From North Africans to Latin Americans: An Exploration of Immigrant Hierarchies in Spain

by

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I. Introduction

The great irony in studying Spanish immigration is that for the past century Spain has been renowned for its mass emigration. Millions of Spaniards left the country’s borders in search of a better life, just as new immigrants today are flocking to Spain for the same reason. The transition from a country of emigration to immigration has been very rapid, and parallels Spain’s more general transformation to a first-world European power. While immigration has only been a salient aspect of Spain’s history since the mid 1980’s, the rate of this process has increased almost exponentially in the past decades, creating a new social dynamic that allows for much room for investigation.

Immigration in Spain became a personal interest after I spent a semester studying abroad in Madrid. I was intrigued with the notion of immigration as a new phenomenon since I was so accustomed to the U.S. as being a country with a historic tradition of immigration. I was curious as to how immigration in a new context would be confronted, without the historical baggage of a legacy of migrants. However, I came to realize that Spain’s own historical baggage was immensely important in setting out guidelines for immigration, as national decisions reflect various historic connections with other countries. Spain’s incorporation in the European Union also contributed greatly to way immigration is dealt with, as exterior pressure to restrict borders conflicted with Spain’s relatively open door policy. As Spain confronted these issues in my time abroad, I was able to talk to individuals about their reactions to immigration. I was struck by racism and prejudice, but also
by appreciation that these new residents were contributing to the Spanish economy. These observations motivated me to use my experience as the starting point for academic analysis.

The question guiding my research has been concerned with the construction of immigrant hierarchies in Spain. In exploring Spain’s immigration policy, I became interested in the ways in which the country specifically favored some groups over others. While much of this favored treatment came under the rhetoric of colonial ties, this language was not consistent. I was intrigued by the ways colonial ties affected immigrant hierarchies, yet as I began to analyze the role of the EU, I realized that colonial links are just one part of the issue of immigrant hierarchies. I address these questions in three parts: through an analysis of attitudes towards immigrants, an examination of Spanish immigration policy, and a discussion of how attitudes and policy intersect in the labor market. These three areas give insight into how immigrant hierarchies are constructed and reinforced.

In reviewing attitudes towards immigrants, we can begin to understand the hierarchical nature that has become established and remains fairly widespread. Using quantitative data, it is possible to see that a clearly defined hierarchy has been recorded, which then gives insight into Spanish legal structures concerning immigration. Spanish immigration policy didn’t exist until 1985, not coincidentally the same year Spain joined the EU. As Spain has struggled since then to create a stable policy, the many changes in legislation reflect the ways in which Spain has chosen to deal with the various immigrant groups entering its borders. In observing these changes, we can see how different groups have become to be constructed
through the law and how that reflects and shapes popular opinions and stereotypes concerning the different groups. Finally, in a discussion of Spanish labor markets, we can fully recognize the ways in which preference is given to various immigrant groups through both policy and attitudes to reproduce these hierarchies and perceptions.

I argue that migration in Spain can be characterized as a balancing act between honoring colonial ties and being a member of the EU. As the European Union puts more pressure on its members to tighten up borders so as to keep “Fortress Europe” safe, Spain has been forced to neglect some of its historic connections to other countries. Each new reform of the immigration laws reflects a reassessment of colonial links as Spain determines its connection and relation to the European Union. As Spain comes to identify with the power of the EU, it forgoes the historic ties that can be seen as the last remnants of Spain’s colonial empire and previously a defining feature of the country’s national identity. As immigrant hierarchies are negotiated throughout Europe with the creation of a political entity that encompasses nations, the case of Spain allows us to see the tension that is inherent between being a country with a rich cultural and historical background while at the same time trying to fit into the mold of the EU.
2. Literature Review

As a recent phenomenon, immigration in the Spanish context has received less attention than some of its European neighbors, but more general theories of immigration offer insight into the Spanish case. Scholars from a variety of disciplines have outlined numerous models on both a micro and macro level to account for this mass movement of people. Literature on the United States, a supposed “classic” immigration country, has permeated immigration theory, as immigration has been a defining feature of American life. However, in the past decades, scholars from Europe and beyond have contributed to a growing literature about global migration. While Spanish immigration contains a unique demographic make-up, much of the process can be viewed in light of these various theoretical models.

Much of immigration literature is based around the complex decision to migrate. Evidently, it is not typically the poorest who chose to leave their countries, but those relatively well off who come in times of their countries’ economic or social transformation (Castles and Miller 1993: 21). Neo-classical economic equilibrium theory, more commonly referred to as the push and pull model, was employed by theorists to describe the factors which drive migrants from their country of origin and attract them to a new nation. However, this model has been fallen out of favor with more recent theorists who call attention to its ahistorical and individualistic nature. Later, some preferred the historical-structuralist model that was employed to explain the unequal power distributions apparently inherent in migration (Castles and Miller 1993). Dual labor market theory is another model that stresses the importance of pull
factors that arise from the demand of modern industrial societies. According to this theory, first world countries have a permanent demand for immigrant labor that is crucial to the economic structure of these nations (Massey et al 1993: 440). Most recently, migration systems theory has been the preferred model for understanding the complex nature of immigration as it looks at both ends of the process. As Castles and Miller explain, “Migration systems theory suggests that migratory movements generally arise from the existence of prior links between sending and receiving countries based on colonization, political influence, trade, investment or cultural ties” (1993: 24). This occurs on both the micro and the macro level, as institutional factors like laws and political economies play a significant role, as well as informal social networks that the migrants themselves develop and serve as forms of cultural capital. The migration systems theory is the most applicable in discussions on immigration in Spain as it accounts for movement between Spain and its prior colonies.

While a huge body of literature confronts the issue of deciding to leave one’s country of origin and selecting a new home, scholars are confronted with another set of theoretical dilemmas as soon as the migrant settles in a specific place. While assimilation theory has been prolific in the American setting, it is less useful in the case of Spain as it takes a multi-generational approach that will not be applicable for a number of years. Most important to this paper is the issue of language as a key factor in assimilation. As one of the first barriers a typical immigrant must overcome, it plays a large role in how an immigrant can adapt and take part in their host country’s society and culture. Often serving as a symbolic feature of “otherness”, language plays a critical role in the immigrant experience. In quantitative studies,
language has been used as the key variable in assessing an individual’s level of assimilation (López 1999). While language has typically played an important role in the immigrant experience, the case of Spain offers an interesting example since a large group of the migrants are Spanish-speaking. This distinction eases assimilation for this group, as language is not the first barrier these migrants must overcome. The presence of these migrants differentiates Spanish immigration from most contemporary migration in the U.S. as well as other regions of the EU.

Racism in Spain today takes a specific form that stems from a history of uneven power dynamics as well as the existence of centuries-old marginalized groups. While there is a debate in the literature as to whether racism in Europe is taking a new form (Rathzel 2002), its existence in European society is indisputable. Racism in Spain is somewhat unique as the country has been fairly homogenous since the Jews and Muslims were expelled in 1492. While there has been racism against Jews and Gypsies in Spain for centuries, the presence of the foreigner is a new phenomenon, making it distinct from other such as the U.S. countries that are founded on migration and have a historic presence of outsiders. As Pettigrew explains, “Europeans lack a “melting pot” metaphor and a sense that immigration is “normal” (1998: 81-82). While general theories concerning the foreigner as “other” are applicable to Spain, more specific models are needed to understand the complex relation of the Spanish people to the various immigrant groups. For example, Spain’s legacy as a colonial power provides an important basis for racist attitudes within the population. Castles explains that the “ideologies of white superiority which underpinned colonialism” (1993: 25) play an important role in the manifestation of
racism in Europe today. In regards to the case of Spain, Angeles Escrivá agrees: “The racist colonial experience and the anti-semitic and anti-gypsy campaigns of previous centuries, which resurface from time to time, set the scene for current expressions of racism. (1997: 47). While racism in Spain has a different historical backdrop than the U.S., its presence is an unfortunate fact of life.

A hierarchy of preference is universal to immigration throughout the globe. While each country has specific preferences, generalizations can be made, particularly for the European continent. While these generalizations give perspective on each country’s specific model, in practice their exists more of a continuum than a set of rigid impermeable categories. Pettigrew (1998) outlines seven different groups of migrants in the European context who correspond with varying levels of status. The first group of the most favored migrants consists of the national migrants who are perceived as coming home. Since Spain has historically been considered a country of emigration and not immigration, those citizens who have chosen to return to Spain are given the most favorable conditions. The second group is made up of citizens of the European Union (EU) who are given full rights to live and work in all member countries. Following this group are members of ex-colonial countries who choose to migrate (this makes sense based on what we know of the migration systems theory). Next Pettigrew points to recruited workers from non-colonial countries, followed by refugees and asylum seekers, accepted illegal immigrants and ultimately rejected illegal immigrants. The varying status of immigrants correlates with their acceptance into the legal system of the host country.
Castles and Miller offer a model that can help us assess the case of Spain. They state:

At one extreme, openness to settlement, granting of citizenship and gradual acceptance of cultural diversity may allow the formation of *ethnic communities*, which are seen as part of a multicultural society. At the other extreme, the denial of the reality of settlement, refusal of citizenship and rights to settlers, and rejection of cultural diversity may lead to the formation of *ethnic minorities*, whose presence is widely regarded as undesirable and divisive (1993: 29).

While they see these models as part of a continuum to describe the reactions of different countries to immigrants, the ideas of ethnic communities and minorities can both be applied to the immigrants in Spain. While the case of Spain does not exemplify the extremes of this continuum, different groups of immigrants fall differently on this scale. As we will see later on, Moroccan and other North African immigrants are regarded more as ethnic minorities, while Latin Americans are more apt to be categorized on the side of ethnic communities. The distinctions between these two groups and the cause for this difference will be a focus of this paper.

With globalization, the idea of a homogenous nation is disappearing. As countries come to terms with the presence of foreigners they must make decisions as to whom to let in. Aristide Zolberg explains, “Industrial states guard their borders and admit workers or refugees as exceptions, rather than the rule, so it is necessary to account for the wall they have erected as well as for the small doors they have provided in it” (1989, qtd. in Castles and Miller 1993: 25). Spain’s walls and doors have changed considerably over the decades as new issues, generally associated with the EU, have continued to confront immigration policy. However, while changing, these walls and doors have continually aided in the construction of a hierarchy among immigrant groups. In understanding how these hierarchies are constructed and
reinforced, we can begin to see how preferences reflect a reconfiguration of Spanish national identity.

3. The Historical, Political, and Demographic Context

Until the recent burst of immigration, Spain had been a generally homogeneous nation for the past five hundred years. In its distant past, Spain was inhabited and controlled by a vast array of different groups, including Visigoths, Romans, and Arabs, who provided a rich array of cultural heritage. In medieval Spain, Christians, Jews, and Muslims peacefully co-existed on the Iberian Peninsula in a golden age of intellectual prosperity. However, this multiculturalism ended during the fifteenth century with the unification of present-day Spain under the reign of Ferdinand and Isabel (Calavita 2005: 23), a defining period for Spanish national identity. During this period the Spanish Inquisition was employed to convert or expel the Jews and Muslims, leaving a dominant Catholic presence that continues up until today (Balfour 2000). The effect of this process is that Spain has had few religious or racial minorities for hundreds of years. The exception to this is the Gypsies who have been the target of discrimination and oppression for centuries. From the sixteenth century until the 1980’s, most Spaniards were simply not exposed to people of different phenotypic features. The xenophobia that is occurring in Spain today can be partially attributed to this historic lack of minorities.

Spain’s colonial empire is a prominent feature of the country’s history. Starting
in the fifteenth century, Spain held global power and a vast empire that stretched continents. For centuries, the Spanish dominated the seas and accumulated a territory of impressive size. However, after centuries of prosperity, Spain’s colonies slowly but surely diminished. Starting with the independence movements in many of its Latin American colonies that occurred at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Spain’s colonial empire was shattered with the loss of the Spanish-American War of 1898. While Spain retained several of its colonies in Africa for more than half a century, 1898 signaled a significant sense of loss. As reflected in the literature and art of the time, a crisis in national identity ensued, as Spaniards tried to reconfigure their lives without global power or prestige (Balfour 2000).

The evolution of the Spanish political system has created conditions that make Spain a new destination for immigration. Known for deep political divisions and vacillations from remarkably liberal to particularly conservative, the idea of “two Spain’s” characterizes both sides of the political dichotomy. The Spanish Civil War, which ended in 1939 with the emergence of Francisco Franco as the new military dictator, left Spain in ruins. For much of the Franco dictatorship, Spain suffered economically, as well as from a politically repressive regime. Especially during these years, many Spaniards left their country for political freedom as well as to escape the miserable conditions of the time. Finally, beginning in the 1950’s, Franco was able to make economic gains, particularly from opening Spain’s border to foreign investors and tourists. These years saw massive rural to urban migrations as new industrialization spurred a demand for labor in the large cities. As agricultural jobs declined, Spain’s labor market and economy saw a reconfiguration. Upon Franco’s
death in 1975, Spain’s economic position in the world was improving, yet the legacy of the repressive dictatorship sustained the impression of Spain’s backwardness. Franco designated the Spanish monarchy to rule after him; however in a remarkable turn of events, the King gave up his power in the intention of establishing a democracy. While the Spanish monarchy today holds symbolic importance, it is not involved in the political decisions of the country. Spain’s Constitution was ratified in 1978 and the country entered the European Community (which later became the European Union) in 1986. Many Spaniards who had left Spain during Franco’s dictatorship came back in the years following his death, meaning the first group of migrants to come to Spain in the twentieth century was that of the Spaniards themselves. The important period of transition starting with Franco’s death put Spain solidly in the first world along with its European neighbors (Balfour 2000).

An important feature of the Spanish nation is the existence of seventeen autonomous communities. These regions have distinct cultures and in some cases languages, which were outlawed under Franco’s dictatorship. Several of these communities have a particularly strong regional nationalism and at various periods in history have sought independence from the centralized Spanish government. Catalonia (which includes Barcelona), the Basque country, and Galicia are the most well known autonomous communities but Spanish regionalism is an important aspect of the Spanish political situation (Balfour 2000). The existence of these self-governing bodies is important because it means they have the authority to enforce their own laws pertaining to a variety of functions, including immigration.

For most of the eighties and nineties, the majority of foreigners were European.
Retirees and vacationers from the continent were the first important groups of foreigners to reside in Spain in the last decades. With Spain’s entry to the EU and later the Schengen Agreement, borders between Spain and other EU countries became irrelevant and work visas unnecessary. Citizens of other EU nations were able to reside in Spain for long periods of time without any legal dilemmas or prohibitions. Germans and Brits in particular were attracted to Spain’s Mediterranean coast and came in droves for leisure time as well as retirement (Calavita 2000). As Spain transitioned to become a destination for foreigners after the fall of Franco, the demographic make-up of these individuals has changed significantly over the years. In the past decade alone immigration patterns have changed dramatically as now two thirds of all foreigners are from outside Europe and mostly from the third world. The Spanish have labeled this phenomenon terciarización or third worldization (Calavita 2005: 27). Specifically in the past five to ten years a large influx of Latin American immigrants has signaled a new phase in immigration trends. While Latin American immigrants have been coming to Spain since the 1980’s, they did not make up a majority of the immigrant population until very recently.

In the past decades, a variety of different immigrant groups have been attracted to Spain. While there are many groups that come to Spain, my essay focuses primarily North Africans, Sub-Saharan Africans, Latin Americans, and Eastern Europeans.\(^1\) The largest group of immigrants from the third world has consistently been from Morocco\(^2\), with its close proximity thirteen kilometers away across the

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\(^1\) This is not to discredit significant numbers of Asians immigrants who merit scholarly research, but the literature and my personal experience has been focused on these specific groups.

\(^2\) Throughout this paper I use the term North Africans to refer to primarily Moroccans, as to be consistent concerning geographic regions instead of nations
Straits of Gibraltar. While Moroccans, numbering in the millions, make up the largest immigrant group, their distinct religion and culture has been a source of conflict and difference. Latin Americans are another important immigrant group who, due to a shared language, religion, and other vestiges of Spain’s colonial presence, are attracted to Spain rather than other European nations. The presence of Latin Americans has increased dramatically in the last five years, particularly from Ecuador, which in several years has exceeded Morocco as the largest immigrant population (Calavita 2000). Sub-Saharan Africans are also a more recent immigrant group who are most known in the media for traveling to Spain on poorly made boats in an attempt to enter Spain’s borders illegally. While these migrants have farther to travel than North Africans, they still resort to dangerous modes of transportation, even with more recent border control to address this specific issue. A sizeable number of Eastern European immigrants are also choosing to come to Spain, primarily from Romania and Bulgaria. While today Romanians and Bulgarians are another group of immigrants who perform undesirable jobs in Spain, this status may be changing in the near future. These two countries joined the EU in January of 2007, which means that within the next few years, these immigrants will have legal working rights based on their EU citizenship. As the last decade has issued enormous change in the different groups of immigrants coming to Spain, the next decade is shaping up to be the same.

The rate of foreign immigration to Spain is difficult to calculate because of the incredibly fast pace of immigration and the difficulty of accessing the number of illegal immigrants. Statistics from 1999 look different from 2007 so that sources of
statistical information become basically irrelevant after a few years, except for comparison purposes. That being said, in 2006 the Spanish government reported that there were 2,738,932 legal immigrants, which reflected an increase of 38.52% immigrants from the previous year. Of that number 36.02% came from Latin America, 23.71% came from Africa, including North Africa, 20.79% from the EU, 12.32% from the rest of Europe and 6.48% from Asia. In 2006 the largest group by country of origin was Morocco, followed by Ecuador, Columbia and Romania. Again, these numbers only include legal migrants, so the actual numbers are larger except in the case of EU immigrants who have no reason to come in illegally (Boletín Estadístico 2006).

While it is difficult to assess how many illegal immigrants actually live in Spain, it is clear that the immigrant population amounts to a large percent of Spain’s total population. Legal immigrants alone constitute 7.5% of the population, (Boletín Estadístico 2006) thus when illegal immigrants are included this number has been predicted to exceed eleven or twelve percent of the population. This number has skyrocketed in the past decade, since in 1980 legal immigrants made up only 0.4% of the Spanish population and still only 1.2% in 1994 (Escrivá 1997: 45). Given the fact that Spain has one of the lowest birth rates in Europe, immigrants are a vital source of growth. Particularly because birth rates are much higher among immigrant families, in conjunction with the fact that the Spanish population is getting older and older, the future of Spain is in some ways dependent on the presence of these foreigners.
4. Hierarchical Attitudes towards Immigrants

Part of the reason I decided to write this essay was due to the xenophobia that I observed while studying abroad in Spain. I was frequently blown away by comments I overheard and had the perception that racism was more socially accepted in Spain than at home, an observation that is solely based on my own experiences in the northeastern United States. However, in reading the literature on racism and xenophobia in Europe, I was surprised that on surveys of the last decade, Spain seemed to rank relatively low in these categories as compared to its European neighbors. However, in just the last decade, attitudes towards immigrants have changed tremendously as the number of migrants as increased exponentially. In more recent surveys, Spaniards are beginning to quantitatively demonstrate negative attitudes towards immigration. The example by Kitty Calavita demonstrates the point well:

In 1999, only 10.6 percent of Spanish respondents agreed with the statement, “Immigrants are a danger to our culture and identity,” less than half as many as among Italians, Germans, or French, and only one-third the number of English respondents who agreed. Three years later, the percentage of Spanish respondents agreeing with this “cultural threat” statement jumped to 25.8 percent, surpassing the percentage of Italian or German respondents who agreed (which in this same period declined), and narrowing the gap with the French and the English. The percentage of Spaniards who believed immigrants posed a threat to job security and to public safety almost tripled during this same period (2005: 126-127).

Attitudes seem to be changing at a ferocious rate, and as immigration continues to change, so will attitudes towards these new members of society.

While, as Calavita documents, racism and xenophobia are now a fact of life in Spain, these attitudes express themselves differently towards the various migrant groups, producing a hierarchy of preference. For example, Moroccan immigrants are not perceived the same way as Latin Americans, and EU citizens residing in Spain are
seen as distinct from Romanians and Bulgarians. On some level, the Spaniards have found a way to articulate these differences through linguistic devices. While foreigner is the official word to refer to individuals not born in Spain, the word for immigrant in Spanish is only used to refer to migrants from the third world. Foreigner is reserved to refer to all other groups that have adopted Spain to be their home (Calavita 2005: 27). Therefore British retirees are foreigners, while Ecuadorians are most certainly immigrants. But even within the category of immigrant, there exists a rigid hierarchy that is specific to Spain and its history.

To document this point, I analyze data from three different years to see if these perceptions of different immigrants have changed over time. In each of these three surveys, from 1995, 2000, and 2001, respondents were asked how they felt towards certain groups of immigrants, specified either by country or region. In analyzing the mean of each response, I was able to determine how each group was perceived in relation to each other. These numbers suggest that an immigrant hierarchy does exist based on public perceptions and the statistics help document a presence of a consistent hierarchy in Spain.

To analyze perceptions of immigrations in 1995, I used a data set from that year, which came from the Center for Research on Social Reality [Spain] Survey entitled “Attitudes towards Immigrants.” This data came from a series of nationwide surveys that were over a number of years in Spain. The question I analyzed read [my translation]: “Following this you will read a list of people from various places in the world. On a scale of zero to ten, tell us how you feel about each one of them where

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3 Participants were all over the age of 18 years old and living in Spain. The sample was random and 1200 individuals participated in the survey. In order to make consistent conclusions, I used list wise deletion to drop any missing data, ending up with 1068 responses.
zero means very bad and ten very good.” The groups listed read: Asians (Orientals), Eastern Europeans, North Americans, Russians, Arabs & Muslims, Occidental Europeans of the EU, Gypsies, Jews, South Americans, and Black Africans.

**Table 1.** Mean Values of Attitudes Towards Different Immigrant Groups, 1995.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occidental Europeans of the EU</td>
<td>6.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Americans</td>
<td>6.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europeans</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asians</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Africans</td>
<td>6.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>6.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Americans</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>5.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsies</td>
<td>5.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabs and Muslims</td>
<td>5.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown in Table 1, on average Arabs and Muslims were awarded the lowest score, while Occidental Europeans of the EU ended up on top. When evaluating this data, it is important to keep in mind that these surveys were taken in the first half of the nineties. At this point, immigration from Latin America was very small, as were those from Black Africa. However, the year does not necessarily account for the fact that Moroccans were not given a category, even though they were the largest immigrant group at this time and Russians were, even though immigration from this region has never been significant. While the category for Arabs and Muslims encapsulates most Moroccans, I still do not know how to account for the existence of a Russian category. While the means for each group do not appear to be vastly
different from each other, I do think they give insight into perceptions of different groups, particularly when viewed in comparison to data from the other years.

To compare the results presented in Table 1 from 1995, I used the data cited by Durán Ruiz (2003) from a survey by Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (Center of Sociological Investigations). The Center conducts surveys every month to track issues of importance to the Spanish population, and in February 2001 and June 2002 asked participants to rank their level of sympathy towards different groups of immigrants on a scale from zero to ten⁴. As opposed to the 1995 data, these surveys include a category for North Africans, as distinct from the rest of the continent, refer to South Americans as Latin Americans, and do not include categories for citizens of the EU, Jews, or Gypsies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latin Americans</td>
<td>7.14</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europeans (Polish, Hungarians, etc.)</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians and ICE (former Soviet Union)</td>
<td>6.33</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asians</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans (excluding Northern Africa)</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Africans (Moroccans, etc.)</td>
<td>5.89</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As seen in Table 2, Latin Americans were ranked the highest and North Africans the lowest. These findings are basically consistent with the 1995 data. However, what is most interesting about these findings is that while the mean values decreased in every category from 2000 to 2001, the order of highest mean to lowest

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⁴ The 2001 and 2002 surveys noted observations from 2188-2306 individuals.
mean remained the same. The hierarchy of immigrants stayed intact, even if every
group was rated as less favorable in the second year the survey was given. The data
from 1995, 2001, and 2002 document the clear presence of a hierarchy of preference
with Latin Americans on top, followed by Eastern Europeans, Asians, Sub-Saharan or
Black Africans and finally North Africans (also referred to as Arabs and Muslims)\(^5\).

While a clear preference does emerge from the data, the degree of difference
between categories is minimal. However, according to Durán Ruiz, this fact is
representative of the nature of surveys in which participants try to present themselves
as more politically correct than they would be in other settings (2003: 9). While
Spaniards may be trying to be politically correct in these surveys, we can still
perceive small differences that may emerge more sharply in less constrained speech.
Even though individuals may not feel comfortable rating North Africans, for example
with a particularly low score, the consistent mean differentials indicate that a
hierarchy does exist. Wayne Cornelius offers a reason for this pressure towards
political correctness: “Since the democratization movement that began in 1976, Spain
has been seized by the goal of becoming a “modern, European democracy”: liberal,
tolerant, with sensitivity for social justice, defense of the weak, and so forth. Racist,
xenophobic attitudes would be incompatible with these ideals. (1994: 360). However,
in the thirteen years since Cornelius’ text, these racist, xenophobic attitudes have
entered into Spanish life. This is not to say that Spain is not transforming into a

\(^5\) The wording of the question in the various surveys is not consistent throughout as the 1995 survey
asks participants how they feel about each group, while the surveys from 2001 and 2002 ask each
respondent for their level of sympathy towards each group. However, I feel that the questions are
similar enough that we can use the data to note the presence of a stable hierarchy over a period from
1995-2002. While the question in each survey does not explicitly ask the participant how they feel
about immigrants from these countries, as opposed to all people of this region, the question in all three
surveys fall in a category of questions that pertain to immigration. Thus while the question does not
explicitly ask participants to rank immigrants, I believe it was evident based on the order of questions.
“modern European democracy” because these attitudes certainly exist, if not on a more extreme level, in all other European nations that have historically been countries of immigration.

While attitudes differ by origin of each immigrant group, they also differ in the various regions of Spain. Each autonomous community has a distinct relationship with different immigrant groups, and thus perceptions change with geographic area. Autonomous communities with their own languages feel very differently towards Latin Americans than do regions where the language is Spanish. In Andalusia, a region in southern Spain that does not have its own language, the feeling is that Latin Americans are the most desirable. As one individual articulates the situation, “Look, nobody would want to have immigrants as neighbors… one would always prefer Spaniards… but if you had a choice, better they be Latin Americans, who are more like us, or black Africans, who are good people, better than Moroccans or Algerians who are the dirtiest and most problematic” (qtd. in Calavita 2005: 127). In Catalonia, however, where Catalan is used, Latin Americans are not the preferred immigrant group because they insist on speaking Spanish, not Catalan. Steve Marshall explains, “as allochthonous Spanish-speakers arriving in Catalonia during the linguistic normalization of the Catalan language, they do not fit tidily into many of the existing paradigms of sociolinguistic analysis” (159). Instead, Sub-Saharan Africans are seen as the preferable immigrant group as they learn Catalan instead of Spanish. While the surveys presented earlier demonstrate an immigrant hierarchy, the various local contexts tend to complicate this situation.
The data presented above supports the idea that Spaniards have a preference for immigrants most similar to them. Differences are perceived to hinder assimilation, which Spaniards may see as a detriment to their society. Even though Spaniards possess a historic model of multiculturalism, this idea has not seemed to permeate the recent discussion in which many Spaniards desire full assimilation of their new immigrants. Immigrants such as Latin Americans who most resemble the Spanish population in terms of language and culture are looked upon most favorably. While there are phenotypic differences that separate some Latin Americans, these immigrants are typically able to integrate most easily into Spanish society. This contrasts with Moroccans or other North Africans who are seen as very distinct from most Spaniards and have historically existed on the bottom rung of any kind of hierarchy. For centuries, Spaniards have feared the Moors (moros in Spanish), whose distinct religion and culture have set them apart. Much of this hostility dates back centuries when Muslims ruled vast portions of the Iberian Peninsula. Upon their expulsion, Spain became a unified nation that identified itself in opposition to the expelled Muslim “other.” Current manifestations of anti-Muslim sentiment are prevalent, and some refer to the phenomenon as “morofobia.” Stereotypes about this group abound, as the individual from Andalusia heard above was able to articulate. Thought to be dirty, and lazy, as well as thieves and misogynists, Muslims are the least desired throughout Spain (Duran Ruiz 2003: 9).

As opposed to the U.S., Spain’s hierarchy seems to rely more on cultural characteristics than physical properties. While the Spanish hierarchy is certainly racialized, cultural properties become more important than race as Moroccans are
perceived as least desirable throughout even though their phenotypic make-up is generally lighter than Sub-Saharan Africans. While Pettigrew’s model (1998) for immigrant hierarchies in Europe helps us to understand the different status levels that accompany different immigrant groups, it also falls short in explaining the differences documented above. While Pettigrew is correct in assessing citizens of the EU higher than other groups, he fails to provide an explanation as to why some groups of ex-colonial countries are preferred over others. I believe the difference lies primarily in religion, something Pettigrew does not take into account in his model.

As demonstrated throughout this section, a hierarchy of preference clearly exists, although it may not necessarily be consistent throughout all of Spain. This hierarchy can be understood in part through historic relations to other nations or regions that justify the perceived similarities or differences. In the next section we will see how these historic relations are reflected through immigration policy that work to favor certain groups over others.

5. Immigration Policy

Spanish immigration policy has gone through numerous transformations since its creation in 1985. Prior to this year, no explicit policy was in place, although a vague sentence appeared in the 1978 Constitution that stated that individuals born anywhere other than Spain could not vote or hold office. While immigrants in Spain were not frequent before this date, they lived and worked without fear since they were
not technically illegal because the category did not exist. The absence of this category is remarkable, particularly from a U.S. perspective, and reveals how the issue was not perceived as important to address at the policy level. However, as immigration started to increase around this time, legislation soon became necessary to create and implement. It is no coincidence that Spain explicitly laid out guidelines for immigration at exactly the same time it joined the European Community. As Kitty Calavita notes, “the evolution of Spain’s immigration laws goes hand in hand with the process of European integration” (1998: 543).

On July 1st, 1985, the Organic Law on the Rights and Liberties of Foreigners in Spain was put into effect, giving rights to foreigners and creating guidelines regarding illegal immigration. While the law was still vague, it specified requirements for different groups of immigrants, called for the use of entrance visas, as well as work and residency permits, allowed for deportation, and introduced a legalization program to deal with foreigners already in the country. Due to the huge tourist industry in Spain that accounts for a large portion of the economy, and the historic lack of immigration, entrance visas had not been deemed necessary in the past. However, the new legislation created entrance requirements for the first time, both for tourists and for potential residents, with various exceptions. Work and residency permits were also needed for the first time for certain groups of immigrants. The creation of the LOE reflects the newness of immigration in Spain since there was no prior need for this type of legislation. It also reflects the beginning of EU pressure

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6 Because the European Community became what is now the European Union (EU) I will use the term the EU to refer to the European countries that have joined this political boundary. It is important to note that Romania and Bulgaria did not join the EU until January 1, 2007.

7 In Spanish, the Ley Orgánica sobre Derechos y Libertades de los Extranjeros en España. I will use the commonly used Spanish acronym LOE to refer to this law.
concerning border regulation, which demanded that Spain address the existence of foreigners within its borders.

In specifying requirements for different groups, the LOE ranked immigrants in a variety of ways. One of the major distinctions was between citizens of EU countries and citizens from non-EU countries. Following agreements between many of the EU countries, fellow EU members could enter and leave at will and were permitted to live and work in Spain. Entrance visas (either for tourism or residency), work permits and residency permits were unnecessary for this group. While many provisions in Spanish immigration policy have changed since then, this feature is one that has remained the same.

The next distinction was made between different groups of non-EU citizens that are key to this essay. Individuals from Latin America, Portugal, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea, Andorrans, natives of Gibraltar and Sephardic Jews were exempt from the entrance visa that all other groups needed, as well as given preference in the issuance of work and residency permits. These preferences thus enabled them to live and work much easier than any other citizen of a non-EU country. The rational behind this policy is that all of these countries (or groups in the case of the Sephardic Jews) have historic, geographic, and cultural ties to Spain. Latin America, the Philippines, and Equatorial Guinea were all Spanish oversees colonies at one time. Portugal, Andorra, and Gibraltar all border Spain and have had varied degrees of control by the Spanish crown. Sephardic Jews they lived for centuries on the Iberian Peninsula until they were expelled in fifteenth century. While this provision was created to give preference to individuals with cultural ties to Spain, it also can also be
seen as a pull factor since immigrants are more likely to choose a country that gives them special compensation.

The final category the LOE concerned immigrants who were neither EU citizens nor from the preferred group of countries with historic links to Spain. These immigrants were required entrance visas for any length of stay, as well as work and residency permits if they stayed on past the three months the tourist visa allowed them. However, residents from North Africa fit somewhere in between the preferred group and the non-preferred group. Initially citizens of these countries were exempt from an entrance visa, but they were given none of the other advantages of the preferred group (Calavita 1998: 544). Even though Moroccans were once a Spanish colony, they have never been included fully in the advantaged group. In effect, the creation of the first immigration laws specified which groups were to be given privileges. In favoring certain immigrant groups over others, the law inherently created a hierarchy that correlates with the quantitative data presented earlier.

Although provisions for certain immigrants were outlined in the LOE, by 1991 there was a perceived need to re-examine the favored status of some immigrant groups. Individuals from Peru, the Dominican Republic and North Africa were perceived to make up the largest number of illegal immigrants and for this reason, some of their privileged status was taken away. While the rest of the privileged group, including citizens of other Latin American countries, were able to reap the benefits given to them in the 1986 legislation, these select countries were no longer advantaged under the law. Henceforth, Peruvians, Dominicans and North Africans were required to obtain visas prior to entry. While individuals from these three
countries can now apply for visas, there are a limited number that are only granted with evidence of a round-trip plane ticket and proof of financial stability (Cornelius 350). While the introduction of entrance visas forced Spain was to readdress its commitment to tourists, it created a mechanism to control illegal immigration. This legislation marks the total fall from grace of the North African immigrants who were initially given an exemption from this category although never given preference for work visas. Even though North Africa has the same colonial ties to Spain as some of the other groups, they have continually been de-valued under the law.

This attempt to curb illegal immigration in 1991 is closely connected to Spain’s entrance to the Schengen Agreement in the same year. The Schengen Agreement had been created in 1985, the same year Spain joined the EC, and had originally been signed by five other EC countries for the purpose of relaxing the borders between the nations. As Spain joined the list of participating countries, the issue of borders was particularly tenuous, creating a need for a tightening up of policy. The Spanish government chose to address the issue of illegal immigrants through visa requirements seeing it “as potentially a more effective instrument of immigration control than either border controls or employer sanctions” (Cornelius 1994: 351) While this has been re-examined more recently due to the surge in Africans attempting to arrive by boat, initially the existence of an entrance requirement was able to deter some illegal activity. As Spain’s immigration policy continued to go hand in hand with the development of the European Union, the country had to re-assess which immigrants were to be favored, continually discrediting colonial ties to North Africa as well as some Latin American countries.
While the LOE did provide a legal structure to deal with immigration, it created a system that made legal residency particularly difficult. Depending on country of origin, some immigrants are first required to arrange an entrance visa from their country of origin. Then all immigrants, with the exception of EU citizens, had to acquire a work contract from an employer in Spain. These job contracts were dependent on the fact that workers from Spain and the EU are not available to fill these positions. After this work contract was obtained, they then had to petition for both work and residency permits separately, although the residency permit was dependent on the work permit. This process occurred each time an immigrant worker changed jobs or the original work contract expired (Cornelius 1994: 345). Regardless of the work contract, work permits were only good for one year, and immigrants had to re-apply each year to keep their legal status. Thus, this process was complex since the bureaucratic nature of obtaining legal status was very difficult, not to mention the requirement for stable work, which is not common amongst new immigrants. Because of these frequent renewals, it was almost impossible for immigrants to stay legal for more than a few consecutive years. While immigrants might be able to arrange stable work for a year or two, it was highly common for individuals to lapse into periods of illegality. This is important because permanent legal status is dependent on uninterrupted legal residency and thus very few immigrants were granted this status. (Calavita 1998: 552). In summary, the first decade of mass immigration was characterized by exclusion under law, since the legislation did not take into account the realities of the immigrant work force.
In 2000, a new immigrant law came to replace the LOE. Entitled the Organic Law on the Rights and Liberties of Foreigners in Spain and Their Social Integration, commonly referred to as LO 4/2000, the law worked to increase immigrant’s rights and ease the division between legal and illegal immigrants. As a result, immigrants were given access regardless of legal status to public education, the national health care system, public housing, and social security. It also gave longer periods of legalization to migrants who could demonstrate they had lived in the country for several years (Calavita 2005: 30). These provisions acknowledged some of the flaws of the previous systems and attempted to solve some of the inconsistencies. However, the law was highly controversial, and a few months later, with a newly configured political majority, the law was repealed and replaced with Law 8/2000. The new legislation overturned many of the provisions outlined in LO 4/2000 and restricted immigrants from the rights of assembly, collective bargaining, striking, and participation in labor unions. It gave police wide discretion to putting immigrants in detention center and allowed for deportation within seventy-two hours of incarceration. Illegal immigrants still had access to schools and health care if they registered with the local municipality, but other social services such as public housing and social security were repealed. A liberal family unification program had been introduced in the early nineties, only to be modified by Law 8/2000 to allow only immediate family members (Calavita 2005: 33-34).

In the years following the implementation of the new immigration laws, more modifications have been made to the legal system. Since the Spanish government no longer wishes to use temporary legalization processes to help immigrants become
legal, they have created permanent legal structures to permit the legalization of immigrants. The process of “permanent regularization” grants legal permanent residence to immigrants who have lived illegally in the country for five years. The function of the local municipality, which documents the presence of immigrants in the country while keeping their identity confidential, helps to provide evidence of the length of stay of each individual. While five years is the standard period of time immigrants must reside in Spain, there are various exceptions based on family ties, work opportunities, and previous attempts at legalization (Durán Ruiz 2003: 14-15). Since Law 8/2000 makes significant distinctions between the rights of legal and illegal immigrants, structures have been put in place to aid the legalization process and give immigrants access to all these rights.

In recent years, the Spanish government redefined what it means to be a citizen. Previously, citizenship was only granted jus sanguinis, which meant that only individuals of Spanish blood could become citizens\(^8\). This meant that immigrants could not even aspire to escape their status as a foreign “other.” However, the law now offers citizenship based on a required number of years of legal, continuous residency. In the case of natives of Latin American countries, Andorra, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea, Portugal, and for Sephardic Jews citizenship is possible after two years. For all other individuals they must legally reside in the country for ten continuous years to become a citizen. As Francisco Durán Ruiz points out, “It is odd that, with the regime of Spanish nationality acquisition, immigrants from Ibero-American countries may obtain nationality without having

\(^8\) Being born on Spanish soil or marrying a Spanish citizen does not confer citizenship immediately; a child’s status depends on the status of his parents and spouses must wait a specified period until citizenship is granted.
obtained previously permanent residency, given that they are only required to have resided legally and continuously in Spain for two years” (2003: 27). Again, North African citizens are not included in this list, even though they have the same historic ties as the other countries. While Spain’s immigration policy has been amended over and over, and while the current thrust is to provide regularized avenues to permanent residency and citizenship, it still recognizes and valorizes some but not all of the groups with historic and cultural ties.

While the reforms at the beginning of this decade attempted to mend some of the inconsistencies of immigration policy, these policy changes also reflects divisions within the Spanish population. This is related to the idea of the “two Spain’s” that characterizes a country historically divided along political lines. The case of Spanish immigration policy has proven to be no different, as the switch from LO 4/2000 to Law 8/2000 within just a few months has shown. Because one political party received a majority for the first time in years, they were able to enact new legislation that had been previously impossible. As immigration policies continue to be amended and modified, they reflect the ideas of the current administration, which is subject to change. This has been the source of the various recent transformations, and can be expected to continue in the following years as Spain attempts to form a stable policy regarding the existence of foreigners. However, changes in administration are not the only source of modifications in policy since the demographics of Spanish immigration is ever changing. As the law attempts to reflect demographic changes as well as political changes in the country, it is hard to predict when a long-standing immigration policy will be established.
As immigrants attempt to obtain the same rights as Spaniards, they are subject to the various immigration laws that either help or hinder this process. As Durán Ruiz describes:

We can compare the process of social integration with the steps of a stairs. The different administrative situations are the steps, which are conformed by the status of rights and freedoms granted to the immigrants. On the first step, the narrowest one, we find the irregular immigrants in situation of ‘presence’. On the last step, the widest one, we find the permanent residents whose status of rights is very close to Spanish population (2003: 34).

When immigrants to Spain attempt to climb the staircase to receive the same rights as other Spaniards, their trajectory is greatly influenced by their country of origin. Since the Spanish legal system gives preference to some countries with historic links, which in effect helps to constructs a hierarchy, some immigrants start out higher up on the staircase than others. As this hierarchy continues to evolve, public perceptions are interrelated with these policy choices. We will explore this issue in the next section concerning labor markets.

6. Immigrants in the Spanish Labor Market: An Intersection of Attitudes and Policy

While immigration policy corresponds with the hierarchy of attitudes towards different immigrant groups, these laws are not necessarily the cause for such sentiments. Policy is a reflection of public perceptions, although the two certainly work hand in hand. Yet these public perceptions, which are reinforced through policy, pose real-life challenges to immigrants who wish to live and work in Spain. Perhaps these challenges are most clearly understood in relation to the Spanish labor
Immigrants who come to Spain in search of employment are susceptible to perceptions that impact hiring preferences. Much like in the U.S., certain groups of immigrants are preferred over others, and in this preference different workers are relegated to different sections of the labor market. In conjunction with labor policy that dictates which sectors immigrants can work in, niche development is slowly evolving. As policy, attitudes, and demographics change, these niches will continue to develop.

Spanish immigration policy sets out specific guidelines for the types of employment each category of immigrant can hold. Since all citizens of the EU are allowed to work in Spain, the policies are primarily aimed at immigrants from the third world. Legalized immigrant labor in Spain is regulated by a quota system that attempts to fill in gaps in the labor market. In 1993 Spain developed a system that called for workers from three different sectors of low wage labor that were considered of need. These areas consisted of agriculture, unskilled construction work, and service. Agriculture made up the largest category of workers with 10,000 spots, followed by domestic service with 5,000 spots, 1,100 for construction work and 3,500 for other services. These numbers stay roughly the same each year, with some notable exceptions, and are determined by expressed need in each autonomous community. Previously these quota systems also served to legalize workers already living in Spain illegally, as they were initially eligible to apply to the program (Calavita 1998: 545). However, in subsequent legislation, the program has been modified and limited to workers entering Spain legally and thus no longer serves as an avenue for legalization. This system works to the benefit of the Spanish economy to provide a
constant supply of legal workers to areas with an articulated need. However certain employers may feel disadvantaged by the system in their inability to continue to exploit illegal labor. The Spanish government has continually threatened to penalize employers who use illegal labor, yet the practice still remains common, particularly in the three areas outlined in the quota system (Calavita 2005: 69).

Because there is typically a surplus of immigrant labor, employers can choose who they want to employ. This feeds into and reinforces the immigrant hierarchies that have been discussed throughout this paper. Different associations with the various groups enables there to be hiring preferences that work to reinforce general attitudes towards the different groups. For example, in general, when given a choice, employers will seek to hire Sub-Saharan Africans over North Africans since they are stereotyped as more hardworking and trustworthy (Cornelius 1994: 338). This is consistent with the view that North Africans are perceived at the bottom of the immigrant hierarchy, even though they have colonial links to Spain and phenotypically more similar to Spaniards. Latin Americans are generally used for employment that has more direct contact with the public since they are able to effectively communicate. While this may vary throughout the different regions in Spain, depending on the regional language, their ability to interact with the public can seen as beneficial. However, because their speech is accented, native Spaniards are generally preferred, although generally require a higher salary. In Catalonia, where Catalan is widely spoken, this may be different since workers who are willing to learn Catalan will be preferred. These preferences aid in niche formation since they dictate which workers will be hired over others.
Niche development in Spain has followed the same trend as in other countries with a large immigrant workforce. Labor niches generally occur either where there is a new or growing industry or when a new group comes in to replace more traditional workers. Generally this happens when “changes in the supply of local, native-born labor produced shortages prior to the advent of immigrants” (1994: 11), as Roger Waldinger’s case study on immigrant professional employees in the New York City government demonstrates. Changes in the Spanish economy prior to the arrival of mass immigration opened up opportunities for immigrant labor. For example, in the field of domestic service middle and upper class families historically employed a live-in maid as a status symbol. During the mass rural to urban migrations of the fifties, many rural women came to occupy these positions. However, in later decades these women preferred work on a daily basis instead of a live-in basis as they had their own families to take care of. Therefore, immigrant women came to fill in this gap as early as 1970 (Escrivá 1997: 54). During the first decade of immigrant labor, Philippine women were most often associated with the domestic service sector. A decade later, Dominican women made up a majority of workers in this industry, although most recently they have been replaced by Ecuadorians (Gratton 2007: 591). The composition of this sector is subject to change in part due to demographic shifts in the immigrant population. Philippine immigrants were more populous in the beginning phases of immigrant, while now Latin Americans and Ecuadorians in particular make up large percentages of the immigrant population. With an increasing number of immigrants who speak the native language, I see these candidates as being more likely to be chosen for these jobs. The ability to communicate is seen as desirable in
these types of positions, which works to reinforce the perception of Latin Americans as a more desirable immigrant group.

While niche development has occurred in sections of the labor market that have been deserted by local workers, this has proved to be contentious as many wrongfully blame immigrants as a primary source for high rates of unemployment. Spain holds one of the highest unemployment rates in Europe and while many scholars have argued these figures on unemployment are vastly inflated, many see it contradictory that immigrants are being solicited for work when Spaniards are unemployed. However, it is important to note that competition generally does not take place between Spaniards and immigrants. Part of the reason lies in policy because for immigrants to legally acquire a work contract, they must demonstrate that Spaniards or EU citizens were not available for this employment. Another reason lies in the fact that immigrants generally perform low status jobs for little pay that Spaniards have previously deserted. Through importing immigrant labor, employers are not forced to raise wages and working conditions for local workers who refuse to accept jobs that have come to be seen as undesirable. Thus, the opinion that immigration is a cause of unemployment is generally false, even though it works to provoke discrimination and xenophobia.

The delegation of employment in Spain is by no means standard as changes in attitudes and policy continue to impact the labor market. The case of Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants gives us special insight into the ways this occurs since their status has recently changed. Immigrants from these countries have consistently been classified as lower than Latin Americans, yet higher than most other groups in the
studies presented previously. However, as Romania and Bulgaria entered the EU in June 2007, their status is subject to change, as they now technically must be reclassified as EU citizens. Unfortunately, even though these immigrants are now citizens of the EU, they must remain in a sort of limbo since they were not awarded all of the same rights as other EU citizens (Lyall 2006). Currently Romanians and Bulgarians do not enjoy the same working rights as other EU citizens, although I expect this will change over time. Thus, while these individuals have not previously been selected over other groups of immigrants, this will most probably change in the near future once their rights as full EU citizens are recognized. As employers will be forced under law to hire these workers over other immigrant labor, their status in society may change and correspondingly be perceived differently in the immigrant hierarchy. Since they have previously worked in the same sectors as immigrants from the third world, their newly acquired rights will give them a large advantage in the labor market. In the context of this discussion of the intersection of policy and attitudes, it will be interesting to see if the public perceptions of these groups will improve. After years of relatively negative public sentiment, the new law may propel these attitudes to change. While only time will tell what will happen, I think a close examination of the citizens from these countries could shed much light on how immigrant hierarchies are constructed in Spain.

As policy and attitudes continue to evolve in the Spanish setting the effects will continue to play out in the labor market. While policy and hiring preferences are not the only factor that affects niche development, these factors will continue to be influential in determining which groups of immigrants perform which types of
employment. Niche development in itself works to perpetuate attitudes towards certain groups of immigrants, and thus the combination of policy, attitudes and position in the labor market contribute to the ever-changing social order in Spain.

7. Conclusion

As show throughout this paper, immigration in Spain, like in other places, reflects a preference for some groups over others. This is evident in numerous ways including Spaniards’ perceptions of different groups, the language used to refer to foreign residents, in immigration policy through different requirements for different groups, in hiring tactics and more. All of these preferences provide internal reasons that contribute to and reinforce a hierarchy that is remarkably consistent. While this hierarchy may be different in local contexts, it is a visible feature of Spanish society. Yet simply the existence of this hierarchy does not provide a thorough explanation for its importance and meaning within the Spanish context. In exploring the various external reasons that impact the Spanish immigrant hierarchy, a better understanding of internal factors is achieved.

The Spanish immigrant hierarchy has deep historical roots that are related to a sense of national identity. While Muslims controlled the Iberian Peninsula centuries ago, the end of their reign signified the unification of Spain. This period has been seen as crucial to the development of Spain as it is known today and serves as the
beginning of a national identity in which Spain as a nation is created and defined as anti-Muslim and anti-Jewish. Christianity has historically served as a key feature of Spanishness, which helps explain why Christian immigrants are much better received than Muslim immigrants. While Christianity has remained a salient feature of Spain for centuries, Spaniards still feel threatened by the existence of Muslims in their country. Lydia Esteve Gonzalez articulates the argument many present-day Spaniards feel, “we threw them out once from Spain, at a great cost; and now they are invading us again” (2000; foot note 190). There is certainly a fear, particularly with a very low national birth rate, as opposed to a high immigrant birth rate, that the next generations of immigrants will begin to take over as they did many centuries ago. This can be seen as a threat to national identity, which has been historically rooted in Christianity even though the Church has become less powerful since the fall of Franco’s dictatorship. Thus, the threat that these Muslims pose to Spanish identity help explain why these individuals are not given the same preference as other countries in immigration policy, even though they share the same historic and colonial links to Spain.

Spain’s colonial legacy has much to do national identity and with immigrant hierarchies. For centuries, the country’s position as a world power with a far-reaching colonial empire became a vastly important feature of Spanish identity. When Spain lost the majority of its colonies in 1898, Spaniards felt a well-recorded sense of loss. In literature, as well as art, Spain has recorded this loss that still carries weight today. Even though a century has passed since Spain lost the majority of its territories, the idea that Spain was once a great power is still somewhat present and relates to a sense
of national identity. Thus, colonial links still have importance to the Spanish, who see these links as the last vestige of their great power.

While Spain still identifies with its colonial past, it also has come to see its power renewed with entrance to the EU. This entry symbolizes the future for Spain as it becomes a path for the country to gain international recognition once again. Admittance to the EU also represents a clear divergence from the repressive past and final acceptance as a European power. Therefore, Spain has a great interest in adhering to the expectations of this political entity, even if this may clash with past conceptions of national identity.

Spain is in a difficult position of balancing its interests to the EU while honoring its colonial ties. Part of the pressure from the EU comes from Spain’s location just thirteen kilometers from Africa, as Spain represents a border to “Fortress Europe.” Since Spain has at times employed a fairly liberal policy for citizenship, most especially so for those with certain colonial ties, the issue of immigration in Spain has the potential to result in an issue for Europe as citizens of Spain are citizens of Europe. As the EU puts more pressure on Spain to control its illegal immigration, the country must slowly relinquish ties to its prior colonies. For this reason Spanish immigrant policy has seen so many reconfigurations, as the nation tries to find a compromise. This present compromise is tenuous at best, and apt to be modified at any time. The past decades have signified a period of transformation as Spain struggles to juggle the past and the future.

Spain is certainly not the only European country that is trying to navigate issues of immigration and policy. Virtually all of the European countries are trying to
craft policies that fit the needs of each country, as well as the EU. While there is talk of a unified immigration policy for the EU, it will be very difficult to navigate the complexities of each country’s relationship to other regions outside of Europe. As each member country must balance its own past with the future of the EU, the emergence of a successful policy may prove to impossible.

The creation of the EU has forced a reconfiguration of the “other.” While Spaniards at one time held this position when millions of Spaniards emigrated to work in other European nations, their admittance to EU citizenship gave them a new status. Today third world immigrants have been constructed as “other” in Spanish society. Yet as the borders of the EU continue to change, most recently with the inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria this past January, the definition of “other” continues to change. In the past, EU status seems to trump all else in giving privilege to this group. However, as Romanians and Bulgarians have previously been seen as the “other” it is unclear how their new status will affect their perception in Spanish society. In studying how these groups are perceived, we may learn more about the ways the Spanish hierarchy is constructed. As the concept of “other” continues to be re-evaluated, attitudes towards immigrants are in a constant reconfiguration.

The idea of Europe as a political entity complicates many of the commonly assumed definitions of nations, citizens and borders. Now that all citizens of the EU can live and work anywhere in Europe, these individuals are inherently preferred under the law. While this may be seen as beneficial to many, the arrangement does not take into account historic relations between countries of the EU or with other countries outside of Europe. Thus all of Europe’s immigrant hierarchies are in the
process of being reconfigured since previous immigrants are now considered fellow “citizens.” While it is unclear how these laws have affected public perceptions in other countries, it is apparent that immigrant hierarchies will continue to evolve as each country works to negotiate its new social order. The case of Spain, as a new destination for immigration and a more recent member of the EU, sheds light on just one example of how these hierarchies are maneuvered. As Europe continues to negotiate its relationship with the rest of the world, these issues will continue to be deliberated for years to come and thus deserve attention from scholars around the globe.
Bibliography


