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Transformation of Japan’s Civil Society Landscape

Mary Alice Haddad

Japan’s civil society is being transformed as more people volunteer for advocacy and professional nonprofit organizations. In the US context, this trend has been accompanied by a decline in participation in traditional organizations. Does the rise in new types of nonprofit groups herald a decline of traditional volunteering in Japan? This article argues that while changes in civil rights, political opportunity structure, and technology have also taken place in Japan, they have contributed to the rise of new groups without causing traditional organizations to decline, because Japanese attitudes about civic responsibility have continued to support traditional volunteering.

KEYWORDS: citizenship, civil society, democracy, Japan, nonprofit organization, volunteering

Japan’s civil society has undergone a profound transformation during the last decade. In 1995 an unprecedented 1.2 million volunteers from around the country descended on the Kobe-Osaka area after a devastating earthquake killed more than 6,000 people. In honor of their efforts, the Japanese government declared 1995 the Year of the Volunteer. Three years later, the Nonprofit Organization (NPO) Law passed the Diet by unanimous vote, overhauling the legal foundation of Japan’s nonprofit sector by significantly easing restrictions on the incorporation of nonprofit organizations. Building on this enthusiasm, the Japanese government spearheaded the UN’s designation of the year 2001 as the International Year of the Volunteer. In that year, nearly 6,000 organizations had become incorporated through the new NPO Law, and 32 million Japanese reported volunteering, up from only 4 million ten years earlier.1
Japanese society did not awake to the news of the earthquake on January 17, 1995, and suddenly decide to become a nation of volunteers. They have been actively involved in supporting their communities through volunteer activities for centuries. Contemporary neighborhood associations and volunteer fire departments trace their history to the Tokugawa period (1600–1868). The volunteer welfare commissioner system began at the turn of the last century and is still very active today. Millions of Japanese are active in their local women’s and youth groups. These traditional organizations are quite different from their more contemporary counterparts in their missions, motivations, and relationship with the government. In this article, I use the word “embedded” to describe these traditional organizations, since their close relationship with local governments is one of the key features that distinguishes them from newer groups.

Briefly, traditional organizations tend to have memberships that are rooted in their local (usually a walkable neighborhood) community even if they are networked into national or even international organizations. People tend to join these groups because it is expected of them as members of their community; they join more out of a sense of civic duty than because they have a particular interest or passion for a cause. The groups are usually not very professionalized and have a small or no professional staff.

Finally, these groups are embedded in their local governments. Civic leaders meet regularly with local civil servants to formulate and implement policies in a wide range of areas, such as fire protection, elder care, and youth truancy. The scope and nature of the contact between the groups and the government are rarely proscribed by a formal contract; contact occurs in a regular, habitual manner established through the long-term relationship between the government and the civic organizations.2

Newer groups can take many different forms, but in general they draw their memberships from a broader geographic area—a whole city, country, or even from across the world. The motivations that bring the members together are less about a sense of community civic responsibility and more about a commitment to a particular cause (e.g., animal rights) or an interest in a particular activity (e.g., reading contemporary nonfiction). These groups can either be highly professionalized, with members essentially writing checks and not much more, or they can be entirely volunteer with no paid staff. Finally, newer groups may have close links to the government (e.g., a nonprofit social service agency),
but those connections are constrained and are usually stipulated by a formal contract. Other groups may entirely eschew any relationship with the government or even view the government with hostility.³

In research on US civil society, many scholars have observed a trend away from traditional ways of volunteering, such as the Knights of Columbus and Parent Teacher Associations, toward greater participation in professional advocacy organizations, such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International.⁴ Is Japan following the US pattern? Are newer organizations gaining at the expense of more traditional forms of participation? Can we expect a kind of “civil society convergence” across the advanced capitalist democracies?

In this article I argue that in Japan, newer forms of participation are not coming at the expense of more traditional ways of getting involved. Many traditional groups are sustaining their participation rates, and some are even seeing an increase in participation. The most successful of the new groups are cooperating with older ones in joint projects that expand the missions and increase the effectiveness of both types of groups. Therefore, while Japan’s civil society is indeed in a period of transformation, new groups are not displacing the older ones, and one should not expect convergence onto the US model of civic participation.

I begin the article with a rough sketch of the civil society landscape in Japan, painting a portrait of where Japanese dedicate their time as compared with Americans. In the second section I use the causal factors identified by Theda Skocpol (2003, 2004) as key to the change in civic participation in the United States—the rights revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, changes in the political opportunity structure, and technological innovation—as a window through which to examine the changes in contemporary volunteer participation in Japan.⁵ In each instance, I argue that while in the US case these factors have resulted in a simultaneous weakening of participation in traditional organizations even as participation in newer ones has strengthened, in the Japanese case they have resulted in strengthening newer organizations without weakening traditional groups, primarily because community attitudes of civic responsibility continue to support participation in traditional groups.

In the final section, I expand on this argument: the attitude that citizens have of their civic duty—what they think their responsibility for volunteering is—can help explain the patterns found in both the United States and Japan. I conclude with some thoughts about what the transformation of Japan’s civil society might mean for its democracy.
Japan’s Civil Society

Japan’s civil society has a long history of community involvement. During the Edo period (1603–1868), Japanese culture flourished in an environment of relative peace. Mutual aid associations grew across the country, especially in the urban centers. In Edo (Tokyo), neighborhood associations called *machikaisho* were established as public-private organizations to perform three primary functions: store rice, provide financing, and aid the poor. Other similar self-help organizations were organized on the village level to serve the same purposes. During the Meiji period (1868–1912), the voluntary and nonprofit sector became more formalized with the establishment, in 1896, of the Civil Code, which enabled the establishment of public interest corporations. This code stands largely intact today, and the first major reworking of the legal structure surrounding nonprofit organizations did not occur until the passage of the 1998 NPO Law.

Currently, Japanese are involved in a wide range of voluntary associations. In contrast to the United States, they have much higher levels of participation in embedded organizations than in newer ones. Table 1 lists a few organizations, both traditional and more contemporary, for which membership data are available in both countries. When comparing the participation levels between the two countries, it is important to keep in mind that the population of the United States is just over twice that of Japan.

<p>| Table 1 | Volunteer Participation in the United States and Japan for Selected Organizations |
|-----------------|-------------------------------|-------------------|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional/embedded groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent teacher associations</td>
<td>6 million</td>
<td>10 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Cross</td>
<td>1.2 million</td>
<td>21.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer firefighters</td>
<td>800,050</td>
<td>900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newer groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>5,313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenpeace</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scouts International (boys, girls)</td>
<td>6 million</td>
<td>195,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA)</td>
<td>17.5 million</td>
<td>114,256</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Japanese participate in traditional organizations at very high rates across the country, in both rural and urban areas. Neighborhood associations are the most prevalent; 91 percent of all Japanese households (115 million people) are currently members of neighborhood associations. Other traditional groups, such as women’s associations (fujinkai) and seniors’ clubs (rojinkai), also have substantial memberships—5 million and 8.7 million, respectively.8 Other service-oriented traditional organizations, such as volunteer fire departments and volunteer welfare commissioners, also have high participation levels (900,000 and 220,000 people belonging to each group, respectively).9 Advocacy groups are growing in popularity across Japan. Most of the well-known international groups, such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International, have established offices, although membership is considerably lower than in other advanced capitalist democracies, and they are significantly smaller than traditional membership organizations, as indicated in Table 1. Among the most visible and successful homegrown advocacy organizations are the many consumer groups. While for most members membership is akin to membership in their local supermarket, the consumer groups have been acting as consumer advocates since the 1960s, and are now often the organizational starting point for local political activity; they also provide a key local network for a variety of new-style politicians, especially women. Thirty percent of Japanese households belong to their local co-op.10

Many other new volunteer organizations that focus on particular social welfare needs, such as the elderly, the disabled, and children, are organized through local Social Welfare Councils. These are quasi-governmental organizations that work in cities and towns to bring together different organizations concerned with social welfare. The councils, which act as an umbrella organization, have thousands of organizational members and help link hundreds of thousands of volunteers.11

**Transformation of Japan’s Civil Society**

Japan’s civil society is vibrant, and Japanese volunteer for a wide range of organizations. As I indicated in the previous section, although many more Japanese are participating in advocacy-style organizations, most volunteering still occurs in traditional organizations serving local communities. Why is this? Why isn’t the trend found in the United States being replicated in Japan, which has faced similar social and political pressures?
Japan’s high rates of participation in traditional organizations have usually been ignored by scholars conducting cross-national studies of civic engagement and volunteering, leading them to describe Japanese civil society as “underdeveloped” or “weak” when compared with other advanced capitalist democracies. \(^\text{12}\) New work by Robert Pekkanen explores the observed phenomenon of high levels of participation in traditional groups and low participation in newer groups, a pattern he terms “dual civil society.” \(^\text{13}\) He posits an institutional explanation: Japan’s legal structure inhibited the formation of advocacy groups while enabling, even encouraging, participation in traditional membership associations. Four edited volumes on the subject of Japan’s voluntary and nonprofit sector also support this emerging consensus: compared with other advanced democracies, Japan’s civil society is weak and underdeveloped, and the reason for this state of affairs is a history of strong state involvement in society, which manifests itself in a restrictive legal environment for nonprofits. \(^\text{14}\)

I do not agree with this general assessment. First, I do not agree that Japan’s civil society is weak or underdeveloped when compared with civil societies in other advanced democracies. \(^\text{15}\) Second, while the restrictive institutional environment is clearly an important factor in shaping Japan’s nonprofit and voluntary sector, it is not a sufficient explanation for patterns of participation. To make the latter argument, which is the focus of this article, I utilize the factors identified by Skocpol as underlying the changes in US participation patterns as a way of examining Japan’s civil society. \(^\text{16}\) This methodology is a useful one because it highlights how historical factors and community attitudes, in addition to legal institutions, have played important roles in the evolution of Japan’s civil society. Furthermore, it helps situate the Japanese experience in a broader context—one in which the explanations given for Japanese patterns are not unique to Japan.

Skocpol attributes the shift in civic participation in the United States from membership organizations to advocacy organizations to three primary causes. \(^\text{17}\) First, the rights revolution of the 1960s and 1970s delegitimized old membership associations that were often exclusive and reinforced traditional social power structures that privileged white, male Anglo-Saxons. In their place, groups that focused on specific causes (e.g., environmental protection, animal rights) or specific identities (e.g., women, blacks, Hispanics) flourished.

Second, a new political opportunity structure opened up new possibilities for political advocacy. New tax laws created tax breaks for nonprofits, leading to the creation of thousands of 501c3 (education
and research) and 501c4 (political action committee [PAC] and lobbying) organizations. Larger congressional staffs enabled the expansion of policy networks between advocates and policymakers. Expanded federal programs that relied on contracts with private organizations to provide services supported the proliferation of social service agencies. Finally, the organizations themselves developed political strategies that utilized class action lawsuits as a means to gain public attention and promote policy changes. For participants, social prestige shifted from being an ordinary member to being a leader or paid employee of the organization. All these factors contributed to the professionalization of the voluntary and nonprofit sector. Old-line membership federations reduced the number of social services they provided as newer professionalized nonprofit organizations and the government began to take over.

A third factor that contributed to the shift from membership federations to professional advocacy organizations was the introduction of new technology. Direct mail solicitation and grants from private foundations and the government began to replace dues-paying membership, which had required significant face-to-face interaction to recruit members. Once again, the result was increased professionalization of “volunteer” staff who were increasingly required to design and distribute computerized mailings and write and administer grants.

In the United States, these three factors have combined to support advocacy organizations while simultaneously undermining traditional membership organizations. Although Japan has also faced these three factors, they have affected Japan’s civil society differently. Rather than promoting newer advocacy organizations at the expense of traditional membership groups, the changes in Japan have supported the development of the new groups while at the same time reinforcing support for traditional organizations.

One of the primary reasons for the differences in the Japanese and US patterns is citizen attitudes toward civic responsibility. In US society, social, political, and demographic changes led to the delegitimation of traditional forms of membership and service. In Japan, although social attitudes have increased their support of newer types of volunteer organizations, Japanese continue to believe that traditional organizations serve vital roles in society and that membership in them is still socially important. Therefore, while Japan’s civil society has also undergone a transformation, the changes have not mimicked those in the United States, and patterns of civic participation are unlikely to converge in the two countries.
Social Movements and Demographic Changes in the 1960s and 1970s

As in the United States, Japan faced significant social upheaval in the 1960s and 1970s. In both countries, environmental and human rights movements took off during this period as industrial pollution threatened urban areas and the Vietnam War challenged the fundamental ideals and myths that the two countries held about themselves as peace-loving nations. Mass public protests occurred in both countries; universities were shut down, and arrests were made.

In the United States, these social movements were accompanied by civil rights movements advocating equal rights for women and minorities. While Japan also passed new civil rights legislation, its effects were much more limited. Minorities represented only a very small percentage of the general population, and the women’s movements were much less effective.18

The 1954 Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court decision is usually given as the starting point of the civil rights movement in the United States. In Japan, it is difficult to point to a specific event that sparked the social movements that dominated the 1960s. Like other international social and civil rights movements occurring around the world at the same time, the Japanese modeled themselves after what they saw occurring in the United States, and social movements occurred on multiple fronts.

Peace movements organized and hit the streets to protest the 1960 renewal of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, which would allow the US military to continue their presence on Japanese soil. Consumer organizations became more active, expanding their economic and political activities with the production of co-op brand products, bulk purchase programs, and local political organizations. Local environmental groups went national, even international, with their causes. Perhaps the most famous case was that of Minamata disease, but hundreds of other battles pitted citizens’ and environmental groups against large corporations and the government in an effort to rein in environmental pollution.19

Levels of civil unrest and citizen protest in Japan were quite similar to those found in the United States. By the late 1960s, citizens were in the streets demanding new rights, and students were shutting down their universities in both countries. However, while in the United States many of the organizations behind the protests grew to become powerful, profes-
sional advocacy organizations, in Japan they did not. The experience of the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) in Japan is illustrative.

The YMCA Japan was a new-style, nongovernmental organization at its inception in 1880, and its focus on youth organization meant that it was in a very good position to take advantage of the youth-led, anti-government, prochange sentiment in the country during this time. Indeed, its membership reached its heyday during the decade of the 1960s. It had organizations in all the major cities and universities and in many of the high schools across the country; hundreds of thousands of Japanese participated in its myriad programs. As with YMCAs elsewhere around the world, youth activities, physical education and recreation, and summer camps were its mainstay, but in the late 1950s, it expanded its education (technical, vocational, English) and international programs as well.

The Hi-Y’s (high school YMCAs) and university-based YMCAs in particular were intimately involved in building radical student leadership and organizing protests across the country in the late 1960s. Leaders and organizers often met in YMCA-sponsored dorms to plan tactics and used the YMCA organizations to recruit members and distribute information about activities. However, rather than being proud of the power of their efforts, these groups were self-critical after the protests were perceived to have gotten out of control by the end of the decade. The 1968 summer school program gave itself the theme of “Bearing the Cross of Universities,” and in 1969, after much deliberation and self-criticism, the National Student Committee dissolved its national organization and suspended the all-YMCA summer school, which had been in operation for eighty years.20

Other YMCAs in Japan continued their activities after 1970, but they were more subdued in their actions and smaller in their operations. As all organizations must, Japanese YMCAs regrouped and refocused their activities. They remain active across Japan today and are one of the largest and oldest nongovernmental, nonprofit organizations in the country. The purpose of their story here is to illustrate that the social upheaval in Japan had many of the same characteristics of that in the United States. However, while Japan’s civil society could have turned in the direction of US civil society, with the professionalization and expansion of advocacy organizations, it did not. Not only did the social movements of the 1960s fail to spur a huge expansion of the advocacy and nonprofit sector, they also did not undermine the legitimacy of or participation in traditional civic organizations.
Traditional organizations did not remain untouched by the dramatic events of the 1960s and 1970s, however. Demographic and social changes profoundly affected these groups, and they needed to adjust their practices or face declining memberships. Many of the important challenges they faced have been identified in the US context in Robert Putnam’s *Bowling Alone*: two-income households, longer commuting distances, TV, and other individualized forms of entertainment have all reduced people’s ability and willingness to get together in their communities, thereby threatening traditional membership organizations that rely on such gatherings. Added to this list in the Japanese context are delayed retirement and the aging of the general population.

Two-income households, longer commuting distances, and delayed retirement have combined to reduce the number and have changed the type of men available to volunteer. Traditional organizations often relied heavily on local, self-employed, or retired men to be their leaders and core members. With fewer able men meeting this description, traditional organizations have had to adjust their practices and recruiting methods to seek out more women and commuters as members.

Other organizations, such as *fujinkai* (women’s associations), depended on housewives for their mainstay membership. As growing percentages of Japanese women have joined the full-time workforce, fewer women act primarily as housewives, straining recruiting for traditional organizations. The reduction in full-time housewives has also put additional household burdens on men, further limiting the time available for them to volunteer. TV, video games, and other forms of individualized entertainment have given young people of both genders many alternative ways to spend their leisure time.

Some traditional organizations have been more successful than others in altering their practices to adjust for the new social reality. One group that has been very successful has been the *minsei’in* (volunteer welfare commissioners). The volunteer welfare commissioner system began in the late nineteenth century as a method of coping with the rising problems of poverty in rapidly growing urban areas. Originally, the volunteer welfare commissioners were elite members of society (e.g., rice dealers, policemen, teachers) who had contact with the poor, and they would determine and distribute public assistance directly to the needy. In the postwar period, the system adjusted for the changing social reality in two important ways. First, the target aid population shifted from the poor and indigent, whose numbers declined as Japan became more affluent, to the elderly and handicapped, along with youth. Second, while originally the overwhelming majority of volunteer welfare
commissioners were men, women now represent more than half the volunteers. These two changes, along with legitimation, funding, and organizational support provided by the government and communities, have helped the volunteer welfare commissioners double their numbers in the postwar period.

Neighborhood associations, another traditional membership organization, have also maintained high membership rates. As mentioned earlier, an estimated 90 percent of all Japanese households are currently members of their neighborhood associations. These groups, which trace their origins to the go-nin-gumi, or Five Family Unit System, of the Tokugawa period, were important during the war for organizing and enforcing conservation campaigns and recruitment efforts. Participation was voluntary in the sense that it was unpaid, but a strong sense of duty for families to shoulder their responsibilities as part of the community combined with powerful local tax collection bodies to make nonparticipation difficult.

Neighborhood associations have evolved over time, but they continue to serve residents in a plethora of ways, primarily by facilitating mutual aid and information exchange. They are often responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of the neighborhood. These responsibilities can range from the most basic, such as making sure that lights in an apartment complex work and the grass in the common areas is kept trimmed, to much more involved activities, such as holding the original deeds on the transfer of property (the local government receiving a photocopy) and determining the irrigation paths and setting the amount of water that can be extracted from a community well or stream.

Although based in traditional Japanese society, these groups are among the first social organizations to form in new communities. They have adjusted their roles for the communities they serve—large urban apartment complexes have neighborhood safety patrols while rural areas have committees to monitor the burning of farm debris. Most neighborhood associations still use the old system of counting membership by households rather than individuals, but this is shifting in the more urban areas where there has been a dramatic rise of single-person households. As with volunteer welfare commissioners, neighborhood associations have shifted their active membership to include more commuters and their leadership to include more women.

One traditional group that has been less successful in the postwar period has been volunteer fire departments. They have seen a gradual reduction in their members, losing members at a rate of approximately 0.5 percent a year for the past thirty years (although the number of women
has increased—by 720 percent in the last fifteen years—women still represent only 1.5 percent of all volunteer firefighters.31 While some individual departments have found ways to thrive by expanding their missions to include fire prevention education and earthquake safety and including women in their departments, many are struggling to recruit new members.32 It is important to note that while Japanese volunteer fire departments are struggling when compared with the volunteer welfare commissioners and neighborhood associations, they are thriving when compared with US volunteer fire departments—on a per capita basis, there are almost three times as many volunteer firefighters in Japan as in the United States (see Table 1).

There has been tremendous social change in Japan during the last half century. The social movements of the 1960s and 1970s spawned the development of many new advocacy organizations, but they did not undermine traditional membership organizations. Demographic and social changes occurring simultaneously put strain on the traditional supporters of membership organizations, and while some groups, such as volunteer fire departments, have had difficulty adjusting, others, like the volunteer welfare commissioners and neighborhood associations, have found ways to stay relevant and to maintain or expand their memberships.

New Political Opportunity Structures

Japan’s political structure has experienced a profound change in recent years. The so-called 1955 System, in which politics was dominated by a triumvirate of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), big business, and the bureaucracy, crumbled in 1993 when the LDP lost its majority in the lower house and Morihiro Hosokawa, from the Japan New Party, became prime minister. The unwinding of the old political structure has created many new opportunities for social organizations to influence politics. However, although the changes have created an opening for newer groups, traditional organizations that have connections to bureaucrats still have more political influence than advocacy groups that target politicians.

While the ministries are not as powerful as they once were, Japanese politicians have not significantly increased their ability to research and develop public policies. In the Japanese Diet, each house has only seventy-five staff members designated to help members of Parliament (MPs) formulate policy. Since there are about 750 members of the Japanese Diet, approximately five Diet members need to share one staff person.33 In contrast, the Congressional Research Service, which pro-
vides the same kind of nonpartisan services to US legislators, has a staff of 729, or 1.7 staff per legislator. Weak staff support significantly reduces the capacity of Japanese politicians to create policy or to form the kind of policy networks so important for advocates in the United States.

Three of the other aspects identified by Skocpol as related to political opportunity structure—class action lawsuits, tax laws, and contracting out—have also undergone some changes in Japan, creating openings for new types of organizations. But again, these have not necessarily undermined established groups. While class action lawsuits are not common, taxpayer lawsuits in which citizens sue the government for misuse of public funds became more common as freedom of information laws changed in the late 1980s and legal mobilization became a more acceptable and effective political strategy. Groups such as the Citizen Ombudsman Network are linking together small watchdog groups across the country, helping them become more effective in identifying and following up on official wrongdoing, using the taxpayer lawsuit as a method to make government more accountable.34

The 1998 NPO Law rewrote the regulations concerning nonprofit organizations, significantly easing the legal restrictions involved in incorporation. As a result of the changes, it has become much easier for smaller organizations to gain legal status. In the nine years following the law, 30,438 organizations have incorporated.35 As in the United States, these organizations enjoy tax breaks, paying lower or no taxes on their revenue and property. However, unlike the US law that allows donors to deduct contributions to NPOs from their income taxes, most donations to Japanese NPOs are not tax deductible.36 Since there are no tax incentives for individuals to contribute, private philanthropy is low in Japan, funding less than 3 percent of the nonprofit sector.37

Like its counterparts across the advanced capitalist democracies, the Japanese government has been facing a financial crisis with respect to the ballooning costs of maintaining its welfare services, especially those serving the elderly. Of all the aspects of the welfare state, it is care for the elderly in which contracting out and privatization have gone the furthest. The NPO Law was specifically designed to allow for the formation of private nonprofit organizations that could serve the elderly and take advantage of the national elder care insurance plan put into effect a year later. Many of the new nonprofits have been formed to serve this population. In this service area, there appears to be a trend toward professionalization similar to that found in the United States. More Japanese are obtaining graduate degrees in social work and are
porting and mentions—and funding, governments’ voluntary nonprofits local close teammates. November has more Dr. programs the Policy” ing like citywide individual, United volunteer Network have nearly 426 he nearly doubled—from 10,000 to 17,000—between 2000 and 2004.38

While advocacy nonprofits serving the elderly have expanded, they have not done so at the expense of membership organizations. The Silver Network in Kashihara is a perfect example of an innovative new volunteer organization that resembles small, advocacy nonprofits found in the United States. It was created in 1994 through the initiative of an energetic individual, Dr. Yashima Yutaka. A medical doctor near retirement and a longtime Lions Club member, Dr. Yashima was determined to create a citywide network that would help the elderly in Kashihara. He did not like the way the government would give the elderly the runaround, forcing them to see multiple government employees to solve their problems. So he lobbied for, and the municipal government adopted, a “One-Door Policy” in which the elderly had a single contact person in the government to whom they could address all their problems.

Silver Network Kashihara sponsors a wide range of programs for the elderly, from neighborhood “friendship salons” and visiting lunch programs to caretaker field trips and annual symposiums on elder care. Dr. Yashima’s dream is to have every senior resident involved in one or more of the programs, so if they need help, they are already integrated into a system that can offer assistance. It is an ambitious goal, and he has made great progress toward achieving it through cooperation with many traditional organizations, including volunteer welfare commissioners, neighborhood associations, senior clubs, and others. In its first six years, the organization grew to include a network of more than eleven volunteer organizations, with a combined total of 13,459 volunteers. Dr. Yashima attributes this growth to his own persistence and close cooperation with traditional organizations as well as with the local government.39

Although the new NPO Law has created greater opportunities for nonprofits by changing the legal environment at the national level, changes in the political opportunity structure at the local level have been one of the most important sources for innovation in the nonprofit and voluntary sector in Japan. As the national government has increased local governments’ share of the responsibility for social service delivery and funding, many governments have created innovative programs to promote the provision of services by nonprofit organizations. In most cases—and in all three of the cities I studied in depth—local governments are attempting to promote the development of new-style advocacy and professionalized nonprofit organizations while at the same time supporting service delivery by traditional membership organizations.
To give one example, in 1998, the city of Sakata created the Volunteer Promotion Council to help support newer-style volunteer groups engaged in service missions, such as serving the elderly and handicapped. The same year, they developed an innovative grant program that distributed 28 million yen (about $215,000) to area nonprofit organizations to support onetime improvements. The program was designed especially to give new NPOs the seed money to start their operations or to make expensive, onetime investments to enable them to expand their services, such as renovating a building for handicapped accessibility.

The new grants were not given to traditional-style organizations such as neighborhood associations, volunteer welfare commissioners, or seniors’ clubs. However, the city did not ignore these groups. Instead, they were made the cornerstone of a new initiative called the Grassroots Welfare Network, which began in 1991 to help the elderly living alone. In this program, every senior over the age of 65 who was living alone and signed up for the program was assigned a group of three or four people who watched over him or her and offered basic assistance, such as shoveling the walk in the winter or providing meals when needed. The program has been very successful and is serving most of the seniors in Sakata.40 This network demonstrates that even while local governments are finding ways to expand and encourage the professionalized nonprofit sector, they are also committed to finding new ways to support traditional membership organizations.

Finally, although the new political opportunity structure has created openings for political influence by advocacy organizations, it still privileges traditional membership organizations that have embedded relationships with the government. Paradoxically, it is their close relationship with the government that gives them more power when negotiating with the government for policies that they want. Although these volunteer groups often rely on government funding and support, the government is equally dependent on the public services these groups provide and is therefore inclined to do what is necessary to keep them happy. Furthermore, both sides have relied on the other to provide valuable feedback about the effectiveness of their service provision. They have cooperated in identifying potential problems and have assisted one another in developing solutions to those problems.41

New Technology

The last factor that Skocpol argues has contributed to the rise of professionalized advocacy nonprofits is new technology, especially computer-
ized mass mailings that enable direct solicitation for donations. Although the technology to compile and distribute these mailings exists in Japan, the Japanese postal system does not have a bulk mail rate that allows nonprofits to save money on postage. Indeed, one NPO activist told me that it was cheaper for Japanese organizations to pay for someone to go to Korea and mail flyers from there than to do a mass mailing from inside Japan.

As in every other technologically advanced country, access to the Internet has spread rapidly in Japan; 83 percent of households now have access to the Internet, up from 25 percent only five years ago. New advocacy organizations are taking advantage of the new technology at much greater rates than the older membership organizations, although it not yet clear how the new technology will affect volunteer participation.

Thus far, websites seem aimed primarily at providing information to members rather than serving as a method for recruiting new members or donors. For example, while the United States has several websites where individuals seeking volunteer opportunities can type in the kinds of organizations that interest them and by providing a zip code find a listing of nearby organizations seeking volunteers (e.g., www.volunteermatch.org, www.servenet.org, www.networkforgood.org, www.unitedway.org), Japan has no such search mechanism. Most of the cross-organization websites, such as the NPO Center (www.jnpoc.ne.jp), are aimed at helping volunteer organizations coordinate their projects rather than helping them recruit individual members or promote their cause. The closest resource for volunteers is the Volunteer Web (www.npo-homepage.go.jp/volunteer.html), which has a listing of a large number of organizations seeking volunteers but does not allow for easy geographical searches.

Citizen Attitudes Toward Civic Duty

One of the most important reasons for the shift in US volunteering patterns is the change in people’s attitudes about what kind of civic participation receives social prestige. At the end of World War II, social prestige was granted to those who were members of organizations such as Knights of Columbus, Daughters of the American Revolution, PTA, and the like. The leadership of these organizations often rotated through the membership, and while there were some members who were more active than others, social status was granted to everyone who was a member in good standing, who came to meetings, and who

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served on the appropriate number of committees. As the social, political, and technological landscape shifted, status was granted not for membership alone but for leadership. Individuals could not do their part simply by showing up at meetings; they had to occupy a leadership role or contribute some kind of specialized skill. Often this meant that they became paid employees of the organization and were no longer volunteers.

In addition to Skocpol, other authors have described how shifts in citizen attitudes about civic responsibility have altered volunteer participation patterns in the United States. In her study of the displacement of volunteers by professionals in urban fire departments in the United States during the late nineteenth century, Amy Greenberg argues that a change in citizen attitudes was largely responsible. She documents how an ethic of republican liberalism that valued civic sacrifice and virtue gave way to one of Christian capitalism that put greater value on property and professionalism, contributing to the delegitimation of volunteer firefighting and the rise of the professional fire service.

Observing the contemporary environment, Robert Wuthnow has also argued that US conceptualizations of what constitutes a “good citizen” have changed. He has suggested that the old scripts of good citizens—the organization man, the club woman, the good neighbor—have been supplanted by the scripts of the nonprofit professional, the volunteer, the soul mate. Volunteering and service are important to both kinds of citizens, but the former emphasize a civic obligation to one’s community, while the latter emphasize common interests, leading them to donate their time to different kinds of organizations. Participation in traditional membership organizations has given way to volunteering for newer advocacy groups in many communities, especially in the suburbs and in the inner cities.

Although some of the same attitudinal shifts found in the United States are also occurring in Japan as more women work, as young people seek to express themselves through advocacy organizations, and as people have more difficulty connecting in urban settings, the commitment to traditional attitudes of civic obligation remain strong in Japan. Japanese continue to support their traditional membership organizations at very high rates, and these organizations continue to be viewed as vital parts of Japan’s social and political landscape. In contrast to the US view that these types of organizations are outdated or obsolete, an astonishing 98.3 percent of Japanese think that neighborhood organizations, the most pervasive of traditional membership organizations, are necessary in contemporary Japan. One scholar has found that Japanese often feel
that their relations to their neighbors are more critical than their relations with their own family, and the significance of neighbors is rising rather than declining with modernization; as families spread out, neighbors become increasingly important.46

While ideas of citizenship may be changing somewhat, people continue to believe that they need to participate in traditional organizations in order to be upstanding members of their communities. For older generations, peer pressure to participate was quite severe. One sixty-year-old retired volunteer firefighter told me that in his day a man who wasn’t a member of the volunteer fire department wouldn’t be able to find a woman who would marry him. Men who didn’t participate were viewed as not fulfilling their responsibility to their community, as being not quite real men.47 While the social constraints are not nearly so strict these days, volunteers for traditional membership organizations still cite obligation to their communities as their primary reason for joining.48

Furthermore, participation in traditional membership organizations continues to be a source of social status for members, and these organizations make sure that the rituals and symbols associated with the status remain in place for members. For some groups, such as volunteer fire departments, there are powerful symbols of their status, such as the traditional *happi* coats that they wear as a uniform. Only volunteer firefighters may wear the coats, and retired members must turn their coats in when they leave the department to become an OB (“old boy”) member.

In many towns and cities facing declining memberships in their volunteer fire departments, one of their most effective recruiting techniques has been to make these status symbols more visible through parades and public events that celebrate the skill and contributions of their volunteer fire departments. The events often include public safety demonstrations and clinics that teach citizens how to use a fire extinguisher properly, how to put out a stove fire, how to perform basic first aid, and other simple safety techniques. Universally, however, the highlight of the event is always an acrobatic show by volunteer firefighters performing stylized versions of traditional firefighting methods atop tall wooden ladders, simulating firefighting in the Edo period. Although the annual events are orchestrated to hark back to the old days and evoke the feeling of a traditional festival that has occurred for centuries, many of them have been introduced only in the last decade as an attempt to increase the visibility of the volunteer fire departments to boost recruits.

For other groups, such as the volunteer welfare commissioners, the symbols of social status are subtler. The volunteer welfare commissioners have a special notebook and stamp that are their official symbols of
their office. However, volunteer welfare commissioners’ most important source of status is not their notebook, but the long selection process that leads to appointment. An individual cannot just decide to become a volunteer welfare commissioner and become one. There is a lengthy and involved selection process that requires nomination by a nominating committee and approval at several different levels of selection committees before the volunteer is offered the post. The work of the volunteer welfare commissioners requires public respect, influence, and—above all—discretion, so the post cannot be filled by just anyone. The public knows that the nomination process is deliberative and selective, so the volunteer welfare commissioners retain high social status even in contemporary society when volunteer welfare commissioners’ membership and roles have changed dramatically from their origins.

In addition to maintaining high status for volunteers in traditional organizations, the activities that these organizations engage in continue to receive public support. Both traditional volunteer organizations and newer NPOs continue to focus their efforts on serving the local community. Most organizations concentrate their activities on community safety and development, with only a small number of groups working on “newer” issues such as peace, human rights, and international development.49

Many of the issue areas, such as public safety, that traditional volunteer organizations address are also part of the government’s responsibility. However, in Japan, government responsibility and the responsibility of community organizations are not viewed as mutually exclusive; rather, both groups are seen as serving the interests of the citizens, and they often work together on joint projects. Frequently, volunteer organizations support government initiatives by disseminating public information to their members and by helping gather feedback and citizen ideas about public policy. The government, especially local government, helps volunteer groups by providing funding for projects, organizing forums that promote cross-organization cooperation, and enhancing the legitimacy of volunteers and their organizations through a variety of legal and extralegal means.50

Therefore, while Japanese attitudes about civic obligation are shifting, providing greater support for newer-style advocacy organizations, this change has not seriously undermined the legitimacy of or commitment to more traditional membership organizations. Attitudes about civic responsibility continue to include participation in community groups such as neighborhood associations, volunteer fire departments, and PTAs.
Conclusion

Japan’s civil society landscape has been transformed in the last decade, and more and more Japanese are becoming involved in political advocacy organizations and professionalized nonprofit organizations. However, while new groups are on the rise, traditional membership organizations, such as neighborhood associations, women’s groups, volunteer fire departments, and volunteer welfare commissioners, continue to be supported at very high rates.

Factors identified as being responsible for the rise of professional advocacy organizations and the decline of federated membership organizations in the US context have also influenced Japan’s civil society. The social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, changes in the political and legal structure, and new technology have all made it easier for advocacy organizations to gather supporters and for social service-oriented nonprofits to acquire legal status and therefore legitimacy, funding, and volunteer support. In the United States, these movements changed citizens’ attitudes about their civic responsibility, delegitimizing membership in and the activities of traditional membership federations. In contrast, Japanese attitudes have continued to support participation in traditional organizations even as they have expanded their ideas about civic responsibility to include activism in advocacy and social service nonprofit organizations.

These developments have profound repercussions for Japan’s democracy. Traditional organizations tend to rely on long-standing, embedded relationships with their local governments in order to influence policy, and they are deeply integrated into the policymaking and implementation processes. These organizations continue to be the mainstay of Japan’s civil society.

Traditional organizations have political limitations, however. Although their close relationship with the government—which gives them privileged access to policymakers—is one of their greatest strengths, it is also a weakness, making it difficult for them to act in ways that go against government policy. Furthermore, their focus on a wide range of local issues makes it more difficult for them to be effective political agents when it comes to issues of national or international concern, or when specialized knowledge is required. Now, growing numbers of advocacy organizations and specialized nonprofits are filling this gap.

While many scholars are concerned with diminished, disaffected, and discontented democracies, developments in Japan give us some reason to hope that at least one of the advanced capitalist democracies is improving. Although Japanese still don’t trust their politicians very
much and are losing faith in their bureaucrats, they are not turning a
deaf ear to society’s problems. Instead, they are increasing their in-
volvement in civil society by founding a plethora of new organizations
and by continuing to support traditional organizations that perform
vital roles in their communities. These developments can only be good
news for the condition and future of Japan’s democracy.

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Notes

1. For the number of NPOs, see 2000 Whitepaper on the National
Lifestyle, www5.cao.go.jp/seikatsu/whitepaper/h16/01_zu/zu301090.html (in
Japanese; accessed June 25, 2007); for the numbers of volunteers see www.
.stat.go.jp/data/shakai/2001/kodo/zenkoku/zuhyou/a075.xls (in Japanese; ac-
cessed June 25, 2007).
2. Please note that several scholars, perhaps most famously Sheldon
University Press, 1997), argue that the embedded relationship be-
tween these organizations and the government makes it questionable whether
they should “count” as democratic civil society.
3. For more about the distinction between these two types of groups and
the importance of the distinction, see Mary Alice Haddad, Politics and Volun-
teering in Japan: A Global Perspective (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2007).
4. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of Amer-
ican Community (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000); Theda Skocpol, Di-
minished Democracy: From Membership to Management in American Civic
Life (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003); Robert Wuthow, Loose
Connections: Joining Together in America’s Fragmented Communities (Cam-
5. Theda Skocpol, Diminished Democracy; Theda Skocpol, “Voice and
Inequality: The Transformation of American Civic Democracy,” Perspectives
In T. Yamamoto, ed., The Nonprofit Sector in Japan (New York: Manchester
University Press, 1998), pp. 21–24. See also T. Shoumura, Chiiki fukushishi
josetsu [Introductory history of community social welfare] (Tokyo: Taiyo Pub-
ishing, 1993).
16. Skocpol, Diminished Democracy; Skocpol, “Voice and Inequality.”
17. Ibid.
19. Jeffrey Broadbent, Environmental Politics in Japan: Networks of Power and Protest (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Makoto Iokibe, “Japan’s Civil Society: An Historical Overview.” In Yamamoto, Decid-


21. Putnam’s book is concerned with social capital rather than civil society. However, the items he mentions as contributing to a declining social capital in the United States are precisely the ones that leaders in traditional civic organizations in Japan identify as challenges to their own membership. This is largely because, as Wuthnow, Loose Connections, points out, the ways in which people participate in the two types of organizations differ. Traditional groups tend to require more frequent face-to-face interactions (usually through weekly meetings), while newer groups can often conduct their business virtually by e-mail or telephone or at infrequent in-person meetings.

22. For a fascinating account of the involvement of women (both housewives and working women) in volunteer organizations, see LeBlanc, Bicycle Citizens.


26. For more on the importance of legitimizing, funding, and organizing support for community rates of volunteering, see Mary Alice Haddad, “Community Determinants of Volunteer Participation and the Promotion of Civic Health: The Case of Japan,” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 33 (supplement), no. 3 (2004): 8S–31S.


36. In 2001, the NPO Law was amended to allow tax deductions to certain nonprofits. However, in the last six years, only sixty-three organizations have reached that status; see www.nta.go.jp/category/npo/04/01.htm (in Japanese; accessed June 25, 2007).


40. Interview, 2002.


44. Wuthnow, *Loose Connections*.
46. In a seminal study of Japan, one anthropologist emphasized the importance of daily contact among neighbors as being more important than blood ties; see Chie Nakane, *Japanese Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970). This perception was substantiated by several of my interviewees, who expressed the importance of neighborhood associations when they got old, since their families were far off and unable (or unwilling) to care for them.
47. Interview, 2002.
48. Thirty of the thirty-six volunteers in traditional membership organizations I interviewed in 2001–2002 gave obligation to the community and/or community members as the main reason they joined; this was in contrast to reasons related to individual interests or personal fulfillment, which topped the list of reasons given by volunteers in newer groups.
49. See chart 3-2-2, www5.cao.go.jp/seikatsu/whitepaper/h16/01_zu/zu302020.html (accessed August 16, 2005); and chart 3-2-17, www5.cao.go.jp/seikatsu/whitepaper/h16/01_zu/zu302170.html (accessed August 15, 2005) for the activities of volunteer associations and NPOs.
50. See Haddad, “Community Determinants,” for more on how these sources of support encourage (or discourage) community participation.