# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................... 2  
Terms ........................................................................................................................... 3  
Introduction................................................................................................................. 4  

## Chapter 1- Explaining African Alignment ............................................................... 7  
  Introduction.................................................................................................................. 7  
  Part I- Traditional International Relations Perspectives ............................................. 10  
  Part II- African Cooperation: A Unique Experience .................................................. 13  
  Part III- New Outlooks on Third World Alignment .................................................... 18  
  Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 28  

## Chapter Two-The Beginnings of Cooperation- a Newly Independent Africa..... 30  
  Nkrumah’s Beginnings .............................................................................................. 30  
  The Conferences of Independent African States ....................................................... 34  
  The Brazzaville-Casablanca Split ............................................................................ 37  
  Congolese Civil War ................................................................................................. 42  
  The Monrovia Block ................................................................................................. 45  
  Unity Revisited ......................................................................................................... 47  

## Chapter Three- The Organization of African Unity ............................................. 49  
  Conference at Addis Ababa ....................................................................................... 49  
  The Charter of the OAU ............................................................................................ 52  
  Structure of the OAU ................................................................................................. 54  
  Responsibilities of the OAU ...................................................................................... 63  
  Factors in the formation of the OAU ........................................................................ 64  
  History and Downfall of the OAU ........................................................................... 68  
  Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 80  

## Chapter 4- The Birth of the African Union............................................................ 82  
  Introduction.................................................................................................................. 82  
  OAU Legacy and a Culture of Change ........................................................................ 82  
  South African Foreign Policy: The African Renaissance and NEPAD ................. 85  
  Obasanjo’s Reform Package and the Creation of the AU ........................................... 90  
  Colonel Muammer Gaddafi and Libyan Integration .................................................. 93  
  Objectives and Principles of the CA .......................................................................... 97  
  Structure of the AU .................................................................................................... 100  
  The AU- A Security Community? ............................................................................ 111  
  Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 116  

Works Cited................................................................................................................. 119  
Appendix 1.................................................................................................................. 125  
Appendix 2.................................................................................................................. 126
Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I need to thank Professor David Kearn, for being so patient with me throughout this entire process. I doubt that my scattered thoughts and panicked emails could have developed into this project if he had not always been there to help me.

I could not have done this without my parents. My mother and father, Thomas and Melissa Cragg, have always been there for me. The hours of phone calls, the financial and moral support without question and endless love has meant more to me than they can realize. I am blessed to call my parents also two of my closest friends. Also, my brother Tim, who pretended to be interested in African cooperation, even as a mechanical engineering student, only further proves how much he loves me. Thank you to my grandparents, Hiroshige and Monica Mori, for instilling the importance of freedom of thought in me. You’ve always motivated me to do the best I can be.

To my loving roommates: Lily Costner, Kelly Klein, Elissa Kozlov and Stephanie Spiegel. When I needed to vent, when it brought me to tears, they guided me through it. Their love and support has meant more to me than they can ever know. To my constants: Michael Cho (who even offered to help my move footnotes), Dana Chidiac, Tristan Bruck, Andrew Warner, David Skinner, Ben Nissim, Raomej Caro, Caitlin Duffy, Michael Jones, Esther Bochner, Mat Schuster, Julie Neuspiel, Meghan Doletzky, Neal Valley, Scott Cook, Zach LeClair, Dylan Marron, Allie Levey, Alice McKenney, Bryan Haviland, James McKeown and whoever my brain dead thesis is almost over head has forgotten. Thanks you always making me laugh, it made this whole process so much easier.
Terms

AAPC- All-African Peoples Conference
AAPO- All-African Peoples Organization
ADO- African Defense Organization
AHSG- African Heads of State and Government
ALC- African Liberation Committee
ANC- African National Congress
AU- African Union
CA- Constitutive Act of the African Union
CIAS- Conference of Independent African States
CSSDCA- Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa
EAC- East African Community
ECAC- United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
ECOSOCC- Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African Union
ECOWAS- Economic Community of West African States
EEC- European Economic Community
EU- European Union
GPRA- Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic
IMF- International Monetary Fund
LPA- Lagos Plan of Action
NAFTA- North American Free Trade Agreement
NEPAD- New Partnership for Africa’s Development
OAU- Organization of African Unity
OCAM- Organizations Communue Africain et Malgache
ODA- Official Development Assistance
ONUC- United Nations Operation in the Congo
OSCE- Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe
PF- Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe
PDP- People’s Democratic Party of Nigeria
PSC- Peace and Security Council of the AU
SADC- South African Development Community
SAP- Structural Adjustment Program
RDA- Rassemblement Democratique Africain
REC- Regional Economic Community
UAM- Union Africaine et Malgache
UDI- Unilateral Declaration of Independence
ZANU- Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU- Zimbabwe African Peoples Union
Introduction

"The biggest weapon wielded and actually daily unleashed by imperialism against that collective defiance is the cultural bomb. The effect of a cultural bomb is to annihilate a people's belief in their names, in their languages, in their environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities and ultimately in themselves...Possibilities of triumph or victory are seen as remote, ridiculous dreams... We have to respond to this through resolute struggle. The people have to speak the united language of struggle contained in each of their languages. They must discover their various tongues to sing the song: 'A people united can never be defeated." Thabo Mbeki, May 24, 2002

Since independence, the countries of Africa have been plagued by external intervention, domestic political turmoil, development challenges and a variety of security concerns. The African people, despite gaining independence in the early 1960’s, have lacked a substantial voice in their own political and economic development. Since European encroachment the people of the continent have experienced slavery, followed by colonialism, followed by the rivalries of the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War, new pressures of globalization arose, impacting Africa’s development and ability to promote peace and democracy.

At the same time, authoritarianism and lack of popular democracy has plagued the nations of Africa. Corruption, kleptocracy and theft of state resources has tragically become the norm among African states. A lack of respect for human rights, poor systems of education, health care and infrastructure has led to a continental HIV/AIDS epidemic, a life expectancy of only 54 years and an illiteracy rate of 41%. Almost half of Africa’s nations have experienced violent conflict, military coup or genocide.²

In an attempt to cooperatively address both the external and internal problems affecting many African nations, the newly independent states of Africa came together in 1963 with the aim of forming a continental organization. Inspired by collective visions of Pan-Africanism, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was created in order to liberate the continent from external influence and to encourage the political and economic development of the new states.

Despite its ambitious aims, the OAU was unsuccessful in ending the development and political problems facing Africa. The spirit of Pan-Africanism was revived in the late 1990’s in the effort to reform the continental organization to help deal with the modern issues facing Africa. The Constitutive Act of the African Union was signed in Lome, Togo on July 11, 2000 marking the beginning of the new African Union (AU) to replace the OAU.

This paper examines the history of continental cooperation, focusing on a comparative analysis of the OAU and the AU. It will argue that a particular set of domestic and international factors interplayed to create the OAU in 1963. As a result of historical divisions from the colonial age, the paper contends that the OAU suffered from regional and historic divisions from its inception. Stripped from any real political power, the OAU was unsuccessful at achieving its goals of political and economic development. As a result of the rise of interdependence, because of globalization and the fall of the Cold War powers, this paper will contend that the African Union was developed as a more effective international organization. I will contend that the African Union follows the typical creation of a security community, as conceptualized by Karl Deutsch. The paper will take an intensive look at the
structure of the two organizations and evaluate the likelihood of success based upon their goals versus the potential effectiveness of the structure.

The structure of the paper is as follows: Chapter 1 will examine and explain the theoretical model of cooperation utilized in this paper, after an assessment of traditional cooperation models such as neorealism and neoliberalism. Chapter 2 will look at the historical setting for attempts at cooperation in Africa after independence. Informal regional affiliations and the lasting effects of colonialism will be considered. This chapter will discuss the factors and political realities that played a part in the OAU’s foundation. Chapter 3 will look at the OAU, focusing on its organizational structure and presumptive responsibilities and power. The history of the Organization and its ability to deal with problems as they arise will be considered. Chapter 4 will discuss the rise of the AU. The transitional period in the 1990’s will be considered, with the changing economic policies of the Organization. The role of Nigeria, South Africa and Libya will be considered as the key players in the establishment of the new African Union. The structure and responsibilities of the AU will then be considered in comparison with the OAU. An assessment of the effectiveness of the new bodies will then be considered in the context of the failures of the OAU.
Chapter 1- Explaining African Alignment

Introduction

Third world foreign policy seems to present an anomaly for traditional international relations theory, primarily because of the exceptional role that international institutions play in politics. For structural realist and institutional neoliberal scholars, international organizations take the role of mediators of state interactions, through a variety of functions and transactions. Martha Finnemore notes, however, that “ultimately, they are understood to be creations of states and servants of state interests. According them more autonomous and causal status, particularly as shapers of actors or interests, would violate the fundamental structure of neorealist and neoliberal theories”. Yet, the history of Africa has been anomalous, as nations have sought to build international organizations, even before adequate state-building has been achieved, as we see in the example of the OAU. The development of the African Union, with its new powers, seems to further erode state power, and allows for independent action by the organization. This leads us to two interesting questions: Why do the African states join international organizations, when they have not adequately built their own domestic state structure? Why, after the failure of the OAU, did states create an international institution with sovereign powers?

3 The phrase “Third World” is used here based on its placement in the relevant literature studied here. It should be noted that the phrase is highly controversial despite its continued placement in the literature. It can be considered classist and outdated, and will be used interchangeably with the phrase “developing world”


5 Ibid. pg. 13
Neorealism, the dominant international relations theory, argues that state interaction is primarily motivated by the balance the apparent threats and perceived power of other states. Cooperation is therefore motivated to achieve mutual security goals. States align to protect themselves against the power of or threats from other states. Neoliberalism assumes a system of self interested states affected by the new processes of interdependence, the impact of globalization and new informal avenues of cooperation. Economic and social interactions require states to cooperate with each other in order to function in the new era of a “world without borders”.

Despite their applications, neorealism and neoliberalism have not adequately explained Third World alignment. For the purpose of this paper, the theory of omnibalancing will be utilized to better understand Third World alignment during the Cold War. Omnibalancing is the understanding that both domestic and international pressures play a role in alignment decisions by Third World nations. It agrees with the central assumptions of the more traditional theories in that nations, in order to ensure their continued survival in the face of external threats, will look for

---

6 For more about realist theories, see K. Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics* (1979) or J. Mearsheimer’s *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. The basic assumption that this paper makes is that realist theories assume a constant balance of power and threat. As a result, nations will align temporarily in the international arena in order to assure the continued existence of the state and its citizens. For realist theories, the international arena is seen as anarchic and chaotic, resulting in temporary alliances until the perceived threat subsides. States are seen as the key players, under the assumption that power has been concentrated enough such that the leader’s policy is the only foreign policy of the state.

7 For more about neoliberal institutionalist views, see R. Keohane and J. Nye’s “Complex Interdependence and the Role of Force” in *The Political Utility of Force in the Current Era* (1977), Keohane. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2005. or “Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations” in *World Politics* 27:1 (1974), pp.39-62. The central assumptions taken for this paper about these views is that due to a variety of factors, such as globalization, increased forums for communication, and the spread of democratization as a result of the end of the Cold War, cooperation is more likely. Non-governmental actors and multinational corporations now have the affect of acting independent of state borders. As a result, it is in the states best interest to cooperate in order to either counter or interact with these factors.
international allies despite potential domestic political objections. Yet, it argues that, especially in the absence of real external threats, the most powerful determinant in Third World alignment is the rational calculation of leaders as to which outside power will most likely keep their regime in power. This is often a result of dangerous domestic political environments that have characterized Third World governments since independence. As Stephen David argues, “It follows that when a leadership is confronted with a choice between aligning so as to benefit the state but endangering its hold on power or aligning in such a way that harms the state but preserves its power, it will choose the latter”. 8 I contend that omnibalancing best explains the strategies and behavior of African leaders with respect to their willingness to engage in African regional cooperation.

However, this paper will also argue that the characteristics of interstate politics in Africa are changing, and as a result, the theory of security communities most adequately explains the creation of the African Union. The essential characteristic of a security community, according to Karl Deutsch, is a group of states integrated to a degree in which there is a “dependable expectation of peaceful change”. 9 The concept of a security community assumes a level of institutional commitment on the part of integrated states to the extent that the security community can act independently of the states that join it. Keohane and Nye distinguish a security community as a “response to opportunity and an expression of hope as much as a response to threat and an expression of fear”. 10 I argue that because of growing

---

10 Keohane and Nye, pg. 365.
levels of interdependence, facilitated by the structure that the OAU provided, that the AU is moving towards the creation of a security community.

The remainder of the chapter is broken down into four sections. The first part will take a brief look at traditional alignment theories, looking specifically at neoliberalist and neorealist theories of cooperation. The second section will look at why alignment in the African context has taken on unique characteristics and therefore cannot be understood by traditional alignment theories. The third section will look at new theories of alignment in the context of the developing world. The theory of omnibalancing and its central tenets will be compared with other alignment theories. This part will look at the theory of omnibalancing in combination with some of the assumptions of neoliberalism to understand cooperation decisions. The last part of the section will look at the concept of a security community as a way of explaining the process of building continental cooperation in the modern age.

Part I- Traditional International Relations Perspectives

Realism and Balance of Power/Threat

For political realists, international politics is similar to any political contest- it is a struggle for power dominated by organized violence. A popular view of the world in the Cold War, it saw actors as needing to compete in power struggle games. Three assumptions are critical to any realist understanding of political activity. First, states are the main actor. This assumes that states are predominant and coherent units. Second, because the state system is anarchic, force is seen as a usable and the most effective instrument to drive policy. Because there is no singular player to protect state interests, states must often act competitively through the threat of force. Third,
as Keohane and Nye put it, “realists assume a hierarchy of issues in world politics, headed by questions of military security: the ‘high politics’ of military security dominates the ‘low politics’ of economics and social affairs”.¹¹

Further, these three assumptions have a direct application to international systems. The first is that the domestic environment matters little in international political decision-making. State security takes predominance over the domestic political system, including social and cultural traits. For example, the alliance between democratic France with tsarist Russia shows a contradiction in domestic ideology, yet was a response to a common threat, Germany.¹² Secondly, because the international system lacks a central authority, the only stability comes from competition itself. Realism holds that states cooperate only to deal with a common threat to state security. As a result, cooperation is seen as temporary and inconsequential to the future of international politics. Therefore, international organizations are of little consequence because states will never cede authority to them. International organizations, therefore, are powerless to shape state behavior. Many claim that this theory can explain Third World interactions. It will prevail whenever states seeking to survive and expand their power interact in an anarchic order. Because nothing exists that would inhibit that activity, it should apply equally.

At the heart of realism is a strong concise depiction of the anarchic world of the international system, in contrast to the domestic order of states. Leaders are able to make rational and calculated decisions in the internal realm because of defined decision making hierarchy. Threats to domestic power are understood to come at

¹² David. pg. 234.
scheduled and specific time, with a strong consensus on the ideology and direction of the state.\textsuperscript{13}

\textit{Interdependence and Neoliberalism}

A number of modernist scholars are beginning to look beyond a realist model, looking instead at the consequences that globalization and economic decisions have had on the world politics. A widespread feeling is beginning that argues that the very nature of world politics is changing with the spread of global communications, interdependent economies and transnational social movements. As a result, modernists have begun to look at the effects of social and economic transactions have had on the relations between states.\textsuperscript{14} One such approach is the theory of complex interdependence.

Complex interdependence has three characteristics. First, it assumes that there are modern channels that have connected societies outside the context of common threat. These include informal ties between government elites, transnational organizations such as banks or corporations and transgovernmental interactions, which challenge the realist assumption that states act coherently as units. Second, the agenda of interstate relationships are not arranged on a static and coherent hierarchy. As a result, military security does not always dominate the agenda, and often the distinction between domestic and foreign policy issues are blurred. Keohane and Nye note that “Different issues generate different coalitions, both within governments and across them, and involve different degrees of conflict. Politics does not stop at the

\textsuperscript{13} Waltz. See also John J. Mearsheimer’s article “The False Promise of International Institutions” in \textit{International Security} 19:3 pp. 5-22.

\textsuperscript{14} See Keohane.\textit{After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.}
Third, military violence is not preferred in conflicts within a region, block or alliance. Other means of resolving conflict would take precedence when interdependence is relatively high, such as economic or social rivalries. As a result, it is more likely that states will create institutional structures to mediate state interaction.

**Part II- African Cooperation: A Unique Experience**

African cooperation has been represented by a very rapid and unique coordination of states following independence. A variety of factors have contributed to this experience, most importantly Africa’s place in the global economic community, and the strong political affects of colonialism. Christopher Clapham notes that what defines Third World politics most is “peripherality”. He says, “Economic peripherality has meant separation from, and subordination to, the dominant industrial economies which have developed especially in Europe and North America”. As a result, cooperation has been seen more as a requisite burden rather than an advantage to the new nations. This has had the effect of reinforcing relations, as states are mutually dependent on each other.

The colonial experience has played a dramatic role in shaping the way in which African states have coordinated with each other. Colonialism created the strange situation of superimposed geographic boundaries. As a result, the process of unification and integration has had to deal with fifty odd states with a wide variance in population size and geographic differences. As David puts it, “Because of the

---

arbitrariness of their borders, therefore, many Third World states began and remain more as an artificial construct than a coherent unit”.

As a result of the structure imposed by the colonial states, the post-colonial state economy was generally organized around the production of primary resources. This process continued the entanglement of the African states with the former colonizers who serves as the primary market for export. As a result, cooperation has aligned around colonial blocs, especially in the economic arena. Tied with colonialism, the level of industrialization in most countries was low or non-existent.

Specialization in primary products, generally seen as an advantage in the international economic system, left Africa prey to whimsical fluctuations in world market demand. In the short term, this has resulted in bottlenecks in the development process. As a result of agricultural protectionism in the First World and because of the growing number of synthetic replacements for raw products, development in Africa has been slow, as the demand for their primary commodities continues to fall. Also, the small size of the domestic market and the replication of colonial economies systems have been a major impediment to integration on the continental level, as neighboring states cannot serve as markets for export.

Despite the small domestic markets, African countries have tended to embrace continental integration as a solution to their development problems. Sam Chime notes, “elites in these countries now tend to perceive modernization as synonymous with

---

18 David. Pg. 239.
industrialization and industrialization as dependent on integration, represented in the economic sense by the search for wider markets”.20 Because political leaders viewed industrialization as the only way in which to improve the conditions in their countries, integration became a requirement for most African nations, because the economies of Africa generally lacked the resources and training individually to create a sustainable economy.

The threat posed by the increasing domination of the international economy by highly industrialized countries has acted as an impetus towards integration. At the same time, the powerful tendencies that propel African states to integrate have often had the effect of hindering it. The reliance on external aid and technical know-how has set up an economic structure of dependency on the foreign economic systems. As a result, external elites have played a considerable role in conflict among African states, both by exacerbating them and at times acting as mediators. Chime notes that, “under this condition, the external catalyst is able to deflect the process of integration from its theoretical goal, namely, the primacy of the interest of the African people”.21

Politically, legitimacy of Third World leaders is likely to be weaker than elsewhere. Many regimes draw upon a very narrow support group, often come to power through force rather than democratic means. Political suppression is often used as a mechanism to stay in power. As a result, they continually face threats to their rule. David notes that “Threats are also likely to emerge because Third World leaders control much more wealth and power than do the groups in society. Gaining control of the states is therefore the only means by which the ambitious can meet their

21 Ibid. pg. 91.
needs”. In the developing world, state power is often a target of societal forces and cannot be assumed as cohesive autonomous whole. At the same time, leaders will often take extreme steps in order to resist attempts by others to gain control, as state control is the only avenue to maintain wealth and influence. It should also be noted that because in the Third World the loss of power is frequently synonymous with a loss of life, Third World leaders are understandably more likely to take extreme efforts against potential threats.

The structure of leadership is often very different in African nations. Because most states are led by authoritarian states, or at least a small body of political elites, foreign policy decisions are generally governed less by public opinion and more by personal opinion. David argues, “Although this elite does not have total flexibility in making policy, it typically needs to be far less responsive to national or institutional concerns than leaders elsewhere need to be. Public opinion in Third World states often carries little influence, and bureaucracies play only a minor role in foreign policy”.  

The nature of nationalist groups has radically affected the political process in Africa. Because African states were not born out of local nationalist appeals, like the Western model, groups with diverse and often conflicting identities were gathered together within these states, with arbitrary political boundaries. As a result, the state structure preceded the building of a nation-state. Africans often retained ideas of community at a local and sub-state level, through lineage groups, clans and tribes. Ethnic nationalism had been encouraged by the colonial administrators in order to

---

22 David, pg. 240.
23 Ibid.
create divisions that prevented the growth of a national identity that could challenge the empire.24 As Clapham puts it, “The lack of organic unity or shared values between state and society, compounded though it is by the myriad effects of social change and incorporation into the global economy and political structure, is the single most basic reason for the fragility of the third world state”.25

National unity was at the heart of political movements post-independence. Because the pan-African movement chose to retain the colonial state structure with a formal recognition of the arbitrary borders, the primary goal became to transform a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural society into a single unified nation.26 Previously, Africans had rooted their identities in hereditary descent and ethnicity, so the claims of unity were a departure from previous nationalist strains. As President Samora Machel of Mozambique put it, “For the nation to live, the tribe must die”.27 As a result, Pan-African thinking survived after independence. The movement towards political unity, and the sense of community across the continent became the dominant political ideology of Africa’s newly independent states as a method to combat the local and tribal influences.

The usual practice in studying integration is to assume that nationalist sentiment are contradictory and mutually exclusive: one either believes in one or the other. In the African context, however, these two forms of nationalism are not incompatible and in fact have shown to be mutually-reinforcing.28 At the same time,

---

25 Clapham. pg. 42.
28 Chime. pg. 91.
however, while a commitment to continental unity and nation-state building are very much compatible, a conflict between state nationalism and ethnic nationalism, and state nationalism and a commitment to the former colonial powers have resulted in regional competition.

The balancing of external and internal threats has characterized the foreign policy of the Third World. External agents are often pivotal players in either protecting or threatening state interests. Internal threats and new domestic players are often ideal vehicles for furthering their ideologies within new arenas. Lack of military strength also increases the motivation of Third World states to penetrate neighboring states through domestic threats. Wars between states are very rare, and when they do occur, the cost can be high, politically and militarily. On the other hand, providing aid to insurgent groups is relatively inexpensive.29

**Part III- New Outlooks on Third World Alignment**

**Omnibalancing**

Where traditional theories falls short is that for Third World leaders, the unstable and anarchic world that is characteristic of the international realm is also often a characteristic of the domestic political environment. This simple observation often explains why Third World leaders align and realign and as a result explains African state alignment better than traditional methods that are rooted in theories of great power politics.

Some of the assumptions of traditional theories are still applicable, and will be assumed in the rest of the paper. First, leaders of the Third World as well as leaders of other states choose to align in way that will help them resist threats from the outside.

---

29 David. pg. 241.
Two revisions can be made to the realist theory in order to allow for a more constructive approach to understanding Third World alignment. Realist theorists argue that leaders of states will often attempt to appease secondary adversaries so that they can focus their resources and attention against the primary threat. For example, the Soviet Union chose to align with the United States against Nazi Germany, despite clear conflict between the two because Nazi Germany was the more real and immediate threat to its survival. But as David notes, “in the Third World, this often means appeasing other states (which often pose less pressing threats) in order to counter the more immediate and dangerous domestic threats. They seek to split the alignment against them and focus their energies on their most dangerous domestic opponents”. Additionally, one of the most important differences between omnibalancing and realism in the context of the Third World is that leaders will often sacrifice the interests of the state for the good of the personal leadership. As a result, one will more frequently kleptocratic states or mass murder by the state apparatus in the Third World.

Similarly, many of the applications of neoliberalism can be assumed in the world of omnibalancing. It is a given that the world is becoming more interconnected, with the rise of non-state actors across state borders. Some of the assumptions of neoliberalism do not apply in the Third World context. First, neoliberalism assumes that a level of development that is not prevalent in the Third World. Because the economic apparatus is still very much state driven, the Third World economies are less interconnected than the developed world. Globalization forces have encouraged

---

30 Ibid. pg. 236.
31 Ibid.
cooperation in Africa, not because international business forces have required it, but because the lack of development has meant that in order to compete, African nations must begin to integrate. Secondly, it does not reflect an accurate depiction of the role of leaders in the Third World. It assumes that a level of involvement by civil society and business interests that is beginning to become important in the Third World, but is not prevalent. Despite these factors, some of the applications of neoliberalism will incorporated. The assumptions driven by the rise of interdependence has driven new forms of cooperation in Africa. The African Union was developed with new organs in order to better facilitate these non state forces to the continent’s advantage. As Nye and Keohane put it, “Both [interdependence] and the realist portrait are ideal types. Most situations will fall somewhere between these two extremes. Sometimes, realist assumptions will be accurate, or largely accurate, but frequently complex interdependence will provide a better portrayal of reality”.\(^\text{32}\) It is the contention of this paper that omnibalancing is a theory that falls toward the middle of these two extremes and best explains Third World alignment.

Omnibalancing helps to rectify the inconsistencies created by Third World alignment. It incorporates to the traditional theories that the needs of leaders to appease secondary adversaries as well as to balance both internal pressures with outside powers in order to keep the regime in power, often at the expense of the greater interests of the state. Omnibalancing rests on the assumption that the leaders in Third World states, as a result of the circumstances looked at in Part I, are weak and oftentimes attempting to maintain legitimacy within their own state, while simultaneously threatened by dramatically different political regimes. Omnibalancing

---

assumes that for the political leaders of Africa, the most powerful determinant in making alignment decisions will be the selfish drive by political leaders to ensure their own political and physical survival.

Omnibalancing incorporates many of the realist assumptions that are similar to the balance of power. Omnibalancing assumes that international politics as an anarchic world with interests that will inevitably conflict. Similar to realism, omnibalancing accepts that there is a clear hierarchy of issues in play when making decisions, with the most important being survival.\textsuperscript{33} However, omnibalancing departs in several crucial aspects from the realist assumptions made by authors such as Waltz and Mearsheimer. The most fundamental is that realism must be extended to include internal threats in addition to focusing on the external threats and capabilities of potentially dangerous actors. The unity of states therefore cannot be assumed. Second, the leader of the state rather than the state itself is seen as the main player in Third World politics. Realism would assume that the decision maker makes a rational decision about how the policy would affect the power of the state. In the Third World context, the state is porous, with unstable leadership, and potentially incoherent policies across the state apparatus. Leaders look at the potential impact that international policies have on garnering domestic support for the individual, instead of the collective.\textsuperscript{34} This in particular has had a tremendous impact on the OAU policies. Because the motivation is garnering political legitimacy from the international organization, leaders tend to talk about OAU policies without

\textsuperscript{33} David, pg. 237.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid. pg. 241.
implementing them. The OAU was plagued by unwillingness of leaders to implement OAU policies, despite supporting them during session.

Realism focuses on the state rather than individual leaders because it assumes that the central government has a command of the other domestic players under its authority and therefore only the behavior of the state as a whole is important. This assumption is of little relevance in the Third World because not only do the leaders not have control of the domestic realm as a whole, but they very rarely have control over other players within their own party. In other words, “The distinction is fundamental, because the interests of this elite need not be synonymous with the interests of the state. Understanding why leaders make the alignment decisions they do requires an understanding of what is in the best interests of the leaders and not of what is in the best interests of the state”.35 Lastly, realism theorists make a distinction between use of force for legitimate threats versus illegitimate ones. For Third World leaders, threat perception is primary, and they do not stop to consider whether the threat is legitimate or not, domestic or international. Because the personal leadership is the only avenue to personal wealth and power, African leaders are willing to take extreme efforts against any perceived threat. In the context of African cooperation, this meant that the OAU developed a strong commitment to domestic non-intervention, because leaders were not willing to let the OAU potentially infringe on domestic power.

Since the continent became independent, only a handful of countries have fallen to outside invasions, yet hundreds of leaders have been overthrown by internal enemies. In fact, almost all Third World states have seen a forceful overthrow of their

government from internal enemies or a nearly successful attempt. As a result, threat of domestic coup has played a large role in the collective conscious of member of states in modern Africa.

Security Communities

Following independence and during the Cold War, the influence of external actors played a huge role in shaping interstate cooperation in Africa. Players, especially the former colonial powers and the Cold War superpowers, used external agents in order to further their domestic agenda. This resulted in proxy wars, fought in many countries in Africa, such as Ethiopia, Somalia and Zaire. Huge amounts of funding from external sources were channeled into competing domestic forces, resulting in long civil wars. But as the Cold War ended, and the agents of interdependence began to grow in influence, a new community began to grow outside the confines of national boundaries. As Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett put it, “This volume thinks the unthinkable: that community exists at the international level, that security politics is profoundly shaped by it, and that those states dwelling within an international community might develop a pacific disposition”.  

Following Adler and Barnett’s structure, a three tier approach will be adopted to understand the concept of a security community. The first tier looks at the precipitating conditions, the second tier examines the reciprocal relationship between the structure of the region and social processes that contribute to the building of a

---

36 Ibid. pg. 238.
community. The last tier will look at mutual trust and collective identity formation.  

See Figure 1.1 for a visual representations of how the three Tiers interact.

**Tier 1.**

The first tier looks at the conditions that are necessary to create an environment that allows for closer cooperation. Adler and Barnett note that,

“technological developments, an external threat that causes states to form alliances, the desire to reduce mutual fear through security coordination, new interpretations of social reality, transformations in economic, demographic and migration patterns, changes in the natural environment, these and other developments can propel states to look in each other’s direction and attempt to coordinate their policies to their mutual advantage”.

The effects of these conditions may create a need for increased formal interaction under the expectation that cooperation would benefit the various parties. Figure 1.1 explains the interactions and process of the creation of a security community, using the three tier model.

**Tier Two**

The defining feature of tier two is that states and their citizens have become involved in a variety of social interactions that has started to transform the integrated environment. The task then becomes to isolate the structural context in which they interact and then shape this relationship. Adler and Barnett divide these roles into the “structural categories of power and knowledge and the process categories of transactions, international organizations and institutions, and social learning”.

---

38 Ibid. pg. 37.
39 Ibid, pg. 38.
40 Adler and Barnett. pg. 39.
Power and knowledge are the structural edges for the development of a security community. According to Deutsch, “larger, stronger, more politically, administratively, economically and educationally advanced political units were found to form the cores of strength around which in most cases the integrative process developed”\textsuperscript{41}. Power also plays a major role in the continued facilitation of the community as it can be used by core members as an incentive to make other states fall in line, or potentially as a coercive power. Alternatively, it can act as an incentive in order to increase power of weak states. In this regard, a security community

\textsuperscript{41} Deutsch. pg. 38.
composed of a group of strong powers can allow weaker states to join in order to enjoy the security and potential other benefits that are associated with that community.

Knowledge provides the other structural boundary. As Adler and Barnett argue, “Part of what constitutes and constrains state action is the knowledge that represents categories of practical action and legitimate activity… we are interested in those cognitive structures that facilitate practices that are tied to the development of mutual trust and identity”.42 For the purpose of current international politics, the current set of ideas that are related to the growth of security community is liberalism and democracy. It will be the contention that for a security community to develop, these values must be in the process of extending to the member states. This is the case for two reasons. First, liberal values are more likely to create a shared transnational understanding of culture, whose concepts on the role of government and universal rights of all allows for the sense of community. Secondly, liberal ideas are more easily able to empower a strong civil society and the organized processes that accompany them, which allows for the better exchange of ideas.43

Process provides the second portion of Tier Two according to Adler and Barnett. Process involves the transactions, international organizations and shared institutions. A transaction includes any sort of exchange, whether economic, political or symbolic, between one actor and another. International organizations are not necessarily security communities, but help to facilitate them. First, they help to develop trust between actors by establishing norms of behavior and providing sanctions in order to create understood norms. Secondly, organizations are important

42 Adler and Barnett, pg. 40.
43 Ibid, pg. 41.
sites for socialization and learning about other actors. They provide a ready meeting place for a host of transactions on a variety of subject areas. Third, international organizations can help to facilitate a collective identity by creating regional collective identities, or furthering larger uniting forces. Lastly, international organizations create a political elite that are loyal to an unbounded nation, which helps to create a process of trust and collective identity.\textsuperscript{44}

\textit{Tier Three}

The relationships discussed in the first two tiers allow for the reaction of a collective identity and mutual trust, which provide the necessary conditions for the development of “dependable expectations of peaceful change”.\textsuperscript{45} Trust and understanding are mutually reinforcing and there is greater tendency to trust members because there is an expectation of mutual identification. Traditional theories see trust in international politics has highly elusive because the anarchy of the international realm makes it virtually impossible. International organizations are therefore seen as a way to monitor the behavior of others- members join not because they seek peaceful cooperation with other members, but because they fear that lack of rules in the international realm means that absent an international organization, they risk potential loss of power.

The development of a security community with the expectation of peaceful change suggests that states no longer rely on rules in the international realm to artificially create trust among states. Adler and Barnett argue that “in sum, we envision a dynamic and positive relationship between core powers and cognitive

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid. pg. 43.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid. pg. 45.
structures on the one hand, and transactions, institutions and organizations and social learning on the other. The positive and dynamic interaction between these variables undergirds the development of trust and the process of collective identity formation, which, in turn, drives dependable expectations of peaceful change”.

Applications

The brief understanding of security communities in the context of African cooperation is that prior to the African Union, the factors developed above prevented the creation of collective identity and trust needed to have dependable and predictable cooperation. As a result, the OAU categorizes a traditional international organization, that facilitates conversation and cooperation, but only in order to dictate rules in an anarchic realm, to the benefit of domestic leaders. The theory of omnibalancing best describes why African political leaders initially chose to cooperate, because it allowed them with political legitimacy at a critical time of state building. However, as liberal values spread and the forces of interdependence continued, international cooperation began to change. Countries were more easily able to gain a sense of regional nationhood, powerful states emerged as leaders of the continent, and the new organization, the African Union, more easily characterized a security community. A discussion of how the AU follows the three tier approach will be included in Chapter 4.

Conclusion

This paper will attempt to use omnibalancing to explain the relationship between African states and the continental organizations that they develop following independence and during the Cold War. Domestic pressures, especially in Third

46 Ibid. pg. 48.
World states, is a result of the unique, and often volatile, relationship that leaders have with state apparatus played a large role in the international organization that they developed, the OAU. It explains why states chose to join continental organizations in order to enhance their international prestige and legitimacy at home. This paper will then attempt to prove that the necessary conditions in order to create a security community developed in Africa following the end of the Cold War. These factors are useful in looking at the transition from the Organization of African Unity to the African Union.
Chapter Two-The Beginnings of Cooperation- a Newly Independent Africa

Nkrumah’s Beginnings

One of the most revolutionary events of the second half of the twentieth century has been the rapidity of political independence of African states from their Western colonizers. Largely a result of nationalist movements, few people at the end of World War II could have expected that twenty years later, almost the entire continent would have achieved self-government and political sovereignty. Aided by external factors, African nationalist leaders and their followers embarked on an unprecedented rally for freedom throughout Africa. Immediately following independence, the African nationalist movement waned, and split into sometimes competing forces, as the main unifying factor had been opposition to colonial control.

Inspired by the anti-colonial activities of the peoples of African descent in North America and the West Indies, African nationalists and pan-Africanists sought to promote a unified Africa in opposition to colonial rule. In 1945, at the Pan-African Congress in Manchester, England, participants adopted the “Declaration to the Colonial Peoples” that very adequately describes the goals of pan-Africanism at the time. It affirmed “the rights of all colonized peoples to be ‘free from foreign imperialist control, whether political or economic’ and ‘to elect their own governments, without restrictions from foreign powers’… participants further underscored that if the colonial powers were ‘still determined to rule mankind by force, then Africans, as a last resort, may have to appeal to force in the effort to achieve freedom’.”

Following the Pan-African Congress, the West African National Secretariat, founded in Manchester at the Congress, proclaimed a goal of total independence. Kwame Nkrumah quickly established support in his home state through the work of his Convention People’s Party and the support of the youth movement. As a result, the British colonial administration granted independence on March 6, 1957. With a solid base of support in the new state of Ghana, Nkrumah began an ambitious program of independence for all of Africa with the political aspiration of unity for the continent. When he began to look for supporters, he found that the struggle for independence had been making far less headway in the rest of colonial Africa, with many areas not even beginning. Nkrumah believed that Ghana’s independence was “meaningless unless it was linked up with the total liberation of the African continent”. Leaders across the continent were still divided about the best way in which to attain independence, either through subtle transition and reform of the continental structure, or full and immediate independence.

In British East and Central Africa, the population had not advanced politically, largely because of the dominant position of white settlers. Most of the leaders came from a reformist tradition, meaning that they were largely advocating good relations with the colonizers. Very few were ready to break away from the colonizers, especially when faced with the repressive tactics of the colonizers.

In the French West and Equatorial Africa, the political situation was even worse. Despite a long history of political activities and well organized political parties, independence had never been a primary goal. It was not until early 1958 that any of

the French colonies fought for independence. In the Belgian colonies, the thought of independence was at best a dream, as the metropolis was imposing strict repression on any political activities of the colonies.50

In the North, the situation was strikingly different. Egypt had been independent since 1922. With Nasser’s rise to power, the radical regimes of Egypt were replaced with a more middle course for the country. In the Maghreb, Morocco and Tunisia were able to gain independence by 1956.

By 1958, Nkrumah began to tackle the broader program of independence and unity. He began by creating a Department for African Affairs, who developed a strategy he could wield to help begin efforts for unity. The first contacts were made at celebrations of independence by representatives from Liberia, Ethiopia and the Maghreb. However, the states of Liberia and Ethiopia were too conservative to have support for Nkrumah’s efforts to hold a conference of all the independent states of the continent. Liberia and Ethiopia were still committed to potential links with the colonial states, and were not domestically secure enough in their position of power to start looking at the rest of the continent. Substantial state and nation building were still being accomplished at home. As a result, Nkrumah began to look elsewhere, mainly in the northern area of the continent.

Efforts to link with the southern parts of the continent had already begun in the Maghreb and Egypt. As Algeria engaged in a crucial battle for decolonization, Morocco and Tunisia did their best to help, giving material and moral aid. Efforts were made by neighboring countries to grant diplomatic support to the FLN, spearheading efforts to bring France to the negotiating table to grant independence.

As a result, they wished to broaden the circle of states supporting the revolutionary struggle.

Nassar began to show a strong interest in making sure that Egypt and other states maintain a level of distance from East and West influences. With the culmination of the Suez crisis in 1956, Nassar began to look for a way to avoid dependence on either the West or the Communist bloc. As a result, he sought out allies that were “anti-colonial, progressive politically and economically, and wary of reliance on other blocs”. He then selected three circles for future solidarity- the Arab circle, the African continent and the “brethren-in-Islam” circle.

From the beginning, Egypt established itself in favor of an African alliance. Nasser made Cairo one of the main centers for the training of nationalists, funding and providing equipment for liberation movements across the continent. In 1953, Nassar wrote in his “Philosophy of Revolution”

We cannot under any condition, even if we wanted to, stand aloof from the terribly and terrifying battle now raging in the heart of that continent between five million whites and two hundred million Africans. We cannot stand aloof for one important and obvious reason—we ourselves are in Africa. Surely the people of Africa will continue to look to us—we who are the guardians of the continent’s northern gate, we who constitute the connecting link between the continent and the outer world. We certainly cannot, under any condition, relinquish our responsibility to help to our utmost in spreading the light of knowledge and civilization up to the very depth of the virgin jungles of the continent.

Nassar therefore chose in favor of an African alliance. He also began to make efforts to create a solidarity between African and Arabs alike, drawing on parallel experiences of European colonization. The struggle against colonization as a result

---

51 Ibid. pg. 32.
developed a sense of solidarity, which helped to facilitate a willingness to work with the Arab states towards the common goal of decolonization.

In 1958, Nkrumah and George Padmore organized an All African Peoples Conference (AAPC) in Accra, Ghana. The function of the conference was to lay the foundation for interstate cooperation post-independence. One of the released resolutions states that commitment, saying, “the ultimate objective of African nations is a commonwealth of Free African States, linguistic and other divisions should be subordinated to the over-riding demands of African Unity”. The AAPC endorsed regional groupings as a stepping stone to continental unity, foreshadowing an approach adopted by the AU. It also demanded the end of political and economic exploitation by imperialist forces.

The Conferences of Independent African States

Nkrumah was established as the natural leader in the African solidarity movement. Trained in the Pan-African Congress of DuBois, he was able to combine the theories of Garvey and DuBois with an application to the continent of Africa. The first Conference of Independent African States (CIAS) met in Accra from April 15 to April 22, 1958. The meeting was a “historical” one, a culmination of heads of states from radically different states. As Woronoff puts it, “The vast panorama of races and religions, of ideologies and outlooks, of histories and futures might have been enough to over-awe the delegates—if they had not assembled to chart the destiny of the whole continent, to proclaim its independence and predict its future”.

The Accra conference was considered particularly important in that it was the first

---

53 Murithi. pg. 24
55 Woronoff. pg. 34
occasion that the leaders of all the African states had to define a common program for
the continent. As more states were added, the second CIAS was held in Addis Ababa,

The first task and primary concern of the African leaders was to help facilitate
the liberation of the rest of the continent. It was contended that the continued
existence of colonialism on the continent was a threat to African states security and
world peace.56 As a continuation of the Pan-African Congress, the CIAS stayed
committed to the peaceful emancipation of the continent. Their commitment to peace
was genuine, but as was their eagerness to have an independent Africa. Unfortunately,
the two goals were oftentimes incompatible.

The Algerian example is a good indicator of the problems with reconciling the
two goals. One of the main causal mechanisms for the original alliance between
Ghana and the Maghreb had been to facilitate support for the Algerian revolutionaries
on the international scene. However, support from the first CIAS for the cause was
largely superficial, with appeals to France to recognize the right of self determination.

As a result, when the second conference at Addis Ababa started, two modes of
thought regarding Algeria developed. One favored a pacifist model, looking to
negotiation as the main mechanism for independence. The second model looked to
the African states for material aid and diplomatic support within the United Nations.

The strongest steps that the two conferences took were in connection with the
problems of racialism and segregation. The practices were condemned as “evil and
inhuman, a negation of the basic principle of human rights and dignity… of such

56 Ibid. pg. 35
explosiveness.. that it may well engulf our Continent in violence and bloodshed”.

By the second conference, South Africa had been pinpointed as the main arena for racialism. The policy of apartheid was decried as immoral and in contempt to the resolutions of the United Nations. At this time, the heads of states drew up a forceful program, where the states of Africa would sever or refuse diplomatic relations, the closing of ports to South African vessels, a boycott of South African goods and the denial of air space. The Arab states were approached and asked to prevent their oil supplies from being sold to the South African apartheid government.

Nevertheless, the heads of the independent states avoided the fundamental question of how to reconcile the need to oppose colonial rule when peaceful mechanisms were not appropriate. As violent uprisings broke out in Kenya, Algeria and Angola against colonial rule, the African states only sponsored peaceful means of decolonization.

Beyond the goals of decolonization, the conferences also attempted to establish a coherent foreign policy program for the already independent states of Africa, the purpose of which was to assert a distinctive African voice in the international arena. The basis of this voice would be a loyalty to the United Nations, adherence to the Bandung principles and support for a list of intangibles including equality, non-interference and non-aggression. The primary goal of the African foreign policy was the defense of the newly found independence. As the Cold War

57 Ibid. pg. 37.
58 For more information about the results of international efforts to isolate apartheid South Africa, see Andemecial. The OAU and the UN, Africana Publishing Company: New York, 1972. pg. 133-140.
59 The Bandung principles refers to a commitment to non-aggression and national sovereignty. These principles were formulated by the Indian and Chinese prime ministers following the end of World War II in order to stress the importance of non-intervention. These principles have traditionally been upheld by Asian-African conferences.
60 Woronoff. pg 39.
developed, Africa became aware that they were being selected as a natural realm for influence from the two opposing blocs.

Domestically, the most urgent problem was the economic dependence of the continent, and the lack of economic development in then majority of the newly independent states. The declaration following the first CIAS, had stressed the need to rise the standards of living of the African people and a long list of projects, including channels of communication, a common market, action against disease spread, higher education, cultural centers and joint economic enterprise.

The second conference began to deal with the fact that despite the fact that the African states favored intra-African economic cooperation over economic trade with the outside world, the economic backwardness of the continent prevented it. Still they feared that outside influences could result in the loss of their freedom of action. The solution offered at Addis Ababa was the collective system of distributing financial and technical aid.61

The Brazzaville-Casablanca Split

Following the second CIAS, a moderate, consensus model of action had been built, with future conferences planned for further implementation. But as the African policy developed, divisions between the radically different states began to become apparent, causing divisions. In an attempt to please the hesitant states, policy had been watered down to the point that the extreme states. The radicals began to switch their support for the more radical findings of the AAPC. The new independent states were less outward looking, and as a result chose not to favor revival of intra-

61 Ibid. pg. 40.
governmental conferences. Thus, as quickly as it had started, the states allowed the beginnings of a Pan-African organization to disappear.\(^\text{62}\)

As the Algerian civil war dragged on, the divide between reformists and revolutionaries grew. Then, only a few days after Addis Ababa convened, the crisis in the Congo began which split the two groups even further. At the end of the war, General de Gaulle came to the realization that the colonial system needed altering. A conference was held in Brazzaville in 1954 to reconsider the role of France in Africa. The question of independence was largely considered inevitable, with the need for greater administrative sovereignty and self government conceded. The leaders at the convention then formed a political party based on the views expressed in Brazzaville called the Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA). The party was generally content with the level of autonomy afforded within the Union, was considerably more reformist than the rest of the continent, and did not push for political independence.

This continued until 1958, when de Gaulle’s constitution increased the level of self-government, retaining only foreign affairs, defense and economic policy as French affairs. This new community quickly fell apart, and by the end of 1960, all the states were totally independent. Only Guinea and Mali, however, really isolated itself from France. The rest remained in the franc zone and continued to have close ties with the EEC.\(^\text{63}\)

From December 15-19, 1960, a large conference was held in Brazzaville, attended by the heads of state of Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Dahomey (now Benin), Gabon, Ivory Coast, Niger, Mauritania, Madagascar, Senegal


and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso). The conference was unique in that it came to a conclusion on the issue of peaceful versus violent means, favoring a peaceful solution at the expense of African independence from the colonizers. The Brazzaville Declaration states,

Faced with the grave situation of Africa today, they are fully aware of their responsibilities. Thus, the method they have chosen is not to merely appear to solve problems but to try to solve them concretely, not to take sides but to reconcile the sides, not to propose any particular compromise but to invite both sides to a dialogue from which alone can emerge a solution that constitutes a positive progress for international peace and cooperation.

On the issue of the Algerian war, there was a clear limit as to how far the states would go to achieve independence. The only acceptable policy to the Brazzaville mode of thought was one of mediation and persuasion.

Starting in 1958, a second group of states were beginning to form. The solidarity of these states was not as historically based as the former French colonies, but it grew quite rapidly as a result of current pressures. The core states of the bloc were the states that had first attained independence. Made up of mainly the leaders of the early Pan-African conferences, by 1961 they were becoming a dwindling minority in the African councils. For the most part, these states were in firm opposition to former colonial powers’ influence and the West. The formation was a political one, for the states shared very little geographically, racially, religiously, or linguistically. The main focal point for cooperation was the Algerian war, which brought most of the northern states of the Maghreb and Egypt to the table.

64 Woronoff. pg. 48.
65 Ibid. pg. 49.
Two weeks following the formation of the Brazzaville group, it was seen as a
provocation, causing the creation of a counter-bloc made of the militant and activist
states. Held in Casablanca from January 3-January 7, 1961, the leaders of Algeria,
Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali, Morocco and Egypt formed the Casablanca group. The
basic purpose of the Casablanca conference was to restart the effort against
colonization. The preamble of their statement makes this clear stating,

We proclaim our determination to liberate the African territories still
under foreign domination, by giving them aid and assistance, to
liquidate colonialism and neo-colonialism in all their forms, to
disourage the maintenance of foreign troops and the establishment of
bases which endanger the liberation of Africa and to strive equally to
rid the African Continent of political and economic interventions and
pressure.

The statement highlights not only the immediate consequences of continued foreign
domination, but the effects of post-colonial intervention in the newly independent
African states. By doing so, the Casablanca group made a point to be in opposition to
not only the colonial powers, but also to the independent states that favor continued
influence by the Western powers.

Because of considerable ideological differences between the two groupings,
when issues arose that required the application of the two different programs, friction
began. The marginal issue of Mauritania ultimately caused a major rift between
cooperation between the two groups. Mauritania was previously part of French West
Africa and attained independence in 1960. Immediately following, the new state
asked for admission to the United Nations. At the same time, Morocco made a claim
to Mauritania as part of its historic empire, supported by the Soviet Union.

---

67 Woronoff, pg. 49.
68 Ibid. pg. 50.
The Brazzaville grouping immediately came to the aid of the new Mauritanian state. Using the USSR’s previous commitment to the independence of all colonies through negotiations, the Brazzaville grouping pledged themselves to remedy the situation, asking for all other African states to support Mauritania as well. The King of Morocco, Mohammed V, immediately called for a conference of the Casablanca grouping. His aim was to rally support from other African states in his campaign to create Mauritania. At heart of the issue, despite Ghana, Algeria and Libya’s support for Mauritania, was an opposition to new forms of colonialism and French imposition. Creating an independent Mauritania, it was argued, would just create one more artificial border in an already divided Africa.69

Much of the campaign against French influence, and therefore against the Brazzaville grouping, was accomplished by the All African Peoples Organization (AAPO). Dependent upon the states that financed it, the AAPO’s politics were mainly a mirror of its most militant members. The formed French colonies never fully participating, and as the English-speaking colonies dropped out, they were replaced by the more militant and oppositional elements from the continent.

As the Algerian civil war continued, the two groupings were again ideologically in conflict. While both accepted the inevitability of Algerian independence, they differed on the mechanism, and the level of French involvement. Despite de Gaulle’s acceptance in principle of the rule of an independent Algerian state, the conflict continued. The Brazzaville group issued a declaration, speaking of France in very friendly terms, and insisting on an end of the war by 1961. The Brazzaville declaration was not well received in many areas. The Algerian war had

69 Legum. pg. 176-182.
posed as the main focal point to prevent inter-African relations for some time. The continued support by the French Community for passive acceptance of French policy towards Algeria only served to exacerbate divisions amongst the newly independent African states.  

In response, the Casablanca grouping issued a statement, using the Brazzaville declaration as a challenge. They saw the Algerian issue within “a with us or against us” paradigm. Those who were truly in favor of an independent Africa had to recognize the GPRA and provide political, diplomatic and material support in their struggle. The resolution, issued on January 7, 1961, implicitly denied the French ability to find a peacefull solution, saying that the group “denounces and condemns all consultations and referendums unilaterally organized by France in Algeria, and the result thereof can in no way commit the Algerian people”.

In July 1961, Algeria was declared independent, confirmed through a massive approval in a referendum of Algerian voters. Despite the Casablanca’s aggressive approach to support for the GPRA, it was through the Brazzaville’s approach of referendum and negotiations that autonomy was granted. By allowing France to protect its domestic interests and to save political face, an appropriate solution for both sides was reached through a long series of negotiations.

**Congolese Civil War**

Unlike most of Africa, Congolese independence came as a result of a very dramatic reduction in presence by its colonizer of Belgium. As a result, preparation for self government was very limited and lacked the political elite that typically made

---

71 Woronoff. pg. 56.
up future government leaders and administrators. Because of Lumumba’s attendance at the 1958 AAPO meeting in Accra, he was widely acknowledged as a valid spokesperson for the Congo.

Political parties, because of the short time period for formation, were largely built along tribal or provincial lines, instead of any national or ideological premise. In the May 1960 elections, Lumumba was the only candidate to receive support across geographical boundaries, despite being concentrated largely in the Orientale province. Following a splintering of the party, riots broke out. Brussels sent in troops to protect nationals, resulting in fears of a wave of re-colonization by Belgium. The United Nations Operation in the Congo was founded in July, whose troops eventually replaced all the Belgian troops in the Congo.

Immediately following the entrance of Belgian troops into the Congo, the Katanga region seceded. Leopoldville agreed that the secession had to be put down, but there was no consensus on the means in which to do so. The ONUC refused to “be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise”.72 As a result, Lumumba looked for African backing to resist the secession, calling the “Little Summit” with Algeria, Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Liberia, Morocco, Sudan, Togo, Tanganyika (now Tanzania), Tunisia and Egypt.

Despite all being ideologically similar to the Lumumba, the African states continued their support for the United Nations as the only option. At the same time, dissent within Congo was coming to the surface. By the time of the Brazzaville conference in 1960, members had the choice to recognize regimes in Leopoldville,

72 Ibid. pg. 59.
Stanleyville and Katanga. At Brazzaville, the conference voted to give full support to the United Nation’s efforts in the Congo. It was also concluded that because it was a United Nations affairs, it was not the place of other states to take intervention in domestic affairs.73

Only Lumumba’s delegates were invited to the Casablanca conference in January, 1961. The radical of the leaders wanted to support the Lumumba regime to an extreme, seeing the United Nations as wavering. This policy was strongly resisted by Nkrumah, fearing further degeneration of the conflict. In the end, the conference asked the United Nations to attempt to preserve the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Congo. Failure of the United Nations to take action to support the furthering of Lumumba’s regime would result in the withdrawal of Casablanca states troops.

Ultimately, the African states had little control over what happened in the Congo. Because of Africa’s small position within the UN, it could only express its opinions in the General Assembly. As a result of a multitude of opinions within the African Community, Africa had very little real impact on the actions taken by the UN. As a result of American and Western influence, Patrice Lumumba was transferred to a prison in the Katanga, and murdered.

As Woronoff puts it, “The death of Lumumba ushered in one of the most tragic periods in the history of Pan-Africanism. The common front was gone, even willingness not to aggravate the situation faded, and one after another the African

---

states took sides”. In an effort to restore intra-African relations, the Brazzaville Group called a conference in Madagascar from March 5-13, 1961. They came up with the solution of a federalist system, which a Kasavubu/Mobutu regime at its head. It was found unacceptable by the Gizenga regime, who were advocates of strict unity. In response to the conference, the AAPO denounced the round table as the act of imperialists. Lumumba was an important member of the AAPO, and as a result, the leaders strongly denounced his murder.

**The Monrovia Block**

The outlook for cooperation looked bleak, with three very different opinions on the situation leaving very little room for continental cooperation. As the split between the Brazzaville and Casablanca powers became further entrenched, moderate leaders soon began to realize that this rivalry made the implementation of any cross continental program impossible. One of the countries that were most concerned was President Senghor’s Senegal. A member of the Brazzaville group, they coordinated with Nigeria and Liberia to sponsor an all African conference. At the lobby of Nkrumeh, the Casablanca states asked for a postponement of the conference, called the Monrovia Conference. In the first effort to bring the two major blocs together, an opposite effect occurred. The Monrovia Group was formed as a result of the conference, combining the Brazzaville states with the moderate English speaking countries like Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone.

The first order of business adopted was promoting better understanding and cooperation in Africa, instead of decolonization as every other conference previously.

---

74 Woronoff. pg. 63.
75 Ibid. pg. 73-74.
The conference adopted a series of principles including the absolute equality of all states and respect for their sovereignty. The Monrovia conference was the first meeting to acknowledge that the greatest threats to African sovereignty and prosperity was coming from within.\(^{76}\)

Following the Monrovia Conference, there were no further efforts to hold a conference of all the independent states of Africa until the end of 1961. The political arena had greatly changed that would allow for more cooperation between states. Mauritania, despite Morocco’s efforts, had been admitted the United Nations. Despite continued violence, it was now evident that Algerian independence was inevitable. The Congo, despite the dissolution of the unity government, had stabilized due to a lack of political rivals.

The Prime Minister of Nigeria, Abubaker Balewa, became an important leader on the unity stage. As a moderate leader and a Muslim, he could look to both the Monrovia block and the Islamic Northern African states for support. Originally, Balewa was successful at getting the Casablanca block to come to the table in Lagos, but when Morocco refused to be seated with Mauritania, Nkrumah pulled out. Balewa personally invited the GRPA to attend the conference, but the Brazzaville members objected. As a result, the Casablanca members decided to boycott, as well as the North African group.\(^{77}\)

It was not until 1962 that any effort at a full continent conference was made again. As the main issues that caused division amongst the independent states disappeared, the cohesion between the blocs also began to disappear. With the

\(^{76}\) Amate. pg. 48-49.
\(^{77}\) Woronoff. pg. 74.
Algerian and Mauritanian situations settled, and no alternative in the Congo, reconciliation between the members of the Casablanca group and the Monrovia group began. Balewa, and Haile Selassie I made every effort to assure success at the next conference in Addis Ababa. On July 5, 1962, Algeria became independent, assuring that there were no longer any large issues of controversy between the states of Africa. When President Ben Bella, the hero of Algerian independence, came out in favor of the meeting, new life was breathed back into the pan-African movement.78

Unity Revisited

From the beginning, the goal of the pan-African movement had always had two prongs: independence and unity. They were considered to be intertwined and reinforcing. As a result, independence was given priority as unity was obviously impossible if colonialism continued throughout the continent. The movement towards unity was understood more primordially. Leaders believed that an inherited understanding of connection with all other Africans would inevitably develop into a united Africa. Unity, therefore, was put on the back burner for the twenty years in order to assure an independent Africa.

Unity continued to emerge at the conferences that followed. As the blocks developed, questions of unity continued on the political scene, but were used largely as political rhetoric more than any concrete plan to further a pan-African cause. In the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, African leaders began to realize that they were even farther away from unity as ever. The natural movement towards unity had failed. It was determined that the broad attempts at unity were mostly a façade. Instead more modest projects, normally economic, that strengthened or created concrete links

78 Ibid. pg. 76
between nations were preferable because they laid a solid foundation for future cooperation. Ironically, a great debate broke out about the best way to create unity, causing one of the most principle divisions amongst African states. Ranging from Ghana’s commitment to full political unity to a moderate stance in favor of continued state sovereignty, eventually the states began to meet in the middle.79

A more promising political atmosphere arose, with the disappearance of the main issues of contention and the dissolution of the blocs, an increasing number of leaders came out in favor of the upcoming conference in Addis Ababa. Finally, President Nkrumah came out in favor of the meeting, asking for a central political organization in order to formulate a common foreign policy, continental wide planning for economic and political development, a common monetary policy and a system of defense cooperation.

The friendly political environment for cooperation allowed for the creation of a larger political structure that became the Organization of African Unity. The beginnings of this process took place at the Conference at Addis Ababa. This process will be discussed further in Chapter Three.

Chapter Three- The Organization of African Unity

Conference at Addis Ababa

Building on the format of the conferences from the last decade, two conferences were scheduled for Addis Ababa in 1963. The first was a meeting of the foreign ministers that were to discuss the general problems and draw up an agenda for the summit. As a result, the issues that there was no chance of reaching an agreement on were weeded out. This decreased the likelihood of Heads of States meeting falling apart because of controversial issues. Issues such as Israel, common market association, Somali claims and atomic testing were immediately taken off the agenda.

The foreign ministers approved an agenda that included the establishment of an Organization of African States, with a charter and a permanent structure. The organization was envisioned to create a forum that would facilitate cooperation on the economy, technology, education, science, decolonization, racial discrimination and apartheid, relations between Africa and the United Nations and more. The Foreign Ministers than drafted a Charter for the Organization of African States, presented by Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{80}

Despite these bold efforts, the Ministers did little to solidify any permanent mechanism to create the organization. Most of the Foreign Ministers could not give specific opinions on the matter and only Ethiopia submitted a draft of a Charter to be considered. When the Casablanca states threw in their ideas, the range of opinions and plans were so vast that it was difficult to envision what the organization could

\textsuperscript{80} Woronoff. Pg. 127.
possibly look like. When the Foreign Ministers convened after a week, the outlook was bleak.⁸¹

When the Heads of States conference adjourned, the media was already discussing the potential failure of the conference. For the most part, the Heads of States preferred a practical approach that called for a mechanism to create a single African organization through which a singular African voice could be communicated in the international arena. Beyond this vision, there was little consensus.⁸²

At heart of this disagreement was a fundamental debate often discussed in integration studies. Two schools of thought exist- federalist and functionalist. For the federalists, integration implies the adoption of a common constitution and the creation of joint institutions or a central government. This overarching political body then uses legal, administrative, budgetary and sometimes coercive power to create an integrated economy and common attitudes. For federalists, political elites as seen as the main actors to ensure integration. Political integration is seen as more important than economics, and a united political body is seen as possible even in the short term.

For functionalists, economics is seen as taking predominance over politics. As a result, economic integration must precede political integration. Gradualism is accepted as necessary, meaning the movement must take on the easiest forms of integration and then move on the more difficult aspects. Nationalism and ideology are seen as forces that cannot be defeated by a frontal political attack. Instead, technical and economic cooperation can slowly erode them overtime to create a strong framework for political cooperation. As a result, economic interest groups and experts

---

⁸¹ Ibid.
are seen as the key players in the integration process. Cooperation is therefore only seen as possible after high levels of economic diversification and development.  

The federalist position, taken by President Nkrumah and his supporters can be summarized in his statement, saying, “African unity is, above all, a political kingdom which can only be gained by political means. The social and economic development of Africa will come only within the political kingdom, not the other way round”. Nkrumah was committed to the need for a centralized African government, with federalist states responsible to it. In opposition to Nkrumah’s plans of a radical political consolidation of the new African states, was the moderate position expressed by Nigerian Prime Minister Balewa. He stated,

“Some of us have suggested that African unity should be achieved by political fusion of the different states in Africa; some of us feel that African unity could be achieved by taking practical steps in economic, educational, scientific and cultural cooperation and by trying first to get the Africans to understand themselves before embarking on the more complicated and more difficult arrangement of political union. My country stands for the practical approach to the unity of the continent”

Balewa’s opinions were supported by the moderate Brazzaville coalition, favoring a reformist position over political unity as the stepping stone to further cooperation. Above all, the majority of African states opposed the radical federalist position as they saw it as an imposition on their new founded sovereignty. As Mali’s Modibo Keita put it, “The colonial system divided Africa, but it permitted nations to be born.

---

85 Ibid. pg. 105.
Present frontiers must be respected and sovereignty of each state must be consecrated”.\textsuperscript{87}

As the conference continued, the differences in opinion slowly began to wane, as the leaders began to see the issues that they shared in common, such as decolonization, the end of apartheid and the goal to increase Africa’s stance in the international realm, began to draw the blocs together. Momentum began to turn in favor of functional unity, with a political union to follow. A following began to develop in favor of signing a charter that would create the Organization of African Unity, and proving to the world that the summit in Addis Ababa was a historical one. The moderates eventually won out, and every leader signed the charter on May 26, 1963, sixty three years after the first Pan-African conference.

The Organization of African Unity is understood as born out of a grand compromise between the two schools of thought. With the Congolese conflict temporarily resolved with the liquidation of Katanga and the Algerian civil war at an end, the Casablanca powers were able to accept the Monrovia formula- a loose, confederal structure with no interference into domestic politics. In return, the Casablanca powers gained a promise that the OAU would give its highest priority to liberating the Southern African countries that remained under colonial rule.

\textit{The Charter of the OAU}

The charter of the OAU consists of a preamble and thirty-three articles, which reflected the attitudes and opinions of the signatories at the time the OAU was formed. The charter lays out the foundations and builds out the structures of what the OAU
would become. Article III of the Charter lays out the seven principles of the organization, namely:

a) the sovereign equality of all member states;
b) non-interference in the internal affairs of states;
c) respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for the inalienable right to independent existence;
d) peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration

e) unreserved condemnation in all its forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighboring states or any other state;
f) absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent;
g) affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.

Of the seven basic principles, four are devoted to the defense of sovereignty of member states, denoting the strength of the moderates and the Monrovia group in the compromise. The Monrovia and Brazzaville group, as noted in the second chapter, were committed to peaceful nonaggression, with continued ties with the former colonial powers. The concept and strength of sovereignty throughout the document is in contradiction with pan-African values, as pan-Africanism contends that there are too many small and nonviable states in Africa, which is a legacy of colonialism. The principles of non-interference are a clear indication of the historical events of the time. Against the background of the Congo crisis and the assassination of President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo led the majority of leaders fearful of intervention into domestic politics of their own countries. As a result, the OAU became only an international agent, powerless to intervene in domestic conflicts.

Only two principles are a nod to the Casablanca group- the dedication to liberate dependant territories and the declaration of non-alignment. The Casablanca

---

group, as noted in Chapter Two, favored a fully independent Africa that took a potentially violent approach against colonialism and the Western powers. The dedication of non-alignment is a continuation of making cooperation decisions based on national interests first. As Matthews puts it, “The principle of non-alignment has anyway been embraced by most African countries as best serving their national interests. In the context of the East-West conflict, the African states saw non-alignment probably as the only course to afford them room to maneuver”.\(^8^9\) Despite these nods to the Casablanca bloc, ultimately they lost in the Charter. The word “pan-Africanism” does not appear in the entire charter. Reference to political union or the aims of federalists are avoided entirely with the rejection of Nkrumah’s proposal.

**Structure of the OAU**

Four main bodies were created in the Charter, specifically:

1. The Assembly of Heads of States and Government
2. The Council of Ministers
3. The Secretariat
4. The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration\(^9^0\)

**The Assembly of Heads of States and Government**

The Assembly is the “supreme organ” of the OAU with functions mainly to debate issues of common concern in order to create a uniform policy for the organization and the continent as a whole in the international sphere. It met at least once a year, or could meet in an extraordinary session at the request of a member and approved by 2/3 of the assembly.

The Heads of States as the controlling body of the OAU is a reflection of the role of the leaders at home. As the newly sovereign state gained independence, they

---

\(^8^9\) Mathews, pg. 58.

\(^9^0\) For a visual representation of the structure of the OAU, and its parts interactions, see Appendix 1.
were faced with a large number of small struggles for control of the state, a reflection of the fragmented nationhood that characterized colonial Africa. A lot was needed to be accomplished at home. Because the nations of Africa lacked a common sense of nationhood that typically results in the development of a state, political leaders were fearful of their hold of power. Additionally, the requirements for economic development plus the potential for colonial return because of the political detriments of factionalism within the nation forced the ruling party to strengthen their hold over the state. This trend developed into a continent of one-party states with strong and oftentimes selfish leaders, and a high level of political repression. As a result, it seemed a natural step to establish these leaders as the controlling body of the continental organization.91

The basic purpose of the Assembly was to “discuss matters of common concern to Africa with a view to coordinating and harmonizing the general policy of the Organization”.92 The Assembly had the power to debate any issue, from decolonization to disputes among states or situations that potentially endangered peace on the continent. It could then make decisions and adopt resolutions on the issues.

In practice, however, the Assembly could only the coordinate the policy of the OAU, and was restrained by the practice of unrestricted sovereignty. The Charter was explicit on the respect for national sovereignty, but it had no enforcement mechanism for the implementation of OAU decisions. As Woronoff puts it, “Each Head of State

---

91 Woronoff. pg. 159.
92 Charter.
had unusually broad powers in his own government but even all of them together could not take decisions binding on any one”.93

As a result, the organization was dependent on the good will of the member states. An individual organization, even when faced with an overwhelming majority, could choose to ignore to violate an Assembly decision. Consequently, the issues discussed were generally those of high importance, where there was a strong dedication and agreement. Controversial questions were wholly avoided, as there could be no expectation of voluntary following. At the same time, unanimity was sought in practice. Resolutions were often a result of compromise, seeking to satisfy as many states as possible.

The Heads of States secondary power was the coordination of the other bodies of the OAU. The Charter says that the body must “review the structure, functions, and acts of all the organs and any specialized agencies which may be created in accordance with the present Charter”.94 Meetings therefore became mostly about hearing status reports and guiding the other bodies.

*Council of Ministers*

The Council of Ministers is composed mainly of Foreign Ministers or ministers designated by the governments of the member states. Resolutions could be adopted by a simple majority, and it met twice a year in ordinary session. The Charter did not define the effect of the resolutions, resulting in uncertainty of their real value. The Council was responsible to the Heads of States, meaning the Assembly could choose to review and reject the resolutions.

---

93 Woronoff.
94 Charter.
The Council had several responsibilities. First, it was “entrusted with the responsibility of preparing conferences of the Assembly”. It reported on the actions of the other organs of the organization and the progress of the resolutions adopted in previous meetings. Secondly, the Council was “entrusted with the implementation of the decisions of the Assembly”. As resolutions were not binding on member states, the meaning of this duty was up to interpretation. Third, the Council served as the mediator between the Heads of States and the rest of the Organization. The Charter dictates that the Council was to “coordinate inter-African cooperation”, so the Council had to work out the activities of the many committees in order to harmonize policy so that it was possible and consistent. It was also given the catch-all power of “it shall take cognizance of any matter referred to it by the Assembly”. Lastly, the Council had oversight over the various bodies. It had to approve the rules of procedure of the specialized commissions. Secondly, the Council had control over the budget of the bodies. Its power of the purse gave it effective control over the administrative bodies that accompanied the various commissions and the Secretariat.

In practice, it was not difficult for the Council to influence the Assembly. Since its primary task was to prepare and follow up the conferences, the Assembly saw the implementation and the work of the subordinate bodies through the lens of the ministers. The decisions adopted were more often than not based on the proposals presented by the Council. The ministers also had considerable influence in the

---

95 Ibid.  
96 Ibid.  
97 Charter.
implementation because it was their responsibility to see through the Assembly’s decisions.98

Eventually, the Council was entrusted with almost all of the actions taken on decolonization, non-alignment and peaceful settlement of African disputes, as the ministers gained expertise. Because it was entrusted to implement vague resolutions by the Heads of State, in many instances the Council had to interpret and create a vision for the projects. Through this process, the Council became a specialized branch for political questions. Because the Council met twice a year, the decisions made were generally considered OAU policy until the next Heads of State summit. Woronoff argues about the time question that “Since the Heads of State repeatedly refused to meet in extraordinary session, whereas the Foreign Ministers could be called together rapidly in crises, the most urgent and explosive problems were dealt with by the Council and not the Assembly”.99

Decisions taken by the Council and the Heads of States would vary widely for a variety of reasons. First, because the Council often met during times of extreme pressure, whereas the Heads of States avoided extraordinary sessions, the action taken was often very different. Secondly, the Ministers were often young, dynamic and most importantly, appointed officials. Because the Ministers were not directly implicated in OAU action, they did not have to take as moderate of a position as the Heads of States, who bore a greater responsibility for the consequences of the organization. Third, the Council needed a simple majority to pass resolutions, where

98 Amate. pg. 68.
99 Woronoff. pg. 165.
the Heads of State required a 2/3 majority. As a result, Council decisions were generally faster, broader and more controversial.100

This gap resulted in friction between the two bodies. For example, in December 1965, the Council unanimously decided that if the United Kingdom did not end the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia within ten days, the African states would end diplomatic relations. Yet, only a third of the states actually severed relations. It became obvious that the Council had overstepped its boundaries, and the Council for a time no longer enjoyed the same freedom it had previously.101

Comission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration

The Heads of States recognized that it was necessary to have a venue for settling disputes that arose between the independent states. Article XIX states that the member states pledge to create the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, consisting of 21 members elected by the Assembly for a period of five years and eligible for reelection.102

The Commission’s jurisdiction was limited to disputes between member states. Because the Heads of State would not accept any proposal that potentially infringed on their personal realm, it interpreted the Charter rather narrowly, keeping a broad area of responsibility to the Heads of State itself. In particular, there was no question of human rights considered in the jurisdiction of the special commission.

Once the jurisdiction of the Commission was understood, the protocol for determining the type of settlement was determined. The Protocol stated that the member states should “reframe from any act or omission that is likely to aggravate a

100 Ibid. pg. 166.
101 Ibid.
102 Charter.
situation”. The members of the Commission were given diplomatic privileges and immunities, and were authorized to conduct investigations or inquiries as they saw fit.

Arbitration quickly became the preferred mode of settlement. The procedure was that each party selected one member of the Committee, and then the two chose a third. None of the arbitrators could be nationals of the parties involved, and no two arbitrators could be from the same country. A basic document called the compromis was set forth, which gave the particulars of the case, and provided that the parties would accept the tribunal’s decision as legally binding. Woronoff notes that “The more juridical and formal nature of arbitration was essential as a guarantee to the states of a just decision, based on law, since this was the only mode of settlement that was directly binding without their approval”. Yet, because the Charter did not allow for the expulsion of a member for failure to implement a ruling, there was little the organization could do to force the execution of an order.

The establishment of the Commission was seen as significant for two reasons. First, it meant that there was a protocol for the conflicts that were bound to arise between two member states, especially because of the imaginary borders created by the Western world. Secondly, there was a special significance given to the fact that for the first time, Africa had its own legal body. International law had a high level of distrust in Africa, as it was frequently used as a venue for colonialism. As a result, African states were no longer willing to bring their differences to what was considered a portion of neocolonialism.

103 Charter.
104 Woronoff. pg. 179.
Even with the African Commission, it was not clear whether states would be willing to give up sovereignty enough in order to permit the Commission to function. Despite the commitment to peaceful settlement, it does not mean that the states would prefer the Commission to more direct means or negotiations through a third party state. Because few states were willing to accept a general clause of compulsory jurisdiction, the Commission faced clear structural problems. Unless the binding mode of arbitration was selected, which it rarely was, the lengthy proceedings and proposed solutions could simply be rejected, with no final settled reached. As a result, the Commission was largely decorative, instead of an effective means in which to settle disputes.106

The Secretariat

The General Secretariat was the last of the principal institutions envisioned in the Charter. It was one of the most significant as it was the only body with a permanent membership and structure. The Charter was relatively vague about the structure of the Secretariat. Article XVIII stipulated that officials and civil servants were to have one allegiance, to the OAU. It reads that the personnel of the OAU “shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization”.107 Likewise, the Charter requires member states to pledge not to influence Secretariat members so that they can most effectively do their work.

106 Amate, pg. 154-156.
107 Charter.
Fearful of the potential power of the Secretariat, the Heads of States limited the power of the Secretary-General, and generally the role of the Secretariat. Looking at other international organizations, such as the UN, the African states feared that the Secretary-General could overshadow the potential legitimacy gained by being the official from a singular state.\textsuperscript{108}

The Foreign Ministers revised the Ethiopian draft to further reduce the stature of the Security-General. The only avenue for direct influence on decisions had been to participate in deliberations of the Organization without a vote, was deleted. The Secretariat was very clearly envisioned as an administrative function. As directed through the Functions and Regulations document written by the Council, the Secretary-General and four Assistants were appointed by the Assembly for a period of four years. The Secretary-General function was to direct the activities of the General Secretariat.\textsuperscript{109}

The rest of the Secretariat was composed of professionals and general categories needed to fulfill the administrative responsibilities of the Organization. Considerable care was given to providing a geographical and political diversity when filling the posts. They were divided into three departments: The Political, Legal and Defense Department, the Economic and Social Department and the Administrative, Conference and Information Department.

Since most of the activity of the Organization took place through conferences and meetings, it was the Secretariat's responsibility to effectively coordinate, conduct and follow up the conferences. It was responsible for preparing the agenda, including

\textsuperscript{108} Woronoff. pg. 185-186.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid. pg. 186.
drawing up the studies and papers. Translation and interpretation, taking of records and providing the materials were necessary during the conferences. The most important of the documents prepared was the annual report on the activities of the Organization, in which the Secretariat would analyze and evaluate the work of the OAU and its bodies.\textsuperscript{110}

\textbf{Responsibilities of the OAU}

The formation of the OAU represented a new pattern in African alignment. Competing regionalisms had characterized African politics since independence. The advent of the OAU represented the high hopes of African politicians that the colonial legacy could be left behind, with the dissolution of the blocs. As a result, the conference came to the agreement that the OAU should play the role as the only institution of political cooperation on the continental level.\textsuperscript{111} As a result, all rival groups were to be dissolved, marking the formal end of the Casablanca-Brazzaville divide.

The organization was not envisioned as the only organization on the continent. Instead, the OAU was supposed to be a supreme political authority in which to coordinate the localized efforts to ensure compatibility and unity of effort. This is not surprising considering the nature of nationalist efforts at that point was primarily on the local level. In the end, however, the charter did not include any provisions to ensure this function. Because of fears of on sovereignty, the OAU was given no

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
supervisory powers nor were other organizations required to consult with it or even inform it of their decisions.\textsuperscript{112}

The development of the OAU had two intended benefits to the nations involved. The first was that the OAU marked the culmination of pan-African ideals, and the institutionalization of shared African goals in the foreign policy arena. Similarly, it marked the reduction of transaction costs in relations outside of Africa, as states made the decision to form a Pan-African alliance in the United Nations. As Krasner argues, the new regime was an arena in which African states could gain power as weak states together, which would further enhance their international prestige.\textsuperscript{113}

At the same time, whether the OAU would be an effective voice for all of Africa was yet to be seen. Despite a clear political accomplishment, many questioned whether the structure created was capable of creating an institution with large responsibilities. As Walraven argues, “With its strong emphasis on sovereignty, non-interference, territorial integrity and national independence, the Charter principally represented a consolidation of Africa’s political status quo… No country… preferred a supra-national formula to the weak regime that had now been founded”.\textsuperscript{114} Why then was the OAU founded, if it was intended to be a weak mirror of the current state of political affairs?

\textit{Factors in the formation of the OAU}

\textsuperscript{113} Krasner.
\textsuperscript{114} Walraven. pg. 148.
Decolonization remained the main rallying point for political leaders at the Addis Ababa conference. The heads of states had been adamant at the restructuring of international power relations, while criticizing the role of the West in Southern Africa. Despite these radical positions, the OAU Charter was surprisingly moderate on issues regarding the West’s influence in Africa. The resolutions on economics, aid and disarmament took a very reformist approach to the affairs. As Walraven argues, “The doctrine of African unity as such did not elicit an a priori negative Western response, as all depended on the objective of such unity. Thus, French policy did not oppose regional regroupments, while the Americans favored a continental structure similar to the OAU on the condition that it contributed to stability and development”. ¹¹⁵ Western influences proved to be a powerful motivator during the formation of the OAU. It played a large role in creating the moderate organization, as noted by the behavior of the Brazzaville players.

Relations between the African states themselves, and their continued dependence on the Western world of economic stability also played a role in the moderate aims of the organization. As Snidal argues, hegemonic stability theory predicts that absent a regional leader, collective action proves far more difficult and ambitious when states are small and numerous.¹¹⁶ The plurality of issues that were brought to the attention of the Organization economically, because of the nature of external dependence, were numerous and caused by different patterns of external dependence. Coupled with the absence of a hegemonic leader, the OAU lacked consensus and focus early on, further reducing its effectiveness from the start.

¹¹⁵ Ibid. pg. 149.
The ideology of the OAU has traditionally been understood as the culmination of pan-African ideals. Despite that, no OAU official or African diplomat claimed after its formation that Pan-Africanism had formed the ideological basis of the charter. The OAU charter formed an important ideological compromise. Both the militant federalists and the moderate-conservative reformists saw several of their goals included in the Charter. References to unity and solidarity, and the eradication of colonialism appealed to former Casablanca states given the prominence of political and diplomatic cooperation and a commitment to defense and non-alignment of the continent. At the same time, the compromise clearly favored the moderate-conservatives of the continent. The concept of neocolonialism did not appear in the document. Disarmament and economic cooperation sections did not denounce alliances between former colonizers and the new African states.117

Two important political events immediately prior to the OAU’s creation played a role in altering the shape of the organization. The first was the assassination of Togo’s first president, Sylvanus Olympio in January 1963. Some of the moderate African leaders were highly suspicious of the role that Nkrumah played in Olympio’s death. This had the effect of not only slowing down Nkrumah’s campaign for a radical federal state, but also of enhancing leader’s fears of political assassinations, causing the radical position on state sovereignty.118

The second event was the emerging rivalry between Nigeria and Ghana. Fearing the transformation of competing sub-regional blocs turned into an obsession for protection from potential regional subversion. Makinda notes that “at the creation

117 M’buyinga. pg. 42.
118 Walraven. Pg. 56.
of the OAU, two issues exercised the minds of its founders: power struggles and the fear of political uncertainty…the OAU subsequently sought to preserve at least three issues: state boundaries that had been established by colonialism; the territorial integrity and sovereignty of each state; and heads of state who felt threatened not just by internal insurgencies, but also by legitimate opposition groups”. 119 As a result, the OAU quickly became dubbed the “dictators club” by the Western media, seen as an institution used to preserve the political power of potentially undeserving heads of state.

**Omnibalancing**

How does one explain the creation of the OAU, especially at a period of time in which leaders needed to create a political and economic apparatus at home? How did a sense of community on the continental level precede the building of a nation in the domestic realm?

The creation of the OAU fulfills several of the requirements of omnibalancing. First, the placement of the international spokesman of the country creates a sense of legitimacy on the domestic level for the leader. Leaders like Haile Selassie and President Nkrumah were able to use their influence on the international sphere as a rallying point for domestic support at home. Additionally, the international arena provided them the unique opportunity to campaign on accomplishments of the organization. Leaders were able to use the flag of pan-Africanism in order to help facilitate a unity of community groups at home. Because the colonial structure had pitted societal groups against one another, it was the new political leaders task to

---

promote unity. Using pan-Africanism and the propaganda of the OAU was an easy way in which domestic leaders could do that.

Secondly, the OAU allowed leaders to counter potential international threats from playing a role in domestic arena. Because the OAU was so firmly committed to non-intervention and domestic sovereignty, it allowed for an institutionalized mirror of the status quo in 1963. Dictators were able to use extreme forms of political oppression against their own people with no fear of external intervention through the rules set by the OAU. Examples of this would include Mobutu’s Zaire and Idi Amin’s Uganda. Even of as late as the Rwandan genocide, the OAU was crippled jurisdictionally to intervene.

**History and Downfall of the OAU**

For the purpose of this paper, a survey of the history of the OAU cannot be looked at in full detail. An overview of the life and important historical events that the OAU took place in will be discussed in order to look at the ideology of the organization as a whole, the problems, structurally and ideologically, that played a role in OAU politics, and the OAU’s political impact on African politics. A look at the main factors in the downfall of the OAU and how they contributed to the creation of the AU will be focused on.

**Competing Regionalisms**

The first problem the OAU faced was that structurally it was given no power in which to understand its relationship with other regional organizations. As Woronoff puts it, “It would be nice to think of the continent as a solar system in which the Organization of African Unity was the sun and the others dutifully
revolved around it. But this is not the case, and the sub-regional bodies follow no fixed path as compared with the OAU; there have been many collisions and eclipses, and the force of gravity is frequently defied.⁵¹²

As a result, the first battle the OAU waged turned out to be one of its most significant. The Charter had left it unclear as to what the regional structures that predated it were to do after its creation. For the most part, the important structures, such as the Monrovia and Casablanca blocs, did dissolve almost immediately afterwards. The Brazzaville bloc refused to do so, instead holding a meeting of its members immediately preceding the first regularly scheduled meeting of the Council of Ministers in Dakar in August, 1963. While the Brazzaville group made the decision to cease as a “political” organization at their meeting in Cotonou, they also used it as an opportunity to expand their membership by including Togo. This sent a signal that they had no intention of dissolving its existence.⁵¹¹ The Brazzaville group renamed themselves the Union Africaine et Malgache (UAM).

As a result, the ex-Casablanca states were furious. The Algerians wrote, “The most important subject discussed at Dakar was that of regional groupings. One would have hoped that, with the creation of the OAU, all regional groupings would disappear, or submit themselves strictly to the authority of the OAU”.⁵¹²

At Dakar, the continued existence of the UAM was more or less legitimated. The political pressure against the UAM was still strong, yet by 1965, the elements had aligned to recreate the UAM under a new title of Organizations Communue

---

⁵¹¹ Franke.
Africain et Malgache (OCAM). OCAM continued to grow in prestige and members over the years until 1970 when the political agenda of the group became more extensive than that of the OAU. As Wallerstein puts it, “The continued existence of OCAM and its implicit ability to go it alone outside of the OAU has served as a major political constraint on the OAU”. 123

The continued existence of competing blocs of states was also apparent in the selection of the first Secretary-General. Despite the positions relatively weak role, the selection of the first SG was seen as very symbolically important, as he would shape the Organization and hopefully bring coherence to bring the staff as a team. The hope was for a unanimous decision, but it was dashed when the UAM presented their own candidate to run against Guinea’s permanent representative to the United Nations, Diallo Telli. This was a political move on the part of the UAM to undermine any potential influence the more radical bloc had in OAU affairs. The first vote ended in a tie, but with substantial effort, the needed two-thirds majority was finally attained in favor of Diallo Telli. 124

Liberation and Colonialism

The second main issue is that the African organization had no real mechanism for how to function as an agency for African liberation. The original purpose of the OAU, especially as seen by the Casablanca states, was to help attain independence for the entire continent. As Mathews points out, “the liberation and decolonization of Africa, particularly southern Africa, has been the central theme and perhaps the only

---

124 Franke.
force that has kept the OAU united”.\textsuperscript{125} As a result, the primary area of interest was Southern Africa, seeking to gain independence for the Belgian and English colonies of the area.

Upon the creation of the OAU, a committee for the liberation of Africa was created (ALC), with the purpose of coordinating military and political aid to liberation movements in the south of Africa. Two phases of the struggle against “all forms of colonialism” were accepted.\textsuperscript{126} The first, the anti-colonial and anti-racial phase was the struggle against the remaining European colonial rule in Africa. The second, was the anti-neo-colonialism phase which struggled against the new forms of continued domination and exploitation of Africans by imperialist countries. The first phase was the primary target by the OAU. The concept of non-alignment allowed the OAU to disregard the second phase, which meant the Organization did very little to help stave off new forms of exploitation from the Western World.\textsuperscript{127}

From almost the beginning, the ALC accepted that force was inevitable in Portugese Africa and South Africa. There was hope that Southern Rhodesia could be decolonized through international pressure on the United Kingdom from the African Commonwealth states. It hoped that Southern Rhodesian independence, coupled with a world court decision in favor of independence in Southwest Africa, would isolate the Portugese and apartheid South Africa enough to favor liberation from white colonialism.

Instead, Ian Smith and the Rhodesian white minority held firm and declared unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in 1965. At the same time, the OAU

\textsuperscript{125} Mathews. pg. 63.
\textsuperscript{126} Charter.
\textsuperscript{127} Mathews. pg. 64.
was facing heavy amounts of internal conflict as Nkrumah’s Ghana and several of the OCAM states began to butt heads on the best way in which to achieve independence, negotiation or conflict. The Council advised totally barring relations with Britain, which caused a major fiasco between the Assembly and the Council, with two thirds of members refusing to follow the plans.\(^{128}\)

The debate over dialogue versus armed struggle continued throughout the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. In 1969, the Lusaka Manifesto was adopted that agreed that resistance movements use peaceful methods, even if it meant a long timeframe for liberation. It was an attempt to pacify the moderate members, particularly the UAM, of the Organization. Opinions quickly began to turn as the conflict continued, and in 1971 the OAU adopted the Mogadishu Declaration.

Even in its struggle against apartheid in Africa, the OAU could not mobilize members in favor of its decision. On the same day that the Council had voted in favor of a boycott of South Africa, Malawi formally recognized the state. When Zambia called for an exclusion of Malawi from the OAU, it went unheeded, because of lack of political support, but also because there was no formal mechanism for expulsion. South Africa, while politically isolated from the continent, was able to maintain ties with colonial and Western powers in order to enhance its economy. This resulted in the economy of South Africa becoming the most developed on the continent,

eliminating the incentive for African nations to refuse to economically collaborate with the apartheid government.\textsuperscript{129}

It would not be fair to characterize the entirety of the efforts made by the OAU in favor of liberation as a failure. The OAU provided six main forms of assistance for the grassroots national liberation movements. First, it gave ideological support. Not a single OAU member has ever supported a movement in favor of colonial oppression. This meant that even the most radical of states in Africa could seek and find allies on the rallying point against colonialism. Secondly, they provided diplomatic support through international forums like the UN. Third, material support for the military and humanitarian aid for the civilians was provided through the Liberation Committee’s budget. Despite members often defaulting on paying their share of the budget, there has always been a core of supporters whose contributions were large enough to allow for the continuation of the struggle. Most importantly, the OAU offered unity within the liberation movements. Liberation movements reflected the society it was a result of, which was often fragmented, with competing nationalisms and visions. The OAU has been relatively successful at uniting differing forces against the common enemy of imperialism. For example, in Zimbabwe, the formation of the Patriotic Front (PF) in 1976, a unification of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) was further strengthened by the formal recognition and support extended to it by the OAU. This

was a crucial step in the development of the struggle that resulted in independence in April, 1980.130

*Maintenance of Peace in Africa*

The concept of domestic non-intervention allowed for the replication of the politics of the status quo. Because the organization had been created at such a pivotal time for the African states, the political and economic structure of the continent was still very much in flux. It cannot be forgotten that the OAU is a collection of some of the poorest, politically and socially fragmented nations in the world, faced with a globalized world of nations that had industrialized a century ago.

The OAU was seen purely as an instrument for conflict resolution amongst member states. The OAU was given no power to take collective measures against any one member or against an outside aggressor. Inevitably, the nation’s decision-making is affected by the fact that imperialism is still obviously present on the continent, especially because most of the aid coming into the continent is coming from external sources. After the colonizers had lost its influence on the continent, the Cold War crept in. The United States and the Soviet Union sought to influence the newly created nations as prime breeding grounds for their own particular ideology. Mathews argues that “penetration by superpowers is itself one of the most serious causes of division among African countries, but one has to emphasize here that such penetration is also a product of African economic backwardness and military weakness”.131

130 Mathews. pg 69.
131 Ibid. pg. 62.
At the formation of the OAU, Article II called for member states to coordinate and harmonize their policies regarding defense and security, and provides the mechanism to create a defense Commission. This was never followed up with a Defense Treaty, like the Arab League Collective Security Pact of 1950, following the establishment of the Arab League.\(^{132}\) As a result, there was no provision compelling member states to come to a collective security decision, or to legally obligate member states to come to the assistance of other members in the event of aggression.\(^{133}\)

The OAU attempted to create its military wing with the creation of the African Defense Organization (ADO). The ADO had two sessions in 1964 and 1965, with nothing substantial coming out of the attempts. There was an attempt in 1970 on the Councils part to reactivate the ADO with a new composition of defense ministers with a new function of “concentrating on the growing threat from Southern Africa”.\(^{134}\) For the most part, the attempt never materialized because of the inherent military weakness of most African states, and their dependence on outside sources for military aid. Ultimately, it was decided in 1978, that the creation of a Pan-African Defense force was unappealing to most member states. Possible problems included logistics, standardization of weapons and training programs, language barriers and ideological differences among African states.\(^{135}\)

Even the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration was not preferred as a mode in which to solve intra-African conflicts. Because the process meant preferring an institution with cross-border jurisdiction, political approaches

\(^{132}\) Mathews. pg. 66.
\(^{134}\) Woronoff. *Organizing African Unity*.
\(^{135}\) Mathews. pg. 66.
were preferred by most states. As a result, the Commission became inactive to the point that there were attempts to abolish it, because most conflicts have been undertaken by the two major bodies of the Organization.¹³⁶

The record of the OAU on intra-African disputes was initially promising. Mathews notes that the Organization arranged “a cease-fire in the Algerian-Moroccan border dispute in 1963, to replace British with African troops in Tanzania after the army mutiny in that country in 1964, and even to improve relations between Ghana and its neighbors on the issue of subversion in 1965”.¹³⁷

In the late 1960’s and early 70’s, the OAU began to take a sidelines approach to intra-African conflicts, allowing regional and Western powers, coupled with help from the UN, to take the lead role. The Organization played no role in domestic conflicts and in most intra-African disputes. It was notably ineffective in the Somali-Ethiopian and Ugandan-Tanzanian wars, because the Organization had not clarified its own ideology enough to take on the Cold War states. The Somali-Ethiopian conflict is a good example of a symptom of a much larger problem in Africa, namely the vulnerability of the continent to outside pressures and imperialist demands.¹³⁸

The achievement of political independence was clearly a major step towards African independence in the global world. With the withdrawal of colonial powers from Africa and the creation of independent African states, the Cold War began to creep into the newly independent nations as the primary recruiting grounds for the ideologies of either the USSR or the United States.

¹³⁶ Ibid. pg. 67.
¹³⁷ Ibid.
¹³⁸ For a full list of the major intra-African conflicts and the role of the OAU from the period of 1963-1981 see Appendix 2.
As a result, intra-African state conflicts are more than they appear. The superpower rivalry in Africa has taken on many overt and covert functions, ranging from the deployment of Moroccan troops to squash the Shaba rebellion as a covert proxy intervention, to the use of Cuban troops to squash democratic aspirations in Eritrea and Ethiopia. The OAU had very little leverage in this regard to prevent superpower influence, as there was no state that was not equally guilty of taking outside aid.\textsuperscript{139}

\textit{Economic Integration}

When the OAU was founded, the political approach to unity had been rejected, in favor of an economic grouping, which Nyerere had considered the stepping stones towards African unity. Article II of the Charter makes it the duty of members to “coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa” and to “cooperate in the fields of transport, communications, health, sanitation and nutrition as well as science and technology”.\textsuperscript{140}

Despite this commitment, the nations of Africa have seen very little results. Why then has economic integration failed? The first generation of economic integration failed in the OAU context and elsewhere for a variety of reasons. First, attempts at economic integration were generally legacies of the past. The OAU and other organizations, such as the East African Community, used old development theories and structures in order to facilitate growth. As a result, the Organization encouraged the adoption of industrialization through high levels of

\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{140} Charter.
protectionism. Close markets in state-run economies developed through the financing by official development assistance (ODA). 141

Similarly, the Organization preferred an aid model that was imposed from the Western world. As Percy Mistry argues, the model failed because it was “(a) anti-market- the market being seen by governments and publics as synonymous with inequity, capitalism and colonialism; (b) anti-private sector and anti-property rights; and (c) anti-foreign investment, except perhaps in the minerals and hydro-carbon resource sectors. The emphasis on pervasive state intervention and the implicit belief in the omnipotence and benignity of the state proved to be a formula for large-scale economic failure”. 142 Yet, because the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) predated the OAU’s establishment by almost five years, the OAU generally adopted a policy of leaving it up to the ECA.

Also, the OAU lacked the expertise and training necessary to compete with the ECA. In the initial period of its formation, the OAU and the ECA did major initiatives together, but eventually tended to follow the ECA’s lead on important economic decisions like the New International Economic Order discussions. 143

Third, despite the hope for the Organization to be seen as a political and economic union, most leaders saw it mainly as a political collaboration. The OAU was able to survive largely because of consensus across the continent on decolonization and apartheid, not because of any economic bond. Because unity of

141 Mathews.
143 Makinda and Okumu. pg. 26.
the organization was the top priority, economic integration was put on the backburner because it did not encourage consensus.\textsuperscript{144}

Fourth, African governments failed to translate their commitments from treaties and summits to any sort of substantive changes in national policies or legislation. Because there was no follow through mechanism for the OAU, most trade or economic policy agreements went largely unenforced. Because African governments were unwilling to prioritize long-term regional economic goals over national political interests, economic integration was rarely put on the agenda. Because economic integration meant a potential for a loss of elements of sovereignty, it was outside the OAU’s jurisdiction to allow for such policies. As noted in Chapter 1, because political leaders were dealing with a constant pressure from domestic rivals, short term economic failure, or loss of individual wealth, was not an option.

The colonial legacy and the imaginary boundaries of the continent meant that political instability was endemic across the continent. Because there was conflict in every sub-region of Africa, it prevented continental unity on economic issues, as security issues took precedence. The colonial legacy also meant that there was a high level of fear markets, private enterprise and foreign investment. As a result, Africa was unwilling to yield to the growing pressures of globalization and became very susceptible to market whims.\textsuperscript{145}

Externally derived development models often took very little regional interests in mind. The method of structural adjustment programs (SAP) were nationally based and did not take into account regional costs and benefits. Because

\textsuperscript{144} Wallerstein.\textit{The Role of the Organization of African Unity in Contemporary African Politics}, pg. 25.
\textsuperscript{145} Mistry.
they were driven to produce short term results, and economic integration is a long term progress, the SAP programs were often tailored to the detriment of regional economic communities. As a result, regional trends were not considered, which caused less effective and timely changes.¹⁴⁶

Lastly, The OAU co-existed with a large number of Regional Economic Communities (REC), including the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and others. These organizations helped to preserve the identity of a specific region, which did not favor economic integration on the continental level. Moreover, because the UN Charter allowed REC’s to directly lobby the UN without mediation from the OAU, REC’s tended to act independently.¹⁴⁷

Experience has shown that despite the political rhetoric in favor of economic integration, the OAU has been unsuccessful at garnering economic integration. The political will to make adjustments and to translate rhetoric into unpopular economic programs is not prevalent in Africa. The ideological differences have made economic cooperation between socialist and capitalist countries almost impossible.

**Conclusion**

Despite the Organizations broad goals and substantial steps towards ensuring African coordination, there were some very clear structural and ideological problems that prevented the OAU from ever fully becoming the dream that its founders had hoped. The principle of domestic sovereignty and the lack of enforcement

---

¹⁴⁶ Clapham.
¹⁴⁷ Makinda and Okumu. pg. 24.
mechanisms prevented the OAU from taking any real stance, especially when faced with a stronger and better funded superpower intervention in the continent.

With the end of the Cold War, and the spread of democracy throughout the continent, a movement began towards to revitalization of the pan-African legacy that leaders like Nkrumah and Nyerere had hope that the OAU would be. Chapter 4 will look at the creation of the African Union, the factors and transition that were at play in its creation, and the political outlook for the new continental organization.
Chapter 4- The Birth of the African Union

Introduction

Following the end of the Cold War, the African continent experienced a period of transition. A wave of democratization swept across the continent, lead by the end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994. As a result, African political leaders began to rethink the potential for a new continental organization. Commey notes that “the end of the Cold War, globalization and the need for a fundamental change of the iniquitous international economic system” combined to press for the recreation of an institution that was similar to Nkrumah’s original vision. 148

This chapter will examine the factors that led to the transformation of the OAU into the AU. This will include a discussion of the changing political atmosphere that allowed for the political leaders of South Africa, Nigeria and Libya to push the continent forward toward cooperation. The first section of the chapter will look at legacies of the OAU in the 1990’s and the post-Cold War political climate that allowed for the momentum to change the international organization. The second section will examine the stated objectives and principles of the AU, comparing it to the original purposes of the OAU. The third section will look at the AU’s organs and structure, contrasting them with those of the OAU and evaluating their potential to remedy the problems associated with the OAU.

OAU Legacy and a Culture of Change

By the early 1990’s, the end of the Cold War and the resulting removal of superpower support coupled with the increased economic challenges facing of the continent as a result of globalization compelled African leaders revisit the structural

weaknesses of the OAU. At the same time, it became increasingly evident that the
West and the UN Security Council were no longer interested in continuing to fund the
African political apparatus, with the failure of structural adjustment programs.\textsuperscript{149} As a
result, the African continent was faced with a debt crisis, in a time of slow world
economic growth. It soon became evident that economic integration was a
prerequisite to dealing with the problems plaguing the continent. In 1980, the OAU
had launched the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA). It served as the blueprint for the
structure of real economic independence for Africa and the precursor to economic
integration to come, yet made no immediate changes to the economic system.\textsuperscript{150}

In the OAU Summit of 1990, the political leaders came together and made the
declaration on the “Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the
Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World” which provided a framework in
which African leaders renewed their pledge to cooperate with each other to quickly
and peacefully end conflicts. The pledge sought to address the major factors that
should guide Africa’s economic goals, mainly changing East-West relations, the
socioeconomic and political changes happening in Eastern Europe and the move
towards a monetary union in Western Europe.\textsuperscript{151} This pledge culminated in the Cairo

\textsuperscript{149} See the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa (1980) available online at
\url{www.uneco/adfii}. For more information about economic integration in the 1980’s see Adebayo Adedeji
\textit{History and Prospects for Regional Integration in Africa} available at
\url{http://www.uneca.org/eca_resources/Speeches/2002_speeches/030502adebayo.htm}. The purpose of the
LPA was self-sustaining development and economic growth. The LPA divided the continent into three
main regions- West Africa, Central Africa and East/Southern Africa and envisioned that these
groupings could serve as building blocks for a larger economic community by 2000.

\textsuperscript{151} Udombana. "A Harmony or a Cacophony? The Music of Integration in the African Union Treaty
Declaration of 1993 that established the OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.152

At the same time, the OAU summit in Abuja in 1991 started the process of establishing an agreement for economic integration, as a continuation of LPA. The treaty, which entered into force in May 1994, gave a 34 year timeframe and a detailed six stage process for the creation of the African Economic Community (AEC).153 African nations realized that in face of large scale trading blocs in the global economies, integration movements could give them more clout with the other groupings such as the European Union (EU) or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).154 Green and Seidman argue that,

“No African state is economically large enough to construct a modern economy alone. Africa as a whole has the resources for industrialization, but it is split among more than forty African territories. Africa as a whole could provide markets able to support large scale efficient industrial complexes; no sub-regional economic union can do so”.155

As the process to create an AEC continued, however, it became increasingly evident that the institutional structure of the OAU was not adequate in order to overcome the problems faced by globalization. These changes in the economic workings of the Organization reflect the transitional period between the forces of interdependence and omnibalancing. A growing need to deal with transnational interactions plus the spread

152 Makinda and Okumu. pg. 29.
153 For more information about the specifics of the African economic integration attempts in the early 1990’s see Kwaku Danso “The African Economic Community: problems and prospects” Africa Today 42, 4 (1995), pp. 31-55 or N. Udombana’s “A Harmony or a Cacophony? The Music of Integration in the African Union Treaty” Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 13, 2002. Especially notable in the context of this paper was that a wide variety of factors such as differing stages of development across the continent, lack of a common currency, continued presence of former colonial powers, the debt crisis and the weakness of the OAU inhibited implementation.
of liberal political values in the early 90’s facilitated the movement towards an
African economic community. At the time of the Lagos Plan, the OAU was not able
to create a community as most domestic leaders were still nationally focused, hoping
to develop through the aid of the IMF and the UN. The individual state focused policy
is a reflection of omnibalancing, as it allowed domestic leaders to campaign on
improved development. Structural adjustment was a doubled edge sword, as it also
meant a privatization of some key economic industries, which allowed for
transnational actors to have a growing presence in the political life of Africa.

Three leaders emerged in the process as key political figures in the creation of
the African Union. Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi went through a process of rediscovery
of Pan-African ideals as a way to place Libya back into the good graces of the
African political community. Olusegun Obasanjo, a former military leader and the
first democratically elected leader of Nigeria, attempted to recreate the African Union
in order to increase his country’s prestige in the continent’s political and economic
arenas. Lastly, South Africa’s Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki attempted to renew
South Africa’s commitment to the African Union as a way to continue his African
renaissance and to encourage foreign investment into the economies of the African
states.

South African Foreign Policy: The African Renaissance and NEPAD

Until 1994, South African foreign policy had been dominated by the
protection of its authoritarian apartheid political system. As a result, South Africa was
labeled an international pariah within and beyond the African continent, leading to
diplomatic isolation from the rest of the continent. In 1994, Nelson Mandela became
the first post-apartheid democratically elected president of South Africa. Since then, policymakers have attempted to transform South Africa’s foreign policy apparatus in order to improve South Africa’s image in the international arena. South Africa constitutes an interesting case study of foreign policy adaptation in the post-Cold War era. Looking at South Africa as regional superpower is particularly helpful when discussing its leadership in the creation of the African Union. As the most industrialized economy on the continent, it also has the largest and best trained military, so it is in a unique position to assume the role of a regional superpower and shape the trends of the continent.156

When Mandela took power, he had a clear vision that the end of the Cold War and the subsequent spread of neo-liberal ideas had made the radical socialist ideology of his African National Congress (ANC) party unattractive to foreign investment. Because of the challenges of globalization, Mandela had to recreate the image of South African politics. He began by internally reforming the philosophies and priorities of the ANC away from traditional populist and socialist economic ideas, a legacy of the reaction to apartheid, to a more liberal capitalist platform. At the same time, through a series of public speeches and publications, Mandela signaled a new foreign policy of South Africa based upon liberal internationalism. The hope was that South Africa could become a destination for foreign investment and a global trading state157. Because of Africa’s poor economic record, especially with regard to poor

156 Hentz. pg. 8.
performance in the protection of property rights, the ANC sought to find an effective way in which to improve the image of the continent as a whole.\footnote{Ibid.}

Mandela’s positions were met with resistance, creating divisions within the ANC. As a result, when Thabo Mbeki took power in 1999, he was forced to take on the divisions between the populist remnants of the ANC, the liberal internationalists, and the pragmatists, who thought that South Africa’s foreign policy should be driven by state interests instead of ideological principles.\footnote{Tieku. pg. 254} Mbeki prioritized the promotion of a coherent foreign policy favoring liberal internationalism. It was intended to signal to the international business community that he was committed to the creation of South Africa as a favorable location for investment. As a part of this commitment, Mbeki made the promotion of democracy a key aspect of South African foreign policy interests, which was consistent with ANC’s efforts to change South Africa’s image post-apartheid.\footnote{Ahluwalia. "The Struggle for African Identity: Thabo Mbeki's African Renaissance", \textit{African and Asian Studies} \textbf{1}:4, 2002. pg. 273.}

In response to South Africa’s commitment to liberal norms and Mbeki’s open condemnation of undemocratic governments in Africa, some African leaders accused South Africa of favoring the West over their African neighbors, many of whom had supported the ANC in their fight against apartheid. Mbeki countered by launching a liberal agenda within a continental framework in order to encourage good relations with the neighboring states, called his “African Renaissance.” Ahluwalia notes that “it is aimed at ending the marginalization of Africa whilst at the same time staking a
Mbeki’s African Renaissance had two goals. First, it aimed to conclude the work started by earlier Pan-African movements. Nkrumah’s mission had gone unfinished, as the legacy of colonialism had tainted his vision. As a result, the African Renaissance attempted to reunite feuding African states under a new banner, with South Africa leading the way. The underlying foreign policy objective was to stress the centrality of the development of the African continent in South African policy, with South Africa playing the critical role of intermediary between the continent and the Western powers. Secondly, it attempted to increase Africa’s international political capital by showing a commitment to the democratic values and norms that are viewed as a prerequisite to drawing international investment. A commitment to democracy promotion and human rights had gathered strength throughout Africa at the end of the Cold War. At the same time, many leaders were still uneasy about the potential for a clash between a commitment to human rights and the principle of sovereignty. Schraeder notes that “the Mandela’s Administration’s joint undertaking with Botswana of a military intervention in Lesotho in 1998 to restore democratic rule suggests an expensive interpretation of what means can be employed to promote democratic values and human rights”. South Africa’s commitment represents the changing tide away from the sovereign domestic rights reflected in omnibalancing and towards further integration.

---

161 Ibid. pg. 273.
162 Tieku.
Mbeki also embarked on a radical project of economic integration in order to satisfy some of the concerns that had led to opposition to Nkumah’s project in the 1960’s. Mbeki started the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), an organization committed to neo-liberal economic policies. This was a reflection of South Africa’s willingness to adopt an economic model of free trade and investment, and its commitment to invest in the improvement of conditions to facilitate growth.\textsuperscript{164} NEPAD’s main objective is to encourage African development by bridging gaps between the continent and the developed world.\textsuperscript{165} South Africa’s support for the creation of the institution is a continuation of their commitment to bring neoliberal values to the continent’s economic institutions.

NEPAD was continuation of the New African Initiative, endorsed by the OAU in July 2001. NEPAD pledged to “eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and, at the same time, to participate actively in the world economy”.\textsuperscript{166} NEPAD serves to fill in the gaps for future development, as a couple organization with the OAU/AU. The primary goal is to encourage an alternative to foreign aid in order to solve Africa’s economic woes. To achieve this ambitious goal, the organization encourages good governance, innovation in the use of natural resources, and the encouragement of economic integration through the harmonizing of AU economic policies and the development of coordination between RECs.\textsuperscript{167}

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid. pg. 233.
\textsuperscript{165} Udombana. pg. 214.
\textsuperscript{167} Udombana, pg. 215-216.
South African foreign policy has been dramatically shaped by the process of
democratization. Normally understood in terms of its impact on domestic politics, the
leaders of South Africa attempted to apply this process to the international arena. In
the OAU context, Mbeki viewed democracy promotion as a core mission of the
institution. Two liberal democratic reforms were at the heart of Mbeki’s proposed
changes. The first reform would exclude states from the OAU whose governments
came to power through unconstitutional means clearly signaling to the Western world
Africa’s renewed commitment to democratic norms. The second called upon the
OAU member states to assist military regimes in their transition to a democratic
system of government.\textsuperscript{168} Mbeki found unlikely support in the form of Nigeria’s
president Olusegun Obasanjo, a former military leader and first democratically
elected leader.

\textit{Obasanjo’s Reform Package and the Creation of the AU}

Obasanjo had led an effort for a reform package beginning in the early 1990’s.
Originally, he organized a coordination of non-governmental organizations to develop
a new vision for Africa. Among other ideas, the meeting suggested that it might be
helpful to develop an institutional mechanism mirrored from the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to deal with post-Cold War issues.\textsuperscript{169} In
November, 1990, discussions began with the OAU as to how best create an
organization like OSCE for Africa, in consultation with civil society groups, African
intellectuals and business elites. The outcome was a new document called the

\textsuperscript{168} Tieku. pg. 255.
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid. pg. 258.

The CSSDCA reforms attempted to assess the behavior of African leaders on four main areas—security, stability, development and cooperation. It attempted to harmonize the standards of behavior of African leaders for the common good. On security, it attempted to transform the concept beyond a traditional military challenges to include the economic, political and social aspects of society more applicable to security in the developing world. This is a reflection of the changing view of world politics, as predicted by Keohane and Nye, that in the post-Cold War era and given the prevalence of democratization, issues regarding economic interconnectedness and humanitarian concerns would be included on the agenda of international forums at the same time as military concerns. The document reads, “the concept of security must embrace all aspects of society… the security of a nation must be based on the security of the life of the individual citizens to live in peace and to satisfy basic needs”. It also urged the African states to view security of member states as interdependent, and to thus focus on the security of the region. This implies that security is a collective responsibility but also suggests a radical new view of state sovereignty that is reiterated throughout the document. The CSSDCA was committed to the idea that sovereignty could no longer be used as a shield behind which African leaders could hide while abusing their citizens.

With regard to stability, it suggested that African states should be judged based on liberal principles, a concept that Obasanjo found great support from South

---

171 Tieku. pg. 256
Africa. This included respect for human rights, good governance, participatory democracy and property rights. The emphasis of the reforms laid in the new participation of civil society in cooperation. This reflected the changing nature of governance in Africa in which leaders were no longer the only political actor; a reflection of the growing importance of international non-governmental agents, the reform package also called on leaders to allow non-governmental groups to act as the main vehicle for dealing with cooperation and development issues.

Because the OAU lacked an institutional mechanism with which to enforce these new demands on members, it became apparent that Obasanjo had to begin a restructuring of the pan-African organization. Specifically, he wanted to place the OAU as the central institution for which Africa’s security, stability and development challenges could be effectively addressed.\(^{172}\)

Obasanjo called on African leaders to implement the reforms included in the CSSDCA. His efforts not only failed, but his imprisonment in 1995 meant that the document totally left the agenda of the OAU. Obasanjo said that his attempts failed because “it threatened the status quo and especially the power positions of a few governments whose domestic hold on unscrupulous power rendered them vulnerable and insecure”.\(^{173}\) When Obasanjo was reelected in 1999, it allowed him the opportunity to revive his CSSDCA project.

This reform effort was furthered by domestic political pressures. Obasanjo’s Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) came to power at the height of popular disapproval with Nigeria’s peacekeeping efforts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The

\(^{172}\) Ibid. pg. 257.  
\(^{173}\) Ibid. pg. 258.
PDP was not only aware that most voters favored the complete withdrawal of troops from Sierra Leone, but Obasanjo had campaigned that it was unacceptable for Nigeria to spend money in external countries when there was still high levels of poverty in Nigeria itself. Obasanjo was stuck- he was not willing to abandon Nigeria’s role in West Africa and the potential to become a regional leader, yet it was impossible for it to maintain the levels of troop and the subsequent financial commitment.

It became imperative for Nigeria to seek external support. Obasanjo created a new Ministry of Cooperation and Integration in Africa to help the government more effectively deal with foreign policy challenges. For Nigeria, the inclusion of the CSSDCA into the OAU would allow for Nigeria to take a step back from its responsibilities in the resolution and peacekeeping of domestic conflicts in the region. Most importantly, the idea was that the peacekeeping costs could be more effectively shared by the well endowed African countries. It was under this context that Obasanjo went to the OAU summit in Algiers in 1999 to help persuade the other nations of Africa in favor of placing the OAU as the primary body to resolve conflicts in Africa.

Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and Libyan Integration

Sensing the political maneuvers of two of the most powerful African leaders to potentially reform the OAU for the advancement of their own domestic agendas, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi intervened and invited the African Leaders to an extraordinary summit in Sirte, Libya from September 6-9, 1999.174 Libya is a state that despite being large in area, is small in population and resources apart from substantial oil reserves. As a result, the Gaddafi regime has pursued an active foreign

---

174 Ibid. pg. 260.
policy with a disproportionately powerful military.\textsuperscript{175} Seeking to become a regional leader, Gaddafi began to seek a nuclear program, leveraging Cold War politics in his favor. Gaddafi has also supported liberation groups, especially favoring those that were willing to end all diplomatic ties with Israel and support pro-Palestinian groups and radical Islamic regimes.\textsuperscript{176} What factors contributed to this radical leader changes in his foreign policy stance toward a more moderate Afro-centric agenda?

First, Gaddafi was a great admirer of former Egyptian leader President Nasser, who had pursued various Pan-African ventures with no success in the 1960’s. Gaddafi took power in 1969 after overthrowing King Idris, a member of the Casablanca group.\textsuperscript{177} With the end of the Cold War, Gaddafi sought new means to exert greater regional influence. A continental union of the “United States of Africa” became his new project in which to expand his power in the international realm, consistent with his earlier foreign policy objectives.\textsuperscript{178}

Secondly, the UN embargo has had dramatic affects on Gaddafi’s foreign policy objectives. Unlike the sanctions on Iraq, the Libyan government is still free to sell oil under the embargo, which accounts for 90% of export receipts. Despite that, the sanctions have increased average transportation costs, which have contributed to a higher inflation rate. At the same time, Gaddafi has used the international sanctions to boost his domestic image. He has manipulated the conflict with UN as a mechanism for more prestige and power.

\textsuperscript{175} Huliaras. "Qadhafi’s Comeback: Libya and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990’s", Ibid.100:1, 2001. pg. 5-6
\textsuperscript{176} For more about Gaddafi’s policies in the 70’s and 80’s, see Asteris Huliaras’s article “Qadhafi’s Comeback” in African Affairs 100:1, pages 5-25. Gaddafi’s regime has been actively involved in the funding of Idi Amin’s Uganda, and even more explicitly, in the National Liberation Front of Chad’s fight against the Southern Chad government. Gaddafi claimed sovereignty over the Aouzou strip on the border are with rich mineral deposits, until he was defeated militarily in 1987.
\textsuperscript{177} Makinda and Okumu. pg. 31
\textsuperscript{178} Udombana. pg. 206.
of rallying popular domestic support against what he has depicted as a Christian imperialist dominated body. Unfortunately, this has also meant that he cannot use sanctions as an excuse for poor economic results, meaning he has had to find a new venue in which to garner economic growth in order to maintain his domestic authority.\(^{179}\)

Without any hesitation, the OAU assembly accepted Gaddafi’s offer to attend the summit. For Mbeki, the summit showed a great opportunity to strengthen the OAU in favor of his African Renaissance without having to go through the extraordinary effort of hosting an unscheduled summit.\(^{180}\) For Obasanjo, the summit was a useful forum in which to portray Nigeria as a benevolent hegemon, by providing security and prosperity to the region.\(^{181}\)

As a result of Gaddafi’s active intervention in Chad and other areas, the countries surrounding Libya were naturally fearful of cooperating with a potentially hostile regime.\(^{182}\) Because Gaddafi frequently financed and diplomatically supported opposition groups, leaders were hesitant to interact with him, for fear of becoming a future target. The Libyan leader, as a result, wanted to use the platform of the summit

---


\(^{180}\) Tieku. "Explaining the Clash and Accommodation of Interests of Major Actors in the Creation of the African Union", Ibid.103:2004. p.260


\(^{182}\) The African states willingness to coordinate with Libya came as a surprise to Western powers, especially in light of the heavy sanctions placed on Libya by the United States and the United Nations. There are three main reasons for African states to coordinate with Libya according to Huliarias nt. 8. First, it gave African nations bargaining power after the Cold War. Second, Libya became a source for alternative modes of economic funding. Lastly, because Gaddafi has been active in liberation movements, there were often pre-existing ties. South Africa’s decision to be nonbiased with regards to alliances also allowed Mandela to cooperate with Tripoli, despite US pressure not to.
as evidence of his return to geopolitics of black Africa and to demonstrate his commitment to Nkrumah’s pan-African project.183

At the summit, Gaddafi introduced his United States of Africa plan. In an address carried on Libyan television, Gaddafi proclaimed,

In the coming years, there will be changes towards further African integration. Boundaries between African states will be scrapped. Armies, with their heavy burden on the national state, will be made redundant and replaced by one African defense force. Even passports and national identities will inevitably disappear. From now on, national differences will give way to a single African identity, with a single currency, one central bank, a single passport and a joint defense force.184 Echoing the sentiments of his pan-African predecessors, Gaddafi insisted in his plan on a continental presidency, a single military force and one currency, all of which he wanted to be approved immediately at the conference.

Gaddafi’s proposal meant that the African leaders at the summit now faced three competing cooperation proposals submitted by three of the largest players on the continent. Fearful of a step backwards towards competing regionalisms, the leaders decided to replace the OAU altogether. On September 9th, 1999, the African leaders adopted the declaration, called the Sirte Declaration expressing the resolve of the African Heads of States and Government to establish a new continental organization and to accelerate the institutions of the AEC.185 The Council of Ministers was then instructed to prepare the legal text for a new continental institution in Africa and submit it in a report for the 36th Ordinary Session in Lomé in 2000.

Following the Summit, Gaddafi and his few supporters presented the decision to the media as a large victory for Libya. Despite Gaddafi’s maneuvers, the

---

183 Tieku. pg. 261
declaration clearly favored the South Africa and Nigerian reforms, as most countries saw Gaddafi’s proposal as too radical and excessively ambitious.186

Following the Summit, the Constitutive Act (CA) was formulated and completed. Many of the terms and conditions of the new organization were lifted from the AEC Treaty, almost word for word. In its final form, the CA consisted of a preamble explaining the goals of the institution and its member states, followed thirty-two articles. The CA was adopted in July 11, 2000, with twenty-seven heads of state, just over half, signing the Act. By March 1, 2001, the remaining states had acceded to it. Article 28 required that in order for the CA to enter into force, “thirty days after the deposit of the instruments of ratification by two-thirds of the Member States of the OAU”.187 On April 26, 2001 Nigeria became the thirty-sixth member of the OAU to deposit its instrument of ratification, meeting the legal requirement of two thirds of states. On July 9, 2002, the AU officially replaced the OAU.

Objectives and Principles of the CA

The African Union was envisioned to rest upon three pillars- the partnership with civil society, the promotion of peace, security and stability of the continent, and the socio-economic integration with the larger goal of sustainable development. These three goals are elaborated in Articles Three and Four of the CA.188 In accordance with the commitment to the AEC, the main objective is the promotion of sustainable development. In addition, the promotion of good governance, social

186 Tieku. p. 262
justice, gender equality, the eradication of curable diseases were new objectives that were included to address the current challenges facing the continent. The Act reaffirms the principles of domestic sovereignty and nonintervention. However, the Act also provides contingencies under which this principle can be overridden. Article 4(h) provides for the “right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”. In 2003, the CA was amended further to give the right of the union to intervene in situations where legitimate order is under threat, and further restrains member states from the use of the territory of member states to subvert other states. The CA was amended in extraordinary session in 2003 to include the right of the Heads of State to intervene when the Peace and Security Council recommends that there is a serious threat to legitimate order.

There are two decision making scenarios for AU intervention. The first requires a decision by the Union’s Assembly of Heads of State and Government. There were concerns that this would risk inaction, especially in light of the OAU’s unwillingness to involve itself in internal conflict. As a result, a second scenario was allowed, in which a member state can request intervention by the Union in order to restore peace and security (Article 4(j)). The article also creates a new body, the Executive Council, whose main function is to execute the directives of the Assembly on matters relating to the management of conflicts, wars and other pressing

---

189 The Act further defines these situations. Notable situations include the peaceful resolution of conflicts, prohibition of the use of force among member states, the peaceful coexistence of member states, respect for democratic principles, human rights, rule of law and good governance, and respect for the sanctity of human life, the condemnation and rejection of political assassination, terrorism and subversive activities (Articles 4(e)- 4(o)).
191 Ibid.
192 CA. nt 187.
situations.\textsuperscript{193} It remains to be seen whether states will be proactive enough to use these avenues to their collective benefit.\textsuperscript{194}

The CA also creates a new organ, the Court of Justice. While the CA is silent on the court’s jurisdiction, the AEC treaty envisions the role the Court to decide on issues brought by member states or referred by the Assembly. The court is also empowered to give advisory opinions at the request of the Assembly. All decisions made by the court would be binding on all parties. The creation of the Court of Justice was a radical departure from the OAU’s structure which left dispute settlement up to the Assembly, a power that was never used. Article 23(2) of the CA provides that “any Member State that fails to comply with the decisions and policies of the Union may be subjected to other sanctions, such as denial of transport and communications links with other Member states, and other measures of a political and economic nature to be determined by the Assembly”.\textsuperscript{195} This gave the new AU the teeth that the OAU very much lacked, potentially allowing it to take action against rogue states.

The CA also empowers the AU to take action against states that have used undemocratic means to stay in power. Previously, leaders could use constitutional amendments in order to avoid losing power. The AU, unlike the OAU, which allowed these transgressions to go unchecked, is enabled to condemn and reject

\textsuperscript{193} Parker and Rukare. p. 373
\textsuperscript{194} The willingness of African leaders to intervene to resolve the conflict in Rwanda under the OAU flag seems to indicate that African leaders are more willing now than ever to involve themselves in potentially dangerous conflicts. Also, South Africa’s involvement in the Lesotho conflict shows a renewed commitment to the restoration of liberal values. As the concept of interdependence spreads, the African states are becoming more and more willing to involve themselves to restore peace because it is seen as a necessary step to the security of the continent as a whole.
\textsuperscript{195} CA nt. 187.
unconstitutional changes of government. It also allows for the barring the illegitimate governments from participating in further activities (Article 30).  

Where the CA and the OAU Charter are similar is on the concept of national borders. This reaffirmation was an attempt to avoid a proliferation of secessionist demands. While the AU was open to reconsidering the inherited colonial borders of Africa, it was clear that like its predecessor, the AU was unwilling to accept the potential risks that secession would have on the unity of the continent.

Structure of the AU

With the exception of the Assembly, the CA effectively created a relatively new organization. The structure of the organization was greatly enhanced in order to solve the problems of inaction that had plagued the OAU. Democratic participation was at the heart of these decisions, and as a result, the influence of individual leaders was decreased, reflecting the transition away from omnibalancing. Figure 4.1 shows the structure of the new AU.

---

196 Ibid.
197 Parker and Rukare.
Assembly of Heads of State and Government

Of all the organs of the AU, the Assembly is the only retained organ from the OAU. Article 6(2) of the CA proclaims the Assembly to be the Union’s supreme organ. Its powers and functions are explained in Article 9(1) and for the most part are the same as the OAU Assembly. These responsibilities include the designation of the Union’s common politics, requests for membership, the monitoring of the implementation of the Union politics, the direction of the Executive Council and the appointment of judges to the Court of Justice.\textsuperscript{199}

The Assembly is composed of the fifty-three heads of state and government. The Assembly will meet in ordinary session annually and in extraordinary session at the request of a member state with two thirds majority. Decisions are made with consensus which is traditional in African organizations. Because the OAU was plagued by the difficulty of reaching consensus, Article 7(1) provides for, failing consensus, decisions shall be reached by a two-third majority. This reflects a growing desire by political leaders for the AU to take real action on issues, as opposed to the propaganda produced by the OAU. These efforts further show a growing sense of a security community rather than a reflection of domestic desires on the part of the Heads of State.

Since its inception in 2002, the Assembly’s record on conflict has been disappointing. The first case was the political crisis in Madagascar during the 2002 summit in which the incumbent, Didier Ratsiraka, refused to accept an election loss to

\textsuperscript{198} Makinda and Okumu.
\textsuperscript{199} CA. nt 187.
Marc Ravalomanana. The AU chose to accept neither and left Madagascar’s seat empty for a year. Similarly, when Zimbabwe’s internal government structure fell apart, to the detriment of the economy and peace, the Assembly took no meaningful action.200

Despite these setbacks, the African Union has taken some meaningful action in an effort to rid the continent of genocide against its own peoples. Two When the Darfur crisis captured international attention in 2003, the AU was called upon to start negotiations. It was because of these efforts that the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement was signed in April 2004. As the AU gains more experience from further peacekeeping operations, coupled with more funding and troops, the peace and security mechanisms created by the CA can help minimize violence on the continent.201

Executive Council

The Executive Council, although named differently, is almost identical in essence to the Council of Ministers of the OAU. It is composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of member states. The decision making process is identical to the Assembly, and meets twice a year in ordinary session. The Executive Council is responsible to the Assembly, but does enjoy a degree of independence. This is evidenced by the fact that the Rules of Procedure was adopted by it without Assembly approval.202

200 Parker and Rukare.
201 Makinda and Okumu. pg. 83-84.
The main function of the Executive Council is to coordinate and monitor the implementation of Assembly policies. Article 13 gives eleven different areas of interest of the member states that falls within the responsibility of the Council. The Council is assisted by two organs, the Permanent Representatives Committee, which serves as the secretariat to the Executive Council and the specialized technical committees, which provides technical assistance and expertise.\(^{203}\) The creation of seven specialized technical committees, a growth from the OAU’s three, allows each committee to focus on a narrower subject matter, which in turn allows for a greater specialization and division of labor.\(^{204}\) The committees’ general purpose is to prepare the background work, follow up on the decisions taken by the AU, make recommendations on implementation, coordinate and harmonize implementation, and prepare progress reports.

**Pan-African Parliament**

The purpose of the Pan-African Parliament is to ensure the full participation of the African people in the economic policies of the continent and thus avoid perceptions of a democratic deficit that have hindered other multilateral organizations. The expectation is that the Pan-African Parliament will provide a forum for the people and grassroots organizations to become more involved in the decision making on the problems facing Africa. The objectives are in line with the general principles of the AU, including the promotion of human rights and democracy, the maintenance

---

\(^{203}\) Parker and Rukare. pg. 375-376.

\(^{204}\) From Parker and Rukkare, pg. 376. The seven committees are expressly established as the Committee on Rural Economy and Agricultural Matters; the Committee on Monetary and Financial Affairs; the Committee on Trade, Customs and Immigration Matters; the Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, Energy, Natural Resources and Environment; the Committee on Transport, Communications and Tourism; the Committee on Health, Labor and Social Affairs; and the Committee on Education, Culture and Human Resources.
of peace and stability, and the support for economic recovery and the facilitation of cooperation among the RECs.

The responsibilities and powers of the Pan-African Parliament are relatively substantial and potentially growing. The Pan-African Parliament maintains a level of democratic accountability over the AEC, by discussing the budget and making recommendations as well as drawing up the budget. It can also question AU/AEC officials. The Pan-African Parliament is also able to perform other functions as it deems appropriate in order for it to achieve its objectives, which it can define through further protocols. This is of particular significance as it allows the Pan-African Parliament to assume some substantial powers. The Court of Justice of the AU further enhanced the power of the Pan-African Parliament by entitling it to submit cases to the Court relating to the CA, such as Union treaties and the acts and decisions of the Union organs. The parliament did not have legislative powers initially; instead only had consultative and advisory powers only. It is envisaged that it will evolve full legislative powers at the end of its first term (probably five years).205

The Parliament is composed of five members per member state, with at least one member being a woman, reflecting the AU’s commitment to gender representation. The members are elected or designated by national legislatures. Holders of executive or judicial posts in the member states are specifically excluded from membership. It is the hope that the Pan-African Parliament will eventually be elected by universal adult suffrage, but this goal is relatively utopian. Members have

immunity in the territories of the member states while exercising their functions as members.

The parliament meets twice a year or in extraordinary session with the request of two thirds of members. Decisions are made by consensus. In the event that consensus cannot be gained, a two-thirds majority is required to pass any venture.

The Pan-African Parliament represents the democratic foundation of the AU. The Parliament could play a significant role in shaping the organization in order to focus efforts towards the goals and hopes of the people as opposed to the political aspirations of leaders that had characterized the OAU. In order for this to happen, the Pan-African Parliament must take some legislative powers and show its willingness to act independently of the other organs of the AU. This will include using its role as an oversight body with respect to the other institutions of the AU.206

The Pan-African Parliament represents a good example of the transition that the African continent is making towards a security community. Non-political members are able to interact together without regard to specific state, showing a growing sense of community permeating through the continent. It also reflects the rise of liberal democratic values, as the ultimate goal is to have elected members have a large say in the actions taken by the AU.

*Peace and Security Council*

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the main AU body charged with promoting peace, security and stability. The PSC is composed of 15 members elected on the basis of equal rights- ten for two year terms and five for three year terms. The

---

criteria for PSC membership is a country’s “contribution to the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa and respect for constitutional governance… and the rule of law and human rights”. 207

The function of the PSC is to promote the peace, security and stability of the continent; anticipate conflict and take preventive measures; and promote peaceful conflict resolution through mediation, conciliation and enquiry. The PSC is empowered to take Peace Support Operations and intervention in accordance with Article 4(j) of the CA. The PSC is also empowered in peace-building and post conflict reconstruction. It has the power to institute sanctions when unconstitutional changes of government take place in a member state. The PSC is also charged with the implementation of the Common African Defense and Security Policy, the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and all international conventions on arms control and disarmament. It also is allowed to defend the independence and sovereignty of any member state against acts of aggression. 208 This body represents a major step forward toward pan-African unity in its ability to intervene means that the greater good will be better reflected in AU policies.

The PSC is a good example of a Tier Three body as understood by Adler and Barnett. It is a natural progression from the OAU’s Commission of Mediation and Arbitration, except with real powers. The Commission of Mediation and Arbitration would fall under the process category in Tier Two as it provided the venue for meaningful discussion about potential strategies to deal with conflict on the continent. Yet, because the mutual trust needed to create a security community was missing in

207 Makinda and Okumu. Pg. 48.
208 For more about the powers of the PSC and its role in international security politics, see Makinda’s The African Union, Chapter 4 “Security and Peace Building” pg. 75.
1963, it was not able to be effective and never favored intervention. At this stage in history, the PSC has the ability to more effectively end conflicts because it is afforded sovereign powers. As a result, it is not affected by domestic pressures, meaning it can recommend intervention. This is a reflection of mutual trust as predicted in Tier Three. 209

The Economic and Social and Cultural Council

The Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) was launched in Addis Ababa in 2005 aims at giving civil society a greater role in the policy formation of the AU. It is composed of professional groups, NGOs, social groups, community based organizations, workers groups, religious and cultural groups and others. It is composed of 150 members and serves as an advisory organ to the AU Assembly.

AU Chairperson, Alpha Konare, claimed that the organ would serve as a tool “against authoritarian regimes, hostile external efforts and the negative waves of globalization”. 210 The inclusion of ECOSOCC is a big step for the democratic structures of Africa because it represents a real effort on the part of politicians to explicitly engage the African civil society in the continent’s development. It is also a large departure from OAU policies that viewed civil society with hostility. Makinda argues that “When fully operations, ECOSOCC will not only enable African people to contribute to the programs and decisions of the AU, but also to assume ownership

209 See Chapter 1, page 26.  
of these programs and play a role in their implementation. This engagement will also be extended to other AU organs.\textsuperscript{211}

ECOSOCC is facing similar challenges to the other AU organs. First, it has no funds or ability to raise funds as currently envisioned. As a result, it is dependant on the Assembly, potentially undermining its ability to act independently of potentially hostile politicians. Secondly, many African governments and heads of state are still very uneasy with an empowered African civil society and continue to treat it with disdain. Third, most of African’s civil society still has weak institutional capacity and as result fail the accountability test.

Despite these potential problems, ECOSOCC in consultation with key women’s groups throughout the continent were effective at lobbying the AU to change some of the gendered bias that was throughout the original CA. Through an engaged civil society, inclusion of women became one of the goals of the organization, reflected in the Pan-African Parliament gender cap. As liberal values continue to spread throughout the continent, heads of state will be less uneasy about African civil society, and political repression will decrease, allowing for an engaged population.

*The AU Commission*

The Commission or the secretariat is the organ that assists the Assembly and runs the organization in between the summits. Ideally, the Commission was envisioned as an administrative arm of the Union and not a decision making body. It is run by the inaugural Chairperson of the Commission and is assisted by a deputy and 11 commissioners, half of which are women. There is a growing concern within

\textsuperscript{211} Makinda and Okumu. pg. 49.
the Organization that the Commission is effectively running the AU. As a result of weakness of the PSC members, the Commission has assumed a lead role in the implementation of the AU’s peace and security agenda, including the management of funds. As Makinda points out, “By acting as the custodian of AU documents, as well as the maker and interpreter of rules, procedures and regulations, [the Commission] has acquired unlimited and overwhelming power. Bodies such as the PSC are further held at the Commission’s mercy, as the latter controls the purse”.  

Within the Commission, it is becoming evident that certain departments receive a great deal of funding while others are left without resources. For example, the department of political affairs that deals with political stability, human rights and humanitarian assistance is generally ignored even when dealing with crises such as Darfur. Power struggles are playing a large role in the AU organs and structures. Because the structures and strategies were developed before the identification of their missions, the implementation is taking a more piecemeal approach.

The Commission is a further reflection of how outside and nonpolitically focused members can play a large role in the workings of the AU. As the Commission is the main actor that interprets the rules and controls the budget, it has allowed the bodies to take efforts that may be domestically unpopular in specific states. The creation of this body can be understood as a further movement away from omnibilancing.

*Relations with Other Organizations*

---

212 Ibid. pg. 51.
213 Murithi. pg 34.
One of the major challenges that hindered the OAU had was that there was no protocol to regulate relations with other regional organizations. As a result, the CA acknowledges the importance of RECs in the attainment of the AU’s goals, especially its attempts at further economic integration (Article 3(l)). As a result, it is one of the AU’s objectives to coordinate and harmonize policies between existing and future RECs. Following the end of the Cold War, REC’s proliferated. It became evident to political leaders of the time that the security of their countries was directly linked to regional stability, which was to a significant extent dependent on increased levels of development in order to resist the damaging effects of globalization. Figure 4.2 shows the proliferation of Regional Economic Communities as leaders attempted smaller scale regional integration, especially as the OAU floundered on economic policies.

When the AU was launched, the founders were well aware that the REC’s already enjoyed some advantages in undertaking economic and peace initiatives. As a result, at the 2001 summit, the Assembly passed a resolution that reaffirmed the status of RECs as the building blocks of the AU. Because many of the REC’s already had a protocol for dealing with conflict between member states, the AU attempted to draw upon these established protocols in order to encourage future cooperation.\(^\text{214}\) In 2003, the CA was amended further to restrain member states from entering into agreements which are incompatible with the principles of the African Union.\(^\text{215}\)

\(^{214}\) For more about the role of REC’s in integrationist politics, especially in the context of continental cooperation, see Satish C. Mehta’s article “African Unification: Past Experience and Future Promise” in *Africa Quarterly* 41:1-2, 2001. pp 88-100.

\(^{215}\) Baimu.
The AU - A Security Community?

This section will attempt to answer the question of whether the African Union does meet the requirements of a security community. The three tiered approach used in the previous section will be used.

Tier One: Precipitating Conditions

Africa’s awareness of the potential benefits derived from cooperation in order to solve mutual problems confirms that the precipitating conditions necessary to promote community building have been present in modern Africa since independence.

---

216 Makinda and Okumu. Pg. 54
Nkrumah’s vision of a continental government advocated for the creation of a political community as early as the late 1950’s. The creation of the AU can therefore be seen as a response to new changes in technology, demography and the international environment, but also a new interpretation of the social reality. As Maxi Shoeman puts it, “Increasingly there seems to be an awareness that what the continent is battling with, is a threat to human survival that calls for serious and immediate action to create security on the continent”.

As Africa’s voice in the international realm becomes more and more marginalized, both politically within international organizations such as the UN, and economically due to globalization forces, an emerging sense of community builds among nations. Adler and Barnett identify external threats as precipitating a condition that encourages closer interaction and cooperation. In the African context, this is true both of the transnational impact of issues such as pandemics (malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDs) but also in that most of the countries share similar internal threats. Theses threats often have spillover effects beyond borders or are common to the majority of countries. A growing understanding that cooperation might bring improvement to these conditions lends to new outlooks on the political reality. Schoeman argues that “As far as the first tier conditions for the emergence of a security community are concerned, Africa would seem to be ready to embark on the building of a security community. Trends, changes and threats have over time reinforced the belief that cooperation is necessary in order to overcome problems”.

---

217 Schoeman. pg. 10.
218 Ibid. pg. 11.
These conditions were brought forth in the late 1990’s for a variety of reasons. First, Cold War politics meant that the super powers pitted African countries against each other. As the USSR and the US attempted to spread their political ideologies in the developing world, it caused divisions between neighboring states, which prevented the creation of mutual trust needed. Secondly, the spread of democratic values has been a slow process in Africa since independence. Almost every state has seen an undemocratic overthrow of government, which has had tremendous influence on African cooperation. Third, interdependence forces as predicted by Keohane and Nye are necessary in order to establish the knowledge process that Adler and Barnett examine. The rise of RECs at the end of the 1980’s, as well as the rise of globalization and international businesses facilitated interdependence.

**Tier Two: Structure and Process**

Both Deutsch and later scholars agree that for security communities to develop, a core state or group of states with the power to create stability and determine the content of the value system around which cooperation develops is necessary.219 The question then becomes whether there exists a state or collection of states, within the modern African political sphere, that has the power to stabilize the political environment and where necessary instill common values. In the OAU context, this was not possible because of the divide between regional powers. The Casablanca-Brazzaville divide prevented the political leaders of the time, such as Nkrumah and Nyerere from moving their vision beyond the early stages of development. As a result, the OAU was the product of various concessions that

---
219 Deutsch. pg 38. or Adler and Barnett. pg. 39.
undermined the effectiveness and crippled its ability to create any real change in the continent.

The prevalence of different regionalisms in Africa is subsiding. South Africa and Nigeria are emerging as powerful leaders on the African stage. Mbeki’s commitment to enhancing the prestige of the continent as a whole, as evidenced by South Africa’s leadership of NEPAD, reflects the fact that new African institutions and larger states are willing to use South Africa’s power to the better continental integration. Obasanjo’s and Mbeki’s access to international forums, such as the G9 summit and the World Economic Forum, has allowed them to create and articulate a single more powerful voice for the continent.220

The rigid structure of the AU, coupled with NEPAD, allows for the creation of norms of behavior and trust building that facilitates the creation of a security community. Because the OAU allowed for a forum in which members were able to communicate their common issues, and provided a formal venue to facilitate communication among leaders, many of the trust building endeavors were started as early as 1963. The destabilizing forces of globalization, the debt crisis, growing public health concerns, and increased awareness of the regions interdependence discussed in Chapter 1 only further impressed the need for cooperation in the minds of many leaders.

**Tier Three- Mutual Trust and Collective Identity**

Mutual trust and collective identity are considered prerequisites to the emergence and continued existence of a security community. The assumption given is that the factors identified in the first two tiers will create a common identity among

---

220 Schoeman. pg. 17-18.
states in the community. Because these factors are mutually reinforcing, they help to create a permanent sense of identity. As Schoeman argues, “There can be little doubt that something like a distinct ‘African sense of identity’ exists. If nothing else, a common identity, however symbolic, is something that has been nurtured over decades, reinforced by the tenets of pan-Africanism and the continental struggle against colonialism and apartheid”.221 Yet up until the end of apartheid and the spread of democracy, there was not necessarily mutual trust. The new generation of African leaders who have expressed the common political will to lead an Africa based on trust and confidence, as well as the strengthening of African civil society has lead to an exponential rise in transactions, and hence a deepening mutual trust.

If a security community does indeed continue to develop in Africa, it can have a dramatic impact on lives of ordinary Africans. The building of mutual trust and a sense of community can end border disputes between states and potentially rectify the problems created by arbitrary colonial borders. Also, because of the vast amount of natural resources in Africa, integration can allow for a more effective economy to be built, utilizing the diverse work force and resources to create developed regional economies.

---

221 Ibid.pg. 19.
Conclusion

The new leaders of Africa are certainly beginning to realize the potential benefits derived from cooperation. Africa stands at a pivotal place in the global sphere- for the first time since independence, states are able to align based upon similar economic and political interests, rather than because of the influence of Western powers. With the end of the Cold War, and the retreat of the World Bank and the IMF, Africa now has more control than ever over its political and economic decisions. These factors have served as catalysts to renew the search for stability through cooperation and integration on the grand scale. The African Union can play a unique role in shaping and pushing the continent towards democratization and economic development.

The AU still faces a number of political and structural challenges. First, a continent wide attempt at building a common identity is a large task. There are currently 53 member states, with distinct regions and diverse populations. Even the UN, when it started, had fewer members than the AU. The AU’s use of regional actors as building blocks to continental cooperation certainly reduces the problems faced by regional divides. Yet, with the exception of ECOWAS and the SADC, none of the other regions have built strong structural organizations to promote economic diversity. As a result, the AU has to build upon the structure of the smaller existing organizations and play a large role in facilitating communication between them. The role of an international organization, something forgotten by the OAU and its members, is to create a forum for communication and interaction, not a challenge to undermine one another.
Secondly, the international reputation of Africa and common misperceptions of the African people need to be remedied. Because the world is becoming smaller, a better understanding of the diverse nature of the African continent needs to be established. As a result, a heightened presence of African leaders on the international arena needs to be a primary goal for African Heads of State. It is in the interest of the smaller and economically weaker nations of Africa to favor strong regional leaders, beyond the role they play in establishing a security community, in that they allow for more effective communication with the Western world. Foreign investment is a prerequisite to African development as it is needed in order to solve the debt crisis that affects more than half of Africa’s countries. This is only possible through a strong commitment by key regional players to liberal values and solid bases of support, both from regional states and domestically.

The third problem is the potential of a return to authoritarian states. Liberal values have had a huge impact in two respects. First, they are a necessary first step in order for any Western state to invest. No developed country is interested in investing in countries where there is a potential for rule of law or respect for property rights to be reversed. Secondly, the spread of liberal values has allowed for an increased role of civil society. Consequently, there has been an increased role of the citizens of Africa in the political process. The Pan-African Parliament must establish structured rules for it to play the role it needs to in African affairs.

Lastly, success of the African Union depends on how much members are willing to give up of their own state sovereignty in the interest of the continent. It is only with one voice that Africa can address the common concerns of the continent.
This also means that the AU has to ensure that it has adequate funding for the institution. The AU faces a major challenge of raising funds from its members who already have economic problems. The operating budget of the AU is estimated at $500 million to run its 18 bodies, compared to the $30 million of the OAU.

Africa has come a long way since the 1963 establishment of the OAU. Heads of state have a growing sense of security in their domestic role, which has played a dramatic shift in integration efforts. A united Africa comes with many benefits. If an effective AU is established, it will allow the African states to exert its due influence on world affairs, and help to remedy the inequalities created by globalization. It is only through one voice that Africa can establish itself in the developed world and resist the new forces of neocolonialism.
Works Cited


Appendix 1

Fig. 4.1 The organization chart of the Organization of African Unity
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Role of OAU</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Algeria–Morocco 1963–5</td>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>Legitimize cease fire, aid communications and provide neutral site for leaders' meeting</td>
<td>Bilateral settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Dahomey–Niger 1963</td>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>None; UAM handled</td>
<td>Settled (UAM help)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Ethiopia–Kenya–Somalia since 1964</td>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>1964 order cease fire; 1967 provide neutral site; 1973 establish a good office–Committee – etc.</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Ghana–Upper Volta 1964–5</td>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>1964 conciliation; 1965 provide forum; pressure on Ghana</td>
<td>Settled (Ghanaian withdrawal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Equatorial Guinea–Gabon 1972</td>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>Assist negotiations, create commission to define border</td>
<td>Quiescent (settlement pending)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Ghana–neighbours</td>
<td>Subversion</td>
<td>1965 attempt mediation</td>
<td>Settled (conflict ended with Ghanaian coup)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Rwanda–Burundi 1966–73</td>
<td>Subversion</td>
<td>1966 legitimize Mobutu mediation; 1973 establish Mediation Committee</td>
<td>Quiescent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Tanganyika (internal) 1964</td>
<td>Army mutiny</td>
<td>Legitimize Nyere's actions and troops loans Replace British peacekeeping</td>
<td>Settled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Ghana–Guinea 1966</td>
<td>Subversion/seizure of diplomats</td>
<td>Inquiry by council of ministers, pressure on Ghana by Assembly</td>
<td>Settled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Guinea–Ivory Coast 1966–7</td>
<td>Subversion/seizure of diplomats</td>
<td>Legitimize Tukman's initiatives</td>
<td>Settled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Guinea–Senegal since 1971</td>
<td>Subversion</td>
<td>1971 establish Mediation Commission</td>
<td>Settled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Tanzania–Uganda 1972</td>
<td>Subversion</td>
<td>1973 provide neutral site for leaders, assist Somalia mediation efforts</td>
<td>Settled (reconciliation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>Role of OAU</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Congo 1964–5</td>
<td>Civil war</td>
<td>Attempt conciliation</td>
<td>Settled (military victory)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Sudan 1964–71 (internal)</td>
<td>Seession</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Settled (some assistance from Ethiopia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Burundi 1964–7 (internal)</td>
<td>Ethnic strife</td>
<td>Minimal, legitimize government actions</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Kenya–Uganda</td>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>Attempt conciliation</td>
<td>Settled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Angola 1975–6 (internal)</td>
<td>Civil strife</td>
<td>Special OAU Summit</td>
<td>Settled (military victory of MPLA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Western Sahara (Morocco–Mauretania) 1976–81</td>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>Attempt conciliation</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Zaire 1977–8 (internal)</td>
<td>Civil strife/ subversion</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>Settled, outside OAU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Egypt–Libya</td>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>Attempt conciliation</td>
<td>Bilateral settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Chad 1977–81 (internal)</td>
<td>Civil strife etc.</td>
<td>OAU discuss, November 1981 create peace-keeping force</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Upper Volta–Mali 1977</td>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>Conciliation, OAU commission</td>
<td>Settled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Sudan–Ethiopia 1977–81</td>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>OAU Commission</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Benin–Gabon 1977</td>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>Attempt conciliation</td>
<td>Settled bilaterally</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>