The End of an Alliance: A Historical Analysis of ROK-ROC Diplomatic Relations, 1972-92

by

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Middletown, Connecticut April, 2017
To my parents
For their unconditional love and support
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Note on Romanization

Korean names and terms have been romanized using the McCune-Reischauer system. Mandarin Chinese names and terms have been romanized using the Hanyu Pinyin system. Exceptions were made for Korean and Chinese names and terms with official English spellings (Syngman Rhee, Chiang Kai-shek, Seoul, Taipei, etc.) and names of authors who have published in English under different transliterations. Following Korean and Chinese custom, surnames precede given names unless otherwise stated.
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We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.

Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston, 1848
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

On August 23, 1992, the Republic of China (Taiwan) terminated diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea (South Korea) when South Korea notified Taiwan as a fait accompli that it would proceed to normalize relations with Taiwan’s enemy state, the People’s Republic of China (China).¹ This immediately ended the 44 years of ROK-ROC alliance, then-South Korea’s oldest diplomatic alliance. On the next day, South Korea officially normalized diplomatic relations with China, and its joint statement with China included the following:

대한민국 정부는 중화인민공화국 정부를 중국의 유일 합법정부로 승인하며 오직 하나의 중국만이 있고 대만은 중국의 일부분이라는 중국의 입장을 존중한다.²

The government of the Republic of Korea recognizes that the People’s Republic of China is the only legitimate government of China. It also acknowledges that there is only one China and respects China’s stance that Taiwan is a part of China.

Although Taiwan fiercely condemned South Korea’s decision to normalize relations with China, many of the major countries in the world had already terminated its diplomatic relations with Taiwan in the 1970s. Japan and the United States, two of Taiwan’s closest allies, also severed relations with the ROC government in 1972 and 1979, respectively. In fact, South Korea in 1992 was the last East Asian country, and the last major country in the world, to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Given South Korea’s historically significant alliance with Taiwan throughout the 1900s,

¹ South Korea will sometimes be referred to as the ROK (Republic of Korea), Taiwan as the ROC (Republic of China), and China as the PRC (People’s Republic of China).
what explains the ROK government’s decision to abandon ROK-ROC alliance in 1992? More importantly, why did South Korea maintain its diplomatic alliance with Taiwan until 1992 when many of the major countries in the world had already severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan in the 1970s?

ROC Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Nationalists in Taiwan once enjoyed diplomatic recognitions as legitimate rulers of Mainland China. However, China’s political emergence and its One-China policy – a principle that there can only be one government representing the Chinese Nation – greatly damaged Taiwan’s international prestige in the early 1970s. In 1971, the United Nations (UN) expelled Chiang’s delegation on grounds that “the PRC government is the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations.”3 In 1972, US President Richard Nixon visited China and signed the Shanghai Communiqué, and the communiqué sought “to progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States,” indicating the United States’ decision to eventually sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan.4 In the early 1970s alone, more than 30 countries had severed its diplomatic ties with Taiwan to normalize relations with China.

Strong bilateral relations over shared historical memories of Japanese imperialism, anti-communism, and national division naturally constructed the historical significance of ROK-ROC alliance. The ROC government was the first government to recognize the founding of the Provisional ROK government in 1919, and Chiang Kai-shek enthusiastically supported the Provisional ROK’s resistance

against Japanese imperialism. Even after Japan’s surrender and the end of the Second
World War in 1945, Chiang’s government was the first one to become the ROK’s
diplomatic ally in 1949. ROK-ROC alliance continued after Chiang’s defeat in the
Chinese Civil War and his retreat to Taiwan, and the two governments quickly
developed their relationship into an anti-communist alliance. Chiang’s visit to South
Korea in 1949, his non-military aid to South Korea during the Korean War, ROK
President Syngman Rhee’s visit to Taiwan in 1953, ROK President Park Chung Hee’s
tour of Taiwan in 1966, and various other political and economic exchanges testified
to the historical significance of their diplomatic alliance. Therefore, South Korea’s
decision to end its diplomatic alliance with Taiwan in 1992 must be seen as an
importance historical milestone.

South Korea’s historically significant alliance with Taiwan aside, ROK-ROC
diplomatic termination in 1992 was also counterintuitive in that South Korea
maintained its alliance with Taiwan much longer than major ROK allies like the
United States and Japan did. Shortly after the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué
in 1972, Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei saw China as an economically
viable partner and quickly severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan.\(^5\) The United
States during this period also maintained its diplomatic interest in China, as
demonstrated through the establishment of the US Liaison Office, Beijing in 1972
and US President Gerald Ford’s visit to China in 1975. The US government finally
terminated US-ROC alliance in 1979 to finalize US-PRC normalization later that year.

Given the United States’ overwhelming influence in South Korea, South Korea’s

\(^5\) Daojiong Zha, “The Taiwan Problem in Japan-China Relations: From an Irritant to a Destroyer?”
domestic and foreign policies often mirror the national interests of the US
government.\textsuperscript{6} But when the United States and its major allies like Japan actively
sought normalization with China throughout the 1970s, South Korea made no attempt
to pursue ROK-PRC normalization. In fact, it was not until 1983 that South Korea
made its first diplomatic contact with China, and South Korea did not openly pursue
normalization until 1988 when it announced Nordpolitik – the ROK government’s
first diplomatic attempt to pursue détente with communist countries such as the
Soviet Union and China. When South Korea finally terminated its diplomatic alliance
with Taiwan in 1992, it was already 20 years behind Japan and 13 years behind the
United States to do so.

Scholars have generally dismissed the significance of ROK-ROC alliance and
often opted for the simplistic explanation that China’s One-China policy forced South
Korea to terminate its diplomatic alliance with Taiwan in 1992.\textsuperscript{7} While it is difficult
to deny China’s influence in the course of ROK-ROC relations, this study aims to
focus more on other previously dismissed factors that potentially explain the
counterintuitive timing of ROK-ROC diplomatic termination in 1992. This study first
examines how South Korea’s domestic and historical factors like authoritarianism and
anti-communist agenda provided the ROK government with political and ideological
incentives to maintain its diplomatic alliance with Taiwan (“ideational rationale”). It
then evaluates how pragmatic concerns such as international trade forced South Korea

\textsuperscript{6} Euikwan Chang, “Peace Regime in the Korean Peninsula and the U.S. Strategic Interests,” \textit{The

\textsuperscript{7} Existing scholarship tends to overemphasize China’s role in ROK-ROC relations. See among others:
Jie Chen, \textit{Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan} (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2002), 28-29; Murray
A. Ruinstein, “Political Taiwanization and Pragmatic Diplomacy: The Eras of Chiang Ching-kuo and
Sharpe, 1999), 465.
to eventually normalize relations with China, therefore destroying ROK-ROC alliance (“practical rationale”). An investigation of how these two rationales interacted with each other from 1972 to 1992 may explain South Korea’s counterintuitive decision to preserve ROK-ROC alliance until 1992.

This study’s primary objective is to understand the course of ROK-ROC diplomatic alliance from 1972 to 1992, but it also enables other intellectual inquiries. First, this study can shed more light on the development of South Korea’s polity during this period. Between 1972 and 1992, South Korea witnessed several political and ideological developments that not only shaped the course of ROK-ROC diplomatic alliance but also transformed the country’s political identity. Factors like authoritarianism, anti-communism, and national interests may help explain the counterintuitive timing of ROK-ROC diplomatic termination in 1992, but it provides equally valuable insights on the evolution of South Korea’s political legacies and the birth of a democratic republic.

This study also provides unique insights on the development of ROK-PRC relations from 1972 to 1992. China’s terms may have dictated the later course of ROK-ROC alliance, but Taiwan’s political status has also been a topic of major contentions in the development of ROK-PRC relations. In fact, ROK-ROC alliance and ROK-PRC normalization are mutually exclusive in that China’s One-China policy forces its diplomatic partners to derecognize Taiwan. Therefore, this study can also invite new perspectives on how Taiwan influenced South Korea’s decision not to normalize diplomatic relations with China from 1972 to 1992.
1.1 Literature Review

This study considers a selection of literature on the theoretical works of international relations, and its applications and shortcomings in understanding the counterintuitive development of ROK-ROC alliance from 1972 to 1992. It also draws on at country specific studies investigating South Korea, Taiwan, and China to identify the intellectual gaps in the larger narrative of ROK-ROC relations.

Theories of international relations provide the frameworks necessary to better understand how states behave as international actors. Kenneth N. Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics* (1979) argues that the current international political system is anarchic, meaning that it lacks a “system-wide component” to police individual states. For this reason, each country must seek to maximize its own power relative to all other states within the international political system. Waltz calls this structural realism. A structural realist would therefore argue that a rational state actor within an anarchic system would always prioritize choices that would ensure its international survival via formation of diplomatic, economic, and military alliances. This would explain that ROK-ROC relations have enjoyed a historically significant alliance to ensure both countries’ mutual survival in the early 1900s. The post-WWII emergence of a bipolar system between the United States and the Soviet Union created a growing tension between countries with competing ideologies. South Korea and Taiwan, each fearing that its sovereignty was under attack from the region’s communist threats like China and North Korea, formed a coalition in order to protect their own sovereignty. But interestingly enough, structural realism would also suggest that the end of ROK-

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ROC alliance in 1992 came from South Korea’s need for international survival. Taiwan’s geopolitical displacement, China’s emergence as a regional superpower, and the growing decline of the Cold War paradigm altogether convinced South Korea that it was a more politically and economically sound decision to abandon alliance with Taiwan in 1992. According to Waltz’s structural realism, South Korea’s need to reevaluate its survival strategies in the changing landscape of the international political system was responsible for both the creation and destruction of the ROK government’s diplomatic alliance with Taiwan.

Structural realism also argues that lessening tensions between two superpowers allow smaller countries to more aggressively seek national interests. Robert Boardman in his essay “Triangles, Wrecked Angles and Beyond: The Post-Cold War Division of Power” (1994) argues that a maturation of bipolarity between the two superpowers provide smaller countries with capacities to seek their own “survival strategies.” Lessening tensions between big powers encourage, and sometimes force, smaller countries to quickly build foreign policy agenda that would suit their national interests. Boardman’s idea of mature bipolarity in structural realism explains many phenomena of East Asia in the 1970s. The United States and China officially ended their mutual diplomatic hostility with Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, and this allowed US allies in Asia like Japan, Philippines, and Malaysia to immediately sever relations with Taiwan as they all had hoped to benefit from China’s growing economic potential. Structural realism would therefore suggest that a

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major US ally like South Korea also should have normalized relations with China during this period.

The theory of structural realism explains South Korea’s decision to normalize relations with China in 1992, but it fails to answer why South Korea postponed an obviously rational choice to end its diplomatic alliance with Taiwan in the 1970s. Christian Reus-Smit in his essay “Constructivism” (2005) argues that sociohistorical factors often shape international relations.10 Constructivism suggests that a state actor’s political, ideological, and cultural identities influence its international decisions simply because such identities instill distinct values and aspirations. Thomas U. Berger in “Power and Purpose in Pacific East Asia: A Constructivist Interpretation” (2003) adds that constructivism is especially useful in understanding East Asian politics because the region is a product of “deep-rooted historically based suspicions and animosities, frustrated nationalism distinct concepts of national identity, and their differing understanding of the national mission in international affairs.”11 Berger adds that the region’s history such as Japanese colonial legacies, the Korean War, and North Korea altogether “account of [interstate] behaviors that appear irrational on a systematic level.”12 A constructivist would therefore argue that South Korea’s history and identity have potentially contributed to the counterintuitive survival of ROK-ROC alliance from 1972 to 1992.

12 Berger, “Power and Purpose in Pacific East Asia: A Constructivist Interpretation,” 408.
Robert D. Putnam’s theory of two-level game combines structural realism, constructivism, and other domestic factors. Putnam in “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games” (1998) explains that despite claims from proponents of structural realism, state actors are often not unitary actors that only consider international objectives. While Putnam acknowledges the importance of realist concerns in international relations, he argues that domestic factors such as “public opinion, domestic economic interests, special interest groups, and elite opinion” are equally important in understanding international outcomes.\(^{13}\) Therefore, Putnam would argue that one is not able to thoroughly evaluate South Korea’s decision to maintain ROK-ROC alliance without jointly evaluating the ROK governments’ international and domestic objectives.

Existing scholarship on ROK-ROC relations often considers structural realism to explain South Korea’s diplomatic relations with Taiwan. However, it rarely draws on constructivism and other domestic factors to produce theoretical conjectures answering the counterintuitive timing of ROK-ROC diplomatic termination in 1992. Yi Kyutae’s “ROK-ROC Political Relations: Past, Present, and Future” (1994) argues that South Korea’s evolving international agenda in the 1980s negatively impacted the course of ROK-ROC alliance. Yi illustrates that while South Korea and Taiwan have maintained a historically significant alliance until the 1970s, China’s emergence as a geopolitical power and its One-China policy made it difficult for South Korea’s to ignore China’s diplomatic pressure to end ROK-ROC alliance.\(^{14}\) Kang Junyoung’s

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“20 Years After ROK-ROC Diplomatic Termination: Retrospect and Prospect” (2013) confirms Yi’s narrative and argues that South Korea’s active trade partnership with China in the 1980s influenced the country’s decision to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. By the late 1980s, South Korea’s total trade volume with China surpassed that of Taiwan, and Kang argues that South Korea at the time had a strong economic incentive to normalize relations with China. Kang also explains that the United States’ normalization with China in 1979 also forced South Korea to reevaluate China’s diplomatic significance.

Zhu Lixi’s Goodbye Arirang: An Overview of Taiwan-South Korea Relations (1993) provides an analysis that draws many parallels with that of Yi and Kang, but it adds that South Korea’s decision to end ROK-ROC alliance partly came from the ROK government’s need to resolve tensions with North Korea in the early 1990s. South Korea at the time was seeking to reunify the Korean Peninsula, and it believed that China’s political assistance would help its reunification talks with North Korea. In order to make a diplomatic breakthrough towards North Korea, South Korea had to improve relations with China, and this required the ROK government to recognize China’s One-China policy and terminate its alliance with Taiwan in 1992. Yi, Kang, and Zhu altogether support the theoretical conjectures of structural realism, and while their research provides this study with an important heuristic platform, they fail to substantially investigate constructivist and domestic factors that may have influenced the counterintuitive timing of ROK-ROC diplomatic termination.

Few attempts have been made to explain why South Korea did not abandon its diplomatic alliance with Taiwan until 1992. Dan C. Sanford’s “ROK’s Nordpolitik: Revisited” (1993) seeks this answer in South Korea’s Nordpolitik, the ROK government’s first diplomatic attempt to “seriously engineer intergovernmental contacts and facilitate expanded trade and investment with eastern bloc countries.” Sanford explains that South Korea’s growing economic relationship with China in the 1980s allowed the ROK government to see China as an important trade partner. With South Korea’s democratization in 1987 and the Soviet Union’s participation in the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics, the ROK government in 1988 had a strong political incentive to fix its historically strained relationship with communist countries.

Nordpolitik’s objectives in 1988 included ROK-PRC normalization, and this explains South Korea’s decision to abandon its diplomatic alliance with Taiwan in 1992.

Qian Qichen in *Ten Diplomatic Episodes* (2003) considers historical factors to answer why ROK-PRC normalization did not take place until 1992 when South Korea’s Nordpolitik had already declared its intention to pursue normalization with China in 1988. A Chinese diplomat who played an important role in ROK-PRC normalization, Qian argues that China’s military alliance with North Korea prevented the PRC government from openly pursuing normalization with South Korea. China and North Korea have been strong communist allies since the late 1940s, and even after their military alliance during the Korean War, their cooperation continued under various mutual economic, military, and political assistance treaties since 1961.

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Despite the economic and geopolitical benefits of ROK-PRC normalization, China carefully approached South Korea because it did not wish to deteriorate its relationship with North Korea. China therefore did not pursue normalization with South Korea until 1991 when both South Korea and North Korea were admitted to the UN. This explains why despite South Korea’s effort to normalize relations with China in 1988, ROK-ROC alliance survived from 1988 to 1992.

Current scholarship confirms the popular narrative that China was an influential force in the later developments of ROK-ROC alliance. Qian and Sanford highlight a number of intriguing constructivist and domestic explanations, but their attempts to apply these findings in ROK-ROC alliance is largely superficial and lack much detail. More importantly, their findings do not at all explain the course of ROK-ROC diplomatic relations from 1972 to 1988. This study therefore employs the concept of two-level game to see how constructivist and domestic factors potentially explain South Korea’s counterintuitive decision to maintain ROK-ROC alliance form 1972 to 1988.

1.2 Methodology

This study should be classified as what Harry Eckstein (1975) calls a crucial case design. A crucial case design examines a case that potentially defies established theoretical expectations, and this design is helpful because outcomes that confound theoretical expectations call for a reevaluation of already established theories or a
need to examine different theories. However, I use a methodical approach that varies slightly from that of Eckstein’s design. While Eckstein often uses his crucial case design to defeat the validity of a theory, I use his design more to explain a single deviant case and less to challenge a causal inference. This single crucial case design therefore sees the counterintuitive timing of ROK-ROC diplomatic termination as a crucial case and uses a competing theories technique to seek new explanations. A competing theories technique is a method that introduces conflicting theoretical explanations to evaluate a case. Ronald Mitchell and Thomas Bernauer (1998) argue that a competing theories technique is valuable not only because it provides a broader framework in which to approach a research question, but it also adds more intrinsic value to the research in that the scientific community “understandably values finding disconfirming existing theory more than those supporting existing theory.”

Therefore, this study first introduces the limitations of structural realism to demonstrate that there is a need for different theoretical explanations. It then examines how constructivism and the theory of two-level game can address the intellectual gaps in the topic and provide additional explanations on why South Korea maintained its diplomatic alliance with Taiwan until 1992.

I perform a historical analysis to investigate this study’s crucial case. James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (2005) define a comparative historical analysis

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framework as a method that employs (1) a casual analysis, (2) an exploration of temporal processes, and (3) a use of systematic and contextualized comparison. The framework first formulates a hypothesis or argument to explain a certain historical outcome. It then chronologically evaluates a series of causes while maintaining a systematically consistent comparison, thus explaining why the outcome took place. This framework is especially useful in a single case study because a small number of cases enable a very detailed analysis, and it also creates novel concepts and explanations that combine theories with history. With this in mind, I investigate the counterintuitive timing of ROK-ROC diplomatic termination by systematically analyzing the domestic, international, historical, and political factors that have influenced South Korea’s alliance with Taiwan from 1972 to 1992. For South Korea’s ideational rationale to maintain its alliance with Taiwan, I perform a content analysis of all presidential remarks from 1972 to 1992 in see whether a chronological trend in the remarks’ domestic and foreign policy rhetoric explains South Korea’s decision to maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan during this period. For South Korea’s practical rationale to seek ROK-PRC normalization, I analyze South Korea’s historical trade data to see whether South Korea at a certain time period developed a stronger economic incentive to pursue diplomatic relations with China.

I also use the concept of path dependency to identify critical junctures that add more explanatory power to a historical analysis of ROK-ROC relations from 1972 to 1992. Path dependency looks at how key actors face certain institutional or structural

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paths after specific critical junctures, and James Mahoney (2001) defines critical 
junctures as “choice points that close off important future outcomes.”\textsuperscript{25} According to 
Paul Pierson (2004), these choice points are often attributed to decisions that 
completely rearrange future outcomes.\textsuperscript{26} An analysis of critical junctures is useful in a 
case study that employs comparative historical analysis because (1) critical junctures 
are often easily identifiable and directly addresses historical outcomes, and (2) critical 
junctures often “establishes a meaningful beginning point of analysis” and “prevents 
the problem of infinite explanatory regress into the past.”\textsuperscript{27} Therefore, I select two 
critical junctures that made decisive impacts on ROK-ROC diplomatic termination in 
1992: (1) the 1983 B-296 Flight Hijacking Incident, and (2) the 1988 Seoul Summer 
Olympics. After South Korea’s decision to make diplomatic contacts with China in 
the B-296 Incident (the first critical juncture), South Korea sees a 2,271.02\% increase 
in total trade volume with China from 1983 to 1988. Building on the first critical 
juncture’ economic success, South Korea successfully invites major communist 
countries to participate in its Seoul Olympics (the second critical juncture), and this 
satisfied the political conditions necessary for the ROK government to declare 

Given the poverty of English materials investigating South Korea’s diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan, I draw heavily from primary and secondary sources written in 
Korean and Mandarin Chinese. This study generally consults secondary academic 
materials to build an overarching narrative of ROK-ROC diplomatic alliance, but it

\textsuperscript{25} James Mahoney, “Path-Dependent Explanations of Regime Change: Central America in 
\textsuperscript{26} Paul Pierson, \textit{Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis} (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), 135.
often relies on primary sources such as government documents, speeches, interviews, journalistic writings, and statistical data to formulate and support original arguments. In particular, I perform a content analysis of all 1,592 South Korean presidential remarks from 1972 to 1992 to evaluate South Korea’s changing domestic and foreign policy rhetoric. All translation work done for the purpose of this study is my own.

1.3 Chapter Organization and Findings

Chapter Two illustrates the historical significance of South Korea’s diplomatic alliance with Taiwan by providing a historical narrative of the bilateral relations from 1921 to 1972. This chapter first looks at the Korean independent activists’ alliance with the Chinese Nationalists to fight against Japanese imperialism from 1921 to 1945. It then examines the emergence of the Cold War paradigm in East Asia, the Korean War, and the transformation of the two countries’ previously anti-Japanese alliance into an anti-communist coalition from 1945 to 1972. A historical narrative on the origin of ROK-ROC diplomatic alliance shows that the two countries’ need to battle mutual enemies created a notion that South Korea’s alliance with Taiwan is a diplomatically significant one. This chapter also aims to emphasize several historical factors that have shaped the course of ROK-ROC relations from 1972 to 1992.

Chapter Three discusses the rise of authoritarianism in South Korea, and its influence on the course of ROK-ROC alliance from 1972 to 1983. South Korea’s authoritarian leadership during this period operated under an anti-communist ideology to legitimize its political agenda, and this indirectly influenced the country to maintain its anti-communist alliance with Taiwan. A content analysis of presidential
remarks in conjunction with a historical analysis of South Korea’s historical, political, domestic, and international agenda shows that anti-communism remained a very relevant aspect of South Korea’s political legitimacy. An analysis of historical trade data also shows that South Korea also had a strong economic incentive to maintain ROK-ROC relations. This chapter concludes that South Korea from 1972 to 1983 had a very strong ideational rationale to maintain ROK-ROC alliance and a very weak practical rationale to pursue stronger diplomatic ties with China.

Chapter Four examines the role of the two critical junctures in the development of ROK-ROC diplomatic termination between 1983 and 1992. The two critical junctures, which are the 1983 B-296 Flight Hijacking Incident and the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics, together triggered South Korea to declare Nordpolitik (South Korea’s first diplomatic attempt to pursue détente with the Soviet sphere of influence) and subsequently ended ROK-ROC alliance. The B-296 Incident (the first critical juncture) greatly bolstered previously weak ROK-PRC trade relations, and following the fall of authoritarianism in 1987, the Seoul Olympics (the second critical juncture) significantly weakened South Korea’s anti-communist legitimacy. This chapter also performs a content analysis of all presidential remarks, an analysis of historical trade data, and a historical analysis of domestic and international factors. The findings suggest that, from 1983 to 1992, South Korea had a weak ideational rationale to maintain its alliance with Taiwan and a very strong practical rationale to actively pursue ROK-PRC normalization in 1988.

The conclusion reviews the essential findings of each chapter to produce an overall analysis of presidential remarks, historical trade data, and South Korea’s
domestic and international factors from 1972 to 1992. This will illustrate a more comprehensive development of ideational and practical rationales during this period. In addition, the conclusion discusses the project’s contributions, limitations, and possible ideas for further research.
CHAPTER TWO: AGAINST COMMON ENEMIES, 1921-72

It is difficult to assess the later developments in ROK-ROC relations without properly understanding its historical significance. This chapter therefore provides a historical overview of ROK-ROC alliance from its beginning in 1921 to 1972 when the Shanghai Communiqué started to threaten Taiwan’s political status. This chapter will show that South Korea’s historically significant alliance with Taiwan mainly originated from the two countries’ joined efforts to fight against (1) the Japanese Empire from 1921 to 1945, and (2) regional communist enemy states such as China and North Korea.

2.1 Against Japanese Imperialism, 1921-45

A series of historical events formed ROK-ROC alliance in 1921 when ROC Premier Sun Yat-sen approved the founding of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea in Shanghai. Under Sun’s leadership in 1911, the Xinhai Revolution successfully overthrew the Qing Empire to officially establish the Republic of China in 1912. Despite his role in the revolution, Sun lacked the military supported needed to conquer the remnants of the Qing dynasty. This led powerful warlords like General Yuan Shikai to expel Sun from the new ROC government, and Sun left Beijing to build a rival ROC government in Guangzhou.

The Korean Peninsula during this period went through a similarly chaotic power transition. The Japanese Annexation of Korea in 1910 formally ended the Korean Empire, turned the Korean people into Japanese colonial subjects, and thus sparked a series of national protests and independent activities throughout the Korean
Peninsula. The Japanese Empire at the time had not yet occupied Mainland China, and many Korean independent activists fled to major Chinese cities like Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Harbin to continue their resistance against Japanese imperialism. US President Woodrow Wilson’s international call for self-determination in 1917 and the success of the March 1st Movement in 1919 created a popular in the Korean Peninsula for an independent Korean government. As a result, a group of Korean independent activists in Shanghai founded the Provisional ROK government later in April 1919. The ROK Constitution officially recognizes the Provisional ROK government as South Korea’s predecessor. Therefore, the Provisional ROK government and South Korea must be seen as ideologically consistent political entities.  

Two years after the founding of the Provisional ROK, Provisional ROK Prime Minister Sin Kyusik visited Sun Yat-sen in Guangzhou to seek the Guangdong ROC’s recognition of the Provisional ROK. Sin was the only non-Chinese participant of the Xinhai Revolution and a personal friend of Sun, and Sun immediately approved Sin’s request and wrote “a promissory note indicating Sun’s intention to support all future Korean independence activities in Mainland China.” The Guangdong ROC never established diplomatic ties with the Provisional ROK because the Guangdong ROC too was a government in exile, but Sun’s note to Sin is widely considered to be the first official diplomatic exchange between the ROK and ROC government.

After Sun Yat-sen’s death in 1925, ROC Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek took control of the Guangdong ROC government. With hopes to reunify Mainland China,

Chiang immediately began a series of military conquests toward Northern parts of Mainland China and successfully defeated the remaining Qing warlords in the region. The Guangdong ROC’s Huangpu Military Academy, “as a result of Sun’s military partnership with the Provisional ROK, at the time enrolled more than 200 cadets from Korea.” The Korean cadets fought alongside Chiang’s forces throughout the expedition, and when Chiang finally conquered Beijing in 1928 to reunify the ROC government, the Provisional ROK attempted to use its achievement in the expedition to seek a more formal relationship with the ROC. Although Chiang remained largely ambivalent on the ROC’s alliance with the ROK to avoid direct conflicts with the Japanese Empire, Chiang honored Sun’s promise to fund the Provisional ROK.

ROK-ROC alliance quickly transformed into a military alliance as the Japanese Empire invaded Mainland China in the early 1930s. Following the Mukden Incident in 1931, Japan established a puppet state in Manchuria with hopes to eventually conquer the rest of Mainland China. The ROC government during this period began preparing for an eventual military confrontation with Japan, and Provisional ROK Member Yun Pongkil’s assassination of key Japanese dignitaries visiting Shanghai in 1932 allowed Chiang Kai-shek to “reassess the Provisional ROK as an important ally against Japanese expansionism in Mainland China.”


Second Sino-Japanese War began in 1937, and on April 1st, 1938, Chiang said the following at the Chinese Nationalists Temporary Congress:

To accomplish our mission for the people’s revolution, we must resist hostile countries seeking pandemonium in East Asia. We must also fight against Japanese imperialism and make it our duty to free the people of Korea and Taiwan.

Chiang believed that the Provisional ROK government’s resistance against the Japanese Empire would help his own battle against Japan. Chiang realized that the Korean Peninsula’s geographic location served as a pathway for the Japanese Empire to enter Mainland China, and that Japanese expansionism threatening Mainland China would continue as long as the Korean Peninsula remained a Japanese colony.

Additionally, Japan by the late 1930s was already spending a sizeable portion of its resources quelling Korean resistance activities, and it was rather evident that the Korean Peninsula’s independence would make Japan’s campaign in Mainland China an impossibly difficult task. In a way, Chiang’s decision to fund the Provisional ROK government largely came from the ROC government’s need to effectively defend Mainland China from Japan. Regardless, Chiang’s strategic need to support the Provisional ROK and the Korean independence activists’ anti-Japanese agenda effectively transformed ROK-ROC coalition into a mutually beneficial alliance against Japanese expansionism in East Asia.

33 Jinteng Zhengyi, Zonglizhan yu Taiwan: Riben zhimindi de benggui [Total War and Taiwan: The Fall of Japanese Colonies] (Taipei: Taiwan yanjiu congshu, 2014), 617.
Nonetheless, the ROC government’s decision to financially support the Provisional ROK for more than two decades proved to be a serious commitment, especially considering that Chiang Kai-shek’s government at the time was waging two wars, each against the Japanese Empire and the Chinese Communists. Until the mid 1940s, Chiang “fully funded all Provisional ROK activities such as stipends, healthcare, family welfare, land grants, and travel costs among many other types of financial assistance.”35 In 1940, the Japanese crackdown of Korean independence activities in Shanghai forced the Provisional ROK to relocate to Chongqing, but Chiang’s generous financial support continued until the end of the Second World War in 1945. Chiang also played an instrumental role in the founding of the Korean Liberation Army in 1941, an army dedicated to the Provisional ROK’s fight against Japan.36 By any measures, Chiang’s decision to support the Provisional ROK government was overly generous and also completely unprecedented especially given the Provisional ROK’s status as a foreign nationalist government in exile.

2.2 The Anti-Communist Alliance, 1945-72

The Japanese Empire’s surrender to the Allied forces in 1945 liberated the Korean Peninsula and ended the Second Sino-Japanese War. The end of the Second World War eradicated all Japanese expansionist threats in the region, but the emergence of post-war bipolarity between the United States and the Soviet Union quickly polarized the East Asian political landscape with competing ideologies. In


36 Kim, Chungguk'angilchŏnjaenggwae Han'guk tongilundong, 409.
late 1945, the two superpowers immediately occupied the liberated Korean Peninsula, with the United States and the Soviet Union each claiming territories divided according to the 38\textsuperscript{th} parallel north. The United States dissolved the Provisional ROK government in Chongqing, and after three years of Allied trusteeship and US military governance, it finally approved the founding of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) in 1948 under the leadership of former Provisional ROK President Syngman Rhee. Communist Revolutionary Kim Il Sung, with the Soviet Union’s support, founded the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) just three weeks after.

Mainland China in the late 1940s was no exception to the kind of political turmoil that marked the beginning of the Cold War in East Asia. While the Chinese Communists sponsored by the Soviet Union became a visibly threatening political force by the end of 1946, scars of Japanese invasion and rampant corruption scandals left the ROC government in ruins. The United States significantly reduced its support for Chiang Kai-shek after the Marshall Mission’s failure in 1947, and the Chinese Nationalists ultimately lost the Chinese Civil War in 1948.\textsuperscript{37} Chiang’s regime and its followers quickly relocated the ROC government to Taiwan, and CCP Chairman Mao Zedong eventually conquered the rest of Mainland China to establish the People’s Republic of China (China) in 1949.

Each against a communist enemy of its own, South Korea and Taiwan maintained its pre-Cold War alliance to counterbalance the region’s communist sphere of influence. Taiwan was a then-permanent member of the United Nations

(UN) Security Council, and it extensively lobbied for the UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCK) to approve South Korea as a sovereign state in 1948.\textsuperscript{38} Taiwan was also the first nation to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea in January 1949, and Chiang Kai-shek personally visited Seoul in 1949 to hold a summit with ROK President Syngman Rhee. South Korea reciprocated favorable diplomatic gestures, and it was in fact the only country to maintain ambassadorial relations with Taiwan throughout Chiang’s chaotic retreat to the island in 1948.\textsuperscript{39} By the end of the 1940s, both South Korea and Taiwan had witnessed the division of their homelands and the rise of hostile communist regimes challenging their political legitimacy. These historical parallels allowed past ROK-ROC partnership against the Japanese Empire to continue as an anti-communist coalition.

The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 significantly reoriented the course of the Cold War in East Asia and forced the United States to increase its military presence in the region. By 1949, the United States had already concluded that neither the Korean Peninsula nor Taiwan held any critical US interests. US Secretary Dean Acheson’s controversial speech in 1950 did not include South Korea as a part of the US defense perimeter in the region, and the US National Security Council shortly after decided that “no further action would be taken to assist the Chinese Nationalists to hold Formosa (Taiwan).”\textsuperscript{40} However, when North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950, US President Harry Truman quickly reversed these policies because he believed that further communist expansion in the region could result in a domino


\textsuperscript{39} Yi, “Hankukkwa Taemanŭi kwankye: chunghwaminkuk paeknyŏn, Hantaekwankyêui yŏksawa hyŏnsil,” 213.

effect threatening critical US interests in the region. Truman immediately deployed UN forces to assist South Korea’s fight against North Korea and ordered US Navy 7th Fleet to neutralize the Taiwan Straits in order to prevent China’s invasion of Taiwan.

Major US interventions in the Korean War greatly strengthened South Korea’s alliance with Taiwan. First, the war allowed South Korea and Taiwan to form an indirect military alliance through US intermediaries. Harry Truman, fearing it would trigger China’s participation in the war, refused Chiang Kai-shek’s offer to join the Korean War, but the ROC government nonetheless assisted South Korea with critical paramilitary aid including “financial packages, industrial reinforcements, and translator corps.”41 Second, the Korean War led both South Korea and China to join the US defense perimeter in East Asia. Although both countries were major US beneficiaries throughout the 1940s, the United States did not consider them as strategically significant allies until the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. In a way, the United States’ decision to join the war protected the Korean Peninsula from falling into the Soviet sphere of influence, but it also protected the Chinese Nationalists from China’s invasion. ROK-ROC alliance under US military auspices during the early 1950s established a more formal bilateral partnership.

The Korean Armistice Agreement in 1953 and the end of the Korean War saw a surge of anti-communist measures in both South Korea and Taiwan. Syngman Rhee’s regime in 1953 began various anti-communist campaign purging communist

parties and dissent in South Korea. In fact, it was during this period that South Korea introduced far-reaching anti-communist legal measures such as the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law, a few of which still exist to this day. The Chinese Nationalists during this period declared martial law to push for similar anti-communist agenda in Taiwan. This in addition to the outbreak of the Taiwan Strait Crises in 1954 and 1958 led the ROC government to introduce several constitutional amendments for the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion, increasing surveillance for political dissent in the country.

ROK-ROC alliance flourished from the 1950s onwards under anti-communist leaderships enjoying US protection. Syngman Rhee chose Taiwan as his first international destination after the armistice, and Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek together “formed a memorandum of understanding to liberate the enslaved peoples behind the iron curtain and to ensure a complete victory against communism.” In 1954, South Korea, as an over demonstration of its alliance with Taiwan, sent to Taiwan more than 14,000 Chinese prisoners of war rejecting repatriation to Mainland China. The two countries also established the Asian People’s Anti-Communist League (APACL) during this period, and while US President Dwight Eisenhower prevented the

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organization from becoming a full-scale military coalition, its creation alone again substantiated anti-communism’s role as a critical catalyst in ROK-ROC alliance.\(^4\)

ROK-ROC relations remained robust amidst a series of political turmoil in South Korea. Syngman Rhee’s presidency ended with an election scandal in 1960, and then-ROK General Park Chung Hee’s military coup d’état in 1961 did little to damage South Korea’s alliance with Taiwan. In fact, the two countries only strengthened their alliance through the 1961 ROK-ROC Trade Agreement, the 1964 ROK-ROC Friendship Treaty, the 1965 ROK-ROC Cultural Exchange Agreement, the formation of Asia-Pacific Congress (APC) in 1966, and ROK President Park Chung Hee’s visit to Taiwan in 1966.\(^5\)

The Chinese Nationalists lost much of their international prestige as the United States pursued détente with the Chinese Communists in the early 1970s. In 1971, the United Nations cited Resolution 2758 to expel the ROC delegation and restored China’s membership in the organization. The United States also changed its policy towards Taiwan under US President Richard Nixon, who sought rapprochement with the Chinese Communists as a means to score a diplomatic breakthrough for his new administration.\(^6\) Mao Zedong broke his isolationist policy in 1971 when he invited a group of US table tennis players to visit China, and this prompted US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger to visit PRC Premier Zhou Enlai and successfully arranged Nixon’s historic visit to China in 1972. At the end of

\(^4\) Dwight Eisenhower rejected the APACL because he believed that “another militarily potent alliance in the region would serve to threaten peace in East Asia.” See: Yi, “Hankukkwa Taemanŭi chŏngch’ichŏk kwankye: kwakŏ, hyŏnchae, milae,” 35.


Nixon’s visit to China, Nixon and Zhou issued the Shanghai Communiqué, which mainly illustrated that “progress towards the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interest of all countries.” This in addition to the United States’ promise to “progressively reduce its forces and military installations of Taiwan” implied the United States’ intention to eventually sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. With China’s emergence as a regional superpower, more than 30 countries severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan during this period. By the end of 1972, for the first time in history, the number of China’s diplomatic allies had surpassed that of Taiwan. The Chinese Nationalists’ sudden isolation in the international political system posed several challenges on the future of ROK-ROC alliance.

### 2.3 Chapter Conclusion

In summary, South Korea’s alliance with Taiwan was once a diplomatically significant one. The ROC government generously funded the Provisional ROK government’s independence activities in Mainland China from 1921 and 1945, and the two government’s anti-Japanese alliance quickly transformed into an anti-communist coalition against China and North Korea during the early years of the Cold War. Despite the fall of Taiwan’s international status in the early 1970s, shared historical memories between South Korea and Taiwan would play an important role in the counterintuitive survival of ROK-ROC diplomatic alliance from 1972 to 1992.

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CHAPTER THREE: THE PROBLEM OF LEGITIMACY, 1972-83

This chapter illustrates that South Korea’s authoritarian and anti-communist agenda explains the counterintuitive survival of ROK-ROC alliance from 1972 to 1983. Visible progress towards US-PRC normalization, the decline of the Cold War paradigm, and China’s emergence as a regional superpower altogether made Taiwan an impractical ally in 1972. Throughout the 1970s, many major countries around the world cited China’s One-China policy to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. But South Korea made no diplomatic contact with China until 1983 and thus maintained strong alliance with Taiwan during this period. This is because South Korea under the leadership of ROK President Park Chung Hee and ROK President Chun Doo Hwan legitimized its authoritarian regimes through an anti-communist ideology. I argue that while South Korea’s authoritarian and anti-communist rhetoric from 1972 to 1983 primarily addressed dissent within the country, it was nonetheless powerful enough to create anti-communist foreign policy tendencies. South Korea’s anti-communist rhetoric during this period prevented the country from openly seeking diplomatic relations with a communist enemy state like China. More importantly, this also discouraged South Korea to abandon a historically significant anti-communist ally like Taiwan, as demonstrated in Chapter Two.

Structural realism – a theory that all states are unitary actors seeking maximum power in the international political system – alone fails to explain why ROK-ROC alliance, despite China’s growing geopolitical importance, survived from 1972 to 1983. To answer this question, I perform a historical analysis to examine how South Korea’s authoritarianism and anti-communist legitimacy have influenced the
course of ROK-ROC relations. This helps investigate domestic and historical factors that are invisible on the surface of South Korea’s international decision-making process, and it also helps explain the counterintuitive survival of ROK-ROC alliance from 1972 to 1983. I argue that South Korea’s extraordinary domestic political circumstances during this period created a very strong ideational rationale for anti-communism and the country’s alliance with Taiwan. South Korea during this period also had a very weak practical rationale to strengthen diplomatic ties with China.

3.1 Defining Political Legitimacy and Authoritarian Regimes

An overview of political legitimacy and authoritarianism, and its significance in South Korea’s political history will better illustrates the role of anti-communist legitimacy in the development of ROK-ROC relations from 1972 to 1983. Max Weber (1978) defines political legitimacy as a right to rule originating from a “belief by virtue in which persons exercising authority are lent prestige.”

Authoritarianism, as defined by Juan J. Linz (2000), represents political systems with (1) limited political pluralism, (2) distinct mentalities of necessary evils, (3) minimal social mobilization, and (4) informally defined executive authorities. Authoritarian regimes tend to justify repressive tactics through an emphasis of political legitimacy because regimes without proper legitimacy are often seen as irrational and unjust,

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therefore become “too costly as a means of sustaining authoritarian rule.”

Authoritarian regimes more aggressively pursue political legitimacy during periods of crises such as economic stagnation, international instabilities, and external security threats because crises often become a good justification used to centralize power.

The emergence of authoritarianism and anti-communism as a hegemonic discourse in South Korea traces its root back to 1945. The US military governance of South Korea from 1945 to 1948 propagated anti-communist rhetoric in order to fight its ideological battle against the Soviet Union in East Asia. After three years of fratricidal war against the communist North Korea, the ROK government officially institutionalized anti-communism, as evidenced by ROK President Syngman Rhee’s anti-communist propaganda, state-sponsored surveillance programs, and other legal measures such as the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law.

Authoritarian measures in South Korea rapidly developed under then-ROK General Park Chung Hee’s military coup d’état in 1961. Park defended his authoritarian tactics as necessary measures for rapid economic development and national security against North Korea.

However, it was not until ROK President Park Chung Hee’s implementation of the Yusin Constitution that “the structures for authoritarian rule were established.” In October 1972, Park cited US President Richard Nixon’s unreliable security commitment in East Asia, North Korea’s continued belligerence, and South

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Korea’s economic stagnations to justify a constitutional amendment known as the Yusin Constitution. The amendment gave Park nearly unlimited executive authorities and used anti-communism as a pretext to suppress dissent and democratic procedures. Even after Park’s death in 1979, ROK President Chun Doo Hwan largely retained South Korea’s authoritarian framework and thus maintained various anti-communist measures. Under Park and Chun, anti-communism had become South Korea’s de facto political ideology.

3.2 Measuring Ideational Rationale: Presidential Remarks

I measure South Korea’s ideational rationale for anti-communist legitimacy through a content analysis of all South Korean presidential remarks from 1972 to 1983. These presidential remarks are often speeches, declarations, and press conferences that deal with various domestic and foreign policy issues. I will evaluate all 327 presidential remarks from Park Chung Hee between 1972 and 1979 and all 355 presidential remarks from Chun Doo Hwan between 1980 and 1983. Park and Chun shared a conceptually identical legitimations strategy in that both considered political dissent from their authoritarian leaderships an attack on South Korea’s fight against communist countries. Park and Chun therefore argued that to endorse or

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55 I do not evaluate ROK President Choi Kyu Hah’s 58 presidential remarks from 1979 to 1980. Choi’s presidency was short, lacked substantial executive power, and was overthrown by Chun Doo Hwan in 1981. Choi’s policies therefore did not make a significant impact on South Korea’s foreign policy decisions during this period. See: Sim Chiyŏn, “Ch’oeuyuhajŏngbu haŭi chŏngdanggudo punsŏk,” [The Structures of Political Parties and Their Analysis Under the Choi Kyu Hah Administration] Han’gukch’ŏngch’ŏi eogyosanŏnch’ŏng 24.2 (2003): 319-43.
partake in anti-state activities were “essentially anti-communist, and more importantly, pro-North Korea.”

The two-level game argues that scholars must additionally evaluate many domestic factors such as elite opinion, public opinion, and special interest group agendas. This study however focuses on elite opinion (presidential remarks) alone to produce a quantitative illustration of South Korea’s anti-communist legitimacy from 1972 to 1983. This is because South Korea’s elite opinion was arguably the most important force to shape the country’s decision-making process during this period. South Korea’s authoritarian leadership heavily censored public opinion, and criticisms toward the regimes made little to no impact on the country’s decision-making process. On the other hand, various South Korean special interest groups pursued objectives fairly consistent with that of the country’s elite agenda. For instance, chaebols, powerful family-owned business conglomerates in South Korea, provided an important economic function for the country’s authoritarian agenda under privileged frameworks such as the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI).

I investigate the frequency of South Korea’s anti-communist rhetoric in both domestic and diplomatic contexts. For South Korea’s domestic anti-communist rhetoric, I investigate the frequency of presidential remarks containing any of the following sentiments: (1) call for unity against communism, (2) call for unity against North Korea, and (3) call for stronger national security. For South Korea’s international

anti-communist rhetoric, I examine the frequency of presidential remarks
demonstrating any of the following sentiments: (1) rhetoric critical of communist
countries, (2) rhetoric supporting peace with communist countries, and (3) rhetoric
demanding stronger ties with traditionally allies. Some presidential remarks contain
more than one, and sometimes contradicting, sentiment, and this can make the total
frequency of all three sentiments to be higher than the actual number of investigated
presidential remarks. The total frequency of each sentiment will produce percentages
demonstrating how prevalent a specific sentiment was at a give time period. This will
demonstrate a quantifiable trend in how the relative strength of South Korea’s
ideational rationale for anti-communist legitimacy has changed from 1972 to 1983.
South Korea’s strong ideational rationale for anti-communism will naturally explain
its decision to maintain alliance with a historically anti-communist ally like Taiwan. I
will then provide an analysis to contextualize how other domestic and historical
factors have shaped the course of ROK-ROC alliance.

3.3 Measuring Practical Rationale: Bilateral Trade Volume

I will assess South Korea’s practical rationale for stronger diplomatic ties with
China through an examination of historical trade data from 1972 to 1983. Signs of
trade interdependence are often powerful impositions that encourage involved
countries to “produce a pacifying process at the bilateral level.”59 Robust diplomatic
relations often lead to more active bilateral trade between two countries, but the vice
versa is equally true in that active trade relations were shown to have had an

59 For more insights on the concept of economic diplomacy, see: Timothy R. Heath, “China’s Evolving
enormously positive impact on bilateral peace, security, and foreign relations.⁶⁰

Therefore, I measure South Korea’s yearly export and import volume with both
Taiwan and China to investigate whether South Korea at a specific time period had a
practical rationale to pursue diplomatic relations with China between 1972 and 1983.
If South Korea at a certain time period had stronger trade relations with China than it
did with Taiwan, the country would more likely have a strong practical rationale to
improve diplomatic relations with China. I will then analyze historical, political,
domestic, and international milestones to study how these factors have shaped the
course of ROK-ROC relations.

This method will effectively compare the relative strength of South Korea’s
ideational and practical rationales from 1972 to 1983. I employ different quantitative
strategies to measure ideational and practical rationale because the two rationales are
inherently different in their forms and therefore incompatible. A precisely
quantifiable comparison between the two rationales is very difficult, but the attempt
will sufficiently demonstrate which rationale was dominating which at a specific time
period. The imbalance between South Korea’s ideational rationale for anti-
communism and practical rationale for stronger diplomatic ties with China will help
eplain the counterintuitive survival of ROK-ROC alliance from 1972 to 1983.

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3.4 Park Chung Hee’s Authoritarian Republic and Taiwan, 1972-79

Park Chung Hee’s authoritarian rule formally began in November 1972 when Park replaced South Korea’s constitution with the new Yusin Constitution.61 Despite Park’s assurance that the new constitution would maintain South Korea’s democratic framework, the constitution limited political pluralism, suppressed dissent, and warranted Park’s lifelong tenure of presidency by “compromising the independence of the legislative and judicial branches of government.”62 Park legitimized his legal dictatorship through a series of anti-communist and authoritarian measures. This forced the ROK government to generally discourage foreign policy towards a communist country like China. This in addition to South Korea’s relatively strong diplomatic and economic alliance with Taiwan protected ROK-ROC relations from 1972 to 1979.

3.4.1 Park Chung Hee’s Anti-Communist Legitimacy in South Korea

From 1972 to 1979, South Korea had a very strong ideational rationale to maintain its anti-communist ideology, and this likely preserved the country’s anti-communist alliance with Taiwan. Table 1 illustrates that out of Park Chung Hee’s 327 presidential remarks during this period, 189 (57.80%) remarks call for unity against communism, 177 (54.13%) remarks support unity against North Korea, and 124 (37.92%) remarks advocate stronger national security. Sentiments relevant to anti-

62 Chang, Protest Dialectics, 24.
communist legitimacy are very frequent in Park’s presidential remarks. This shows that anti-communist legitimacy remained highly relevant and arguably permeated all levels of the South Korean society between 1972 and 1983.

**Table 1. Frequency of Park Chung Hee’s Presidential Remarks Containing the Following Sentiments in Domestic Policy, 1972-79**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unity Against Communism</th>
<th>Unity Against North Korea</th>
<th>Stronger National Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td><strong>189/327</strong></td>
<td><strong>177/327</strong></td>
<td><strong>124/327</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(57.80%)</td>
<td>(54.13%)</td>
<td>(37.92%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Databases available from Taet’ongnyŏnggirok’yŏn’gushil yŏnsŏlgirok, Taehanmin’guk taet’ongnyŏngugirokkwan, [Speech Records from the Research Center for Presidential Records, ROK Institute for Presidential Records].

Note: Combined percentages of rhetoric can exceed 100 percent because a single presidential remark may include more than one investigated sentiment.

Park Chung Hee advocated that anti-communist measures were necessary for South Korea’s growing political and economic instability in the early 1970s. Park argued that the shifts of international powers in East Asia made South Korea a more vulnerable target of North Korea, and this in addition South Korea’s relatively weak economic performance in the early 1970s required a strong centralized leadership.

Although Park’s motivation behind the Yusin Constitution primarily came from a wish to consolidate his executive power, national security through anti-communism was not a completely illogical idea given South Korea’s political circumstances.

North Korea’s successful military infiltration during US President Lyndon Johnson’s
visit to Seoul in 1966, its attempted assassination of Park at the presidential Blue House in 1968, and its high-profile flight hijacking of a South Korean commercial flight in 1969 altogether convinced Park that North Korea was militarily capable of invading South Korea.

Park Chung Hee’s security concerns grew deeper as events like the Guam Doctrine in 1969 and the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972 appeared to demonstrate the United States’ intention to minimize its military presence in the Korean Peninsula. Shortly after Richard Nixon’s visit to China, the United States withdrew the US 7th Infantry Regiment from South Korea with hopes to ease tension with China. The South Korean economy during this period also struggled to replicate the country’s rapid economic growth in the 1960s, and these domestic instabilities continuously threatened Park’s political legitimacy. Park needed a strong authoritarian framework to protect his legitimacy in South Korea, and despite strong political opposition from the public, he finally passed the Yusin Constitution in November 1972.

Park Chung Hee addressed his initially unstable political legitimacy by “equating extreme anti-communism with national security and public safety.” Park delineated that an intention to interfere with his authoritarian agenda was to be seen as an attempt to compromise South Korea’s national security against North Korea. Park used this logic to employ various anti-communist measures, and these repressive tactics often relied on “effective state organs, such as the ROK Military and the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA).” The Yusin Constitution granted these organizations with extensive investigative powers, and the organizations often

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resorted to extrajudicial tactics far harsher than the ROK government’s already draconian policies. Increasingly repressive tactics provoked a stronger opposition against Park’s regime, and this naturally led to even harsher tactics, “creating an endlessly vicious cycle of extreme political oppression and domestic instabilities.”

From 1972 to 1979, Park had declared one nationwide martial law, two nationwide garrison decrees, and nine nationwide emergency decrees. South Korea during this period was responsible for 1,928 recorded cases of heavy repression such as illegal political arrests, and 392 recorded cases of extreme oppression like illegal torture and execution. Park’s regime under the new Yusin Constitution had successfully institutionalized anti-communism as its modus operandi.

3.4.2 Park Chung Hee’s Foreign Policy and Its Implications for Taiwan

Park Chung Hee’s foreign policy between 1972 and 1979 generally reflected South Korea’s strong anti-communist ideology, and this explains the country’s decision to maintain its anti-communist diplomatic alliance with Taiwan. Table 2 shows that out of Park’s 327 presidential remarks, 142 (43.43%) remarks criticize communist countries, 11 (3.36%) remarks support peace with communist countries, and 49 (14.98%) remarks call for stronger ties with traditional allies. This demonstrates that Park’s foreign policy rhetoric during this period was much more

66 These numbers are likely much higher in reality because many extrajudicial and coercive measures employed by the state were never officially recorded. See: Paul Chang and Alex Vitale, “Repressive Coverage in an Authoritarian Context: Threat, Weakness, and Legitimacy in South Korea’s Democracy Movement,” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 18.1 (2013): 42.
antagonistic than receptive towards communist countries. It also illustrates that South Korea had a strong ideational rationale for anti-communist foreign policy.

Table 2. Frequency of Park Chung Hee’s Presidential Remarks Containing the Following Sentiments in Foreign Policy, 1972-79

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Against Communist Countries</th>
<th>Peace with Communist Countries</th>
<th>Stronger Ties with Traditional Allies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 142/327 (43.43%) 11/327 (3.36%) 49/327 (14.98%)

Source: Databases available from Taet'ongnyônggirokgyŏn 'gushil yönsălgirok, Taehanmin 'guk taet'ongnyôngugirokkwan, [Speech Records from the Research Center for Presidential Records, ROK Institute for Presidential Records].
Note: Combined percentages of rhetoric can exceed 100 percent because a single presidential remark may include more than one investigated sentiment.

South Korea’s anti-communist alliance with Taiwan remained relatively robust throughout the 1970s, despite China’s international effort to isolate Taiwan. In 1971, South Korea released an official diplomatic statement condemning Taiwan’s removal from the United Nations (UN) in that “[the UN’s] decision to expel the ROC delegation sets a dangerous precedent for the international community’s tolerance towards malevolent communist forces.” Immediately after Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, ROC Foreign Minister Zhou Shukai visited Seoul to confirm South Korea’s support for Taiwan, and Park Chung Hee reassured to Zhou “the Republic of


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Korea’s commitment to its old anti-communist partner.”68 South Korea and Taiwan maintained their diplomatic traditions from the 1960s through the Asian People’s Anti-Communist League (APACL) and the World Anti-Communist League (WACL). The United States’ decreased security commitment in the Korean Peninsula, the fall of Saigon, and the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 also encouraged South Korea to strengthen its alliance with an anti-communist country like Taiwan, bolstering ties under “the two countries’ shared rhetoric for a stronger coalition against anti-communism.”69 ROK Prime Minister Kim Chongp’il was the highest-ranked representative from Asia to attend ROC Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s state funeral in April 1975, and he again visited Taipei in 1977 to hold several diplomatic meetings with the Chinese Nationalists.

South Korea’s staunch anti-communist foreign policy aside, many prominent political figures in South Korea at the time had strong ties to the Chinese Nationalists. Park Chung Hee and Chiang Kai-shek, both graduates of the Imperial Japanese Army Academy, were said to have been good friends. Chiang shortly before his death in 1975 had referred to Park as “his successor as an anti-communist leader and the defender of free ideals in East Asia.”70 Park also greatly admired Chiang as a “generous patron of South Korea and its independence,” and is said to have sought Chiang’s advice throughout his military rule in South Korea.71 Many other South Korean figures during this period were once independent activists, scholars, and

68 “Parkchŏnghŭi taet'ongnyŏng Taeman oegyobujang chŏpkyŏn tamhwa,” [President Park Chung Hee’s Meeting with the Foreign Minister of Taiwan] Kukkagirogwon [ROK National Archive].
soldiers who have heavily benefited from Chiang’s financial and political sponsorship during the 1940s and the 1950s. These individuals include ROK Prime Minister Chŏng Ilkwŏn, ROK Foreign Minister Kim Hongil, and ROK Air Force Chief of Staff Kim Sin, and they naturally played “a significant role in South Korea’s pro-Chinese Nationalists foreign policy throughout the 1970s.”

Park Chung Hee’s anti-communist regime maintained strong diplomatic ties with Taiwan, but the slowly shifting course of the Cold War challenged the long-term future of ROK-ROC alliance. Richard Nixon’s détente towards China forced Park to seek new strategy against regional communist countries, and the ROK government mainly did this through rapprochement with North Korea. In July 1972, Park announced the 7.4 ROK-DPRK Joint Communiqué, which was the first diplomatic statement ever to formally address the issue of reunification in the Korean Peninsula. In 1973, South Korea formally abandoned its decades-long policy rejecting communication with diplomatic allies of North Korea, and Park declared the 6.23 Special Declaration calling on countries “with differing ideologies to open doors to South Korea.” Responding to Park’s changing policy towards communist countries, then-ROC Premier Chiang Ching-kuo said the following in 1974:

今天許多國家，明知共產毒素的禍害，但是為了眼前的苟安，卻隨逐姑息主義的逆流，陷於所謂的「對內反共」和「對外親共」的矛盾，去與共匪「和解」，與共匪「建交」，殊不知這樣措施已為亞洲埋下了大動亂的禍根。

Today, many countries, despite knowing the toxic dangers of communism, let immediate benefits and shortsightedness condone communism. The

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73 Park Chung Hee, Pakchŏnghũdaet ongnyŏngyŏnsŏlmunjim Che10chip 6wolp’yon [President Park Chung Hee Speech Collection, Volume Ten, June Edition] (Seoul: Taet’ongnyŏngbisŏshil, 1980), 77.
74 Chiang, Jianghuxi yanlunji, 89.
contradiction in the so-called “domestically anti-communist” and “internationally pro-communist” is allowing countries to make peace and build diplomatic ties with the communist bandits. They have yet to realize that their actions have already sown the seeds for catastrophe in Asia.

Having lost more than 30 diplomatic allies to China, Taiwan interpreted Park’s slowly changing foreign policy without much enthusiasm. Park’s foreign policy during this period nonetheless operated under South Korea’s anti-communist framework, but it also had pragmatically justified reasons to carefully pursue rapprochement with regional communist countries. While Park superficially advocated dialogues with communist countries in response to the shifts in the region’s Cold War paradigm, South Korea’s strong anti-communist ideology prevented the ROK government from making any formal diplomatic engagements with China. However, these tendencies subtly suggested South Korea’s intention to improve relations with China in distant future. In this way, South Korea’s foreign policy remained largely anti-communist from 1972 to 1979. But Chiang had correctly predicted that South Korea’s slowly liberalizing rhetoric towards communist countries would eventually problematize the future of ROK-ROC alliance.

3.4.3 South Korea’s Economic Alliance with Taiwan, 1972-79

South Korea and Taiwan enjoyed strong economic relations from 1972 to 1979. Figure 1 indicates that from 1972 to 1979, South Korea’s export to Taiwan increased from 16.13 Million US Dollars to 161.41 Million US Dollars (900.60% increase), and the country’s import from Taiwan also rose from 47.86 Million US
Dollars to 209.74 Million US Dollars (338.10% increase).\textsuperscript{75} On the contrary, virtually no economic activity between South Korea and China took place in this period. This shows that while South Korea had an extremely strong economic incentive to maintain its alliance with Taiwan from 1972 to 1979, it essentially had no practical rationale to pursue stronger ties with China.

Figure 1. South Korea’s Trade Volume with Taiwan and China, 1972-79

South Korea’s trade with Taiwan maintained a healthy growth rate throughout the 1970s. South Korea and Taiwan had already established a strong economic base in the 1960s through the 1961 ROK-ROC Trade Agreement, and their economic alliance

\textsuperscript{75} See Table A1 in Appendix for precise yearly export and import volumes in South Korea’s trade with Taiwan and China from 1972 to 1979.
grew stronger under the 1972 ROK-ROC Patent Protection Agreement and the 1972 ROK-ROC Tax Exemption Agreement. The Cold War significantly limited the two countries’ trade options, and this partially allowed the two countries, even during the 1973 Oil Crisis, to maintain an overall healthy economic growth. South Korea and Taiwan from 1972 to 1979 had 15 bilateral economic meetings, 11 government economic partnerships, and numerous high-profile private investment deals. In the mid 1970s, Chiang Ching-kuo financially sponsored the ROC government’s scientific exchanges with South Korean research institutions to build Taiwan’s own heavy chemical industry. During this period, South Korea’s cumulative export volume to Taiwan totaled 659.72 Million US Dollars, and its cumulative import volume to Taiwan reached 924.53 Million US Dollars.

Meanwhile, South Korea from 1972 to 1979 had no trade ties to China. The lack of ROK-PRC diplomatic relations aside, China’s market during this period was largely closed to the outside world. In fact, it was not until 1978 that PRC Leader Deng Xiaoping implemented the Open-Door policy encouraging active foreign trades and investments in China. As a result, South Korea’s export to China was essentially non-existent. South Korea’s import from China totaled 6.05 Million US Dollars because some South Korea businesses maintained indirect trade with China through third-party intermediaries like Hong Kong and Singapore.

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76 Im Unnam, Han’gukwasa Ch’onghwamin’guk yanggukkan’i kyoyŏkch’ungji’i kwanhan yŏn’gu [A Study on Trade Promotions in ROK-ROC Trade Relations] (M.A. thesis, Konkuk University, 1989), 23-50.
77 Mao Jiaqi, Jiangjingguo de yisheng he ta de sixiang yanbian, [The Life of Chiang Ching-kuo and His Ideological Development] (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan: 2003): 368-75.
South Korea under Park Chung Hee had a strong ideational rationale to maintain its anti-communist legitimacy, and this allowed South Korea to preserve its diplomatic alliance with an anti-communist ally like Taiwan. In addition, South Korea’s economic alliance with Taiwan was far stronger than the country’s economic ties to China. Overall, from 1972 to 1979, South Korea’s ideational rationale for ROK-ROC alliance was much stronger than its practical rationale for diplomatic ties with China.

3.5 The Rise of Chun Doo Hwan and Taiwan, 1979-1983

After Park Chung Hee’s assassination in October 1979, then-ROK General Chun Doo Hwan took political control of South Korea through a successful military coup d’état in December 1979. However, Chun’s military regime in 1979 faced major challenges, from weak political legitimacy to democratic uprisings. Chun sought to legitimize his regime with the United States’ support, and with US-PRC normalization in January 1979, South Korea’s foreign policy had to more actively reconsider its strained relationship with China. But Chun maintained South Korea’s anti-communist ideology to justify his authoritarian agenda, and this prevented the country from making any substantial initiatives toward China. This explains the counterintuitive survival of ROK-ROC alliance from 1979 to 1983.

3.5.1 Chun Doo Hwan’s Problem of Legitimacy

Chun Doo Hwan did not have the anti-communist fervor that represented Park Chung Hee’s career, but he nonetheless championed South Korea’s anti-communist
ideology and maintained the country’s alliance with Taiwan. According to Table 3, out of Chun’s 355 presidential remarks from 1980 to 1983, 136 (40.96%) remarks support national unity against communism, 156 (46.99%) comments support unity against North Korea, and 96 (27.11%) comments call for stronger national security. The frequency of Chun’s domestic rhetoric is visibly lower than Park’s presidential remarks from 1972 to 1979. Compared to Park’s rhetoric, the result shows a 29.13% decrease in call for unity against communism, a 13.19% decrease in call for unity against North Korea, and a 28.51% decrease in call for stronger national security. However, the frequency is nonetheless high enough to conclude that South Korea’s ideational rationale for anti-communism remained strong from 1980 to 1983.

Table 3. Frequency of Chun Doo Hwan’s Presidential Remarks Containing the Following Sentiments in Domestic Policy, 1980–83

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Unity Against Communism</th>
<th>Unity Against North Korea</th>
<th>Stronger National Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>136/332 (40.96%)</td>
<td>156/332 (46.99%)</td>
<td>96/332 (27.11%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Databases available from Taet‘ongnyônggirokkwan, Taehanmin‘guk taet‘ongnyônggirokkwan, [Speech Records from the Research Center for Presidential Records, ROK Institute for Presidential Records].

Note: Combined percentages of rhetoric can exceed 100 percent because a single presidential remark may include more than one investigated sentiment.

Chun Doo Hwan’s strong anti-communist rhetoric during this period came from his lack of political legitimacy. In early 1980, few approved Chun as the legitimate successor of Park Chung Hee, and millions of protesters opposed his new military

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79 Chun made no presidential remark in 1979 because he did not formally inherit all presidential authorities until 1980.
junta and demanded a direct presidential election. By April 1980, South Korea’s
democratization movement had become large and organized enough to threaten the
new military regime, and Chun cited anti-communism and national security to declare
a nationwide martial law on May 17, 1980. On the next day, Chun’s troops attacked a
large group of pro-democracy protestors in Kwangju, South Korea, killing 165 and
injuring 3,515 people. Chun Doo Hwan argued that the Kwangju Incident was a
dangerous “communist revolution that sought to hinder national progress and
cooperate with the North Korean bandits.”

Domestic political instability persisted even after the Kwangju Incident, and
Chun Doo Hwan employed various authoritarian measures to legalize anti-communist
witch-hunts in South Korea. In October 1980, Chun established the Social Cleansing
Committee (SCC) to eradicate “all communist and societal evils,” and he introduced
the 1980 Society Protection Law “allowing special inspections of all individuals
whose ideologies and behaviors are deemed dangerous by the government.”

South Korea during this period persecuted dissent under these measures, and when the
United States finally approved Chun’s rule in August 1980, he immediately forced
ROK President Choi Kyu Hah’s resignation to become South Korea’s new president
in 1981. Chun’s authoritarian agenda grew more ambitious under his new presidential
leadership, and this shows that South Korea from 1979 to 1983 still had a strong
ideational rationale for anti-communist legitimacy.

80 Chun Doo Hwan, Chŏnduhwan Taet’ongnyŏng yŏnsŏlmunjip che5gonghwaguk ch’ulbŏmjŏn
[President Chun Doo Hwan Speech Collection, Pre-Fifth Republic Era] (Seoul:
Taet’ongnyŏngbisŏshil, 1990), 45.
81 Song Ukun, Kunbu k’udet’aui sŏnggongyoine kwanhan yŏn’gu: puk’ane taehan chŏkyong
kanŭngsŏngul chungshimŭro [Research on the Success Factor of the Military Regime’s Coup d’état:
Focusing on Its Potential Implications Towards North Korea] (Ph.D. Dissertation., Soongsil
University, 2007), 120-31.
3.5.2 Chun Doo Hwan’s Foreign Policy and Its Implications for Taiwan

Chun Doo Hwan’s foreign policy from 1980 to 1983 maintained South Korea’s anti-communist alliance with Taiwan, but its strong pro-US tendencies forced South Korea to carefully reconsider its traditionally hostile diplomacy towards China. Table 4 shows that out of Chun’s 332 presidential remarks, 138 (41.57%) remarks criticize communist countries, 139 (41.87%) remarks support peace with communist countries, and 60 (18.07%) remarks call for stronger ties with traditional allies. This shows that Chun’s foreign policy rhetoric towards communist countries was generally more forgiving than that of Park Chung Hee. Compared to Park’s rhetoric, the result shows a 4.28% decrease in criticism towards communist countries, a 91.98% increase in peaceful rhetoric towards communist countries, and a 17.10% increase in call for stronger ties with traditional allies. However, that a little less than half of all presidential remarks criticize communist countries confirms South Korea’s strong ideational rationale for anti-communist foreign policy between 1980 and 1983.

### Table 4. Frequency of Chun Doo Hwan’s Presidential Remarks Containing the Following Sentiments in Foreign Policy, 1980-83

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Against Communist Countries</th>
<th>Peace/Reunification with Communist Countries</th>
<th>Stronger Ties with Traditional Allies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>138/332 (41.57%)</td>
<td>139/332 (41.87%)</td>
<td>60/332 (18.07%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Databases available from Taet’ongnyŏnggirokyŏn’gushil yŏnsŏlgirok, Taehanmin’guk taet’ongnyŏnggirokkwan, [Speech Records from the Research Center for Presidential Records, ROK Institute for Presidential Records].

Note: Combined percentages of rhetoric can exceed 100 percent because a single presidential remark may include more than one investigated sentiment.
Chun Doo Hwan accommodated a slightly more liberal stance towards communist countries in that he needed the United States’ support to compensate for his weak political legitimacy in South Korea. The United States at the time had hoped to ease tensions with China and demanded that South Korea minimizes its military presence in the Korean Peninsula. In need of the United States’ approval, Chun willingly abandoned several important military programs started by Park Chung Hee such as South Korea’s nuclear missile program and the country’s long-range missile program. Chun also transferred South Korea’s Wartime Operation Control (WT-OPCON) to the US government and agreed to limit “South Korea’s missile capabilities to not exceed 180 kilometers in range and 453 kilograms in weight.” The United States, recognizing that Chun’s regime would serve its security interests in the region, announced its decision to “fully support General Chun Doo Hwan should he become the next president of South Korea.”

South Korea maintained relatively strong diplomatic ties with Taiwan from 1979 to 1983, but it had to carefully consider the United States’ détente towards China. In February 1981, Chun visited Washington D.C. to meet with US President Ronald Reagan. Chun also attended the 1981 National Press Club Conference, and there he made the following comment on China and Taiwan:

질문 1: 두 공산주의 강대국, 즉 소련과 중국 중 각하는 어느쪽이 동북아 지역의 평화와 안정에 더 큰 위협이 된다고 생각하십니까?

답변 1: 중공과 미국은 친구관계입니다. 그런데 미국은 우리의 친구니까 친구의 친구인 중국이 덜 위협적이라고 봅니다.

질문 2: 각하, 한국과 대만과의 관계를 강화할 어떤 계획이 있으신지요?
답변 2: 대만과 우리는 전통적인 우호 관계를 유지해 왔습니다. 현재처럼 그런 관계를 유지할 생각입니다. 84

Question 1: Of the two communist powers, the Soviet Union and China, which do you believe is a greater threat to the peace and security of Northeastern Asia?

Answer 1: The Chinese Communists and the United States are friends. Since China is a friend of our friend, the Chinese Communists are less threatening.

Question 2: Mr. President, what are your plans for stronger ROK-ROC alliance?

Answer 2: Taiwan is and will continue to be South Korea’s historical ally.

Chun Doo Hwan considered the United States’ normalization with China in 1979 and implied South Korea’s willingness to potentially pursued diplomatic relations with China. However, Chun’s domestic anti-communist ideology prevented South Korea from making any substantial initiatives toward China, and the country maintained its diplomatic alliance with Taiwan. From 1980 to 1983, South Korea consistently participated in Taiwan’s World Anti-Communist League (WACL), and the country during this period held several bilateral diplomatic meetings with representatives from Taiwan. In October 1982, PRC Air Force Major Wu Ronggen’s fighter landed in Sŏngnam, South Korea, and South Korea accepted Wu’s request to seek asylum in Taiwan. 85 In fact, more than 13 Chinese pilots from 1979 to 1983 employed similar strategies to seek political asylum in Taiwan, and South Korea enthusiastically

84 Chun, Cheogonghwaguk ch’ulbŏm chon yŏnsŏlmunjip [Pre-Fifth Republic Speech Collection] (Seoul: Taet’ongnyŏngbisŏshil, 1988), 78.
85 Mun Hŭngho and Chu Risi, Han’guk-T’aiwan kwan’gyesa [The History of South Korea and Taiwan] (Seoul: P’ollît’eia, 2015), 66.
accommodated their requests. But despite these diplomatic gestures, South Korea during this period failed to produce any diplomatic breakthroughs that worked to strengthen its alliance with Taiwan.

Taiwan’s uncompromising foreign policy towards China did little to alleviate Chun Doo Hwan’s apprehension for stronger ROK-ROC alliance. Internationally, South Korea had long abandoned its completely anti-communist stance on foreign policy, but even after US-PRC normalization in 1979, Taiwan firmly rejected diplomatic communication with China. The Chinese Nationalists rigorously perpetuated its original political principle that they remain the sole legitimate rulers of Mainland China, and this prevented Taiwan from seriously considering diplomatic policies that could have positively influenced the course of Cross-Strait relations.

South Korea’s foreign policy from 1979 to 1983 carefully approached the country’s alliance with Taiwan. This is because the United States’ diplomatic ties with China forced Chun Doo Hwan to consider the possibility that South Korea too would one day pursue diplomatic relations with China. However, Chun’s largely anti-communist ideology did not allow South Korea to make any meaningful diplomatic efforts toward China. Overall, South Korea’s foreign policy from 1979 to 1983 had a slightly weaker but nonetheless strong ideational rationale to maintain its anti-communist agenda at an international level.

86 Mun and Chu, Han’guk-T’aiwan kwan’gyesa, 67.
87 Li Mengxun, Yijiubaqinian yihou Taihai liangan minjian jiaoliu zhi yanjiu [A Study on Civilian Exchanges Between Taiwan and Mainland China Since 1987] (Taipei: Fengyun chubanshe, 1993) 56-89.
3.5.3 South Korea’s Economic Competition with Taiwan

From 1979 to 1983, South Korea’s trade relations with Taiwan suffered as the two countries competed against each other in the global market. Meanwhile, South Korea’s economic ties to China grew. Figure 2 illustrates that from 1979 to 1983, South Korea’s export to Taiwan decreased from 161.41 Million US Dollars to 147.51 Million US Dollars (8.61% decrease), and the country’s import from Taiwan increased from 209.74 Million US Dollars to 288.71 Million US Dollars (37.65%). On the other hand, South Korea’s export to China increased from 1 Thousand US Dollars to 4.84 Million US Dollars (489,900% increase) and the country’s import from China increased from 5.58 Million US Dollars to 69.35 Million US Dollars (1,143.41% increase). ROK-PRC trade relations made far greater progress in terms of percentage growth, but South Korea’s total trade volume with China remained rather insignificant compared to that of ROK-ROC trade relations. The data suggests that while South Korea’s practical rationale to strengthen diplomatic ties with China became stronger from 1979 to 1983, it was not powerful enough to offset a much stronger economic incentive for ROK-ROC diplomatic alliance.

By the early 1980s, South Korea and Taiwan had both achieved a successful export-oriented economy heavily relying on domestically produced industrial products. In fact, the two countries during this period shared six of their top ten import countries and three of their top ten export goods. For instance, “textile products alone made up 56.2% of South Korea’s export and 27.8% of Taiwan’s

88 See Table A2 in Appendix for precise yearly export and import volumes in South Korea’s trade with Taiwan and China from 1979 to 1983.
Businesses from the two countries often completed in the same markets, and this naturally decreased “South Korea’s previously high trade interdependence with Taiwan.” But despite such unfavorable circumstances, ROK-ROC trade relations remained an important bilateral partnership. From 1979 to 1983, South Korea’s total trade volume with Taiwan totaled 2.44 Billion US Dollars. With the help of the United States’ 1980 Taiwan Relations Act, South Korea also traded indirectly with Taiwan.

**Figure 2: South Korea’s Trade Volume with Taiwan and China, 1979-83**


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On the other hand, ROK-PRC trade relations made significant progress with China’s Open-Door policy in 1978. The policy in addition to the United States’ normalization with China in 1979 encouraged South Korean businesses to significantly reevaluate China’s market potential, and in June 1982, the ROK government began applying a special tariff rate on Chinese products to encourage more trade between the two countries. South Korea’s growing interest in China was equally matched by China’s economic need to trade with South Korean businesses. China at the time lacked significant industrial infrastructures to maintain its rapid industrialization, and it saw its economic relationship with South Korea as a potentially rewarding partnership. In 1978, PRC Foreign Minister Li Qiang publicly announced that “China may have to consider having trade with South Korea,” and indirect trade between the two countries flourished through third-party intermediaries like Hong Kong and Singapore. However, the lack of ROK-PRC diplomatic relations severely limited South Korea’s economic activity in Mainland China, and vice versa. From 1979 to 1983, South Korea’s total trade volume with China was 293.18 Million US Dollars, which was around one-tenth of South Korea’s total trade volume with Taiwan during this period. While South Korea successfully bolstered its trade ties to China, the ROK government from 1979 to 1983 still had a relatively weak practical rationale to pursue diplomatic relations with China.

3.6 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter concludes that South Korea from 1972 to 1983 had a strong ideational rationale to maintain its alliance with Taiwan and a relatively weak practical rationale to seek diplomatic relations with China. South Korea under the authoritarian leadership of Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan sought to legitimize its authoritarian agenda through anti-communism. A content analysis of all 659 presidential remarks from 1972 to 1983 illustrates that Park and Chun championed anti-communist rhetoric in both domestic and foreign policy. While the frequency of anti-communist sentiments slightly decreased under Chun’s pro-US tendencies, South Korea nonetheless maintained relatively strong anti-communist legitimacy until 1983. This prevented South Korea from openly seeking diplomatic relations with a communist enemy state like China, let alone abandoning a historically significant anti-communist ally like Taiwan.

ROK-ROC trade relations, despite South Korea’s economic competition with Taiwan in the early 1980s, remained relatively strong from 1972 to 1983. ROK-PRC trade relations did not exist under the Park Chung Hee period, and while this quickly changed under China’s Open-Door policy in 1979, its size failed to outgrow South Korea’s long-established economic alliance with Taiwan during this period. This shows that the historical significance of ROK-ROC relations aside, South Korea also had a greater economic incentive to protect its diplomatic alliance with Taiwan.
CHAPTER FOUR: NORDPOLITIK, 1983-92

This chapter demonstrates that South Korea’s Nordpolitik under the leadership of ROK President Roh Tae Woo ended ROK-ROC alliance in 1992. Nordpolitik was formally announced in 1988 to become South Korea’s first diplomatic attempt to pursue détente with communist countries, mainly China and the Soviet Union. In this chapter, I argue that the policy should be seen as a path dependent outcome of two critical junctures: (1) the 1983 B-296 Flight Hijacking Incident, and (2) the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics. The B-296 Incident provided South Korea with strong economic incentives to pursue diplomatic ties with China in 1983, and the Seoul Olympics’ success in 1988 provided the country with strong political incentives to openly seek diplomatic normalization with China. Under China’s One-China policy, South Korea’s rapidly increasing economic and political contacts with China from 1983 to 1992 heavily deteriorated and eventually ended ROK-ROC alliance.

I employ path dependency – a theory that a retrospective analysis of critical junctures may explain certain institutional trajectories – to illustrate how the B-296 Incident in 1983 and the Seoul Olympics in 1988 together became a powerful impetus for ROK-ROC diplomatic termination in 1992. Structural realism – a theory that all states are unitary actors seeking maximum power in the international political system – fails to adequately explain why South Korea, despite the apparent political and economic incentives, chose not to announce Nordpolitik between 1983 and 1988. Path dependency can address this time gap to illustrate how the two critical junctures have influenced South Korea’s decision to pursue normalization with China in 1988. In doing so, I will investigate how various historical and domestic factors have
influenced the development of the B-296 Incident, the Seoul Olympics, and Nordpolitik. I argue that South Korea’s practical rationale for normalization with China grew tremendously under the two critical junctures. South Korea’s ideational rationale for anti-communist legitimacy collapsed with the end of ROK President Chun Doo Hwan’s authoritarian rule and subsequent democratization in 1987. On the other hand, South Korea in 1988 had a very strong practical rationale and a virtually non-existent ideational rationale, and this allowed the Roh Tae Woo administration to put aside its historically significant alliance with Taiwan and declare Nordpolitik.

4.1 Evaluating Path Dependency Through Critical Junctures

A brief discussion on the theoretical framework of path dependency and critical junctures can better illustrate the argument that South Korea’s Nordpolitik was a path dependent outcome of two critical junctures. Path dependency examines how key actors follow certain institutional or structural paths after decisions made in specific critical junctures, and James Mahoney (2001) defines critical junctures as “choice points that close off important future outcomes.”94 Paul Pierson (2004) suggests that critical junctures need to be studied because they “place institutional arrangements on paths or trajectories, which are then very difficult to alter.”95 This calls for a historical analysis of several events or outcomes that potentially narrowed a range of potential outcomes to create “a new sequence that begins with the critical

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94 Mahoney, “Path-Dependent Explanations of Regime Change: Central America in Comparative Perspective,” 113.
95 Pierson, Politics in Time, 132.
juncture.” This study therefore engages in a historical analysis of notable events to locate relevant critical junctures. This study uses the path dependency framework to “establish a meaningful beginning point of analysis” and “prevent the problem of infinite explanatory regress into the past.”

From 1983 to 1992, two critical junctures have shaped South Korea’s decision to seek normalization with China in 1988. The first critical juncture of Nordpolitik is the B-296 Incident in 1983, an event that stimulated an exponential economic growth in ROK-PRC trade relations to strengthen South Korea’s practical rationale for more contacts with China. The incident involved a group of anti-communist activists who hijacked a PRC commercial jet to land in Ch’unch’ŏn, South Korea. After a series of ROK-PRC diplomatic negotiation concerning the jet’s return to China, South Korea was able to establish a diplomatic channel with China and develop its previously weak trade relations with China into a thriving economic partnership. From 1983 to 1988, South Korea’s import from China saw a 1,899.70% increase while the country’s export to China also rose by 7,591.12%. Although the incident itself failed to immediately lead to ROK-PRC normalization, its tremendously positive economic impact on ROK-PRC relations essentially signaled the beginning of the end of ROK-ROC alliance.

The Seoul Olympics in 1988 became the second and final critical juncture for Nordpolitik in that its success provided Roh Tae Woo with a political incentive to abandon South Korea’s traditionally anti-communist foreign policy. South Korea

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97 Mahoney, “Path-Dependent Explanations of Regime Change: Central America in Comparative Perspective,” 113.
allocated a tremendous amount of capital and efforts in the event as it was the first large-scale international event in the country’s history. The Seoul Olympics, with 159 participating nations, became the largest ever Olympics event at the time and also the first Olympics in 12 years to facilitate participation from both the United States and major communist countries like China, the Soviet Union, and East Germany. Using the event’s historical significance along with South Korea’s democratization in 1987, Roh sought to redesign his political legitimacy and portray his administration as a pioneer of an internationally respected democracy. The Seoul Olympics’ historical significance provided South Korea with a strong political justification to abandon its traditionally anti-communist foreign policy, catalyzing the implementation of Nordpolitik in 1988. This further weakened South Korea’s diplomatic alliance with Taiwan as the alliance was largely based on the two countries’ shared anti-communist ideology.

4.2 Measuring Ideational and Practical Rationales

In this chapter, I will replicate the measures employed in Chapter Three to evaluate the relative strength of South Korea’s ideational rationale for anti-communist legitimacy and its practical rationale for ROK-PRC normalization. I will measure these rationales after each critical juncture to examine how the two critical junctures have influenced South Korea’s decision to pursue Nordpolitik in 1988. Inconsistent benchmarks for different empirical chapters carry the danger of a fragmentary analysis. This study will provide a more comprehensive narrative of South Korea’s ideational and practical rationales to cover both empirical chapters. The measurement
will produce an overarching analysis of how South Korea’s ideational and practical rationales have shaped the entire course of ROK-ROC alliance, not just from 1972 to 1983 or 1983 to 1992.

I measure South Korea’s ideational rationale for anti-communist legitimacy through a content analysis of all presidential remarks delivered from 1983 to 1992, with 332 remarks from Chun Doo Hwan between 1983 and 1987, and 601 remarks from Roh Tae Woo between 1988 and 1992. I investigate the frequency of the ROK government’s anti-communist rhetoric in both domestic and diplomatic contexts. For South Korea’s domestic anti-communist rhetoric, I investigate the frequency of presidential remarks containing any of the following sentiments: (1) call for unity against communism, (2) call for unity against North Korea, and (3) call for stronger national security. For South Korea’s international anti-communist objectives, I examine the frequency of presidential remarks discussing the following sentiments: (1) rhetoric critical of communist countries, (2) rhetoric supporting peace with communist countries, and (3) rhetoric demanding stronger ties with traditional allies. Some presidential remarks contain more than one sentiment, and this can make the total frequency of all three sentiments to be higher than the actual number of relevant presidential remarks. The total frequency of each sentiment will produce percentages demonstrating how strong a specific sentiment was at a given time period. This will indicate whether South Korea at a given time period had an ideological need to maintain its anti-communist alliance with Taiwan.

This study measures South Korea’s practical rationale for normalization with China through an analysis of South Korea’s trade volume with Taiwan and China.
Strong trade relations often become a powerful impetus for stronger diplomatic relations. I look at South Korea’s trade volume with Taiwan and China, export and import, to investigate any visible chronological trend or growth that explains South Korea’s foreign policy towards Taiwan from 1983 to 1992. I will then discuss historical, political, domestic, and political factors that potentially explain a certain trend shown in the content analysis or bilateral trade volume. This will better contextualize the development of ROK-ROC relations from 1983 to 1992.

4.3 Critical Juncture One: The B-296 Flight Hijacking Incident, 1983

On May 5th, 1983, South Korea declared an emergency airstrike alert as an unidentified commercial jet from China entered the South Korean airspace. A group of anti-communist activists had hijacked the plane carrying 96 Chinese passengers from Shenyang, China. The hijackers requested an emergency landing to the South Korean aviation authorities with hopes that South Korea would grant them political asylum to Taiwan, its diplomatic ally. The plane eventually landed on Camp Page, a US Air Force base in Ch’unch’on, South Korea.

South Korea throughout the Cold War maintained no diplomatic ties with China, and this forced the South Korean leadership to act with great political caution as a jet carrying 96 nationals of an enemy state had landed on its territory. Shortly after, South Korea received a telegram from China “requesting South Korea’s permission for a negotiation concerning the plane’s return to China.” Chun Do Hwan granted China’s request, and on May 7th, 1983, PRC Civil Aviation Director 98 Woonhamnyusŭ, July 4, 2011.

Shen Tu arrived in Seoul with a team of 32 Chinese diplomats. For the first time in 30 years, a high-ranking government official from China had landed in South Korea.

The six hijackers requested asylum to Taiwan, and the ROC government quickly sent its own diplomatic delegation to South Korea with hopes to negotiate their release. ROC Ambassador to South Korea Xue Yuqi called the hijackers “anti-communist martyrs seeking freedom,” and demanded South Korea’s full diplomatic cooperation on their safe return to Taiwan.99 The World Anti-Communist League (WACL) Chairman Gu Zhenggang also contacted the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs supporting the hijackers’ release, garnering a significant media attention in Taiwan.100 Taiwan’s enthusiastic support for the hijackers came from the fact that their escape from China reinforced Taiwan’s narrative that the Chinese Nationalists are the sole legitimate rulers of Mainland China.

Naturally, South Korea’s negotiation with China revolved around the issue concerning the extradition of the hijackers. Shen Tu’s delegation initially demanded that South Korea extradites the hijackers to China, but ROK Deputy Foreign Minister Kong Romyŏng’s delegation refused and argued that “according to the Hague Convention, the hijackers are to be tried under the South Korean law.”101 While the laws specified in the Hague Convention indeed privileged South Korea with a prerogative to try the hijackers under its own law, the decision more so came from South Korea’s diplomatic alliance with Taiwan. Taiwan aggressively protested China’s extradition request throughout the incident, and South Korea was simply not

100 Mun and Chu, Han’guk-T’aiwan kwan’gyesa, 66.
101 Mun and Chu, Han’guk-T’aiwan kwan’gyesa, 65.
able to prioritize a request from an enemy state over that of an important diplomatic ally. South Korea and China have agreed to return the jet and its passengers to China and to punish the hijackers under the South Korean law. The six hijackers were eventually released in August 1984 and sent to Taiwan.

The South Korean delegation sided with Taiwan to reject the Chinese delegation’s request for extradition, but the two countries came to an agreement in a surprisingly cooperative spirit. According to an article from China’s Renmin Daily published on May 17th, 1983, Shen Tu left the following comment on the two countries’ very first diplomatic contact:

沈图说：在处理这一劫机事件中，南朝鲜有关当局按照有关国际公约的规定，采取了合作的态度，保护了飞机、旅客和机组的安全，对两名受伤机组人员给予及时的治疗和护理，对旅客和机组人员在生活上给予了适当的照顾和妥善的安排。他代表民航局和二九六号机组以及全体中国旅客，向南朝鲜有关当局表示感谢。102

Shen Tu said: the South Chosŏn authorities have handled the hijacking incident in accordance with the international conventions and showed cooperation for the safety and treatment of the aircraft, passengers, crews, and injured personnel. Shen expressed his gratitude to the South Chosŏn authorities on behalf of the Chinese aviation authorities and the Chinese passengers.

Shen Tu in the article refers to South Korea as South Chosŏn, upholding China’s interpretation that North Korea is the only legitimate government of the Korean Peninsula.103 However, Shen’s expression of gratitude to South Korea nonetheless testified to the B-296 Incident’s diplomatic success, especially given China’s previously hostile relationship with South Korea.

103 Chosŏn comes from North Korea’s official name, Chosŏnminjuju’ŭinmin’gonghwaguk [The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea].
after some persuasion, had agreed to honor South Korea’s request to include his official diplomatic title in the incident’s concluding memorandum. Consequently, the signed memorandum read “signed by the People’s Republic of China Civil Aviation Director Shen Tu and the Republic of Korea Deputy Foreign Minister Kong Romyŏng.” The two delegations’ decision to use their official diplomatic titles carried a certain diplomatic significance in that it implied their mutual recognition of each other as a diplomatically sovereign state. Two days later, Shen’s delegation left Seoul with a comment that he “expects signs of goodwill in [the two countries’] future endeavors.”

4.3.1 The Economic Impact of the B-296 Flight Hijacking Incident, 1983-88

The B-296 Flight Hijacking Incident’s role as a critical juncture for Nordpolitik (and subsequent ROK-ROC diplomatic termination) came from its contribution to the previously non-existent ROK-PRC trade relations. Figure 3 shows that from 1983 to 1988, South Korea’s export to China increased from 4.84 Million US Dollars to 372.25 Million US Dollars (7,591.12% increase), and the country’s import from China also increased from 69.35 Million US Dollars to 1.39 Billion US Dollars (1,899.70% increase). ROK-ROC trade relations also remained strong during this period, but saw slightly less impressive growth. South Korea’s export to Taiwan increased from 147.51 Million US Dollars to 954.39 Million US Dollars (547.01% increase), while the country’s import from Taiwan rose from 288.71

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105 Song, Zhonghan guanxishi: Xiandai juan, 112.
106 See Table A3 in Appendix for precise yearly export and import volumes in South Korea’s trade with Taiwan and China from 1983 to 1988.
Million US Dollars to 1.10 Billion US Dollars (271.05% increase). This shows that South Korea’s thriving economic partnership with China from 1983 to 1988 created a relatively strong practical rationale to strengthen diplomatic ties with China.

**Figure 3. South Korea’s Trade Volume with Taiwan and China, 1983-88**

![Graph showing trade volume](image)


Note: The figure also includes data from 1982 to highlight the first critical juncture’s impact on ROK-ROC trade relations.

Mutual goodwill displayed in the B-296 Incident’s concluding memorandum triggered more active trade between businesses in South Korea and China. In July 1983, two months after the incident, South Korea revised its tariff policy to better accommodate Chinese agricultural products from entering the South Korean market,
directly targeting “China’s surplus feed grain problem.” By the end of 1984, South Korea had already purchased more than 24,000 metric tons worth of agricultural produce from China, and this trend starkly contrasts in late 1982 when South Korea did not purchase any agricultural produce through direct trade with China. In 1985, the Korean Coal Corporation signed a deal with the Chinese National Coal Import and Export Corporation to ship coal directly from various Chinese ports to “Korean ports, mostly Pusan, Inchon, and Pohang.” Before the B-296 Incident in 1983, South Korea largely relied on minor third party transactions through intermediary cities like Hong Kong and Singapore to secure natural resources from China, and the incident successfully transformed a previously indirect ROK-PRC trade relations into a thriving economic partnership.

The B-296 Incident also allowed Chaebols, powerful South Korean family-owned conglomerates, to introduce several high-profile joint ventures in China. By the mid 1980s, South Korea began exporting advanced industrial products such as electronics, semiconductors, and chemicals, and businesses began relocating production to countries with more affordable labor costs. Prospects on ROK-PRC relations grew optimistic day by day after the incident’s diplomatically receptive closure “as both governments encouraged bilateral activities shortly after the flight

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hijacking incident." In 1985, Daewoo became the first Chaebol to win a contract for a joint venture in China, building its own production plant in Fuzhou, China. Other major Chaebols like Hyundai and Lucky-Gold Star also began lobbying for ventures and investments in China as it relaxed foreign investment restrictions throughout the mid and late 1980s, and their economic activities in China alone largely contributed to a massive 823.01% increase in South Korea’s total export volume to China from 1985 to 1988. In short, the incident’s diplomatic breakthrough and the emergence of South Korean business interests from 1983 to 1988 forced South Korea to reevaluate its trade alliance with China.

While South Korea from 1983 to 1988 maintained strong trade relations with Taiwan to achieve substantial growths, it did not produce the kind of major breakthroughs that ROK-PRC trade relations enjoyed. By 1985, South Korean businesses had predicted that “[South Korea’s] trade volume with China will soon outpace that of Taiwan,” and began relocating many of its trade interests from Taiwan to China. This was due to the simple fact that China had a much bigger market potential than Taiwan, and that “China’s market in 1986 was expected to have a consistent double-digit growth at least until the late 1990s.” Granted, ROK-ROC trade relations survived, and perhaps even thrived, under privileged frameworks like

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110 Kim, Hanjung myuŏkkwan ’gyee kwanhan yŏn ’gu: Chungguk muyŏkchŏngch’aek shisajŏmul chungshimūro, 18.
112 For a comprehensive list of major South Korean conglomerates’ business interests in China during this period, see: Hong Kwŏnhŭi, “Chunggong parame sŏllenŭn chaegyep’unghyang,” [Big Money Flutters as the Communist China Opens Doors] Sindonga 3.1 (1988): 368-77.
the ROK-ROC Economic Alliance Council and existing bilateral treaties such as the 1961 ROK-ROC Trade Agreement and the 1972 ROK-ROC Tax Exemption Agreement. In fact, South Korea’s 547.01% increase in export to Taiwan, 271.05% increase in import from Taiwan, and “eight high-profile South Korean investments in Taiwan from 1982 to 1986,” altogether reaffirm Taiwan’s significance in the South Korean economy from 1983 to 1988. Nonetheless, South Korea in the mid 1980s “for practical reasons more aggressively pursued future trade contacts in Mainland China over those in Taiwan.” ROK-ROC trade volume during this period may have been larger than that of ROK-PRC trade relations, but China’s overwhelmingly high market potential provided South Korea with a very strong practical rationale to strengthen diplomatic ties with China.

4.3.2 South Korea’s Anti-Communist Political Legitimacy, 1983-1987

Despite the exponential growth in ROK-PRC trade relations from 1983 to 1988, Chun Doo Hwan’s anti-communist legitimacy maintained South Korea’s diplomatic alliance with Taiwan. Table 5 illustrates that out of Chun’s 332 presidential remarks during this period, 121 (36.45%) remarks call for national unity against communism, 161 (48.49%) remarks encourage national unity against North Korea, and 90 (27.11%) remarks promote stronger national security. The result shows that the frequency of Chun’s domestic anti-communist rhetoric did not drastically change from his remarks between 1980 and 1983. Compared to the remarks from 1980 to 1983, the result shows a 11.01% decrease in call for unity against communism, a 3.19% increase in call for unity against North Korea, and no

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115 Chang, “Han’guk Taeman muyŏkchŏngch’aegŭi pigyo’yŏng’gu,” 86.

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percentage change in call for stronger national security. This indicates that South Korea’s ideational rationale for anti-communist legitimacy remained relatively strong.

Table 5. Frequency of Chun Doo Hwan’s Presidential Remarks Containing the Following Sentiments in Domestic Policy, 1983-87

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unity Against Communism</th>
<th>Unity Against North Korea</th>
<th>Stronger National Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>121/332 (36.45%)</td>
<td>161/332 (48.49%)</td>
<td>90/332 (27.11%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Databases available from Taet’ongnyŏnggirok’yŏn’gushil yŏnsŏlgirok, Taehanmin’guk taet’ongnyŏngugirokkwan, [Speech Records from the Research Center for Presidential Records, ROK Institute for Presidential Records].

Note: Combined percentages of rhetoric can exceed 100 percent because a single presidential remark may include more than one investigated sentiment.

Chun Doo Hwan addressed South Korea’s immense domestic instability and his lack of political legitimacy through a number of strong anti-communist measures. Pro-democratic movements beginning in the early 1980s persisted with the support of loyal student protestors throughout the mid 1980s, political corruptions were commonplace, and crime rates were at its height as organized crime ran rampant.

State authorities like the ROK Army and the Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP) constantly employed harsh authoritarian measures to combat political dissent, and “Chun’s approval rating remained consistently mediocre throughout the 1980s.”

Chun therefore employed “various laws and policies extending the

\(^{116}\) The ANSP was Chun Doo Hwan’s government intelligence agency. It was known as the Korea Central Intelligence Agency (KClA) under Park Chung Hee’s rule. See: Yi Ch’olho, “Kukkap’ongnyŏkkwa in’gwŏnch’imhae: Che5konghwaguk Chŏnduhwan chŏnggwŏn’girũl chungshimũro,” [State Violence and Human Rights Violations: A Study of Chun Doo Hwan’s Fifth Republic Period] Kongbŏmnonch’ong 6.1 (2010): 1-42.
regime’s already draconian tactics against political dissent.”\textsuperscript{117} Chun Doo Hwan’s anti-communist rhetoric during this period, just like that of ROK President Park Chung Hee, served to compensate the regime’s unstable political legitimacy. These domestic political turbulences greatly strengthened South Korea’s ideational rationale for a strong anti-communist ideology.

The Rangoon Bombing in October 1983, an event in which North Korea unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate Chun Doo Hwan during his visit to Burma, only fueled Chun’s anti-communist rhetoric. While Chun was not injured, the bombing killed four high-ranking South Korean officials including ROK Foreign Minister Yi Pômsôk, ROK Deputy Prime Minister Sô Sökhun, and ROK Presidential Chief of Staff Ham Kyõngch’un. After returning to South Korea, Chun often cited the attack to argue that political dissent would further compromise South Korea’s fight against North Korea, and that to criticize his regime is to essentially act as a pro-North Korea communist. Chun’s regime from 1983 to 1987 saw its anti-communist measures at its height, “justifying arrests and torture of protestors, an organized destruction of political plurality, and various other human rights violations.”\textsuperscript{118}

Chun Doo Hwan’s anti-communist ideology collapsed with South Korea’s democratization in 1987, destroying its ideational rationale for anti-communist legitimacy and ROK-ROC alliance. In June 1987, millions of demonstrators nationwide heavily protested Chun’s refusal to abolish South Korea’s electoral

\textsuperscript{117} Yi, “Kukkap’ongnyökkwa in’gwônch’imhae: Che’gkonghwaguk chônduhwan chônggwôn’girul chungshimûro,” 11.
\textsuperscript{118} Yi, “Kukkap’ongnyökkwa in’gwônch’imhae: Che’gkonghwaguk chônduhwan chônggwôn’girul chungshimûro,” 11.
college for the upcoming election, eventually forcing the regime to approve a constitutional amendment reinstating a direct presidential election. The end of Chun’s authoritarian regime, South Korea’s democratization, and then-ROK General and Chun’s political crony Roh Tae Woo’s pledge for a “post-ideological republic,” altogether dismantled South Korea’s decades-old framework of authoritarianism in June 1987. South Korea’s democratization in October 1987 significantly weakened the country’s ideational rationale for anti-communist legitimacy, and this casted a shadow on the future of ROK-ROC diplomatic alliance.

4.3.3 Chun Doo Hwan’s Foreign Policy and Taiwan, 1983-1987

ROK-ROC alliance from 1983 to 1987 continued under Chun Doo Hwan’s anti-communist legitimacy, but South Korea’s foreign policy towards Taiwan remained largely symbolic in nature. Instead, South Korea built on the B-296 Incident’s diplomatic outcome as a critical juncture to create more diplomatic opportunities with China. Table 6 shows that out of Chun’s 332 presidential remarks, 75 (22.59%) remarks criticize communist countries, 123 (37.05%) remarks call for peace with communist countries, and 16 (4.82%) remarks advocate for stronger ties with traditional allies. The result indicates that South Korea’s ideational rationale for anti-communist foreign policy became weaker. Compared to the remarks from 1980 to 1983, the result shows a 45.66% decrease in criticism towards communist countries, an 11.51% decrease in call for peace with communist countries, and a 73.33% decrease in calls for stronger ties.

decrease in call for stronger ties with traditional allies. This shows that South Korea’s foreign policy, unlike the country’s domestic anti-communist legitimacy, showed a relatively liberal stance towards communist countries.

Table 6. Frequency of Chun Doo Hwan’s Presidential Remarks Containing Foreign Policy Rhetoric, 1983-1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Against Communist Countries</th>
<th>Peace with Communist Countries</th>
<th>Stronger Ties with Traditional Allies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>75/332 (22.59%)</td>
<td>123/332 (37.05%)</td>
<td>16/332 (4.82%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on a database available from Taet’ongnyônggirok’yon’gushil yônsölgirok, Taehanmin’guk taet’ongnyôngugirokkwan, [Speech Records from the Research Center for Presidential Records, ROK Institute for Presidential Records].

Note: Combined percentages of rhetoric can exceed 100 percent because a single presidential remark may include more than one investigated sentiment.

South Korea’s foreign policy during this period tried to separate its anti-communist legitimacy inside the country with pragmatic pursuits abroad. From 1983 to 1987, South Korea maintained its alliance with Taiwan under the country’s loosely defined anti-communist framework, but it focused more efforts on diplomatic opportunities toward China rather than on its alliance with Taiwan.

While South Korea often cited the historical significance of ROK-ROC alliance, it made little effort to strengthen its diplomatic relations with Taiwan. This mainly came from China’s potential role in South Korea’s policy towards reunification. By December 1983, South Korea’s economy had double that of North Korea, and the ROK government was carefully conceptualizing the possibility of
reunification “through economic and political absorptions of North Korea.” Some believed that South Korea’s plan for reunification would require political support from major communist powers, and that the ROK government’s détente with China was necessary in order to make reunification a possible reality. It is also interesting to note that ROK Foreign Minister Yi Pŏmsŏk introduced the intellectual framework of Nordpolitik during his speech at Korea National Defense University in June 1983, just one month after the B-296 Incident and the first ROK-PRC diplomatic contact.

Naturally, South Korea’s relationship with Taiwan rapidly deteriorated as the ROK government began siding with China in various issues. In March 1984, a Taiwanese basketball team had visited Seoul to participate in the Asian Youth Basketball Cup, but they were later refused participation and sent back to Taiwan on the ground that the International Olympic Committee (IOC) regulations banned the usage of the official ROC flag. Taiwan, believing that the South Korean authorities had mistreated the Taiwanese team, boycotted the 1986 Asian Games in Seoul, only to see China’s enthusiastic participation in the event. When South Korea invited China to participate in the Seoul Asian Games, PRC Paramount Leader Deng Xiaoping applauded South Korea’s invitation and commented that China “must improve its relations with South Korea; economically it is mutually beneficial and

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121 Though the intellectual framework of Nordpolitik emerged as early as 1983, it was not until the Roh Tae Woo administration that South Korea substantially implemented Nordpolitik in its foreign policy. See: An and Park, “Not’aeu chŏngbuŭi ‘pukpangjŏngch’aek’ŭi chuyo kyŏlchŏngyoin kömt’o mit chaep’yŏngga kanŭngsŏng: punsŏksujunbyŏl p’yŏngga mit taejungjŏk inshigŭi koeri t’amgu,” 133.
politically it will help China’s unification.”  

ROK-ROC alliance during this period was largely a symbolic one, partly addressing Chun Doo Hwan’s anti-communist legitimacy. Instead, the two countries focused more on pragmatic agendas. From 1983 to 1987, Former ROK Prime Minister Chŏng Ilkwŏn visited Taipei three times, successfully hosting the 1984 ROK-ROC Economic Cooperation Meeting, the 1986 ROK-ROC Economic Council Conference, and the 1986 ROK-PRC Customs Agreement Conference. Despite numerous economic exchanges between the two countries during this period, South Korea did not participate in any notable diplomatic exchanges with Taiwan.

Overall, South Korea’s foreign policy from 1983 to 1987 attempted to (1) maintain its symbolic anti-communist alliance with Taiwan, and at the same time (2) pursue an economically and politically driven relationship with China. This strategy created a diplomatic conflict of interest, for the obvious reason that China’s One-China policy did not allow its allies to have formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan. While South Korea had no diplomatic ties with China from 1983 to 1987, the country’s significant business interest in China forced the ROK government to act with some political caution in its relationship with Taiwan. South Korea from 1983 to 1987 had a relatively stable ideational rationale for anti-communism. But nevertheless, ROK-ROC alliance was beginning to see its end as several economic and political impositions forced South Korea to reevaluate its diplomatic ties with China.

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122 Wang, Zhonghan jieji waijiao, 58.
123 Yi, “Hankukkwa Taemanŭi chŏngch’ichŏk kwankyŏ: kwakŏ, hyŏnchae, milae,” 42.
4.4 Critical Juncture Two: The Seoul Summer Olympics, 1988

On January 4th, 1988, just eight months before the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics, the Soviet Union finally announced its decision to participate in the event. Other major communist countries like China and East Germany had already declared their intention to join the Seoul Olympics in 1984 and 1985, respectively, but South Korea especially welcomed the communist superpower’s decision to join the event. In fact, South Korea had been eagerly lobbying for the Soviet Union’s participation since late 1987 with an expectation that its participation would encourage other communist countries to follow suit. Indeed, 15 communist countries including Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Vietnam eventually accepted South Korea’s invitation to make the Seoul Olympics the largest sporting event ever at the time and the first international sporting event in 12 years to see participation from both the United States and the Soviet Union. The Seoul Olympics, as South Korea had carefully engineered, was on a well-trodden path to symbolize the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a peaceful world order.

South Korea’s early initiative to host the 1988 Olympics began in the late 1970s under ROK President Park Chung Hee, but it was not until Chun Doo Hwan’s military regime in 1980 that the country began actively pursuing the Olympics. South Korea at the time had never hosted a high-profile international event, and Chun believed that a “bold and provocative proposition, such as the Olympics, would dilute domestic political opposition threatening the [Chun] administration.” In fact,

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Chun mentioned the Seoul Olympics 165 times throughout his seven years of presidential tenure, demonstrating that the Seoul Olympics very often played an important role in his political discourse and legitimacy. Chun’s political endorsement in addition to Hyundai President Chŏng Chuyŏng’s financial patronage allowed South Korea to make significant progress on its campaign for the 1988 Olympics. In September 1981, the International Olympic Committee announced that Seoul would host the event.

However, South Korea’s democratization and the beginning of Roh Tae Woo’s presidency in 1988 quickly changed the initial political motivation behind the country’s support for the Seoul Olympics. The end of the Chun Doo Hwan regime in 1987 formally disintegrated South Korea’s authoritarian structures, and Roh, once Chun’s right-hand man, had hoped to disassociate himself from Chun’s authoritarian past. For this reason alone, Roh had a significant political incentive to ensure the Seoul Olympics’ success. The international success of South Korea’s first large-scale international event would boost Roh’s political legitimacy and help portray his administration as “South Korea’s first internationally respected democratic government.”

The Seoul Olympics and the growing decline of the Cold War also provided Roh Tae Woo with a pretext to liberalize South Korea’s previously anti-communist policy, a vestige of the country’s authoritarianism. Even during his presidential

125 The number count is based on databases available from Taet’ongnyŏnggirokyŏn ‘gushil yŏnsŏlgirok, Taehanmin’guk taet’ongnyŏngugirokkwan, [Speech Records from the Research Center for Presidential Records, ROK Institute for Presidential Records].

campaign, Roh had consistently advocated reunification with North Korea, and believed that stronger diplomatic ties with communist countries with the help of the Seoul Olympics would play an instrumental role in his plan for reunification. Despite confirmed participation from China and East Germany in the mid 1980s, Roh concluded that the Soviet Union’s participation was necessary to attract more communist countries to the Seoul Olympics.\(^\text{127}\) In June 1987, South Korea under the leadership of IOC Member Kim Unyong formally started lobbying for the Soviet Union’s participation in the Seoul Olympics.\(^\text{128}\) The Soviet Union initially showed reluctance to the proposal as North Korea at the time demanded its participation as a co-host, but the negotiation without North Korea continued as IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch formally endorsed Kim’s proposal in September 1987.\(^\text{129}\) In January 1988, the Soviet Union finally accepted South Korea’s invitation to participate in the Seoul Olympics.

By May 1988, the Soviet Union’s confirmed participation encouraged 15 other communist countries such as Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Vietnam to also join the Seoul Olympics, officially making the event the largest Olympics event ever at the time. Roh Tae Woo cited the outcome to demonstrate that South Korea had played a critical role in the beginning of the end of the Cold War era. In July 7\(^\text{th}\), 1988,

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\(^{127}\) Roh Tae Woo at the time had not yet been elected South Korea’s president, but his previous role as the president of the Korean Olympic Committee gave him a voice in South Korea’s preparation for the Seoul Olympics.

\(^{128}\) South Korea had gone to great lengths to secure the Soviet Union’s participation in the Seoul Olympics. For instance, Kim Unyoung had learned to speak conversational Russian just to gain support for his cause from the Soviet Union. See: “23nyŏn chon sŏurollimp’igi chun’ŏn kyo’lun,” [Lessons from the Seoul Olympics 23 Years Ago] Chunangilbo, September 12, 2011.

just two months before the Seoul Olympics, Roh formally declared his plans for Nordpolitik in the 7.7 Special Declaration:

한반도의 평화를 정착시킬 여건을 조성하기 위하여 북한이 미국, 일본 등 우리 우방과의 관계를 개선하는 데 협조할 용의가 있으며 또한 우리는 소련, 중국을 비롯한 사회주의 국가들과의 관계개선을 추구한다.\(^\text{130}\)

In order to better facilitate peace on the Korean Peninsula, we are willing to encourage North Korea’s relationship with our allies such as the United States and Japan. We will also work to improve diplomatic relations with socialist countries like the Soviet Union and China.

The statement above was the first presidential remark in which a South Korean president publically announced the ROK government’s decision to seek normalization with China. While North Korea eventually chose to boycott the Seoul Olympics, Roh believed that the quickly approaching end of the Cold War era and unanimous participation from all major communist powers provided an ideal timing for him to officially announce his breakthrough diplomacy towards the entire Soviet sphere of influence. The declaration of Nordpolitik in a way implied South Korea’s secondary intention to risk ROK-ROC alliance in that no country has ever bypassed China’s One-China policy to maintain diplomatic relations with both Taiwan and China. The Seoul Olympics and its significance in the Cold War era had provided Roh with a strong diplomatic justification to abandon South Korea’s traditionally anti-communist foreign policy. Roh had thus signaled the beginning of the end of South Korea’s anti-communist alliance with Taiwan.

\(^{130}\) Roh Tae Woo, *Not’aeu Taet’ongnyŏng Yŏn’sŏlmunji Che1kwŏn* [President Roh Tae Woo Speech Collection, Book One] (Seoul: Taet’ongnyŏngbisŏshil, 1994): 10.
4.4.1 The Fall of Anti-Communist Legitimacy, 1988-92

From 1988 to 1992, the Roh Tae Woo administration had a very weak ideational rationale for anti-communist legitimacy and alliance with Taiwan. Table 7 shows that out of Roh’s 601 domestic presidential remarks during this period, just 51 (8.49%) remarks support national unity against communism, 48 (7.99%) remarks call for national unity against North Korea, and only 1 (0.17%) address stronger national security against communism. Compared to Chun Doo Hwan’s rhetoric between 1983 and 1987, the result shows a 76.71% decrease in criticism towards communist countries, an 83.52% decrease in call for unity against North Korea, and a 99.37% decrease in call for stronger national security. This shows that Roh from 1988 to 1992 very rarely cited anti-communism to address his political legitimacy.

Table 7. Frequency of Roh Tae Woo’s Presidential Remarks Containing the Following Sentiments in Domestic Policy, 1988-92

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unity Against Communism</th>
<th>Unity Against North Korea</th>
<th>Stronger National Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>51/601 (8.49%)</td>
<td>48/601 (7.99%)</td>
<td>1/601 (0.17%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Databases available from Taet’ongnyônggirokgyŏn’gushil yŏnsâlgirok, Taehanmin’guk taet’ongnyônggirok’gyockwan, [Speech Records from the Research Center for Presidential Records, ROK Institute for Presidential Records].
Note: Combined percentages of rhetoric can exceed 100 percent because a single presidential remark may include more than one investigated sentiment.

Roh Tae Woo emphasized greater autonomy and progressive domestic policies to disassociate himself from South Korea’s previously authoritarian, anti-communist, and US dependent regime. In 1988, Roh lessened legal restrictions to allow freedom
of speech in media, becoming the first South Korean president to condone dissent, political satire, and the unionization of major national broadcasting companies. Other reforms included Roh’s “war on crime successfully combating organized criminal activities in South Korea throughout the early 1990s,” and an independent initiative to retrieve the ROK Armed Forces’ Peacetime Operational Control (PT-OPCON) that Chun Doo Hwan had yielded to the US Armed Forces Korea (USFK) earlier in the 1980s. These policies sharply contrasted many of South Korea’s previously authoritarian and anti-communist tactics. Some critics argue that Roh nonetheless maintained several authoritarian measures as his modus operandi, as evidenced by Roh’s political connections to several authoritarian figures and the administration’s surveillance controversy in 1990. Nonetheless, Roh rarely cited anti-communism to advance his domestic political agendas. The Roh administration during this period attempted to design its political legitimacy through democratic frameworks and naturally avoided authoritarian policies based on anti-communism.

Coincidentally enough, anti-communist legitimacy in Taiwan also collapsed in the late 1980s. ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo during this period abolished several authoritarian and anti-communist measures such as “restrictions on public rallies, group activities, travels to Mainland,” and the Chinese Nationalists legalized opposition political parties in Taiwan shortly after the founding of the Democratic

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131 South Korea did not retrieve its PT-OPCON until ROK President Kim Young Sam’s administration in 1994, but Roh Tae Woo nonetheless made significant contributions to the outcome throughout his presidency from 1988 to 1993. See “Not’aeuttae kongshik’wa… YSttæe p’yŏngshijakchŏn’gwŏn hwansu,” [Formalization Under Roh Tae Woo and PT-OPCON Retrieval Under YS] Kyŏnghyangshinmun, June 27th, 2010.

Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986. Chiang lifted the martial law in 1987 shortly before his death in 1988, and ROC President Lee Teng-hui’s subsequent rise to power rapidly liberalized the country’s formerly authoritarian and anti-communist ideology. Lee during this period promoted “further Taiwaneseization of the government, supported direct election of the president and downsizing of the provincial government.” These policies contradicted the Chinese Nationalists’ previous efforts for political singularity and centralization, and Taiwan no longer advocated anti-communism as its ideological foundation. The fall of authoritarianism and the rise of progressive political establishments in both South Korea and Taiwan in the late 1980s likely did little to strengthen the two countries’ anti-communist diplomatic alliance.

4.4.2 The Declaration of Nordpolitik and Its Economic Impact, 1988-1992

Roh Tae Woo’s Nordpolitik greatly bolstered ROK-PRC trade relations and catalyzed South Korea’s pursuit of diplomatic normalization with China from 1988 to 1992. This also had a detrimental impact on the course of ROK-ROC alliance. Figure 4 shows that from 1988 to 1992, South Korea’s export to China increased from 372.25 Million US Dollars to 2.65 Billion US Dollars (612.86% increase), and the country’s import to China also increased from 1.37 Billion US Dollars to 3.72 Billion US Dollars (172.15% increase). South Korea’s trade with Taiwan during this period was not as successful. South Korea’s export to Taiwan increased from 954.39 Million US Dollars to 2.26 Billion US Dollars (137.04% increase), its import from

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135 See Table A4 in Appendix for precise yearly export and import volumes in South Korea’s trade with Taiwan and China from 1988 to 1992.
Taiwan increased from 1.07 Billion US Dollars to 1.32 Billion US Dollars (22.77% increase). Compared to the level of growth ROK-PRC trade relations enjoyed from 1988 to 1992, ROK-ROC trade relations struggled with relatively weak growth. 1992, the year that South Korea normalized relations with China, was also the year when ROK-PRC trade relations, export and import, surpassed that of ROK-ROC trade relations. Evidently, South Korea during this period had an extremely strong practical rationale to improve diplomatic relations with China.

Figure 4. South Korea’s Trade Volume with Taiwan and China, 1988-92

Note: The figure also includes data from 1987 to highlight the second critical juncture’s impact on ROK-ROC trade relations.
South Korea used the Seoul Olympics’ success and Roh’s declaration of Nordpolitik to justify new economic strategies toward China’s rapidly growing market. The ROK government during this period established organizations such as the International Private Economic Council of Korea (IPECK) and the Korean Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA) to coordinate “trade and investment relations with socialist countries with which diplomatic relations have not yet been established.” However, these organizations specifically focused on China for the following reasons: (1) China’s geographical proximity to South Korea, (2) China’s significant market potential, and (3) China’s attempt to diversify its foreign trade institutions. IPECK helped private South Korean businesses including Chaebols like Samsung and Hyundai establish numerous trade contacts in major Chinese cities in Liaoning and Shandong Province. By the end of 1989, South Korea became China’s tenth largest trading partner and for the first time “agreed to commence charter flights between Shanghai and Seoul.”

ROK-PRC trade relations quickly accelerated as South Korea and China in early 1990 established each of their trade liaison offices in Beijing and Seoul. In 1991, Seoul hosted the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and invited Taiwan, China, and Hong Kong altogether as “the Three Chinese Economic Entities.” South Korea grouped the three regions for political purposes, especially to accommodate political disputes between Taiwan and China, but the ROK government throughout the meeting largely focused its efforts on China and largely dismissed delegations

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from Taiwan and Hong Kong. This is because South Korea’s total trade volume with China in 1991 was 19.49% larger than that of ROK-ROC trade, but more importantly, South Korea’s total trade volume with China was set to be multiple times larger than that of its trade with Taiwan by the end of the 1990s.\textsuperscript{139} While South Korea had intentions to continue active trade with Taiwan, ROK-ROC trade relations from 1988 to 1992 did not achieve any significant developments, as substantiated by a generally stagnant growth in trade volumes between the two countries. It is not clear as to whether the cause of this trend was a political one. However, it was rather evident that South Korea’s economic interests from 1988 to 1992 formed a very strong practical rationale, perhaps strong enough to abandon ROK-ROC alliance, to formally seek normalization with China.

4.4.3 The Rise of Nordpolitik and the End of an Alliance, 1988-1992

Roh Tae Woo’s announcement of Nordpolitik in July 1988 significantly reshaped much of South Korea’s foreign policy towards communist countries. South Korea’s foreign policy under Nordpolitik established ROK-PRC normalization as a top diplomatic priority, and by 1988, the country was prepared to end its historically significant alliance with Taiwan. Table 8 shows that out of Roh’s 601 foreign policy remarks, 57 (9.48%) remarks criticize communist countries, 457 (76.04%) remarks support peace or reunification with communist countries, and only 1 (0.17%) remark call for stronger ties with traditional allies. This indicates that South Korea’s foreign policy during this period rarely showed hostility towards communist countries.

Compared to Chun’s remarks from 1983 to 1987, the result shows a 58.03% decrease

\textsuperscript{139} Yi, “Hankukkwa Taemanŭi chŏngch’ichŏk kwakye: kwakŏ, hyŏnchae, milae,” 63-5.
in criticism towards communist countries, a 59.21% increase in call for peace with communist countries, and a 96.47% decrease in call for stronger ties with traditional allies. The result suggests that South Korea’s ideational rationale for anti-communist foreign policy during this period was extremely weak.

Table 8. Frequency of Roh Tae Woo’s Presidential Remarks Containing Foreign Policy Rhetoric, 1988-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Against Communist Countries</th>
<th>Peace with Communist Countries</th>
<th>Stronger Ties with Traditional Allies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>57/601 (9.48%)</td>
<td>457/601 (76.04%)</td>
<td>1/601 (0.17%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Databases available from Taet’ongnyŏnggirokkyŏn’gushil yŏnsŏlgirok, Taehannin’guk taet’ongnyŏngugirokkwan, [Speech Records from the Research Center for Presidential Records, ROK Institute for Presidential Records].
Note: Combined percentages of rhetoric can exceed 100 percent because a single presidential remark may include more than one investigated sentiment.

South Korea declared Nordpolitik just one month before the Seoul Olympics in 1988, and it had hoped to use the event as a launch pad for diplomatic missions towards communist countries. During the Seoul Olympics, South Korean officials approached “eastern bloc representatives to hold discussions on political relations with those who were on hand in Seoul for Olympics-related programs.” South Korea during this period “promised massive financial packages and development loans to communist countries willing to normalize relations with South Korea,” and offered various other

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140 Sanford, “ROK’s Nordpolitik: Revisited,” 3.
economic incentives such as favorable tariff rates.\textsuperscript{141} The ROK government’s attractive economic proposals and the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 allowed South Korea to normalize diplomatic relations with Poland, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, the Czech Republic, Romania, Mongolia, and Albania from 1988 to 1990. Roh Tae Woo visited San Francisco in June 1990 to hold an official summit meeting with USSR General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, and three months later, South Korea finally normalized diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

Taiwan viewed Roh Tae Woo’s declaration of Nordpolitik as a sign that its diplomacy towards South Korea was failing. In 1988, South Korea was the only major country in the world and the only East Asian country to have diplomatic ties with Taiwan. South Korea’s considerable economic and political significance aside, Lee Teng-hui at the time was seeking to recover Taiwan’s membership in the United Nations (UN). Taiwan therefore had strong strategic interests to maintain as many diplomatic allies as possible. On January 3\textsuperscript{rd}, 1987, three months before the announcement of Nordpolitik, ROC Ambassador to South Korea Zou Jian said the following during an interview with Taiwan’s \textit{Youth Daily News}:

\begin{quote}
國際關係是一分複雜而現實的，世界上沒有任何國家，會為了他國利益而犧牲本國利益。所以，我認為，就中韓關係而言，一再強調「兄弟之邦」、「傳統友誼」已經沒必要，只有我門有實力，中韓關係自然會更密切，而單以目前的形勢來看，我也認為，我們應保持樂觀的態度，不必因任何人一句話而有過激的反應。\textsuperscript{142}

International relations are very complicated and real, and no country would ever sacrifice its own interests for that of other countries. I believe that an outdated emphasis on brotherly and historical aspects of ROK-ROC relations
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{141} “Not’aeujönggwŏn Pukpangjöngch’aegŭi chungyohan ümi,” [The Significance of Roh Tae Woo’s Nordpolitik] \textit{T’udeishinmun}, April 7\textsuperscript{th}, 2015.

\textsuperscript{142} “Fang Zoujian dashi tan Zhonghanguanxi yu weilai waijiao zhengce,” [Ambassador Zou Jian Visits to Discuss ROK-ROC Relations and the Future of Foreign Policy] \textit{Qingnianribao}, January 3\textsuperscript{rd}, 1987.
is not very useful. We must instead become more powerful, and stronger ROK-ROC relations will naturally follow. Given the current circumstances, we must maintain optimistic attitudes and not overreact to a single comment.

Taiwan made several attempts to provide South Korea with diplomatic and economic incentives to reconsider ROK-PRC normalization. ROC Foreign Minister Hu Zhiqiang was one of the highest-ranked foreign dignitaries to attend Roh’s presidential inauguration in February 1998, and the ROC government also sent multiple economic delegations to Seoul just in 1989 with hopes that stronger trade ties would encourage South Korea to maintain its diplomatic alliance with Taiwan. But these attempts all failed for the simple reason that Taiwan possessed no political or economic incentive to match China’s geopolitical and economic capacity. Taiwan at this point had no choice but to hope that “South Korea would honor the two countries’ old brotherhood and seek a mutually beneficial alternative.”

However, ROK-ROC relations remained relatively dormant from 1988 to 1992. On the other hand, ROK-PRC relations rapidly developed as it entered the 1990s to witness the end of the Cold War era. China’s military alliance with North Korea previously made it difficult for the country to open dialogues with South Korea, but the Tiananmen Square Incident in April 1989 forced the PRC government to seek “a new diplomatic breakthrough in order to (1) compensate for its internal political legitimacy, (2) prevent potential sanctions from the West, and (3) maintain China’s stability in East Asia.” In addition to China’s political motivation for a diplomatic breakthrough, the ROK government made clear its intention to normalize relations

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with China. South Korea financially sponsored the 1990 Asian Games in Beijing, and during the 1991 APEC Meeting in Seoul, Roh Tae Woo invited PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen to the presidential Blue House for a private meeting discussing South Korea’s future diplomatic relations with China.¹⁴⁵ In September 1991, South Korea and North Korea were jointly admitted to the UN, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 formally signaled the end of the Cold War era. China at this point had no reason to postpone its mutually beneficial diplomatic relations with South Korea.

South Korea’s diplomatic alliance with Taiwan eventually ended in August 1992 as the ROK government proceeded to normalize relations with China. ROK Foreign Minister Yi Sangok and PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen secretly began negotiating terms for normalization in March 1992, and the crux of the negotiation revolved around South Korea’s future relationship with Taiwan. One month into the negotiation, ROC Presidential Secretary Jiang Yanshi visited Seoul to deliver Lee Teng-hui’s personal letter “requesting that South Korea does not advance its current economic ties with China to full diplomatic relations.”¹⁴⁶

South Korea took Lee Teng-hui’s letter into consideration throughout its normalization process with China. The South Korean delegation initially demanded that China respects the ROK government’s historical alliance with Taiwan in fairness that South Korea recognized the PRC government’s alliance with North Korea. However, China consistently cited its One-China policy to reject the proposal, and after weeks of delayed negotiation, South Korea finally accepted China’s demand that

¹⁴⁵ Qian, “Tongwang Hancheng,” 144.
¹⁴⁶ Mun and Chu, Han’guk-T’aiwan kwan’gyesa, 76.
the ROK government severs diplomatic ties with Taiwan.\textsuperscript{147} Ten days before the announcement of ROK-PRC normalization, the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned ROC Ambassador to South Korea Jin Shuji to inform him that South Korea would soon terminate its diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Furious that the decision was made behind closed doors, Taiwan immediately severed ties with South Korea and quickly withdrew its embassy from Seoul. On August 28\textsuperscript{th}, 1992, South Korea and China together released the Joint Statement of the Founding of ROK-PRC Diplomatic Relations and included the following:

대한민국 정부는 중화인민공화국 정부를 중국의 유일 합법정부로 승인하며 오직 하나의 중국만이 있고 대만은 중국의 일부분이라는 중국의 입장을 존중한다.\textsuperscript{148}

The government of the Republic of Korea recognizes that the People’s Republic of China is the only legitimate government of China. It also acknowledges that there is only one China and respects China’s stance that Taiwan is a part of China.

Taiwan’s accusation of South Korea’s diplomatic impropriety ended ROK-ROC relations with a somewhat unfortunate closure. ROC Deputy Foreign Minister Jiang Xiaoyan accused Roh Tae Woo’s decision to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan without properly discussing the issue with the ROC government, and ROC Foreign Minister Qian Fu also expressed his disappointment in South Korea’s decision to “abandon an old friend for a new one.”\textsuperscript{149} It was perhaps the two countries’ long history of alliance from 1921 to 1992 that had fueled more disappointments from both

\textsuperscript{147} This decision partly came from a political pressure to normalize relations with China before the end of Roh Tae Woo’s presidency in February 1993. See: Qian, “Tongwang Hancheng,” 156.
\textsuperscript{148} “Taehanminkukwa Chunghwainminkonghwakukkanui eokyokwankyesulipe kwanhan kongtongsongmyöng,” Tongailbo.
\textsuperscript{149} Mun and Chu, \textit{Han’guk-T’aiwan kwan’gyesa}, 99.
sides. This had concluded South Korea’s historically significant alliance with Taiwan in 1992.

4.5 Chapter Conclusion

South Korea from 1983 to 1992 had a very strong practical rationale to seek diplomatic relations with China and a weak ideational rationale to maintain its alliance with Taiwan. Historical trade data shows an exponential growth in ROK-PRC trade relations during this period. While ROK-ROC trade relations saw substantial growth as well, it was not able to match China’s massive economic potential. This supports the argument that the 1983 B-296 Incident served as the first critical juncture of Nordpolitik, greatly strengthening trade between South Korea and China from 1983 to 1987. The 1988 Seoul Olympics, as the second critical juncture of Nordpolitik, built on the first critical juncture’s economic success to create the necessary political conditions for Roh Tae Woo to formally pursue normalization with China in 1988. China’s own political circumstances and its relationship with North Korea explain why China, despite Roh’s declaration of Nordpolitik in 1988, waited until 1992 to normalize relations with South Korea.

South Korea did not openly seek normalization with China until 1988 because Chun Doo Hwan’s anti-communist legitimacy remained fairly strong until the fall of authoritarianism and the country’s subsequent democratization in 1987. A content analysis of all 933 presidential remarks from 1983 to 1992 shows that while Chun retained anti-communist legitimacy until 1987, the end of authoritarianism, democratization, and Roh Tae Woo’s renunciation of South Korea’s anti-communist
ideology altogether extinguished South Korea’s ideational rationale for anti-communism in 1988. Therefore, South Korea from 1988 onwards had no political incentive to maintain its anti-communist alliance with Taiwan at the cost of delaying ROK-PRC normalization.
CONCLUSION

The primary objective and contribution of this study was to investigate how ROK-ROC relations, despite China’s geopolitical emergence and Taiwan’s isolation in the international political system, have survived from 1972 to 1992. Building on structural realism’s explanatory limitation, I performed a historical analysis of historical, political, domestic, and international factors that have shaped the course of ROK-ROC alliance during this period. I argued that the persisting imbalance between (1) South Korea’s ideational rationale for anti-communism and (2) its practical rationale for ROK-PRC normalization explains the counterintuitive survival of ROK-ROC alliance during this period. Initially stronger ideational rationale for anti-communism allowed South Korea to preserve its diplomatic alliance with Taiwan, but its practical rationale for ROK-PRC normalization later dominated its ideational rationale, allowing South Korea to declare Nordpolitik in 1988. The two critical junctures (the 1983 B-296 Incident and the 1988 Seoul Olympics) expedited the implementation of Nordpolitik, and the policy’s attempt to pursue détente with communist countries was directly responsible for ROK-ROC diplomatic termination in 1992.

Synthesis of Findings

A content analysis of South Korea’s presidential remarks illustrates that the country’s domestic anti-communist legitimacy remained strong until its collapse in 1988. Figure 5 combines the results presented in Table 1, Table 3, Table 5, and Table 7. The figure shows that from 1972 to 1992, the frequency of rhetoric promoting
unity against communism and unity against North Korea sees an 85.31% and 85.24% decrease, respectively. The frequency of rhetoric supporting stronger national security sees an even more dramatic decline with a 99.66% decrease. The result indicates that while South Korea had a fairly strong ideational rationale for anti-communist legitimacy from 1972 to 1987, its domestic anti-communist sentiments was significantly weakened from 1988 to 1992.

**Figure 5. Total Frequency of South Korea’s Presidential Remarks Containing the Following Sentiments in Domestic Policy, 1972-92**

![Bar chart showing the frequency of presidential remarks containing unity against communism, unity against North Korea, and stronger national security sentiments from 1972 to 1992.](chart)

Source: Databases available from *Taet’ongnyŏnggirokyŏn ‘gushil yŏnsŏlgirok, Taehanmin’guk taet’ongnyŏngugirokkwan*, [Speech Records from the Research Center for Presidential Records, ROK Institute for Presidential Records].

Note: Combined percentages of rhetoric may exceed 100 percent because a single presidential remark can include more than one investigated sentiment.
South Korea’s anti-communist rhetoric dominated its presidential remarks from 1972 to 1992 because anti-communism was the hallmark of the country’s authoritarian agenda. ROK President Park Chung Hee, amidst serious domestic and international turbulences of the 1970s, had hoped to preserve his political legitimacy through the Yusin Constitution in 1972. Park championed the logic that anti-communist tactics would protect South Korea from North Korea’s military attacks, and he continued to employ anti-communist measures to suppress political dissent until his death in 1979. ROK President Chun Doo Hwan, after his successful military coup d’état, largely replicated Park’s anti-communist measures to address his early political insecurity. Chun was not the staunch anti-communist that Park was, but his anti-communist rhetoric remained strong until 1987 when South Korea’s authoritarianism ended with the country’s democratization. ROK President Roh Tae Woo in 1988 had hoped to dissociate himself from South Korea’s authoritarian past, and he actively avoided the country’s previously anti-communist political ideology.

The developments of South Korea’s political ideology have greatly shaped the country’s foreign policy towards Taiwan. Another content analysis of presidential remarks shows that the frequency of South Korea’s anti-communist rhetoric in foreign policy also showed a generally declining trend. Figure 6 synthesizes the results presented in Table 2, Table 4, Table 6, and Table 8. The figure shows that from 1972 to 1992, the frequency of rhetoric criticizing communist countries decreased by 78.17%. On the other hand, the number of remarks supporting peace with communist countries rose dramatically with a 95.58% increase. The number of comments endorsing stronger ties with traditional allies decreased by 98.87%. The
result supplements the conclusion made in the previous content analysis. South Korea’s ideational rationale for anti-communism, even in its foreign policy rhetoric, significantly declined from 1972 to 1992.

**Figure 6. Total Frequency of South Korea’s Presidential Remarks Containing the Following Sentiments in Foreign Policy, 1972-92**

![Chart showing sentiment percentages in South Korea's foreign policy rhetoric from 1972 to 1992.]

Source: Databases available from *Taet’ongnyŏnggirok’yŏn ’gushil yŏnsŏlgirok, Taehanmin’guk taet’ongnyŏngugirokkwan*, [Speech Records from the Research Center for Presidential Records, ROK Institute for Presidential Records].

Note: Combined percentages of rhetoric in certain time periods can exceed 100 percent because a single presidential remark may include more than one investigated sentiment.

Anti-communism remained the de facto political ideology of South Korea from 1972 to 1992, and this forced Park Chung Hee to pursue a similarly anti-communist objective in his foreign policy. Signs of improving US-PRC relations, especially US President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, forced South Korea to seek new survival strategies in the international political system, but Park’s uncompromising
anti-communist legitimacy and the ROK leadership’s strong personal ties to the Chinese Nationalists during this period prevented South Korea from engaging with a communist enemy state like China.

However, South Korea from 1980 to 1987 adopted a slightly more forgiving stance towards regional communist countries. This is because Chun Doo Hwan’s political legitimacy at the time heavily relied on the United States, and events like China’s Open-Door policy, US-PRC normalization in 1979, and the B-296 Incident (the first critical juncture) altogether forced Chun to reconsider China as a potentially important diplomatic partner. Nonetheless, Chun’s anti-communist ideology still prevented South Korea from openly pursuing rapprochement with China during this period. Chun’s authoritarian rule ended with South Korea’s democratization in 1987, and Roh Tae Woo’s general tendencies for post-ideological policies along with the international success of the Seoul Olympics (the second critical juncture) encouraged Roh to abandon the country’s traditionally anti-communist diplomacy from 1988 to 1992. In 1988, Roh declared Nordpolitik and began prioritizing ROK-PRC normalization over South Korea’s historically significant alliance with Taiwan.

An analysis of historical trade data shows that economic concerns played an equally significant role in the development of ROK-ROC relations. South Korea’s economic partnership with Taiwan dominated throughout the 1970s, but the country’s economic incentive for ROK-PRC normalization grew sharply throughout the mid-1980s onwards. Figure 7 gathers data from Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 4. The figure illustrates that while ROK-ROC trade relations maintained a healthy growth from 1972 to 1992, South Korea’s total trade volume with China saw an
exponential growth starting in 1983. From 1983 to 1992, ROK-PRC trade relations see an 8,498.21% increase, much higher than the 720.11% growth representing South Korea’s trade relations with Taiwan. The figure also shows that in 1990, for the first time in history, ROK-PRC yearly trade volume (2.85 Billion US Dollars) surpassed ROK-ROC yearly trade volume (2.70 Billion US Dollars). The findings show that South Korea’s initially non-existent practical rationale for ROK-PRC normalization became an extremely powerful force in the late 1980s.

**Figure 7. South Korea’s Overall Trade Volume with Taiwan and China, 1972-92**

From 1972 to 1979, South Korea enjoy an established trade partnership with Taiwan built on several bilateral treaties such as the 1961 ROK-ROC Trade Agreement, the
1972 ROK-ROC Patent Protection Agreement, and the 1972 ROK-ROC Tax Exemption Agreement. Meanwhile, ROK-PRC trade relations, with exceptions of indirect trade through intermediary port cities like Hong Kong, did not exist because the ROK government at the time had no formal diplomatic ties to China. South Korea’s trade with Taiwan suffered in the early 1980s following steep economic competitions in the global market, but South Korea nonetheless had a very strong economic incentive to maintain its diplomatic alliance with Taiwan.

ROK-PRC trade relations made major progress after the B-296 Incident (the first critical juncture) in 1983. South Korea’s first diplomatic contact with China in the incident encouraged numerous South Korean businesses to enter the Chinese market from 1983 to 1992, creating a stunning 2,271.02% increase in the total trade volume between South Korea and China. ROK-ROC trade relations during this period made progress impressive in its own right, but it failed to produce the kind of economic breakthroughs that ROK-PRC relations have achieved. South Korea’s yearly trade volume with China did not surpass that of Taiwan until 1990, but many South Korean businesses have already predicted in the mid 1980s that China’s future economic potential would easily surpass that of Taiwan. By the late 1980s, South Korea had an extremely strong practical rationale to pursue ROK-PRC normalization. This in addition to major communist countries’ participation in the 1988 Seoul Olympics (the second critical juncture) allowed South Korea to formally declare Nordpolitik and formally prioritize ROK-PRC normalization over its historically significant alliance with Taiwan.
Limitations, and Ideas for Future Research

The arguments and the evidence presented in this study inevitably carry limitations. First of all, one could further develop the study’s measurement methods of ideational and practical rationales. While presidential remarks and historical trade data are admittedly the most significant indicators of South Korea’s anti-communist legitimacy and the country’s pragmatic incentives in foreign policy, but there are other types of measurement that could be useful. These include a content analysis of newspapers, a quantitative analysis of diplomatic contacts, public polling, and more. In addition, many diplomatic and government documents concerning ROK-ROC relations remain classified. An opportunity to evaluate these sources in future could potentially reveal previously unconsidered factors and explanations and supplement the findings of this study.

Given the recent rise of authoritarianism around the world, this study also encourages further research on the role of foreign policy in authoritarian regimes. This study has investigated how South Korea’s concerns for political legitimacy have influenced its foreign policy, but how do authoritarian leaderships use diplomacy as explicit tools to “seek legitimacy and thus securing stability and maintaining power of authoritarian rulers?”

Previous scholarship investigating the relationship between authoritarianism and foreign policy has not sufficiently studied how diplomacy is used as proper legitimation strategies. A framework that evaluates the relative strength of ideational and practical rationales can perhaps present interesting perspectives on the role of diplomacy in authoritarian regimes.

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APPENDIX

Table A1. South Korea’s Trade Volume with Taiwan and China (Thousand US Dollars), 1972-79

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Export Trade Volume to Taiwan</th>
<th>Import Trade Volume from Taiwan</th>
<th>Export Trade Volume to China</th>
<th>Import Trade Volume from China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>16,131</td>
<td>47,875</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>40,942</td>
<td>55,394</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>50,754</td>
<td>107,688</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>62,880</td>
<td>161,973</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>83,717</td>
<td>80,031</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>103,812</td>
<td>109,206</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>140,080</td>
<td>152,619</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>161,407</td>
<td>209,741</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>659,723</td>
<td>924,527</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6,049</td>
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</table>


Table A2. South Korea’s Trade Volume with Taiwan and China (Thousand US Dollars), 1979-83

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Export Trade Volume to Taiwan</th>
<th>Import Trade Volume from Taiwan</th>
<th>Export Trade Volume to China</th>
<th>Import Trade Volume from China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>161,407</td>
<td>209,741</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>216,322</td>
<td>313,336</td>
<td>15,421</td>
<td>25,578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>259,982</td>
<td>355,071</td>
<td>4,634</td>
<td>69,987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>203,899</td>
<td>280,379</td>
<td>6,323</td>
<td>91,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>147,509</td>
<td>288,714</td>
<td>4,840</td>
<td>69,345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>989,119</td>
<td>1,447,241</td>
<td>31,219</td>
<td>261,964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A3. South Korea’s Trade Volume with Taiwan and China (Thousand US Dollars) 1983-88

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Export Trade Volume to Taiwan</th>
<th>Import Trade Volume from Taiwan</th>
<th>Export Trade Volume to China</th>
<th>Import Trade Volume from China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>147,509</td>
<td>288,714</td>
<td>4,840</td>
<td>69,345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>258,820</td>
<td>339,014</td>
<td>16,943</td>
<td>205,160</td>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>196,120</td>
<td>333,409</td>
<td>40,330</td>
<td>478,401</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>332,977</td>
<td>431,929</td>
<td>123,478</td>
<td>620,768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>555,139</td>
<td>758,879</td>
<td>211,024</td>
<td>865,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>954,393</td>
<td>1,071,262</td>
<td>372,250</td>
<td>1,386,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td><strong>2,444,958</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,228,207</strong></td>
<td><strong>768,865</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,626,339</strong></td>
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</table>


Table A4. South Korea’s Trade Volume with Taiwan and China (Thousand US Dollars), 1988-92

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Export Trade Volume to Taiwan</th>
<th>Import Trade Volume from Taiwan</th>
<th>Export Trade Volume to China</th>
<th>Import Trade Volume from China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>954,393</td>
<td>1,071,262</td>
<td>372,250</td>
<td>1,386,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1,308,232</td>
<td>1,328,391</td>
<td>437,355</td>
<td>1,704,540</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1,248,562</td>
<td>1,451,901</td>
<td>584,854</td>
<td>2,268,137</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1,608,973</td>
<td>1,514,696</td>
<td>1,002,511</td>
<td>3,440,548</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2,262,253</td>
<td>1,315,238</td>
<td>2,653,639</td>
<td>3,724,941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td><strong>7,382,413</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,681,488</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,050,609</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,524,859</strong></td>
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