the brain, which further emphasized its machine-like qualities. Social theorists, however, cared little about the anatomic and tangible brain, but examined its many different functions. In other words, anatomists studied the brain as an object, whereas social theorists were concerned with how the brain was the cause of the individual's actions. This maintains a distinction between an object's physical properties and how those properties contribute to its function. Despite these differing methods, both groups of thinkers arrived at similar conclusions, which, like intellectual historian Peter Gay, stressed reason to be the defining quality of the Enlightenment.

¹ Miguel de Cervantes, *Don Quixote*, trans. Edith Grossman (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2003). All direct quotations from Cervantes' *Don Quixote* have been taken from this translation.

Anatomists contended that reason, or rational organization, was responsible for the construction of the individual's anatomical nervous system, which suggests that in order to know an individual, one must know how he is made. In 1665, Danish anatomist, Leuwenhoek, made strides in the study of the nervous system by reconceptualizing the nerve as being constructed of nervous fibres, which is still markedly similar to how the nerve is viewed by modern scientists. Additionally, Boerhaaves's *Institutiones medicae* (1708), Porterfield's *An essay concerning the motions of our eyes* (1737), Bayne's *A new essay on the nerves* (1739), Monro's *The Anatomy of Human Bones and Nerves* (1746), and Hartley's *Observations on Man* (1749), all stress the rational organization of man's internal structures.² These anatomists focused on the machine-like qualities of the individual, implying that man could be understood in terms of his parts. Anatomists were limited, however, in their understanding of the physical brain due to technological constraints preventing them from understanding the nerves' physiological mechanisms, leaving both a gap in the knowledge and an opening for which a new method could examine the mind.

Social theorists, thus, emphasized how the individual's propensity to act reasonably emanated from the mind, insisting that the individual must be understood in terms of his actions. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century British Enlightenment theorists such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume, and Adam Smith examined different ways in which individual's ability to think reasonably would lead to the formation of organized social structures. Hobbes viewed reason as a tool used in the creation of government. To a certain extent, Locke viewed the individual's

² C. U. M. Smith, "Chronology," in *Brain, Mind and Medicine: Essays in Eighteenth-Century Neuroscience*, ed. Harry Whitaker, C. U. M. Smith and Stanley Finger (New York, NY: Springer Science, 2007), 6-7.

development of reason as a means by which to organize the individual into his worldly context. Hume and Smith, however, maintained that an individual's actions are caused by his faculty of reason, but they also note the existence of the individual's other mental faculties of emotion and morality. Social theorists reinforce the idea of reason as a definitive Enlightenment ideal, but as the eighteenth-century progressed, the prominence of the individual's faculty of reason became nuanced to include man's faculties of emotion and also of morality.

To move to a specific example, many eighteenth-century English novels bolster the mental faculties of emotion and morality and at least implicitly insist that if one desires an understanding of the totality of life, it is necessary to investigate the three dominant mental faculties: reason, emotion, and morality. The eighteenth-century is often termed as the time of the rise of the English novel. The prominence of the novel also highlights that anatomists' texts and social theorists' texts did not monopolize eighteenth-century English intellectual culture. An examination of eighteenth-century English novelists, instead, yields a representation of the mind that is markedly different than the conception of the mind arrived at by the anatomists and social theorists. Samuel Richardson's highly popular eighteenth-century novel *Clarissa: Or the History of a Young Lady* (1748) depicts a young Clarissa who is so driven by her morality such that she defies her parents' wishes to marry an aristocratic man, and dies as a result. Novels suggest that the individual's mental faculties compel action, but there is a seemingly greater importance of morality and emotion in the novels. It is the case that those individuals who read novels may view the Enlightenment differently than anatomists and social theorists.

Another advantage to examining the novels is that with growing literacy rates, including more women readers, novels captivated a wider audience than either anatomy texts or social treatises, which implies that it is through the novel that one can understand more fully the popular view of the mind's faculties in the eighteenth century. Roy Porter, an expert on eighteenth-century England, argues:

The choice as to whether we see the Enlightenment principally as an elite movement, spearheaded by a small, illustrious band, or view it instead as a tide of opinion advancing upon a broad front, obviously colours our judgment of its impact.³

This thesis follows Porter's idea by emphasizing how popular novels, which had become a part of eighteenth-century English culture, can afford new ideas regarding how the mind was viewed.

Popular novels, such as the ultra-popular *Don Quixote* genre incorporate the three mental faculties—reason, emotion, and morality—and give insight as to how the mind would have appeared to a literate population. These imitations retain some of the main thematic concerns of *Don Quixote*—travel, friendship, romantic love, and most importantly, madness. Tobias Smollett's *The Life and Adventures of Sir Launcelot Greaves* (1760) examines Lockean conceptions of reason and the formation of ideas. Charlotte Lennox's *The Female Quixote* (1752) contours a woman whose madness is defined by sixteenth-century French Romances influencing how she conceives of emotions. And Henry Fielding's *The History of the Adventures of Joseph Andrews and his Friend Mr. Abraham Adams* (1742) depicts a man who is so moral that he is essentially stagnant. These novels, by examining these very different faculties of the mind, contribute to an eighteenth-century discussion that was

³ Roy Porter, *The Enlightenment* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities International Press, 1990), 6.

occurring in many academic circles and aimed to understand how these three faculties interacted within an individual in order to lead to self-consciousness and autonomy.⁴

These three novels could be taken as a point of convergence for the anatomical and philosophical interpretations of the mind, thus contending that the individual must be conceived of in terms of his relationship with each of these mental faculties. Smollett's novel suggests that the faculty of reason allows the individual to achieve self-consciousness by following a deductive path. Deduction is defined in this thesis as a larger project from which something is taken. As will be argued, an individual's immaterial ideas constitute this larger project. Lennox's novel, however, conceives of the individual in terms of her relationship with emotion. The mental faculty of emotion allows the individual to achieve self-consciousness by following an inductive path. Induction is defined here as developing something larger from smaller pieces, and in thesis, the small fibres will be viewed as the pieces used to create the larger entity. Fielding's novel contends that the mental faculty of morality is the quintessential element of the individual, acting as a link between reason and emotion, and also, a link between the deductive and inductive pathways. The novels provide these mechanisms of the mind's faculties, but the eighteenth-century individual and his mind virtually never existed in complete isolation from society, but rather the mind caused social interactions in both the public and private spheres.

This thesis takes as its specific task the study of three novels that were popular in England during the eighteenth-century in order to provide a more complete

⁴ Daniel N. Robinson, *An Intellectual History of Psychology* (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1976), 8. Robinson contends that it in an attempt to study "an intellectual history of psychology, one must be concerned with far more than academic psychology." Robinson understands psychology to mean how a person thinks. For that reason, his study of psychology spans from the Hellenic Age, even though the term psychology had not been created, to nineteenth-century scientific psychology.

representation of the brain—and the more philosophically, the mind—as it compares to typical British Enlightenment thinkers. However, many relevant themes are still neglected. This thesis examines only the English Enlightenment, thus ignoring the French Enlightenment, including Diderot’s *Encyclopédie* published between (1751 and 1772). Similarly, this thesis examines a textual intersection between English literature and advances in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English anatomy, thus an intersection between literature and science. However, it does not begin to do justice to the topic of incorporating scientific thinkers into larger intellectual debates. This thesis must also forego a discussion of Spanish culture, and does not begin to examine Cervantes’ masterpiece *Don Quixote* itself. Rather, this thesis examines imitations of *Don Quixote*, and while they provide much insight into an Enlightenment conception of the mind, they pale in comparison to the work on which they are based.

Historiography

Eighteenth-century novels are beginning to gain attention as a catalyst for change in the eighteenth century. In her 2007 book *Inventing Human Rights: A History*, Lynn Hunt argues that the eighteenth-century is marked by “changes in reactions to other people’s bodies and selves.”⁵ Novels emphasized autonomy—the idea that an individual could govern himself—by making the point that “all people

⁵ Lynn Hunt, *Inventing Human Rights: A History* (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc, 2007), 30.

are fundamentally similar because of their inner feelings.”⁶ Hunt contends that novels had extraordinary impact on the readers, and even if that impact was not as strong as Hunt suggests, novels apparently did have a psychological impact on the individual and influenced his conception of the world. It is thus possible that the eighteenth-century English imitations of *Don Quixote* influenced the reader’s conceptions of the mind’s faculties and ways of achieving self-consciousness and autonomy.

The emphasis in these novels was on the space available to the individual in the public and private sphere. Eighteenth-century political relationships were emerging in the wake of Thomas Hobbes’ radical seventeenth-century political and religious treatise *Leviathan* (1651). Although Hobbes’ work was for various, often contradictory reasons, considered radically extreme, it emphasizes how a political entity organizes and maintains the security of a group of people:

it is not the Length of Time that maketh the Authority, but the Will of the Sovereign signified by his Silence, (for Silence is sometimes an argument of Consent;)...⁷

Recent historians, such as Linda Colley, in *Britons: Forging a Nation, 1707-1837*, emphasize Britain’s authority, as exemplified by its Act of Union in 1707, the Nine Years’ War with France, the War of Spanish Succession, the wars of Jenkins’ Ear and Austrian Succession, the Seven Years War and the wars against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France.⁸ Colley argues that these political tendencies cultivated ideas—of Protestantism, capitalism, and royalty—and were the driving forces in the creation

⁶ Hunt, *Making Human Rights*, 39.

⁷ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (New York, NY: Penguin Book, 1968, first published 1651), Part II, Ch. 26, p. 313.

⁸ Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 52.

of Britain and “for the British to look anxiously and inquiringly inwards.”⁹ Colley’s work, however, examines very few individuals, and is inclined to think of Britain as a holistic entity. As such, it suggests an individual’s identity is influenced primarily by what occurs on a national level, but this approach to eighteenth-century history diminishes the role of the individuals that lived in eighteenth-century Britain.

Did eighteenth-century Britons exhibit more autonomy in the private sphere than in the public sphere, despite the requirements to adhere to set cultural stereotypes? G. J. Barker-Benfield’s *The Culture of Sensibility: Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain*, contends that the eighteenth-century family was created in accordance with the long-standing stereotype that men were more inclined to reason whereas women were more inclined to feel emotion. However, both male and female individuals exhibited some elements of agency. Barker-Benfield, however, contends that sensibility was vastly present in eighteenth-century culture. This idea of sensibility creates an importance of the individual’s body and suggests that the individual, not the government, is largely responsible for how he acts:

“Sensibility” signified revolution, promised freedom, threatened subversion, and became convention. The word denoted the receptivity of the senses and referred to the psychoperceptual scheme explained and systematized by Newton and Locke. It connoted the operation of the nervous system, the material basis for consciousness. During the eighteenth century, this psychoperceptual scheme became a paradigm, meaning not only consciousness in general but a particular kind of consciousness, one that could be further sensitized in order to be more acutely responsive to signals from outside environment and from inside the body.¹⁰

This notion of sensibility allowed individuals to feel, or connect with, certain emotions and effectively lead reform on the public sphere, including the reformation

⁹ Colley, *Britons*, 4.

¹⁰ G. J. Barker-Benfield, *The Culture of Sensibility: Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), xvii.

of male manners, female consumerism, and most profoundly, redefining women as being more equal to men.

Eighteenth-century nerve theory incorporated itself into the eighteenth-century novel, suggesting that science and literature are capable of co-existing in order to achieve a larger goal. George S. Rousseau, a pre-eminent scholar of the nerve, contends that the nerve has incorporated itself into modern literature.¹¹ However, he suggests that the two seemingly disparate entities have intermingled in an attempt to answer a larger question. In his 2004 essay “Nerves: At the Intersection Between Science and Culture,” he argues that Tobias Smollett incorporates the anatomical nerve into the novel and that “science and literature were perhaps never so close in their ultimate aims than in the century (1680-1780) that discovered imagination.”¹² Thus, George Rousseau highlights how literature and science may have the same long-term goals, but the different disciplines approach the problem manifestly differently.

Science and literature are interdependent, meaning that science can contribute to ideas raised in literature, and literature can expand on questions raised by science. Examining a later time than the eighteenth century, Jonah Lehrer’s 2007 book *Proust was a Neuroscientist* contends that artists arrive at scientific principles before the

¹¹ George S. Rousseau, “Originated Neurology,” in *Nervous Acts: Essays on Literature, Culture and Sensibility*, ed. George Rousseau (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 6. George Rousseau contends that neurology is both a facet of culture and inherently interdisciplinary. He attributes his general interest in neurology to a reading of John Evelyn that explains neurology, or the study of nerves, in religious terms: “The soul, as seated more conspicuously in the brain, doe, but the originated neurology, give intercourse to animal spirits.” This combines elements of religion and neurology.

¹² George Rousseau, “Science and the Discovery of the Imagination in Enlightened England,” in *Nervous Acts: Essays on Literature, Culture and Sensibility*, ed. George Rousseau (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 86

scientists.¹³ The most prominent example is taken from Marcel Proust's 1913 work, *In Search of Lost Time*. In this work, the unnamed narrator eats a Madeleine, and the taste of that sweet cake reminds the narrator of his hometown Combray, suggesting that memory and the sense of taste are related. As neuroscientist Rachel Herz explains in the late 1990's, this is because memory, smell, and taste are all performed by the same piece of the brain—the hippocampus. In this way, through literature, Proust espoused an idea of science through one of his “deep insights...that our senses of smell and taste bear a unique burden on memory” that would later be proven by modern science. Thus the literature predated the science.¹⁴ Barbara Naumann suggests, however, that this is not a one-way relationship; she contends that literature is capable of creating itself from scientific ideas by “incorporating a level of self-reflection into the representation of scientific processes without itself being involved in a particular science.”¹⁵ This illustrates how science has allowed for the creation of literature. Although these two academics suggest science and literature cooperatively exist, others are more skeptical.

The innate differences between science and literature suggest that they do not coalesce perfectly, but rather, they must retain partially separate identities. In their article “Tearing Down the Wall: Literature and Science,” Warren B. Westcott and J. Everett Spell maintain that science and literature are incapable of coexisting in a sort of utopian manner; when they exist together, one becomes inherently weaker than it would be if it existed independently:

¹³ Jonah Lehrer, *Proust was a Neuroscientist* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2007).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 80.

¹⁵ Barbara Naumann, “Introduction: Science and Literature,” *Science in Context* 18, no. 4 (2005), http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FSIC%2FSIC18_04%2FS0269889705000645a.pdf&code=a153f0d56c2fd2475695a37a3d8fa71f

In 1962, Aldous Huxley pointed to a fundamental difference between science and literature. Science, he said, concentrates on public experience, attempting to order and define objective reality as it is shared by all of us. Literature, by contrast, investigates a more private side of human experience like emotions and motivations.¹⁶

Thus the reverse argument is that science and literature have methodologically different approaches, and to combine those approaches is detrimental to the quality of the knowledge produced. For example, Johannes Kepler, in his 1611 manuscript *The Dream*, writes about visiting the moon. However, Westcott and Spell argue that it lacks the literary finesse that literary scholars admire. To reinforce their point, Westcott and Spell contend that Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* (1818) is valuable as literature but that it is horribly inaccurate in scientific terms. Admittedly, it is scientifically inaccurate to suggest that Victor Frankenstein could create life, but it is not irrelevant to suggest that Victor Frankenstein was enamored with science and that his scientific curiosity was nourished when he "chanced to find a volume of the works of Cornelius Agrippa. [He] opened it with apathy; the theory which [Agrippa] attempts to demonstrate, and the wonderful facts which relates soon changed this feeling into enthusiasm."¹⁷ Thus a concern for science, even defunct theories, could lead to new ideas. Criticizing Shelley for lacking scientific accuracy is not unwarranted, but it overlooks the idea that Shelley may have introduced to these scientific concepts to a larger population. Westcott and Spell maintain that both science and literature must retain separate identities in order to achieve their initial goals. However, by combining the two disciplines, both disciplines are introduced

¹⁶ Warren B. Westcott and J. Everett Spell, "Tearing Down the Wall: Science and Literature," *The English Journal* 89, no. 2 (Nov., 1999), <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-8274%28199911%2989%3A2%3C70%3ATDTWLA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0>.

¹⁷ Mary Shelley, *Frankenstein* (New York: Penguin Books, 1992, originally published, 1818), Vol. I, Ch. 2, p. 40.

into a new cultural framework, possibly to one that would have not been receptive to them otherwise, suggesting that there is value in examining the points at which science and literature intersect.

Eighteenth-century English imitations of *Don Quixote* provide an instance when the science of the mind and literature co-exist, suggesting that eighteenth-century England must be understood in terms of its third culture, or rather, the centralized question from which all differing methods and solutions can spring. C. P. Snow and John Brockman offer different interpretations of a third culture. In his 1959 lecture *Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution*, Snow argues that a third culture is one that bridges science and literature, two very polarized disciplines.¹⁸ However, eighteenth-century science of the mind does not exemplify closing the gap between the different fields of study; this is more indicative of a particular overlap of interest. Conversely, John Brockman claims that the third culture is one in which scientists speak directly to the public and “avoid the middleman and endeavor to express their deepest thoughts in a manner accessible to the intelligent reading public.”¹⁹ Although eighteenth-century English novelists interact with and make information accessible to the public they maintain their roles as novelists, suggesting that Brockman’s theory, like Snow’s theory, fails to define eighteenth-century England.²⁰ Instead, three distinct groups of thinkers—anatomists, social theorists,

¹⁸ C.P. Snow, *Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 12.

¹⁹ John Brockman, *The Third Culture* (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1995), 18.

²⁰ Bertrand Goldgar, “Fielding, the Flood Makers, and Natural Philosophy: “Covent-Garden Journal No. 70,” *Modern Philology* 80, no. 2 (Nov., 1982), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/437620>. Henry Fielding was not a scientist, but he believed that scientific efforts should be directed toward practical applications. In he satirized the Royal Society of London in *Convent-Garden Journal*. No. 70, especially the way in which it forces its complex beliefs towards an unsuspecting public. Within his

and novelists—attempt answers to questions about the mind, suggesting that the third culture in eighteenth-century England is defined as allowing deviating groups of thinkers to answer the same question using entirely distinctive methods.

article, Fielding achieves humorously depicting the scientific controversy surrounding the attempt to understand the Great Flood by symbolizing humans as ants whose hill has been showered by a cow.

The Mind: Anatomically, Philosophically, and Literarily

...after all the years I have spent asleep in the silence of obscurity, I emerge now, carrying all my years on my back, with a tale as dry as esparto grass, devoid of invention, deficient in style, poor in ideas, and lacking all erudition and doctrine, without notes in the margins or annotations at the end of the book, when I see that other books, even if they are profane fictions, are so full of citations from Aristotle, Plato, and the entire horde of philosophers that readers are moved into admiration and consider the authors to be well-read, erudite, and eloquent men...

--Cervantes, *Don Quixote*, Prologue to the Reader, p. 4

The inherent weakness of eighteenth-century anatomy and social theory texts is their autonomy. According to intellectual historian Quentin Skinner, some intellectual historians believe that the “autonomy of the *text* itself” is the key to discovering its meaning.²¹ Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century anatomy texts give full explanations of the physical body. Hobbes’ autonomous *Leviathan* meticulously presents an account of how a government is built. This autonomy, however, is problematic because it presents the individual’s mind as if it exists in a vacuum, implying that the mind cannot change or alter. Conversely, eighteenth-century novels, particularly the imitations of *Don Quixote*, depict individuals with changing minds. A prominent trend in the *Don Quixote* genre is to follow the character as he indulges in mad activities throughout his travels, but at the novel’s conclusion, the character learns the errors of his ways and is released from his madness. This could

²¹ Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” *History and Theory* 8, no.1 (1969): 3, <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0018-2656%281969%298%3A1%3C33AMAUIH%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6>.

be taken to imply that changes have occurred in the individual's mind. Eighteenth-century English imitations of *Don Quixote* display anatomical language and suggest that the authority of social theory is diminished when applied to specific individuals, depicting the mind as constantly changing and questioning the extent to which the faculties of reason, emotion, and morality each contribute to an individual's actions.

Nervous Fibres and the Brain

At roughly the same time, the new level of detail afforded by the microscope allowed anatomists to dissect the nerve into its smaller components, which suggests that the individual pieces of the nervous system exhibit machine-like qualities. Until this time, the nerve was understood as a hollow conduit that linked the brain to the periphery. The nerve was considered part of the brain's machinery, but not a machine itself. After visiting London and discovering Hooke's 1665 work *Micrographia*, which described how view body tissue under a microscope, the Dutchman Antony van Leeuwenhoek was the first person able to observe a microscopic section of nervous tissue.²² Leeuwenhoek's histological approach to the nerve—examining the it on a microscopic and cellular level—led him to conclude that each individual nerve was constructed of smaller components, which he termed nervous fibres. This indicated that the nerve was not only part of the machine but exhibited its own machine-like qualities. Additionally, Leeuwenhoek's new conception of the nerve acts as the starting point of modern neuroscience.

²² Brian J. Ford, "Enlightening Neuroscience: Microscopes and Microscopy in the Eighteenth Century," *Neuroscience*, ed. Harry Whitaker, C. U. M. Smith and Stanley Finger (New York, NY: Springer Science), 31.

The machine-like nerve constitutes the mechanistic brain, thus the anatomists' attempts to discover how the brain was built was based on inductive logic. This inductive logic is as follows: the microscopic nerve fibres must be grouped together in order to achieve nerve; similarly, nerves must be bundled together in order to create a functioning brain. In his famed 1664 work *Cerebri Anatome*, the English doctor Thomas Willis identifies nerves as the anatomical pieces of the human brain.²³ This work identifies and numbers cranial nerves—nerves that connect directly to the brain—establishing a classification system that has been retained by modern doctors.²⁴ By classifying these nerves, Willis insists that the brain may only be understood as a conglomerate of smaller pieces, but he also maintains that the brain is connected to the rest of the human body by a complicated network of nerves.

In his 1786 anatomy textbook *Medical Sketches*, the Scottish physician John Moore demonstrates that the benefit of the inductive approach was that it allowed for a conception of a whole to be conceived from seemingly disparate pieces. In order to examine different body systems, Moore first dissected each body system into its components. For example, the nervous system is composed of: “a large, pulpy mass called the brain,” “another white substance...passing through the base of the skull...called the spinal marrow,” and nerves, or “masses of fibres or filaments.”²⁵ If looked at separately without being influenced by an inductive philosophy, one might

²³ C. U. M. Smith “Brain and Mind in the ‘Long’ Eighteenth Century,” *Neuroscience*, ed. Harry Whitaker, C. U. M. Smith and Stanley Finger (New York, NY: Springer Science), 16.

²⁴ Lawrence Kruger and Larry W. Swanson, “1710: The Introduction of Experimental Nervous System Physiology and Anatomy by François Pourfois du Petit,” *Neuroscience*, ed. Harry Whitaker, C. U. M. Smith and Stanley Finger (New York, NY: Springer Science), 99.

²⁵ John Moore, *Medical Sketches: In Two Parts* (Eighteenth-Century Collections Online, 2003), Main Body, Ch. 7.
<http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/ECCO?dd=0&locID=31841&d1=0562900200&srchtp=a&c=1&S U=0LRM&d2=5&docNum=CW3308316545&h2=1&vrsn=1.0&af=BN&d6=5&ste=10&dc=tiPG&stp=Author&d4=0.33&n=10&d5=d6&ae=W0314681796>

fail to see how these three entities are related. However, understanding the smallest pieces—the nerves—allowed Moore to see that they were connected. When all these pieces operate together, a large holistic entity emerges, which Moore terms the nervous system. Moore's text examines the entire human body, and each chapter of the text examines a different body system—the circulatory, respiratory, digestive, and nervous systems. Once these systems are understood as separate entities, it is then possible to conceive of a human individual being physically formed.

Moore propagates a holistic vision of the individual's body while also recognizing the limits of that method, which suggests that, even for Moore, the inductive approach alone is not sufficient for knowing the brain. In the eighteenth-century, microscopes were not as effective as they are in more modern science, which limited how anatomists understood *how* the minute pieces operated to form connections. Moore acknowledges his seemingly limited knowledge: "We see the effects...but a knowledge of the principles and powers by which they are produced, has hitherto eluded human comprehension."²⁶ This suggests that anatomy understands the pieces of the machine but fails to understand how the machine operates. More broadly, this suggests the practical limitations of an inductive approach. The inductive approach, allows for comprehension of many of the anatomical components of the mind, but this approach fails to understand how the reactions between these pieces cause individuals to act in certain ways, that anatomy is weak in understanding how the physical pieces can be directly translated into human actions.

²⁶ John Moore, *Medical Sketches*, Main Body, Ch.7.

The Mind and Social Theory

The English Enlightenment social theorists share the mechanistic interpretation of the brain, but they understand the labors of the mind from a top-down, or deductive approach. British Enlightenment thinkers and their texts attempt to understand an individual's actions. Since these thinkers take a philosophical approach, they do not encounter the technological limitations that the anatomists do. John Locke's *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690) addresses the mind as an organ for acquiring knowledge and emphasizes reason as its dominant faculty. Earlier, Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan* (1651) maintains that man has reason, but he shows how the individual's knowledge and reason leads him to organize into governments. Similarly, Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (1776) conceives of man's reason as the foundation of capitalism. Smith's lesser-known work, *A Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) treats emotion as it relates to reason. Finally, David Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739) recognizes both reason and emotion, but also features the faculty of morality more prominently than the other theorists' texts. For all these thinkers, knowledge, reason, emotion, and morality are all immaterial concepts. Different words—"brain" and "mind"—are adopted by the anatomists and social theorists to signify these different approaches to understanding the same larger concept of human life. Anatomists, in their concern for the physical brain, neglect the immaterial. The mind, as it is termed by social theorists, is immaterial, and it controls the immaterial substance, knowledge.

John Locke punctuates the mind's two-step process for the acquisition of ideas, suggesting immaterial ideas are the source from which an individual's actions are deduced. Locke's *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690) contends that man is not born with innate knowledge, but rather, it is through experience alone that he arrives at developing new ideas. Locke proposes a two-step mechanism for the acquisition of and processing of these ideas. In the first step, a sensation from the external world is imprinted on the mind; this is not a physical imprint but a metaphoric imprint. This first step represents the mind's interaction with the external world, but the second step occurs within the mind itself. In this second step, the mind shuffles those imprints it has previously acquired and leads to the development of an idea. According to Locke:

when men so instructed are grown up and reflect on their own minds, they cannot find anything more ancient there than those opinions which were taught them...²⁷

Thus the first stage, forming impressions on the mind, does not inherently lead to the formation of an idea. Instead, the mind must somehow process those impressions, as it does in the second-step, causing the individual to develop an idea. These ideas then lead to moral principles by which the individual acts, suggesting that an individual's actions proceed from his ideas. Furthermore, this emphasizes how the faculty of morality is dependent upon the faculty of reason.²⁸ The slight disruption to this theory, however, is that man's ideas are not wholly dependent on his mind; he is dependent upon the natural world to provide him with a first impression. Despite this

²⁷ John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1995, originally published 1690), Book I, Ch. 3, p. 39.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Book I, Ch. 3, p. 26.

perturbation, it remains that an individual's ideas influence how he will act and organize himself in the face of the natural world.

The abstract individual's formation of a political Leviathan may exemplify an individual's fear of death, but more so, it exemplifies the usage of an individual's rational faculties and the extent to which the individual is a deductive product of an organized government. Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan* (1651) stresses that as reason begins to guide an individual's actions, an organized society can come into existence. Although this theory is developed even more fully by Locke and especially by Rousseau, Hobbes contends that the individual's desire to self-preserve leads him to organize under a political Leviathan. However, being guided by one's faculty of reason is not without its shortcomings, which may be bolstered by Hobbes' definition of the Leviathan:

and in [it] consisteth the Essence of the Common-wealth; which...is *One Person, of whose Acts affect a great Multitude, by mutuall covenants one with another...*²⁹

This emphasis on one person controlling the acts of the multitude indicates that some, probably many, personal freedoms are lost. It could be argued that the individual is lost as a result of his actions being monitored by the Leviathan. However, the individual organized in this manner in order to prevent premature extinguishment. As such, the overall process ensures the individual's existence, suggesting the individual is deduced from a large societal structure, and as such, the individual must learn to balance a political identity with an individual identity.

Adam Smith, like Hobbes, maintains that reason is responsible for an ordered society, but he also notes how man's faculty of reason corresponds with his faculty of

²⁹ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Part II, Ch. 18, p. 228.

emotion, suggesting that an essential element of an individual's identity is the acquisition of the faculty of emotion. In his celebrated economic treatise *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), Smith illustrates how an individual's faculty of reason contributes to the construction and maintenance of capitalism. This theory reduces the individual to an economic being that is seemingly devoid of emotion. However, Smith's earlier work, *A Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759), examines more minutely, interpersonal relationships. With the inclusion of interpersonal and emotional relationships, Smith's text depicts a stage of life that has been deduced from the political level. However, the text maintains the supremacy of the faculty of reason by suggesting that emotion is a byproduct of reason. According to Smith, emotions are methodically introduced to the individual:

when music imitates modulations of grief and joy, it either actually inspires us with those passions, or at least puts us in the mood which disposes us to conceive them.³⁰

In other words, emotions are manifestations of reason brought into existence from ideas, which denotes a value to and hierarchizes the individual's faculty of reason as being more valuable than his faculty of emotion.

David Hume suggests that in addition to the faculties of reason and emotion, the faculty of morality is required in order for an individual to understand an idea. In *A Treatise Concerning Human Nature* (1739), Hume exhibits the final stage of the deductive scheme, which is the creation of a fully functioning and mentally sound individual. This individual has three distinct mental faculties, reason, emotion and morality, but these three faculties cooperate in order to lead the individual to an

³⁰ Adam Smith, *A Theory of Moral Sentiments* (Indianapolis IN: Liberty Fund, 1982, originally published 1759), Part I, Sect. ii, Ch. 2, p. 37.

understanding of, not a creation of, an idea. Remembering that ideas are the highest stage in this system, this concept reinforces the notion that the individual has been deduced from something larger. According to Hume, three stages are required to understand an idea. First, Hume maintains “that all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv’d from simple terms,” which exhibits a Lockean understanding of the faculty of reason.³¹ Second, emotions, which arise from “the original impressions, or their ideas,” make that idea more relatable to the individual.³² Third, man’s morality allows, the individual to determine the extent to which the original impressions are good or evil.³³ Although Hume presents these three distinct faculties, each faculty maintains the same goal, which is to achieve an understanding of an idea. Thus the faculty of morality defines the individual because it is this faculty that emphasizes the extent to which ideas impact individuals, or in other words, morality links the idea to the person.

Returning to the eighteenth-century English novelists, there is in them, a total conception of life, which strongly suggests a richer knowledge of the mind’s faculties. Novelists emerged alongside eighteenth-century anatomists and social theorists, but they were not limited like the other thinkers. Novelists did not encounter technological limits like anatomists, and they were not required to retain strong theoretical frameworks throughout their texts like the social theorists. Instead, novelists depicted what literary critic René Wellek terms as being an author’s

³¹ David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (New York: Penguin Books, 1985, originally published 1739), Book I, Sect. 1, p. 52.

³² *Ibid.*, Book II, Part I, Sect. 1, p. 328.

³³ *Ibid.*, Book III, Sect. 1, p. 516.

“experience and total conception of life.”³⁴ The goal of depicting this total conception of life granted the novelist with a freedom to blend both the anatomists’ and social theorists’ methods. Novelists present a hybrid, or convergence, of the inductive and deductive theories. For example, according to Barker-Benfield, physical nerves are described in Samuel Richardson’s *Clarissa*, Tobias Smollett’s *Humphrey Clinker*, Anne Radcliffe’s *The Mysteries of Udolpho*, and Frances Burney’s *Juliet*, thus showing an explicit merging of nervous theory into literature.³⁵ In addition to the inclusion of this anatomical language in fiction, novelists depict human actions as they relate to governments and interpersonal relationships, which are subjects treated by Hobbes and Smith, indicating that social theory was present in the novels. As literary critic Northrop Frye contends “fictions, therefore, may be classified, not morally, but by the hero’s power of action, which may be greater than ours, less, or roughly the same.”³⁶ It is through these literary heroes that there is a point of convergence between anatomy and social theory, leading to new conception of the mind.

Literary Minds

Portraying human experiences allows novelists to depict specific characters and those characters’ actions, or in other words, eighteenth-century English novels are empirical studies of single, specific individuals, not just studies of an abstract

³⁴ René Wellek and Austin Warren, *The Theory of Literature* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1956), 95.

³⁵ Barker-Benfield, *The Culture of Sensibility*, 17.

³⁶ Northrop Frye, From *Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays*, in *Theory of the Novel: A Historical Approach*, ed. Michael McKeon (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 200), 122.

individual. Novels depict specific individuals, however Ian Watt acknowledges the novelists' freedom, contending that novelists attempt "to portray all the varieties of human experience."³⁷ One aspect of human experience involves the mind and the extent to which the mind controls an individual's actions. According to Watt, there was even a consciousness among novelists to give a depiction of what was going on within the individual's mind, as depicted by the epistolary novel.³⁸ The mind could be depicted from the point of view of single individuals, and it is because of this aspect of the novel that an individual's other mental faculties are salient.

Furthermore, these empirical studies can present views that are altogether antithetical to those arrived at by either the anatomists or social theorists; for example, Watt contends, novels such as Richardson's *Clarissa* "denoted an un-Hobbessian belief in the innate benevolence of man."³⁹ This disconnect between novels and social theories allows the novels to articulate new theories of the faculties of the mind.

Even if literary critics do not agree about the date of birth of the novel, many agree that it was prominent and popularized in eighteenth-century England.

According to literary critic Susan Staves, "during the eighteenth-century especially, *Don Quixote* came into its own; not only was it read and enthusiastically appreciated, but it also found many imitators."⁴⁰ Despite their non-canonical status, these

³⁷ Ian Watt, From *The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson, and Fielding*, in *Theory of the Novel: A Historical Approach*, ed. Michael McKeon (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 364.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 454.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 441.

⁴⁰ Susan Staves, "Don Quixote in Eighteenth-Century England," *Comparative Literature* 24, no. 3 (Summer, 1972), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1769895>. J. Fitzmaurice-Kelly, *Cervantes in England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1905), 232. The first English translation was done by Thomas Shelton, who seemed to capture the grand style of Cervantes. In a seemingly manipulative attempt to bolster his own career as an author, Tobias Smollett inadvertently developed his own theories of translation while translating the novel. Upon seeing the popularity of Jarvis' work, Smollett thought

eighteenth-century English imitations of *Don Quixote* have been chosen in this thesis because they were both widely read and depict individuals whose actions quibble what social theorists would expect. Although critics have not arrived at a consensus regarding whether the modern novel was born in “Don Quixote’s memorable escapade or on Robinson Crusoe’s desert Isle,” these imitations show strong resemblances to the two main contenders.⁴¹ These eighteenth-century imitations were produced very much in the tradition of Defoe’s *Robinson Crusoe* (1719), yet they retain the spirit of *Don Quixote*. Although these imitations are often less well-known than the canonical works, the three works chosen were well-read and reviewed favorably. Three eighteenth-century English imitations of *Don Quixote*—Tobias Smollett’s *Sir Launcelot Greaves* (1760), Charlotte Lennox’s *The Female Quixote* (1752), and Henry Fielding’s *Joseph Andrews* (1742)—combine the themes of madness and travel from the *Don Quixote* story with the marked themes of eighteenth-century English novels.

The theme of travel in Cervantes’ *Don Quixote* (Part I published in 1605, Part II published in 1615) stresses the Lockean conception of learning through experience but also posits that an individual’s interpersonal relationships are most essential to his ability to formulate ideas. Locke contends that the individual learns through experience:

he could rival that translation by producing his own translation that retained the “spirit of ideas” without “servilely adhering to its literal expression.” Smollett’s goal was to preserve “that ludicrous solemnity and self-importance by which the inimitable Cervantes has distinguished the character of Don Quixote.”

⁴¹ Marthe Robert, From *Origins of the Novel*, in *Theory of the Novel: A Historical Approach*, ed. Michael McKeon (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 57.

thus the first capacity of human intellect is, that the mind is fitted to receive impressions made on it, either through the senses by outward objects, or by its own operations when it reflects on them.⁴²

He prioritizes personal experience, but he does so at the cost of interpersonal relationships. Although much of Don Quixote and Sancho Panza's journey involves chasing after the completely fabricated Dulcinea of Toboso, Don Quixote's experience traveling is valuable insomuch that it introduces him to new people, and from those people, he is introduced to new ideas. Here are a few examples. While staying at the inn, a mysterious man and his monkey appear; the man claims that the monkey can tell, for a fee, any past or present events. Don Quixote, however, believes this man has made a pact with the devil and violently destroys his stage. As a result Don Quixote is forced to pay Master Pedro a fine, forcing him to realize that his actions are bound within an economic system. Continuing with his travels, Don Quixote is obligated to obtain an island over which Sancho Panza can govern as recompense for Sancho's services as a faithful squire. The Duke and Duchess of Aragon deceptively offer Sancho an island in hopes of being amused his failures. As a result, Don Quixote is introduced to corrupt governments, which are very different from the pristine governments he has read about in the books of knight errantry. Finally, Don Quixote learns about freedom of religion, from Ana Félix, who converts to Christianity. These minor characters in the novel are necessary to Don Quixote's understanding of new ideas, thus amending Locke's theory of reason to include more learning through interacting with other individuals. Some characters, such as Sancho Panza, when he lies to Don Quixote about delivering a letter to the imagined Dulcinea

⁴² Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, Ch. 1, p. 70.

of Toboso, do not introduce Don Quixote to new ideas but merely contribute to his madness and misunderstanding of the world.

Madness, the second theme, causes Don Quixote to misinterpret inanimate objects as being human objects that emotionally excite him, indicating that reason prevents an individual's emotions from being externalized. The publication of Cervantes' novel was contemporaneous to the publication of Robert Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621), which is a textbook account of "the diseases of the mind."⁴³ Addressing madness in the novel, therefore suggests at least a partial link between the novel and the science of the mind. Cervantes predominantly defines madness as it relates to reason; Don Quixote's friend the barber tells him, "in the madhouse in Sevilla was a man whose relatives had put him there because he had lost his reason."⁴⁴ However, Don Quixote's madness is a loss of the faculty of reason, which now has been replaced by the faculty of emotion. Oftentimes, Don Quixote's madness causes him to confuse inanimate or mundane objects for something that excites emotion from him. He confuses windmills for giants, and being led by his pride, he attacks the harmless windmill. Don Quixote mistakes a bed sheet for an enemy who has come into close proximity with him, which invokes fear and causes him to shred the sheet. Finally, when Don Quixote sees a peasant girl on horseback, he is deluded into thinking she is the beautiful Dulcinea of Toboso, invoking the sentiment love. Don Quixote's madness, or loss of reason, results in increased emotional experiences. This definition of madness is much too simplified because there are character such as Sancho Panza's wife, that act both reasonably and

⁴³ Robert Burton, *Anatomy of Melancholy* (New York: New York Review Books, originally published 1621), Part I, Sect 1, Subsect. iii, p. 138.

⁴⁴ Cervantes, *Don Quixote*, Second Part, Ch. 1, p. 462.

emotionally, and the eighteenth-century imitations of *Don Quixote* examine these more complicated notions of madness.

Smollett, the eighteenth-century translator of *Don Quixote* and author of *Sir Launcelot Greaves*, blends his medical and literary skills in order to define madness as being related to man's anatomical body as opposed to his mental, or in post-nineteenth-century terms, psychological condition.⁴⁵ Before becoming a novelist, Smollett trained as a surgeon at the University of Glasgow, and his friendship to the eighteenth-century anatomists John and William Hunter almost certainly kept him abreast on developments in eighteenth-century anatomy.⁴⁶ Although he abandoned his medical career to become a novelist, his anatomical training is present in his novels such as his imitation of *Don Quixote*, *The Life and Adventures of Sir Launcelot Greaves* (1760). In this novel, Smollett claims that Sir Launcelot's madness has been caused by "a distempered brain."⁴⁷ He attributes an anatomical cause to his definition of madness, which corresponds to one who does not have the reason to differentiate the theoretical or ideological from the practical.⁴⁸ Although Sir Launcelot has the best intentions of enforcing laws, which are symbols of reason, he inadvertently breaks them and often finds himself in legal proceedings, thus indicating a strong

⁴⁵ Gary Hatfield, "Remaking Science of the Mind" in *Inventing Human Science: Eighteenth-Century Domains*, ed. Christopher Fox, Roy Porter, and Robert Wokler (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press), 185. The term psychology did not come into existence until after the nineteenth-century.

⁴⁶ Donald Bruce, *The Radical Doctor Smollett* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 22, 25.

⁴⁷ Tobias Smollett, *The Life and Adventures of Sir Launcelot of Greaves* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973, originally published 1760), Ch. 15, p. 124.

⁴⁸ Jerry Beasley, *Tobias Smollett: Novelist* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1998), 1. Smollett was met with limited initial success, upon the publication of *The Adventures of Roderick Random* (1748) and *The Adventures of Peregrine Pickle* (1751), so Smollett turned to translating already canonical novels into English. He translated LeSage's *Gil Blas* in 1748, Cervantes' *Don Quixote* in 1755 and later republished in 1761, and Voltaire's *Candide* which dates from between 1761 and 1765. Smollett's translation of *Don Quixote* is very controversial, with an interpretation of madness similar to that of *Don Quixote*, which was perhaps influenced by his time translating *Don Quixote* from Spanish into English.

disconnect in what he intends to do and what he does. This is strikingly similar to Cervantes' *Don Quixote*. Whereas Smollett's novel blends the faculty of reason with anatomy, other imitations take more creative approaches and call attention to the individual's other mental faculties.

Charlotte Lennox bridges the gap between two groups of people associated with the novel—individual readers and intellectual novelists—and her novel *The Female Quixote* defines madness as the inability to experience emotions, claiming that the mind's faculty of emotion is equally important to the mind's faculty of reason. Lennox retells the Don Quixote story with a female protagonist who learns about emotions through La Calprenède's sixteenth-century French romances. As a result, this woman is incapable of experiencing or expressing genuine emotion. As the cultural historian of eighteenth-century Britain Barker-Benfield contends, "that women first became literate in significant numbers is a profoundly important feature of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century history," and it is likely that Lennox's sentimental novel—a novel that appealed to the emotions—would have been consumed by this new group of readers.⁴⁹ Additionally, Lennox's novel was highly regarded by other novelists such as Henry Fielding and Samuel Richardson, which suggests that her work also appealed to the high-culture intellectual. Her work was taken seriously by other writers even though she was a woman, and even though she was making a strong call for social change. The themes of Lennox's work, love and emotions, alleviate that seemingly large gap between everyday readers and the well-regarded novelists.

⁴⁹ Barker-Benfield, *The Culture of Sensibility*, 162.

In his novel *Joseph Andrews*, Fielding expresses self-consciousness through the inclusion of autobiographical elements, which implies that Fielding's novel defines what it means to be human more so than it defines madness. The novel includes an allusion to his father's war career, and this autobiographical element makes the novel more human by including a piece of the novelist's life in it.⁵⁰ This element of personality exists throughout Fielding's novel, as he questions what it means to be an individual. According to theorist of the novel Philip Stevick, Fielding exhibited "a keen interest in both history and philosophies of history, all with a conviction that history has something to say about the meaning of life," which may suggest that Fielding uses the novel as tool for examining human life.⁵¹ Fielding's novel *Joseph Andrews*, imagines a man whose ability to act, and essentially be human, is inhibited by his unrealistic moral character. Joseph's madness is defined as a loss of the human ability to act. Instead of taking initiative, Joseph waits for things to happen to him. He blindly follows his mentor's teachings and loves his future wife mostly because it is convenient. Fielding's novel satirizes morality, not because he thinks it is unimportant, but because he thinks it is the quintessential element of human existence that must exist in balance with man's other faculties.

Each type of text examined in this thesis would appeal to a different audience, which suggests that eighteenth-century is perhaps not best defined by the desire to equalize the amount of knowledge each person has, but rather by a desire that all people know something, thus the Enlightenment is not best defined as universality. Each of the three methods for viewing the mind—anatomically,

⁵⁰ Ronald Paulson, *The Life of Henry Fielding* (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2000), 5.

⁵¹ Philip Stevick, "Fielding and the Meaning of History," *PMLA* 79, no. 5 (Dec., 1964), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/461142>

philosophically, or literarily—retains responds to a central question about the mind, but each type of writing would appeal to a different audience. As exemplified, there is no single method for knowing everything about the mind. According to intellectual historian Quentin Skinner, context differentiates these three different approaches; or rather mainly it is necessary to understand “what sort of society the given author was writing for and trying to persuade.”⁵² Anatomists wrote primarily for medically trained men; social theorists wrote for the intelligentsia; and novelists wrote for everyone, both intellectuals and non-intellectuals. Suggesting that information about the mind is found in these three distinct texts implies that there was an unequal distribution of knowledge. Readers of novels would know some anatomy but not necessarily as much as one who read an anatomy textbook would know. Instead of knowledge about the mind being equally distributed, these varied types of sources allowed for many types of individuals to know at least something about the mind. The novels are the point of convergence of anatomy and social theory, but the novels acknowledge that the physical objects, such as the nerve and brain, are directly responsible for an individual’s actions. Strikingly, the novels suggest ideas that differ immensely from those proposed by social theorists, so the readers of novel arrive at a conclusion of the mind and the faculties of reason, emotion, and morality that is barely recognizable in the social theory texts.

⁵² Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding,” 40.

**Phlebotomies and Physiognomies:
Or, the Deductive Path of Reason
in Tobias Smollett's *Sir Launcelot Greaves* (1760)**

...since historians must and ought to be exact, truthful, and absolutely free of passions, for neither interest, fear, rancor, nor affection should make them deviate from the path of the truth, whose mother is history, the rival of time, repository of great deeds, witness to the past, example and adviser to the present, and forewarning to the future.

--Cervantes, *Don Quixote*, First Part, Chapter IX, p. 69

The Text and Reason

As a trained physician of the Enlightenment period, Tobias Smollett produced a novel that unoriginally defines madness as a loss of reason and suggests that the individual's faculty of reason, more originally, is responsible for all of his actions. Smollett's version of the *Don Quixote* story closely emulates Cervantes' original novel, and like Cervantes, Smollett defines madness as a loss of reason. This novel is attentive to Lockean theory of reason and stresses how self-conscious individuals are both born from and affected by ideas. Emphasizing the role of language—in place names, in anatomical language, and in political propaganda—this novel alludes to a deductive mechanism by which reason guides an individual from being at the mercy of the all-encompassing, intangible ideas that organize the public sphere to commanding his own ideas and achieving self-consciousness. Smollett's novel emphasizes the significance of the faculty of reason, but the novel complicates this

deductive mechanism—a mechanism that begins at the highest level of organization, an idea, and arrives at a more precise level of organization, the self-conscious individual—by suggesting limits to this mechanism and hinting that the mind’s faculties of emotion and morality must also exhibit some influence over the individual’s actions.

Smollett’s retelling of the *Don Quixote* story exploits how an individual’s actions are influenced by other individuals, suggesting that the individual must personalize and relate to his faculty of reason and prevent it from being too influenced by the external world. The novel’s use of Lockean language, like phrases such as “making impression[s] upon his mind,” suggests that this novel strongly considers the mental faculty of reason.⁵³ In the narrative, three travelers—Captain Crowe, Mr. Ferret, and Tom Clarke—first encounter Sir Launcelot Greaves, who classifies himself as a knight errant, and his squire Timothy Crabshaw while traveling from York to London. Sir Launcelot expresses that he is a “general redresser of grievances,” or rather, he enforces civil laws.⁵⁴ His identity is so influenced by these civil laws that, as a result, he exhibits very little depth of character. Not only does Sir Launcelot believe that he is a knight, but as soon as Captain Crowe, one of the original three travelers, meets Sir Launcelot, he too is deluded into thinking that he is a knight.⁵⁵ This symbolizes that the faculty of reason is precarious, and must not be too easily influenced by external forces, or by particular people. In addition to Sir Launcelot’s identity as a knight, he chases after a lost lover, Aurelia Darnel; their love affair has been halted by a long-standing family feud, thus stressing the tension that

⁵³ Smollett, *Sir Launcelot Greaves*, Ch. 23, p.185.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, Ch. 4, p. 41.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, Ch. 18, p. 151.

exhibits between reason and emotion. Sir Launcelot's desire for Aurelia, or what Captain Crowe classifies as "mingled considerations [that] produced a kind of ferment in the oeconomy of his mind,"⁵⁶ propels his adventures. This suggests that Sir Launcelot is influenced by his emotional faculties as opposed to his reasonable faculties. Sir Launcelot, just like Don Quixote, encounters individuals who teach him the ideas of political identity and allegiance to the king. Finally, Sir Launcelot is violently attacked and dragged to a madhouse where he encounters his lost love Aurelia Darnel. The doctor convinces Sir Launcelot of his madness, causing Sir Launcelot to claim "the practice of medicine is one of the most honourable professions exercised among the sons of men."⁵⁷ This appreciation for doctors, as opposed to for knights, suggests that Sir Launcelot has recovered his faculty of reason, for a doctor represents an individual whose faculty of reason is not blindly influenced by the external world, but one who searches for evidence. Upon emerging from his madness, Sir Launcelot marries Aurelia, which not only suggests that the faculty of emotion is dependent upon the a healthy faculty of reason, but more importantly that Sir Launcelot was on path to viewing himself as a more normal individual, not as a knight.

The whimsically sung political propaganda suggests that as each individual achieves self-consciousness, it becomes easier to differentiate individuals from the group. As Sir Launcelot passes through a parliamentary election, staunch supporters of the king sing "*God save great George our king.*"⁵⁸ These words, or what Locke

⁵⁶ Smollett, *Sir Launcelot Greaves*, Ch. 13, p. 107.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, Ch. 24, p.192.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, Ch. 9, p.71. This is an instance when Smollett uses anachronisms to confuse the reader about the time of the novel. Although Smollett does not explicitly state what year this novel takes place,

would classify as “signs of internal conceptions, and...marks for ideas within [a person’s] own mind,” suggest that all the individuals experience the same thoughts. In other words, when individuals are driven by political ideas, or other ideas that organize the public sphere, they lose their individuality.⁵⁹ Smollett’s novel alludes to a mechanism by which the individual’s faculty of reason leads him to self-consciousness, or rather, a state in which the individual is no longer controlled by larger ideas, but rather is deduced from those ideas and expresses enough individuality to command his own ideas.

Smollettian Reason and Deductive Self-Consciousness

The theme of travel within the novel suggests that individuals have the idea that they exist, so the first stage of the deductive path toward self-consciousness is an understanding of physical location and the materialization of the idea of place through naming cities. The “social triumvirate”—Mr. Fillet, a country practitioner in surgery, Captain Crowe, and his nephew Tom Clark, lawyer—is traveling “on the great northern road from York to London.”⁶⁰ In order for the travelers to understand where they are, landmasses must be named. The act of naming land corresponds to the Lockean notion of giving identity to a specific object, or rather understanding the “cohesion of particles anyhow united.”⁶¹ Like Smollett’s novel, Hobbes contends

references to King George and the Hanoverian dynasty suggest this novel takes place in England in the first half of the eighteenth century.

⁵⁹ Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book III, Ch. 1, p. 321.

⁶⁰ Smollett, *Sir Launcelot Greaves*, Ch.1, p. 1.

⁶¹ Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, Ch. 27. p. 243.

that ideas must first become materialized in the physical world before the individual can achieve self-consciousness and command them:

so now do Cities and Kingdomes which are but greater Families (for their own security) enlarge their Dominions, upon all pretences of danger, and fear of Invaders...⁶²

In order for the political Leviathan to recognize himself as ruler, he must know the geographical limits of his Dominion. The size of the Leviathan's dominion indicates the extent to his power, suggesting that individuals must first define themselves in terms of the larger, natural world.

After defining the natural world, it is necessary for individuals to understand with whom they exist, so the individuals inhabiting the land are organized into a cohesive group that abides by the laws of what Smollett describes as fetishized constitutions. This suggests that the second stage of deduction is national and political organization. Ensuring justice for all, Sir Launcelot is compelled to save a group of self-proclaimed innocent people from the harsh sentences prescribed to them by an unjust Magistrate. As Sir Launcelot talks to these people about the injustice, they aggressively ask, "where are is our admired constitution, the freedom, the security of the subject, the boasted humanity of the British nation?"⁶³ This fetishized constitution represents the creation of civil laws, which organize society and correspond to the utilization of reason. As Locke suggests, language is representative of ideas, the language of laws clearly defines what an individuals may or may not do. The individuals, however, are upset because they believe that the Magistrate has acted immorally and deprived them of that constitution. This suggests that even though

⁶² Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Part II, Ch. 17, p. 224.

⁶³ Smollett, *Sir Launcelot Greaves*, Ch. 12, p. 98.

they exist as a group and adhere, the individuals possess some conception of morality, illustrating that the faculties of reason and morality exist in tandem as individuals become closer to achieving self-consciousness.

Smollett's allusion to the advent of new words, such as "quacks," denotes how individuals continue to be deduced into smaller groups marked by similarities, even after being organized as a whole society. This suggests that an individual retains the identity he gives himself, but must also at least partially accept the identity prescribed to him by society. After passing through a parliamentary election debate, Sir Launcelot encounters politically active medical man, Mr. Ferret, who is attempting to sell an elixir of life: is already fuming, and that anger is encouraged when Mr. Ferret, a medical man, gives a very politically charged speech:

You may undervalue me and my medicine, because I don't appear upon a stage of rotten boards, in a shabby velvet coat and tye-periwig, with a foolish fellow in motley, to make you laugh by making wry faces... Take notice, I don't address you in the stile of a mountebank, or a high German doctor; and yet the kingdom is full of ...quacks. We have quacks in religion, quacks in physic, quacks in law, quacks in politics...they have intoxicated [Germany's] brain, until she is become delirious.⁶⁴

Most striking in Mr. Ferret's oration is the repetition of the word "quacks," which classifies individuals based on their occupations, whether it be theology, law, or politics. Mr. Ferret uses the word—Locke defines a word as "the instruments whereby men communicate their internal conceptions"—negatively, in order to imply that these specific classes of people obsessively follow the rules of their respective

⁶⁴ Smollett, *Sir Launcelot Greaves*, Ch. 10, p. 79. Smollett's knowledge of history of medicine is made apparent through the voice of the surgeon denouncing the works of past men who studied medicine: "Aristotle was a pedantic blockhead, and still more knave than fool. The same censure we may safely put on that wise-acre Dioscorides, with his faculties of simples, his seminal, specific, and principle virtues; and that crazy commentator Galen, with his four elements, elementary qualities, his eight complexions, his harmonies, and discords. Nor shall I expatiate on the alkahest of that mad scoundrel Paracelsus..."

disciplines, which suggests that there is a disconnect in how an individual views and himself and how that individual is viewed by society.⁶⁵ Since the individual is also part of a political identity, he is never isolated and must accept society's view of him, at least to some extent, as he begins to become conscious of himself.

Smollett's character Tom Clarke exemplifies the self-conscious individual, which suggests that the definition of self-consciousness in the novel is not consciousness of a physical substance but the individual's understanding of how he is related to all social structures. Smollett maintains Locke's idea that consciousness is achieved through knowing one's personal identity, "not in the identity of the [physical] substance."⁶⁶ The character Tom Clarke clarifies what is meant by that abstract phrase. Tom Clarke is the epitome of a self-conscious individual not because he knows who he *is* but because he understands how he fits into the larger social strata. As a lawyer discussing property law, he expresses knowledge of land boundaries, knowledge of a nation's laws, and knowledge of a smaller professional group of lawyers.⁶⁷ Clarke examines those three relationships he exhibits with the higher organized social structures and synthesizes them into one identity, or self-consciousness. Tom Clarke achieves his self-consciousness as a result of a strong faculty of reason, but he then disseminates his faculty of reason to Captain Crowe, hoping to prevent him from descending into madness. This suggests that the self-conscious individual can then play a strong role in allowing others to become self-

⁶⁵ Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book III, Ch. 1, p. 325.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, Book II, Ch. 27, p. 252.

⁶⁷ Smollett, *Sir Launcelot Greaves*, Ch. 1, p. 5.

conscious because he helps to cultivate in others the necessary mental faculty for achieving self-consciousness.⁶⁸

As posited above, the individual's faculty of reason guides an individual to self-consciousness, but Sir Launcelot's pining for Aurelia also puts forward the view that even without the faculty of reason, one can achieve a partial, or skewed, self-consciousness. Sir Launcelot's dual identity as both a knight and a lover throughout most of the novel causes him to seek Aurelia, his lost love. However, upon acquiring his faculty of reason, Sir Launcelot retains his love for Aurelia. Captain Crowe notes the "mingled considerations produced a kind of ferment in the oeconomy of [Sir Launcelot's] mind," suggesting how the faculty of emotion affected Sir Launcelot even during his madness.⁶⁹ Sir Launcelot's relationship with Aurelia still factors into Sir Launcelot's self-consciousness, suggesting that without the faculty of reason, Sir Launcelot had at least a partial sense of self-consciousness and hints at the limits of reason's power.

The Limits of Reason: Reason and Emotion

Smollett's novel compares phlebotomies and physiognomies and suggests that man's faculty of reason is limited in that it allows him to conceive of himself as an

⁶⁸ Hannah Sypher Locke and Stanley Finger, "Gentleman's Magazine, the Advent of Medical Electricity, and Disorders of the Nervous System," in *Brain, Mind and Medicine: Essays in Eighteenth-Century Neuroscience*, ed. Harry Whitaker, C. U. M. Smith and Stanley Finger (New York: Springer Science, 2007), 259. In eighteenth-century English society, individual editors disseminated reason; English newspapers such as *The Tatler*, the *Gentleman's Magazine* presented rural and urban news, but the difference is that it soon became a "depository for a much wider range of submissions," including political articles, sketches, essays, but what is so innovative is that the editors summarized reports from prestigious professional societies in order "to keep readers on top of the latest scientific and medical developments."

⁶⁹ Smollett, *Sir Launcelot Greaves*, Ch. 13, p. 107.

individual with spirit but cannot conceive of others as more than tangible bodies. The travelers Mr. Ferret, Tom Clarke, and Captain Crowe first encounter the squire Timothy Crabshaw after he falls off his horse, nearly drowning in the river. Mr. Ferret, the surgeon, performs a phlebotomy, which is the process of extracting blood from a vein in order to later diagnose the patient. There are two steps: extracting the blood, and a more difficult step, analyzing the data. This phlebotomy is representative of Locke's conception of complex ideas: "simple ideas which the mind has, and out of which is made all its other knowledge."⁷⁰ Individuals, however, are also complex, but they are not the summation of simple ideas. The collection of simple ideas that Smollett uses to identify Timothy Crabshaw arrives at his physiognomy, or appearance, not his character:

His stature was below the middle size: he was this, squat, and brawny, with a small protuberance on one shoulder, and a prominent belly...His small glimmering eyes resembled those of the Hampshire porker...⁷¹

Man utilizes his faculty of reason in an attempt to understand another person, but he conceives of the individual as a summation of simple ideas regarding his physical appearance. It is possible for the faculty of reason to provide an understanding of the physical body, but the individual cannot fully fathom the consciousness another individual feels. This indicates a limit of the faculty of reason and causes one to examine other ways in which individuals are connected if they cannot share the same consciousness.

Smollett's novel exhibits a Humean conception of reason—that understanding of an idea occurs in three distinct stages—to suggest that a disruption at any stage in

⁷⁰ Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book I, Ch. 7, p. 83.

⁷¹ Smollett, *Sir Launcelot Greaves*, Ch. 2, p. 10.

the reasoning process negates the faculty's power. Sir Launcelot, like Don Quixote, has only a superficial understanding of knight errantry, and Mr. Sycamore conceives of a plan similar to Sampson Carrasco's, that would exploit Sir Launcelot's superficial understanding of knight errantry. "[H]e could wear armour, wield a lance, and manage a charger" and deceive Sir Launcelot into believing that he is an enemy knight.⁷² In order to understand the problem with Sir Launcelot's reason, it is necessary to compare it to a Humean conception of reason:

First, the original impression. Second, the transition to the idea of the connected cause or effect. Thirdly, the nature and qualities of that idea.⁷³

Sir Launcelot's sight of a person in a knight's costume is the original impression. He then has transitioned to the idea that dressing as knight results in the person actually becoming a knight. However, Sir Launcelot has not reflected on the nature and qualities of that idea. In other words, he has failed understand that specific actions and sentiments must accompany the person wearing the knight's armor in order to be considered a knight. Although only one stage of Sir Launcelot's reason has been disrupted, he is considered to have no faculty of reason, suggesting Smollett's text propagates that idea that an individual is either completely reasonable or completely unreasonable.

The doctor diagnoses Sir Launcelot's mental disposition as being a weakness of the nerves, but he also comments on how his anatomical structure affects both the faculties of reason and emotion, subverting the social theorists' conception of the mind in order to suggest that the individual only understands his mind through understanding his physical body. Still searching for Aurelia Darnel, Sir Launcelot is

⁷² Smollett, *Sir Launcelot Greaves*, Ch. 18, p. 147.

⁷³ Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, Part III, Sect. 5, p. 132.

attacked and forced to enter a madhouse, which were beginning to appear in eighteenth-century England.⁷⁴ The doctor diagnoses Sir Launcelot with:

what is called weakness of the nerves, sir, --tho' that is a very inaccurate expression; for this phrase, denoting a morbid excess of sensation, seems to imply that sensation itself is owing to the loose cohesion of those material particles which constitute the nervous substances.⁷⁵

The doctor describes man's mental faculties of reason and emotion in terms of these anatomical structures. As previously argued, anatomists described the pieces of the brain whereas social theorists described man's distinct mental faculties. However, Smollett's novel subverts that traditional belief in order to suggest that the faculties of reason and emotion need not be understood as properties of the philosophical mind, but instead, as properties of the physical body. Overall, however, defining Sir Launcelot's madness first in terms of its effects on his physical nerves and second in terms of its effects on its emotions leads to the conclusion that man's faculty of reason is viewed as inherently more valuable than his faculty of emotion.

After Sir Launcelot and Aurelia are married, Mr. Ferret returns to the city to "feed his misanthropy," which suggests that the self-conscious individual is capable of maintaining personal attachment with ideas.⁷⁶ After Sir Launcelot and Arabella are married, Mr. Ferret is appalled at being surrounded by happiness and declares "his intention of returning to the metropolis, where he knew there would be always food sufficient for the ravenous appetite of his spleen."⁷⁷ This suggests that the city now has an objective denotation—the geographically defined landmass—and Mr. Ferret's

⁷⁴ Hugh Freeman, "The General Hospital and Mental Health Care: A British Perspective," *The Milbank Quarterly* 73, no. 4 (1995), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3350289>.

⁷⁵ Smollett, *Sir Launcelot Greaves*, Ch. 23, 187.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, Ch. The Last, p. 211.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, Ch. The Last, p. 211.

personal connotation—a place of misanthropy. This idea in Smollett’s text quibbles with Locke, who claims that:

men having been accustomed from their cradles to learn words which are easily got and retained, before they knew or had framed the complex ideas to which they were annexed, or which were to be found in the things they were thought to stand for, they usually continue to do so all their lives.⁷⁸

Whereas Locke remains skeptical of man’s reasonable faculty being able to grasp continuously altering ideas, Smollett suggests that the individual’s personal attachment to the idea allows for the retention of differing interpretations of the same word. The faculty of reason is not directly responsible for this. Mr. Ferret’s self-consciousness allows for this defiance of reason. It might be speculated here that reason is valuable as an independent faculty of the mind, but it becomes infinitely more valuable when one considers how it has long-term effects that greatly affect the mind’s ability to function.

Smollett’s novel represents a society that has been organized by utilizing reasonable faculties, but maintains that the faculty of reason is so important because it allows an individual to achieve self-consciousness. The publication of Smollett’s novel corresponds with the development of madhouses throughout eighteenth-century England and raises the topic of whether society’s organization required that all people exhibit the faculty of reason. The first formal provision for taking care of the mentally ill was done in 1728 when London’s Guy’s Hospital opened and annexed a “lunatic house” for twenty patients.⁷⁹ This impulse to separate the mentally from

⁷⁸ Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book III, Ch. 10, p. 398.

⁷⁹ Freeman, “The General Hospital and Mental Health Care,” 654.

other types of body defects suggests that madness carries social implications.⁸⁰ Smollett's novel suggests that there are social implications—after all, Tom Clarke tries to prevent his uncle from descending into madness—but more importantly, a lack of reason prevents an individual from becoming self-conscious. Eighteenth-century madhouses based an individual's entire existence on the existence of the faculty of reason, and although Smollett's novel emphasizes reason, it hints at realizing there are limits to reason's powers, suggesting that an individual's other mental faculties may compensate for a lack of reason.

⁸⁰ In Cervantes' *Don Quixote*, the barber and priest expressed ideas similar to the purposes of madhouses. They wanted to confine Don Quixote because of his madness.

**A Dolorous Epistle and Confused Verb Tenses;
Or, the Emotion's Inductive Path to Achieving Self-Consciousness in
Charlotte Lennox's *The Female Quixote* (1752)**

...sorrows were made not for animals but for men; but if men feel them too much, they turn into animals...

--Cervantes, *Don Quixote*, Second Part, Chapter XI, p. 521

The Text, Madness, and Emotion

Charlotte Lennox, as a female novelist of the Enlightenment period, wrote a novel, *The Female Quixote*, which re-envisions the ultra-popularized *Don Quixote* story and suggests that madness is the byproduct of a malfunctioning mental faculty of emotion. This work of fiction relates madness to the mental faculty of emotion and suggests that the mental faculty of emotion allows an individual to become self-conscious. Both Hume and Smith argue that emotions are subservient to reason, but Lennox's novel subverts that hierarchy. As part of the *genre* of sentimental novels, Lennox's novel cites emotions as emanating from the anatomical nerve and speculates that that individual's mental faculty of emotion organizes her within the framework of an inductive mechanism. This inductive mechanism leads from the microscopic nerve to the creation of a family, and allows the individual to achieve self-consciousness. Not only does this idea from Lennox differ from the

interpretation of Smollett's novel, but this also suggests that the individual's faculty of emotion was necessary to both women **and** men, subverting the cultural stereotype that men were less inclined to exhibit emotion.

The Female Quixote's basic narrative suggests that the individual's faculty of emotion is equal in power to, not subservient to, her faculty of reason. Lennox maintains a Smithian conception of emotions, suggesting that the emotions are how someone feels, and more specifically, how someone feels about another person.⁸¹ Lennox's main character Arabella descends into madness after reading La Calprenède's sixteenth-century French romances. This prevents her from being able to feel anything for anyone except herself. She is perpetually disappointed by her cousin, Mr. Glanville, and his efforts to express his love for her only because his actions do not represent those actions in her sixteenth-century romances. As a result of her misunderstanding of emotions, her Uncle and her cousin, Miss Glanville, become angry and attempt to impose the mental faculty of emotion on her, illustrating the extent to which emotion is necessary for the maintenance of a family. Mr. Glanville continues to court Arabella, but his competition with Sir George is in line with that of an early-modern hero who must win the affections of his beloved. Arabella is finally released from her madness and is able to love Mr. Glanville only after a doctor convinces her that all books are evil. The doctor argues that books do not compensate for experience. This is most likely reference to a Lockean conception of reason and the preferential treatment of the faculty of reason, and thus maintains

⁸¹ Smith, *A Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Part I, Sect. iii, Ch. 1, p. 43.

the likelihood that Lennox is writing on behalf of the mental faculty of emotion, indicating that she wants more constructive recognition of emotion.

Lennox's novel suggests that despite the marked differences between the faculties of reason and emotion, they are also similar. The faculty of emotion, like reason, provides a mechanism by which the individual achieves self-consciousness. Hume suggests that there is a "difference betwixt feeling and thinking" and maintains that emotions are necessary for understanding ideas.⁸² Smith suggests that individuals express emotions for others because there is pleasure in seeing others' happiness.⁸³ Lennox accepts these immediate differences, but she places value on the faculty of emotion. Her novel alludes to a specific inductive mechanism by which the individual achieves self-consciousness, which questions whether one faculty, the faculty of reason, should be considered innately superior if the faculty of emotion achieves the same goal. By presenting these ideas in the *Don Quixote* story, she is asking for these ideas to become infiltrated into society. Lennox's novel, however, is not merely an imitation of *Don Quixote* but quite possibly a criticism of society's undervaluation of the mental faculty of emotion.

Lennoxian Emotion and Induction of Self-Consciousness

The first stage of the Lennoxian induction, thus disagrees with the social theorists by suggesting that an individual's faculty of emotion emanates from the anatomical nerves, not from the philosophical mind. Lennox's novel is one

⁸² Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, Part I, Sect. 1, p. 49.

⁸³ Smith, *A Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Part I, Sect. i, Ch. 1, p. 9.

representative of the sentimental *genre*, which was also termed “a cult of refined emotionalism.”⁸⁴ These emotions were the results of what historian of neuroscience C. U. M. Smith terms as “the sensible parts of the body,” or nerves, which intercepted “the communication between a part and its nerve.”⁸⁵ Thus, sentimentalists contended that the microscopic nerve was responsible for emotion. The English physician, John Moore, in his 1744 poem “The Oeconomy of Love,” explicitly espouses this idea.⁸⁶ Since Lennox’s novel is a representative of this line of thought, one might argue that Arabella’s failure to experience emotion is the result of her anatomic nerves. These nerves, when functioning correctly, are the building blocks of emotion and begin the inductive pathway that leads an individual to self-consciousness.

Mr. Glanville’s nerves have produced emotion, illustrating an emotion-driven individual as the second stage of this inductive mechanism, and his fervent chasing after Arabella suggests that in this text, self-consciousness is defined as having both appreciation for and command over one’s emotions. When compared to her emotion-driven suitor, Mr. Glanville, it appears that Arabella is interested in observing and gossiping about love as opposed to experiencing it.⁸⁷ When Arabella forbids Mr. Glanville to write her love letters, he “set[s] out seat for her,” and instead of writing to her, chases after her, illustrating that his emotions have caused him to act.⁸⁸ At this point, however, Mr. Glanville is subservient to his emotions. Although Mr. Glanville appreciates his emotions and they have led to action, those emotions have given him

⁸⁴ Barker-Benfield, *The Culture of Sensibility*, xix.

⁸⁵ C. U. M. Smith, “Brain and Mind,” 21.

⁸⁶ John Armstrong, “The Oeconomy of Love” (Eighteenth-Century Collections Online, 2004), line 45. <http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/ECCO;jsessionid=66D13580F45B4E0FA7D64F82F5BAF608?c=1&stp=Author&ste=11&af=BN&ae=T181362&tiPG=1&dd=0&dc=flc&docNum=CW114289802&vrsn=1.0&srcht=a&d4=0.33&n=10&SU=0LRK&locID=31841>

⁸⁷ Lennox, *The Female Quixote*, Book II, Ch. 4, p. 67.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, Book II, Ch. 7, p. 79.

no choice. His physical body is also commanded by his emotions; he is bed-ridden as a result of his love-sickness for Arabella.⁸⁹ Although the individual is not in control of her emotions, this subverts Smith's notion that emotions are byproducts of man's faculty of reason and suggests that emotions are the cause of an individual's actions.

Moreover, Arabella's failure to sympathize with the despairing Sir Bellmour suggests that the faculty of emotion, not a nation's civil laws, both affords personal freedoms and connects individuals; this interpersonal connection is the third required stage for inductively achieving self-consciousness through the utilizing the faculty of emotion. When suitors express their love for Arabella in ways that are dissimilar to her ideas gleaned from reading romances, she denounces them to death, highlighting her absurdity. One suitor, Sir Bellmour writes a letter begging to "let [his] death then...expiate the Offence [he has] been guilty of."⁹⁰ Sir Bellmour is so in love with Arabella that he is willing to die for her, yet Arabella has no emotion after reading this letter. Yet, her maid Lucy, "was greatly affected at so dolorous Epistle," which suggests Lucy's emotions have allowed her to form a bond with the despairing Sir Bellmour. Her emotions have exemplified a Smithian conception of how sympathy and sorrow denote "our fellow-feeling with the sufferings."⁹¹ Lucy's emotions have not only endowed her with individuality, but she has at least a limited amount of choice in determining with whom she sympathizes. As Smith contends, "in both cases our regard for the multitude is compounded and made up of the particular regards which we feel for the different individuals of which it is composed."⁹² Lucy

⁸⁹ Lennox, *The Female Quixote*, Book III, Ch. 8, p. 133.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, Book IV, Ch. 9, p. 174.

⁹¹ Smith, *A Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Part I, Sect. iii, Ch. 1, p. 43.

⁹² Smith, *A Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Part II, Sect. ii, Ch.3, p. 89.

feels emotion for this specific individual and this emphasizes the inductive mechanism; emotion emanated from the microscopic nerve and has now created a connection between two people. In contrast, individuals who are deductively organized are not permitted to choose with whom they are connected; they are bound together by civil laws. The nerves have elicited emotions and caused individuals to become grouped together and suggests the individual can soon achieve self-consciousness, already defined simultaneous appreciation for and command over one's emotions.

It must be noted that the premature death of Arabella's mother suggests that self-consciousness is inductively achieved through parentage and strikingly implies that the faculties of reason and emotion are similar in that they are independently cultivated through experience. Achieving the role of parent represents, at least in some symbolic form, the Hegelian master-slave dialectic and suggests a new individual has come into existence. A parent is simultaneously the master of the household, and to some extent, the slave to the political unit. When master and slave interact, they think about the other in terms of themselves. Then, they struggle with each other it leads to the formation of a new, in this instance, self-conscious, being. Since the parent encompasses both master and slave, she must recognize both roles and struggle to decide whether she is more the master of the household or servant to the state.⁹³ This new being is the self-conscious individual. Lennox's depiction of a family alludes to the stereotypical family that existed from antiquity through much of

⁹³ G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979, originally published 1807).

the eighteenth century. The seventeenth- and eighteenth- century philosopher Gilbert Burnet politely suggests that a woman compensates for a man's deficiencies:

[the man] may excel the wife in greatness of Mind and height of Knowledge, the Wife some way makes up with Affection and Tender Care.⁹⁴

Although Burnet devalues the woman because of her seemingly strong faculty of the emotion, Lennox suggests that the women's role as a nurturer is the final stage of the Lennoxian inductive pathway and allows an individual to achieve self-consciousness. The mother is the head of the internal household, and like a Leviathan, helps to maintain her children's well-being. One aspect of maintaining that well-being includes acting as an emotional nurturer, implying that she values emotions and has enough command over them to lovingly raise children. Since Arabella's mother's premature death left Arabella without an emotional nurturer, her father compensated by allowing her to read French romances, from which she gleaned "Romances were the real Pictures of Life, from them she drew all her Notions and Expectations."⁹⁵ The emotional nurturer represents a self-conscious individual by controlling her emotions. The need for an emotional nurturer suggests that Locke's *Essay on Human Understanding* itself is only one half of a story because it only treats the development and cultivation of the faculty of reason. Even Locke places the emphasis on rationality, albeit in the midst of a discussion of emotions. The second part should include how a person's faculty of emotion is developed similarly to but independent from that faculty of reason. To some extent, this argues that the faculty of emotion is bifurcated from the faculty of reason, yet the interconnectedness of the mind, which

⁹⁴ Barker-Benfield, *The Culture of Sensibility*, 42, Lennox, *The Female Quixote*, Book I, Ch. 1, p. 6. Since Arabella had no mother, her father acted with greatness of mind hoped to "render [Arabella's] Mind as beautiful as her Person was lovely," this emphasizes the father's inclination to be reasonable.

⁹⁵ Lennox, *The Female Quixote*, Book I, Ch. 1, p. 7.

has already been discussed, causes one to wonder how the other mental faculties affect the development of the faculty of emotion.

Arabella's negative response to her uncle's patriarchal concern for her faculty of emotion suggests that emotion, unlike reason, must be cultivated entirely from within the individual. As her uncle mandates that she experience love, Arabella responds by running away, suggesting that the quintessential difference between reason and emotion is that one can be forced to think something whereas emotions are personal by nature. Therefore, a person cannot be forced into feeling something. The books given earlier to Arabella become substitutes for emotion, but they do not help her achieve emotion. Thus, when the faculty of emotion malfunctioning, some other faculty needs to connect the individual to the larger cultural context, suggesting limits to the power of the faculty of emotion.

Limits of Emotion: Emotion and Reason

Although the faculty of emotion leads to the development of self-consciousness, Miss Glanville's aversion to finding love in old age nuances Hume's conception of emotion. It suggests that the faculty of emotion is more effective in understanding present ideas than understanding ideas related to the future. Unlike Arabella, her cousin Miss Glanville is averse to waiting until she is older to find love. When Arabella proclaims wanting to be courted for ten years as in one of her novels, Miss Glanville's inclination toward vanity and beauty is made apparent as she contests that if Arabella will "marry when [she is] an old Woman," she will be much

less attractive, and in this sense, have difficulty being loved.⁹⁶ The difference between Miss Glanville and Arabella is that Miss Glanville's thoughts are oriented toward the present, whereas Arabella's thoughts are oriented toward the future. Hume contends that emotions are utilized in order to better understand ideas, yet he assumes that emotions understand future ideas as effectively as they understand present ideas. Lennox's text subverts this notion and implies that emotions are better suited for understanding ideas in the present as opposed to future ideas, thus suggesting that there is a limit to the utility of emotion.

Despite the path described above, by which the faculty of emotion creates an inductively organized system, Lennox maintains the Humean conception that emotions can occur almost instantaneously, suggesting that emotions cause disruption to organized systems. The courting method proposed by the French romances is both methodical and does not allow for a quick development of emotions. This is contrary to Hume's contention that "we will operate on others, by what we feel immediately in ourselves."⁹⁷ This suggests that emotions cause immediate action, but Lennox's novel complicates this idea by implying that these instantaneous actions, not surprisingly, disturb the balance of the organized structure. Emotions effect immediate action, and as Lennox depicts, Mr. Glanville's lack of control over his emotions disrupts Arabella's life. Emotions effect nearly instantaneous action, but they do so at the cost of organization, causing one to question how emotions are checked.

⁹⁶ Lennox, *The Female Quixote*, Book III, Ch. 2, p. 112.

⁹⁷ Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book II, Sect. 2, p. 382.

Emotional and reasonable faculties cooperate, yet Lennox questions Locke's conception of experience in order to suggest that emotions must be experienced physically whereas reason is cultivated through a mental experience. Throughout the novel, Arabella's family members attempt to convince her of her madness, yet they do so with no avail. Her faculty of emotion has not guided her actions, suggesting that she has not developed self-consciousness, despite appearing with a strong, defensive personality that prevents her family members from successfully convincing her of her folly. This suggests that there is no correlation between how an individual conceives herself and how she appears to others. Nonetheless, Arabella is finally convinced of the books' absurdities by a doctor's damning criticism of all books, even including Shakespeare's plays, *Aesop's Fables*, and "books with antient Histories."⁹⁸ The doctor's Lockean critique of books is that books do not afford individuals with sufficient experience. The difference, however, is that Locke's text is concerned with reason whereas Lennox's text questions emotions. Still, Lennox's novel questions experience as it relates to emotion. The doctor's attack on books suggests that emotions must be physically experienced, but it should not be interpreted as damning all books. Instead, his argument suggests that books provide only valuable mental experience and cultivate the faculty of reason. This distinction between the physical and the mental is reminiscent of the anatomists' concern for the physical and social theorists' concern for the mental. Yet this distinction also implies that the faculties of reason and emotion retain distinct identities, but a total conception of the mind requires noting how these distinct identities interact.

⁹⁸ Lennox, *The Female Quixote*, Book IX, Ch. 11, p. 378

Before visiting the doctor, Arabella encounters a countess whose advice to her about the French romances purports to be an understanding of historicity, or how history progresses, but she also suggests that for many, the faculty of emotion is requisite for the development of reason. Before the doctor critiques the French romances, a gentle countess “historicizes romance” by putting forth the idea that “Arabella’s mistake involves thinking in the wrong verb tense: these things *happened*, rather than *happen*.”⁹⁹ This suggests that Arabella’s lack of emotion and presence of a faculty of reason causes her to misinterpret past events for present events. However, Arabella’s lack of emotion may account for her inability to understand the present. In other words, the faculties of reason and emotion cooperate and are necessary for understanding all of history.

Hume provides a theoretical model for suggesting that the faculties of emotion and the faculties of reason cooperate, but eighteenth-century medical treatises relate that theory to what is practical. George Cheyne’s 1733 health manual *The English Malady* is “a treatise of nervous diseases of all kinds.” However, it is unique in that examines both bodily and emotional symptoms of specific diseases: “And of all the Miseries that afflict Human Life, and relate principally to the Body, in this Valley of Tears.”¹⁰⁰ This suggests that in order to understand the nervous disease, the faculties of reason must describe how that disease affects the body’s anatomy whereas the faculty of emotion describes how the individual feels as a result of being diseased.

⁹⁹ Scott Paul Gordon, “The Space of Romance in Lennox’s Female Quixote,” *Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900* 38, no. 3 (Summer 1998), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/451060>.

¹⁰⁰ George Cheyne, *The English Malady: Or a Treatise of Nervous Diseases of All Kinds* (Eighteenth-Century Collections Online, 2003), Introduction, p. 4.
<http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/ECCO?vrsn=1.0&dd=0&locID=31841&b1=KE&srchtp=b&d1=0384600400&SU=All&c=5&ste=11&d4=0.33&stp=Author&dc=flc&n=10&docNum=CW107864112&b0=George+Cheyne&tiPG=1>

Additionally, the Scottish doctor, John Armstrong, wrote “The Art of Preserving Health: A Poem” (1796), which presents medical advice in the form of poetry because “its leading aim is to please; and its powers are, to a certain degree, to make pleasing what would not be so of itself.”¹⁰¹ Armstrong suggests that he must veil reason in the guise of emotion in order to make his knowledge most effective. To some extent, this suggests that without emotions, some people might not be able to develop the faculty of reason necessary for the maintenance of the human body. Or, in its more extreme version, the faculty of emotion influences the individual and her acquisition of knowledge more so than the faculty of reason. Although it may be tempting to hierarchize the value of the faculties as Hume does, there exists such a mutual dependence between the faculties of reason and emotion because the two faculties fulfill different purposes. But when combined, they aim to create a total conception of life, or rather, how the self-conscious individual perceives herself within the societal context.

Lennox’s novel suggests a mechanism that depends on the faculty of emotion and allows an individual to become self-conscious within society, yet her work stresses that society, because it does not value emotion, inadvertently, does not value women. Lennox’s novel alludes to an inductive mechanism by which the faculty of emotion leads an individual to self-consciousness while noting both the limits of emotion and the way in which the faculty of emotion interacts with the faculty of reason. To some extent, elevating the value of the mental faculty of emotion is also a

¹⁰¹ John Armstrong, “The Art of Preserving Health: A Poem” (Eighteenth-Century Collections Online, 2004), “On Dr. Armstrong’s Poem on the Art of Preserving Health,” 3. <http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/ECCO?vrsn=1.0&dd=0&locID=31841&b1=KE&srcthp=b&d1=0912200400&SU=All&c=3&ste=11&d4=0.33&stp=Author&dc=flc&n=10&docNum=CW115155536&b0=The+Art+of+Health&tiPG=1>

criticism of society's negative view of women as emotional beings. In her feminist treatise *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792), Mary Wollstonecraft contends that the women were not born inherently worse than men but rather attributed "[women's] 'weak and wretched' minds and bodies to 'a false system of education.'" ¹⁰² Wollstonecraft suggests that if a woman's faculty of reason was cultivated at a young age, emotion would not constantly clutter the mind because love, "once it has got the entire possession of the breast, will admit neither a rival nor a successor." ¹⁰³ Lennox, however, differs from Wollstonecraft in that she believes that reason and emotion may be reconciled; she purports for women to embrace their emotions. According to Barker-Benfield, Lennox's novels would both introduce women to reason and would "suit women's nervous system and education." ¹⁰⁴ Lennox contends that embracing one's faculty of emotion leads to a state of self-consciousness and additionally suggests that women should be regarded as just as self-conscious as men. Lennox's novel appears at a time when women were viewed as achieving more power, and as Barker-Benfield contends, women both reared the children and furnished the household, exhibiting "a source of power and influence." ¹⁰⁵ Lennox is not necessarily a proto-feminist and does not want women to be viewed as equal to men, but rather, her novel suggests that she wants women to be accepted as women, both emotional and rational beings.

¹⁰² Barker-Benfield, *The Culture of Sensibility*, 1.

¹⁰³ Smith, *A Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Part I, Sect. iii, Ch. 2, p. 57.

¹⁰⁴ Barker-Benfield, *The Culture of Sensibility*, 171.

¹⁰⁵ Roy Porter, *English Society in the Eighteenth Century* (Harmondsworth, Middx.: Penguin, 1982), 41. As found in Barker-Benfield, *The Culture of Sensibility*, 160.

**Bodily Moles and Springing from Dunghills:
Or, Morality as it Connects Reason and Emotion
in Henry Fielding's *Joseph Andrews* (1742)**

...but I, influenced by my star follow the narrow path of knight errantry, and because I profess it, I despise wealth but not honor. I have redressed grievances, righted wrongs, punished insolence, vanquished giants, and trampled monsters...I always direct my intentions to the virtuous ends, which are to do good to all and evil to none...

--Cervantes, *Don Quixote*, Second Part, Chapter XXXII, p.666

Fielding and his Novel

In his novel *Joseph Andrews*, Henry Fielding, a satirist of the Enlightenment period, questions the mere possibility of a wholly virtuous individual, yet he suggests that morality is the means by which the individual achieves self-consciousness. The word “madness” is used only twice throughout the entire novel.¹⁰⁶ No character in the text is defined as mad, but because it is an imitation of *Don Quixote*, it is possible to deduce Fielding's definition of madness. Following the patterns of the *Don Quixote* genre, one may assume that the title character, Joseph Andrews, is mad. As illustrated through both Smollett's and Lennox's novels, madness is always related to a mental faculty. Whereas Sir Launcelot in Smollett's novel lacks the faculty of

¹⁰⁶ Madness is found in Book III, Chapter 1, but it is used to describe Cervantes' novel. The one but this is a description of Cervantes' novel. The other instance of “madness” is in Book II, Chapter 12, which is used in a song sung by a strange woman Fanny and Joseph encounter.

reason, and Arabella in Lennox's novel lacks the faculty of emotion, Joseph Andrews has an *excess* of the faculty of morality. That excessive faculty of morality, however, causes Joseph to be inactive and complacent. Although this thesis has used the previous imitations of *Don Quixote* to suggest how the mental faculties of reason and emotion allow the individual to achieve self-consciousness, it was also suggested that they were both incomplete mechanisms. The explanation of both the deductive and inductive mechanisms carried the specific *caveat* that reason and emotion are interdependent, which thus prevents either faculty, when it exists in isolation, to achieve self-consciousness. Fielding's text, however, alludes to a two-step mechanism by which morality operates to reconcile the two faculties of reason and emotion and to allow the individual to achieve self-consciousness: first, morality allows the individual to visualize the two pathways—deductive and inductive—already described at length in this thesis, and then decide which path to take; second, morality leads the individual to that path and allows him to operate as a result of either the faculty of reason or the faculty of emotion. This mechanism articulates the extent to which all three mental faculties are intrinsically related, suggesting that all three faculties must be present for a properly functioning mind.

Joseph Andrews symbolizes morality, yet his complacency throughout the narrative suggests that the point of Fielding's novel is to inquire about morality's role in achieving self-consciousness. Fielding relies on the Humean conception of morality as one's ability to distinguish between what is virtuous and what is vicious. Fielding's inquiry into morality satirizes Richardson's *Pamela*—a work he also satirizes in *Shamela*—by claiming Joseph Andrews is Pamela's brother. Joseph, as

a symbol of morality, exemplifies the Humean conception of morality and “resist[s] the supreme power” of his flirtatious employer Lady Booby, whose failed seduction of Joseph causes her to banish him from the estate.¹⁰⁷ This exploits a tension that must exist between an individual’s morality and an individual’s role in an economic context. One might suggest that it is necessary for the individual to relinquish his morality to ensure his survival.

Upon being asked to leave the Booby Estate, Joseph Andrews has no choice but to seek his *fiancée*, Fanny Goodwill, but is attacked on his journey, suggesting that the morality individual has little, if any, advantage in the world. After being mugged, Joseph chances upon the town parson, Mr. Adams, returning from London, whose love for books and knowledge implies that he symbolizes the individual’s faculty of reason. Furthermore, Fanny, as a result of her love for Joseph, sets out to rescue him after hearing that he was mugged, thus implying that she symbolizes emotion. The two travelers are connected by Joseph, which suggests that morality connects reason and emotion. The three travelers set out to return to the Booby Estate, but they encounter obstacles: they appear before the magistrate, miss a carriage, and fear encountering a gang of murderers. Despite the lack of explicit madness, the three travelers are no more successful at traveling than Don Quixote who spends many of his nights at an inn. Most importantly, they encounter Mr. Wilson, a man divulges his life story, but heroically saves the day. As the travelers arrive at the Booby Estate, Lady Booby, hoping to prevent Joseph’s marriage, concocts a rumor that Joseph and Fanny are brother and sister. However Mr. Wilson fulfills his promise to Joseph and visits the Booby Estate, putting this rumor rest by

¹⁰⁷ Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book III, Part ii, Sect. 9, p. 604.

recognizing Joseph's back mole and identify him as his infant son that had been kidnapped. The ironic point, however, is that even the most moral man I more recognizable by his aesthetic features, albeit a generic one, than morality, which Fielding implies should be most definitive of the individual.

Joseph Andrews' stagnancy reaffirms the Humean notion that actions are the best indicators of a person's character, suggesting that morality is the indirect driving force of all actions. Fielding aims to show how morality relates to the human faculties of reason and emotion, and reinforces Hume's contention that "actions are, indeed, better indications of a character than words."¹⁰⁸ It is almost humorous that despite his morality, Joseph does very little throughout the novel. He passively listens to Mr. Adams' lectures, and it is Fanny's efforts that reunite the lovers, thus suggesting that morality has no direct impact on an individual's actions. Even if morality has no direct influence over an individual's actions, it is too prominent in the novel to be ignored.

Fielding's Mechanism of Morality

Fielding's interest in the artifice of the novel suggests that he defines morality as an internal conceptualization and comparison of the paths taken by the faculties of reason and emotion. In order to understand how Fielding conceives of morality, it is necessary to compare it to another conception of morality. Hume defines morality as understanding whether one's actions are virtuous or vicious, which suggests that man conceives of an action and then either proceeds with the action, or he does not

¹⁰⁸ Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book III, Part iii, Sect. 1, p. 626.

proceed with the action.¹⁰⁹ However, he has no immediate point of reference that helps him to decide the effects of this action. Fielding's novel rectifies this shortcoming of Hume's theory of morality. By bolstering the artifice of the novel, Fielding suggests that morality is defined as the choice one makes when presented with two options:

I will dismiss this Chapter with the following Observation: That it becomes an Author generally to divide a Book, as it doth a Butcher to joint his Meat, for such Assistance is of great Help to both the Reader and the Carver.¹¹⁰

Fielding contends that chapters are the physical pieces of the novel, and that the novelists manipulate them. This highlights the artifice of the novel and causes one to reconsider the novel—not Fielding's specific novel—in a new way. The pages of a novel exhibit meaning only when they are collated; similarly, the novel's narrative only comes to life when all pages are present. Thus, the novel can be understood as a metaphor for Fielding's conception of morality.

An individual cannot conceive of an action as moral or immoral unless another possible course of action is presented to him, which helps define Fielding's first stage of morality as presenting the individual with the two alternative paths. The novel exists as a cooperative effort between its smallest components, or the pages, and the larger, intangible pieces, such as the story and ideas it conveys. This is markedly similar to how anatomists induce the individual from its smallest pieces, the nerve fibres, whereas the social theorists deduce individuals from the immaterial aspects of him, or his ideas. Just as the novel allows one simultaneously to comprehend the meanings of the individual pages and the narrative as a whole,

¹⁰⁹ Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Part I, Sect.i, Ch. 1, p. 515.

¹¹⁰ Fielding, *Joseph Andrews*, Book II, Ch. 1, p. 78.

Joseph Andrews alludes to the idea that the individual's faculty of morality allows the individual to simultaneously comprehend how he acts from the nerves—by his faculty of emotion—and how he acts from his ideas—by the faculty of reason.

Fielding's second stage of morality allows the individual to choose which path to take and subverts Hume's hierarchy of the mental faculties, only to suggest that the faculty of morality is indirectly responsible for all human action. Hume's organization of his *Treatise of Human Nature* creates a distinct hierarchy of the mental faculties: Book I explains understanding; Book II examines passions; and Book III examines morality.¹¹¹ As the *Treatise of Human Nature* proceeds, a consecutive faculty of the mind processes the idea and then arrives at a specific understanding of that idea. In contrast, Fielding's novel suggests a different hierarchy of those faculties, with the faculties of reason and emotion being equal but the value of the faculty of morality being greater than both them.

The faculties of reason and emotion only cause action as a result of the presence of morality. Again, it is necessary to think of the three travelers in terms of the mental faculties they represent—Joseph as morality, Mr. Adams as reason, and Fanny as emotion. As Joseph and Mr. Adams travel back from London, they encounter a woman who is being attacked. Although Joseph represents morality, he resists helping the woman, claiming “this is no Business of ours.”¹¹² Despite Joseph's request to ignore the situation, Mr. Adams comes “to the Assistance of the poor Creature whom some Villains are murdering.”¹¹³ Mr. Adams methodically levels a blow at “the Part of the Ravisher's Head, where, according to the Opinion of the

¹¹¹ Hume, *A Treatise of Human Understanding*.

¹¹² Fielding, *Joseph Andrews*, Book II, Ch. 9, 119.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, Book II, Ch. 9, p. 119.

Ancients, the Brains of Some Persons are deposited.”¹¹⁴ This is an instance at which anatomy is present within the novel. This suggests that man’s faculty of reason allows the individual to perform the action, but that action is more broadly dependent on the individual’s faculty of morality. Similarly, the faculty of morality stimulates the individual acting from the faculty of emotion. After Lady Booby releases Joseph from her service, he travels to find Fanny. However, he is met with limited success because he is mugged, suggesting that an individual’s actions should not emanate directly from emotion. After hearing this, Fanny “abandoned the Cow she was milking, and taking with her a little Bundle of Clothes under her Arm,” set off to help Joseph.¹¹⁵ Fielding’s novel suggests that only after being triggered by the faculty of morality, the faculties of reason and emotion, as explained in the chapters on Smollett and Lennox, cause actions that lead to self-consciousness, suggesting that morality is the quintessential element of self-consciousness.

The presence of immoral characters in Fielding’s novel suggests that immorality is defined as an individual who chooses act in accordance with either the faculty of reason or from the faculty of emotion without first considering both options. Mr. and Miss Booby are immoral characters by Hume’s definition, meaning that they do not always exhibit a knowledge of what is virtuous and what is vicious. However, they also allow for a new definition of immorality to be gleaned from the text. Joseph’s uncle, Mr. Booby, leans toward the deductive, reason-driven method and advises against marrying Fanny because she is “so much beneath” him.¹¹⁶ Nonetheless, Mr. Booby’s does not achieve self-consciousness because his

¹¹⁴ Fielding, *Joseph Andrews*, Book II, Ch. 9, p. 119.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Book II, Ch. 10, p. 126.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Book IV, Ch. 7, p. 264.

individuality is overshadowed by his class status and desire to maintain class hierarchies. Miss Booby is more inclined to act as a result of faculties of emotion. Lusting after Joseph Andrews, her “tender Advances had not met with the Encouragement she might have reasonably expected,” which suggests that by upholding Joseph’s strong virtue.¹¹⁷ Although her actions result from her faculty of emotion, she fails to seduce Joseph and does not achieve self-consciousness through the creation of a family. Fielding’s novel suggests that immorality prevents the individual from achieving self-consciousness. Morality allows one to view the paths afforded by the faculties of reason and emotion equally. Contrarily, immorality prevents the individual from equally viewing those paths, suggesting that the immoral individual is more inclined to act in accordance with either reason or emotion. Examining morality suggests that the faculties of the mind do not exist according to binaries, meaning that the faculties of the mind are not either present or absent, but rather that there can exist almost infinitely varying amounts of each faculty.

Fielding satirizes the Great Man Theory of History to suggest that self-consciousness is recognizing how one’s self is incorporated into the fabric of society, and is not indicative of one’s power in society. Despite its many references, Fielding only appears to praise the Great Man Theory of History, or in Hegelian terms, he superficially appears to value most those individuals who have played a major role in world history, such as Julius Cesar and Napoleon. The narrator in *Joseph Andrews* praises the use of biography because “it is most certain, that Truth is only to be found in the Works of those who celebrate the Lives of Great Men.”¹¹⁸ However, because

¹¹⁷ Fielding, *Joseph Andrews*, Book I, Ch. 10, p. 38.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Book III, Ch. 1, p. 162.

this novel is so satirical, there is an air of doubt about the truthfulness of this argument for a Great Man Theory of History.¹¹⁹ Fielding mocks this approach just as he makes a mocks Joseph's wholesome virtue. In effect, he questions the power any one individual has in the world. Fielding's novel suggests that he values the mental faculty of morality and achieving self-consciousness. However, since Fielding suggests that individuals are not capable of achieving great power in world history, he defines self-consciousness as self-reflection on one's position in within the societal framework. Individuals may not be able to achieve great power, but as exemplified by Miss Booby's economic power over Joseph, individuals can almost certainly achieve some extent of personal power.

The Power and Cultivation of Morality

Overall, Fielding's satirical depiction of Joseph's uncontrollable emotions and back mole suggests that morality is the least powerful of the three mental faculties. When Joseph fears that he has lost Fanny forever, Mr. Adams espouses Stoic ideas and suggests that it is Joseph's "Duty to abstain from immoderate Grief."¹²⁰ Or, in the words of second-century Stoic Marcus Aurelius, "Let no emotions of the flesh, be they of pain or pleasure, affect the supreme and sovereign portion of the soul."¹²¹ Remembering that Joseph symbolizes morality, Mr Adams suggests that morality can be more powerful than the faculty of emotions. However, when Mr. Adams

¹¹⁹ In *Don Quixote*, there is also doubt cast upon the truthfulness of the narrator.

¹²⁰ Fielding, *Joseph Andrews*, Book III, Ch. 11, p. 230.

¹²¹ Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations*, trans. Maxwell Staniforth (New York: Penguin, 1964, originally written in Second century A.D.), Book V, Axiom 26, p.87.

succumbs to tears after he fears his son has drowned, it becomes apparent that the faculty of emotion is more powerful than that of morality.¹²²

Not only is morality weaker than emotion, but Fielding's depiction of Joseph's back mole suggests that the faculty of reason is also more powerful than the faculty of morality. In this midst determining Fanny's parents, Mr. Wilson—the man Joseph meets while traveling home from London—identifies Joseph as his kidnapped son by a mole on his back. However, it is absurd, and brings the satirical elements of the novel to the forefront, to believe that a back mole is an identifying feature because they are so common. This suggests that morality is incapable of subverting the authority of the faculty of reason in organizing society.

It appears as though morality is the least powerful mental faculty, however, both examples—failed Stoicism and an abnormally identifiable back mole—suggest that morality is only the least powerful faculty when the individual is placed in a social context. As previously argued, the faculty of morality stimulates both reason and emotion. This leads to the intellectual surprise that morality is the most powerful faculty in causing the individual to become self-reflexive, whereas the faculties of reason and emotion are more powerful in orienting the individual into the societal framework. Despite being powerful, these mental faculties are not unchanging and can be influenced in ways beyond the individual's control.

Fielding's novel satirizes a debate on the advantages and disadvantages of public and private schools and suggests that an individual's morality can be affected by a group, but an individual cannot affect another individual's morality. Mr. Adams and Joseph Andrews engage in a debate regarding the value of public and private

¹²² Fielding, *Joseph Andrews*, Book IV, Ch. 8, p. 271.

schools. Mr. Adams claims that Sir Thomas Booby is so vicious because he attended a public school, which was “the Cause of all the Calamities he afterwards suffered. Public Schools are the Nurseries of all Vice and Immorality.”¹²³ It seems odd, however, that interactions with individuals, even of the most vicious nature, are capable of completely altering Mr. Booby’s moral disposition. Joseph contests with Mr. Adams, claiming that private schools are where a parent may “preserve the Purity of his Child.”¹²⁴ In other words, Joseph claims because individuals are disciplined in private schools, their immorality will not affect other individuals. Like Mr. Adams’ contention, this is preposterous. Fielding acknowledges both extremes regarding whether individuals are capable of effecting moral change unto other individuals. It is likely, however, that Fielding presents the two extremes of the argument in order to suggest both, that individuals can cause others to perform morally reprehensible actions, and that individuals alone are unable to effect some long-term change.

Although the individual is endowed with a certain level of morality, Fielding’s depiction of capitalism criticizes the public sphere for not instilling morality in its citizens. Mr. Adams travels to London hoping to have a bookseller publish and sell his sermons. The bookseller is guided by his capitalistic drive, which represents his role in the public sphere, and refuses to sell the sermons unless they are “the Manuscript Sermons of a Clergyman lately deceased, all warranted Originals, and never printed.”¹²⁵ This drive for capitalism, or a macroscopic structure, prevents society from wanting to cultivate man’s mental faculty of morality. Instead,

¹²³ Fielding, *Joseph Andrews*, Book III, Ch. 5, p. 200.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, Book III, Ch. 5, p. 201.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, Book I, Ch. 16, p. 66.

according to Hume, laws are constructed in order to compensate for man's lack of morality. This corresponds with Hume's conception that laws result from an individual's lack of morality.¹²⁶ To some extent, this indicates that the larger public structures of a society relegated all power over the mind to the individual.

Similar to the individual's other mental faculties, the individual's faculty of morality must be cultivated and slowly brought into existence. By not conforming "to the exact Rules of Biography" and maintaining that Joseph has a very short family lineage, Fielding only satirically suggests that that the mental faculty of morality can instantaneously appear, or rather has "sprung out of dunghills."¹²⁷ Fielding's pithy humor suggests that morality is not just given to an individual, but rather, it must be cultivated into existence, suggesting that all three mental faculties exhibit at least some extent of power and similarity.

Fielding's novel alludes to the notion that the faculty of morality acts as a point of convergence for the mind's faculties of reason and emotion, which suggests that the mind must be thought of as a total unit, a composition of specific components. In stronger terms, *Joseph Andrews* alludes to a model of morality that suggests the mind does not exist as the fragmented faculties of reason and emotion. For example, the Scottish doctor James Adair, in *Essays on Fashionable Diseases* (1790) illustrates how the general public cared little about the components of the mind and more about the mind as a total unit. Furthermore Adair claims "before the

¹²⁶ Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book III, Sect. 7, p. 588-589. "There are the persons whom we call civil magistrates, kings and their minister, our governors and rulers, who being indifferent persons to the greatest part of the state, have no interest, or but a remote one, in any act of injustice; and being satisfied with their present condition, and with their part in society, have an immediate interest in every execution of justice, which is so necessary to the upholding a society."

¹²⁷ Fielding, *Joseph Andrews*, Book I, Ch. 2, p. 17.

publication of this book, people of fashion had not the least idea that they had nerves.”¹²⁸ This is an indication of the extent to which anatomy had become present in the daily lives of individuals, suggesting that science had become prevalent in daily life. However, these individuals were not concerned with the pieces of the brain; they were concerned with viewing the mind as a total unit. Mental diseases became fashionable. Upper-class society, especially women, pretended to be afflicted by diseases. This could be viewed both as a disregard for the different faculties of the mind and as an appreciation of the mind as a total unit.

Fielding’s novel alludes to the mental faculty of morality as a means by which to connect the mental faculties of reason and emotion. This could be used to suggest that the Enlightenment period should be defined as an attempt to grasp the totality of life, not only as a time of grasping for the totality of life through the use of science and reason. Despite not having a centralized constitution, Roy Porter contends that “the *philosophes* claimed that critical reason would prove emancipatory. Reason and science, they proclaimed, would make people more humane and happy.”¹²⁹ Reason and science were prominent during the Enlightenment period, but Fielding’s novel stresses that the mental faculty of morality is essential to human life, even if Hume notes that morality is unknowable by reason. Reason compelled anatomists to achieve a total conception of man’s physical body whereas as reason compelled the canonical social theorists to strive for a total conception of how society operated.

¹²⁸ James Adair, *Essays on Fashionable Diseases* (Eighteenth-Century Collections Online, 2003), “Essay on Fashionable Diseases,” 6.
<http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/ECCO?dd=0&locID=31841&d1=0274600200&srchtp=b&SU=A1l&c=1&docNum=CW407361579&b0=Adair+Fashionable+Diseases&h2=1&vrsn=1.0&b1=KE&ste=11&dc=etoc&stp=Author&d4=0.33&n=10&tiPG=1>

¹²⁹ Porter, *The Enlightenment*, 8.

Neither examining the anatomic brain nor examining the intangible mind affords a total conception of life. As previously noted, the literary critic René Wellek's contended that novels portray a totalized conception of life. This could lead to the question of the extent to which the Enlightenment period should be understood as a culmination of science and reason. Instead, it might be argued that it is best to study the Enlightenment period from the novels it produced, or rather, the products that most closely resemble its goals.

Conclusion

Since human affairs, particularly the lives of men, are not eternal and are always in a state of decline from their beginnings until they reach their final end, and since the life of Don Quixote had no privilege from heaven to stop its natural course, it reached its end and conclusion when he least expected it...

--Cervantes, *Don Quixote*, Second Part, Chapter LXXIV, p. 934

Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century anatomists and social theorists studied the mind in two ways: anatomically and philosophically. As a result of the microscope, seventeenth-century anatomists discovered that the nerve was constructed of small nerve fibres. The 1665 discovery that many nervous fibres were bundled together to create a solid-like nerve created a conception of the nerve as scientists know it today. However, to seventeenth-century anatomists, this discovery reaffirmed that the brain was a machine and nerves, even in their very composition, were rationally constructed to ensure the livelihood of that machine. Anatomists discovered the pieces of the machine, but social theorists studied the effects of that machine on human actions. Both the anatomists and social theorists agreed that this mind was wholly devoted to reason. These thinkers were writing for a specific class of people, and it is likely that not all seventeenth- and eighteenth-century individuals were reading these texts. The eighteenth-century novel, however, included discussions of the mind and was widely read. As a result, examining the novel's

conception of the mind provides a clearer understanding as to how a public audience perceived the mind in ways that contradicted how elite thinkers perceived the mind.

Thus the three eighteenth-century imitations of *Don Quixote* examined in this thesis suggest that an eighteenth-century conception of the mind was more complicated than simply contending the emotion and morality were subservient to reason. The *Don Quixote* genre was very popular in eighteenth-century England, so it is likely that many individuals had exposure to these novels. When the three novels—Smollett's *Sir Launcelot Greaves*, Lennox's *The Female Quixote*, and Fielding's *Joseph Andrews*—are examined in conjunction with one another, the prominence placed on the mental faculty of reason is diminished, or rather reconfigured. These novels suggest that the mind consists of three major faculties—reason, emotion, and morality—yet it is morality, not reason, that is most essential to the human mind. Smollett's novel suggests that self-consciousness is achieved through the faculty of reason whereas the Lennox's novel suggests that self-consciousness is achieved through the use of emotion. Fielding's novel reconciles those ideas by contending that the faculty of morality links both reason and emotion and allows the individual to foresee how acting from either reason or emotion will affect him. These novels suggest that there is no inherent hierarchy of the mental faculties; the faculty of reason affects the individual's actions in the public sphere whereas the faculty of emotion affects the individual's life in the private sphere.

One of the most striking aspects of this study is that it suggests how the seemingly divergent and antithetical faculties are reconciled. Erasmus' 1592 satire, *In Praise of Folly* provides a post-renaissance example of the long-standing debate

concerning which mental faculty has more power over the individual's actions. That text humorously depicts both sides of the debate within one text, but like this thesis, it suggests that both reason and emotion are necessary component for an individual's life. This debate regarding reason and emotion can be seen as well in the decades following the eighteenth century. For example, phrenology is the mid-nineteenth-century scientific study of the faculties of the mind. Phrenology could itself be viewed as a an intermingling of seventh- and eighteenth-century anatomy and social theory because it suggests that there are defined pieces of the physical brain that are responsible for the mind's different faculties of reason and emotion, in addition to many other faculties. This debate can even be found in nineteenth-century Romanticism, which is viewed as emphasizing both reason and emotion. Novels of the Romantic period such as Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* (1818) attempted to reconcile science, which is symbolic of reason, and emotion. More importantly, this suggests two seemingly antithetical elements may be reconciled because both are equally valuable.

This study examines the possibility that readers of popular eighteenth-century English novels became imbued with a notion of the mind almost entirely different than that of their contemporary elite thinkers, one that almost exclusively suggested reason's dominance. However, this only begins to comprehend the complex relationship between novels, the science of the mind, and the eighteenth-century novel. This raises questions about whether popular novels – as contrasted with, for instance, the major politically oriented novels of the eighteenth-century, such as Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* (1719) and William Godwin's *Things as They Are*;

or *The Adventures of Caleb Williams* (1794) – were the only *genre* to reconceptualize the faculties of the mind. It also raises questions about whether intellectually comparable countries such as France presented the mind in novels in the same way as England. For instance, did Voltaire's philosophically-driven *Candide* (1759) or Rousseau's epistolary novel *Julie, or the New Heloise* subvert the hierarchy of the faculty of reason? With the late-twentieth-century rise of the discipline of Neuroscience, the science of the mind has again begun to expand in both breadth and depth, presumably permeating modern novels similarly to the eighteenth-century. Yet, though nervous fibre and has undergone – and will likely continue to undergo – many revisions in its textual representation over the past three centuries, it remains, at its most basic level, the foundation of an idea.

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