‘Ahora Más Que Nunca’: Memory Production Following the Peruvian Internal Conflict

by

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Para Máximo Guillermo Rodríguez Delgado,
que su memoria viva dentro de esta tesis,
siempre con nosotros, siempre presente.
# Table of Contents

**Acknowledgements**  
5

**Introduction: Production of Memory in the Aftermath of Violence**  
The Internal Conflict  
10  
How Can We Describe Memory Production Following the Internal Conflict?  
14  
Chapter Outline  
18

**Chapter One: Truth, Reconciliation and State Produced Memory**  
Introduction  
21  
Where does the Peruvian case fit in within frameworks of transition?  
26  
How does a Nation Cure its Trauma?  
30  
Which Injustices were Left Out?  
39

**Chapter Two: Places, Realms and Sites of Memory Production**  
Introduction  
43  
El Ojo que Llora  
47  
El Lugar de la Memoria  
57  
El Museo del Directorio Nacional en Contra del Terrorismo en el Peru  
67

**Chapter Three: Alternative Narratives, and the Production of Cultural Memory in the Private Sphere**  
Introduction  
74  
La Teta Asustada  
79  
Adios Ayacucho  
86

**Conclusion and Reflections**  
92
Acknowledgments

I began this project over a year ago, when I decided to write about the Peruvian internal conflict in an effort to learn more about my family’s own history through the history and politics of the nation that both of my parents are from. Having the opportunity to look at the internal conflict through the lens of memory production has been interesting as I make connections between a nation’s trauma and my family’s own intergenerational trauma and memory surrounding the internal conflict. I knew about the internal conflict far before I knew about any of the history and politics surrounding it. Growing up, my parents would seldom tell me anything surrounding their upbringings. To an extent, this was an issue of language and cultural barriers. But on another level, it was likely because of the awareness that I was unable to fully comprehend what living in Peru in the 1970s and 80s was truly like. Occasionally, snapshots of my father’s upbringing would be revealed to me in lessons in parenting that were an attempt to get me to appreciate the opportunities and the life that I had. My father would describe the electricity going out often in his neighborhood, for weeks at a time. He would often lament about a lack of warm water, food, and the difficulties of living life by candlelight. I didn’t know it at the time, but what my father was describing was a common tactic by the Shining Path to terrorize Lima and its citizenry. Through the destruction of electrical towers, the Shining Path would induce blackouts across Lima’s power grids, creating chaos and unrest for other attacks. This was a common tactic utilized by the Shining Path during the 1980s. Through this project I have gotten the opportunity to travel to Peru for the first time in my life (previously my parents had prohibited me from traveling to Peru due to concerns about my safety), and meet my family, see the places where my parents lived and got to know many of the people and places that shaped them into the people I know them to be today.

This thesis is dedicated to my late grandfather, Guillermo Rodriguez. I first met him a year and a half ago when I was studying abroad in Madrid. I don’t know much about my mom’s side of the family, but upon meeting him and our Madridian family I was instantly received as one of their own and treated with the upmost kindness. It is the pleasure of my lifetime that I had the opportunity to meet my grandfather before he passed. He was a friendly man, with a good sense of humor and an infectious laugh. We will always have the time we spent together in the Plaza del Toros.

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Thank you to the Wesleyan faculty who assisted me throughout this whole project. My advisor President Michael Roth, who has been a huge help this year.
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A big thanks to all the members of my family that treated me so kindly and with great hospitality while I was in Lima. Thank you to: the Campos side of the family for having me over their house; my cousin Pierre for nursing me back to health when I fell ill near the end of my trip; and my aunt Romy and uncle Eddie for their kindness and help finding my way around the city.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my parents, Roxana and Javier, and brother Dylan for everything. I wouldn’t be where I am today without their support and love. I am grateful for the sacrifices that they have made for me and want to acknowledge that they have not gone unnoticed. This thesis is also for them, and in honor of the journey they made 30 years ago to the United States seeking a better life.

As a young child, my mother would frequently hum songs to get me to fall asleep. One song that comes to mind when reflecting on the thesis is “Carry that Weight” by The Beatles. I don’t think she understood the meaning behind Lennon’s and McCartney’s lyrics at the time, but they are so clear to me now.

Boy, you’re gonna carry that weight
Carry that weight a long time
Boy, you’re gonna carry that weight
Carry that weight a long time

Note: All sources originally in Spanish were translated by the author unless otherwise noted.
Key Terms

- **APRA** - American Popular Revolutionary Alliance – a center-left Peruvian political party. Alan Garcia served as president of APRA and is the only party member ever to have been elected as President of Peru.
- **CIDH** – Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (IACHR, Inter-American Court of Human Rights), an autonomous judicial institution based in the city of San José, Costa Rica. It serves to uphold and promote basic rights and freedoms in the Americas. The Court rules on whether a State has violated an individual’s human rights, rather than if individuals are guilty of human rights violations.
- **CVR** – Commission de la Verdad y Reconciliación – was a truth and reconciliation commission established by President Alejandro Toledo to investigate the human rights abuses committed during the 1980s and 1990s.
- **DIRCOTE/DINCOTE Museum** – El Museo del Directorio Nacional en Contra del Terrorismo or The Museum of the National Directorate against Terrorism in Peru, a museum run by the Counter-Terrorist Directorate branch of the National Police of Peru that is responsible for Peru’s anti-terrorist law enforcements efforts. They are responsible for the capture of Shining Path leader Abimael Guzmán.
- **Quechua** – the language most spoken by descendants of the indigenous peoples controlled by the Incan empire. The actual number of Quechua speakers is difficult to determine, but estimates are between 4 million and 4.5 million, about 20 percent to 25 percent of the total population.
- **Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)** – is a communist revolutionary organization in Peru, espousing Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. When it first launched the internal conflict in Peru in 1980, its goal was to overthrow the state by guerrilla warfare.
- **LUM** – Lugar de la Memoria, la Tolerancia y la Inclusión Social (Place of Memory, Tolerance, and Social Inclusion), a museum, cultural center, place of reconciliation and reflection on the Shining Path’s reign of terror in Peru from the 1980s through 2000.
Introduction

Production of Memory in the Aftermath of Violence

One of the ways history is not merely professional or a matter of research is that it undertakes to create a critically tested, accurate memory as its contribution a cognitively and ethically responsible public sphere.

- Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma

The Internal Conflict

Peru’s twenty yearlong internal armed conflict, or as it is known to the Quechua-speaking people of Peru the *sasachakuy tiempo* or “the difficult time”,1 began in 1980 when the Communist Party of Peru- Shining Path declared its armed phase of its revolution to overthrow the state and ended with the fall of Alberto Fujimori’s government in 2000. This came after a twelve-year military rule, and in protest of the first democratic election in years, where President Fernando Belaúnde was elected to power. The Shining Path was founded in the early 1970s during the military reformist government. The group has its ideological origins in Maoist groups created following the Sino-Soviet split of the late 60s. And it rejects electoral politics and its leader Abimael Guzmán, dismisses all forms of legal or peaceful struggle on the Peruvian left as “revisionism” and treasonous to the cause. Sendero would turn its violence against leaders of popular organizations, elected officials, priests and nuns, nongovernmental organization members, and state functionaries. They

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targeted anyone who didn’t pledge their allegiance to their “people’s war” that was based in the escalation of violence and terror.²

It is difficult to understand the internal conflict without considering the societal divisions by race, geography and legacies of colonial Spanish rule that exist in Peru. Edward Said’s Orientalism comes to mind as a useful theoretical tool to understand these socio-cultural divisions. Said refers to what he calls Orientalism as the conception of the other that is absolutely distinct from the western. This extreme Othering is borne out of colonialism and colonial extractive institutions. In the case of former Spanish colonies, and the conquest of indigenous American empires, orientalism played a profound role in determining the configuration of power. Said tells us that, the relationship between the west and the other is thus, a “relationship of power, of domination, and of a complex hegemony”.³

Anthropologist Jane Schneider and historian Barbara Weinstein conceptualize Said’s orientalism on a nationwide scale, examining how it manifests within one country. They argue that orientalism arises where “national histories produce extreme regional contrasts” and that in the case of Peru the erosion of Andean structures of life by colonialism, constituted the creation of an Andean identity or lo andino as the other, thus sowing the conditions for indigenous people to be marginalized throughout Peruvian history.⁴ This marginalization is what drives the historically

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rooted political, economic, and social exclusion of indigenous peoples in Peruvian society. This is important when considering what exactly drove thousands of poor peasants to join the Shining Path’s ranks. When we consider that the Shining Path dealt militarily with concrete problems of the poor, it is clear that the allegiance was more pragmatic rather than in agreement with the foundation of a new order.⁵ And it is also worth noting that these alliances were rarely unanimous, and often created politically divided and polarized peasant communities.

Social scientist Dirk Kruijt argues that the Shining Path was able to consolidate occupied territories and power in the Peruvian highlands, because of the frayed relationship between the Belaúnde government and the armed forces, and the destruction of public infrastructure and expulsion of political figures in rural sectors.⁶ Additionally, the regions of the Peruvian highlands produced 60 percent of the world’s coca in the 1980s, and the Shining Path was able to utilize the earnings from coca production to fund their activity.⁷ It didn’t help that the Belaúnde administration (1980-1985) and the Alan Garcia administration that followed (1985-1990) did not take the threat seriously, and only local and national police forces were utilized to neutralize the threat, while the military was delayed in creating a coherent plan to tackle the Shining Path threat and the threat continued to proliferate.

⁷ Ibid., 37.
In fact, by 1990 the Sendero Luminoso insurgency had grown to the point where 40 percent of Peru’s territory had been declared “emergency zones” and were placed under the administrative control of the military. The state’s involvement in the conflict was escalated by the Fujimori administration (1990-2000) that suspended the constitution in a military backed coup d’état, and was largely characterized by market fundamentalist policies, disdain for democratic institutions and staunch anti-communist and anti-terrorist action. Fujimori’s government is largely credited with defeating the insurgency, which was destabilized after the capture of the Sendero’s leader Abimael Guzman, and for providing a new sense of security to the country. The Shining Path was not the only perpetrator of violence; however, it is important to remember that much of violence took the form of state-sanctioned human rights abuses under the governments of three different presidents. In the aftermath of the internal conflict, 69,000 people were murdered or disappeared, over 40,000 children were orphaned, over 20,000 women were left widowed, and about 600,000 internal refugees migrated to the cities to escape the terror. It is estimated that about 40 percent of the political violence that occurred during the internal conflict was at the at the hands of state security, paramilitary, and other police forces.

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How Can We Describe Memory Production Following the Internal Conflict?

Historian Jay Winter critiques the use of the term “collective memory” in studies about memory and argues that it is not the memory of large groups. He says, “states do not remember; individuals do.”11 Instead he says, if we are to ascribe any meaning to collective memory it is “the process through which different collectives, from groups of two to groups in their thousands, engage with acts of remembrance together”.12 Thus, in throughout this thesis I will be utilizing Winter’s definition of collective memory to discover how Peru’s citizenry remembers the internal conflict. This definition of collective memory is compatible with the goals of societal reconciliation, which is facilitated through the acknowledgment of past atrocities in the public sphere. This thesis poses the following interrelated questions: how are past political periods remembered and contested? How have legacies of violence and poverty manifested themselves in contemporary discourse? And how do we then reconstruct and reconcile social relations within such a fractured society? These questions cannot be adequately answered within a single thesis, of course, but I will attempt to uncover more about how different modes of memory production within Peruvian society seek to tackle these important questions. And by comparing these approaches we can discover how Peru is attempting to remember the internal conflict.

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12 Ibid., p. 5.
The internal conflict is a relatively recent conflict. It is not intergenerational and the task of remembering the conflict lies with those who were alive when it occurred. Those who survived to tell their stories about political violence and terror. Thus, as with the production of memory in other cases of war, the objective of remembering in the internal conflict is to create memory of past atrocities to avoid repeating the past, to honor the victims, and to ensure a peaceful and productive political transition. As we will see in the remainder of the thesis, calls for memory and justice after violence have merged with the demands for human rights, reparations and institutional change.

This thesis rests on the assumption that the production of memory is a political process. Political Scientist Jo-Marie Burt argues that memory may also be deployed to justify past and current political projects. She calls this phenomenon the “battles of memory” and these battles serve to represent the “distinct conceptualizations of politics and the collective good, and the subjective rendering of the meaning of past events.”13 Historian Steve Stern, argues on similar grounds claiming that “people from different social sectors, with distinct political trajectories and varied personal and collective experiences, have vastly different memories of the same political events.”14 And it is this disconnect from the memories of different sectors of society that creates a struggle for memory in the public sphere. A struggle

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between different groups that influences the memory of an event in a way that is quite intentional. Competing and often conflicting memories in this vein vie for credibility in the public sphere, credibility that is politically motivated.

A prime example of the construction of subjectivities in the production of memory is in the case of the assassination of María Elena Moyano. Moyano was a community organizer, feminist, activist, and the deputy mayor of Villa El Salvador, a shantytown outside of the capitol. Through her work with various community advocacy organizations she worked to install food kitchens, health committees, the Vaso de Leche program (which provided local children with milk), and committees for education. She disagreed with what she saw as the infiltration of the Shining Path in women’s organizations. An outspoken critic of the Shining Path and their place in Peruvian left-wing politics, she was murdered by Shining Path guerillas on February 15, 1992. It is important to know that Moyano was critical of Fujimori’s state violence, and his administration’s neoliberal economic policies which she believed were destroying her community. After her death, the Fujimori administration hailed her as a hero and invoked her memory as a reminder of the Shining Path’s brutality. But, in effect, what this does is erase and abstract her image from her political beliefs, as she disagreed with and in life had spoken out against Fujimori’s administration as well. Her memory, for the Fujimori administration, served as a way to legitimize the regime’s authoritarian political project and give credence to the escalation of state-sanctioned violence during this period. Her memory was especially appropriated in the period following Fujimori’s April 5th coup
d’état that same year. She was portrayed as a passionate community leader, who was adored by the people within her community and stood up to the Shining Path, only to be murdered against the will of the people. To the Shining Path, however, she was seen as a “state collaborator and a member of the revisionist Left, an enemy of the revolution whose betrayal must be paid in blood.”

They saw her political presence and success as a non-violent community leader as an affront to their combative objectives, and their goal to radicalize the masses. And as efforts to achieve truth and justice move forward, and both Fujimori and the Shining Path are held accountable for their actions, battles over memory, and the meaning behind the internal conflict will rage on.

Figure 1. María Elena Moyano. Courtesy of El Comercio.

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Chapter Outline

The first area of inquiry for this thesis is the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR), which was established by executive decree in 2001 as a Truth Commission and was later amended to add “reconciliation”. The commission’s objective was to “clarify the processes, facts and responsibilities of the violence and human rights violations attributable to the terrorist organizations, as well as agents of the state.” In practice, this included ethnographic research, review of archives compiled by the U.S. State Department, and the collection of thousands of testimonies from a variety of actors; including victims, perpetrators, witnesses, political and religious leaders, and institutional representatives. Utilizing this information, the commission created and published an official record and analysis of the internal conflict in 2003, and at the same time recommended policies and identified criminal responsibility for the state to address. This document serves as the state’s official historical narrative of the internal conflict, and I will be analyzing its framework and objectives in comparison to other frameworks that seek to investigate and interpret past atrocities and dictatorial pasts, how it was perceived and interpreted by public intellectuals, party leaders, and members of the media, and what narratives were ultimately excluded from the commission’s final report.

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Next, I will investigate spaces that commemorate the internal conflict and serve as sites of memory. These sites include, El Lugar de la Memoria, a museum that houses a documentation and research center that, in the wake the CVR report, is dedicated to the pedagogical and cultural commemoration of the history of violence that occurred during the internal conflict; El Ojo que Llora, a memorial that was privately commissioned and designed to honor the victims of the internal conflict in Peru, in an attempt to create a collective narrative and promote peace; and El Museo del Directorio Nacional en Contra del Terrorismo en el Peru (DIRCOTE Museum), a museum curated by the Peruvian National Police’s anti-terrorist directorate (National Counter-terrorism Directorate), which houses confiscated artifacts previously owned by Shining Path members and tells the story about the internal conflict from the perspective of DIRCOTE’s forces. Sites of memory such as these serve to produce a dominant narrative of history and one that persists in the public sphere long after those directly involved in the conflict are gone. In and of themselves, sites of memory are the product of conflicts and struggles over narratives and thus they merit thorough investigation.

Lastly, I will analyze narratives that explore the conflict between the government and Shining Path, with particular attention to how the past is re-performed in different cultural settings of remembrance. This will be achieved through analyzing ‘Adios Ayacucho’, a short story by Julio Ortega that has also been

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17 This memorial has been the subject of controversy as it honors the deaths of inmates who were members of Sendero in addition to the deaths of victims of violence from Sendero and the state.
performed by the Peruvian theatre group Yuyachkani, and ‘La Teta Asustada’ a film directed by Claudia Llosa. Both works of fiction seek to commemorate the memory of victims of the internal conflict and demonstrate the ways that individuals grapple with their trauma. ‘Adios Ayacucho’ serves as a critique of twentieth century understandings of Peruvian culture that universalized Andean people and culture, and ascribed inherent qualities to them. This methodology resulted in the labeling of Andean people as inherently violent and utilized this as an explanation for the internal conflict in Peru’s rural regions. ‘La Teta Asustada’, on the other hand, relies heavily on contemporary understandings of culture that takes cultural difference into account when considering how to work through trauma.
Chapter One
Truth, Reconciliation and State Produced Memory

“The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.”
- Karl Marx, the German Ideology

“They gave us their voices. We return them in a report that tells the story of us all, the history that we must not forget, the history that we must not repeat, and the other story, that of hope, that which should begin today.”
- Dr. Salomón Lerner Febres, concluding his presentation of the CVR’s Final report in Ayacucho

Introduction

After the fall and exile of President Alberto Fujimori, the transitional government of Valentin Paniagua in 2001 established The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR). The commission’s final report, Hatun Willakuy, which is a Quechua expression that translates to “the great story”, was submitted to President Alejandro Toledo and the Peruvian nation in 2003. The Peruvian commission drew on the international history of truth commissions, that emerged following the twentieth century’s “dirty wars” and dictatorships in the Latin American southern cone and in Central America. Between 1974 and 2007, 28 countries had created truth commissions. Argentina was the first Latin American nation to participate in this demand for truth and accountability, creating the National Commission on Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP) in 1983. Its report was simply entitled *Nunca Mas*. 

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The commission in Peru was charged with establishing an objective account of the two decades of political violence and unrest that took place from 1980 to 2000. This era of violence began with the Shining Path’s attack on the Andean village of Chuschi, where they burned ballot boxes in the village during the first democratic election in which Andean peasants were allowed to vote following the end of a decades-long military dictatorship. This was their declaration of war against Peruvian liberal democracy. And this era ended with the exile of Fujimori, after thousands of videotapes surfaced showing him and the former head of Internal Intelligence, Vladimiro Montesinos, bribing an array of public officials, ranging from congressmen to media figures. This corruption scandal set the stage for the political conditions and contestation that would result in the establishment of the CVR. That is to say, the corruption scandal, along with the state’s abuse of violence upon its citizens throughout the internal conflict, resulted in a loss of trust from citizens in the institutions that depend upon trust for their survival, thus creating the political and social need for memory, justice and accountability. Therefore, memory in the Peruvian case is utilized to provide political stability to the transitional government following Fujimori’s authoritarian rule. The CVR attempts to explain the emergence of the Shining Path and the brutal response by security forces of the state. The commission held the insurgents responsible for 57 percent of deaths and disappearances throughout the conflict, while the security forces were blamed for 37 percent of deaths and disappearances.\textsuperscript{18} The CVR shocked the public with its

\textsuperscript{18} Peru. Comisión de la Verdad y, Reconciliación: “Conclusiones Generales”.
estimate of over 69,280 deaths resulted from political violence on both sides of conflict. This is three times the estimated number cited by numerous human rights organizations and the government prior to the release of the findings by the CVR.\textsuperscript{19} This establishes the internal conflict as the most violent episode in the country’s history, exceeding the number of deaths caused by both the wars of independence and the war against Chile.\textsuperscript{20}

Historically, truth commissions have played a major role in societies that have undergone periods of intense conflict and violence and that sought a transition towards peace, stability, establishment of the rule of law, and human rights. Thus, truth commissions, at least tacitly, serve to legitimize the regime that follows a period of violence. The task of truth commissions varies greatly, but generally they aim to catalogue testimonies and generate participation in public hearings by victims, survivors and perpetrators. In the case of Peru and the creation of the CVR, this delineation between victim and perpetrator is obscured due to the fact that the Peruvian case is an intra-state conflict involving various non-state actors. With intra-state conflict the task of assigning culpability and responsibility, and the larger task of reconciling society is extremely difficult. Many felt that they have been wronged throughout this conflict by both the Shining Path and the Peruvian government. The victims of the internal conflict were disproportionately indigenous Peruvians,

Spanish is not their native language, and they hailed from rural communities. Those who served on the commission and worked to collect testimonials for the report often came from vastly distinct backgrounds from the highland Peruvians of indigenous descent that they were working with. This is evidenced in Kimberly Theidon’s ethnographic work *Intimate Enemies: Violence and Reconciliation in Peru*, where Theidon describes her experience in Ayacucho interacting with rural communities and listening to their narratives of trauma while struggling not to impose her own western worldview onto others.

Truth Commissions and the data they collect are invaluable pieces of the production of state sanctioned memory. In the recent past, three frameworks of memory production have predominated among transitional states. The first is a human rights framework, which has accountability as its primary objective. This includes, a complete investigation of violations under dictatorships, and the punishment of the perpetrators. The second is a reconciliation framework, which is concerned with democratic stability and thus focuses its efforts on building a future rather than revisiting a past. And the third framework, looks to romanticize the past and glorify a time of “law and order” brought about by these authoritarian leaders. All of these frameworks serve to create an official narrative of history in the public sphere. This is especially significant considering that these commissions are often established by the state, and oftentimes a state undergoing a democratic transition. This is the case with the Peruvian CVR.
The *Hatun Willakuy* report is demarcated into two major sections. The first provides a timeline to provide historical context and then aims to determine responsibility and culpability throughout the conflict. The next section attempts to discover and diagnose what structural factors have contributed to the emergence and perpetuation of the conflict, and then proposes recommendations to toward reconciling Peruvian society. Cynthia E. Milton in her analysis of the document reveals that the CVR creates a historical narrative distinct from what global trends would suggest. Rather than conceiving of the internal conflict as an extension of Cold War tensions, and as a purely ideological conflict that pits the Left against the Right in an existential battle, it constructs the narrative of the conflict as a consequence of long-standing ethnic and regional stratification. This stratification has endured since the colonial period, creating unequal conditions across the nation that contributed to the conflict.\(^{21}\)

The CVR’s *Hatun Willakuy* is a mode of memory production conducted by the state, a form of what performance scholar Diana Taylor coins as ‘archival memory’, or a way of storing and transmitting memory that is a permanent and tangible resource, that is subject to revision and interpretation.\(^{22}\) Archival memory in this case includes records and legal documents, all of which are resistant but not impervious to change given that they are produced as an official narrative. In this

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chapter, I compare the Peruvian case to other commissions in the Latin American southern cone. I then examine the role of actors in the conflict as laid out in the CVR and will look to reactions and public opinion following the publication of the commission’s report to evaluate its role in the greater project of transitional justice, and to discover what purpose state production of memory serves in the Peruvian case.

Where does the Peruvian case fit in within frameworks of transition?

Truth commissions are transitional processes that seek to create history in the public sphere. The production of memory by the state, which often becomes the dominant narrative, creates a public history. Generally speaking, through processes of memory production in Latin America in the twentieth century, dictatorships have presented a narrative where the military is depicted as the savior from the moral threat of communism, which seeks to subvert the identity of the nation. This is especially present in cases of memory production in Chile, following the Pinochet regime, and Argentina following the oppressive military dictatorship of the 70s and 80s. Both cases from the southern cone of the Latin American continent are similar to the Peruvian case of state production of memory in that they were called by executive decision to create a truth commission to recommend policy for the transitional government. Thus, in all three cases the state is seeking to investigate and produce a narrative of its own abuses. The differences lie in the recommendations by the commissions and in the resulting narratives contained in their reports.
In Argentina, the CONADEP, which was created in 1983 and submitted a final report in 1984, sought to investigate the human rights violations that had occurred during the dictatorship and the Argentine dirty war of the twentieth century. In this case human rights organizations, most notably the ‘Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo’, had a large role in shaping how the commission operated and on what it focused its investigation. These groups demanded the denunciation of the dictatorship and the prosecution of military officers that were guilty of human rights abuses, ranging from kidnapping, to torturing, to murder. The goal of these human rights groups was democratization and stability following decades of authoritarian rule; the demand for this transition called for a different type of memory production and historical narrative. Recognition of individual human rights were the principle demand of the CONADEP, but they were intimately linked with the democratization of Argentina. Perpetrators of violence who ‘planned and issued the repressive violence’ and those who ‘acted beyond the orders’ were tried. Those who “carried out orders to the strictly to the letter” were not, showing the role that leniency plays in reconciliation, and in turn showing the role that reconciliation plays in the project of democratization in a transitional society. In addition, Emilio Crenzel argues that CONADEP explained state terrorism as a response to guerrilla violence, placing all responsibility of for the disappearances and human rights violations on the

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dictatorship, while absolving civil society and the political establishment of all culpability, setting the stage for those actors to create a new democratic order.\textsuperscript{24}

When considering the Chilean transition, or rather transitional compromise, we see a divergence from the tendencies in the Argentine case. An interesting aspect of the Chilean case was the grant of amnesty or immunity from prosecution to those involved in the horrors. The rationale for this largely being the popularity of the Pinochet regime among large sections of the public, therefore putting the regime in a position where it played a role in the transition, in a sense dictating its terms. We can look at the first Chilean Truth and Reconciliation Committee (CNVR) and its final report, the Rettig Report, as a compromise between the military’s political prowess, and the Chilean left’s pressure for accountability of human rights abuses. In the Chilean context, democracy was the primary long-term goal but was not the intent of the investigation or its report. Stability and cooperation by the military and previous regime towards democratic transition was instead the aim, which comes with the cost of retaining anti-democratic aspects of the political system in the interim.\textsuperscript{25} The task of producing memory in Chile thus takes an incrementalistic approach, compromising certain accounts and perspectives of history in order to achieve an optimal political objective. The most stunning result of the Chilean commission became not the investigation itself but the trials against various military officials that it prompted. The results of the Chilean commission are

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 22.
considered to be one of the most successful commissions in the entire world. The commission is thought to have had positive effects on the military and police, and as a whole a large impact on the mission of democratization. The analysis of the causes of state-sanctioned violence, understood the Pinochet dictatorship as part of a Cold War conflict. Fears that the ascendency of a socialist government would lead to Chile becoming a satellite of the Soviet Union prompted the intervention by the United States in a coup d’état overthrowing the Allende government and installing the Pinochet regime.

These commissions were charged with by the state with the responsibility to gather the stories of victims, determining the truth about what happened, and assigning responsibility. Chile and Argentina, I would argue, borrowing from Greg Grandin’s analysis, largely produced memories that are depoliticized. As a result, Argentine and Chilean truth commissions propose notions of liberal democracy that circumvent and curtail the emergence of socioeconomic and social justice. That is to say, that the commissions of the south cone tended to prioritize democratic stability, over conceptions of reparations, or rehabilitative and retributive justice. Peru’s CVR differs vastly from this analysis as it looks to structural and societal factors and historical oppression as causes for the emergence of the Shining Path. And the Peruvian political scene at the time of the formation of the CVR, was largely clear of members of the Fujimori regime, given that they had lost the public’s trust following

the administration’s corruption scandal, and this left the state-appointed commission able to apply more culpability to state actors when compared to the Argentine and Chilean cases. It also allowed for recommendations to address the systemic issues that marginalized populations, indigenous and non-Spanish speaking peoples face, and that previously went unaddressed. It called for political-institutional reform and a victim-oriented reparations program. Additionally, this is an obstacle that the Chilean and Argentine commissions did not have to contend with given that there are not large indigenous populations and widespread marginalization in those societies along those same lines. Indigenous populations comprise about a quarter of the total Peruvian population, and they only comprise 9 percent of the Chilean population and 2.38 percent of the Argentine population.

The recommendations, however, have been largely ignored by the succeeding governments and efforts to provide reparations have made little progress. The Peruvian CVR went to further lengths, I would argue, to seek the truth, whether politically expedient or not, but these efforts were undermined by the lack of positive reception from those in power, and the absence of a socio-political transformation that would address socio-historical harms inflicted upon the subaltern citizen.

**How does a Nation Cure its Trauma?**

Truth Commissions like the Peruvian CVR endeavor to voice a nation’s collective trauma. Max Weber, the founder of Sociology, in his work *Sociology of Religion*, describes what he calls “carrier groups” which are collective agents of
traumatic processes. Sociologist Jeffrey Alexander describes the concept of “carrier groups” further as he posits that they are groups endowed with the talents to create meaning in the public sphere by articulating a narrative of trauma as a shared experience, which he calls the “articulation of meaning making”. However, for these carrier groups to successfully communicate a group’s shared trauma, it is necessary for there to be a certain level of social cohesion and understanding within the group itself. The establishment of an interconnected community is vital for a sense of understanding of collective trauma. As Alexander explains, as members of collectivities both identify the cause of trauma and assume moral responsibility, it is then possible to “share the suffering of others”. And through the acknowledgment that the suffering of others is also our own, only then can we then expand what Alexander terms, society’s “circle of the we”. Thus, as the CVR essentially functions a Weberian “carrier group” for Peruvian memory following the internal conflict, it not only serves as a declaration of an individual’s trauma, but that of the entire nation. And in the sense that this trauma is collective it also seeks to construct a more united nation. A Peruvian citizenry that acknowledges the role of societal divisions in perpetuating violence is imperative so that recent history can be seen as, Margarita Saona terms it, “a collective wound in need of repair.”

29 Ibid., p. 1.
The commission collected 17,000 testimonies over a two-year period. President of the Peruvian CVR, Salomón Lerner Febres, has said that the “numerical data is overwhelming, but inadequate [because] no number [can] express the inequalities, responsibilities, and methods of horror experienced by the Peruvian people.”31 The task of the commission he says is to “publicly expose the tragedy as the work of human beings who inflicted suffering on other human beings.”32 In his address to the republic, during the presentation of the report in 2003, Lerner admits that, “a large sector of the population was historically ignored – sometimes even scorned – by the state and urban society, that enjoys the benefits of being a part of a political community.”33 Like Anderson, Lerner highlights the need for Peru as a nation to understand the suffering that occurred throughout the internal conflict. He says, that “the imperious need to understand each other” is intimately linked to the “question of future reconciliation.”34 And with a greater understand of people’s “lived experiences”, Peruvians have the “opportunity to imagine the ethical transformation of society.”35

The latter section of The Hatun Willakuy report does just what Lerner explains by looking at the factors that made the violence possible. The rationale for doing so is that through a structural analysis of Peruvian society, the nation can begin to heal and repair injustice and prevent future violence. The report looks

32 Ibid., p. 13.
33 Lerner, Salomon. “Discurso de Presentación del Informe Final de la Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación.”
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
beyond establishing historical fact and takes a position on the causes and the solutions to the internal conflict. The report specifically looks at the emergence of the Shining Path in Ayacucho, where most of the violence and disappearances occurred. Ayacucho, a region in the high Andes of Peru, was an impoverished rural region, whose citizenry was largely ethnically indigenous. The region had not experienced a great modernizing economic boom and social life was still characterized by the legacy of “semi-feudal” or colonial-like structures. Historian Steve Stern describes the relationships of social rule in the region as subject to “the region’s long history of landed and racial domination and defensive Indian community authority structures.”

The report looks at inequality between Peru’s region, not simply as a measure of poverty and wealth, but as an unequal distribution of political and symbolic power. It cites the presence of ethnic-cultural and racial discrimination that weighs down discourse in the nation and keeps marginalized voices from expressing their concerns and discontent. The report argues that unequal processes of modernization also played a role, especially in a society with very “little social mobility and a fairly rigid hierarchical order” where existing divisions were only widened. And this created conditions in which social sectors that were underdeveloped and impoverished were receptive to proposals for a radical break with the established order.

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37 Peru. Comisión de la Verdad y, Reconciliación: “Factores Históricos o de Largo Plazo que Explican el Conflicto”, p. 337.
And this section of the report also looks to provide recommendations for reconciliation and to overcome a nation’s trauma. The CVR defines reconciliation as “a process of reestablishing and rebuilding fundamental bonds among Peruvians, bonds that were destroyed or eroded by the conflict of the past decades.”  

The report proposes a comprehensive plan for reparations, that consists of six programs: programs of symbolic reparations, reparations in health, reparations in education, restoration of citizens’ rights, programs of economic reparations, and collective reparations. In January of 2003, the CVR drafted a bill to propose to the members of congress to create political channels and agencies to implement their recommendations. It called for the creation of a “National Council for Reconciliation” that would oversee the implementation of transitionary measures, and an “Advisory Committee of Victims of the Violence” made up of seven representatives who are victims of violence during the internal conflict, and who would get to provide feedback and input into the measures implemented by the transitional body.

This bill and many of the recommendations have gone unheeded by the Peruvian government. This due largely to skepticism and reservations regarding aspects and conclusions of the commission’s work. Many continue to critique the number of deaths and missing persons presented by the report. A piece published

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40 Ibid., pp. 428-432.
by *Panamericana*, a Peruvian media outlet, in 2005 claims that the calculation that was utilized by the committee for the committee is unreliable and that the actual number of victims of political violence can never be truly known. Hugo Ñopo, a Peruvian economic researcher at the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), calls the commission “irresponsible” to report this figure that is based on several assumptions that doesn’t consider the number of actual identifiable victims of the internal conflict. Thus, he believes that the number is vastly overinflated, and that the actual figure lies closer to 23,969 people.\footnote{Panamericana. “Cuestionan una vez más cifras de muertos por terrorismo.”, September 9, 2005.}

Several political parties, public intellectuals, and government agencies, like the Armed Forces of Peru, have rejected the proposals and claims of the report. Cynthia Milton argues that the CVR clearly lays out responsibility with the governing parties from 1980 to 2000 for having “abdicated responsibility for assuring order to the armed forces at the expense of the constitution and human rights.”\footnote{Milton, Cynthia E. “At the Edge of the Peruvian Truth Commission: Paths to Recounting the Past” in Radical History Review No. 98, 2007, p. 10.} Thus, these groups strive to dismiss and discredit the commission’s findings, as its findings create issues for their re-electability and sow doubt and distrust into the public about these prominent national parties.

Parties like APRA, or the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance were especially vocal about their disapproval of the commission’s report. Milton recounts a particular instance where APRA supporters were protesting Lerner’s address to the
public in Huamanga on the morning of the commission’s submission of the final report. Though the protesters were seemingly few in numbers, they attempted to drown out Lerner’s address with shouts of “Commission of Lies”.  

![Figure 1.1. Political Cartoon by Peruvian cartoonist Eduardo Rodriguez Diaz or “Heduardo” published shortly after the release of the CVR. The cartoon shows a man commenting on the CVR’s report “They say that Abimael Guzman and the other terrorist leaders are also planning their critiques against the CVR. This is reconciliation! The political parties Unidad Nacional, APRA, Fujimorists, Accion Popular, the armed forces and the Shining Path are joining forces and fighting against the truth.” Courtesy of Perú 21, September 4, 2003.](image)

It is important to note that APRA is led by Alan Garcia, former President of Peru from 1985 to 1990 and again from 2006 to 2011. On APRA’s website, they include a page on the party’s thoughts on the truth commission. According to the page, the party believes that Peruvians should reflect on the state of the indigenous citizens in Peru and agrees with the assertions of widespread systemic discrimination that the CVR report lays

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out. But the party vehemently disagrees with the characterization of the actions of the Armed forces as an “institution which perpetuated and tacitly sanctioned practices of human rights violations.” They believe that the murders, tortures and rapes that occurred at the hands of the armed forces throughout the internal conflict were not a result of systemic actions but the actions of rogue individuals. APRA maintains the innocence of the Peruvian armed forces by arguing that the circumstances of the internal conflict differ greatly than the conflicts in other Latin American nations, and thus merit a distinct response and responsibility. They argue that Peru’s armed forces did not endeavor to overthrow democratic regimes and constitutional orders, as the armed forces in Argentina and Chile, but instead were serving the democratic state in its struggle against terrorism.

Various public intellectuals made their positions clear about their doubt in the reliability of the CVR’s report and the possibility of reconciliation in Peru. In the weeks leading up to the release of the CVR’s final report the headlines read:

“There is no reconciliation possible with the assassins of Shining Path.”
- Alan Garcia, Correo, August 14, 2003 45

“With Shining Path there can be no pact, no political solution and no form of reconciliation.”
- Congreswoman and former presidential candidate Lourdes Flores Nano, La Republica, August 10, 2003. 46

Unexpectedly, even the former president of the transitional government who signed the executive degree creating the CVR, Valentín Paniagua was critical of its

46 Ibid., p. 324.
publication. Paniagua maintained that he authorized the creation of a “Truth Commission” not a “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” and that was skeptical about the feasibility about reconciliation.\(^{47}\) There was also an exceptionally controversial moment when Sofia Macher, one of the commissioners of the CVR, referred to the Shining Path as a “political party”.\(^{48}\) Members of media went after Macher, asserting that she had “removed her mask”\(^{49}\), suggesting that she was a Shining Path sympathizer along with the rest of the commission. This incident caused enough controversy that Lerner was summoned before a congressional committee in 2002, to defend the use of term “political party” by Commissioner Macher.\(^{50}\)

\[\text{Figure 1.2.} \text{ An APRA supporter holds up the party flag and a sign that says, “Truth Commissions + Waste of Money + Lies”. Courtesy of Cynthia Milton’s “At the Edge of the Peruvian Commission: Paths to Recounting the Past.”}\]

\(^{47}\) “Paniagua mantiene serenidad frente a informe de la CVR”, La Republica, August 22, 2003.
\(^{48}\) “Azcueta lamenta que congresistas no entiendan el trabajo de la CVR”, La Republica, June 10, 2003.
\(^{49}\) Ibid.
Which Injustices were Left Out?

Various types of human rights abuses were perpetrated throughout the duration of the internal conflict. The CVR report documents many of them and the personal stories of victims of the conflict. One perspective in particular, seems to have been left unrecognized by the CVR, the perspective of the countless indigenous women who were forcibly sterilized at the hands of the Peruvian government during the period of the internal conflict. Forced sterilizations will be defined as, “surgical procedures of sterilization performed on a person against their will or without their full, free and informed consent.” Similar to the distribution of violence of the internal conflict at large, these procedures were disproportionately performed on indigenous women from rural regions of Peru. Claims and incidences of forced sterilization have been neglected by the truth-seeking processes of the CVR and has continued to have been neglected to this date (as of the submission date of this thesis).

A majority of these violations occurred during the Fujimori administration from 1990-2000. Fujimori appeared on the scene as a champion for women’s reproductive health, defending access to information and provision of contraceptive methods. He was quoted as saying that, “poor women deserved the same opportunity as wealthier women to regulate their fertility, and [that] all women had

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the right to control their bodies and use contraceptives if they wished.” He also spoke at a United Nations conference on women held in Beijing in 1995, where he emphasized the importance of sexual education and family planning as tools to combat poverty and social injustice. He argued that Peru had to reduce its average family size in order to eliminate poverty, and thus population control became an objective for his administration under the guise of development and modernization. Fujimori had established a national program in family planning in 1991, but it wasn’t until 1995 where he expanded the health policy to include sterilization as a method of contraception provided by the state. The expanded program was known as el Programa de Salud Reproductiva y Planificación Familiar (the Reproductive Health and Planned Parenthood Program) or the PSRPF.

Julia Tamayo, an organizer with the feminist non-profit organization Flora Tristán, describes Fujimori’s sterilization at length in a report for the NGO. She recalls the establishment of what were called Festivales de la Salud (Health Festivals) which were a front for sterilization clinics in poor rural areas. The findings her report find that only 10 percent of the 314,967 women who were sterilized gave real and full consent. These sterilizations were conducted under conditions of deceit, coercion or to serious threat to women’s safety. Tamayo describes cases where

55 Ibid., p. 114.
women were brought to clinics for other medical purposes including the flu, childbirth, vaccination and even inquiry about contraception and then were given anesthesia and operated on without full awareness of the situation by the patient.\footnote{Vasquez del Aguila, Ernesto. “Invisible women: forced sterilization, reproductive rights, and structural inequalities in Peru of Fujimori and Toledo”, Estudios e Pesquisas em Psicologia, 2006, p. 115.}

She also describes at length coercive and intimidation tactics that were utilized by healthcare providers towards patients, including the threat of police intervention, the loss of health services, the presentation of falsified information about contraception, and verbal manipulation due to a language barrier with Quechua-speaking women.\footnote{Ibid., p. 115.} According to Tamayo, women were also provided with incentives to participate in sterilization, for example, women were often given meals and clothing in exchange for compliance with the procedure.\footnote{Ibid., p. 116.}

Many of the indigenous women who have been violated lack government-issued identification, thus the state has no record of their existence or citizenship. Therefore, this is also an issue of how citizenship is defined and practiced within Peru. Indigenous peoples, as evidenced by the CVR findings, have historically been treated as second-class citizens, and their disposability at the hands of the state is evidenced by these egregious cases of sexual violence, and a stunning lack of justice and reparations for these women. The state has failed to acknowledge these injustices committed by the Fujimori administration, and implicitly excludes them from official narratives about the identities of victims in the internal conflict. If the
objective of the reconciliation of civil society is recognition of the trauma of the nation, then aren’t the indigenous women who were forcibly sterilized by the Fujimori administration also entitled to recognition?

Figure 1.3. Tens of thousands took to the streets to protest against the presidential candidacy of Keiko Fujimori, daughter of Alberto, ahead of elections in June of 2011. Courtesy of The Independent.
Chapter Two

Places, Realms and Sites of Memory Production

Introduction

In the aftermath of the publication of the CVR’s Hatun Willakuy report, and its demands for symbolic reparations and the creation of sites of memory, various memorials, monuments and sites were erected. The CVR argued that symbolic actions are necessary to re-establish the social contract and to demonstrate the will of the state to ensure that violence and human rights violations are not repeated.\(^{59}\)

The social contract, and the legitimacy of the authority of the state over the individual that it represents, were broken between the state and the people by violence during the Peruvian internal conflict. Symbolic reparations publicly acknowledge the damage inflicted upon the Peruvian people by the acts of subversive groups like the Shining Path and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, and the acts or lack of action by the state itself.

The recommendation for public symbolic reparations was heeded in a number of different ways by various actors in the Peruvian public sphere. Several local governments, NGOs, individual artists, and the federal government, across all of Peru’s regions, have constructed memory museums and various other sites of memory including murals, parks, commemorative plaques, and monuments to remember the internal conflict. The creation of sites of memory constructs a

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\(^{59}\) Peru. Comisión de la Verdad y, Reconciliación: “Propuestas de la CVR: Hacia La Reconciliación”, p. 419.
historical narrative and promotes the memory of the victims. In this chapter, I will consider two sites of memory that were commissioned following the publication of the final report. The first, *El Ojo que Llora* (The Eye That Cries), is a memorial located in Lima that honors the victims of the internal conflict. Constructed by the sculptor Lika Mutal, it was financed by citizens and NGOs. This site is in contrast to the major site produced by the state, *El Lugar de la Memoria, la Tolerancia y la Inclusion Social* (The Place of Memory, Tolerance and Social Inclusion), a museum space that explores the conflict.

French historian Pierre Nora explains that *lieux de mémoire* (sites of memory) are places in which memory is crystallized, and where “a residual sense of continuity remains.” This is opposed to what Nora calls *milieux de mémoire*, or settings in which memory is a real part of everyday experience, which he claims doesn’t exist in the globalized, democratic, and post-colonial world we live in today. Nora argues that methods of remembrance utilizing social memory and more generally the way we relate to the past within modern society have changed to the point where *milieux de mémoire* has ceased to exist. Instead what we have now is history, which is the way that modern societies organize “a past they are condemned to forget because they are driven by change.”

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61 Ibid., p. 3.
in that is a phenomenon of the present and something that is always bonded to the present, rather than preserving a lived connection to the past.

Nora also makes a distinction between “dominant” and “dominated” lieux de mémoire. What Nora refers to as “dominated” lieux de mémoire, include objects of everyday experience such as cemeteries, museums, and other forms of commemoration. They are distinct from what he calls “dominated” lieux de mémoire, which are spectacles and celebrations of triumph and are often imposed from above by the government or the victors in a conflict. One doesn’t visit such sites, but one is summoned to them. Nora ultimately sees the study of lieux de mémoire as a method of transcending history and a return to a “history critical of more than just its own methods”. He looks at historical memory as a concept that is subject that is inherently political and subjective. We can use Nora’s concept of lieux de mémoire to investigate the ways in which societal values, and the way they change over time, are reflected in physical locations.

Nora explains that history through memory is distinct from other forms of historical narrative. He writes:

“a history that is neither a resurrection nor a reconstitution nor a reconstruction nor even a representation but, in the strongest possible sense, a ‘rememoration’ – a history that is interested in memory not as remembrance by as the overall structure of the past within the present: history of the second degree.”

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63 Ibid., p. 20.
64 Ibid., p. 16.
Thus, I will be looking at the representations and memorialization of the Peruvian internal conflict not as an exercise in learning about the conflict itself, but instead looking at the conflict as a means to understand current day conceptions about the past.

James Young, a social theorist and linguist, writes about Holocaust memorials in his work *The Texture of Memory*. He asserts that Holocaust memorials, “reflect particular kinds of political and cultural knowledge even as they shape the understanding future generations will have of this time.” 65 What he means by this is that to understand memorials constructed following traumatic events, we need to consider the forces that came together to spur the process of its creation which he calls its “biography” or the record of its coming-into-being. And the aim of creating monuments and memorializing history is not remake memory, but “invite the collaboration of the community in acts of remembrance.” 66 Young writes:

“To the extent that the myths and ideals embodied in a nation’s monuments are people’s own, they are reaffirmed in such monuments and made to appear natural and true. Hence, and inescapable partnership grows between a people and its monuments.” 67

In the Peruvian case, it is essential to acknowledge Young’s analysis of the memorialization of history and its relation to the “biography” of the monument itself when we consider sites like *El Ojo que Llora* and *El Lugar de la Memoria*, which both

66 Ibid., p. 73.
67 Ibid., p. 74.
tackle the task of memorializing the traces left behind by the violence of the internal conflict. We must consider the context in which these two sites are being created and how that affects the production of memory by those spaces.

**El Ojo que Llora**

*Figure 2.1. Ojo que llora. Photo Justin Campos*

*El ojo que llora* memorial (Figure 2.1) is located in the *Campo de Marte*, a park in the capital city of Peru, and was completed in 2005. The physical design of the memorial is comprised of a stone that lies in the middle of a pond, that is surrounded by a circular labyrinth of boulders and a purple marble gravel path. The stone in the center of the space has an “eye” inserted in it that serves as a fountain that appears to cry endlessly down the center of the stone (Figure 2.2). In the maze of approximately forty-thousand boulders, each is inscribed with the names of a
victim of the internal conflict and the year in which they died (Figure 2.3). The sculptor of *El ojo que llora*, Lika Mutal, is a Dutch artist who lives and works in Lima. The stone that lies at the center of the memorial is a black stone that Mutal discovered near the Cerro de Lacco, a pre-Columbian cemetery. It is a quiet space where people wait for others to exit the maze before entering themselves, and one that is very solemn. One can see which victims’ families have visited the site, based on the flowers and notes that have been left alongside the path. The objective of the memorial was to provide a space to contemplate and remember the victims of the internal conflict and to give a physical place to the marginalized voices that were silenced throughout the conflict. By walking along the labyrinth, one reflects on the individual stones and the victims they represent as well as the space that the piece takes up as a whole as a representation of the loss that the nation has suffered. The piece at first glance is not inherently political but asks the spectator to the consider the humanity of the Peruvian people and the cost of war.

However, the site has undergone public scrutiny since its unveiling in 2005. The memorial is seen by many on the political right as a “monument to terrorism” and to the Shining Path, as some of the boulders surrounding the path carry the names of fallen members of the Shining Path. The list of names utilized for the memorial were supplied by the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission. They include the names of 41 victims who were killed in Lima’s high security Miguel Castro Castro penitentiary, during a prison raid under the Fujimori administration. These victims are considered by many Peruvians to “be terrorists responsible for
ruthless killing and fear.” The revelation that Shining Path militants had been included in the memorial led to the demands for the removal of the names, and public denunciation and destruction of the entire memorial.

Figure 2.2. Ojo que llora. Photo Justin Campos

According to a report by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, on May 6, 1992, 500 Peruvian Army troops descended upon Lima’s Miguel Castro Castro Prison by both air and by land. Their original objective was to transfer the prisoners to the Santa Mónica Prison, but instead an attack on the prisoners ensued leaving 41 inmates dead and 18 wounded. The attack in particular targeted Cell Block 1 A of the prison, where the prison’s female inmates are housed.  

Figure 2.3. Ojo que llora. Photo Justin Campos

Figure 2.4. Ojo que llora is vandalized and covered in orange paint. Photo Eitan Abramovich/Agence France-Presse
Peruvian security forces sprayed the area with bullets and threw tear gas, bombs and dynamite into the site. A piece written by the New York Times in 1992 entitled, “Peru Routs Rebels in 4-Day Prison Fight”, reports that “the outcome is almost certain to be seen as a major victory against the Shining Path, which used the prison for indoctrinating and training its members.”70 The piece also states that “major victories over the Shining Path are crucial for Mr. Fujimori, who justified his seizure of near-dictatorial power on April 5 by saying that Congress and the courts were making it impossible to fight the insurgency effectively.”71 For the dictatorship, security trumped protections of human rights throughout the internal conflict.

A legal battle between the survivors of the attack of the prison and the Peruvian government continue the battles over memory into the following decade. The Costa Rica-based Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled in November of 2006 that the Peruvian government should pay the families of the dead prisoners and the tortured survivors approximately twenty million dollars (in US dollars) in damages. Additionally, the court ordered that the Peruvian state take financial responsibility for counseling and therapeutic services for the survivors of the attack, as well as for the burial, legal, and transportation expenses that have been incurred by the families of the victims. Furthermore, as a form of symbolic reparations to the victims that were killed, the court ordered that a commemorative plaque be placed in the Miguel Castro Castro criminal center. The state objected to this and argued

71 Ibid.
that this would “affect the internal security of the criminal center and the measures
destined to the reconciliation of Peruvians”\footnote{Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Caso del Penal Miguel Castro Castro vs. Perú, Sentencia de 25 de Noviembre, 2006, p. 22.} given that the prison continues to
house other active members of the Shining Path. Instead, the compromise that was
reached between the court and state was that the state was to ensure that all
people declared as deceased victims in the Miguel Castro Castro attack be
represented in the \textit{El ojo que llora} monument, an already existing public monument
that serves to acknowledge the victims of violence in Peru.\footnote{Ibid., p. 163.}

Although seemingly resolved by the Inter-American court’s decision in 2006,
the debate whether the victims of the prison raid should be represented in \textit{El ojo que llora} continues. In 2007, the monument was vandalized with orange paint—the
colors that represent Fujimori’s party (Figure 2.4). The incident came as the Fujimori
went to trial for the political killings, abductions, disappearances, and corruption
that occurred during his administration. The consensus among his supporters and
admirers is that the monument is an affront to Fujimori’s legacy, which is seen by
many to have brought stability to the nation. In fact, almost one in four Peruvians
admire Fujimori “for laying the foundation for today’s stability regardless of who
may have suffered during that process.”\footnote{Carrion, Julio F. \textit{The Fujimori Legacy: The Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru}. The Pennsylvania State University Press: University Park, PA, 2006, p. 133.} Attacks on the site by Fujimori
sympathizers, thus was not a surprise. His supporters gagged and bound the night
watchman, covered the center piece and surrounding stones in orange paint, and
took a sledge hammer to the eye of the monument. In addition, vandals, supposedly different from the ones who colored the site orange, crossed out several names with a green marker.\textsuperscript{75} These names belonged to the victims of the Cantuta massacre – another instance of Fujimori-era injustice. Nine students and one professor had been forcibly taken from their classroom at the Universidad Nacional de Educación Enrique Guzmán y Valle by a military death squad and disappeared in July of 1992. This is thought to be a response to the Tarata bombing done by the Shining Path that had occurred in Lima two days before and had left over 40 dead.

Both of these instances of vandalism sought to erase victims of the internal conflict, and to obscure memory in favor of the protection of Fujimori’s reputation, and also to assert his innocence in the face of ongoing legal action against him. This attempt to re-write the past influences the site that we see today. Mario Vargas Llosa, a prominent Peruvian novelist and candidate for president in the 1990 election, argues in defense of the memorial. He criticizes the Inter-American Court’s decision because it imposes orders on a sculpture that does not belong to the state and that is the private property of the artist who created and designed it. He maintains that because the names of those murdered in Miguel Castro Castro already appear in the stones of the site, that it is up to the artist to decide what to do with their piece in the face of criticism. Although he does recommend that the stones be turned over, “temporarily hiding them from the public eye, until time has

healed the wounds, calmed the spirits, and established the consensus that allows one another to accept our own culpability in the violence that occurred in the fight against terror.”

I would argue that conflicting and competing memories that are at play here are what could bring about reconciliation. Reconciliation occurs when spaces allow for political engagement and the peaceful contestation of ideas. I disagree with Vargas Llosa’s proposal and argue that, in effect, what he is proposing is to erase the memory of victims and victimizers, albeit temporarily. But, the task of reconciliation cannot occur when ideas and actors are silenced and when violence is allowed to be enacted upon sites of remembrance. Additionally, the end of reconciliation is coexistence, where individuals can learn live with their own histories and the perspectives of others. What Vargas Llosa proposes is that victims of Shining Path terrorism should not have to coexist with former members of the guerilla group. I maintain that it is important, now more than ever, that both sides have a space where they can articulate their grievances and claims, in hopes in reaching a compromise that is peaceful and that works towards strengthening democratic institutions, and non-violent political discourse.

Additionally, a further examination of the Fujimorists’ political tactics is important to understand the battle for memory at the *ojo que llora* memorial. To borrow from political scientist Jo-Marie Burt’s analysis of the Fujimori administration, this action of defacement of the monument calls into question what

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she terms the “politics of fear”. She argues that the politics of fear was the mechanism by which the Fujimori administration was able to quash all effective opposition through the 1990s. While policies of economic austerity dismantled public institutions and the use of patronage politics undermined freedom of speech press both played a role in the centralization of Fujimori’s political power; fear tactics that were utilized in tandem with these policies played a much more sinister role in Fujimori’s government. The authoritarian state’s use of violence through arbitrary detention, killings, torture, exile and deportation, created a submissive culture in which “citizens willingly surrendered rights in exchange for the promise of order and stability”.77 Politics of fear worked to demobilize efforts by civil society to

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**Figure 2.5.** Political Cartoon released at the time of the publication of the CVR. In the cartoon Jesus tells the representatives of the armed forces, the oligarchy and the church that “The truth will set us free” and they respond with “Terrorist.” Courtesy of Somos 16, 2003.
resist the seizure and then exercise of authoritarian power, in fear of being branded a terrorist. Burt describes this social phenomenon through the phrase, “quien habla es terrorista” or “anyone who speaks out is a terrorist”. Thus, in a sense the government sought to create terror akin to that of the Shining Path.

This sentiment persists into the current day, as Fujimorists desecrated the ojo que llora memorial in order to brand those on the left unaffiliated with the Shining Path and those in the human rights community as terrorists and Shining Path sympathizers. The phrases, terrorista or “terruco/a” a substitute that is in common use in Peru, and other variations on these words serve as a political device that perpetuates discrimination upon those given the label. Communications studies expert Karrin Vasby Anderson presents a theory that highlights the importance of language in politics and public perception. She examines language as an institution that perpetuates sexism and presupposes the power of language to create and alter material realities. Thus, in this case, ideology also constitutes an identity that can be discriminated against through intolerant institutions in the same sense that gender/gender expression can be undermined through sexist institutions. Language can be utilized to marginalize and create a sense of the “other” in relation to the dominant group, which in this case pits the “terrorista” against the law-abiding citizen. In the case of the ojo que llora this phrase was weaponized to undermine the existence of the memorial. Fujimorists armed with insults sought to silence the

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families of the victims of the Miguel Castro Castro Prison massacre, and to prohibit
no only their right to mourn, but to erase memories and narratives that paint the
state in a negative light.

El Lugar de la Memoria

Figure 2.6. Lugar de la memoria. Photo Justin Campos

El Lugar de la Memoria museum (Figure 2.1) was a major initiative by the
Peruvian government. It had been planned since 2008 when the government of Alan
Garcia received a two million Euro donation from Germany to build a Memory
Museum. This would house Yuyanapaq, a photographic exhibit about the internal
conflict that had been previously been housed in the Museo de la Nación in Lima.79

The German Minister Heidmarie Weiczorek-Zueld decided to offer this support following a visit to Peru when she was profoundly moved by the Yuyanapaq exhibition. Construction of the museum was finally completed in 2015 and was inaugurated during the government of Ollanta Humala. According to the museum’s mission statement, it aims to provide “symbolic reparations” for the victims of the internal conflict, to educate future generations about this time period, and to promote a democratic culture in Peru. According to political scientist Ernesto Verdeja, memory museums play a two-fold purpose as “critical devices that play a role in deciding what kinds of historical interpretations are normatively appropriate” while also “demand[ing] a reassessment of society’s obligations to its members.”

These are key tasks for a state in transition to undertake.

When offered a donation to build a memory museum, President Garcia initially declined, fearing that this kind of institution would worsen existing social tensions. Several members of the Garcia administration believed that the money could be better utilized for development projects rather than museums. Garcia’s head of the Ministry of Defense said, “If I have people who want to go to the museum but don’t eat, they are going to die of starvation...There are priorities.” Various public figures agreed. Many believed that the space would serve to glorify and honor the Shining Path and other subversive groups. It is also important to note

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that Garcia had also been President of Peru between 1985 to 1990, in the midst of the internal conflict. One can assume that Garcia was wary of commissioning a museum where his own past legacy and decision-making in the internal conflict against the Shining Path would be interrogated and subjected to review in the Peruvian public sphere. His administration has been accused of various extrajudicial executions, similar to Fujimori’s regime, and it seems Garcia fears judicial reprimand, and public scrutiny in the same way. Garcia had a clear incentive to silence narratives that expose claims of corruption and human rights abuses by his administration during the internal conflict. This negotiation over the creation of a memory museum is a prime example of how political battles between different groups can influence memory in a way that is quite politically intentional.

Several months later, Garcia changed his mind and accepted the German government’s donation for the construction of a memory museum. He was eventually convinced by various Peruvian intellectuals including novelist Mario Vargas Llosa, former President of the CVR Salomón Lerner, former Prime Minister Beatriz Merino, artist Fernando de Szyszlo, and theologian Gustavo Gutiérrez, who had all come out publicly against the government’s decision to decline the grant. Lerner said in an interview that, the refusal to accept the German government’s proposal was “a monumental mistake” and that it is a “depreciation of the value of memory that doesn’t reflect well on the Peruvian government”.82 Marino also

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82 “Defensoría insta a Ejecutivo a aceptar dinero alemán para Museo de la Memoria”. La República, February 27, 2009.
expressed similar thoughts on the importance of building a memory museum as she said that, “solidarity within a nation is built by the promotion of ideals such as equality, freedom and justice, not on intolerance, hatred and injustice, and from this we can derive the necessity for truth, and the urgency to build memory museums.”

What was arguably most instrumental in persuading Garcia to accept the German grant was Vargas Llosa’s meetings with the commanding general of the Peruvian Army at the time, Otto Guibovich, and with Garcia himself. In the meetings with Guibovich and the President, Vargas Llosa pitched to them the virtue of creating an unbiased and pluralistic space. He highlighted the value of inclusion, and the creation of a national memory that is the product of collaboration by all members of Peruvian society. And he stressed that a museum of memory would hold close the narratives of the armed forces that “gave their lives to protect democracy from being corrupted by subversive forces.” Following these meetings, Vargas Llosa was appointed head of the commission to oversee the development and implementation of the memory museum.

As the head of the commission Vargas Llosa changed the official name for the space from the proposed “memory museum” to the “place of memory” or Lugar de la Memoria. This in itself is a deliberate and conscious wording, in that it rejects the notion that this space is a museum and that produces collective memory in the way a museum would by displaying historical artifacts in a space in order to preserve the

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83 “Defensoría insta a Ejecutivo a aceptar dinero alemán para Museo de la Memoria”. La República, February 27, 2009.
past in an uncritical fashion. Vargas Llosa maintains that a “museum” is “associated with an institution that preserves the past and reconstructs violence” and instead a “place of memory” is a site that “provides a fuller, fairer and more accurate historical account.” What he means by this is that he believes that a place of memory is distinct from a museum in that it allows for more reflection, reconciliation, and democratic discourse. Several months later, Vargas Llosa would resign from the committee to protest legislation “DL 1097” passed by Garcia’s government. “DL 1097”, would close the books on the most heinous crimes by granting amnesty to members of the Peruvian security forces that served during the internal conflict. He called the law “unacceptable in a modern democracy” and his move prompted the Peruvian Congress to repeal the law on September 14, 2010. The only person to vote against the repeal being then Vice President Luis Giampietri, who was a naval special operations officer under Garcia in the 1980s, where he is reported to have been ordered by Garcia to put down a prison riot that resulted in the deaths of over 300 Shining Path inmates. And it was later found by the Inter-American Court that the action taken by the Garcia Administration had violated the American Convention on Human Rights. This shows clearly that the Garcia administration has something to gain from silencing narratives that hold the military accountable for abuses of human rights.

After several other resignations, by Salomon Lerner and Fernando de Szyszlo, respectively, then President Ollanta Humala, chose Diego Garcia-Sayan, president of the Inter-American Court to be the new head of the commission. This promoted yet another change in the name of the museum from the “place of memory” to the “place of memory, tolerance and social inclusion.” Like the former this name change is also politically deliberate. Words like “tolerance” and “social inclusion” redirect attention from conceptions of justice, responsibility, and accountability, and is thus another concession to the members of the armed forces who fear prosecution for their crimes.

The lack of agreement on how to achieve the plurality of representations of memory that Vargas Llosa originally proposed led to continued controversies and attacks on the “space,” even very recently. For example, Alejandro Aguinaga, Fujimori’s doctor and a congressman in his party, known as Fuerza Popular, said in 2014 that the El Lugar de la Memoria museum held a political bias because it failed to present the point of view of the soldiers who “defended Peruvian democracy and served their country” while former Shining Path members had been seemingly absolved from culpability.\(^87\) Aguinaga laments at what he sees as the representation and celebration of murderers in a space that is meant to be about past tragedy and the prevention of future tragedies. Foreseeing the possibility of controversy over who is included in the number of dead, the museum had already decided not to

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\(^87\) Collyns, Dan. “Peru attempts to address years of violence with tolerance museum”. The Guardian, June 20, 2014.
display the figure for the estimated death toll of the internal conflict. This form of self-censorship by the museum and its curators, is a prime example of the concessions that are made in the battles over memory and the creation of official histories.

Additionally, Edwin Donayre, a former general and congressmen of the center-right party Alianza para el Progresso (APP) accused *El Lugar de la Memoria* and its employees of having Shining Path sympathies and for terrorist apologia. He released a video in April 2018 where museum employees were supposedly making sympathetic comments about the Shining Path. Donarye visited the museum in a disguise, complete with a wig, hat and sunglasses, where he claimed to be a victim of violence in Colombia. He claimed to have been tortured by the Colombian Armed Forces and was deaf and mute. The museum does not usually give tours, but they make exceptions for victims of political violence that visit the space, and thus Donarye and his party were accompanied through the museum by Gabriel Eguren, a specialist in pedagogical museum studies who is an employee of the museum. The whole time, Donarye is recording the tour while members of his party bombarded Eguren with questions about the possibility of pardoning Abimael Guzmán, leader of the Shining Path, and about the release of terrorists generally. In the edit of the video released to the media, he adds subtitles to the portions of the tour video he wants to highlight because they are particularly incriminating.

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Donarye’s critique against Eguren is that she utilizes Shining Path terminology throughout the tour, she spoke ill of the Peruvian armed forces, and claimed there was a possibility that Guzmán’s lawyer could request a pardon. Eguren in a later interview, claims that she uses Shining Path slang in her tours because that is the most the accurate way to explain the concepts, that she is not in favor of pardoning Shining Path militants but was pointing out that any prisoner could ask for clemency and that she supports the military.\(^8^9\) Many reacted violently toward Eguren following the release of the video. Over social media Eguren has been flooded with threats of murder and imprisonment. This incident has also had repercussions for Eguren professionally as she was fired from her position at the museum. Following the release of the video, Donarye proposed to the Minister of Culture, Patricia Balbuena, new guidelines for the museum where the military and police would be clearly recognized by the museum and its employees as heroes in the conflict. Following the release of this video, Donarye also introduced a bill to grant amnesty to military officials prosecuted for cases of human rights violations.\(^9^0\) Donarye’s objective with the video was to undermine the museum’s narratives by exposing them as biased and pro-terrorist. Many others claim that the bias accusation is categorically false. He was successful in getting Eguren fired, and in directing the public discourse just as he proposed an amnesty bill and a commission to establish new standards of conduct for *El Lugar de la Memoria*. Donarye hopes to

silence resistance from employees of the museum and other lawmakers who are afraid of being blacklisted from positions because they have been identified as terrorist sympathizers.91 Attacks on the museum from Fujimorists and former military operatives have not been uncommon, and they all utilize similar tactics that seek to demonize the memory institution as terrorist.

Apart from the struggles over memory from ideological and political actors, struggles also took place in deciding what mission and pedagogical value the space would have. The full name of the memory museum, El lugar de la memoria, la tolerancia y la inclusion social, shows that while the museum is a space for remembrance, it is also a space for tolerance and social inclusion. It has an educational mission that exceeds the task of remembering. This educational mission seeks to create an objective narrative that presents findings as history as opposed to memory. And it displays history that is meant to educate the coming generations, those that were born long after the end of the internal conflict. This makes the concessions and on-going battles over memory in this museum all the more significant and raises questions about how we curate knowledge for pedagogical purposes. As Cynthia E. Milton tells us, there is no measure of legitimacy for museums.92 Anyone can erect a museum for anything they’d like and promote narratives and histories of their own choosing. The state, I would argue, is distinct

91 Donarye, as of February 2019, has also been recently sentenced to five years and six months in prison for an embezzlement scandal that occurred during his tenure as commanding general of the Peruvian armed forces under President Garcia, where he and other military officials stole and resold 2,571,000 soles of gasoline and oil ($782,112 USD) from the Peruvian military’s reserve.
from this in that it has a duty to its people, if it is a democratic state, and a vested
interest in creating a national narrative. In addition, *El Lugar de la Memoria* is the
only state-sponsored site to mark the internal conflict in Peru in the context of the
entire nation, not limited to the history of a particular region or commemorating
particular victims of the conflict. This makes the task of curating an official narrative
all the more important.

The museum, I would argue, is inaccessible to most who live in the capital,
not to mention Peruvians at large. During my own visit to the museum in the
summer of 2018, I traveled from the historic center of Lima to the museum and
there was no direct public transportation route, and it was also an hour away from
the center of the city by taxi. And the neighborhood where the museum resides is an
upscale district of the city known as Miraflores and located in a neighborhood within
the district that has no direct link to the period of violence. The space is breathtaking
and resides on a make-shift cliff that overlooks the ocean nearby. This level of
extravagance raises further questions about accessibility and representation.

The physical location of the museum creates a barrier-to-entry for most
Peruvians that the violent history of the internal conflict affected. This is in stark
contrast to the memory museums that have been erected across the country by
local grassroots efforts. Most notably, the National Association of Family Members
of Kidnapped, Detained and Disappeared Persons, or ANFASEP, created a memory
museum in Huamanga, a city in the Ayacucho region of Peru that was marred by
violence throughout the internal conflict. The museum is based primarily on input
from the women of ANFASEP and focuses on honoring victims and the disappeared.

The ANFASEP museum is distinct in that it rejects the nation-building project of
*Lugar de la Memoria*; it doesn’t call for national solidarity or social integration and
reconciliation. It doesn’t seek to create a coherent or official narrative, but to
display the personal and individual trauma of victims of the internal conflict and its
impact on local communities. The ANFASEP museum is intimately tied to the victims
of violence and their families because the museum is housed in the same space as
the ANFASEP offices and center. Thus, as a spectator, it is impossible to distance
oneself from the victims of political violence, as one could do at *El Lugar de la Memoria*. By comparing these two museums and evaluating of the accessibility and
representation of victims within the museum space, we can see how the mission and
ideology behind a site is instrumental in the struggle over memory. In this case, the
inclusionary and democratic mission of *El Lugar de la Memoria* is hindered by the
reluctance to put victims and survivors’ narratives first, in the way that the ANFASEP
does.

**El Museo del Directorio Nacional en Contra del Terrorismo en el Peru**

“The Army united to history
by fertile and virile tradition,
is crowned with laurels of glory
by forging a free nation.

Evoking a glorious past
of the Inca’s ancient splendor,
Ayacucho, Junin, Dos de Mayo
freedom conquered with courage.

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Zarumilla, La Breña, and Arica
deeds that are bequeathed to history
Bolognesi oh, sublime soldier!
I hail you as an exemplary patron.

The borders he proudly defends
like a guardian of national honor
from his people he receives the arms
and is the bastion of social justice
I am a soldier who in these ranks militate
and I have a duty to fulfill,
to live dedicated to the homeland
and to fight to the death for her.”

- Hymn of the Peruvian Army first adopted by the armed forces in 1973, and translation by Cynthia E. Milton from Conflicted Memory: Military Cultural Interventions and the Human Rights Era in Peru.

El Museo del Directorio Nacional en Contra del Terrorismo (The Museum of the National Directorate against Terrorism in Peru) also known as the DIRCOTE museum is a space that houses artwork and archives by the Shining Path and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement that were seized by Peruvian security forces throughout the internal conflict. DIRCOTE is a special intelligence group that is best known for the capture of Shining Path leader Abimael Guzmán. The museum is not considered a site of memory in the same the way that El ojo que llora and El lugar de la memoria are considered sites of memory because it is a private space. You need special permission to access it. It is located in the National Police buildings in the center of Lima. The museum is not a space that recognizes or that provides reparations for victims, like the CVR intended. Instead, the art, books and other possessions a that once belonged to communist insurgents are “on display” – but only for those who want their own anti-insurgent recollections confirmed. Peruvian anthropologist María Eugenia Ulfe describes her visit to the museum under the
guidance of a colonel of the National Police that explained the origin and significance of the objects given that there is no identification or classification for most of the museums’ objects. Cynthia E. Milton argues that perhaps this is intentional. One must be guided through the museum by a military official, to ensure that they properly interpreted the museum, in the way that the officers do. As a result, this imposes the officer’s narrative onto the spectator of the museum as there is space for resistance or contestation. I contend that the DIRCOTE museum is a force of counter-memory to the memory production of sites of memory, as it strays away ideologically with the dominant narrative proposed by the CVR and seeks to undermine that memory with its own that promotes the role of the armed forces in the conflict.

Figure 2.7. Several portraits and items related to Guzmán on display at the DIRCOTE museum. Photo Víctor Palomino (Agencia Peruano de Noticias Andina)
The space itself has a direct connection to the Peruvian security forces and its struggle against the insurgency. The police would use the collection to train personnel “to recognize the guerillas’ aesthetic production and thus gain knowledge useful for fighting them.”

Thus, the museum represents the possessions of the enemy of the state, leaving very little room for reflection and reconciliation that is possible in the other sites of memory. The majority of the pieces were confiscated by Shining Path inmates, most notably from those at Miguel Castro Castro Penitentiary. Ulfe describes the significance of the objects for Shining Path members and claims the objects were a method of “constructing a different historical discourse for Peru...a break with Peruvian history as they began to rewrite it.”

When these artifacts of memory are placed in a military museum like the DIRCOTE museum their meaning is distorted. These items are interpreted differently than their creators intended. The military use them as a reminder of the history of the internal conflict. Ulfe tells us that the colonel that guided her throughout the museum, is skeptical of the CVR’s final report. He rejects the report’s description of the systemic conditions that underlie the conflict and favors his own interpretation of the conflict that paints the Shining Path as a “dehumanized, violent and aggressive political body.” Milton, also describes a similar experience as she toured DIRCOTE’s facilities. The colonel that guided her group through the space said that

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95 Ibid., p. 33
96 Ibid., p. 37.
the young revolutionaries [referring to the Shining Path] “wanted to make things better but were led astray” and that the peasants who joined them in their cause were “brain washed”. As Milton points out, the colonel did not consider structural reasons such as poverty, inequality, oppression, in determining their commitment to the revolutionary cause. This shows a disconnect in the beliefs of military officials from the findings of the CVR that give credence to structural explanations for the internal conflict.

In a sense, this museum serves as a testament to the spoils of war. The museum is curated, and the objects are placed in a way that conveys a clear narrative. The exhibition, according to Milton’s account, begins with a story line about revolutionary passion and excitement that then turns to horror and imprisonment. There is a heavy focus on Guzmán as a figure. Even a wax figure of Guzmán, that shows him as he looked when he was captured in 1992, was commissioned for display in the museum. Many of his personal possessions including his doctoral thesis, glasses, canes, notebooks, and the possessions of his first wife all seem to imply some kind of obsession with Guzmán. The prevailing narrative here being that the national police saved the nation from the Shining Path leader. This narrative represented by the museum is essentially the memory of the institution of DIRCOTE. Not quite unlike El Lugar de Memoria, the space serves as an institution to educate. Although, I would argue that it is not education in the same

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sense. The DIRCOTE museum does not allow for the free contestation of ideas, and thus it is more like indoctrination into the history and ideology of the National Police. Also, as historian Richard Caro notes, DIRCOTE needs this museum “not only to keep alive memories of the Shining Path, but also to keep active the reason for DIRCOTE’s existence within the National Police, a poor sibling within the state’s security apparatus.”

Thus, it is also a matter of self-preservation.

The memory produced by this site is distinct from the that other sites explored in this chapter. The narratives presented by the DIRCOTE are incompatible with a human rights narrative or the meaning behind the mottos “Nunca Más” or “Never Again”. They are memories that often negate the narratives proposed by these sites, and that honor different participants in the internal conflict. It emphasizes the importance of recognizing winners and losers, and the virtues of honor and glory in the aftermath of the internal conflict, rather than looking to responding to victims and survivors of violence. Despite this, I would also claim that it is important to complicate the military’s narrative and to not lump together its experience with that of other conflicts from the Southern Cone. The Peruvian case is distinct from that of Argentina or Chile in that the conflict took place during democratically elected governments, after a previous decade of left-leaning military rule, “and was in response to a very serious subversive threat, that of the Communist Party of Peru- Shining Path which committed most of the violence.”

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99 Ibid., 4.
And although military memory producers are utilizing “post-conflict memory tactics similar to those of their Southern Cone counterparts, their history is specific to them.” As Milton also makes clear, this is not to suggest that the Peruvian armed forces are any less culpable for their actions. It is quite the opposite. This nuance in considering the Peruvian military’s narrative and analysis of it is imperative to truly understand how the military sees itself within history, to expand our understanding about how the past is curated in the present, and to see the manner in which the military promotes its memory of the internal conflict to undermine and rewrite that which is presented by the CVR’s final report.

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Chapter Three

Alternative Narratives, and the Production of Cultural Memory in the Private Sphere

“The chasm and the rivers shout, only the owls cry
All of those enemies arrived to our town
When they killed people with machine guns and grenades
In the Hidden Graves, townspeople disappeared
Peasants and workers cried in prison
Students and teachers, tortured and massacred
Bearing no fault, without sin
Townspeople were disappeared and killed
In Umaro, Bellavista, Acomarca, and Cayara”

- “Fosas Clandestinas“ (Hidden Graves), a song performed by Estrellas de Fajardo (pseudonym created by the translator to protect the group), originally performed in Quechua and translated by Jonathan Ritter.

Introduction

In the aftermath of periods of violent political and social turmoil, societies look to commemorate the past and to investigate the truth. We have seen throughout this thesis how this is evinced in institutions of truth seeking and societal reconciliation, like the CVR, and through the various sites of memory. These are examples of memory production in the public sphere. But, what about memory constructed outsides of these official venues of truth seeking? Alternative interpretations of history and narratives are those that exist in the private sphere. What does memory created outside of the private sphere look like? In a sense, these narratives represent a political resistance to the dominant narrative. They often take form within culture, for example, through visual and performance art, cinema, stories, humor, and song, among countless other expressions. In authoritarian nations, where public discourse and spaces are monopolized by the state, these
narratives are censored, silenced, and prohibited. But in a democratic state, or in the case of Peru a state in transition towards democracy, what is the role of these “alternative narratives?” I will argue that remnants of Peru’s recent authoritarian past persist into the politics and public discourse of the present day. The narratives of the dictatorships of the Latin American dirty wars of the late twentieth century are characterized by their depiction of the military as “saviors” of the nation from a moral threat. And this moral threat to the authoritarian regimes, including Peru’s, was the spread of communism, and subversion of the state’s authority through terror and violence. Thus, given the continued political efforts to erase memory by the old regime and its allies, it becomes all the more important to make visible alternative memories that exist outside the public sphere.

This raises the question as to how societies transmit alternative memories through culture? Cultural practices and memory are often destroyed by periods of political violence and thus there is a need to keep alive one’s private cultural life. Jewish survivors following the atrocities of the Second World War found their collective culture destroyed and lost. Many tried to preserve their private cultural lives, often lives in which Yiddish occupied a central place. Elizabeth Jelin describes the practice of the production of Yizker-bikher or books of memory, where long lists of the names and photographs of the dead were preserved.101 The aim of this practice was to transmit memory, to prevent the erasure of the past. The fear of the

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absence of memory drives the cultural production of memory, and the resulting
cultural transmission of the past to future generations. Even further, the
transmission of a constructed historical narrative is utilized in this sense as a means
to signal the continuity and permanence of a group or community, that is resilience
in the face of adversity. This is implicit in the logic that guided institutions like the
CVR, *El Ojo que Llora* and *El Lugar de la Memoria*, where these bodies seek to
reproduce memory so that the public will “remember so as not to repeat.”

The books of memory were largely unsuccessful in transmitting culture.
Language barriers led to the fracture of bonds across generations, and Jelin tells us
that, “amnesia was a reality for those who stumbled on the edge of the void created
by genocide. It was for this reason that Yizkor books remained unvisited
cemeteries.”\(^{102}\) Thus, a large part of the cultural transmission of memory is being
able to be listened to and bear witness to trauma. This is evident in the case in the
internal conflict, as it becomes vital for cultural transmission to include the
transmission of Andean memories and practices, many of which were destroyed
during the internal conflict. Many of the citizens of the emergency zones controlled
by the Shining Path during the conflict have migrated to urban areas, altering the
way families once interacted with their personal culture. It is critical to maintain
linguistic and cultural ties for future generations to recollect the internal conflict,

\(^{102}\) Jelin, Elizabeth. *State Repression and the Labors of Memory*. Edited by Judy Rein and Marcial
although this task is difficult in an urban area like Lima where the public culture is so different from the countryside.

To understand, the role of culture in the production of memory, it is important to investigate the political nature of cultural production. For example, in *The Republic*, Plato tells us that Socrates believed that the, “introduction of novel fashions in music is a thing to beware as endangering the whole fabric of society, whose most important conventions are unsettled by any revolution in that quarter.”¹⁰³ What Socrates means is that art has the political potential to upheave, subvert, and challenge the status quo. Art serves as an expression of discontent with society in this sense. Historically across Latin America, art has been utilized as a device for protest and to make political statements. By expressing societal discontent that is communicated to the public, art raises the public’s conscious and awareness of social issues and inequities, which then acts to mobilize people to action and to introduce ideas and debate into the public sphere. This adds an important dimension to memory production by expanding the narratives and perspectives that are available to the public. Feminist theorist Rita Felski describes this expansion as a “counterpublic”, that resists exclusion from the dominant public memory and seeks to create counter-memory separate from the state’s sanctioned memory.¹⁰⁴

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A prime example of how art was used as political resistance in Latin American history, was in Chile where women from shanty towns used art as protest against the Pinochet regime. Women that lived in shantytowns organized through the church and set up workshops manufacturing *arpilleras*, which were brightly colored patchwork quilts that were constructed from simple materials such as burlap and scraps of cloth. These *arpilleras* depicted the conditions that they were experiencing under the regime, like military raids on the shantytowns, protests and demonstrations, soup kitchens and hungry people, and massive unemployment.\(^{105}\)

A prominent women’s organization known as *Vicaría de la Solidaridad* that had ties to the Catholic Church, distributed the quilts abroad to raise global awareness of the repressiveness of the Pinochet regime.\(^{106}\) They were sold to buyers that included Chilean exiles across Europe and North America and then in turn were sold to the public. They were displayed in art exhibitions, on university campuses, and in demonstrations by human rights organizations, to educate, gain sympathy and support abroad.\(^{107}\) The production of art in the form of *arpilleras* in the Chilean case served to articulate grievances and suffering that was occurring in Pinochet’s Chile and to advocate for a return to democracy and support for the regime’s victims.

\(^{106}\) Ibid., p. 30.
\(^{107}\) Ibid., p. 32.
Figure 3.1. Arpillera that depicts the story of Carmen Gloria Quintana and Rodrigo Rojas, teenage protestors who were tortured and burned in 1986. Photo courtesy of the Royal Alberta Museum.

La Teta Asustada

In 1997, Kimberly Theidon and Ponciano Del Pino conducted a study on mental health in the southeastern part of Ayacucho. They conducted interviews and held in-depth discussions with various members of the community. They met with 99 men, 112 women and 91 children from 12 distinct communities, including the village of Chuschi, where the Shining Path’s guerilla war against the state was first declared 17 years earlier. They discovered that 89 percent of the men and 91 percent of the women suffered from tristeza (sadness) over their living conditions.
and the loss of their loved ones in the internal conflict. Additionally, 41.5 percent of
the adults reported having had nightmares as a result of their losses and that they
had been drinking more. Theidon and Del Pino, describe these afflictions as
symptoms for what is known as susto or a scare that causes the soul to leave the
body. Out of the people interviewed, 71 percent of men and 87 percent of women
reported having experienced susto.108 As a consequence, there were reports that
domestic violence had increased in the villages as a result of increased drinking. And
women reported no longer choosing to breast-feed their children, fearing that they
would transmit their fear and memories to the child, and thus resigning the child to
carry their trauma. This social affliction is known as la teta asustada (the frightened
teat). The anthropologist Billie Jean Isbell recounts a similar visit to Chuschi in 1996
where she interviewed women about their thoughts about their own trauma. In one
instance she is chatting with various women at an outdoor market in the village, and
she asks them how things were, and they replied, “Sad. We are always sad. We have
suffered too much.”109

In many of works on post-internal conflict Peru Theidon explores
psychological trauma and how to contend with a growing number of traumatized
individuals in Andean communities in the wake of the internal conflict. She asserts
that that “focusing on individual psychopathology erases the social devastation that

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results from political violence.”¹¹⁰ She asks, “are we dealing with mental disorders per se or with distorted social relationships produced by impunity and justice?”¹¹¹ She claims that if researchers in these rural, Quechua-speaking communities want to respond to the concerns of survivors they have to focus on “social disorder, angry gods, witchcraft, and spiritual and moral confusion”¹¹² and provide a culturally appropriate response to suffering. She calls these ailments los males del campo or the evils of the countryside, and they are illnesses that are strongly related to Andean religions, and theories about the supernatural that exist in these rural communities.

This becomes especially important when we consider the task of the CVR’s relatores or interpreters of the testimonials of survivors of the internal conflict who primarily, indigenous, rural-inhabitants that are Quechua-speaking. Their assignment is to listen to hours of recorded testimonies and to translate them into Spanish and summarize them two-to-three-page relatos or stories. Theidon recounts an interview with Sandra, a relator, who describes to her the training she received from the CVR team in Lima about how to listen to survivors’ testimonials. She tells Theidon that the head researchers told her that:

“the campesinos (peasants) are very imaginative, and [that] they would tell us all sorts of fabulous things. We were warned not to fall for all of that.

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 216.
¹¹² Ibid., p. 217.
Susto [soul loss due to fright], llakis [painful memories that fill the body and torment the soul], irritation of the heart – they told us those things were inconceivable. They don’t exist.”

I concur with Theidon’s critique of the training in that it seeks to establish a sort of normative value on local theories about trauma and a universal understanding of psychiatry. It is divorced from culture, and it reduces the theories about illnesses in these communities to “beliefs and customs.” In doing so, renders invisible the lived experiences and narratives of the survivors.

This is central to the theme of director Claudia Llosa’s 2009 film _La teta asustada_. The film has achieved much international recognition and success, having won the 2009 Golden Bear award and been nominated for a Best Foreign Language Film award Oscar. The film is a cultural product of the aftermath of the internal conflict, and much of the plot has to do with issues of the Andean experience of war. Rather than portray violence or images of war, the film looks at psychological trauma and narratives transmitted through spoken word, song, and images of daily life. It takes place in the present day, and shows the viewer pain and intergenerational trauma, and asks us to simply listen and bear witness to the testimony of suffering people.

Cultural studies scholar Anne Lambright argues that _La teta asustada_ “re-locates national culture and redefines the national subject, suggesting that the

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future of Peru lies greatly in urban indigenous culture.”¹¹⁴ This claim suggests much about Peruvian social inequalities and national identity. It is said that three out of every four people killed during the internal conflict spoke Quechua or another native language as their mother tongue. Theidon also tells us that, “the dead were people – in the national imaginary”- [that] had counted for little during their lives and largely unaccounted for in their deaths.”¹¹⁵ Thus, the story of the producing cultural memory of the internal conflict is one where there is a necessity to uplift the voices of the marginalized indigenous communities that have been disproportionately affected by violence. Additionally, it also becomes the duty of the coming generations to carry the traditions, stories, and oral histories that have been transmitted to them from their elders, for if not, the Andean traditions die with them.

*La teta asustada* tells the story of Fausta, a young indigenous woman living in a shantytown outside of Lima. Her mother, Perpetua, passes away, and leaves Fausta with the task of returning her body to their village. This proves to be an expensive task. Fausta also suffers from *la teta asustada*, which, as Theidon chronicles, is an illness that comes as the result of the transmission of Fausta’s mother’s trauma about her rape to Fausta in her infancy. We learn in the opening scene of the film that Perpetua’s husband was brutally murdered by soldiers fighting


the Shining Path in their village, and then the same soldiers raped Perpetua while she was pregnant with Fausta. She recounts this narrative to Fausta in Quechua through song, and Fausta responds in song, pleading for her to mother to eat something as she is dying in bed. She passes on soon after, and Fausta goes to live with her uncle. Fausta’s teta asustada affliction manifests itself as various medical issues. Fausta has frequent nosebleeds, and she also keeps a potato in her vagina. The doctor dismisses her claims about la teta asustada and recommends other methods of birth control for Fausta. Fausta tells us that she has placed a potato in her vagina to keep away men who would rape her, as she is traumatized her mother’s assault. She is also very fearful and wary of men who aren’t in her immediate family. The potato continues threatens her health throughout the movie as it potentially causes infection to her vagina and uterus.

To earn money for a proper burial for her mother, and one that is consistent with Andean beliefs, Fausta goes to work as a maid for Aida, a wealthy concert pianist who lives in Lima. One day Aida overhears Fausta sing and offers her a pearl from a broken necklace to hear her sing more of her original songs in Quechua, and consequently gives her another pearl for every occasion that she sings for her. Aida promises to give her the complete necklace once she earns all of the pearls. While working for Aida, Fausta begins to overcome her fear of men as she befriends Noé, a gardener who works at the home as well. In the end, we learn that Aida has stolen Fausta’s melodies and appropriated them into as original piano compositions. Fausta learns this upon visiting a concert of Aida’s, and is promptly fired following the
concert, with Aida breaking her end of bargain about the pearl necklace. Fausta then retaliates by breaking into Aida’s room and taking the pearls that she was promised. Fausta soon falls ill again, and is taken to the hospital by Noé, where the potato removed from her vagina, as she has overcome her fear of sexual violation and learned to trust men in her life. The film ends with Fausta returning her mother’s body to her village and burying her by the ocean.

Figure 3.2. Movie poster for the film’s original Peruvian release. Photo courtesy of IMDb.com.
The central themes of the film surround the memory of the internal conflict and reconciliation as the response to inherited trauma. *With La teta asustada*, Llosa proposes that culture can be utilized to expand the number of methods that one can express their vulnerabilities, and this allows one to produce memories that are capable of expressing hurt and pain. And in agreement with Theidon’s research, Fausta is able to overcome what ails her, through expressing her Andean culture. Singing in Quechua gave Fausta an outlet to contest her grievances, in a society that doesn’t allow her much space for her participation or discussion of her trauma in the public sphere.

**Adios Ayacucho**

Peruvian novelist Julio Ortega’s 1986 short novel *Adios Ayacucho* also deals with themes about the way memory should be constructed in the wake of the armed conflict and attempts to give a political voice to Andean citizens and Andean cultural practices. While the story was written in the midst of the internal conflict, it recalled narratives of war that would be relevant long after its publication. The novel also highlights subjects of racism and ethnic violence that was at the heart of the internal conflict. And it relates this contemporary conflict to the ferocious ethnic-based violence that dates back in history to the arrival of Spanish colonialism. And it deals with these themes about memory and violence in a fictional space, giving voice to a protagonist whose body is mutilated and missing an arm and a leg, but is still able to communicate and move from place to place. Thus, in a sense, the novel
attempts to give the victims of the internal conflict, who are no longer with us, a
space to articulate and express their grievances -- an impossibility in the real world.

*Adios Ayacucho* tells the story of Alfonso Cánepa, a peasant leader from the
department of Ayacucho, who was accused by state security forces of being a
terrorist. At the start of the story, Cánepa is called into a police station, labeled a
terrorist, and soon disappeared. He is beaten brutally, mutilated, and is killed by a
military death squad. What was left of his body was thrown into a pit, with many of
his bones literally stolen from him and taken away by the military officials, thus
denying him a proper burial and eternal peace. He rises from the ravine where his
body and his name where left to fade into oblivion and he decides to journey to
Lima to reclaim his bones. Canepa demands from the Peruvian government the
reconstruction of his body and a dignified death. Throughout the rest of the novel,
Cánepa strives to advocate on his own behalf to President Fernando Belaúnde Terry,
the head of the state of the Republic at the time and ask him to return his bones
him. He writes the president a letter denouncing the state of terror and demanding
justice for victims of the internal conflict. In the end, he is rejected by the president
in a public setting, and then sets out to the tomb of the conquistador Francisco
Pizzaro and takes Pizzaro’s bones to complete his own body.

The story was also adapted into a play in 1990 by one of Peru’s most
important theatre groups, Grupo Cultural Yuyachkani. The group is known for
producing plays that incorporate Andean traditions and practices with western
practices of theatre and performance. The play integrates Quechua language and
song, Andean dances, masks, clothes and instruments into its performance.

Lambright tells us that for Yuyachkani, bodies and the dead, “become repositories of national memory, [or] means of exploring collective and individual trauma.”\footnote{Lambright, Anne. \textit{Andean Truths: Transitional Justice, Ethnicity, and Cultural Production in Post-Shining Path Peru}. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2015, pp. 89.} The play differentiates itself from the Ortega’s novel as it incorporates paranormal Andean traditions. In the play, Cánepa dies, and his ghost seeks a proper burial and is hosted within the Q’olla an Andean\textit{ comparsa} (carnival performer) dancer. The Q’olla puts on Cánepa’s shoes and Cánepa’s spirit is given the opportunity to be re-embodied in the Q’olla’s body and utilize its high-pitched voice. The Q’olla as a figure is culturally significant. It is a figure that is represented in the Virgen del Carmen Festival that takes place every July in Paucartambo, a town in the region of Cusco.\footnote{Ibid., 98.} The opening scene of the performance depicts the \textit{pacha vela}, an Andean burial ritual where families lay out the clothes of their lost loved ones to accompany them in their post-life journey.\footnote{Cynthia, E. Milton. \textit{Art from a Fractured Past: Memory and Truth-Telling in Post-Shining Path Peru}. Edited by Cynthia E. Milton. Durham: Duke University Press, 2014, pp. 202.} The play does not explicitly depict the violence that leads to Cánepa’s death that is shown in the novel.

Both Ortega and Yuyachkani, through the utilization of vastly different mediums, accomplish similar objectives. They both give victims the ability to testify and advocate for themselves, and in the process has the audience carry the burden of producing memory for a nation that attempts to forget. This is an especially relevant claim when we consider the role that Yuyachkani played in the CVR
hearings. The group was invited to perform at public hearings held in Ayacucho between 2002 and 2003. They also assisted with the hearings in Huanta and Huamanga both towns in the department of Ayacucho that were directly impacted by the internal conflict. Apart from performing, they held workshops and discussion circles that focused on the importance and the benefits of testifying. In a sense, Yuyachkani’s emphasis on performing the dead and those unable to speak, emboldened victims to tell their stories, in the place of those who could not.

It is important to note the political and intellectual value that Ortega’s novel holds in Peruvian literature. The novel depicts a struggle for recognition, truth and justice, a struggle that transitional justice efforts would attempt to tackle 15 years later with the CVR. In addition to this, Ortega’s novel also seeks to challenge dominant narratives in literature about Andean people. In particular, Adios Ayacucho exists in contrast with the intellectual discourse and fiction coming from prominent Peruvian authors such as Mario Vargas Llosa who has written extensively about Andean life. One example in particular of these dominant narratives are highlighted in Vargas Llosa’s coverage of the Uchuraccay murders. In 1983, Vargas Llosa was asked to lead an investigatory commission into the Uchuraccay incident. Earlier that year, eight journalists and a guide were brutally murdered in the village of Uchuraccay in the Ayacucho region during an expedition into the zona de emergencia (emergency zone). After a three-hour investigation by Vargas Llosa and

120 Ibid., pp. 90.
his commission, they found three comuneros (indigenous community members) culpable for the Uchuraccay murders.

He writes about this experience in a 1983 New York Times piece entitled *Inquest in the Andes*. Vargas Llosa concludes that the murders were inevitable and unpreventable given inherent aspects of the cultural background of the Iquichano people of the Uchuraccay village. He critiques their customs as “archaic and backward”, labels the people “badly informed” due to isolation from other ethnic groups, and argues that they are naturally violent as “violence is the atmosphere they live in from the time they are born until the time they die”. They claim that the Iquichanos who committed the murders didn’t know what they were doing or for what cause, and that they couldn’t have understood the consequences of their actions. Vargas Llosa’s claim here completely undermines the indigenous comuneros’ autonomy in the situation and reduces any possible motives they may have had as ignorance and savagery.

He concludes in his piece that a true democracy will never exist in Peru as long as it continues to be an “incomprehensible abstraction for all the others.” Vargas Llosa here is invoking the reductionist trope of “two Perus” that was dominant at the time and that continues to persist in discussion in the public sphere on the issue of whether Peruvian indigeneity and modernity are compatible.

Historically, Peru has constructed itself as a heterogeneously ethnic, cultural and linguistic society. In the modern age, the Spanish-speaking and western-educated,

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members of society hold much of the political and social power in the nation. This is in opposition to the aboriginal, which encompasses not only the Quechua-speaking indigenous peoples of Peru but also the peoples of the Amazon region. Mario Vargas Llosa agrees that there is inequity and divide between these “two Perus” but as Ortega proposes perhaps the answer is not modernity, but an expansion of the public sphere to include distinct cultural practices and languages, and ideas unconnected to western narratives that dominate current discourse. And as director Claudia Llosa and Theidon propose, a need for space for the expression of trauma and the testimony of suffering that is both culturally consistent and tolerant.

Figure 3.3. Photo from a performance of Yuyachkani’s Adios Ayacucho. Courtesy of the Hemispheric Institute.

Conclusion and Reflections

“Perpetrators have a history as well as victims, but in what sense do they share a narrative? In fact, their narratives intertwine just as all adversarial histories must.”
- Charles Maier, Doing History, Doing Justice

Throughout the course of this thesis, I have identified various modes of memory production and how they have been utilized by Peruvians to remember the internal conflict. This search for memory began with the CVR but it did not end there, the CVR’s final report was subject to immense scrutiny and accordingly others pursued their own methods of making meaning out of the internal conflict. Many believed that the CVR’s investigation was inadequate and did not interrogate the horrors of the internal conflict sufficiently or in a manner that allowed the victims to express the most autonomy. Others disagreed with the report’s central claims and branded the commissioners as terrorist sympathizers too afraid to tell the country the truth behind the internal conflict. Whatever the case may be, this continued discourse and controversy over the memory of the internal conflict is proof that memory its debates are endless. What Jo-Marie Burt coins the “battles of memory” will carry on far after the victims of the internal conflict are gone.

Thus, if the truth of the matter is subjective and difficult to pin down, the task at hand remains the possibility of societal reconciliation. How can perpetrators and victims of violence learn to coexist and cohabitate following the internal conflict? The task is certainly difficult. In many communities, this is already underway, but not without issues. In intimate Enemies, Theidon describes a
conversation she had with a woman named Señora Hermelinda, who insists that forgiveness was out of the question. Señora Hermelinda says,

“We won’t have forgiveness. First the guilty would need to kneel and ask for forgiveness, and maybe then we could pardon them – before that, no. What sort of reconciliation could there be between the good and the bad, between those who lost everything and those who gained everything? They came out of this ahead. They benefited! There’ll never be reconciliation while there’s inequality between us. Those who ruined our pueblo have not even apologized! Nothing. They say the government pardoned them, that the Big Daddies pardoned them, and that’s why the community can’t do anything to them.” 123

It is difficult to heed calls for reconciliation when victims of the internal conflict find it impossible to see perpetrators of violence as deserving of forgiveness. Former members and allies of the Shining Path are seen as guilty by the communities they inhabit, but without any legal proof or the presence of judicial trials they are as free as anyone else. As a result, the desire for vengeance rears its ugly head in many of these communities. Veena Das and Arthur Kleinman, confront this issue in their works on violence and social suffering. They contemplate “how people engage in the tasks of daily living, reinhabiting worlds in full recognition that perpetrators, victims, and witness come from the same social space.” They suggest that perhaps strategies that “permit people to delay that full recognition” are the key to staying the hand of recognition. This is a sad realization, but one that becomes increasingly difficult to overcome as long as those who have refused to

recognize the harm that they have done and refuse to hear the demands of those they have wronged, continue to do so. After all, apologies are a two-way street.

As for recommendations for future research on memory production in post-internal conflict Peru, I would recommend inquiry into social movements and spaces of resistance and their role in the crafting memory and investigating processes of reconciliation, although Theidon’s ethnographic work in *Intimate Enemies* is a brilliant example of this. Although I explored this to an extent throughout the thesis, there was not as much available on the subject as I would have hoped.
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