Social Mix or Maquillage?: Institutions, Immigration, and Integration in Marseille

by

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ABSTRACT

The French city of Marseille has been mythologized as either a multicultural haven of tolerance or a dangerous slum, but both portrayals are incomplete. The urban governance institutions of Marseille are structured analogously to those of Lyon, and cities in France are given similar frameworks with which to address socioeconomic inequities. Theoretically, the cities had the same opportunities to adjust to economic change and succeed in the latter half of the 20th century, but today, while inequities between European-origin white French and ethnic minorities persist in both cities, they are far more pronounced in Marseille. Why is this so? Using an interdisciplinary social science approach, this thesis considers the factors that contribute to institutional development, as well as the ways in which context influences how rules, norms, and practices are institutionalized over time. I argue that the nation-building project and colonial expansion, key aspects of national institutional development, created the constraints under which local institutions operate. Postwar transformations and decentralization devolved responsibility to local institutions, leading to increased variation in local policy implementation. I conclude that local institutional practices derive from local context and are institutionalized over time, but certain segments of society, namely ethnic minority immigrant populations, are excluded from the institutionalization process. Local institutions maintain the status quo by creating a responsive and inclusive image but not actually realizing inclusion.
**ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADERLY</td>
<td>Association for the Development of the Lyon Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFCM</td>
<td>French Council for the Muslim Religion (Conseil Français du Culte Musulman)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMDSQ</td>
<td>National Commission of the Social Development of Neighborhoods (Commission National de Developpement Social des Quartiers)</td>
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<tr>
<td>COURLY</td>
<td>Urban Community of Lyon (Communauté urbaine de Lyon)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPJ</td>
<td>Collective of the First of June (Collectif du Premier Juin)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CQPM</td>
<td>Collective of the Popular Quarters of Marseille (Collectif des de Quartiers Populaires Marseille)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATAR</td>
<td>Interministerial Delegation for Territorial Management and Regional Attractivity (Délégation interministérielle à l'aménagement du territoire et à l'attractivité régionale)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPCI</td>
<td>Intercommunal structure (établissement public de cooperation intercommunale)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLM</td>
<td>Rent-controlled public housing (Habitation à Loyer Modéré)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSEE</td>
<td>French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACA</td>
<td>Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAM</td>
<td>Port Autonome de Marseille</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QN</td>
<td>Northern areas of Marseille (quartiers nord)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZUP</td>
<td>Designated disadvantaged urban zones (zones à urbaniser en priorité)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUS</td>
<td>Sensitive urban zones (zones urbaines sensibles)</td>
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INITIAL FIGURES

Figure 1: Relevant French Cities. All spatial data visualizations by Author.

Figure 2: Map of Relevant French Regions, Departments.
INTRODUCTION: IN SEARCH OF A FAIR REPRESENTATION

Just as pages are held together by their edges, so the fate we reserve for minorities who are still on the borders of the city will determine the outcome. The result for all those who do not have the same beliefs as the majority, those who claim their difference, those not content with thinking differently but also see themselves as different. Yesterday Protestants and Jews, today Muslims.
— Edwy Plenel, For the Muslims: Islamophobia in France

Marseille: A Multicultural Haven?

The non-profit association Femmes d’ici et d’ailleurs, or “Women from Here and Elsewhere,” is housed near Noailles neighborhood of Marseille, a short walk from the central Vieux Port. Noailles is known for its markets, bright blue tables covered with freshly caught fish, outdoor stands providing traditional Maghrebi foods—a doughy, flaky bread called mesamen; ingredients for tagines; figs, dates, halal meats. Every Friday during my four-month stay in Marseille, I took the metro to Noailles, turned left out of the station onto a narrow street, and entered the headquarters of Femmes d’ici et d’ailleurs. There, immigrant women, local volunteers, and student interns would gather in the building’s kitchen, bring forth favorite recipes, and teach one another to measure, weigh, mix, fry, and sauté. If they were not in the kitchen, they were participating in French-language learning workshops, or crafting handmade clothing out of brightly patterned fabrics. I remember cooking a peanut stew with a woman from Comoros; I made madeleines with a woman from Senegal; I fried makrout, semolina cakes, with two women from Kosovo. I remember speaking a slow, tedious, sometimes broken French, and I remember how we all kept going when we made mistakes. This was my travail
benévole, a community service assignment for academic credit, but I always felt that I was another participant, rather than a volunteer.

Fatima Rhazi is the founder and director of the organization. As the only female sports photographer in Oudja, and then Casablanca, Morocco, she found it challenging to obtain her press credentials and was forbidden from photographing major sporting events. She later gave up her photography career in Morocco and immigrated to Marseille, where she led photography workshops at a social center and discovered the extent to which immigrant women could be isolated. She established *Femmes d’ici et d’ailleurs* in 1994 in order to provide immigrant women with the skills to be a part of French economic life, integrate into French society, and gain independence.

During my studies in Marseille and for the year following my departure, *Femmes d’ici* was emblematic of what I felt was unique about Marseille. The collaborative and supportive nature of the organization’s *ateliers* signaled a commitment to and celebration of multiculturalism. The interactions between recent immigrants and those who had more experience integrating into city life, between the student interns coming from a Jewish school and the Muslim women teaching and learning new skills, between myself, an American, and other women who were also coming from afar, but for reasons very different from my own, seemed to be an example of what is possible when we embrace diversity.

When I learned of the October and November 2005 riots that began in Clichy-sous-Bois, a Parisian suburb, which spread to other large French cities but did not
erupt to the same extent in Marseille, I was intrigued.¹ My coursework in Marseille had introduced me to the French republican model, North African immigration in France, and clashes between Islam and misappropriated laïcité, or state neutrality toward religion. The lack of racial and ethnic-related violence during the 2005 riots in Marseille led me to believe (and others to support) the idea that Marseille’s institutions manage the city’s diverse population, particularly in their treatment of Muslim North African immigrants, more favorably than the leadership of comparable cities such as Lyon or Toulouse. Several mechanisms that appeared to maintain social peace include the city’s interreligious advisory council, Marseille Espérance, a plethora of community organizations, and the physical inclusion of immigrant populations within the city limits.

Academic authors and popular sources support this positive vision of Marseille. Katharyne Mitchell refers to the Marseille as a “shelter of tolerance” in her research on why Marseille did not burn in 2005, and she equates lower levels of ethnic rioting to peaceful coexistence.² She compares the spatial and economic development of Marseille and Paris, but she focuses on qualitative economic activity rather than the significant quantitative disparities between and within the two cities. In her view, trading activity among Marseille’s inclusive outdoor ethnic markets is evidence of multicultural social capital networks and coexistence between religious, racial, and ethnic groups. Shared public spaces within the city proper provide

¹ In October 2005, two teenagers in the Parisian suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois were electrocuted while attempting to hide from the police, triggering riots that lasted for three weeks throughout the Parisian suburbs and those of other large French cities. The civil unrest stemmed from tensions surrounding youth unemployment and police harassment, felt most strongly among North African and other ethnic minority immigrants.

opportunity for urban assimilation and cultural mixing. Other authors who wrote of
the 2005 riots reference Marseille as a successful example of integration for other
French cities. On the other side, right-wing bloggers warn that the city has a
“Muslim immigrant problem,” is “no longer a French city,” and that “no-go zones” in
certain areas are ruled by Sharia law. In actuality, neither the tolerant, multicultural
melting pot representation nor the conception of the city as the European capital of
Islamic fundamentalism paints a fair picture of the social, political, and economic
realities of ethnic minorities in Marseille. A more complex landscape and history
exist beneath the paradoxical façades.

Urban Inequities

Over the course of three weeks in Marseille and Lyon, I interviewed activists,
non-profit leaders, functionaries, local political officials, and average residents about
local politics and the barriers to economic, political, and social integration. Our
conversations brought the inequities between and within urban spaces to the forefront
of my research. Interviewees pointed me to statistical differences between wealthy
districts in the south of Marseille and areas classified as zones à urbaniser en priorité
(designated disadvantaged urban zones, or ZUP), located in the central and northern
parts of the city (quartiers nord, or QN). Data show persistent disparities between the

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3 Ibid.
4 Trent Buatte, ’Space, Race, and the City: How Marseille, France Escaped the 2005 Riots’ (American University, 2010).
7 Daniel Greenfield, ’French City with 40% Muslim Population Is the Most Dangerous City in Europe,’ Front Page Mag,
January 4, 2014.
8 Enza Ferreri to Enza Ferreri, April 12, 2014, http://enzaferri.blogspot.com/2014/10/marseille-is-no-longer-european-
city.html#axzz4e2t6NWtv.
two poles of the city in indicators ranging from income (Gini coefficient = .436; income of the wealthiest 20 percent is 5.4 times higher than the poorest 20 percent)\(^9\) to premature death rates (before the age of 65; +14 percent in the 15\(^{th}\) arrondissement, +40 percent in the 16\(^{th}\)),\(^10\) which is an indicator of health inequality. Other indicators, such as access to public transportation, educational attainment levels, incidents of violence, and rates of obesity, diabetes, cancer, and asthma further demonstrate the extent to which the neighborhood in which one is born determines one’s life path.

Many individuals living in the QN and centre-ville are first-, second-, or third-generation immigrants, in large part coming from former French colonies or protectorates, including Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, the Comoros Islands, and sub-Saharan African countries.\(^11\) It is estimated that ethnic minorities make up between 30-40 percent of Marseille’s population.\(^12\) These populations face discrimination in areas such as employment, housing, and education. Furthermore, there is sparse representation of ethnic minorities in notable political or economic positions. For example, in Marseille’s 2008 municipal elections, only six out of 101 municipal councilors (6 percent) were of an ethnic minority, and only one executive position (3 percent) was filled by a representative of ethnic minority background.\(^13\)

Socioeconomic disparities and discrimination are not unique to Marseille. For example, economic inactivity in ZUP in France is 33.8 percent, eight points above the

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\(^11\) In this thesis, I will often refer to North African/Maghrebi, Comoran, and sub-Saharan African immigrants and their descendants as “ethnic minorities,” although sometimes I refer specifically to “Muslim North African/Maghrebi immigrants” or simply “North African immigrants.” Whereas I focus on Muslim North African/Arab immigrants, it is important to note that sub-Saharan African immigrants face significant discrimination in France as well.
national average. However, the poverty rate in Marseille is striking when compared to Lyon, a city with an agglomeration of comparable size and with similar demographic markers. The overall poverty rate in Lyon is 14.5 percent, whereas the poverty rate in Marseille is 25.5 percent. The percentage of individuals living under the poverty line in the poorest arrondissement, or district, in Lyon is 21 percent, whereas the percentage in the poorest arrondissement in Marseille is 53 percent. Of the one hundred poorest communes of France, the percentage living under the poverty line is 31 percent in the poorest commune within the Lyon agglomeration, Venissieux. 2009 statistics concerning poverty in Paris, Lyon, Toulouse, Seine-Saint-Denis, Aix-en-Provence, and Marseille show that Marseille has fewer households eligible to pay taxes, fewer college-educated individuals, higher unemployment, and more single-parent households than all other cities and departments in the comparison.

One factor that can prohibit further understanding the racial and ethnic dimensions of poverty in France is the country’s “color-blind” approach to public policy, stemming from France’s Republican approach to equality, negative associations with how information about Jews was used in Vichy France during World War II, and concern about how state-sanctioned racial categorization could fuel the Front National. A 1978 law forbids the collection of data on race, ethnicity, religion, or exact information on nationality, and data on race and ethnicity has not

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14 Délégation interministérielle à la ville, "Rapport 2008 de l'observatoire national des Zones Urbaines Sensibles (ONZUS)," (Marseille: Observatoire national des zones urbaines sensibles, 2008).
15 INSEE, the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies, sets the poverty threshold at 60 percent below median income; in 2016, this was approximately €1,008 per month. See https://www.insee.fr/fr/metadonnees/definition/c1653 for formal definition.
17 INSEE, "Recensement Général de la Population," (France, 2009).
been collected in the census since the law was passed. Instead, political leaders implement class- and place-based policy, targeting geographic locations that include large ethnic minority populations.\textsuperscript{18} Social scientists approach the study of inequality in France by using subjects’ nationalities, as well as the nationalities of their parents and grandparents, to approximate ethnicity or religion.

Data on inequality is absent from sensationalist portrayals of Marseille. Low levels of violence in Marseille during the 2005 riots do not necessarily indicate that all is well in the city. Alternative interpretations of the differential violence from interviewees include: the presence of a civil society network that controls the city’s population but does not necessarily transmit their demands to decision-makers; the unique geospatial structure of the city that facilitates particular relationships with police, leading to permissive or conflict-avoidant behavior on the part of police; and poverty so extreme that it inhibits mobilization.\textsuperscript{19} The absence of violence is but one component of a just society, and it is insufficient on its own. Those who study Marseille and treat social, political, and economic disparities as secondary to a supposed indicator of tolerance ignore the systemic barriers to inclusion for the city’s marginalized populations.

Central Questions, Methods, and Structure of the Thesis

The urban governance institutions of Marseille are structured analogously to those of another large French city, Lyon, and cities in France are given similar

\textsuperscript{19} Vincent Geisser, interview by Elizabeth Shackney, January, 2017, Marseille, France.
frameworks with which to address socioeconomic inequities. In the decades following World War II, urban economic trends and processes such as modernization, globalization, internationalization, and deindustrialization influenced the transition from industrial to tertiary economies in French cities. Multi-level governance structures and economic diversification became increasingly important in order for urban areas to accommodate these transformations, and national agencies supported the creation of intercommunal structures (EPCI) to make urban areas more competitive. Theoretically, the cities had the same opportunities to adjust to and succeed in a changing world. Lyon internationalized and attracted new economic activity, adapting quickly; Marseille was not so successful. Today, inequities between European-origin white French and ethnic minorities persist in both cities, but they are far more pronounced in Marseille. Therefore, the central questions to this thesis are: To what extent is civil society, particularly organizations that advocate for issues that affect ethnic minorities, included in the institutionalization process? Why are social, political, and economic inequities particularly pronounced in Marseille? Why did Lyon’s institutions more readily adapt to global economic change? How and why

20 For institutional structures, see Chapter One.
These national frameworks include:
*Politique de la Ville* – a framework for connecting officials to associations in order to aid vulnerable populations.
*Contrat urbain de cohésion sociale* – a reference framework for urban policymaking, part of the Politique de la Ville dedicated specifically to the “neighborhoods in difficulty.” It ensures the coherence of other urban interventions.
*Zone d’éducation prioritaire (ZEP)* – priority education zones where schools receive additional support for after school activities, a reduction in the number of students per class, and research-based instruction, among other supports.
*Zone d’urbanisation prioritaire (ZUP)* - the result of a scheme developed between 1959 and 1967 to determine areas with the highest demand for housing.
*Zone urbaine sensible (ZUS)* – a geographically-based categorization that is intended to direct services toward disadvantaged ethnic groups.

21 In this thesis, I refer to these trends as “(global) economic change,” “economic transition,” or “economic pressures.”

22 In this thesis, I will refer to French citizens with European origins as “white French.”
has economic and political failure disproportionately affected ethnic minorities? How do the institutional processes and outcomes in these cities relate to our understanding of the national French institution and Western European nations?

These questions are broad, complex, and central to many of our urban inquiries, and I cannot claim to answer them completely. I do, however, provide evidence that relate national context, local context, civil society, and institutional decision-making. Using an interdisciplinary social science approach, I consider the factors that contribute to early institutional development, as well as the ways in which context influences how rules, norms, and practices are institutionalized over time. I draw on new institutionalism, social capital and civil society literatures, and French immigration and integration theory. Case studies of Marseille and Lyon provide evidence for my theoretical argument. These cases are supported by qualitative data from interviews with activists, non-profit leaders, academics, and administrative officials in Marseille and Lyon, as well as with census data and spatial data visualization. I created all maps throughout the thesis using ArcGIS® Online by Esri. I endeavor to paint a more nuanced picture of political life in these French urban areas.

In the first part of the thesis, I establish national context as well as a theoretical view of institutions. In Chapter One, I establish my theoretical argument

23 My interview plans were pre-approved by the Wesleyan University Institutional Review Board.
24 ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual property of Esri and are used herein under license. Copyright © Esri. All rights reserved. For more information about Esri® software, please visit www.esri.com.
25 Understanding interethnic relations on the local level requires a recognition of the forces that shaped the French nation: “Any account of the contemporary response to migration and migrants in France must, therefore, acknowledge the importance of a colonial past in defining and shaping interethnic relations—just as we must acknowledge that some of the arrangements for dealing with immigrants are in precise terms a colonial legacy. Of comparable importance is the fact that since the French Revolution the problem of how to handle étrangeré - not just that of foreign immigrants, but also that of the constituent elements of the ‘hexagon’ - has been a significant one in the development of a French social order. So if colonialism provides one frame of reference, then the building of a French nation state must provide another,” Grillo (1985), pp. 289-90.
and review the institutional structures of the French government system. I introduce new institutionalism to support the significance of institutions, and I critique Robert Putnam’s *Making Democracy Work*, arguing that Putnam does not comprehensively address the informal elements of institutions or the ways in which institutions control civil society engagement. I then present the current structure of French governmental institutions, explaining how decentralization assigned more social welfare responsibility to local institutions without providing them with adequate resources. The shift to local responsibility has brought the differences between local institutions to light. In Chapter Two, I describe French immigration and integration theory and history, tracing how the public discourse on immigration, citizenship, and identity has changed over time. The information presented in the first two chapters establishes the national framework within which local institutions operate.

In the second part of the thesis, I turn to the cities. In Chapter Three, I present contexts of institutional development for Marseille, and I introduce Lyon as a comparison. I explore geography, economic history, immigration, socioeconomic, and political context primarily since World War II, paying particular attention to the experiences of immigrants and ethnic minorities in each city. National and local contexts come together in Chapter Four, where I present three shared policy issues—national housing crisis, broad economic change, and intercommunal structure (EPCI) development—and the policy responses from municipal institutions. I show how national context influenced similar responses to the housing crisis, although the location of industry in each city led to differential socio-spatial development. National and international context shaped the need to adapt to changing economic
circumstances, and local context determined how institutions went about restructuring their economic strategies. Finally, national institutions imposed EPCI structures, which would serve to strengthen urban areas as they shared resources across communal lines. I examine what led to the success of Lyon’s EPCI, whereas Marseille’s developed much later.

In Chapter Five, I present information from interviewees on municipal-civil society relations, as well as local processes of social, economic, and political change. I show how local institutions shape opportunities for participation, as well as how they perpetuate exclusion. Examples of institution-driven exclusion include the creation of ethnic minority representative councils with institution-appointed members who support dominant political agendas, insufficient yet appealing policy responses to real community needs, and the politicization of associational funding. These mechanisms may appear to be inclusive and responsive, but their superficial qualities function as means of silencing dissenting voices. Interviewees pointed to the lack of political representation of ethnic minorities, paired electoral sectors that diminish the electoral power of impoverished residents, and the differences between Marseille and Lyons’ relationships with their surrounding communes as a number of forces preventing significant change. This chapter focuses primarily on Marseille.

The conclusion recapitulates the findings of this thesis, addresses limitations, and suggests avenues for future research. I then explore the broader implications of my research, including its relation to the rise of extreme right parties, its relevance to politics in the United States, and the difference between appreciating diversity and actively advocating for justice.
Ultimately, I argue that the nation-building project and colonial expansion, key aspects of national institutional development, created the constraints under which local institutions operate. Postwar transformations and decentralization devolved responsibility to local institutions. Urban institutions in Marseille and Lyon have faced similar social and economic problems, but they responded differently, with varying degrees of success and social inclusion. I conclude that local institutional practices derive from local context and are institutionalized over time, but certain segments of society (immigrants, Muslims, the unemployed, etc.) are excluded from the institutionalization process. Exclusion ensures the maintenance of the status quo, to the benefit of the upper half of the income distribution, and to the detriment of vulnerable populations.

Contributions to the Field

This thesis contributes to an intersection of political science, sociology, and history literatures. Primarily, I add to a body of criticism of Robert Putnam’s theories on social capital and civil society in my assertion that state and local institution place limits on civil society, restraining access to the institutionalization process.26 Per Mouritsen and Nick Vlahos draw attention to Putnam’s bootstrapping myth and the ways in which institutions shape opportunities for participation, and my evidence supports their claims.27

This thesis offers a more nuanced, realistic picture of Marseille, while focusing on the elites, popular forces, and institutional structures that have shaped it into what it is today. My narrative counters both idealistic and hellish depictions of the city, and my translation of otherwise inaccessible materials, namely *Sociologie de Marseille*, brings much-needed depth to Anglophone study of Marseille. This thesis also contributes to a growing conversation about managing French diversity by acknowledging the differential experiences of ethnic minorities coming from post-colonial backgrounds and examining the relationship between recent Islamophobia and current socioeconomic conditions in urban areas.

My research on the significance of intercommunal structures is a significant contribution to the study of multi-level governance, as few scholars have drawn connections between the formation of such structures, the factors that lead to such development, and the varied successes of cities included in agglomerations. My comparative study of the EPCI of Marseille and Lyon is particularly novel, as I encountered very little Anglophone literature on their structures. The agglomeration has become an important political and economic region in the United States as well.\(^\text{28}\) This thesis contributes to a growing body of research on the relevance of metropolitan areas, particularly in the French context.

**Implications**

The social, economic, and political dynamics described in the context of Marseille and Lyon provide insight into broader political forces. These dynamics

include the institutionalization of norms and practices as a result of national and local context, responsiveness to global economic trends, and the degree to which institutions represent minority groups. Other French cities, European nations, and the United States have faced similar issues, with varying degrees of success in including immigrant populations or ensuring economic security for all citizens. The blunders of mainstream political parties have, in part, fueled the rise of extreme right parties; in France, this is evident in the growing popularity of the Front National.

Whereas the majority of this thesis focuses on the immigration and integration of Muslim North African immigrants, several interviewees mention the Syrian refugee crisis and the ways in which the French government currently handles asylum seekers. Insofar as Marseille and Lyon are representative of policymaking in France, these cases have broader implications for the management of the refugee crisis today. The policy decisions made by institutions in France, the third largest economy in the European Union\(^29\) and the sixth largest in the world in terms of nominal GDP, are important, as the country sets an example for other European nations to follow.\(^30\) Understanding its ideologies, and the ways in which they are manifested in urban policy implementation, provides insight into the future of inclusion in Western European democracies.

\(^{29}\) Germany is the first largest economy in the European Union; Britain is second.

\(^{30}\) International Monetary Fund, "IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO), April 2016."
The real political task in a society such as ours is to criticize the workings of institutions that appear to be both neutral and independent…
— Michel Foucault

Introduction

This chapter first provides a framework for understanding the theoretical role and power of political institutions, the relationship between institutions and civil society, and the significance of studying the context of institutional implementation. I outline the development, structure, and function of French political institutions, beginning with the central government, then exploring French decentralization in the 1980s, and finally examining institutions on the local level. Ultimately, this information provides a basis for understanding why institutions matter, the state of institutional relationships with civil society, and how local institutions are linked to the social, political, and economic inequities experienced disproportionately by ethnic minorities in France.

1.1 Institutional Theory

What role do institutions play in shaping collective outcomes, how do they take form, and which factors most strongly determine the success of democratic institutions? In this section, I discuss new institutionalism and the argument that institutions play an integral role in shaping our behavior, preferences, and choices. I introduce Robert Putnam’s argument that civil society networks drive the success of democratic institutions; I criticize his arguments from a new institutionalist
perspective; and I explore the structures that support the creation of those civil society networks in the first place. Given that historical and social contexts are shaped by power imbalances and political conflict, I argue that opportunities for civil society participation are shaped by previously existing power structures. Therefore, the context of institutional development is crucial to understanding the extent of participatory democracy in a given society today.

New institutionalists assert that institutions play an important role in how our societies, our behavior, and our possibilities are shaped. Whereas the concept of an “institution” has been vaguely and arbitrarily applied to many aspects of organizations, culture, and history, I will borrow sociologist Ronald Jepperson’s definition of institution as “a social order or pattern that has attained a certain state or property” as well as his definition of institutionalization as “the process of such attainment.” Institutionalization can be carried out by formal organizations, regimes, or aspects of culture. In this thesis, the institutions I focus on are French governmental structures, first on a national scale, then on a local level, and I discuss how these institutions interact with one another and with civil society.

Institutionalism has traditionally focused on how institutions function, interact, and impact society. The study of institutions and their structures prevailed in the field of political science up until the post-war period; “new institutionalism” made its debut in 1977 with John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan’s seminal paper, “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony,” influenced in large part by the cognitive revolution in psychology. Following this

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revival, new institutionalism has explored how institutions and their structures (often invisibly) shape behavior, frame preferences, and guide choices within a given society. The field has shifted its focus to individual cognitive processing in its analysis, as well as the “practical, semiautomatic, noncalculative nature of practical reason.” For example, Mary Douglas explains how institutions camouflage any trace of human design in organizations, transforming convention into institution by adding “parallel cognitive convention,” shaping the institution into “part of the order of the universe and so…ready to stand as the ground of an argument.” The ways in which the interests of institutional actors are hidden within legitimate structures can serve to reinforce social hierarchy, and Lynne Zucker demonstrates how institutions facilitate the transmission of culture, ensuring that these social hierarchies persist over time.

Whereas institutions can serve to reinforce self-interest and hierarchy, important features of democracy, namely participation, can also be institutionalized in the procedures and practices of governmental bodies. As Alexis de Tocqueville demonstrated, a participatory public is key to building a healthy democracy. Autonomous participation, Guillermo O’Donnell argues further, can curtail clientelism and populist tendencies, conditioning citizens to hold their governments accountable to better represent shared interests.


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from the new institutionalists, Putnam believes that civil society networks shape our
democratic institutions and the extent to which they are successful. When 1970s
decentralization reform in Italy transferred centralized responsibilities to elected
regional governments with uniform institutional structures, some local institutions
were more efficient, effective, and more responsive to their constituents, while others
were not as successful. Putnam argues that civic community networks, strong
associational life, and social capital explain the variation in the performance of
democratic institutions, as evidenced by performance following the decentralization
reforms in Italy. Putnam does address other potential links to performance, most
importantly demonstrating that the levels of civic society activity are a stronger
predictor of performance than the level of socioeconomic modernity. New
institutionalism is mentioned briefly, but Putnam explains that because institutional
structure is held constant in the case of Italy (as each region’s government was
identically structured), institutional design is not the focus of his research.

Putnam attributes differences in the “civicness” of a region to “social patterns
over time,” but the social patterns he elucidates are linked to more closely to
institutional rules, norms, and practices, than to the idea of regional culture and social
experiences. For example, the vertical and autocratic structures of rule in the south
dating back to the twelfth century have prevented the development of self-
government in the southern regions; by contrast, the communal republicanism that
developed in northern and central Italy has enabled civic life in the north. In Putnam’s
view, however, these institutional developments were “made possible by the norms

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36 Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti.
and networks of civic engagement,” and not the other way around. In sum, civil society, which is shaped by social and historical contexts, impacts the efficacy and degree of participatory democracy involved in the function of institutions.

Critics of Putnam’s assertions in *Making Democracy Work* claim that he places too much emphasis on grassroots volunteerism and that his analysis neglects dynamics of power. Putnam says that civil society determines the success of democratic institutions, but what determines the success of civil society? Of course, civil society is vital, but when we attribute the quality of political institutions to bottom-up organizing and action, we do not account for power imbalances and conflicts that shape the ways in which civil society is able to develop and progress. Political sociologist Per Mouritsen writes of Putnam’s analysis:

> It ignores the rise of the modern state, the process of unification and centralization, and the emergence of class-based movements and parties…Local administration and quality of life may certainly improve where civic roots are deep. But, historically, Putnam misses two things. First, if unfertile southern civil soil permits only clientelism and “amoral familism” to grow, this is not because people in the *Mezzogiorno* refuse to pull themselves up by their bootstraps. It is the outcome of structural underdevelopments and dependency.

Mouritsen recognizes the bootstrapping myth: when individual effort is hampered by institutional forces, it is nearly impossible to simply pull oneself up. Institutional structures and power shape (or limit, or control) the development of civil society and thus limit the power of civil society to influence the ongoing development and functioning of the institution. As scholars of new institutionalism would argue, institutions set the agenda and determine the framework of what is possible. In a

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37 Ibid., p. 129.
39 Mouritsen, p. 656.
society where power is vertically concentrated and the people are treated as subjects rather than citizens, it is challenging to imagine different forms of participation and engagement beyond the existing structures. Civil society organizations can also mimic the structures of prevailing institutions, thus limiting one’s imagination of possible challenges to the dominant institutional structure. In conclusion, Nick Vlahos suggests, “We must recognize how partisan government actors, decentralized institutions, and writ law shape opportunities of public participation rather than neutrally responding to bottom-up pressure for greater political inclusion.”\textsuperscript{40} The enduring power of historical development on civil society certainly influences the success of institutions, but “historical development” is not arbitrary—it is a function of institutional structures of power.

Additionally, Putnam views institutional structure as a constant, as the Italian regions he describes have identical structures as defined in their constitutions. However, there are more components to an institution than formally codified structures, including the informal but institutionalized rules, norms, and practices that determine the institution’s relationship with other governing bodies. In France, for example, a city’s historical dynamics with surrounding suburbs influences its ability to form metropolitan area relationships. As I explain in this thesis, whereas Marseille and Lyon have nearly identical urban institutions, historically-rooted intercommunal dynamics hindered the early development of Marseille’s agglomeration structure and enabled the success of Lyon’s. Furthermore, the norms, rules, and practices that become institutionalized can inform a city government’s relationship with civil

\textsuperscript{40} Vlahos, pp. 17-18.
society, even if they are not formally codified. Although Putnam asserts that the Italian regional institutional structures are identical, there are elements of these institutions that may not be reflected in their constitutions.

Caroline Patsias et al. pull these ideas together and point to the importance of studying both the design of participatory institutions and the contexts within which they are implemented in order to appreciate the constraints that inhibit full participation. They cite eight potential situations of state-society relations that are the result of both formal structure and implementation conditions, as they relate to the “self-organizing capacity of civil society” and the “mode of engagement with the state.” These relationships can be categorized as follows:

- **Participatory publics**: “When groups are able to determine their own goals and interests while still being linked to the state and participating in the process of institutionalization”
- **Tutelage**: “When civil society is dependent on state resources and the method of engagement with the state in associationalism”
- **Cooptation**: “When the State attempts to impose clientelistic modes of engagement on autonomous social organizations”
- **State-led corporatism**: When “social organizations created by the State…depend on clientelistic modes of engagement on autonomous social organizations”
- **Contentious participation**: “When groups are able to determine their own goals and interests but interact with the state via collective action”
- **Bifurcated**: “When groups are self-organized and do not receive resources from the state but are linked to the state via clientelism”
- **Crisis**: “A strong legitimacy crisis must shake the regime when an autonomous civil society refuses to engage with the State”
- **Prostrate**: “When groups are not self-organized and are integrated in a clientelistic system”

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42 Ibid., p. 6.
43 Ibid., p. 6.
Patsias et al. then demonstrate the formation of the relationships in several of these categories in case studies of Marseille (categorized as bifurcated) and Montreal (between participatory and contentious participation). The authors are concerned with a “double perspective:” how does civil society influence participatory design and to what extent are the characteristics of civil society determined by governmental institutions? I return to these classifications in Chapter Five when I apply them to my analysis of Marseille and Lyon.

These cities, as distinct as they may be, developed within the context of the French nation. Their institutions were shaped by the same national experiences, and the challenges they face are often identical, for example, accommodating immigrants, navigating economic crisis and change, or managing the provision of public services. Therefore, it is important to investigate how national context (notably, the nation-building project and colonial expansion) plays out on the local level. However, France’s diverse regions, similar to those of Italy, have developed with differing degrees of success and varying patterns of engagement. Lyon and Marseille, the two cities of interest to this thesis, provide some evidence of the relative successes and failures of local government, specifically in addressing similar challenges. Even when basic institutional structures are nearly identical, different institutionalized power structures have shaped political decision-making and policy implementation in each city. My argument appreciates Putnam, incorporates the concerns of Vlahos and Mouritsen, and utilizes the “double perspective” propagated by Patsias et al. I investigate the contexts (national, then local; geographic, historical, economic, and social) that impact the aspects of institutional development that may not be reflected
in the formal structures in both Marseille and Lyon (Chapters Three and Four). I focus on the elements of institutional power that have influenced which areas of society are allowed participate in institutionalization processes in Marseille (Chapter Five). In this thesis, I examine the effect of these contexts on the treatment and experiences of Muslim North African immigrants.

1.2 Governmental Institutional Structures in France

In this section, I explain the development and structure of French institutions. I begin by describing the French nation-building project and the central government; I then outline the decentralization reforms of 1982 and how they established the structure and power of local government today; I provide an example of how decentralization can exacerbate inequalities; and finally, I briefly outline the history and current categories of intercommunal structures.

1.2.1 Central Government

In describing the role of the French central government, this section provides a starting point for understanding the relations between the central government and local government, ultimately informing our perspective on the role of local government in creating, maintaining, and combatting inequities.

The French nation-building project involved deep tension between regional autonomy and government elites attempting to organize a more centralized state. Centralization, including a push for cultural homogeneity, has historically been motivated by the progressive integration of diverse towns and provinces, as well as
the suppression of indigenous ethnic identities. Following the French Revolution, the central state attempted to unify the nation by abolishing regional governments and replacing them with “rational,” gridded departments. According to Vivien Schmidt, the French Revolution set the parameters for the decentralization debate, framing the question as such: “To what extent are the requirements of national unity and the dictates of principles of equality before the law compatible with local liberty?” This question has been at the center of every conversation about decentralization since. One example of this constraint is extending universal suffrage from national elections, which were thought of as strengthening national unity, to local elections, which were seen as weakening unity. It follows that universal suffrage was granted for the election of national leaders early on in 1848, whereas election by universal suffrage for local leaders, including mayors of communes and presidents of regions, arrived later, in 1884 and 1986 respectively, following significant political battles.47

National identity has been asserted from the top down through the development of administrative institutions, infrastructure, a centralized educational curriculum, and the army. Despite strong centralization efforts over time, regional and local identities, as well as the accompanying diversity of interests, tendencies, and preferences, do persist today.48 These regional differences are key to any comparison of smaller units of the French administrative structure, such as cities or communes. Following World War II, modernization efforts included further reorganization of the

47 Ibid.
state. Whereas previously, regionalism had been a product of the right, by the late 1970s, decentralization reform had become a symbol of political, economic, and social modernization, and it was utilized by the newly-elected left.49

Up until the early 1980s, decision-making in France was centralized within the national (central) government; authority was translated to the departmental and regional levels by the central appointment of prefects who then presided over a general council. The constitution of the current Fifth Republic of France was established in 1958 and passed by popular referendum following the collapse of the Fourth Republic, triggered by the May 1958 crisis and the Algerian War. The new constitution established a semi-presidential system in place of the parliamentary system, strengthening the roles of the President and Prime Minister. The President, elected by universal suffrage since 1962, serves in five-year terms in consultation with an appointed Prime Minister. The President has significant power, particularly in the areas of national security and foreign policy, appoints the executive branch, and presides over the Council of Ministers. This powerful body, smaller than the Government, is made up of only senior ministers.

The Prime Minister heads the Government, made up of ministers, deputy ministers, and junior ministers, or Secrétaires d'État. The number and competencies of the ministries varies by administration, though core ministries, such as the Ministry for the Economy, Industry and Employment or the Ministry of National Education persist regardless of leadership. The Government creates policy by writing bills introduced to Parliament and setting the Parliament agenda. The Parliament is made

49 Le Galès.
up of two houses, the National Assembly and the Senate, which pass statutes, vote on the budget, and question the executive.  

1.2.2 Decentralization and the Three Tiers of Local Government

Between the 1950s and the 1980s, European countries expanded their welfare state models; in the early 1980s, however, central governments shifted their involvement in the economy and society. Trends in decentralization are largely linked to economic crisis and changes to immigration policy in the 1970s. As mechanisms to integrate immigrants, as well as public service provision mechanisms, such as housing, health, or infrastructure, were not effectively reaching target populations, central governments decentralized, partially renouncing their charges under the welfare state. The result of decentralization combined with urban internationalization was a shift to market-led societies, “new networks of international connectivity,” and the dissolution of national protectionism, often privileging the private sector. These changes were reflected in civil society as well, as the provision of public services was privatized through collaboration with non-profit associations. Multiple nations developed forms of federal or regional governments, including the establishment of “ad hoc bodies and appointed organizations…and cooperation with other organizations that carry out the actual service delivery.”

Today, France remains a centralized unitary state, but decentralization processes have granted legal and financial powers to its administrative subdivisions,

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50 National Assembly members are called deputies; they serve five-year terms and are directly elected by citizens. Senate members are called senators; they serve six-year terms and are elected by approximately 145,000 local representative electors.
52 Ibid., p. 191.
namely regions (created in 1986), departments (established in 1790), and communes (see Figure 2 in Initial Figures). This section first expands on the politics that framed debate about the nation state and decentralization mentioned in Section 1.1.1. Additionally, I explain the general effects of decentralization, the modern role of each level of local government, and more recent decentralization reforms. I draw heavily from Vivien Schmidt’s *Democratizing France*, which is the leading English language text on the history of decentralization in France leading up to the implementation of the Defferre laws. Understanding the motivations behind decentralization is key to comprehending the challenges of local governance and politics today.

*Immigration and Decentralization in Europe*

Economic crisis and immigration reform (discussed further in Chapter Two) played an important role in the restructuring of the welfare state and related decentralization reform. As the primary concern of authorities responsible for managing immigration into Europe has been meeting industrial needs for cheap labor, the responsibility for the integration of immigrants fell to social welfare systems. The oil crisis of 1973 led to increased restrictions on immigration, which then primarily took the form of family reunifications. Therefore, during the 1970s, European countries began directing attention to adequately integrating ethnic

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54 “During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) imposed an embargo against the United States in retaliation for the U.S. decision to re-supply the Israeli military and to gain leverage in the post-war peace negotiations. Arab OPEC members also extended the embargo to other countries that supported Israel including the Netherlands, Portugal, and South Africa. The embargo both banned petroleum exports to the targeted nations and introduced cuts in oil production. Several years of negotiations between oil-producing nations and oil companies had already destabilized a decades-old pricing system, which exacerbated the embargo’s effects.” See: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/oil-embargo
minorities using social welfare networks. Public figures and media capitalized on this combination of economic crisis and the use of welfare resources to support immigrants, so that in negotiating the place of immigrants in social welfare systems, “what has predominated are cost-benefit analyses of [immigrants’] presence and fiscal contributions for the political economy of social policies in a rapidly aging Europe.” In this way, immigrants came to be seen as a burden to the social safety net. From this period on, European nations have transferred power to the local level through decentralization processes. Though often justified as a tool for democratization, “the thinly disguised intention has been to shed responsibility for facing a range of budget-busting social challenges.” The effects of this renunciation are felt significantly by immigrant populations, who may be economically and socially vulnerable. The following section details the French decentralization process and its effects on democratization and social welfare.

**The Defferre Decentralization Reforms of 1982**

Aside from a set of laws passed under France’s Third Republic, decentralization efforts since the French Revolution had been unsuccessful. Many of the challenges facing post-industrial societies during the ‘70s and ‘80s—including the influx of immigration due to family reunifications, deindustrialization, globalization, and the decline of central state power—set the stage for the devolution of centralized power. Despite concerns about how policies would negatively impact social welfare, decentralization reform was led by the Socialists, led by President François

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55 Ireland, p. 7.
56 Ibid.
Mitterrand and Gaston Defferre, a Socialist who served as Minister of Interior and Decentralization from 1981-84 as well as Mayor of Marseille from 1944-45 and 1953-86. The framework for modern decentralization was created by the Defferre laws in 1982, which redistributed many central government responsibilities to the local level, marking a fundamental shift in the French political system. Resistance from national political leaders and local elected officials leading up to the 1980s presented significant challenges to creating and passing decentralization reform; these political forces also impacted the rollout and impact of the reforms. Intentions behind decentralization reforms included breaking the welfare state mentality, increasing local economic revitalization, and holding local politicians accountable for their decisions.

Socialist support for decentralization emerged in the mid-1960s, when Robert Lafont, a regionalist thinker, related socialism to local autonomy and “accuse[d] the Gaullist state and capitalism of undermining the regions of France through the process of internal colonialism” for the first time. Local or regional control thus became a new socialist form of citizenship. Gaston Defferre branded them as a means of “restoring the right of minorities…and restoring economic vitality to the nation from the base up.” Decentralization, the Socialists claimed, would bring about the changes necessary to modernize and develop French society while simultaneously benefitting the party’s political agenda, and they cemented their support for the policies by the end of the 1960s. The right was divided on its opinion of

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57 Gaston Defferre served as the mayor of Marseille from 1944-45 and 1953-86, and he was also a member of the National Assembly (1945-58, 1962-86) and the Senate (1959-62).
59 Ibid., p. 65.
decentralization. The relative strength of the region in comparison to the department and commune was unclear, and the party tended to cater to local notables who benefitted from the maintenance of the status quo. Hearkening back to the original question on balancing local liberty with national identity set by the Revolution, both Communists and the right were concerned as to how strengthening local government might threaten national unity.\textsuperscript{60}

Upper-level civil servants and prefects, especially on the regional level, believed that decentralization threatened traditional career paths, their relationships with local notable figures, as well as their independence. Local elected officials tended to oppose reform for different political reasons, as previous efforts to increase regionalism and technocracy under de Gaulle intended to remove power from the periphery and seemed to undermine local authority.\textsuperscript{61} Both groups believed that the reforms would add complexity to their work.\textsuperscript{62}

Therefore, pragmatism and consensus-building were at the center of the Socialist reform efforts, so that the framework for the law could be passed quickly and irreversibly. Their success in passing the laws came at the expense of the more innovative, sweeping changes they had originally hoped for, perhaps compromising the ultimate success of the reform and leading to the disorganized entanglement of political responsibilities. The \textit{loi-cadre}, or framework law, passed by the Socialist majority in 1982 had a significant influence on all aspects of public policy and administration, including economic development, the role of civil service, and the

\textsuperscript{60} Schmidt.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
delivery of social services. Though decentralization was led by the Socialists, the right began winning elections in the periphery shortly after the reforms were passed, benefitting from the new powers granted by the reforms. The strategy behind the reforms involved “transferring power to local elected officials first and leaving until later the working out of the details of the transfer of local finances and of…administrative functions and duties.”\footnote{Schmidt, p. 106.} Defferre avoided addressing policy that would draw significant opposition, such as territorial restructuring.

By decree, the Defferre laws gave regions and departments a level of power similar to that of the commune, removed significant power from regional and departmental prefects, and bestowed a special municipal status to Paris, Lyon, and Marseille (detailed in the next section). The actual effects of decentralization on cost savings, participation and democratization, and economic development are more complex. Administrative law scholars view the changes as revolutionary, while political sociologists and other social scientists are skeptical that any real change has occurred. The reforms politicized the periphery by bringing party politics into the local sphere, making national politics more salient on the local level. Furthermore, they have increased party competition, the size of the political class, and political transparency on the local level. Schmidt argues that the laws have improved the scope of representative democracy and the general responsiveness of officials to local needs, but they have not yet led to an increase in direct democracy. They have made it possible for new relationships to develop among public actors, in turn opening up the possibility of new activity in the political and administrative fields. Finally, the
transfer of economic development powers to the local level has been generally successful, although success of implementation varies.64

Whereas the consensus-building and accelerated strategy did lead to the permanence of decentralization, it also created unintended problems. Both the left and the right were concerned about “the extent to which the state had removed itself from the periphery, with some arguing that it should have done so completely; others, that it had removed itself too much; and yet others maintaining that it had done so in the wrong way.”65 Changes in administrative functions led to confusion, redundancy, and inefficiency in the provision of social services. The financial system for local government became more complex and more expensive than the preceding one, with only slightly less dependence on the state. The absence of any participatory local democracy laws made it possible for local notable figures to benefit significantly when their regional and departmental positions were upgraded to positions of political power, whereas promises that local associations would mobilize citizen participation have yet to be realized. This has led some to believe that the reforms were ultimately designed for the notables, rather than the promotion of participatory democracy. On the urban level, decentralization increased the political and administrative power of mayors (especially in Bordeaux, Lille, Lyon, and Marseille), increased competition between communes, and affected the politics of intercommunal cooperation.66 For the most part, however, decentralization codified existing informal practices already occurring within urban communes. As they had always had a significant role in

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64 Ibid.
65 Ibid., p. 117.
providing services and overseeing economic development, the cities gained more independence but saw their financial resources diminished, due to a new block grant system and a reduced local business tax. Finally, the Defferre laws did not clearly establish hierarchy between the local levels of government, which left it up to the local level whether or not departments, regions, or communes would collaborate with one another.67

Schmidt concludes, “Even though decentralization has not been the democratizing force many had hoped, it has nevertheless set up the structures that can lend themselves to such democratization in the future…there is nothing to stop local governments from streamlining their own administrative services, redirecting resources to areas they consider most in need, and reducing expenses.”68 The question is whether and when enhanced democratization will be realized, and by whom.

Patrick Ireland presents a less optimistic view. On the topic of decentralization across Europe, he writes, “While decentralization has given regional, state, provincial, and local official more power, it has also saddled them with tasks for which they lack the experience and administrative capacity. The fragmented funding and personnel resources they receive can fail to compensate for those deficiencies.”69 Local governments have the power but not the resources to address the needs of their inhabitants, and they are not mandated to be responsive in any particular way. Representation and democratization as possibilities rather than requirements could lead to greater differentiation between regions, departments, cities, or communes.

67 Schmidt.
68 Motte, p. 185.
69 Ireland, p. 7.
Responsiveness to a diversity of local needs, and especially the needs of vulnerable populations, depends on political will, as well as the norms and practices of local institutions.

*Current Structure of Local Government*

The structure of local government at the time of writing has been shaped by the Defferre decentralization laws and subsequent decentralization reforms, most recently the *loi NOTRe*. Thirteen regions are governed by a directly elected regional council, which then elects its own president. 101 departments, including those overseas, are governed by a general council elected by universal suffrage, which also elects its own president (see Figure 2 in Initial Figures). Communes, similar to civil townships or municipalities, are governed by municipal councils. The Paris, Lyon, Marseille (PLM) Act of 1982, part of the Defferre laws, created special municipal statutes for France’s three largest cities. The three cities are divided into *arrondissements* that each elect their own *arrondissement* councilors, who serve six-year terms (see Figures 3 and 4). However, in Marseille, the sixteen *arrondissements* are paired to form eight sectors, and each sector has its own council. One third of the councilors of the *arrondissement* (or sector, in the case of Marseille) also sit on the municipal council; the rest sit only on the *arrondissement* (sector) council (see Figure 5). The mayor of each city is then elected by the councilors of the municipal council.
Figure 3: Marseille’s Arrondissements.

Figure 4: Lyon's Arrondissements.
The métropole, or metropolitan area, is an agglomeration of a large urban area and its surrounding communes, defined as an établissement public de cooperation intercommunale (henceforth referred to as EPCI), which generally requires the area to have 650,000 inhabitants or more, with its own tax structure. Ten cities in France are part of “ordinary” métropoles. The departments and regions in which these cities are located may delegate specific responsibilities to the métropole on a voluntary basis.

The three largest métropoles, Greater Paris, Lyon, and Aix-Marseille-Provence, have a “special status.” Their governance combines the competencies of general municipalities, the EPCI, and the department. All métropoles (including those with special status) are responsible for economic development, spatial planning, housing, urban policy, and policy geared toward the general collective interest. The history and modern function of EPCI, including the métropole, is defined in Section 1.2.3.

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70 Sylvie Gittus, "Que change la Loi NOTRE pour les collectivités territoriales ?," Le Monde, May 28, 2015.
71 "The metropolis exercises, as of right, within the metropolitan perimeter, a certain number of competences:
Divided responsibilities surrounding education serve as one example of how responsibilities are shared between the levels of administration. Communes are responsible for elementary schools; departments are responsible for junior high schools; and regions are responsible for high schools. All three are responsible for the building and upkeep of facilities, as well as several minimal aspects of each level of education. The central government, through the Ministry of Education, is responsible for curricula and personnel. Furthermore, significant administrative reorganization is underway following the passing of the *loi NOTRe*, and the competencies of regions and departments are shifting.

The *loi NOTRe* (*loi portant sur la Nouvelle Organisation Territoriale de la République*) is the most recent territorial reform act. The law was passed in August 2015, and implementation began in early 2016. This law consolidated twenty-two regions into thirteen regions, clarified regional-level competencies, created municipal reforms, among other changes. Justification for these reforms includes diminishing public spending, concentrating the strategic influence of regions and intercommunal structures to adapt to a globalized economy, and someday eliminating the purpose of

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the department. Furthermore, the law aims to disentangle duplicate competencies at various administrative levels, as the decentralization efforts of the Defferre laws created some confusion and overlap.\textsuperscript{72} However, some also categorize the reorganization and renaming of the regions as another attempt to fracture regional identity and thus regional diversity, strengthening the power of the central government. Notably, the \textit{loi NOTRe} municipal reforms include the creation of the Aix-Marseille-Provence Métropole, the largest intercommunal structure (explained further in Chapter Four) in France, as well as the assignment of new competencies to intercommunal structures.\textsuperscript{73}

This thesis investigates the differential success of the local implementation of policy within a national and international context of economic and social change. Current inequities are the result of decades of local action and inaction; therefore, I will focus on the competencies and structures of local government prior to the rollout of the \textit{loi NOTRe}. It is useful, however, to incorporate concerns related to institutional structures as they stood prior to the \textit{loi NOTRe} and examine whether or not the ongoing restructuring will address their shortcomings.

\textit{La réforme des rythmes scolaires}

One recent example of how decentralization can create unequal outcomes on the local level is \textit{la réforme des rythmes scolaires}, or the school-rhythm reforms, a campaign promise fulfilled by Socialist President François Hollande that went into effect in September 2014. The reform changes the elementary school week from four

\textsuperscript{72} Gittus.
\textsuperscript{73} Baylet and Grelier.
full days to four shortened days and one half day. It also carves out three hours per week for extracurricular activities, to be organized by the municipalities. The reform was based in child development research, and experts argued that shortened school days that concentrate instructional time during the morning hours improve cognition and learning.\textsuperscript{74} The changes would be implemented by the mayors of communes, who were given significant leeway in determining whether half days would be on Wednesdays or Saturdays, as well as the day and content of the extracurricular activities. Aside from some modest state aid, the municipalities were required to finance the afterschool activities independently.

Aside from the most obvious problem with the reform—the altered school day does not coincide with the schedules of working parents, adding to childcare costs—the differential implementation of the reform has led to unequal outcomes across communes. The success of implementation of these reforms depended most on the partisan affiliation, size, and financial situation of each commune.\textsuperscript{75} The extracurricular activity requirements are vague, so municipalities are able to determine the extent to which they offer engaging activities (cultural, athletic, or academic experiences) or simple daycare services during the required three hours. Hosting activities can be costly, and it has been difficult for many municipalities to find enough facilitators to lead the workshops. Furthermore, the existence of an associative network is necessary in order to provide appropriate activities run by experienced facilitators.

\textsuperscript{74} Arnaud Gonzague, "Rythmes Scolaires : Une réforme cruciale, biologiquement, pour les enfants," \textit{Nouvel Obs}, November 16, 2013.

\textsuperscript{75} Aurélie Cassette and Etienne Farvaque, "In Consideration of the Children,' Really? Adoption of the School-Rhythm Reform by French Municipalities," \textit{French Politics} 12, no. 2 (2014).
Due to variations in resources and political will to support Socialist policy, the school-rhythm reforms were received differently across communes. A town such as Fercé-sur-Sarthe, which has less than 700 residents, adapted well to the changes and children now have access to offerings such as circus classes, whereas Marseille, a large, poor city governed by the right, has experienced a more chaotic transition.76 Marseille Mayor Jean-Claude Gaudin, of the Union for a Popular Movement (center-right) opposed the changes, so implementation was plagued with procrastination and limited consultation with teachers.77 Ultimately, children in wealthier areas of France (where, for the most part, activities are already offered) have seen an increase in their access to creative and cultural activities, whereas the children who stand to gain the most from these activities remain cut off. Some families can work around the altered schedule, afford additional childcare, or move their children to private schools to avoid the reform altogether. The families who do not have the means to adjust to these changes, notably poor immigrant families, struggle disproportionately. The differential implementation on the local level reveals how management choices are motivated by local institutional practices, even when their formal structures are identical, which can reinforce inequities on local levels, both within cities and between them.

1.2.3 Intercommunal Structures (EPCI)

The final level of government relevant to this thesis is the intercommunal structure (EPCI). The EPCI is an institution with its own tax-raising capabilities that

covers and governs a territory that contains multiple communes and/or urban areas. On the European level, intergovernmental relationships have evolved significantly since the 1980s. New structures of multilevel governance have altered state/urban relationships with spatial development and the provision of social services. These structures have been shaped by European Union policies relating to constraints on national economic legislation, environmental guidelines, and a stronger emphasis on ameliorating social inequities.78

In France, various structures have emerged, evolved, and been abolished over time.79 The history and development of these collaborative structures is fraught with instability, overlapping territories and personnel, high costs, and a lack of clarity of competencies, structure, and finances. Adding to the complexity, “local rivalries, fear, and general lack of cooperativeness” plagued the success of EPCI on the ground.80 Five recent laws and periods of reform aimed to address the confusion have shaped the structures of the dominant EPCI today: the law of February 6, 1992, the loi Chevènement of 1999, reforms between 2008 and 2012, the loi MAPTAM of 2014, and the loi NOTRe of 2015. This section outlines the evolution of the variations of EPCI but excludes the political battles that accompanied the passing of each law.

The commune is the smallest unit of the French administrative structure. France has over 36,000 communes, originally structured around each church in France, making up 40 percent of all towns or communes in the European Union. Given the large number of small municipalities that have often struggled to

78 Salet and Thornley.
79 Primary examples include: municipal unions, urban districts, equilibrium metropolitan areas, urban communities, communities of communes, communities of cities, and agglomeration communities
80 Schmidt, 79.
adequately serve their residents, the EPCI originated to combat this municipal fragmentation at the end of the 19th century, beginning with “municipal unions” in 1890, up to the establishment of “multi-community inter-communal trade unions” (SIVOM) in 1959. SIVOM facilitated collaboration between voluntary associations of nearby communes in order to provide public services such as waste management or the management of ports.

The next period of development for EPCI focused on the unique challenges of post-war urbanization. Thus, “urban districts,” the first EPCI with independent fiscal structures, were established in 1959. Schmidt notes that the districts were generally unsuccessful, given that “mayors generally opposed [the district structure] because they saw them as taking powers away from the communes and because they could be established without the full agreement of the communes involved.” In 1963, the centralized regional planning authority, DATAR, determined eight urban areas that included cities that could be grouped together, including Aix-en-Provence and Marseille as one grouping and Lyon, Saint Etienne, and Grenoble as another, intending to counterbalance the level of activity in Paris and establish order in the administrative hierarchy. Such groupings would theoretically improve the competitiveness of the regions, and the “equilibrium metropolitan areas” would take on stronger regional administrative and economic development roles, performing some functions that had previously been limited to the capital. Administration of equilibrium metropolitan areas was carried out through the creation of “urban

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82 Schmidt.
83 Schmidt, 79.
"communities" in 1966. The ease of implementation depended on the urban area. The Bordeaux urban community came together smoothly, whereas the consolidation of the Lyon urban community involved a significant court battle, although it did eventually come together.\textsuperscript{85} The early urban community set the foundation for more successful integrated inter-municipal models.

The Law of February 6, 1992 marked a new phase in EPCI development, establishing two new categories of EPCI with independent tax structures: the “\textit{community of communes}” and the “\textit{community of cities}.” These categories were designed to foster more integration between communes and transfer greater responsibility in terms of management of space and economic development.\textsuperscript{86} The \textit{loi Chevènement} of 1999 simplified and strengthened structures of inter-municipal cooperation, introducing a single tax structure for urban communities and agglomerations but allowing communities of communes to choose from three possible systems. The law consolidated EPCI into only three levels: communities of communes (15,000+ residents), “\textit{communities of agglomeration}” (a new structure; 50,000+ residents), and urban communities (500,000+ residents), and extended the spatial planning and management responsibilities of the EPCI. The minimum population for an area to qualify as an urban community was raised to 500,000 from 20,000.\textsuperscript{87}

A 2009/2010 reform created a special metropolis status for urban areas with 650,000 residents or more, capitals of regions, or centers of employment zones with

\textsuperscript{85} Schmidt.
\textsuperscript{86} Cour des comptes.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.
over 400,000 residents. The changes brought about one final relevant form of EPCI: the “métropole.” Métropoles absorb other EPCI within their territory, as well as the competencies of the department and some responsibilities of the region. The purpose of these reforms and further decentralization efforts was to give urban centers a more powerful economic development role on the European stage. Furthermore, these changes serve to diminish the role of the department. The loi MAPTAM of 2014 expanded on these efforts by clarifying the role of local and regional authorities and reorganizing the legal structure of the métropole. It created the Métropole of Greater Paris, established the special status of Lyon’s collectivity, and merged six intermunicipalities to create the Aix-Marseille-Provence Métropole, which will be phased in completely by 2020 (see Figures 6 and 7). Communities of communes, communities of agglomeration, urban communities, and metropolises are managed by a community council composed of municipal councilors from each represented municipality. Up until 2014, these representative municipal councilors were elected to community councils by the municipal councils; today, community councilors are elected by universal suffrage.

88 Cour des comptes.
91 Ibid.
Figure 6: Marseille Agglomerations, 2000-present.

Figure 7: Lyon Agglomeration, 1969-present.
The metropolis and the urban community are the two most relevant structures to this thesis. Both Marseille and Lyon were originally part of urban communities; following the *loi MAPTAM*, Marseille and its surrounding communes became a metropolis with special status, and Lyon and its surrounding communes became part of a territorial collectivity, a type of local authority with the competencies of a department and a metropolis.\(^{92}\) In Chapter Four, I explain the evolution of the intermunicipal statuses of Marseille and Lyon as they relate to the political and economic situations surrounding each city.

**Conclusion**

Democratic institutions have the power to shape a society’s imagined possibilities—from what it means to be a citizen to how a government should interact with and respond to constituents. Putnam argued that the strength of civil society determines the success of democracies, but Vlahos and Mouritsen question how institutions limit the power of civil society and prevent it from influencing the evolution of the institution. Patsias et al. combine these ideas, drawing attention to the relationship between the government and civil society in the institutionalization process. These concepts pertain to French ethnic relations and immigration, especially as national context (nation-building and colonial expansion) combined with local context (geographies, economic and political histories) shapes local institutions and their responses to policy challenges. Local practices, which derive from those

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contexts, are institutionalized over time, but not all segments of the population are
given the opportunity to participate in the process of institutionalization.

Global economic and societal forces, such as modernization,
deindustrialization, and globalization, led to the reconsideration of the central state’s
role in social welfare and transferred responsibility to the local institution. As
decentralization bestowed greater authority to local institutions without the resources
to match, local institutional structures and the context of their development achieved
greater significance. As I explain in the next chapter, French national institutions
developed a vocabulary and epistemology to set the terms of debate about
immigration, integration, and citizenship, and these ideologies translate to practice on
the local level.

There is significant power and responsibility on the local level to address
contemporary issues related to inequality and the representation of an increasingly
diverse population. Whether or not local governments implement policy to ameliorate
disparities depends on the responsiveness of the local elected officials, which, as I
will show in Chapter Four and Five, relates to the evolution of local institutional
structures.
CHAPTER TWO: THE MIGRATION

IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION, AND CITIZENSHIP IN FRANCE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

A full migrant suffers, traditionally, a triple disruption: he loses his place, he enters into an alien language, and he finds himself surrounded by beings whose social behavior and code is very unlike, and sometimes even offensive to, his own. And this is what makes migrants such important figures: because roots, language and social norms have been three of the most important parts of the definition of what it is to be a human being. The migrant, denied all three, is obliged to find new ways of describing himself, new ways of being human.


Introduction

In Chapter One, I argued that institutions limit the development of civil society and its participation in the institutionalization process. In addition, institutions shape the public imagination and discourse regarding politics and identity. I also explained the evolution of French institutional structures and how decentralization reform increased the power of local institutions. Local institutions are shaped by both national context and their particular local contexts.

In this chapter, I explore the broad, national context that relates most closely to the treatment of ethnic minorities: France’s recent immigration history, particularly Maghrebi immigration. I then focus on the modern French philosophy of integration, namely the French republican values, which were popularized and integrated into the discourse surrounding immigration around the same time as the implementation of the decentralization reforms described in Chapter One. I then discuss the experiences of integration and discrimination for Maghrebi immigrants and their descendants, and I describe the institutional forces that shape these

93 Typically defined as Algerian, Moroccan, and Tunisian.
experiences. Ultimately, I argue that the same economic and political challenges faced by post-industrial societies during the 1980s that set the stage for decentralization reform also created the conditions to reshape the dominant discourse on immigration, integration, and citizenship. This discourse establishes the broad context in which local French institutions operate.

2.1 A Timeline of Maghrebi Migration to France in the Twentieth Century

France has recruited and received waves of immigrants since the nineteenth century, when fast-paced industrial growth, a declining birth rate, and labor shortages attracted European immigrants.94 Leading into and throughout the early twentieth century, immigrants arrived primarily from Spain, Italy, Portugal, Belgium, and Poland. Beyond European immigration, however, France’s colonial relationships have defined its most significant immigrant influxes. Since the beginning of Maghrebi conquest in 1827, France recruited migrant labor from its North African colonies and protectorates (see Figure 8). Up until the 1960s, Maghrebi immigration was generally economic and labor migration.95 Originally, due to Algerian rural labor surpluses and France’s need for unskilled labor, France and Algeria agreed to craft immigration policy in a way that viewed immigrants as temporary workers, and they limited family migration.

95 Andaraliev Murodjon, "Magreb Migration and Integration Issues: A Case of France" (Central European University, 2012).
Over the course of the twentieth century, most Muslim North African immigrants came from Algeria, then Morocco, and fewer from Tunisia. Following the destruction and casualties of World War I, colonial migrant workers entered France as soldiers, industrial workers, and miners. During reconstruction following World War II, France again desired inexpensive labor; from 1945 to 1974, France received significant migrant waves from its former imperial territories in Asia, North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa, most notably from Vietnam and Algeria, and immigration was largely unregulated. The Algerian War began in 1954, building tension between Algerian immigrants and white French. However, following Moroccan and Tunisian independence in 1952 and Algerian independence in 1962, circulation between Algeria and France recommenced, leading to a sharp increase in

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the Maghrebi immigrant population in France.\textsuperscript{97} Two specific populations coming from independent Algeria included \textit{Harkis}, or Algerians who had supported France during the war, and \textit{pieds noirs},\textsuperscript{98} the Christian and Jewish European colonists who settled in the North African French colonies and were repatriated to France after the war. \textit{Pieds noirs} assimilated into the category of white French and gained easier access to housing and employment; \textit{Harkis}, on the other hand, faced discrimination and white French resentment. In 1962, there were 350,000 non-\textit{pieds noirs} Algerians in France; by 1969, this number had risen to 470,000.\textsuperscript{99}

Immigration was particularly visible in areas with industrial labor needs, notably in and around France’s three largest cities: Paris, Lyon, and Marseille. Marseille, as the nation’s foremost port city, was often a first stop for immigrants who could then move inward toward a next destination. Marseille also attracted a large \textit{pied noir} population. Given the labor conditions under which they entered France, North African immigrants often resided in ethnic enclaves located nearest to factories, which shaped residential segregation in the cities. In Marseille, as industry was more centrally located, segregation occurred within the city, between the southern \textit{arrondissements} and the central and northern areas. In contrast, in cities like Lyon or Paris, industry was located in the outskirts of the cities, therefore many immigrants found themselves in the suburbs, or \textit{banlieues}, of the cities and remain there today. I explore immigration patterns in Marseille and Lyon in Chapter Three.

\textsuperscript{98} This label, which translates to “black feet,” most likely derives from the black boots that European soldiers wore in the colonies.
The 1973 oil crisis, subsequent economic conditions, maturing baby boomer population, and the entrance of women into the workforce limited labor needs for immigration. Since then, immigration policy has vacillated between very strict (“zero immigration”) and liberal, varying based on who is in power. In 1974, France ended its labor migration programs and began to regulate immigration more strictly, but the number of Maghrebi immigrants continued to grow in the form of family reunifications. Policy added uncertainty to the lives of settled immigrants: rather than receiving five- to ten-year residence cards, residents were given annual permits that had to be renewed and could be easily refused for reasons such as being a suspected threat to the public order or returning late from a paid holiday.\(^{100}\) As discussed in Chapter One, this sequence of events factored into the reconsideration of the central state’s role in social welfare, which served as justification for decentralization reform.

By 1982, there were 800,000 Algerians and 431,000 Moroccans in France. At this point, North Africans made up about 38.4 percent of foreigners in France, although this census figure is likely to be an underestimate.\(^{101}\) The Socialist government attempted to liberalize immigration policy between 1981 and 1983, once again providing ten-year residency and employment cards, increasing security for immigrant residents, with mixed success. However, some Socialist policies at this time actually reinforced anti-immigrant sentiment. For example, a 1983 poll showed that 63 percent of the public “thought the Métro was not a very safe place,” and so the government placed more police within the subway system, even though very few

\(^{100}\) Lloyd.  
\(^{101}\) Blanc.
incidents actually took place in the public transportation system.\textsuperscript{102} High unemployment, insecurity about the future of work, and housing crises—viewed as a product of the failures of the Socialists and the right—led to the increased electoral power of the Front National, a party of the extreme right fueled by anti-immigrant rhetoric, and strict immigration policy was soon to follow.\textsuperscript{103}

In 1993, Charles Pasqua, the Minister of the Interior, enacted the Pasqua laws, a series of ambiguous and arbitrary measures restricting immigration and regulating the lives of immigrants in France. These laws ultimately served to create suspicion and associated immigrants with “crime, drug-dealing and terrorism.”\textsuperscript{104} They were in large part reversed by the Socialists after 1997, but condemnation from the Left on the national scale often did not transfer to the local level due to the realities of policy implementation on the ground. Communists and socialist municipalities also played a role in the rejection and exclusion of their immigrant populations in areas such as housing, education, and social services.\textsuperscript{105} Today, immigration primarily takes the form of family reunifications and asylum applications.\textsuperscript{106}

It is important to note that the study of ethnic minorities in France is not completely a study of immigration, but because the French avoid conceptualizing race or ethnicity, the conversation often focuses on those “issued from immigration,” as mentioned in the Introduction.\textsuperscript{107} Discrimination against immigrants from North and sub-Saharan Africa has had a lasting impact on their descendants, many of whom are

\textsuperscript{102} Christofferson, p. 118.
\textsuperscript{103} Lloyd.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., p. 45.
\textsuperscript{106} Hamilton, Simon, and Veniard.
\textsuperscript{107} I explain this fully in Section 2.1.2, \textit{The French Republican Model and Integration}.
now second-, third-, or even fourth-generation French citizens, but estimates of the number of individuals with North African heritage or of the Muslim population in France are difficult to assess. Table 1 shows the origins of immigrants in France in 2013, but it only includes first- and 1.5 generation\textsuperscript{108} immigrants. In 2011, demographer Michèle Tribalat estimated that 29.1 percent of immigrants in France, as well as first- and second-generation immigrants (4,189,000 people) were from the Maghreb; 8.9 percent are from sub-Saharan Africa (1,288,000); 10 percent are from Asia (1,444,000); and 49.4 percent (7,111,000) are from Europe.\textsuperscript{109}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Country or Continent} & \textbf{Number of Immigrants} \\
\hline
Europe & 2,125,512 (36\%) \\
Africa & 2,540,210 (43.5\%) \\
Algeria & 760,289 \\
Morocco & 709,619 \\
Tunisia & 258,812 \\
Other African countries & 811,490 \\
Asia & 840,314 (14.4\%) \\
Turkey & 248,640 \\
Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam & 160,799 \\
Other Asian countries & 430,875 \\
America/Oceania & 328,307 (5.6\%) \\
\hline
\textbf{Total Immigrant Population} & \textbf{5,835,344} \\
\textbf{Total Population of France (2013)} & \textbf{63,844,529} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Immigrants in France by Country of Birth, in 2013\textsuperscript{110}}
\end{table}

2.2 The French Republican Model and Integration

Dominant French discourses on citizenship, immigration, and integration are often portrayed as having deep historical and traditional bases, hearkening back to the republican values instilled by the Revolutionaries. Today, the French republican

\textsuperscript{108} 1.5 generation (or 1.5G) immigrants “are individuals who immigrate to a new country before or during their early teenage years,” sometimes also including foreign students. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immigrant_generations#1.5_generation)


\textsuperscript{110} INSEE, “Recensement général de la population, exploitation principale,” 2013. According to INSEE, “immigrant” is defined as someone born abroad and residing in France, regardless of naturalization or citizenship status. “Foreigner,” one who does not become a French citizen, is a category of “immigrant.”
model demands a full acceptance of French identity and culture: there are no hyphenated nationalities, no racial or ethnic checkboxes on the census, and there is no official acknowledgement of categorical difference (see Introduction for explanation of these practices). This public philosophy of integration has been constructed and naturalized, grounding and confining debate to specific terms.\textsuperscript{111,112} In actuality, the dominant immigration/integration discourse has shifted over time, depending on political and economic contexts and on how it best served the interests of key political actors, notably the Front National. In this section, I explain the republican model as it is evoked in discourse today and the terms of its accompanying public debate; I explore the evolution of the republican frame; and finally, I relate immigration discourse to French secularism, or \textit{laïcité}.

The republican ideals often referred to by political actors include universalism (loyalty to all regardless of nationality), unitarism (recognition of common purpose), secularism (\textit{laïcité}), and “assimilation with an onus on foreigners to become French and on French institutions to facilitate this process,”\textsuperscript{113} supporting the “universally desirable” goals of \textit{liberté, égalité}, and \textit{fraternité}. These ideals and principles were structured at a time of national hegemony and colonial expansion. On the domestic level, they supported the nation-building project, as assimilation was the most effective way to unify the indigenous people of the diverse regions, namely the Bretons, the Basques, and the Corsicans. Regionalist movements threatened to divide

\textsuperscript{112} This is an example of how institutions take a set of norms and behaviors and codify them in a way that camouflages their human origins. See Chapter One of this thesis and Douglas (1986).
\textsuperscript{113} Andrew Geddes and Peter Scholten, \textit{The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe} (Sage, 2016).
the nation, and repression of regional culture was deemed necessary.\textsuperscript{114} Therefore, dating back to the eighteenth century, to become French was to assimilate, and in so doing, one would be recognized as an individual rather than a member of a group. The ideals supported French colonial expansion as well, as its imperial conquests were motivated by “a worldwide mission to spread French culture,” often used as a façade “behind which lurked the economic and military aims of colonialism.”\textsuperscript{115} The republican ideals were widely invoked again in the 1980s, this time pertaining to the political inclusion of Muslim North African immigrants, a renewed “crisis of integration.” Marceau Long, Vice President of the \textit{Conseil d'Etat} from 1987-1995 frames the revived perspective concisely, citing a common comparison to the Anglo-Saxon approach to diversity:

There are different conceptions. One is based on the right of ethnic minorities, of communities; this is the concept which has been adopted in the Anglo-Saxon countries but is also prevalent in Europe, notably in Eastern Europe. The other concept is ours, French but also continental, based on individual adhesion…[Those who talk of communities] are wrong. It’s another way of imprisoning people within ghettos rather than affirming their right to opinions as individuals.\textsuperscript{116}

According to this view, any construction of “communities” runs contrary to the advancement of equality. Proponents of this philosophy prioritize a societal cohesion based on the denial of difference.

The dichotomy of French universalism versus Anglo-Saxon multiculturalism is framed as absolute, and the republican model is often supported with historical and institutional evidence. These means of framing the discourse mask the constructed

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{115} Lloyd. p. 38.  
(human design) and naturalized (made to seem as though the principals are part of the natural order) nature of the republican ideals. French universalism and Anglo-Saxon multiculturalism are not absolute features; there are examples of French categorization by race, such as the use of ethnic quotas by local councils in housing allocations or school placements,\(^{117}\) whereas Britain has a legacy of cultural universalism.\(^{118}\) Furthermore, the French philosophy on integration has not uniformly maintained an emphasis on cultural assimilation. Prior to the 1980s, integration policy focused on socio-cultural insertion and meeting the basic needs of the population in order to avoid social disruptions. Immigration was seen as relating to economic and labor forces. Even immigration policy changes after the economic crisis in the 1970s were framed as being economically-grounded; the public accepted that restrictions were put into place because there was no longer a need for workers and because additional insertion could no longer be sufficiently supported by the state.\(^{119,120}\) According to Adrien Favell, a leading scholar on immigration and integration in France, the impact of the dominant framework that emerges is that it “imposes a language, epistemology, and theoretical scheme on the ongoing treatment and debate of policy problems...It structures and constrains political actions and policy interventions that take place within the accepted frame.”\(^{121}\) The emergent universalist, assimilationist framework limits the public imagination of what it means and has meant to be French in France.

\(^{117}\) See M. Silverman (p. 4) for further explanation of official usage of racialized criteria.
\(^{118}\) Maxim Silverman, Deconstructing the Nation: Immigration, Racism and Citizenship in Modern France (Routledge, 2002).
\(^{119}\) Favell.
\(^{120}\) As previously stated, these factors served as justification for decentralization reforms; see Chapter One.
\(^{121}\) Ibid., p. 26.
It is important to understand the political and social context leading up to the 1980s in order to explain why the discourse changed and how integration became such a prominent issue. Some argued that policy relating to insertion up to that point had failed; others said that the number of “problematic” immigrants was rising; while others still blamed the “discovery” of Islam in the 1980s. None of these assertions could be supported with facts, as insertion efforts had been fairly successful, the number of immigrants had been in decline since restrictions were enacted in 1974, and practicing Muslim immigrants had entered France throughout the twentieth century. These explanations shift blame for national economic insecurity to immigrants, rather than the decisions of elite policymakers. The changing rhetoric can be most readily linked to more general political issues, notably a decline in the power of state governance and the state’s ability to fund social welfare programs, and a perceived failure of the traditional political system. Some blamed the Socialist failure to address unemployment, while others no longer trusted the right to address their concerns either. Jean-Marie Le Pen, founder of the Front National, capitalized on the political and economic change as well as anti-elitist sentiment in the provincial areas. The party’s success came in the form of highly-publicized local electoral fight in 1983. Le Pen successfully linked the general insecurity to immigration and a necessary interrogation of the French identity, changing the terms of the debate and forcing the mainstream political parties to take positions in relation to his own. The Front National was particularly successful in areas with high unemployment, a large

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122 Ibid.
123 Christofferson.
number of recent immigrants, and a significant *pied noir* populations, such as Marseille, where Le Pen received 21.42 percent of the vote in 1984.\textsuperscript{124}

The result of Le Pen’s politics was a reappearance of the traditional republican ideals and a citizenship of strict cultural assimilation. The open wound of the situation in Algeria made North African immigrants the central focus of the conversation; the colonial racism that enabled the activation of concerns regarding the compatibility of Islam and North African culture with French values is explained further in the next section. Offering a generalized explanation that seems particularly relevant to our times, Favell writes:

Political problems begin to arise within this frame only when there is a conjunction of contingent political economic factors. An economic crisis, which leads to social competition over work and deprived urban spaces and the rejection of new immigrants by the working classes and unions, may then combine with the wider sea-changes of post-industrial societies: the decline of the state, the breaking-up of unified national political culture, the rise of post-national and regional forces. Within this context, immigration can become an effective salient issue, taken up by right-wing traditionalist or working-class parties, and used as a focus for wider grievances.\textsuperscript{125}

Le Pen captured the anxiety related to the floundering centralized state in the face of globalization and economic policy pressures from the European Community, successfully reframing the entire debate for years to come.

Under the terms of the new normative discourse catalyzed by Le Pen, the primary focus of constructing French identity was “nationhood bonding…without which social integration and moral order is not possible.”\textsuperscript{126} Public order was also presented as a fundamental public good. It followed that nationality law extended

\begin{footnotes}
\item[124] Ibid., p. 194.
\item[125] Ibid., p. 23.
\item[126] Ibid., p. 64.
\end{footnotes}
beyond border control and was designed to elucidate the necessary “preconditions for successful integration.”

The state was responsible for ensuring integration (and thus public and moral order) in public spaces, such as schools, associations, and the media; successful integration and therefore successful citizenship meant that one was able to distance oneself from one’s own culture in these spaces and participate as a fully autonomous individual. The actual target of this specific construction of citizenship is the fight against Islamic fundamentalism, which is obscured by an appeal to concerns about safety and wellbeing. Legislators simultaneously tapped into and reinforced concern about the compatibility of Islam and French values, bringing the “symbolically sensitive area of practices towards women and children in Islamic culture that violate western norms—particularly excision…and polygamy” into the fore.

This focus on cultural concerns has shifted the conversation far and away from the socio-economic and welfare issues affecting ethnic minorities in France, “the one area that the state has lost or relinquished since the 1980s.” Immigration and integration policy adheres to abstract philosophical claims rather than empirical social science evidence. In other words, the ways in which integration is discussed often outweighs the advancement of constructive policy solutions.

The republican value of secularism, or *laïcité*, has had a central role in discussions and controversies relating to national identity and the integration of Muslim North Africans in France. Historically, secularism was a tool for keeping the peace between political and Catholic institutions. It was codified in the 1905 *loi sur la*

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127 Ibid., p. 65.  
128 Ibid., p. 65.  
129 Ibid., p. 241.
separation des Églises et l’État (Law on the Separation of Churches and State), which remains the primary legal means of implementing secularism in policy.  

Similar to the other republican ideals, whereas secularism is often asserted as a traditional and enduring value, it only became part of the mainstream vocabulary in 1989, following debate about women and girls wearing the hijab in public school settings. The political concept of secularism, which used to be “aimed at achieving religious liberty, freedom of conscience, and equality by institutional and juridical means, has been transformed into a narrative secularism, that is, a discourse performed to address national identity in a context of social and historical uncertainty.”

This discourse plays out in policymaking: in 2004, religious symbols (notably the hijab) were banned from public schools, using secularism and gender equality as justifications. In 2008, the Conseil d’État, the highest French court, denied citizenship to a Moroccan woman who refused to remove her niqab, “thereby establishing that the radical practice of her religion was incompatible with the essential values of the French community, and in particular with the principle of equality between men and women.” In 2010, the niqab and burqa were banned from public spaces entirely.

Secularism has evolved from a principle ensuring religious liberties to a narrative that defines what fits into the French republican model and what does not. As we have seen, these French republican values fit into the discourse propagated by the Front National, which channels concerns stemming from economic instability into anti-immigrant, and anti-Muslim, sentiment.

[131] Ibid., p. 4.
[132] Ibid., p. 9.
2.3 Integrating Maghrebi Populations

The previously described dominant political philosophies of integration map onto the integration experiences of Muslim North African immigrants and their descendants. Not all immigrants to France have had the same opportunities to integrate into society, and although France has seen significant immigration from former colonies and protectorates in both North Africa and Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in particular), the economic circumstances under which North Africans entered France made integration over time particularly difficult.\textsuperscript{133} For example, Algerians as colonial subjects in France received lower pay while doing the most dangerous work, were habitually the first to be laid off, and did not receive protection from their national government in the way that the native countries of other European immigrants, particularly those from Italy, Poland, and Spain, fought for contracts and agreements to protect workers.\textsuperscript{134,135} Furthermore, there is also a hierarchy within the category of North African immigrants. Morocco and Tunisia were French protectorates, and the French presence came about via treaties with local authorities. In contrast, France conquered Algeria with violence, battling and repressing local tribes that lacked the unification of an indigenous Algerian administration. Algerian independence also came about through violent means. Therefore, the French relationship with and collective memory of Algeria is

\textsuperscript{133} Bin Shen, “A Comparative Socio-Economic Study of Integration between North African and Southeast Asian Immigrants to France” (Wesleyan University, 2009).

\textsuperscript{134} Derderian.

\textsuperscript{135} When Algeria was still under French colonial rule, Algerians had special citizenship status in France, therefore Algerians living in France were not afforded the same protections from a host country, as France controlled the host country.
particularly important in understanding the modern conception of North Africans as Arabs and Arab Muslims, as well as the hostility toward Algerians in particular.

Two factors, colonial racism and the perceived temporary status of immigrants, have influenced the political discourse surrounding North African immigration and explain the racism and material challenges faced by North Africans in France. First, the relationship between France and its colonies engendered a new form of colonialism in metropolitan France, evident in political discourse and policy. Arab Muslims in North Africa rarely received the benefits of French colonial advances, such as the development of modern ports, infrastructure, and social services, and the destructive conquest led to the “massive appropriation of lands, the uprooting and dislocation of tribes, the collapse of artisan industry, and the creation of an impoverished peasantry which was constantly subject to disease and hunger.”

The challenging task for the supporters of the Republic was then to turn this story of destruction into one of emancipation, and the message emerged that France had attempted to liberate Algerian women from oppressive Islam, an assertion that is echoed in more recent controversies, notably the debate over banning the hijab. Historian Sharif Gemie summarizes the impact of Algerian colonialism on the French perception and conflation of the Arab and Muslim worlds:

The history of Algerian colonialism left French people with a set of commonly circulating images by which to understand Muslim and/or Arab populations. (Indeed, one problem was precisely that the Algerian experience left many French people unable to distinguish between Arab and Muslim cultures.) The lessons drawn from 130 years of Algerian colonialism taught French people to see Islam as an enemy force, retrograde in its values and violent in its methods. This third colonial, racialized contact has also left a permanent suspicion about almost all forms of Muslim organization.

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The justification narrative, anger, and fear related to colonial subjugation is thus generalized to all Arab- or Muslim-seeming populations, including Syrian and other refugees seeking protection in France today.

Racism against Arab populations was nothing new, but its currents swelled beginning in the inter-war period. Then, following World War II, the French government, focused on maintaining a unified French culture, sought out immigrant workers who could easily assimilate, potentially from Yugoslavia, Italy, or Portugal. However, the need for low-wage, low-skilled workers led the government to turn instead toward North Africa. The way in which leaders selected acceptable workers reflects and reinforces a view of Arabs as an inferior race. For example, in the documentary *Memoires d’Immigrées*, one official recounts how the government selected agricultural workers from rural areas for their “work ethic;” in actuality, rural workers were chosen because they were uneducated and were less likely to organize against the working and living conditions they would experience upon their arrival in France. Immigration laws that strictly regulated in the 1970s transformed the Arab into a figure of illegality and suspicion. Finally, Arab immigrants have been continuously referred to as immigrants, rather than French people, residents, or citizens who compose an ethnic minority. These are only several examples of how immigration policy and rhetoric has reinforced cultural racism against Arab immigrants.

Richard Derdarian explains that cultural racism “posits absolute cultural differences or ethnic divides that negate the possibility of integration or peaceful
coexistence.” This discourse of cultural racism, still present in politics and media, has stoked public discrimination against North Africans. Jean Marie Le Pen, the founder of the Front National, exemplifies this rhetoric in his speech, stating: “The nature of immigration has changed. What we are witnessing on our national soil is the shock of two fundamentally different cultures. Islam, which is already the second religion in France, is opposed to any kind of assimilation and threatens our own identity, our Occidental and Christian Civilization.” Through a lens of cultural racism, any failure to integrate is linked to innate and immutable cultural weaknesses, rather than any fault of the state.

Following cultural racism, the second factor that has influenced the immigration discourse is the fact that immigrants from the Maghreb were considered to be temporary migrant workers. This is evident in hasty approaches to urban planning and construction of public housing, as well as the lack of political, social, and economic rights afforded to Magrebi populations. In the 1970s, policy shifted, unsuccessfully, toward repatriation. This view was reflected in academic studies of immigration, and it did not change until the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the volume and diverse foci of immigration research grew dramatically. Re-appropriated colonialism facilitates this view of Arab immigrants as inferior, disposable, and unassimilable.

The most tangible effects of a politic infused with colonial discourse are evident in experiences with employment and housing for North African immigrants.

139 Derderian, p. 12.
141 Lloyd.
and their descendants. Although Arabs fought for, rebuilt, and have made significant cultural contributions to France, they were treated as second class citizens. They were given the kind of work that nobody else wanted and lived where nobody else would. North Africans worked for low wages in service, industry, construction, and agriculture, and lived in transitional housing, public housing (HLM), or shanty-towns called bidonvilles (explained on the local level in Chapters Three and Four). Today, Arab and Muslim populations in France continue to experience discrimination. Even when their skill levels match those of white counterparts, they are still less likely to be hired. In 2002, the unemployment rate for immigrants with a college degree was sixteen percent, twice the rate for white French with a college degree (eight percent); the unemployment rate for immigrants with a high school diploma was thirty-two percent, over twice the rate for white French with a high school diploma (fifteen percent). Much of this is name-based: a resumé study by the organization SOS Racisme revealed that those with non-European names were 1.5 times less likely to be employed in every category of employment. Many immigrants who populated public housing units in the 1960s and 1970s have not left; today, fifty percent of North African immigrants, thirty-seven percent of other African immigrants, and thirty-six percent of Turkish immigrants live in HLMs. Present-day housing discrimination goes hand in hand with limited access to education and a high prevalence of crime.142 I will expand on how discrimination has played out on a local level in my exploration of Marseille and Lyon.

Conclusion

Institutional discourses on immigration have changed over time to suit the needs of political actors. Institutionalized discourses camouflage the human intent behind the framing of the debate and portray assimilation, secularism, and universalism as part of the natural order. The economic and political circumstances under which Maghrebi immigrants entered France differentiated their experiences from those of European immigrants. Nationalities, religion, and regions are conflated so that those who appear to be of North African or Middle Eastern descent are viewed as Arab Muslims. Cultural racism and a conception of North African immigrants as temporary migrant workers have made economic, social, and political integration particularly challenging. Therefore, French society demands that Muslim North Africans assimilate but does not afford them the opportunity to actually do so.

Despite political and media assertions that Islam is incompatible with French values and democracy, there is significant evidence that on a national scale, Arab Muslims express the desire to integrate into French society and that in many ways, they have successfully integrated. Information compiled by Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaïsse shows that many French Muslims convey satisfaction with their lives in France, aside from experiences with discrimination. A 2005 U.S. State Department poll, for example, showed that 65 percent of self-described Muslims had confidence in the French national government, and 89 percent believed in the French public school system. 95 percent expressed an overall favorable opinion of France.\(^{143}\)

Dominant discourses paint French Muslims as a homogeneous and unified group,

\(^{143}\) Ibid., p. 47.
when actually, the Muslim “community” is fragmented and diverse, with various socioeconomic situations, varying degrees of religious observance, and many forms of self-identification. The only unifying feature for Muslims in France is “their ‘lived experience,’ which includes the bitterness of exclusion as well as successful efforts to integrate. That experience forms the basis of an emergent ‘French Muslim’ identity.” Any French Muslim identity outside of these experiences (for example, as Islamic fundamentalists) is therefore imposed by dominant political actors. The discrimination experienced by French Muslims is not the fault of immigrants and their descendants, but of an exclusionary system.

As explained in Chapter One, the economic crisis of the 1970s coupled with the economic and political challenges facing post-industrial societies led to significant instability. The uncertainty of this period influenced how the state conceptualized its role in governance, and it ultimately created the conditions for decentralization reform to take place in the early 1980s. The same factors that influenced decentralization also enabled the rise of the Front National, which in turn shaped a discourse about immigration and citizenship that endures today.

Theory meets practice on the local level. Marseille and Lyon incorporate elements of the national immigration discourse into their own institutions, and they perpetuate particular notions of citizenship. The challenges they share—notably housing crises and economic development—and the range of possible responses are shaped by national context. However, increased political decentralization and varied approaches to problem solving brings local institutional differences to light. In the

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144 Ibid.
145 Ibid., p. 16.
second part of this thesis, I show how the aforementioned economic and political shifts and immigration discourse play out in local-level policy implementation. In Chapter Three, I provide background on the local contexts, which will help to explain local institutional differences between Marseille and Lyon. In Chapter Four, I present three cases that illustrate the interaction of national and local contexts in addressing shared challenges. Finally, in Chapter Five, I explore institutional barriers to social and political change in Marseille.
CHAPTER THREE: THE CITIES
GEOGRAPHY, ECONOMY, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS IN MARSEILLE AND LYON

Through it all, the city has strengthened its role as a strategic space where our major challenges become acute and visible—a lens to see a larger world that remains difficult to grasp.

— Saskia Sassen, The City in a World Economy

Introduction

The city as an economic and political entity provides insight into not only local practices, but also national power and global forces. Up to this point, we have considered French politics from a national perspective, noting the diversity of the regions. While there are commonalities and centralized forces that unite the regions of France, diverse histories have led to differentiated, location-based outcomes for social groups and varied responses from local political and economic leaders. One example that I expand upon in this chapter: Marseille has long been France’s gateway to the Mediterranean, a frequent first stop for migrants, whereas Lyon has been a wealthier city with a financial- and technology-oriented center. Each city’s position has shaped how business and politics are conducted.

Urban sociologist Saskia Sassen makes the case for using the city as a unit of analysis, especially when representing the effects of globalization and the rise of the information economy. In Cities in a World Economy, she writes, “We need to enter the diverse worlds of work and social contexts present in urban space, and we need to understand whether they are connected to the global functions that are partly structured in these cities.”146 Le Galès emphasizes the significance of the local in the

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146 Saskia Sassen, Cities in a World Economy (Sage Publications, 2011).
French context: “An analysis from the bottom up is indispensable in order to understand what is going on” in French society. Fast-paced urbanization and deindustrialization post-World War II increased the political and administrative power of mayors in large cities outside of Paris, and decentralization reforms after 1982 did so to an even greater extent. Therefore, municipal administrations are a key force in shaping the lives of city-dwellers and outsiders alike, and they serve as an important unit of analysis.

This thesis focuses on Marseille and introduces Lyon as a comparison. Michel Peraldi, the lead author of Sociologie de Marseille, selects additional cities as imperfect comparisons: Toulouse is growing and has a similar agglomeration structures; Aix-en-Provence is Marseille’s neighbor and rival; and Seine-Saint-Denis, a department outside of Paris and not a city, has comparable economic and social fragility. Paris, Lyon, and Marseille are often grouped together in academic research and national policy on metropolitan areas, such as the Paris, Lyon, Marseille (PLM) law embedded in the Defferre reforms. Paris is disproportionately larger than Marseille and Lyon, and it has historically been the seat of national power and cultural hegemony. As this thesis considers metropolitan structures and local politics, I therefore exclude Paris from my comparison. Prior research has examined Lyon as a comparison to Marseille, though it tends to be described as demographically but not economically comparable. For the purposes of this research, however, Lyon

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147 Le Galès, pp. 102-103.
148 Motte.
149 I had access to significantly more information on Marseille than Lyon, given my social connections in Marseille and my limited available time to translate materials. Therefore, the focus of my research is Marseille, and Lyon is introduced to show that what has occurred in Marseille is not necessarily typical to France.
150 Michel Peraldi, Sociologie De Marseille (la Découverte, 2015).
151 Ibid.
remains a revealing comparison. Marseille and Lyon are the second and third largest cities in France, respectively, and they are both urban/industrial zones that have attracted immigrants, including large numbers of Muslim North African immigrants in the twentieth century. Less frequently mentioned, however, is the variation of experiences of political, social, and economic integration between these cities.

The commonalities between Marseille and Lyon, the challenges that they face and the persistent inequalities between ethnic minorities and white French, demonstrate the role of centralized power and national context. The differences, especially the different ranges of the economic indicators, reveal the strength of local institutions and localized decision-making. This comparison examines the institutional forces behind political and economic outcomes in two of France’s largest cities and how these outcomes simultaneously reflect and shape a national discourse on socioeconomic class, post-colonial immigration, and Islam. Additionally, I highlight the institutional role in limiting the development of inclusive and representative civil society. This chapter provides a basic overview of each city’s geography, economic history, immigration history, socioeconomic situation, and local politics, with a stronger emphasis on Marseille. Together, these factors make up the “context” that shaped the rules, norms, and practices of local institutions.

3.1 Geographies, Histories, and Economies

Marseille is located in the Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur (or PACA) region, in the department Bouches-du-Rhône, along the eastern side of the Mediterranean coast (see Figure 2). The city is bordered by sea on one side and surrounded by mountains,
posing design challenges for urban planners. Aix-en-Provence, a smaller, wealthier city, is a thirty-minute bus ride away. The city has a Mediterranean climate, characterized by typically sunny days, warm weather, and a strong Mistral wind most common in the winter and spring. It was founded by Greek sailors around 600 B.C.E.; by the fourth century C.E. it was a major center for trade. Marseille remained largely independent through the Middle Ages and became a part of France in the thirteenth century, after which it was continuously ruled and dominated by an oligarchy of wealthy local merchants. The oligarchs were more concerned with Mediterranean trade than monarchical interests, which at times created a contentious relationship between the Crown and the city. When Louis XIV suppressed rebellion in Marseille in 1660, the city was fully integrated into the French Crown, becoming a leading port and trading center. Marseille’s naval and military bases, coupled with its geographical location, made it a key force in colonial expansion. Furthermore, it was home to France’s largest shipping company, Messageries Maritimes, established in 1851 and responsible for carrying both goods and people and expanding France’s global influence. Today, Marseille is a three-hour TGV, or high-speed train, ride away from Paris.

Traditionally, Marseille’s economy has been tied to its port activity, which in turn is connected to France’s geopolitical endeavors, such as the opening of the Suez Canal and the colonization of Algeria. Additionally, it served as a regional commercial center and warehouse. Marseille’s port was its industrial and economic

center, and thus where the working class was housed (see Figure 9). The industrial port economy of Marseille, however, has been in decline since colonial independence in the 1960s, accelerated by the oil crisis of 1973. Political and economic actors responded poorly to these transformations, which were not at all unique to Marseille, hoping to transition Marseille’s industrial economy into a tertiary economy. Today, the factories are gone, pushed outside of the city toward Fos-sur-Mer. Marseille’s economy is primarily driven by its service and administrative sectors, but the city is also marked with high poverty and unemployment rates. Michel Peraldi describes Marseille as “an economic star that has died but whose light continues to shine.”

Figure 9: Marseille: Industrial Areas, up until mid-Twentieth Century.

Lyon is located in the Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes region, to the north of PACA, and is part of the Rhône department (see Figure 2). Two rivers, the Rhône and the Saône, meet at a confluence, forming the central area of the city. The closest cities

\[155\] Peraldi.
within the region are Grenoble, a high-tech center, and St. Etienne, an industrial city. It is a two-hour TGV ride away from Paris. Lyon has historically been an important trade center and was the first municipality to be incorporated into the French Republic. Italian refugees set up the foundations for the silk industry in the fifteenth century. As Marseille’s urban fabric has been shaped by its ports, Lyon’s has been largely influenced by the silk industry. In addition, merchant bankers and printmakers opened offices in Lyon early on, which, combined with the silk industry, set the foundation for Lyon to build itself as a wealthy city characterized by a strong work ethic and early labor organizing activity. After the French Revolution, Lyon became known for its innovative, inventive, and industrious tradition; labor organizing and worker riots ultimately pushed manufacturing mills outside of the city to cheaper labor in the suburbs of the city. Therefore, industry has been located in the suburbs, outside of the central area of Lyon (as is the case with cities such as Paris, Bordeaux, and Lille), in contrast to Marseille (as in Nantes, Toulouse, and Nice). Following World War II, Lyon maintained its status as a commercial and industrial hub, developing major retail and office complexes. Its economy is further served by a diverse array of industries, including its access to and provision of energy resources, the chemical industry, and the electronics, plastics, and heavy machinery industries. Additionally, Lyon is known for its strong literary and culinary traditions.

156 Northcutt.
158 Northcutt.
3.2 Immigration Settlement Patterns in the Cities

The immigration trends and discrimination towards Muslim North Africans on the national scale, explained in Chapter Two, took on particular significance in France’s three largest cities, Paris, Marseille, and Lyon, as these regions were in need of immigrant labor. Maghrebi immigrants arrived in Marseille after crossing the Mediterranean, and some intended for the city to be only a temporary stop; they then moved inward to other large urban areas, notably Paris and Lyon, in search of economic opportunity. A 1937 survey shows that ninety percent of Algerians in France lived and worked in five major areas: the Paris basin, in or near Marseille, the Lorraine basin, the Lyon-St. Etienne region, and the Nord/Pas-de-Calais region.\textsuperscript{159}

Within those regions, incoming immigrants found housing as close as possible to sites of labor activity, which shaped lasting settlement patterns.

Modern patterns of segregation began to take shape prior to both World Wars. In each city, the location of labor activity or already-established communities of North Africans determined where people settled, ultimately leading to the formation of “micro-ghettos or enclaves.” As was common at the time, low-wage industrial workers wanted to avoid the cost of commuting, so most immigrant workers lived in the densely populated \textit{quartiers populaires} nearest to factories. Algerian enclaves especially “became a natural point of arrival and reception for post-war immigrants and consolidated a pattern of enclave formation which has survived down to the present.”\textsuperscript{160}

Throughout the nineteenth century and through the first thirty years of the twentieth century, Marseille’s economic center was its port: goods were either


\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., pp. 63-4.
imported or manufactured near the port to be exported, and other activities supported the port’s functioning, such as dock repair or shipbuilding. Therefore, the central and northern areas of the city, nearest to the port, have historically housed the working classes, and then the North African immigrant populations. In comparison, in Lyon, Algerians settled near chemical, automobile, glass, and armaments factories in the suburbs, where the Service de l’Organisation des Travailleurs Coloniaux, the organization responsible for managing colonial workers, constructed barracks in the Lyonnais suburb of Venissieux. In 1916, these barracks housed nearly six hundred Algerian men, and after the Second World War, Venissieux became one of France’s largest Algerian communities (see Figure 10).161

Immigrant settlement patterns relating to the location of industry have persisted, even when economic activity has slowed and factories have disappeared.162 Marseille’s industrial port activity began to decline following World War II, but the greatest shock to the city’s economy arrived in the face of colonial independence, as much of the port activity was tied to the North African colonies and protectorates. The migrants that flocked to the city after 1968 masked the economic crisis that the city was facing, and even though opportunity was shrinking, the immigrants continued to settle in the vacant areas of Marseille that had traditionally housed laborers and newcomers. The ensuing socioeconomic conditions, perpetuated and exacerbated by discrimination, have trapped generations of Maghrebi immigrants in the housing projects in central and northern areas contained within the metropolis of Marseille. I will expand upon the ways in which poverty, immigration, and geography

161 Ibid.
162 I describe the factors that contribute to the persistence of these patterns in Chapter Four.
interact in both Marseille and Lyon in the next section, as well as the implications of
decolonization, deindustrialization, and policymaking that exacerbated Marseille’s
economic decline in Chapter Four.

In public and academic discourse, scholars and politicians reference several
additional important immigrant and minority populations within each city aside from
North African populations. This was evident in my field work: when I asked about
“immigrants,” interview subjects in Marseille automatically assumed I was asking
about North African Muslims, whereas my conversation with the Equal Opportunity
Prefect in Lyon centered exclusively on Balkan immigrants and Romani populations
until I specifically asked about Maghrebi residents in the city. In the wake of
decolonization, Marseille received significant pied noir, Comorian, and West African
populations. Over 100,000 pieds noirs, or white settlers who had resided in Algeria
and were expelled following the end of French rule in North Africa, returned to
France and came to reside in Marseille, comprising nearly one-eighth of the
population. Many chose to migrate to the south, as the warmer climate there was most
similar to that of Algeria.\footnote{Andrea L Smith, \textit{Colonial Memory and Postcolonial Europe: Maltese Settlers in Algeria and France} (Indiana University Press, 2006).} Pieds noirs returned as Muslim Algerians simultaneously
made their way to France, and MacMaster asserts that they “injected into French
society both colonial attitudes towards Algerians and the most violent hatred;” they
sought refuge in France as Muslim Algerians immigrated simultaneously, which
exacerbated pied noir resentment.\footnote{MacMaster, p. 212.} In 1974, a majority of the citizens of the
Comoros Islands, another former French colony, voted in favor of their independence
in a referendum. In the mid-to-late seventies, Comorians arrived in France, and a large number settled in Marseille. The same pattern followed for West Africans and residents of other overseas departments and territories (DOM-TOM).\footnote{Nasiali.}

Significantly more literature has been devoted to the study of immigration in Marseille than Lyon, as Marseille has traditionally been the gateway to and from the Mediterranean. The cities are similar in that migrants followed the work and settled according to the location of industry; North Africans in both areas faced discrimination and formed enclaves. However, Marseille’s socioeconomic segregation and post-war economic decline differentiates the city from Lyon and other French cities, and, as we will see in subsequent sections, these differences have had a significant effect on the quality of life of the Muslim North African and sub-Saharan African immigrants who created a home in Marseille or Lyon.

3.3 Socioeconomics of the Cities

3.3.1 Between Cities

The variance in recent social and economic indicators in Marseille and Lyon is striking. Several indicators of social and economic fragility depict these differences alongside other comparable cities (see Table 2).\footnote{As stated above, these cities and one department were chosen for comparison because “Toulouse is growing and has a similar agglomeration structures; Aix-en-Provence is Marseille’s neighbor and rival; and Seine-Saint-Denis, while a department outside of Paris and not a city, has comparable economic and social fragility.”} While still useful, it is important to note that these indicators do not fully capture the experiences of the most vulnerable populations in each given metropolitan area.
Table 2: Marseille’s Social Characteristics in Comparison to Other Large French Cities, 2009 (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Paris</th>
<th>Lyon</th>
<th>Toulouse</th>
<th>Seine-Saint-Denis</th>
<th>Aix-en-Provence</th>
<th>Marseille</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median disposable income (in Euros)</td>
<td>36,085</td>
<td>25,610</td>
<td>22,272</td>
<td>19,789</td>
<td>27,015</td>
<td>20,579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxable households</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-parent families</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth population older than 15 years of age not enrolled in school or without a high school diploma</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduates of higher education institutions</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneficiaries of the RSA(^{168})</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population below the poverty line(^{169})</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When indicators such as percentage of population living below the poverty line or unemployment are broken down by arrondissement, the differences between Marseille and Lyon are even clearer. In Marseille, the maximum arrondissement percentage of population living below the poverty line is 52.8 percent (3\(^{rd}\) arrondissement); the minimum is 11.1 percent (8\(^{th}\) arrondissement). The range is 41.7 percentage points (mean = 26.43; standard deviation = 13.22). In Lyon, the maximum

\(^{167}\) INSEE, “Recensement général de la population,” 2009

\(^{168}\) A social assistance program providing a minimum income to unemployed or underemployed workers; data from 2011

\(^{169}\) INSEE, the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies, sets the poverty threshold at 60 percent below median income; in 2016, this was approximately €1,008 per month. See https://www.insee.fr/fr/metadonnees/definition/c1653 for formal definition.
**arrondissement** percentage of population living below the poverty line is 20.4 percent (9th **arrondissement**); the minimum is 8.7 percent (6th **arrondissement**). The range is 11.7 percentage points (mean = 13.98; standard deviation = 4.12), far smaller than the range of **arrondissement** percentage living below the poverty threshold. The same patterns hold for unemployment. Furthermore, as I demonstrate in the following section, correlations between the aforementioned indicators and percent immigration population by **arrondissement** are strong for both cities, though they are slightly stronger in Marseille.

### 3.3.2 Within Cities

Who is affected by poverty, and in which areas of the cities? In the Introduction, I explained that the “color blind” approach to public policy often masks the relationship between poverty and ethnicity. Therefore, the information I provide here is incomplete, but in combination with interview data and prior research, it provides a fuller picture.

Using 2013 census data, I examined relationships between the percentage of immigrants in **arrondissements** (Marseille: n = 16; Lyon: n = 9) in both cities and percentage living under the poverty line, unemployment rates, and median income (see Tables 3 and 4). In both cities, there is a strong correlation between percent immigration population and each indicator. There is a strong negative correlation between immigration percentage and median income (Marseille: r = -.89, p < .01;
Lyon: $r = -.78$, $p < .05$; a strong positive correlation between immigration percentage and percent living under the poverty line (Marseille: $r = .96$, $p < .01$; Lyon: $r = .88$, $p < .01$); and a strong positive correlation between immigration percentage and unemployment rate (Marseille: $r = .93$, $p < .01$; Lyon: $r = .82$, $p < .01$).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3: Marseille: Percent Immigration Population and Economic Indicators, 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent immigration population</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marseille</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st arrondissement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
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<tr>
<td>6th</td>
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<tr>
<td>7th</td>
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<td>8th</td>
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<td>9th</td>
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<td>10th</td>
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<td>11th</td>
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<td>12th</td>
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<td>13th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Table 4: Lyon and Two Suburbs: Percent Immigration Population and Economic Indicators, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percent immigration population</th>
<th>Percentage living under the poverty line</th>
<th>Unemployment rate (15-64 years old)</th>
<th>Median disposable income per consumption unit, in euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lyon</td>
<td>12.10</td>
<td>14.50</td>
<td>13.50</td>
<td>21883.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st arrondissement</td>
<td>9.82</td>
<td>15.80</td>
<td>14.20</td>
<td>21794.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>9.53</td>
<td>11.10</td>
<td>13.30</td>
<td>24999.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>11.70</td>
<td>13.10</td>
<td>12.50</td>
<td>23139.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>7.58</td>
<td>9.90</td>
<td>11.50</td>
<td>24111.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>9.77</td>
<td>11.70</td>
<td>12.90</td>
<td>22735.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td>8.70</td>
<td>11.50</td>
<td>28488.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>13.91</td>
<td>15.70</td>
<td>13.90</td>
<td>20856.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>15.78</td>
<td>19.40</td>
<td>15.70</td>
<td>18710.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th</td>
<td>15.13</td>
<td>20.40</td>
<td>15.30</td>
<td>18823.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vénissieux</td>
<td>22.91</td>
<td>29.60</td>
<td>22.80</td>
<td>15621.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaulx-en-Velin</td>
<td>25.33</td>
<td>31.90</td>
<td>22.30</td>
<td>14937.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Marseille, high-poverty *arrondissements* are located in the *quartiers nord* (13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th *arrondissements*), as well as in the *centre-ville* (1st, 2nd, 3rd), where 25 percent or more of the population of each *arrondissement* lives below the poverty line (see Figure 10). Immigrant groups have been housed in high concentrations of social housing in these areas, especially Comorian and Algerian populations, and these *arrondissements* carry the stigma of the *banlieues*, or suburbs, of other French cities. In Marseille, however, the poor neighborhoods in the *quartiers nord* and *centre-ville* are an integral part of the administrative structure of the city, rather than peripheral spaces.173

In Lyon, the *arrondissements* with the highest percentage of individuals living under the poverty line are the 8th and 9th *arrondissements*, with 19.4 and 20.4 percent living under the threshold, respectively. These are located on the periphery of the city.172

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172 Ibid.
173 Peraldi.
proper (see Figure 11). These numbers are still far from the maximum 52.8 percent of residents living under the threshold in the 3rd arrondissement of Marseille. Given the city’s labor and settlement history, the poorest areas of the agglomeration, with higher concentrations of ethnic minorities, are located in the suburbs, notably Vénissieux and Vaulx-en-Velin. Lack of mobility stems from mechanisms such as limited public financial resources for developers, exclusionary attitudes on the neighborhood level, and discrimination by landlords.\textsuperscript{174,175} When these suburbs are included in considerations of urban economics and demographics, Lyon begins to more closely resemble Marseille. Whereas in Marseille, poverty is contained within the city proper, in Lyon it has been largely relocated to the suburbs.

In conclusion, relationships between immigration and precarious economic situations are similar in both cities, but they are more pronounced in Marseille. Poverty and immigration in each city are visualized in Figures 10 through 13; the relationship between poverty and immigration is visualized in Figures 14 and 15.

\textsuperscript{175} I explain how these patterns came to be and how they have persisted in Chapter Four.
Percentage of Residents Living under the Poverty Line, by Arrondissement, in Marseille and Lyon.

Figure 10: Marseille: Percentage Living under the Poverty Line, by Arrondissement

Figure 11: Lyon: Percentage Living under the Poverty Line, by Arrondissement
Percentage Immigrant Population, by Arrondissement, in Marseille and Lyon.

Figure 12: Marseille: Percentage Immigrant Population, by Arrondissement

Figure 13: Lyon: Percentage Immigrant Population, by Arrondissement
Relationship between Percent under Poverty Line and Percent Immigrant Population, by Arrondissement, in Marseille and Lyon.

**Figure 14:** Marseille: Relationship between Percent under Poverty Line (shading) and Percent Immigrant Population (map markers), by Arrondissement

**Figure 15:** Relationship between Percent under Poverty Line (shading) and Percent Immigrant Population (map markers), by Arrondissement
3.4 Political Contexts

Neither Marseille nor Lyon has eliminated the inequities between ethnic minorities and white French, which reflects the impact of the national institution on the dynamics of local institutional development. However, the variance in socioeconomic indicators between the two cities reflects the ways in which the context of the development of local institutions has influenced urban change. I do not claim that the decisions and policies of local political institutions are fully responsible for the differences between indicators in the two cities, but it is clear that the two cities have followed different paths of development in response to globalization and pressures to modernize, with varying degrees of success. This section provides political context for understanding constraints on social and economic change in these urban spaces.

3.4.1 Clientelism in Marseille

It is impossible to discuss the politics of Marseille without first describing the influence of clientelism and corruption. Lyon has experienced scandal as well—Lyonnais Mayor Michel Noir was removed from office and served eighteen months in prison after a conviction of the abuse of public goods—but at various points in time, clientelism has been a well-documented feature of Marseille’s system of governance, and it has severely impacted citizens’ trust in local government.

Césare Mattina, who wrote the leading book on clientelism in Marseille, claims that “clientelistic relationships between elected representatives and their

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electors in democratic regimes involve the exchange of goods, resources, and services for votes (or promises of votes) and political support.”

In the 20th century, these goods and resources were more likely to be public goods, such as housing or employment, than traditional services such as military protection. Mattina points to the election of Socialist Mayor Siméon Flaissières in 1892 in Marseille as the period when municipal socialism became a form of clientelism that took root in the city. The mayor and his administration, observing working-class desire for mobility, distributed public goods to electors in exchange for votes. These actions transformed the role of elected representatives in the city. Flaissières’ administration thus established the possibility “of distributing services that were both collective and personalized…[which] generated the mediating function of elected representatives between institutions and the local populations.”

In the 1930s, this type of activity increased. First Deputy Mayor Simon Sabiani’s power was based in clientelistic relationships (primarily exchanging City Hall employment for votes) with Italians and Corsicans. He is quoted in a local newspaper as saying, “We’ll be hiring more people, and as long as I’m there, it’ll be my friends and only my friends. They’ll be first, and others will come after them, if there’s any room left.” Soon, clientelism was no longer tied to municipal socialism, as practices were institutionalized.

The number of public sector jobs increased between the post-war period and the 1980s. This created more opportunity for clientelistic policies, which became an increasingly significant source of power in the 1960s and ‘70s. Mattina writes,

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178 Ibid.
179 Statement to the *Petit Marseillais*, June 11, 1933, quoted in Mattina (2007).
Through clientelism, these political leaderships forged bonds, created new social hierarchies, confirmed and consolidated the status of notable figures, and engendered mechanisms for social and political inclusion and exclusion. For example, mechanisms for clientelistic allocation of social housing allowed local politicians, especially in Marseilles, to shape the social and electoral composition of territories. The control of the mayor and his office over recruitment, promotions, and appointments to the town hall and ancillary services led to the creation of a bond of loyalty between the municipal staff and the mayor.180

Clientelism was ultimately a tool that shaped the social order in Marseille. While one might suppose that the poor are most in need of public resources and thus the most likely targets of this clientelism, in a working-class city such as Marseille, the beneficiaries were principally the middle and upper-middle classes, who were able to achieve the status of notability as arbitrators between public institutions and the population.181

In the 1980s, while local government did see an increase in its responsibilities, economic and social crisis diminished the capacity of the City Hall to pursue its clientelistic practices, as elected representatives had less to distribute. This did not lead to the complete disappearance of clientelism, but it did create tension between officials, who now had less to offer, and electors, whose expectations remained the same. Letters of recommendation and intervention became more symbolic—a commitment to help, but no means of helping. This diminished the role of local officials and notables. Following the 1989 election of Mayor Robert-Paul Vigouroux, a focus on Europeanisation and internationalization, as well as public admonishment of clientelism from elected officials and notables, marked a change in the function of municipal politics.

180 Mattina.
181 Ibid.
Today, Marseille’s clientelism takes on new forms in altered relationships between elected officials, notables, and electors, particularly through civil society mechanisms. These practices undermine the health of democracy, and activists and organizations are limited in their capacity to alter the municipal system. One Marseille resident, Youcef Mammeri, offers this description in the Open Society Foundations report, *Muslims in Marseille:*

[Clientelism] is the reason why, in the working-class neighbourhoods, mainstream political leaderships and political machines hold the upper hand over the expression and the opinion of the residents. This works through a series of mechanisms, like the associations, which are not necessarily ‘bought’ or ‘corrupted’ – the word is a bit strong – but at least ‘controlled’. Their leaders are ‘controlled’ through a job given to them, or housing, or a grant. In every neighbourhood of Marseille, when there is a place for social life, a civil society organisation, generally, they are spotted by the political machines and quite rapidly put under control. During the campaign for the elections, I realised that the most important thing was not to spread a message of dialogue about ideas, values, or about a plan; but develop networks through which votes would be captured. Now, these networks, the most effective, the most powerful, they are activated by the major mainstream parties. I realised that even with the people I knew, it was not easy to discuss, because either they were ‘controlled’, in a soft manner and almost willingly on their part, or they were victims of threats, like cancellation of subsidies, or even more serious threats…Yes, this kind of clientelism, of patronage, is still deeply entrenched in Marseille; elsewhere in France, you won’t find this anymore.182

Speaking in 2009, Mammeri recognizes how clientelism has continued to function through non-profit community associations. I will return to these ideas in the final chapter, as interview subjects frequently brought up modern forms of patronage and political control over the social order.

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3.4.2 The Mayors

Mayors hold significant political and administrative power in the urban political sphere. In each city, several mayors have played a significant role in urban policy and development in the past century (see Table 5).

Table 5: Post-war Mayors in Marseille and Lyon (key players bolded; interim mayors omitted)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marseille</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Name</strong></td>
<td><strong>In office</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Cristofol</td>
<td>1946-1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michel Carlini</td>
<td>1947-1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaston Defferre</td>
<td>1944-1945; 1953-1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert-Paul Vigouroux</td>
<td>1986-1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Claude Gaudin</td>
<td>1995-present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lyon</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Name</strong></td>
<td><strong>In office</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edouard Herriot</td>
<td>1905-1940; 1945-1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Louis Pradel</strong></td>
<td><strong>1957-1976</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francisque Collomb</td>
<td>1976-1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michel Noir</td>
<td>1989-1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raymond Barre</td>
<td>1995-2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gérard Collomb</td>
<td>2001-present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

183 Motte.
Marseille

Marseille’s three powerful mayors, Gaston Defferre, Robert-Paul Vigouroux, and Jean-Claude Gaudin, were all issued from the same political realm, and thus they governed in similar styles. Defferre was a lawyer who led a clandestine resistance network under the Vichy occupation during World War II. After securing an alliance with the right, he was a powerful political figure on both the local and national stages, and the Communists were his greatest political enemy. Motivated in large part by electoral political interests, modernization under his direction took the form of expelling industry (the Communist Party along with it) and attempting to transition to a tertiary economy, and the city saw an increase in the number of public sector jobs (explained in detail in Chapter Four). Diversity was informally institutionalized under Defferre as certain elected officials were viewed as unofficial “representatives” of migrant or ethnic groups, such as Corsicans, Armenians, pieds noirs, and Jews, although there was no Italian, Algerian, or general Maghrebi representation. Substantial representation corresponded with presence in professional occupations, namely medical and functionary roles, as well as historical representation within community organizations. Corsicans, Armenians, Lebanese, and pieds noirs, as we have seen, settled more easily in Marseille, finding work in small business and services and accessing property without clientelism. They were thus afforded the right to representation in local society. Migrant workers, first Italians and then Algerians, immediately settled in social housing without community representation, aside from workers’ unions. These origins and organizations translated to representation or lack thereof under Defferre’s administration.
Defferre, who died in office in 1986, played a central role in shaping the ideologies of his successors, who were both key players in his political network: Vigouroux was a notable within Defferre’s Socialist government, and Gaudin was Defferre’s adjunct from the right. Following Defferre’s death, Vigouroux was seen as an ideal transitional mayor, as he was discreet and lacked ambition. Nevertheless, he left an enduring legacy. He implemented new ways of representing (while still controlling) ethnic difference in the city, most importantly creating *Marseille Espérance*, an interreligious dialogue advisory association under the mayor’s office that officially incorporated representatives from previously marginalized social groups.

However, in representing singular religious groups rather than placing migrant origins and discrimination at its center, *Marseille Espérance* could be essentializing. It equated Arabs with Muslims, and “all of their actions, big or small, were scrutinized through the prism of Islam. It created a forced form of Islamization, without reference to individual choices or personal inclinations.” Nevertheless, *Marseille Espérance* became a model for interreligious dialogue in other cities, and it has been reaffirmed by the current mayor, Jean-Claude Gaudin. Additionally, Vigouroux oversaw the creation of new cultural spaces and events as the city’s cultural actors gained national prominence, Marseille came to be seen as a dynamic city. This emphasis on culture set the stage for redevelopment in and around the port.

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184 Peraldi.
185 Lorcerie and Geisser.
through a now nearly twenty-year, publically-managed initiative, *Euromediterranée*, carried out under Gaudin.¹⁸⁶

In 1995, Jean-Claude Gaudin originally ran on a platform meant to bring the far right voters back to the center-right. Once in power, Gaudin set an agenda has centered on urban renewal, specifically the *Euromediterranée* development. *Euromediterranée* was jointly initiated by the French central government, Marseille, the Marseille-Provence Metropolitan Community, the department, and the region. Urban development has spanned from the Gare-Saint-Charles train station to the port, with a focus on cultural development, including the construction of the Museum of European and Mediterranean Civilizations, the Villa Mediterranée conference center, and the restoration of the Fort Saint-Jean. See Figure 1 for an example of how the project is advertised. Text on the advertisement translates to “Welcome to the new Marseille; 20 years of progress.” Critics of recent development remark that it is attempted gentrification, providing very little to the ethnic minorities living in poverty who continue to struggle to find housing, employment, and quality education. It has come at the cost of the informal economic activity sustained by ethnic minority populations,

¹⁸⁶ Peraldi.
who have been excluded from the formal economy, and the city’s economy has not
recovered from the industrial jobs lost under Defferre. It is unclear who will receive
the greatest return on investment from Euromediterranée, as the state holds
significant power over the management of the project. Regardless of
Euromediterranée’s measurable impact, Gaudin’s 2014 platform touted the success of
urban redevelopment, and his electorate was made up of those who supported and
benefitted from his urban renewal policies.187

Lyon

A decade after World War II, Defferre returned to power in Marseille, and
further north in Lyon, Edouard Herriot was improving relations between municipal
government and local unions, increasing public assistance funds, and launching an
urban renewal program, leaving Lyon in a good financial situation by the time Louis
Pradel was elected in 1957.188 Pradel’s focus, similar to Defferre’s in Marseille, was
modernization. The majority of large French cities, especially Paris, Lyon, and
Marseille, lost center city residents in the 1960s, freeing up space for new
development. However, Marseille did not replenish economic activity in the city’s
center, whereas Lyon was able to attract new business quickly.

Urban renewal under Pradel focused on Lyon’s center, but it also extended to
the suburbs. His goal was “to adapt the historical neighborhoods to the economical
[sic.] needs.”189 Planned projects demolished crumbling architecture to build modern

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187 Ibid.
189 Fatiha Belmessous and T. Berteli, “Public Spaces Developments in Lyon (France) and Barcelona (Spain): A Successful
urban infrastructure, replacing the old housing stock with higher-quality and higher-cost housing. Between 1962 and 1975, 88,000 units were constructed in the agglomeration, 36,000 were demolished, with a net gain of 52,000 housing units. Two thirds of these units were in the eastern suburbs of Lyon, areas of working-class residence and industry. In Lyon, the gentrifying of the central areas was economically successful and brought in new business, and social housing was pushed out to the suburbs. The same patterns did not hold true under Defferre in Marseille: the central city was not economically revitalized as was intended, and while social housing was peripheral to some extent, it still was an important part of Marseille’s administrative unit (see Chapter Four for the narrative of economic decline in Marseille). More generally, Pradel oversaw the renewal of infrastructure, sanitation, housing projects, and development of the metro system while simultaneously working through the creation of state-mandated Urban Community of Lyon (COURLY), established in 1969. These developments go hand in hand, as waste management and public transportation were the main purposes (and challenges) of developing intercommunal relationships between Lyon and 54 of its suburbs (henceforth referred to as ‘the agglomeration’). As COURLY navigated intermunicipal relationships, Marseille resisted the development of any intercommunal structure.

Michel Noir’s winning mayoral campaign in 1989 emphasized the importance of Lyon’s role and reputation on the international stage. On the local level,

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192 See Chapter Four for full explanation of battles over intercommunal structures.
however, urban policy focused on “the improvement of quality of life,” an intersection of urban planning and social development policies that extended to the agglomeration. Rhetoric surrounding this policy also reflects the collaborative relationship between communes and inclusive conceptions of representation. Henri Chabert, Vice President of urban planning at the time, said, “The reconquest and the requalification of public spaces should reflect the identity shared by the 55 communes of the agglomeration area.”

Whereas one impetus behind his focus was the “crisis of the banlieues,” where the frustration of limited economic opportunity and discrimination led to riots in 1981, the focus on “quality of life” also reflected Noir’s commitment to transforming Lyon into a “European metropolis,” which required the unification and shared identity of the agglomeration. On one level, social policies had the potential to ameliorate inequalities relating to poverty and discrimination, which threatened the city’s social cohesion. On another level, inclusive urban development was necessary to “ensure the influence and the prestige of the city and attract economic agents.”

At least in public discourse, Noir and his administration recognized that positive social change was a necessary component of economic growth, which simultaneously reinforced and was bolstered by the city’s reputation.

Socialist Gérard Collomb has served as mayor of Lyon since 2001. He was president of the Grand Lyon urban community and has served as president of Lyon’s latest agglomeration institution, the council of the Metropolitan Community of Lyon, since 2015. He is known for the development of Vélo’v, France’s first bike share

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195 Belmessous and Berteli.
program, as well as urban redevelopment projects stressing the importance of “social mix” in neighborhoods such as Part-Dieu and La Duchère. He has furthered Lyon’s international strategy through partnerships with cities like Dubai and Collomb’s leadership in organizations including the Association of Urban Communities, Eurocities, and the United Cities and Local Governments organization.196

The post-war mayors of Marseille can be categorized as “great men,” powerful metropolitan leaders who also occupied national government positions, who also made ethnicity salient within their administrations but had less success in adapting to global economic change. The prominent Lyonnais mayors of the post-war era served primarily on the local level, with the exception of Edouard Herriot. Beyond urban policy, the management of intercommunal relationships and internationalization have proven to be key aspects of the Lyonnais mayoral position.

3.4.3 Relationships with Surrounding Communes

Marseille’s relationships with surrounding communes has involved significant conflict, while Lyon’s relationships with surrounding communes have been more productive. Historically, Marseille has competed against Aix-en-Provence, a smaller, wealthier city approximately 40 kilometers outside of Marseille. Wealth disparities between the city and more prosperous surrounding villages also prevents collaborative planning, as prosperous areas do not wish to take on the social burdens of Marseille. Additionally, after Marseille pushed industry and the Communist

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supporters outside of the city, its relationship with the now Communist-majority surrounding communes grew contentious.

In any sort of intercommunal relations and unions in the 19th and 20th centuries, Lyon and Villeurbanne acted as informal allies. Due to their collective size, they dominated the smaller communes surrounding the city. For the most part, the conflict that derived from this domination was resolved as Lyon and its suburbs underwent the process of forming an urban community in the 1970s and ‘80s. Size may be a partial factor in explaining Lyon’s relationships with its suburbs, as Lyon is smaller than Marseille. I will elaborate on these relationships in Chapter Four.

Conclusion

Marseille’s geographic location and topography have influenced its local economy as well as its relationships with surrounding communes. Its status as a Mediterranean port city has created norms of competition for autonomy. Marseille depended on France’s colonies to support the city’s economic wellbeing, and the immigrants who settled nearest to the port and the city’s factories worked their way into the fabric of the city. The large number of pieds noirs exacerbated postcolonial conflict in the city. Local politicians, through clientelistic practices, exploited ethnic politics in order to secure their positions within local and national government.

Lyon’s geographic location similarly influenced the development of its economy and local institutions. As the first municipality incorporated into the French republic, its relationship with the state has historically been more collaborative, and its relationship with surrounding communes has been more coherent. The silk
industry had a major influence on labor politics in Lyon; labor organizing ultimately pushed this and other industries out into the suburbs. As in Marseille, immigrants in Lyon sought housing close to the factories in which they worked. Clientelism has not factored into city or agglomeration politics as prominently in Lyon as in Marseille. A combination of these factors in both cities have led to socioeconomic and ethnic divides on geographic and social levels, which are prominent within Marseille proper but are divided between city center and suburbs in Lyon.

In this chapter, I have described the local contexts that have shaped the rules, norms, and practices of local governments. In Chapter Four, I examine how those rules, norms, and practices are exemplified in urban confrontation with housing crises, economic transition, and intercommunal cooperation. In Chapter Five, I explore how they continue to influence the local political scene in Marseille. Interviews with leaders of associations and public institutions reveal not only reliance on the non-profit sector to deliver public goods, but also contentious relationships between the institution and some civil society organizations. I use this information to respond to the following questions:

- How have geographical, historical, economic, demographic, and political contexts influenced the development of the local institutions?
- How would we categorize the local institutions of Marseille and Lyon?
- Finally, how do the rules, norms, and practices on the local level influence or place constraints on civil society?

The context under which these local institutions developed has had an enduring influence on urban politics and institutional flexibility to adjust to external economic forces. When institutions fail to adapt, immigrant populations living in precarious poverty suffer disproportionately.
Chapter Four: The Responses
Housing, Economic Change, and EPCI Development

Against the backdrop of the shrinking state, in addressing the crisis, the plan was not the economic recovery of the city, but a matter of dignity.

— Michel Peraldi, Sociologie de Marseille

Introduction

In Chapter One, I explained that following World War II, deindustrialization and modernization enhanced the administrative role of urban mayors. Decentralization reform in the 1980s shifted the responsibility for social welfare from the state to the local level, giving local governments more power, but fewer resources. In Chapter Two, I described how post-World War II immigration, economic crisis in the 1970s, and an additional wave of immigration following African independences led to changing rhetoric towards Maghrebi immigrants and the capacity of the welfare state. Then, in Chapter Three, I presented the historical, economic, social, and political contexts that have shaped and continue to shape the development of local institutions in Marseille and Lyon. This chapter examines how these three concepts (economic changes surrounding decentralization, immigration, and institutional context) come together to shape local policy and its outcomes, and how they affect Maghrebi immigrants in particular. Chapter Five focuses specifically on how the same three concepts have influenced the relationship between local government in Marseille and its civil society organizations.

These concepts are illustrated through three social and political challenges that arose in post-war France: housing crisis, economic transition, and intercommunal structure (EPCI) development. The housing crisis and the response from urban
governments is an example of how national phenomena play out similarly in local institutions. The major divergence between the two cities’ approaches to housing is where the ill-housed ended up: contained within the city of Marseille, pushed outside into the suburbs of Lyon. Adjustment to post-war and post-industrial economic pressures—both of which are international phenomena—is an example of a significant divergence in the paths of Marseille and Lyon. Whereas both cities expelled industry to the suburbs, Marseille has had difficulty attracting new business while Lyon diversified its economy successfully. The variance in successful transition is in part tied to local institutional context. Finally, two narratives of EPCI development further clarify the role of local institutional context in adapting to economic change. Marseille’s local institutions were reluctant to cede power to surrounding communes, and surrounding communes were disinclined to take on the social welfare burdens of Marseille, so both parties rejected cooperation until the 1990s. Lyon, however, managed to forge relationships throughout the 1970s and ‘80s, which provided the urban area with a useful tool for adapting to a changing world, including the housing crisis and post-industrial diversification.

There are two additional issues to keep in mind as I work through these examples: the relationship between the institution and civil society, and how context influences the development of the institution. I will address both fully in the final chapter. In the housing example in Section 4.2, I touch on the latter question, as I share an example of which types of organized activities were deemed acceptable for those living in institutional housing in Lyon.
4.1 Housing and Geographic Concentrations of Poverty

Poor housing conditions and segregation of immigrants of North African, sub-Saharan African, and even Turkish origins are evident in both Marseille and Lyon, but they are not unique to these cities. In this section, I first explain the effects of the national patterns of housing discrimination and segregation in urban areas. Then, I zoom in on Marseille and Lyon and trace the evolution of the city’s most deprived neighborhoods. The challenges each city faced in accommodating a growing population were similar, but the resulting geographic patterns of exclusion differ. The housing example shows how discrimination stemming from national context and history plays out on a local level. Additionally, examples of landlord and local elected official responses to tenant organizers demonstrate the constraints placed on civil society, limiting residents’ ability to affect change. These institution-civil society interactions are generalizable to the national level.

4.1.1 National Housing Issues

A 1992 study called *Mobilité géographique et insertion sociale* (Geographical Mobility and Social Inclusion, or MGIS) revealed that, in France, immigrants from the Iberian Peninsula and Southeast Asia follow a housing path toward home ownership, whereas immigrants from the Maghreb, sub-Saharan Africa, and Turkey tend to follow a social housing model. This immigrant origin segregation derives from the fact that the latter “have only limited opportunities on the private housing market. In a context of decreasing supply of housing and low credit ratings, obtaining quality housing and good living conditions, for the most stigmatized groups, those
with the lowest resources, is only possible through social housing.” The survey showed that nearly half of the Maghrebi (Morocco: 48 percent; Algeria: 46 percent), and Turkish (51 percent), and slightly more than one third of sub-Saharan African (35 percent) households in France in 1992 lived in the most dilapidated and neglected publicly subsidized, or HLM, housing units among high concentrations of other immigrants, compared to 17 percent of the total French population living in any sort of social housing. A later survey in 2006 that focused specifically on housing in the PACA region “confirmed that the tendencies observed in 1992 on the national level endured and were apparent on the regional level.”

There are social consequences to limiting housing options for immigrant populations. First, immigrants come to live in areas with high concentrations of other immigrants. Second, they find themselves in “institutional housing,” especially HLM, but also transitional settlement housing and hostels. Institutional housing then places immigrant families under institutional control in regards to housing as well as other social relations. Finally, “a fourth consequence, to which this ‘institutionalization’ is in part a response, is that the housing and rehousing of immigrants constitute a ‘problem’ for French society.” This feeds into conceptions of immigrants as burdens to systems of social welfare.

Whereas urban governments in France promote “social mix,” as an important goal of social housing, policies promoting integration have had limited

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198 Publicly subsidized housing in France is called “HLM.”
200 Lorcerie and Geisser, p. 158.
201 Grillo, p. 99.
202 Diversification of socioeconomic conditions within residential areas
impact. Social mix policies since the 1990s in Paris, Lyon, and Marseille have not reached their potential for socioeconomic diversification, and scholars point to three main factors preventing their success. First, financial constraints related to a reduced public investment in public housing have limited the construction of new social housing, even though demand is high. Land outside of low-income areas is more expensive, which increases construction costs, and there is more incentive to build in areas already populated by low-income families.\textsuperscript{203} Furthermore, middle- and upper-class neighborhoods are resistant to an increase in low-income housing stock, demonstrating “not in my backyard” attitudes. Local governments in well-off areas reinforce the idea that disrupting the homogeneity of the neighborhoods will influence the “social harmony.” Many local politicians serve or have allies on the national level, so they have been able to alter the penalties of not reaching the social housing minimum threshold of 20 percent.

Finally, landlords fear renting to low-income individuals, as they are concerned about the possibility of unpaid rents, conflict between tenants, and potential vacancies. They then create illegal categories of risk often “assessed on the basis of assumptions about ethnic identity or characteristics (single-parent families, families with multiple children)”\textsuperscript{204} and the landlords then avoid renting to “high-risk” individuals. Risk categories are unclear and vary between cities and neighborhoods; assessment is at the discretion of local officials.\textsuperscript{205} Risk categorization is then

\textsuperscript{203} Korsu.
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid., p. 6.
\textsuperscript{205} Lorcerie and Geisser.
“reinforced by self-censorship [as these families]…do not even dare apply for homes in wealthy areas.”\textsuperscript{206}

The effect of these three factors (financial constraints, resistance on the neighborhood level, and resistance from landlords) is that social housing in wealthier areas is typically inhabited by middle-income families, and families with immigrant backgrounds, who typically have fewer resources, are relegated to the poorest areas of the cities. Korsu demonstrates that housing policy related to social mix has not been successful in increasing socioeconomic and ethnic diversity in Paris, Lyon, or Marseille.\textsuperscript{207} Limited supply, limited options, and evident discrimination are key features of public housing on the French national level.

\textit{Housing for Refugees Today}

Samar Damlakhi, one interviewee in Marseille, described the challenges facing migrants in search of housing today. Her experiences with housing take place in Marseille, but her example illustrates how refugees and migrants are more generally limited in their housing options.

Samar brought her parents to Marseille from Syria in 2016, and she has also helped other refugees integrate through a non-profit association called \textit{SOS Mediterranée}. Her parents had requested refugee status, which would grant them a 10-year visa, providing a path to nationality and establishing their rights in France. Instead, as with many refugees, they received only “protection” status, a one-year permit that can be renewed. She described it as “good enough,” but the status allows

\textsuperscript{206} Korsu, p. 6.  
\textsuperscript{207} Ibid.
the government to reserve the right to send individuals back when French officials have determined that the Syrian Civil War is over. The temporary “protection” status makes it difficult to find work or housing. Many landlords are not looking to rent to people for only one year, as they prefer long-term renters. Additionally, many do not want to rent to migrants or refugees. This process sends individuals into substandard institutionalized housing, often in the periphery, far away from city life. They are surrounded by other Arabic-speaking immigrants, and although they may find community among those with similar backgrounds, they are less likely to learn the French language. Samar Damlakhi’s observations today mirror the processes that shaped the immigrant experience throughout the twentieth century.

4.1.2 Marseille

The quartiers nord (QN) of Marseille were formed from the national immigrant housing crisis beginning in the 1960s. Families from the Maghreb joined migrant workers who had been living in dormitories or hostels. The city had not created housing stock to accommodate the influx of immigrants, so many created makeshift homes in camps called bidonvilles, which had existed in various forms since World War I. While they waited to gain access to HLM (public subsidized) housing, they lived in transitional settlements, but the prospect of integration into the HLM was politically and practically challenging. Minimum income requirements excluded many immigrant families from HLM apartments, but in 1977, the loi Barre created a system that made housing more accessible. Middle class residents and pieds

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208 Samar Damlakhi, interview by Elizabeth Shackney, January, 2017.
noirs were now able to access credit to purchase their own homes, and they vacated the HLM. More large public housing estates were established on the margins of older areas of the city—in the center and in the QN—and immigrant families filled in. The QN quickly gained a public perception of having been “invaded” by immigrants. These areas took on greater significance in national debates concerning integration in the 1980s and ‘90s, as the Front National influenced the discourse about citizenship and Muslim North African immigration. In Marseille, “it quickly developed into an urban and social crisis, in a context of growing economic crisis.” The ethnicized housing market that emerged from this crisis has remained stable over time, and today, “patterns of segregation and relegation are pervasive.”

Anna Grzegorcyzk focuses on the legacy socio-spatial segregation in Marseille specifically. Her analysis centers on zones urbaines sensibles (sensitive urban zones, or ZUS), a typology created in 1996 to focus economic, social, and urban policies on the most deprived urban areas. ZUS are categorized by the high quantity and low quality of social housing as well as high unemployment. Whereas nationally, between 1996 and 2006, the number of ZUS decreased by 2.3 percent (approximately .3 percent per year), in the PACA region, the ZUS population increased, and 8.2 percent of the population resided in 48 ZUS. The largest ZUS in France, Centre Nord, is in Marseille and houses over 55,000 people. It is made up of parts of the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th arrondissements of Marseille (see Figure 17).

Writing in 2012, Grzegorcyzk finds that both “newcomers and natives are excluded

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209 Lorcerie and Geisser, p. 154.
210 Ibid., p. 155.
211 This is an example of geographically-based categorization that is intended to direct services toward disadvantaged ethnic groups.
and marginalized, causing general social inequalities and social disintegration” but that these inequities are “additionally strengthened by racial discrimination in immigrants’ case.”

Pervasive patterns of segregation in Marseille and elsewhere derive from class- and ethnicity-based discrimination, as well as a mismatch between supply and demand in affordable housing. High demand has increased housing costs, and low-income residents find it to be increasingly difficult to secure housing. In Marseille, there is a 2 to 3 percent turnover rate for HLM apartments, with 30,000-35,000 applications. Furthermore, in interviews from the 2011 report, *Muslims in Marseille*, some tenants note that the limited supply benefits the housing bureaucracy,

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213 Lorcerie and Geisser.
“as it provides greater power to housing allocation committees and the officers who formulate how the social mixing code gets to be translated into practice.” The report’s interview subjects previously employed in the housing field recall racist justifications for denying applications in a climate of scarcity. The actors who shape the housing market are part of the city’s body of “notables,” including “civil servants and local authorities, members of the prefectural body, local elected representatives, HLM bodies, [and] civil society organizations active in the field of integration-through-housing.” Houard notes that their decision-making behavior is interdependent, and “the most influential among the notables play a direct role of systemic coordination.” Recent policy has aimed to ameliorate housing issues related to supply, but Marseille and other cities have yet to come close to accommodating the most disenfranchised residents.

4.1.3 Lyon

Whereas low-income immigrant populations in Marseille inhabit the arrondissements within the city proper, these same populations in Lyon are instead relegated to the suburbs. As mentioned in Chapter Three, Mayor Louis Pradel took charge of a massive construction program in Lyon and its suburbs between 1962 and 1975 in response to the French housing crisis, with a net gain of 52,000 housing units. The central city area, particularly areas that had traditionally housed immigrant populations, lost residents. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 6th arrondissements lost 20 percent of

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214 Ibid., p. 164.
216 Ibid.
their population to the suburbs, and older housing units in the central city, described as “inner-urban tenements,” was replaced with high-quality, high-cost apartments. About 35,000 of the new housing units were located in the eastern suburbs, many of which were located in zones à urbaniser en priorité (priority zones for urbanization, or ZUPs) in Rillieux, Vaulx-en-Velin, and Vénissieux. HLM units made up about 30 percent of all new housing constructed in the 1960s and were primarily located in these ZUP suburbs.

As in Marseille, the economic and labor situation of immigrants determined the areas in and around the city where they could find housing. Mortgages were difficult to obtain, so renting was the only option for poor immigrant families in unskilled or semi-skilled employment. Different from Marseille, immigrants in Lyon were pushed out to the ZUPs in the suburbs, rather than specific areas of the city proper. They had the choice between HLM in ZUPs or privately owned apartments,

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217 Grillo.
218 ZUPs are the result of a scheme developed between 1959 and 1967 to determine areas with the highest demand for housing.
but new, cheap, private apartments were difficult to come by, many were located in areas likely to be demolished, and discrimination from landlords closed off the option completely. Another factor that influenced access to housing was a theory popularized by Alain Girard called the *seuil de tolerance*, or the “threshold of tolerance,” which stated that beyond a certain threshold, somewhere between 5 and 20 percent, “the French react to a foreign presence in their midst.”²¹⁹ In the Rhône department, in which Lyon is located, the prefecture employed the theory to keep immigrant families out of certain areas, and communes then fought their way onto the list of forbidden areas in order to justify exclusion. Therefore, mayors in Vaulx-en-Velin and Vénissieux resisted the influx of immigrants, blaming the prefecture for setting a threshold. In turn, the prefecture blamed the thresholds on “political pressure” from local politicians. The circular blame-game demonstrates how the actions and rhetoric of politicians turned the immigrant populations into the “problem” instead. The result of the period of new construction and the rhetoric of “tolerance” was a major shift in the social composition of Lyon’s metropolitan area.²²⁰

In 1975, the eastern suburbs (such as Vaulx-en-Velin, Saint-Priest, Villeurbanne, or Vénissieux) were mainly populated by the working class, and today, they are some of the poorest areas of the agglomeration. Saint-Priest, Vaulx-en-Velin, and Vénissieux contained both the highest numbers and percentages of foreigners; the same patterns hold true in most areas today. The western suburbs (such as Ecully, Ste-Foy, or Francheville) were occupied by the middle class, and today, many are

²¹⁹ Ibid., p. 126.
²²⁰ Grillo.
wealthier than *arrondissements* in the center city (see Tables 6 and 7; Figure 19).

These areas included low numbers and percentages of foreigners; the same patterns here also hold true in most areas today.

**Table 6: Distribution of foreign population in COURLY by area of communes, 1975 census**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of communes</th>
<th>Total pop.</th>
<th>Foreign pop.</th>
<th>Percent foreigners in area population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lyon</td>
<td>457,410</td>
<td>45,285</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>194,335</td>
<td>34,755</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td>185,325</td>
<td>30,525</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>51,120</td>
<td>5,650</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>84,275</td>
<td>5,065</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>86,750</td>
<td>6,795</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest</td>
<td>112,820</td>
<td>10,735</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 7: Selected communes (highest foreign pop. in area in 1975; lowest foreign pop. in area in 1975) in each agglomeration area**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Commune</th>
<th>Percent foreigners in commune population, 1975</th>
<th>Percent foreigners in commune population, 2013</th>
<th>Percent change</th>
<th>Average income in commune, 2013, in Euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lyon</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>-110.4</td>
<td>21,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>-14.3</td>
<td>28,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>Vaulx-en-Velin</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>-54.8</td>
<td>12,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meyzieu</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>-89.2</td>
<td>20,198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td>Saint-Fons</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>12,801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bron</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>+14.1</td>
<td>18,579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>Pierre-Bénite</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>-43.4</td>
<td>17,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>La Mulatière</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>+25.0</td>
<td>19,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>St.-Didier</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>-56.6</td>
<td>37,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Francheville</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25,396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>Neuvville-sur-Saône</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>-54.4</td>
<td>19,066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fontaines-Saint-Martin</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>+45.6</td>
<td>29,301</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<sup>221</sup> In Grillo, p. 89.<br>
<sup>222</sup> In Grillo, p. 89.<br>
<sup>223</sup> Ibid., pp. 87-8.<br>
<sup>224</sup> INSEE, "Recensement Général De La Population."
4.1.4 Organizing, within Limits

Aware of the dilapidated and “soulless” conditions of many of the HLM, transition settlements, and hostels in which immigrants resided, national leaders implemented animation policies to bring these spaces back to life and created opportunities for dialogue between directors and residents. Animation involved educational and other programming for residents, who showed little interest in the activities; “dialogue” took the form of conseils de maison of residents and directors. These were titled conseils (councils) rather than comités (committees) in order to delineate relations of power. A representative of the Maison de Traveilleur Etranger
(the hostel association) put it clearly: “We could have had a committee, but that would not have been prudent. They would have tried to impose the law on the directors. We said no to co-gestion.”

When residents asserted their own preferences and power, it became clear that only certain types of organization and activity were permitted. In one hostel in Lyon, students in a language class worked to organize residents to mobilize against high rents, and they were immediately shut down, dismissed as “Arabs” who did not understand the purpose of activities and conseils, and labeled “antagonistic” and leftist. A strike movement spread from Paris to other large cities in 1975-6, and strike leaders were deported in the middle of the night. This made it clear that civil society organizing could have serious consequences. Attempts to “animate” institutional housing and create limited forms of representation serve as examples of the constraints placed on poor immigrants’ access to civil society in the realm of housing.

I spoke with Christophe Merigot, the director of La Duchère, a world-renowned urban renewal project in Lyon named after the neighborhood where the project is located. La Duchère has demolished many of the older, dilapidated HLM in the area and replaced them with affordable housing units, hoping to attract middle class renters or buyers. Community meetings occur sporadically in order to address the ongoing development, but not all residents attend. Merigot’s statements echo those of housing directors who opposed immigrant organizing in the 1970s, but with slightly more awareness and sympathy. He observes that those who come to meetings

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226 Ibid.
are those who are “more invested, more ‘white,’ old, who own their apartments…The project reduces social housing. Diminishes it. It makes new people come in. To discuss with the current inhabitants, it’s more complicated.” As the goal of the project is to increase social mix, creating that mix displaces those who had lived in social housing units. Therefore, conversation about the intended results would be understandably difficult. Furthermore, Merigot refers to Algerian immigrant participation in dialogue about their changing community:

They don’t understand the project. It’s not for them. They don’t understand the interest of mixité. Because if you live more and more within your own community, it’s warm, it’s good to be together…why is it necessary to make new people come in? [They don’t want] the white middle class, who might look down on current residents.

Merigot recognizes why Algerian and other immigrant communities living within La Duchère may be resistant to conversation and change, but at the same time, he claims that they do not fully understand the goals of the project. The intent of the La Duchère renovations is not to accommodate the desires of a self-defined community, but to promote social mix, a “French ambition,” as Merigot describes it. The functionaries involved in La Duchère privilege the French value of social mix over meeting the needs of specific communities who do not “understand” their goals. They draw a line between those who are truly French and those who never will be, between acceptable values and unreasonable demands.

227 Christophe Merigot, interview by Elizabeth Shackney, January, 2017, Lyon, France.
228 Ibid.
4.2 Marseille’s Economic Decline

Cities across Western Europe, Marseille and Lyon included, underwent significant transformation in response to post-war deindustrialization, demographic and social changes in urban areas, and service sector expansion. Michel Peraldi argues in *Sociologie de Marseille* that whereas the challenges facing Marseille’s local political institutions were not unique, the decisions made by local political and economic actors had a particularly devastating effect on the city’s economy and social structure.²²⁹ The decisions made by institutional actors are framed, steered, and supported by local institutional structures. This is where the histories of Marseille and Lyon diverge, as Lyon more readily adjusted to economic change.²³⁰ In this section, I present the recent history of Marseille’s economic decline, which contributes to an understanding of how Marseille’s institutional history and context relate to socioeconomic inequities today.

In the years following World War II, Marseille experienced radical demographic change. The city lost 10,000 inhabitants per year from its central areas for thirty years following the war; it then alternated between periods of growth and decline, and today, its rate of growth (0.7 percent) is comparable to that of Lyon (0.8 percent). Other cities attracted new inhabitants to replace those who had left, and they revitalized urban areas; over time, many Mediterranean basin cities, such as Barcelona, Naples, and even Tangier grew, but Marseille did not. In 1920, the populations of Barcelona and Marseille differed by 100,000; in 2015, Barcelona had

²²⁹ I read and translated the entirety of *Sociologie de Marseille* in order to present this section of the thesis.
²³⁰ I will not devote as much space to describing Lyon’s successful adjustment, but the alternative path of Lyon is made evident throughout the rest of this chapter.
1.5 million inhabitants and 5 million in its agglomeration, whereas Marseille’s population hovered around 850,000. The second radical change was the city’s socio-professional composition. A large part of those tied to the industrial society—the workers, technical management, and the landed bourgeoisie—left the city. In 1954, industrial workers made up forty-two percent of the active workforce; management, craftsmen, and owners of industry and commerce made up 13.7 percent of the workforce. In 2010, industrial workers made up only 9.5 percent; management, craftsmen, and owners of industry and commerce made up 2.8 percent. Marseille has become an administrative city with a high unemployment rate. The primary employer is the state: 18 percent of the labor force is employed by the public sector, two times the rate in Paris. These jobs are in large part controlled by local notable figures (see Chapter Three, Section 3.4.1. on public employment and clientelism). The resulting city, according to Peraldi, is one that “has been rid of its productive forces; a city that is sedentary and in a ‘drip-fed’ state.”

The aforementioned demographic shifts coupled with the transformation of Marseille’s port led to what I will refer to as the “industrial-port crisis.” Beginning in the 1960s, Marseille’s port underwent significant transformation, including the transition of port economic activity from commercial to state-run oil and petroleum, the erasure of diverse port commerce following African independences, and the economic stagnation unforeseen (or ignored) by the city’s political and economic actors. A 1965 national reform on the autonomous port status transformed the principal French ports into state-run, public establishments, creating an administrative

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231 Peraldi.
body called the *Port Autonome de Marseille* (PAM), the director of which is chosen by the state. PAM is “responsible for the construction, administration, and maintenance of the industrial zones at Fos and Lavéra” as well as port facilities in the surrounding area, generally referred to as Marseille-Fos (see Figure 20). The creation of PAM and the changing administration of the port marked a shift to the state becoming the primary economic actor in the city; under its direction, major port activity moved outside of Marseille and shifted from commercial to oil traffic. The major ports were moved out of Marseille to Fos, a site to the west of the city. Fos became a major site of steel production, and the port space created there was ready to accommodate large oil tankers and bulk container shipment. By the 1990s, ninety percent of port activity related to oil and petroleum traffic.

![Figure 20: Marseille in Relation to Fos-sur-Mer and Aix-en-Provence.](image)

Peraldi notes that the transformation from diverse commercial goods to oil traffic was not simply a change in the type of goods. Oil ports are fundamentally different from commercial ports. In Marseille’s commercial port, both goods and people would pass through: goods were weighed, stocked, and rerouted; people associated with commercial shipments would also travel to and stay in the area. Peraldi writes, “The port irradiated the city, created thousands of jobs in addition to those who directly organized the port activity, thousands of businesses in a pyramid, from the large maritime companies who stationed their headquarters closest to the docks to the most basic of jobs.”\footnote{Le port irradiie la ville, engendre des milliers d’emplois outre ceux qui organisent directement le travail portuaire, des milliers de commerces en pyramide, depuis les grandes compagnies maritimes qui tiennent évidemment leur siège au plus près des quais jusqu’aux plus sommaires des boulangeries.} A petroleum port managed by the state does not stimulate the local economy in the same way. It sells nothing, requires far fewer employees, several men operate a set of valves, and the port collects only tax income. The main beneficiaries are then the institutional actors, primarily the state. As port activity was also closely tied to the French colonies, African independences in the late ‘60s and early ‘70s significantly impacted Marseille’s industries. After one decade of independence combined with the changes under the public management of the port, oil mills, soapmakers, and naval repair and construction industries were virtually erased from the city.

Marseille did not recover from or adjust to deindustrialization as other cities did—Lyon, for example, modernized its economy under the coordination of various intercommunal agencies (see Section 4.3.2). There is evidence that the primary political and economic actors saw the catastrophe coming, and in fact, many actually
welcomed the industrial-port crisis as a political benefit, as it made it possible to rid the city of its Communist base. Gaston Deferre, the Socialist mayor of Marseille from 1944-1945 and 1953-1986, envisioned Marseille’s economic transformation from an industrial to a tertiary city. There was no better place than Marseille, local actors believed, to station the headquarters of both large and small corporations. The banishment of the port to Fos and its surrounding areas—the clearing of the factories, their fumes, and their waste—made room for the new vision of Marseille. The Socialists in Marseille were allied with the more conservative Gaullists (a Socialist-centrist coalition), rather than parties further to the left. In 1953, the Communist party made up thirty-seven percent of the municipal vote; in the 1970s, the Communists still comprised 30 percent of the electorate. The strategic movement of industry to outside of the city brought the workers, who made up the Communist majority, with it, and therefore the “principal political enemy” of the city government was no longer a threat. The local notables would also benefit from a tertiary economy: clientelistic ties between City Hall between notables and elected officials gave notables influence over public service employment and the management of public housing, without significant bureaucratic obstacles. The larger the public service sector, the more resources for the notables to control.

Local actors miscalculated the extent to which new business and the dream of tertiary Marseille would fill in the emptied areas within the city, and they did little to support and save the businesses that remained. Large firms chose to stay in Paris, and they subcontracted work to Marseille. Smaller firms wanted to be closer to sites of

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234 Peraldi.
235 Ibid.
production and found Marseille’s city center to be “asphyxiating,” so they stayed away as well. Dockers, seamen, and sailors in some cases prevented the revitalization of the port spaces, for they feared that their skills would be rendered obsolete and no proposed initiative adequately guaranteed their economic security. Development has been haphazard, driven by a combination of “the sometimes absurd and deviant development state and the opportunist enterprises of adventurous ‘entrepreneurs’” rather than a coherent, locally-informed planning scheme.

The industrial-port crisis went largely unnoticed up until Deferre’s death due to three key factors: public sector employment, North African immigration, and superficial port activity. The creation of public service jobs created an illusion of economic transition, rather than crisis. What emerged from this change was a new political, publically-employed middle class that became the electoral base for the local representatives in power. This middle class made it seem as though development was sustainable and progressive, leading to a triple alliance between elected officials, the notables, and the middle class. Immigration following the Algerian War also masked the effects of the crisis: large-scale construction of public housing for repatriates and North African immigrants provided jobs for construction workers, leading economic indicators to appear positive. Finally, seasonal traffic from Corsica, Algeria, and Tunisia, the shipment of goods such as citrus fruits, and cruise ship traffic create a bustling atmosphere around the port in Marseille, but these exchanges have not made up for the immense losses the city suffered. While

236 « De façon absurde et perverse la détermination de l’Etat aménageur et les entreprises opportunistes de véritables ‘aventuriers’ commerciaux. » Peraldi, loc. 735.
Marseille is still the primary French port for global traffic (98 million tons per year), it lost its European hegemony to the Nordic ports, such as Rotterdam (421 million) and Antwerp (189 million), as well as to Hamburg (140 million). This is especially clear for container traffic, which is judged to be most profitable. Rotterdam traffics 10.8 million tons of container traffic per year, whereas Marseille traffics only .85 million per year.  

A second, quieter “second economic crisis” unfolded in Marseille as local officials dismantled the city’s informal economic system. Ports can be the sites of informal economic activity that ultimately benefits the city’s formal economy by increasing traffic. In Marseille, the black market takes the form of physical urban markets that provide products from the African countries and the Arab world, not found in traditional hypermarkets and stores: the Noailles market offers alimentary goods, Belsunce sells clothing and fabric, and one can find the Grand African and the Comptoir Algerian near the Gare-Saint-Charles. Additionally, this market activity provides a source of income and identity to the city’s North African and sub-Saharan African immigrant populations, who are often excluded from the formal economy. A combination of the tourists visiting these areas and the spectacle of the markets feeds Marseille’s cosmopolitan reputation. Across Western Europe in the 1990s, modernization took the form of slum and informal economy eradication, and local governments, including that of Marseille, began cracking down on informal economic activity.  

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237 Peraldi, loc. 649.
First, in 1987, national immigration policy limited travel between Algeria and France; additionally, Antwerp and Hamburg recuperated automobile trade from Marseille; finally, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Instanbul became a major market, attracting Maghrebi travelers who wanted to shop, directing activity away from Marseille’s markets. Therefore, the informal markets selling mostly ethnic goods suffered, and the immigrants who depended on these spaces for their economic wellbeing lost their “economic powerhouses.” At the end of the 1980s, drug and arms trafficking began to take the place of informal alimentary and apparel trade. Data show that Marseille’s drug trafficking activity is no more active than in areas such as the suburbs of Paris, but Marseille is sensationalized in the media, and the fact that areas active in the drug trade are contained within the city amplifies the association.\footnote{Peraldi.}

The clichés surrounding the port economy—framing this activity as “fraud,” “corrupt,” or “counterfeit,” and sensationalizing the port’s role in the international drug trade—stigmatize and lead to the criminalization of the informal economy that has sustained individuals in Marseille’s poorest areas. This second economic crisis is comparable to the industrial-port crisis in its detrimental effects on economic productivity, but the public discourse surrounding it has rendered it less important.

The Bouches-du-Rhône department has continued on a path of growth due to advanced technological and industrial development, diverging from the trajectory of Marseille’s economy. Middle managers and technicians moving to the south chose to go to Aix-en-Provence rather than Marseille. The state-created nuclear studies center, Cadarache, between Aix and the Alps has contributed to the department’s economic
growth; the tech company Gemplus invented the smart card, the microchip-embedded secure credit and debit cards, and has a major manufacturing plant in Saint-Paul-lès-Durance, about forty miles outside the city. Between 1996 and 2006, the Bouches-du-Rhône department saw 31 percent job growth, compared to the national average of 22 percent; the unemployment rate in the department was 11.8 percent in 2013.240 Marseille, in contrast, has withered, with an overall unemployment rate of 18.5 percent in 2013.241

Marseille’s transformation under Deferre ties into decentralization reform and the changing discourse on immigration. As described in Chapter One, the Deferre decentralization laws gave more power and resources to local administrations; the State had relinquished a large part of its role in social welfare, and the department and urban governance recovered those responsibilities. These changes were welcome within Marseille’s institutional practices of clientelism, which has transferred over to an alliance between elected officials, notables, and the publically-employed middle class. Notables gained greater control over resources concerning employment and housing. Without a suitable alternative to the previous order, and without extensive collaboration with neighboring suburbs (as we will see in the next section), the city’s economy faced significant setbacks. North African immigrants, primarily located in the center and northern areas of the city, suffered disproportionately from the city’s crisis situation, as they were doubly hit by the decline of the industrial port and the suppression of the informal economy.

Lyon’s institutional decision-making, on the other hand, set the city on a different path. The mayoral agendas of Louis Pradel, Michel Noir, and now Gérard Collomb described in Chapter Three focused directly on practical economic development—from COURLY to inclusive development to internationalization. I discussed one example of this in the previous section: in response to demographic changes in the 1960s and ‘70s, Pradel cleared out the central areas of the city and replaced dilapidated buildings with wealthier tenants and new business, while Marseille stagnated. Additionally, scholars agree that Lyon has managed to successfully diversify its economy, while also supporting traditional industrial activity. In the next section, I will discuss another divergence that directly relates to economic development: the level of collaboration with surrounding communes. The relationships that Lyon formed with its agglomeration suburbs in the 1960s and ‘70s, while fraught with resistance, went hand in hand with the creation of agencies that aided the city in adjusting to new economic norms. EPCI eased Lyon’s transition into a thriving, innovative, international city.

4.3 EPCI Development

As delineated in Chapter One, the centralized regional planning authority, DATAR, began creating the metropolitan area policies that would form urban communities in 1966 (see Chapter One, Section 1.2.3 for a detailed history of the evolution of EPCI). Policymakers intended to balance power between Paris and the other cities, to manage the state’s investments on the local level, and to create
coherent, rational areas for partnerships and development.\textsuperscript{242} As DATAR was a national planning agency, the absence of connection with officials on the local level was a source of tension between local administrations and DATAR planners.\textsuperscript{243} In some areas, the metropolitan area development eventually led to increased cooperation, as was the case in Lille, Lyon, and Rennes. Elsewhere, such as Bordeaux, Grenoble, Toulouse, and Nantes, however, cooperation was limited.\textsuperscript{244} In Marseille, mayor Gaston Defferre immediately refused the creation of the urban community, and the city and its surrounding communes did not agree on the creation of an EPCI structure until 1992. In Lyon, on the other hand, the DATAR imposition sparked conflict, but local officials established its urban community structure in 1969. Local institutional norms and culture influenced, or in the case of Marseille, prevented, the development of EPCI structure, as well as the economic and social service benefits that accompanied EPCI development.

4.3.1 Marseille

Marseille was resistant to state-imposed EPCI structures and moved to block the creation of a new institution. Resistance related to two major factors: political concerns and relations with nearby cities, Aix-en-Provence in particular. In the early stages of state-imposed EPCI development (beginning in 1966), Gaston Defferre, a Socialist mayor who had formed a coalition with the conservative Gaullists, saw the Communist Party as his primary political enemy. Defferre pushed industry and its

\textsuperscript{242} For more information on how intra-regional governance became important across Western Europe, see Salet and Thornley (2007).
\textsuperscript{244} Motte.
workers, and thus the Communists, outside of the city and into the surrounding areas, such as Fos, Berre l’Etang, Martigues, Aubagne, or Gemenos. Therefore, no matter how the EPCI map was drawn, the Communists would gain power. On the other end, EPCI and collaborative planning meant that surrounding communes would have to take on some of the burden of Marseille’s socioeconomic problems. Walid Benali, an official at the office of the Prefect for Equal Opportunity, said that Marseille city officials “would prefer the [homeless] shelters to be around the city, but politically it’s complicated. The other mayors around say, ‘Keep your poor people.’” On top of historical rivalries, the economic situation in Marseille also hampers effective collaboration.

Later, after decentralization in the 1980s increased competition between communes, the multipolar nature of any sort of Marseille agglomeration was another source of tension. Marseille, Aix-en-Provence, and Aubagne are all within a forty-minute drive of each other, and they are autonomous, powerful competitors. Aix, however, has dominated Marseille in terms of attractiveness, economic success, and demographic growth since the 1980s. Competition with Aix in particular hampered agreement. The geographic constraints on Marseille—the sea on one side, mountains on the other—have also limited the cognitive conception of a coherent metropolitan territory.

In the 1990s, the dynamics of cooperation changed. Defferre’s death led to a change in coordination efforts between political actors. Local actors came to the

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245 Peraldi.
246 Mathieu Arfeuillere and Walid Benali, interview by Elizabeth Shackney, January, 2017, Marseille, France.
247 Peraldi.
248 Motte.
realization that the creation of a coherent metropolitan area was necessary in order to manage the kinds of large-scale projects that would allow for effective metropolitan functioning and competition with other attractive metropolitan areas.\textsuperscript{249,250} These concerns were also picked up by the state, as DATAR encouraged cooperation between cities and communes in order to bolster their significance in an increasingly international economy.\textsuperscript{251} The 1999 loi Chevènement created financial incentives, such as additional grants and subsidies, as well as a single local business tax for members of the urban community, that managed to benefit both poor and wealthier communes. Following these concerns and policy changes, a weak community of communes came together in 1992, which was then converted into the Marseille Provence Métropole urban community in 2000, uniting eighteen communes. Aix-en-Provence and Aubagne refused to be a part of the urban community and created separate EPCI. Marseille Provence Métropole was dissolved in 2015 and integrated into the newly created Métropole d’Aix-Marseille-Provence in 2016, which now incorporates ninety-two communes with a combined population of approximately 1,876,019 inhabitants (see Figure 6 in Chapter 1).\textsuperscript{252,253} Motte posits the Mediterranean hypothesis as explanation for the communes’ reluctance to cooperate. Based on the work of historian Fernand Braudel, he claims that historically, in Latin Mediterranean spaces, cities and elite social groups battle for complete autonomy.

\textsuperscript{249} Acts of cooperation between communes in the Aix-Marseille-Provence area include: coordination between university systems; projects that require large financial investment, such as the construction of a new incinerator in the oil refinery area of Fos; or large, collaborative events that bring in tourists
\textsuperscript{251} Fred Guilledoux, "Grand Marseille : Ayrault vaincra-t-il les égoïsmes provençaux ?," La Provence, September 8, 2012.
which generates economic and social inequalities. This legacy has persisted in Marseille and its surrounding area in terms of communes’ willingness to coordinate resources.

4.3.2 Lyon

Compared to that of Marseille, Lyon’s EPCI development period has been far longer, so that by the time metropolitan areas became essential to economic growth, Lyon’s metropolitan area had already been established as a legitimate entity. Lyon has relied on intercommunal relationships in the form of municipal syndicates (SIVOM) since the early twentieth century, when communes worked together to manage the delivery of public services, especially relating to water, waste treatment, gas and electricity, and public transportation. Under SIVOM, however, each commune retained its own tax structure. The original plan for the more integrated metropolitan area, developed by national planning agencies DATAR and OREAM in the early 1960s, was multipolar, bringing together Lyon, Saint Etienne, and Grenoble with the intent to “encourage convergence by ignoring rivalry and local identities, even though these could be seen and felt everywhere.” At first, the plan for Lyon was controversial, and the organizations faced significant resistance from local elected officials, who successfully delegitimized the national administrations. Planners thus abandoned the triple urban core model and instead focused solely on Lyon, which led to the development of the Lyon urban community, or COURLY.

254 Scherrer’s “Birth and metamorphoses of the area of an urban agglomeration” details this long history (in French)
255 Jouve, p. 48.
256 Ibid.
The original COURLY consisted of fifty-five communes. The mayors of Lyon and Villeurbanne had an “implicit coalition” that dominated the agglomeration throughout the 1970s, creating some conflict with smaller communes in the west and Communist areas in the east (Vaulx-en-Velin and Vénissieux). Nevertheless, COURLY operated under a pragmatic vision to coordinate and deliver efficient public services.\textsuperscript{257} Since its conception, COURLY has added four more communes, bringing the agglomeration to a total of fifty-nine communes, with approximately 1,354,476 inhabitants in 2014. Lyon alone has approximately 506,615 inhabitants.\textsuperscript{258} In 2015, it was converted to an EPCI with special status, the Metropolis of Lyon, informally called Grand Lyon (see Figure 7 in Chapter 1). Today, Lyon’s EPCI merits the description as “one of the most powerful metropolitan governments in Europe.”\textsuperscript{259}

Over time, the EPCI structures and the resulting collaboration between communes have proven to be useful and innovative in the areas of economic growth, urban planning, public transportation, and social housing. These innovations have been in large part thanks to the emergence of the Association for the Development of the Lyon Region (ADERLY) in the mid-1970s and the Agence d’Urbanisme de la Communauté Urbaine de Lyon (the COURLY Regional Planning Agency) in 1978. ADERLY has enhanced economic development across the agglomeration in conjunction with changing economic priorities from industry to service. The association became the primary contact for companies looking to relocate to Lyon

\textsuperscript{257} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{258} INSEE, 2014.
\textsuperscript{259} Deborah Galimberti et al., "La Métropole de Lyon. Splendeurs et fragilités d’une machine intercommunale," \textit{Hérodote}, no. 3 (2014).
and its surroundings, and it “organized competition between the various industrial zones…it exploited the fragmentation of the economic area of Lyons and the differences in company taxes from one commune to another.”

This method of organization successfully attracted new businesses to the area.

The COURLY Regional Planning Agency is a research organization created to “produce studies to change the local decision-makers’ vision of the [urban governance and planning] situation.” Its research has impacted urban planning, public transport, and social housing on the agglomeration scale. Concerning planning and dovetailing the work of ADERLY, the agency supported innovative zoning regulations that not only offered cohesive planning for land development, but also made zoning into a “territorial marketing exercise aimed at ‘selling’ the urban area to foreign investors on the international scene.” This exercise, which merged a communication strategy with the overall planning strategy, also demonstrated a commitment to stimulating economic growth. In the area of public transportation, the agglomeration was able to receive a higher level of state funding for an additional metro line in 1991 because its leadership agreed to create an urban transportation plan that incorporated various means of transport (cars, bikes, metro, tram, etc.). The Regional Planning Agency used this opportunity to research how commuting and transportation should impact town planning, adding greater coherence and rationale to planning within the metropolitan area. Finally, research-based suggestions from the agency prompted a shift to handling social housing on an intercommunal level.

260 Jouve, pp. 50-1.
261 Ibid., p. 53.
262 Ibid., p. 54.
Marseille also consults with an urban planning research agency, *l’Agence d’urbanisme de l’agglomération marseillaise*, but up until recently, it focused solely on Marseille proper, rather than the agglomeration. Now, it also performs analysis on the metropole level. Perhaps in time, it will provide similar benefit to the city as Lyon’s Regional Planning Agency.

Although leadership in and around Lyon faced significant resistance to adoption through the 1980s, mayors of communes gradually came to manage social housing issues on an intercommunal basis.263 Officials from the office of the Prefect for Equal Opportunity in Marseille noted that the rehousing is a much easier process in a city like Lyon, where the government can relocate individuals and families from crumbling apartments to newer spaces in other communes.264,265 They note that in Lyon, “the partnerships are already organized. In Marseille, the mayor has to call a surrounding city anytime he wants to do something,” and they must negotiate the terms of the deal every time.266 This process is inefficient. The benefits of addressing issues such as economic growth, urban planning, public transport, and social housing on a larger, more collaborative scale are clear in the innovative policies that emerged at the hands of Lyon’s Regional Planning Agency. The development of the urban community structure (and later, the métropole) faced resistance, as it did in cities across France. However, once it was accepted, the structure better positioned Lyon to adjust to changes in: deindustrialization and modernization, as it had the capacity to

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263 Jouve.
264 The *Prefet pour l’égalité des chances* is a regional position created in 2005 in the “departments most concerned with urban issues,” including PACA, Rhône-Alpes, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, and three areas of Ile-de-France; see the official statue here: https://www.senat.fr/rap/a05-212/a05-2123.html
265 This refers to the process of demolishing a crumbling public housing block, rehousing the individuals and families elsewhere, and then building anew.
266 Arfeuillere and Benali.
attract new business; internationalization, as it adopted strategies to make Lyon an important player on the European and international stages; and urban issues, such as transportation and social housing, as it had the capacity to manage resources collectively.

Conclusion

Marseille and Lyon both faced significant challenges relating to the housing crisis and post-war, post-industrial economic transition. Both cities faced a similar set of constraints and practices in housing an influx of Maghrebi immigrants, although Marseille’s populations landed in the central city and northern arrondissements, while Lyon’s immigrants were pushed out to the suburbs. Marseille, like other cities, expelled industry from the city, in large part because of political interests. Though the city intended to rejuvenate its economy, the businesses never came, and the city descended into economic crisis. The destruction of the informal economy further devastated ethnic minorities who had long been excluded from formal economic activity. Lyon developed policies and partnerships that led to a more successful economic transition, though its Maghrebi and recent immigrant populations continue to face discrimination and economic disadvantage.

Cities across Europe are in the process of addressing concerns related to “the new metropolitan action space.” In the second half of the 20th century, EPCI proved to be necessary in adjusting to the challenge of adapting to economic pressures, notably that of regional economies meeting competitive conditions of international
connectedness. EPCI also gave cities like Lyon a new institutional tool for managing public services such as social housing. Marseille held out against cooperation until the 1990s; Lyon, while initially resistant to the imposed EPCI structure, came around to developing successful partnerships with its surrounding communes within a reasonable timeframe. The different timelines of EPCI development are directly influenced the institutional rules, norms, and practices relating to cooperation and responsiveness in Marseille and Lyon.

Those hit hardest by these changes were not given the right to participate in local democracy, neither through the formal institution nor via civil society. Housing authorities were disappointed to see that Maghrebi immigrants in hostels were not participating in animation activities, but when they organized to challenge high rent, they were immediately accused of not understanding the principals of auto-gestion. Notables and elected officials only deemed certain civil society activity—activity that did not run counter to the bottom line of the establishment—acceptable. Anything else was characterized as savage and irresponsible. In the next chapter, I will share evidence from interviewees on how Marseille’s local institutions have continued to exclude Maghrebi immigrants and their descendants from the institutionalization process.

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267 Salet and Thornley.
CHAPTER FIVE: THE ASSOCIATIONS
INSTITUTION-CIVIL SOCIETY RELATIONS IN MARSEILLE

It’s either conviction and you fight for it until you can’t stand up, or you stop everything.
— Fatima Rhazi, Director of Femmes d’ici et d’ailleurs

Introduction

The French nation building project and colonial expansion shaped the development of the national French institution, which in turn shaped local institutions. The post-war welfare state and decentralization reforms in the 1980s shifted social responsibility to the local institution, and these transitions highlighted the ways in which local context can lead to variation between similarly structured local institutions. Local context, particularly relationships with surrounding communes, influenced both Marseille and Lyon’s capacity to cope with pertinent challenges, such as economic adjustment and public housing.

Informal rules and practices that derive from local context (e.g. clientelism in Marseille) become institutionalized, and thus the institution evolves. However, certain sectors of society are excluded from participating in the process of institutionalization. Institution-driven exclusion comes in many forms, such as representative councils with no real power, the issuing of insufficient or superficial responses to real community needs, or only agreeing to fund non-profit associations that fit within a given political agenda. At face value, these practices can seem inclusive and responsive, but as they have no real impact, they function as means of quieting dissenting voices. In this final chapter, I investigate the relationship between civil society and local government in Marseille. Using qualitative information from...
interviews with individuals connected to Marseille’s institutions and/or civil society, I share the perceived barriers to political and social change. I also explore the ways in which the local institution controls or limits the development and actions of civil society, thereby limiting the extent to which civil society can influence the inclusivity and representativeness of the institution. Some observations extend to the national level as well. At the end of the chapter, I connect this chapter with the previous two chapters. I offer classifications of the two cities and relate these to Marseille and Lyons’ formative contexts.

Over the course of three weeks in France, I met with individuals involved in civil society organizations, or associations (henceforth referred to as “associational interviews”), as well as individuals who are part of local institutions (henceforth referred to as “institutional interviews”), both in Marseille and Lyon. For associational interviews, I spoke with representatives from several types of associations: organizations that relied on state funding; organizations that were completely independent and doing well financially; and organizations that were completely independent, but struggling financially. For institutional interviews, I spoke with appointed officials and functionaries. Some subjects (“interviewees”) have been or continue to be involved in both of these worlds. The concerns voiced by interviewees fit into three categories: maquillage (or “make-up,” meaning actions and policies that look good on the surface, but do not have a real or lasting impact); issues with translating activism to political results; and the evolving financial relationship between the local institution and civil society associations. Clientelism was

268 The focus in this chapter is Marseille, and the Lyon interviews are useful only to provide some perspective on the possibility of other institution/civil society relationships in France.
mentioned in conjunction with *maquillage* and associational finances. A lack of accountability for elected officials unites these three issues, and several interviewees suggest that the absence of accountability is tied to the electoral structure of the city. The range of interviewee backgrounds provides varied and balanced perspectives on movements for social and political change in Marseille.

### 5.1 Maquillage

Several interviewees drew attention to examples in which politicians directed public funds towards policies and projects that reflect well on the officials in the short term but do not address problems that require long-term or significant financial investment. Examples include the mismanagement of the *Politique de la Ville*, a political tool for remedying inequality; the *Carte Scolaire*, a policy that aims to create socioeconomic diversity in public schools; pandering or patronage practices in the period leading up to elections, particularly in the form of construction projects; and the types of studies that public officials do and do not commission from the municipal research agency. Ultimately, these policies and practices can create the illusion of progress without actually addressing deeper issues, notably entrenched poverty and discrimination.

The *Politique de la Ville* is a national framework developed in 1982 for connecting public officials with associations so that they can jointly address vulnerable populations, thereby improving the poorest and most difficult neighborhoods.\(^{269}\) Alain Fourest, a former functionary involved in the implementation

\(^{269}\)Peggy Rousselot, interview by Elizabeth Shackney, January, 2017, Marseille, France.
of the *Politique de la Ville* in Marseille, explained that mayors such as Gérard Colomb in Lyon enthusiastically embraced the opportunities provided by the new framework. Colomb fought hard to create sustainable development projects, such as the complete renovation of the housing project *La Duchère*, enhance public transportation, and improve the lives of poor residents. Fourest noted, “It is not perfect, but when a mayor makes the decision to use money from the government in a smart way, it works.” In Marseille, however, the *Politique de la Ville* has been used to create an associative (i.e. tied to non-profit associations) elite and to feed the political machine, rather than to help those most in need. Fourest said that the mayors in Marseille used the money attached to *Politique de la Ville* to create parks and enhance neighborhoods that did not have the greatest need for support. Peraldi corroborates these concerns, explaining that projects conducted under the framework focused on physical renovations of subsidized housing (HLM), adding that the initiatives led to increased hiring in the associative world and support for cultural or arts organizations. The leadership in Marseille has used the *Politique de la Ville* to their own personal advantage, rather than targeting funds toward the neighborhoods and programs that needed it most.

Salim Grabsi, a teacher in a priority zone in the *quartiers nord* (QN) and an activist in several collectives fighting for the rights of minority residents in Marseille, mentioned both the *Carte Scolaire* and construction projects as pandering as additional examples of illusory programs. The *Carte Scolaire* is a program that has

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270 Alain Fourest, interview by Elizabeth Shackney, January, 2017, Marseille, France.
271 Ibid.
272 Peraldi.
existed in France since the 1990s, with a goal of creating socioeconomic mix in middle and high schools. The policy is attractive on paper, but it has never truly materialized. Parents who “have the codes,” or who know who to talk to and how to work the system, are able to avoid mixing schemes and will send their children to a school of their own choosing.273 Regarding construction leading up to elections, Grabsi says,

There is the presidential election, and the quarters [or areas within arrondissements], one sees that a quarter might become a problem, so they might be able to talk to them...each time there is a presidential election, they create reflections on the neighborhoods, asking what can we give them? They give money for urban renovations. We can’t say they don’t do anything, because right now they’re giving money to do work...they renovate the buildings, but they don’t respond to the emergencies, the unemployment. They focus on appearances. It’s makeup; “maquillage.”274

As with the programs initiated under the Politique de la Ville, politicians take action that will lead to electoral success, rather than rationally determining policies that direct the most appropriate actions and resources to those who need them most.

Finally, Peggy Rousselot, a researcher at the Agence d’Urbanisme de l’Agglomération Marseillaise (Urban Planning Research Agency for Marseille and its Agglomeration, or AGAM), who specializes in “Solidarity and Society,” discussed her work and the types of studies commissioned by public officials.

Elizabeth Shackney: Do you receive requests from politicians, or do you study issues even when politicians do not request that you research them? How do you explain what is asked for and what is not?

Peggy Rousselot: Our statute does not allow us to do that type of thing [commission our own studies]. Yes, there are areas with no political intervention and nobody asks us to study them, there are empty spaces. Several explanations: first, there are political subjects that are too sensitive where nobody wants to go, for example, ethnic questions, poor people, income inequality, the very rich and the very poor. The second reason is that

273 Salim Grabsi, interview by Elizabeth Shackney, January, 2017, Marseille, France.
274 Ibid.
the subjects that relate to the long term, that take fifty years to have a result...the politicians are perfectly aware that they won’t have the results to present on their campaign and as it’s expensive, they won’t do it. For example, the question of the separation of rainwater and wastewater. Nobody wants to do it.\textsuperscript{275}

Local elected officials, concerned with their position in the ranks, commission studies on non-controversial issues that they are able to address in the short term, which hinders their ability to address more impactful areas such as poverty.

The practice of commissioning the studies that Peggy Rousselot described is a tool for promoting \textit{maquillage}, or make-up—projects and policies that look good and generate votes, but do not necessarily serve the general interest or the areas that need the most help. Both institutional actors (Fourest and Rousselot) and associational actors (Grabsi) highlighted these issues. Alain Fourest noted these practices in Marseille’s implementation of \textit{Politique de la Ville}, money from which melded the associational and political landscapes together, and Salim Grabsi mentions them in the context of the \textit{Carte Scolaire} and construction projects. According to these interviewees, Marseille municipal policies are often based on relationships and appearances, rather than research and genuine need. The \textit{maquillage} described here is a form of clientelism, and it generates a relationship in which the local governing institution holds power over civil society.

\section*{5.2 From Activism to Policy Outcomes}

Another frequent topic of conversation was the political response to activists and status quo disrupters, with a particular focus on the response to demands for
greater representation of ethnic minority populations within local and national institutions. Interviewees expressed concern that councils for minority representation are often ineffective and comprised of individuals who will most likely share the perspective of the dominant political actors, as they are often selected by the institution itself. Representation is a concern on every institutional level; the composition of national bodies such as the *Conseil Français du Culte Musulman* (French Council for the Muslim Religion, or CFCM) reflects that of similar councils on the local level. Two cases represent other ways in which political elites interact with those disrupting the status quo: Alain Fourest’s quest to change national priorities on urban issues, and Salim Grabsi and Yazid Attalah’s experience fighting poverty with the *Collectif du Premier Juin* and the *Collectif des de Quartiers Populaires Marseille*. Similar to problems related to *maquillage*, interviewees expressed that political responses to activist demands for representation and more effective policy may seem acceptable on the surface but are dysfunctional in practice.

French political institutions have attempted to be more representative of the diversity within the French population, giving some degree of power to individuals of North African descent, but not “too much” power. The CFCM came together under President Sarkozy as a council to represent Islam and Muslim prayer spaces, not French Muslims per se, within state institutions. It came to serve in a “community mediator” role, to which officials turned when they wanted to address problems in the *banlieues*, or suburban slums, further conflating *banlieues* with Islam. Other regional and local institutions have also developed similar councils, and according to three

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276 Geisser.
interviewees, they are plagued by the same structural issues. Beyond the concern that these councils are considered to be tools for managing social order, the elected or chosen representatives are often described as puppets of the institution. According to QN native Yazid Attalah, regarding the regional council in PACA, “In reality everything is done to neutralize its role. It is inefficient and you find inside people who do not know the reality of the problems and who are at the orders of the politicians.”

Foued Medjabri, who works at the Union des Jeunes Musulmans in Lyon, expressed a similar sentiment, noting that well-spoken Muslims are never chosen to lead these councils: “It will always be someone who enters into the interest of the state…It will be someone who hasn’t mastered French, who can’t express himself, who won’t defend the interests of Muslims, who is put in front.”

Politicians ensure the official creation of representative bodies, but the selective ways in which leaders are chosen by political and notable actors ensures that the councils have limited power.

Alain Fourest recounted the frustration he felt working on social and urban policy within political institutions on the national level as a functionary. He served as a national representative from Marseille to the Commission National de Developpement Social des Quartiers (National Commission of the Social Development of Neighborhoods, or CMDSQ), a precursor to the Politique de la Ville. The CMDSQ was a small, official department that worked with the prime minister on urban development and social issues within the difficult neighborhoods. Even though he had not attended the elite political academies and was not from Paris, he felt that

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277 Yazid Attalah, E-mail, January 7, 2017.
278 Foued Medjabri, interview by Elizabeth Shackney, January, 2017, Lyon, France.
the ministers respected him because he had worked closely with individuals in the field, in the QN of Marseille. However, he said, “They heard what I had to say, but they did not listen to me. It was tough to develop links between departments; we were not taken seriously by the institution.” In 1985, the CMDSQ was able to secure an additional ministerial position, the Ministre de la Ville who would theoretically give their recommendations more clout within the cabinet. However, “just like our team, he was not taken seriously and was not getting nearly enough funding for the projects he was conducting.” Even under a Socialist government, the CMDSQ and the Ministre de la Ville were merely symbolic gestures with no substantive weight in the policy arena.

Salim Grabsi and Yazid Attalah had a similar experience in their attempts to influence Marseille and national policy, but from an outside, activist perspective. In 2013, they created an organization called the Collectif du Premier Juin (Collective of the First of June, or CPJ), composed of the family members of individuals who were murdered in the QN, most often related to drug violence. The message of CPJ was “Stop the Violence.” They made it clear that the violence in the QN is not senseless, but is rather a product of economic and other systemic problems acting upon the neighborhoods. CPJ organized a large march to draw attention to the issues in these areas, and because elections were not far off, it was widely publicized and attended by notable figures. Unfortunately, the media and politicians focused on the stereotypical “weeping mother,” and they treated “violence” as the key issue, supporting the portrayal of the men in the QN as absent fathers, extremists, or drug

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279 Fourest.
dealers, and erasing the economic, social, health, and education issues behind the violence. These portrayals frame the debate in terms of problems that are easier to solve (more policing to curb violence) and create scapegoats who are easy to blame (violent Muslim men and absent fathers), exonerating the local notables from their own responsibility for the crisis.\footnote{Grabsi.}

CPJ experienced internal political conflict—some members basked in the media spotlight or were appeased by job offers within the local government—but to Grabsi and Attalah, this fight was not about feeding their own egos, but was a response to real problems. Camille Hamidi, a French sociologist, notes that this sort of infighting is common within community organizations, as the closer they get to the institutions, the more they lose touch with the communities they are attempting to represent. These problems can be intensified within immigrant organizations, for there may be tensions between groups of various origins. Radical collectives in France may endeavor to join forces with leftist political parties, but there is often a sense of paternalism or neocolonialism within the traditional parties. These obstacles can prevent long-term success.\footnote{Camille Hamidi, interview by Elizabeth Shackney. January, 2017, Lyon, France.} Following its own internal conflicts, CPJ dissolved, and Grabsi and Attalah’s team created the \textit{Collectif des de Quartiers Populaires Marseille} (CQPM). Later in 2013, CQPM conducted a listening tour of all of the poor neighborhoods in Marseille in order to understand the residents’ barriers to integration. Following these conversations, the Collective published a booklet of the 101 solutions given by residents living in poverty. They sent their report to the prime
minister, his cabinet, and the city’s politicians, and they received some media attention.

Early on in CQPM’s activism, only Minister of Justice Christiane Taubira\(^{282}\) was responsive to the report, and she met with representatives from CQPM to discuss the proposed solutions. Initially, the local government asked Grabsi and Attalah if they wanted to be the intermediaries between City Hall and the neighborhoods while translating the 101 solutions into actual policy, but they refused to work for the institution. They told me, “We’ve been doing this for 25 years, and we know their techniques to kill time. When there’s a problem they say they’re going to create a working group. You come up with a proposal, and at the end of it, nothing happens.”\(^{283}\) As the politicians came to see how working with the CQPM could be politically beneficial, however, they worked with the collective to draft the *Pacte de Cohesion Sociale*, which will likely be an important tool in addressing issues pertaining to education, public services, and employment in Marseille’s poor neighborhoods. Despite this progressive outcome, it is important to highlight Grabsi and Attalah’s frustration throughout the process, particularly how the media framed their original march, the disproportionate focus on violence, internal politics, and the sense that political figures were only willing to take on their concerns when they appeared to be politically beneficial. Even then, Grabsi and Attalah’s prior experience with the institutions led them to believe that working groups and committees would be a waste of time, and they had already compiled firsthand accounts of problems and

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\(^{282}\) Taubira is known for her role in legalizing gay marriage in France, and she recently resigned over conflict relating to her opposition to a policy that would strip dual-citizens of their French citizenship if they are convicted of terrorism.

\(^{283}\) Grabsi.
solutions for poor communities. They instead wanted to see real resources and real commitment.

Several interviewees drew attention to Muslim councils that create an illusion of representation; Alain Fourest felt that political actors within the national institution were unwilling to take recommendations about urban issues seriously, and the ministerial position created under his tenure was an empty role; and institutions responded to Salim Grabsi and Yazid Attalah’s collective demands when it best suited the institutional agenda, rather than the needs of the public. These examples are additional forms of *maquillage* that allow the institution to hold status quo disrupters at arm’s length.

5.3 Associational Support

I mentioned the creation of an “associational elite” through clientelistic means in conjunction with *maquillage* and the *Politique de la Ville*. In this section, I present a more detailed view of the relationship between the local institution and civil society associations involved in the delivery of social services. All interviewees agreed that the role of associations in the delivery of social services, such as employment training or education, has grown increasingly important, but they disagree on the adequacy of institutional support for these organizations. Additionally, institutional interviewees were less likely to discuss the ways in which politics impact funding. In Marseille, the lack of trust, oversight, and accountability in both the associational and institutional spheres impedes progress.
Associations often take on the role of the state in supporting economically and socially precarious communities. Two officials in the Prefect for Equal Opportunity’s office,\textsuperscript{284} housed in the prefecture in Marseille, spoke to the shift in responsibility for social welfare from the state to the private sector. Mattieu Arfeuillere, the Cabinet chief, explained, “The associations are resources that are missing from the neighborhood. They meet with people who have a problem and don’t know where to go…they became the link between the people and the government—the missing link that the government took away.”\textsuperscript{285} Aside from the public schools, and given decreased public spending since the right has been in power, public intervention is less common, and instead, the associations, rather than functionaries, are providing public services and shaping communities. Samar Damlakhi, a Syrian woman who immigrated to Marseille, runs a non-governmental organization that runs a rescue boat for refugees in the Mediterranean between Libya and Italy. She notes that the migrants she works with prefer services provided by civil society, as the organizations have spent time on the ground and better understand the problems going on in the neighborhoods. Their services feel more “human.” In the case of refugee rescue operations, government-run rescue boats have artillery and do not provide the same type of warm, personalized services as her association’s rescue boat. These less-bureaucratic private associations often function very well, meeting the needs of those they serve when they have the financial means. According to Salet and Thornley, these observations are not unique to Marseille or to France. Across Western

\textsuperscript{284} The \textit{Prefet pour l’égalité des chances} is a regional position created in 2005 in the “departments most concerned with urban issues,” including PACA, Rhône-Alpes, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, and three areas of Ile-de-France; see the official statute here: https://www.senat.fr/rap/a05-212/a05-2123.html

\textsuperscript{285} Arfeuillere and Benali.
Europe since the 1980s, national governments have reduced their proactive role in economic and social involvement and have instead privileged the private sector.\footnote{Salet and Thornley.}

Registered associations are eligible to receive subventions from various levels and offices of the government. Significant funding does come from the local institutions. Among their many responsibilities, Walid Benali and Mattieu Arfeuillere, the two employees in the Equal Opportunity Office, and Nora Preziosi, an adjunct to the mayor,\footnote{Part of the mayor’s cabinet.} review grants and provide resources to organizations. Benali and Arfeuillere described the funding process for associations as more flexible than hiring state employees. Functionaries have a statut and cannot be removed from their positions, “whereas for an association, they have a precise mission to get you from Point A to Point B. Every year, they give you a file of the budget they need, their goals for the year.”\footnote{Both made fun of the fact that they themselves are functionaries. Sure, functionaries can be a burden to the state, they said, but we need them!} They can then fund associations on a short-term basis and revoke funding if the service is no longer needed. Benali said that their needs “could vary a lot from one year to another, maybe we don’t have enough money so we stop financing the association. Even if we’ve been financing an association for years, we can stop all of a sudden.” Financing decisions could also depend on the prefecture’s priorities for the year. Functionaries, who are hired for life, do not allow for the same flexibility.

In conversation about her relationship with associations, Nora Preziosi, the adjunct responsible for youth, animations dans les quartiers, and the rights of women, demonstrated flexibility in her own spending and aid. She made it clear that
she looks over files carefully to make sure she is not funding "fake associations." When she finds a file with a quality project, she reviews the file with her office. She stated, "It’s me who decides the amount I am going to give." Similar to funding from the Equal Opportunity Office, the funding is under her discretion and subject to change. In Preziosi’s view, she is doing her part by helping individuals and funding robust projects. While these actions are useful, the individual aid and small amount of funding is not nearly enough to substantially impact Marseille’s vulnerable arrondissements. If accountability mechanisms function well, if electoral processes ensure that officials who most efficiently and effectively serve the public good keep their jobs, and if budgets were larger, then the funding process for civil society service providers could be meritocratic and impactful. The budget under the rightist government has shrunk, and as I will explain in the following section, accountability in Marseille does not appear to be strong, so political support often determines who gets funding and who does not. One functionary noted that when it comes to financing organizations, le politque est roi, or “the politician is king.”

Damlakhi drew attention to the fact that civil society does the job of the state without the adequate support of the state. The flexibility is beneficial to public officials with changing priorities, but it can pose significant challenges for associations, especially when funding becomes politicized and clientelistic. Fatima

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289 Concerns about embezzlement are often sensationalized. In 2013, politician Sylvie Andrieux funneled public funding into non-existent associations; other high profile stories have heightened awareness about embezzlement and corruption among associations. These concerns have led to more budget cuts for organizations.

290 Nora Preziosi, interview by Elizabeth Shackney, January, 2017, Marseille, France.

291 An interesting note: Preziosi focused additional remarks on the ways in which she helped individuals. When someone in need of a lawyer comes to see her, she said, she calls a lawyer. When they need health services, she connects them to the right provider. "If someone’s son goes to prison," she said, "she comes to me, I call the director of the prison and make sure there’s an intervention…I’m an elected official but I only do social work.”

292 Anonymous, interview by Elizabeth Shackney, January, 2017, Marseille, France.
Rhazi, a recipient of the Legion of Honour, is the founder and director of Femmes d’ici et d’ailleurs, an association geared toward professional insertion for immigrant women. On top of the association’s success in professional insertion, the organization helps women build confidence and community. We discussed the relationship between Femmes d’ici and the government, and Rhazi was visibly frustrated. She explained that over the years, they received less and less funding from the collectivité locale, or local government, and so she now does her best to finance their activity with catering. Now that the city, department, and region are all governed by politicians on the right, “their mentality is ‘do more with less.’ We’ve already been getting along with almost nothing, and now we have to do our work with nothing at all.”

Each day is a struggle to keep the organization afloat without succumbing to political demands. Nasserra Benmarnia, Attaché to Deputy Patrick Menucci, active in the Socialist political scene, and formerly involved in the association Union des familles musulmans (Union of Muslim Families), echoed these concerns from an institutional perspective. What the state is incapable of supporting, it asks of the associations, and up until recently, it supplied nearly sufficient funding to the associations to do this work. This has changed, as “there is a crisis that came because the institutions were taken by the parties of the right who decided to manage other missions and be less involved in solidarity…today there are associations who close more and more.”

Civil society associations have taken on a significant role in community and urban development, but they receive limited and temporary funding. Interviewees

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293 Fatima Rhazi, interview by Elizabeth Shackney, January, 2017, Marseille, France.
294 Nassera Benmarnia, interview by Elizabeth Shackney, January, 2017, Marseille, France.
also discussed the political complications involved in funding the work of associations. Vincent Geisser, a sociologist and political scientist who has studied Islam and discrimination in France extensively, explained that these issues are particularly salient in Marseille:

All the associations for immigrants are very much controlled by the government, and it is difficult for them to work independently and to have their autonomy, whereas in other cities, associations work on projects independently and without the government controlling them all the time…There is a clientelism with associations where politicians give money to organizations who in return promise their vote and bring residents to also vote for the people who gave them money. Politics are very present within associations in Marseille. 295

According to Geisser and others, the associations that empower the population or work against the goals of the politicians are less likely to receive support. For example, Fatima Rhazi’s *Femmes d’ici et d’ailleurs* teaches immigrant women English and helps them prepare for citizenship exams. In Rhazi’s view, the government is reluctant to grant citizenship to more foreigners on French soil, and because organizations like hers run counter to these political interests, they receive less funding and must cut their budgets. This model impedes progress. Rhazi explains,

The aim of the associations is to get people out of this cycle [of poverty]. But the government says they’re trying to help these people, then blame those who don’t look for jobs or live off of the RSA, so they don’t even allow organizations to try and help this people. In the end, I don’t even want to ask for money, just for jobs for the people who come to see me.

The demand for services is high, and Rhazi’s track record is proven, but political interests prevent the implementation of projects that address the real community needs.

295 Geisser.
Some leaders have pursued other funding channels to sustain their organizations. Damlakhi’s association, *SOS Mediterranée*, does not receive any funding from the government, as their mission does not align with current priorities. *SOS* rescues migrants and refugees, bringing them to safety in Europe. Damlakhi believes that the politics of the refugee crisis prevent the institutions from funding the association, so they instead participate in crowdfunding campaigns.\textsuperscript{206} Other associations have consciously decided not to apply for government subventions. For instance, two women, Marie Fresson and Saïda Driouiche, run a small religious dialogue organization that is removed from institutional structures, and they do not anticipate working with local officials anytime soon. Working outside of public institutions, or working with minimal public support, comes at a cost: budgets are tight, and leaders work around the clock to ensure that their associations survive. On the other end, a large association in Lyon, *Union des Jeunes Musulmans*, provides religious and Arabic language study resources. The leaders maintain the organization’s financial independence by collecting dues, donations, and running a book store.\textsuperscript{207} However, these resources are not as accessible to the smaller organizations that support immigrants and Muslims in Marseille.

There is a lack of trust between citizens and institutions in Marseille. Civil society associations that do solidarity work have taken on the role of the state in providing services, but funding is insufficient and politicized. Interviewees like Salim Grabsi and Fatima Rhazi recognize that there are some officials who get out into the communities to better understand what is going on, who stand up for marginalized

\textsuperscript{206} Damlakhi.  
\textsuperscript{207} Medjabri.
populations, but that work is hard and receives little support from the institution. Salim and Fatima want to see more regular, genuine involvement from public officials, as long as they aren’t showing up just to have their names associated with the project. When she spoke of her crowdfunding success, Samar Damlakhi told me, “You just need to explain to people, and they will be willing to help out.” If institutional actors can also open themselves up and listen, perhaps they, too, will be willing to help out.

5.4 Institutional Accountability and the Electoral System

In 2014, only 491,097 out of approximately 850,000 residents of Marseille were registered to vote. Only 236,545 Marseille residents turned out to vote in the second round of municipal elections in 2014. The right coalition received 96,813 votes (42.4 percent), electing Jean-Claude Gaudin and his administration for the fourth time, meaning that 11.4 percent of the city’s population and 19.7 percent of registered voters supported Gaudin to be their mayor. As Peraldi notes, the right’s austerity measures and focus on urban renewal have directed resources away from the city’s poorest residents, affecting Marseille’s ethnic minorities in particular. Interviewees corroborate this point: funding for civil society organizations engaged in solidarity work is temporary and limited, subject to the whims of politicians; efforts to increase minority representation or enact substantial change are designed to have very little influence; and politicians focus on policies that improve their image, rather

298 Damlakhi.
300 Peraldi.
than those that meet the practical needs of the city’s residents. The collective impact of this evidence is that it is difficult to improve the living conditions of those living in poverty in Marseille. In 2013, over one quarter of the city lived under the poverty line, and 65 percent of the population lived in an arrondissement where 20 percent or more of the population lived below the poverty line. Given this information, how is it that Gaudin, his administration, and the right continue to win municipal elections?

Yazid Attalah, Vincent Geisser, and Alain Fourest offered evidence that the electoral map diminishes the voting power of immigrants and the poor. Recall that in Marseille, the sixteen arrondissements are paired to create sectors. The sectors elect a municipal council by proportional representation, which then elects the mayor. Tables 8 and 9 provide information on the paired districts that make up each sector, including information on poverty, immigration, age, and the winning party in the 2014 municipal election. Figures 22 and 23 illustrate poverty and immigration indicators in the paired sectors.
Table 8: Composition of Sectors, 2013\textsuperscript{301} Municipal Election Voters, 2014\textsuperscript{302,303}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Arrondissement</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Number of registered voters in 2014</th>
<th>Number of votes in 2\textsuperscript{nd} round of 2014 municipal election</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1st</td>
<td>38,733</td>
<td>43,161</td>
<td>25,975</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>35,262</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>II</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>23,995</td>
<td>31,564</td>
<td>15,783</td>
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<td>45,337</td>
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<td>47,982</td>
<td>52,562</td>
<td>32,088</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>47,000</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>IV</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>42,252</td>
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<td>74,234</td>
<td>79,985</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10th</td>
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<td>VI</td>
<td>11th</td>
<td>60,437</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{301} INSEE, “Recensement Général De La Population.”

\textsuperscript{302} “Résultats des Élections Municipales et Communautaires 2014”.

\textsuperscript{303} Data on number of voters by arrondissement not available.
### Table 9: Composition of Sectors, 2013;  Municipal Election Results, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Arrondissement</th>
<th>Percent living under the poverty line</th>
<th>Percent immigration population</th>
<th>Percent aged 17 and under</th>
<th>Percent vote for Front National</th>
<th>Winning party in 2014 municipal election</th>
<th>Percent vote for winning party</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>41.60</td>
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**Key:**
- High-poverty (25% and above)
- Mid-level poverty (18-24.99%)
- Low-poverty (10-17.99%)
- High-proportion immigrant (18% and above)
- Moderate-proportion immigrant (10-17.99%)
- Low-proportion immigrant (5-9.99%)

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**Figure 21:** Reference: Marseille Sectors

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304 INSEE, "Recensement Général De La Population."
305 Voting data by socioeconomic or ethnic information not available.
306 "Résultats Des Élections Municipales Et Communautaires 2014."
Figure 22: Marseille: Arrows = Percent Under Poverty Line, by Arrondissement (paired sectors by greyscale)

Figure 23: Marseille: Icons = Percent Immigration Population, by Arrondissement (paired sectors by greyscale)
Overall, few residents voted in the 2014 municipal elections, as only between 29 and 41 percent of the population over the age of 18 in each sector voted. Beyond turnout, when a high-poverty arrondissement is paired with a low-poverty arrondissement, or when a high-proportion immigrant arrondissement is paired with a low-proportion immigrant arrondissement, the sector is likely to be dominated by the political right. Young people, less-educated individuals, those who do not speak French at home, and immigrants, segments of the population who are likely to be left-leaning, are underrepresented among those registered to vote. This further diminishes the electoral power of disproportionately young and immigrant arrondissements with high poverty rates.\(^{307,308}\)

The relative weakness is especially clear in Sector I, where the pairing of the 1\(^{st}\) (high poverty, high-proportion immigrants) and 7\(^{th}\) (low poverty, low-proportion immigrants) arrondissements led to a win for the right. This may indicate an overwhelming influence from residents in the 7\(^{th}\) arrondissement, who are older, wealthier, and whiter, and therefore more likely to be registered to vote, than residents in the 1\(^{st}\) arrondissement.\(^{309}\) On the other hand, in Sector VII, the high-poverty, moderate-to-high-proportion immigrant pairing of the 15\(^{th}\) and 16\(^{th}\) arrondissements led to a win for the left; similarly, the winning coalition in the high-poverty, high-proportion immigration pairing in Sector II includes some representation on the left.

\(^{307}\) According to research by Braconnier et al., once registered, citizens who do not self-initiate voter registration and are later encouraged to register have only a slightly lower election turnout rate, suggesting that being registered makes one far more likely to participate politically. See: Céline Braconnier, Jean-Yves Dormagen, and Vincent Pons, "Voter Registration Costs and Disenfranchisement: Experimental Evidence from France," *American Political Science Review* (2017).

\(^{308}\) As in the United States, one must be a French citizen above the age of 18 to vote.

\(^{309}\) Unfortunately, I could not get data on registered voters by arrondissement.
One complicated feature of these data is the Front National vote. In Sector VII, a high-poverty, high-proportion immigration sector, the Front National won. In Sector VIII, the Front National gained 30.63 percent of the vote in the second round of voting. One commentator offers this explanation of the Sector VII win: “It is first and foremost the non-immigrant electorate who voted Stéphane Ravier [the Front National candidate] in the second round of municipalities, while voters with a stronger proportion of Muslim names have remained massively faithful to the left.”310 Therefore, one could assume that the Maghrebi immigrants in these areas are not among those voting Front National. However, one interviewee, Samar Damlakhi, noted that some immigrants vote for the extreme right to protect what they have attained. They are in favor of closing the door to further immigration. Perhaps the Front National’s success is mainly driven by white French, but supported by some immigrant populations. Importantly, Front National support may serve an indicator feelings of distrust in or lack of representation from traditional political parties. Full investigation of this issue is beyond the scope of this thesis.

A high proportion of the Marseillais are touched by poverty, and interviewees felt that the politics and policies of the right were especially detrimental to poor, immigrant families. Paired electoral districts compounded with underrepresented groups in the electorate provide an advantage to the right and ensure that marginalized people remain on the margins. Elsewhere, in the suburbs of Lyon such as Vaulx-en-Velin or Vénissieux, mayors of poor communes advocate for residents

and place pressure on Lyon to redistribute resources.311 Elected officials in Marseille, however, govern both the rich and the poor. These factors, along with clientelistic systems of loyalty, make it difficult to hold politicians in Marseille accountable for their actions.

Conclusion

_Civil Society and Marseille’s Institutions_

Conversations with interviewees reveal the challenges that _Marseillais_ civil society faces in its attempts to shape institutions into more inclusive, representative, and responsive bodies. All of the examples provided in this chapter, from the misappropriation of _Politique de la Ville_ funding to the politicization of associational finances, and even the electoral strength of the Front National, demonstrate an institutional disconnect from serving the needs of _all_ residents. In the end, when the framework of political possibilities is dominated by appearances and short-sighted reelection goals, the city as a whole suffers. And when the public needs a _bouc émissaire_, a scapegoat, to blame for its suffering, those who are made to seem the “least French”—the immigrants, the Muslims, the Romani—are offered up not only as a sacrifice, but also as a distraction from the dysfunctional institution. In the words of French journalist Edwy Plenel, “To agitate on the question of religion is a diversion from democratic and social issues.”312 National discourse on the compatibility of Islam and French democratic values, debate over the hijab or

311 Geisser.
312 Edwy Plenel, _For the Muslims: Islamophobia in France_ (Verso Books, 2016).
concerns about the ubiquity of halal eateries, distracts from the failures of fiscal policies that have favored the upper half of the income distribution.

**Categorizing Local Institutions**

How would we categorize the local institutions of Marseille and Lyon, how has context\(^{313}\) influenced the development of the local institutions, and why does it matter? Dominant themes in institutional rules, norms, and practices play out within the local institution as well as its relationships with governments in surrounding areas. In Marseille, these themes include non-cooperation, clientelism, and reliance on, but not full support of, civil society. Lyon’s institutions, on the other hand, have managed to cooperate with associations and surrounding communes in order to pursue common goals.

There is evidence that institution-civil society relations are strained in both cities, but conflict is more pronounced in Marseille. In Chapter One, I presented Caroline Patsias et al.’s typology of institution-civil society relations. Patsias et al. categorize Marseille’s institutional relationship with civil society as bifurcated (no resources from the state),\(^ {314}\) but given the evidence I provided on the politics and necessity of receiving public funding, it appears that the relationship is better categorized as a combination of mostly tutelage\(^ {315}\) (dependent on state resources) and some state- or municipal-led corporatism (clientelistic engagement, state-created but

\(^{313}\) Geographical, historical, economic, demographic, and political contexts described in Chapters Three and Four.

\(^{314}\) Bifurcated: “When groups are self-organized and do not receive resources from the state but are linked to the state via clientelism”

\(^{315}\) Tutelage: “When civil society is dependent on state resources and the method of engagement with the state is associationalism”
These relationships are particularly salient for organizations engaged with immigrant groups. As for Lyon, without as much information to draw from, it appears that politics have a less significant influence over the city’s institution-civil society relations. Interviews with individuals such as Foued Medjabri, of the *Union des Jeunes Musulmans* indicate that the wealth of the city facilitates autonomous and independent organizing. Evidence on organizing in immigrant hostels in the 1970s plus Christophe Merigot’s comments on immigrants’ limited understanding of *La Duchère*’s social mix goals (see Chapter Four, Section 4.1.4) demonstrate how prevailing attitudes toward Maghrebi immigrants limit their role in institutionalization and decision-making processes. Therefore, the institution-civil society relationship in Lyon can be classified as participatory publics mixed with tutelage. Therefore, in both cities, systemic barriers to participation prevent full inclusion of dissenting voices, but these barriers are most pronounced in Marseille.

Multi-level governance structures also affect the ways in which residents feel included in institutionalization processes, and they are a necessary component of competitive urban economies. Salet and Thornley offer a typology of four potential regional governance (or in the case of France, EPCI) structures. Marseille’s EPCI was nonexistent up until the 1990s, whereas Lyon’s EPCI began to function in the 1970s. Marseille’s current EPCI is best described as a weak form of “functional coordination,” meaning that, at this point, they “organize cooperatively at the

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316 State-led corporatism: When “social organizations created by the State…depend on clientelistic modes of engagement on autonomous social organizations”

317 Patsias, Julian, and Daniel.

318 Participatory publics: When groups are able to determine their own goals and interests while still being linked to the state and participating in the process of institutionalization.
functional level, through a provision of a particular service.” When the structure does function smoothly, it can combat fragmentation and lead to efficient development. However, the downside to functional coordination is its technocratic nature and its distance from the electorate, it can “reproduce existing (unequal) relationships,” and it “cannot fully compensate for any structural conflicts in the formal constitutions.”

Lyon’s EPCI is an example of a strong “unitary regional government” with weaker local governments. This model is functional and efficient, and the EPCI can coordinates services, infrastructure, and public transportation across communes efficiently. The included communes are seldom competitive with one another, and there is “high potential for interregional and international networks because of the powerful regional government.” Downsides to the model include potentially diminished quality of the democratic experience, limits to what can be controlled from the center of the EPCI, and an inability to manage urban sprawl and other external issues. The greatest challenge for ongoing EPCI development is democratizing intercommunal structures, so that residents can contribute to this increasingly important administrative level.

How has context influenced these classifications? The geography of each city, their relationships with surrounding communes, and the practices implemented by urban leadership shaped institutional and economic development. The physical boundaries of Marseille, mountains on one side, sea on the other, limited urban

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319 Salet and Thornley, p. 196.
320 Ibid.
321 Ibid., p. 194.
sprawl as well as the idea of a coherent space of cooperation with surrounding communes. Its distance from Paris, its location on the Mediterranean, and its role as a port city led to competition with nearby town for autonomy as well as its entangled relationship with the North African colonies and *pied noir* populations. The port economy led to the inclusion of factories within the city proper, at least until after World War II. Lyon, on the other hand, developed within a more coherent intercommunal space, and the city was the first municipality incorporated into the French nation. Labor organizing pushed factories to the outskirts of the Lyon, which has had lasting effects on socio-spatial composition. Relationships between civil society and local government (primarily in Marseille), as well as relationships between local government and surrounding communes (in both cities) were shaped by these and other contexts. Both cities’ EPCI are evidence of how these relationships and practices are institutionalized.

It is not sufficient to say that Marseille and Lyon’s institutions are structures handed down from or imposed by Paris. Local practices derive from local context and are institutionalized over time, but certain segments of society (immigrants, Muslims, low-income residents, etc.) are excluded from taking part in the institutionalization process. Forms of institution-driven exclusion include ethnic minority representative councils, the membership of which is composed of actors supporting institutional aims, insufficient or superficial policy responses to real community needs, and the politicization of associational funding. These practices ensure that only the elites, the notables, and their priorities are reflected in the institutions, while simultaneously creating an image of an inclusive and responsive body. This process is most evident
in a city like Marseille, where the evolution of its institutions has led to visible inequities contained within the city limits.

Yazid Attalah and Salim Grabsi’s activism yielded the *Pacte de Cohesion Sociale*, a framework that could positively impact the lives of vulnerable populations in Marseille if implemented fully. Marseille’s EPCI is changing significantly and is more collaborative than before under the new Marseille-Aix-Provence Métropole; Lyon’s EPCI has come a long way. Increased integration over time and voter registration efforts could potentially address accountability issues within the electoral structure. There is much work to do in order to improve economic, political, and social realities for Maghrebi immigrants and their descendants, but it can be done intentionally and sustainably. Context matters, and institutions matter, but neither is immutable.
**CONCLUSION: IN SEARCH OF SOLIDARITY**

Superiority? Inferiority?
Why not simply try to touch the other, feel the other, discover each other?
Was my freedom not given me to build the world of you, man?
— Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*

**Chapter Review**

In Chapter One, I established that institutions shape societies, beliefs, and conceptions of what is possible. Dominant political institutions can institutionalize social hierarchy, but they can also institutionalize access and participation, minimizing clientelistic tendencies and increasing accountability for elected officials. Robert Putnam argues that strong civil society networks lead to the success of democracies, but I support Per Mouritsen and Nick Vlahos in their assertions that Putnam’s analysis is incomplete, as “partisan government actors, decentralized institutions, and writ law shape opportunities of public participation rather than neutrally responding to bottom-up pressure for greater political inclusion.”

I argued that the practices of local government in Marseille serve as an example of how institutions limit or control civil society. Additionally, I outlined central, local, and multi-level government structures in France, directing attention to how decentralization has devolved social welfare responsibility to the local level. Diminishing resources have hindered the ability of local institutions to address social issues.

National hegemony and colonial expansion are two formative features of French institutions. In Chapter Two, I traced how the evolution of immigration and

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322 Vlahos, pp. 17-18.
integration in France, as well as the shifting discourses on citizenship and identity, provide national context for addressing social issues on the local level. Jean-Marie Le Pen placed blame for economic insecurity on Muslim North African immigrant populations; similar forces set the stage for decentralization. In Chapter Three, I incorporated the national context of the previous chapters into descriptions of local urban contexts. I described the geographical, historical, economic, social, and political backgrounds of the cities in order to establish similarities and differences between them. In Chapter Four, I explored local responses to national challenges (housing, economic transition, and EPCI development), noting how they diverge. Finally, in Chapter Five, I looked specifically at municipal-civil society relations in Marseille, as well as interviewees’ perceptions of processes of social and political change. The actions of local government officials were often described as *maquillage*, referring to policy driven by appearances that leads to only short-term fixes. Representational bodies for Muslims, immigrants, or low-income individuals are devoid of any real power. This chapter directly addressed Putnam’s claims, as I argued that local institutions explicitly and implicitly exclude certain populations from participating in political life.

**Key Findings**

I find that discrimination and segregation, which fit into frameworks of national institutional development, persist in both Marseille and Lyon, although socio-spatial differences exist between the two cities. Whereas the relationship between poverty and immigration is similar in both cities, poverty is far more
pronounced in Marseille. Additionally, Marseille’s low-income immigrant communities live within the city proper, whereas in Lyon, they mostly exist autonomously in separate communes outside of the city proper but as members and beneficiaries of the Lyon agglomeration. These divergences stem from variance in the location of industry, which is the result of urban geographies, histories of social and political action, and local institutional differences.

I also find that the development of intercommunal structures (EPCI) proved to be a necessary urban development in the latter half of the twentieth century, so that cities could compete on a global scale. Relationships with surrounding communes as well as socio-spatial composition were determinant factors of the success of EPCI. Given the more collaborative nature of the relationships between Lyon and its surrounding communes, as well as its particular socio-spatial structure, the Lyon EPCI came together relatively quickly. In contrast, relationships between Marseille and surrounding communes can be categorized as “non-cooperative.” This, combined with the socio-spatial structure of the region, created significant obstacles for EPCI development in Marseille, ultimately affecting the city’s ability to compete for economic investment. Marseille’s current day EPCI functions under a developing form of “functional coordination,” meaning that there is some cooperation to deliver resources, but it has not yet reached its full potential for collaboration. Lyon’s current day EPCI can be classified as a “unitary regional government,” meaning that services, infrastructure, and public transportation are coordinated efficiently.323

323 Salet and Thornley.
Finally, institution-civil society relations are strained in both cities, though again, differences are more pronounced in Marseille. In Marseille, civil society is largely dependent on state resources and relationships are clientelistic. Some groups remain self-organized, but others are organized by the institution to facilitate the distribution of public services. In Lyon, less dependence on state funding means that groups are better able to determine their own goals and interests, although institutional influence over civil society organizing remains. Of greatest concern in Marseille is the lack of accountability measures for public figures, as voter turnout is low and the district configuration suppresses the electoral power of minority voices.

Equal opportunity for participation in local decision-making has not been institutionalized, particularly in Marseille. Instead, programs and policies that appear to be inclusive or responsive have little impact on the communities they are intended to help. These actions include figurehead representative councils for Muslims, which include politically-appointed members who do not fully represent the needs of diverse French Muslims, and policy frameworks that funnel money into construction projects and an associational elite. Local institutions maintain the status quo by creating a responsive and inclusive image but not actually realizing inclusion.

**Limitations and Directions for Future Research**

My research was limited by my language skills, French restrictions on studying race and ethnicity, and access to interviewees. There is significant research on integration in Marseille in the French language, but Anglophone academic research is less common and, as previously mentioned, tends to mythologize the city
as either a haven for diverse groups of immigrants or as a dangerous Muslim stronghold on the verge of destruction. France’s “color-blind” approach to race and ethnicity limit the accuracy of information about Muslims and those with immigrant origins, and thus limit the strength of claims about discrimination. In my research, this obstacle coupled with the language barrier has made it difficult to gather precise information about who lives where.

Another limitation in my research was access to interviewees and information. As I spent approximately four months in Marseille in 2015, I had an already-established understanding of the city, as well as a network of friends (potential translators!) and professional and academic connections there. Additionally, I was fortunate to connect with one man, Yazid Attalah, in Marseille, who then set up multiple meetings and interviews for me in the city. I knew only one person in Lyon and was unable to find an equivalent to Yazid there, so I had to rely solely on responses to e-mails in order to schedule any interviews. Therefore, there is significantly more detail included on Marseille, and Lyon functions as a sometimes-incomplete comparison. Despite these limitations, I believe that the information I do provide presents Lyon as an example of another path that French cities followed. In other words, Lyon’s development shows that Marseille’s development is not necessarily typical of French cities.

I suggest several directions for future research. First, many of the theoretical relationships that I presented—between global economic change and EPCI development, between decentralization and inequities, between electoral sectors in Marseille and the efficacy of representation—should be evaluated quantitatively. It is
also important to locate data that includes detailed information on national origins in order to more rigorously assess the effects of municipal policy on minority populations. This data exists, but can be difficult to locate or obtain.

Future research should include a more robust comparative study of EPCI development in France, including more cities and deeper analysis of the development processes. Such research could also extend to evaluating the development and importance of metropolitan areas in other European countries as well as in the United States. How will recent territorial reforms, such as the *loi NOTRE*, further democratize the local level?

Marseille’s electoral patterns lend to an interesting study of how the Front National has been successful in an urban area, and its success in the 13th and 14th *arrondissements* of Marseille is particularly fascinating; these areas also merit further study. Finally, European decentralization would lend itself to comparison with federalism and inequities in the United States. There is a body of literature on federalism and health policy, notably Medicaid programs, as well as varied U.S. state approaches to immigration; additionally, there is literature on decentralization and effective governance.324,325,326 One might concisely examine the conditions under which decentralization and federalism exacerbate inequities rather than democratize communities.

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Implications for Social Democracy

The French social welfare system is in crisis. The system works exceptionally well for about sixty percent of the population, particularly those who are “well educated, well paid, forty years old or older, and married with children,” who have guaranteed job security and generous pensions. But this security comes at great cost to a large minority. High unemployment is the key consequence of French social and economic policy. Job security, therefore, is only useful if you are able to find employment, and it comes “at the expense of the very people who do not enjoy it.” Those who feel economically insecure, who fear that their livelihoods are threatened by globalization and immigrant populations, want someone to be held accountable for their losses.

In France, mainstream politicians, particularly those on the left, place blame on economic forces beyond national political control, namely globalization. It is not true, however, that politicians have been powerless in the face of globalization; instead, as exemplified in Marseille, they have enacted policy that has protected only part of the French population and created significant insecurity for others. According to Smith, “the French model itself is the leading cause of the social and economic crisis. It has served not to diminish inequality and unemployment, but rather to institutionalize these scourges on both class and racial lines.”

Ethnic minorities, women, and immigrants are particularly vulnerable, and the white

328 Ibid., p. 10.
329 The results of which include: “red tape, high deficits which crowded out investment and made high interest rates necessary, an overvalued currency, and tight labor laws,” Smith (2004), p. 12.
330 Smith, p. 12.
working class has grown angry, insecure, and fearful. Many feel that Socialist President François Hollande has betrayed the interests of the working class.

White working class anger is directed toward those who are also facing significant economic insecurity, such as immigrants, refugees, or Arab Muslims. Marine Le Pen, daughter of Jean-Marie Le Pen and the current leader of the Front National, has taken up the fight for the white working class. According to Le Pen’s iteration of the Front National, mainstream politicians are not protecting workers against globalization, and they privilege undeserving immigrant populations instead. The Front National has gained political support in areas that have traditionally been Communist or Socialist strongholds, where inequality has grown and industry has declined. Even a small influx of immigrants “compound[s] the sense of a changing world,” and the Front National has once again capitalized on economic insecurity and channeled white French anger into fear of Islamic extremism.331 While the mainstream Left blames external forces, Le Pen places blame on the establishment, but particularly on the ways in which it has ignored the “Muslim problem.” Just as the economic insecurity that followed the 1973 oil crisis gave rise to the Front National and its scapegoating in the 1980s, the 2008 financial crisis, rising labor competition, and the resulting deprived urban spaces have made the party’s anti-immigrant appeals salient yet again. Le Pen is reaffirming institutionalized nativism.

The Front National has filled a void for white working class voters where the Left used to be, and minority groups pay the price. Whereas some French economic restrictions are linked to the country’s membership in the European Union, the pitfalls

of the social welfare system are the result of the failure of French politicians to adequately address the nation’s economic problems. The comfort and security of those protected by the social safety net comes at the expense of a large minority, and political institutions support this protective paradigm in the appropriated name of “solidarity.” By supporting this system, the political left converges with the political right, and extreme parties seem to be the only alternative to an amalgamated mainstream. The ultimate consequence of these processes is the weakening of pluralistic democracy. A political science professor at Sciences Po in Paris, Dominique Reynié, asserts, “If we consider the invention of pluralistic democracy at the end of the 19th century, it was founded on the possibility of making a choice between the right and the left...If we have lost this duality, we have probably lost the mechanical principle of democracy.” The fate of democracy thus rests on whether or not political institutions can act in true solidarity and represent all, and not just part, of their citizenries.

While the patterns of discrimination and economic disparities presented in this thesis are particularly noticeable in Marseille, the same correlations between immigration status and poverty indicators persist in Lyon. The processes that go on in these cities are emblematic of institutional priorities on every level—in France and in Europe. When institutions limit the power of civil society organizations advocating for equal rights and opportunities, and when electoral systems make it difficult to hold elected officials and their administrations accountable, the interests of an area’s most vulnerable residents go unheard, unrepresented, and unaddressed. The Muslim

332 Smith.
North African immigrants, and those standing up on their behalf, in my interviews and in the reports, books, and articles that I read, do not feel represented, and the political institutions that shape their access to opportunity are not acting on their behalf.

The problems facing France’s social welfare system are not unique, as issues such as long-term unemployment and income inequality are common. Socialist parties in countries across Europe are not faring well, as the left lacks “a narrative that tries to unite the different sectors of the working class.” Britain’s vote to exit the European Union as well as the election of United States President Donald Trump serve as concrete external examples of what can happen when mainstream political parties fail to mitigate the social and economic reverberations of globalization. Therefore, the instability and policy responses as described in Marseille and in France prove to be particularly relevant to our understanding of modern social conditions and political events.

**Implications for Solidarity**

What would real democratic solidarity look like? The Open Society Foundation’s report, *Muslims in Marseille*, concludes with a set of recommendations for Marseille’s City Hall, employment departments, the housing departments, among other areas of municipal administration. The recommendations implore equal treatment of and opportunity for Muslims and ethnic minorities. They suggest

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334 Rubin.
335 Lorcerie and Geisser.
conducting detailed studies of the labor market experiences of those from migrant backgrounds and the implementation of training schemes and apprenticeships that attract Maghrebis and Comorians. Other recommendations focus on public housing and representation on public committees. These include equitable distribution of public housing, better representation of minorities on public housing allocation committees, opening up representation to more diverse and younger Muslims on Marseille Espérance, and more equitable recruitment for the municipal police force.  

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What these items have in common is an element of sacrifice. When barriers to employment, housing, or representation are lowered, competition increases, and those who were previously guaranteed security find that their privilege has been diminished. Danielle Allen writes, “Since democracy claims to secure the good of all citizens, those people who benefit less than others from particular political decisions, but nonetheless accede to those decisions, preserve the stability of political institutions. Their sacrifice makes collective democratic action possible.”  

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Democracy requires sacrifice, and an even distribution of risk, for the common good. But it is not democratic for only a few designated social or demographic groups to consistently bear these burdens.

In his description of the Reading Terminal Market of Philadelphia, Elijah Anderson heralds the “cosmopolitan canopy:” the everyday, ethnically diverse spaces in which “all kinds of people” acknowledge one another, cultivate trust, and create a

336 Ibid.
sense of safety and security, regardless of identity. African craft shops, Jewish bakeries, Asian markets, and Amish produce stands operate side by side in this space, facilitating connection and community, often through the acts of sharing and experiencing food. The Reading Terminal Market is an excellent parallel to the markets of Marseille, the public spaces where the city’s diversity is celebrated and visible. Experiences of acknowledgment and appreciation in bustling public spaces provide us with a vision of an egalitarian society, but these moments are fleeting. Anderson asserts that cosmopolitan canopies allow individuals the chance to “encounter others and so work toward a more cosmopolitan appreciation of difference.” Too often, however, our appreciation for difference does not extend to support for redistributive measures.

Democratic solidarity means moving beyond simply getting along. It involves building trust, valuing the common good, and engaging in consistent conversation. It involves income redistribution, increased opportunity for employment, and representation that reflects the demographic makeup of a society. Solidarity requires sacrifice. Inclusive rules, norms, and practices must be institutionalized, for in the end, liberté, égalité, and fraternité that applies to only some means liberté, égalité, and fraternité for none at all.

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339 Ibid.
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