From Farm to Sanctuary

by

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We’re born into this world with pollutants already in our bloodstream, our bodies corrupted by atmospheric poisons all the way down to our DNA. Our relationships, both within and across the categories to which we’ve been assigned, are strained and often break under the weight of the lies we’ve been told about ourselves and each other. We’re estranged from other animals and the rest of the natural world, which we can only vaguely perceive through the haze of the stories we’ve been told all of our lives...How can we be true to ourselves or others in such a disconnected state? And, if we can’t be true, how can we hope to do the things that we need to do to make things right?

- pattrice jones (2010, 191)
Introduction

This thesis aims to trouble the recent movement back to small-scale, humane, family farming and poses sanctuary as a moral alternative to farming nonhuman animals. Currently, humans raise and kill billions of nonhuman animals every year to satisfy culinary desires. The majority of these farmed animals are raised on industrial “factory” farms, which have been widely critiqued for their disregard for human well-being, nonhuman well-being, and the environment. Thus, small, family farming is seen as a preferable alternative to factory farming. In this thesis, I argue that small farms are morally objectionable due to the farm spaces themselves as well as the values and structures they perpetuate. Instead, I discuss how formerly farmed nonhuman animals should be incorporated into society as members of an interspecies sanctuary community, in which they are able to shape their own lives and contribute to the flourishing of others in the community. In this way, sanctuary offers a radical rethinking of how we conceptualize and relate to “farmed” nonhuman animals.

I begin with a discussion of factory farming and its multitude of negative effects in order to contextualize my analysis of small-scale farming and sanctuary, two alternatives to industrialized animal agriculture.


Industrialized animal agriculture, or “factory” farming, dominates food production in the United States, with 99 percent of farmed animals being raised on factory farms (Foer 2009, 35). In contrast to the idyllic image of cows grazing on rolling green pastures, industrial farming consists of hundreds to thousands of
animals living in close confinement, usually indoors. In order to be classified as a
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation (CAFO), or factory farm, a farm must
have a minimum of 300 cows raised for beef, 200 cows raised for dairy, 750 pigs, or
37,500 chickens (Follmer and Termini 2010, 52). Larger CAFOs have upwards of
1,000 cows, 2,500 hogs, or 125,000 chickens (ibid.). This confinement and high
animal density allows for meat, dairy, and eggs to be produced in large quantities at
low prices.

Industrialized animal agriculture began in 1923. Celia Steele, living on the
Delmarva (Delaware-Maryland-Virginia) Peninsula, had been raising a flock of
chickens for her family's consumption. One day, she accidentally received 500
chicks instead of the 50 she had ordered (Foer 2009, 105). To keep all of them
through the winter, she housed the chickens indoors and added vitamins A and D
to their feed in order to help them survive without exercise or sunlight (ibid.).
Twelve years later, her 50 chickens had become 250,000; modern factory farming
had begun (ibid.). In fact, today, the Delmarva’s primary economic activity is
poultry production.

Following Steele’s discovery, through the 1930s, factory farming giants such
as Arthur Perdue and John Tyson helped to generate methods to make industrial
poultry farming as cheap and efficient as possible. Government subsidies aided in
the production of cheap corn to feed the birds, and lights were used to manipulate
their natural growth cycles (Foer 2009, 105-106). In the 1940s, antibiotics were
added to feed in order to stop the spread of disease (ibid.). In 1946, the genetic codes
of chickens were altered to produce an animal that would supply the most breast
meat (ibid.). Thus, two types of chickens – broiler chickens for meat and layer hens
for eggs – were born (ibid.).
Similar fates befall other farmed animal species, such as pigs. In the mid-1900s, North Carolina hog farmers saw profit in “total confinement,” in which hogs are housed in indoor holding pens, just large enough for their bodies (Thompson 2000). This confinement allowed for increased profits, as less land, labor, fencing, and feed (due to lack of exercise) were required (ibid.). By 1983, North Carolina was producing the most pigs in the nation (ibid.).

The rise of industrialized farming has been incredibly lucrative. Perdue Farms, founded by aforementioned Arthur Perdue, makes over $6 billion in sales annually, and produced 640 million birds in 2011 alone (Perdue Farms 2017). Factory farming produces the majority of animal products consumed in the US, with just a few large corporations responsible. This consolidation and profitability is a marker of industrialized agriculture more generally, but it is especially visible in the industrialized farming of animals.

Although factory farming has been highly successful in producing large quantities of animal-based foods at low costs, it has also been criticized for a number of reasons. The consequences of factory farming impact farmed animals, the environment, human public health, and meat industry workers.

**Animal well-being on factory farms**

Farmed animals living on factory farms have very poor well-being. Their well-being is negatively impacted due to genetic manipulation, extreme captivity, “routine” procedures, and slaughter. To demonstrate this, I will discuss the experiences of factory-farmed chickens, turkeys, pigs, and cows. Suffering due to “routine” procedures and genetic manipulation will be discussed at length in chapter 1.

*Chickens and Turkeys*
Factory-farmed chickens exploited for eggs, or “layer hens,” are housed in “battery cages” that are so small they have less than an 8 x 11 sheet of paper to occupy, meaning they cannot even open their wings (Foer 2009; Fiber-Ostrow and Lovell 2016). These cages are stacked on top of one another in windowless sheds (Foer 2009, 47). Layer hens are starved by not being fed for two weeks at a time in order to shock their bodies into producing more eggs (Fiber-Ostrow and Lovell 2016); this is known as “force molting.” After a year or two, when a hen is no longer able to produce as many eggs, she is sent to slaughter (ibid.).

Broiler chickens raised for meat are genetically engineered to have large bodies that grow incredibly quickly (Striffler 2005); as will be discussed in chapter 1, this manipulation causes suffering and death (Gauthier and Ludlow 2017). Broilers are raised in large buildings that pack as many as 20,000 birds together; they do not have much more space than caged layer hens (Fiber-Ostrow and Lovell 2016). After only about seven weeks, broiler chickens are slaughtered (ibid.). Similar to broilers, turkeys are densely packed into warehouse-like facilities and suffer due to enlarged, genetically-manipulated bodies (Wartman 2011).

In Eating Animals, Jonathan Safran Foer describes how chickens and turkeys are slaughtered in a manner that poses serious ethical concerns (2009, 132-133). The birds are grabbed by their wings and legs in order to be loaded into the transport truck, causing broken limbs. They are not given food or water, even if the slaughterhouse is hundreds of miles away. Upon arrival, they are grabbed by the workers and hung in shackles by their legs. The birds are then dunked into an electrified water bath in order to paralyze them; they are often still conscious after this, as the current in the bath is only one tenth of what would be needed to render them unconscious. Next, their necks are sliced open by a blade, causing the birds to slowly bleed out. Some birds twist and flap to miss the blade; although
slaughterhouses are supposed to have “backup cutters,” it is impossible for the workers to catch every missed bird. Finally, they are dunked into a vat of boiling water (called the “scalding tank”) in order to be defeathered. If their throats have not been cut, they are conscious when boiled; this happens to millions of birds every year.

**Pigs and Cows**

Female pigs, or sows, used for breeding are usually housed in gestation crates during their pregnancies (Foer 2009, 183). These crates do not allow the sows to turn around or lay down comfortably (Fiber-Ostrow and Lovell 2016). Before their piglets are born, they are moved to “farrowing crates,” which are not any larger (Foer 2009, 184). The piglets are castrated without anesthesia and removed from their mothers (ibid., 186-187). They are confined to concrete-floored pens for four months until they are slaughtered for meat (Fiber-Ostrow and Lovell 2016, 235). Breeding sows are once again impregnated, and this cycle continues. Once the sow is no longer able to reproduce, she is also sent to slaughter.

Female cows used for dairy experience a constant cycle of impregnation, birth, loss of their calves, and milking in order to produce milk for human consumption (Gruen 1993; Gillespie 2013). These cows live indoors in tiny stalls with concrete floors and little enrichment (Fiber-Ostrow and Lovell 2016). The intensive birth/milking cycle causes illnesses such as mastitis (an infection of the udder) and lameness (Gruen 1993; Gillespie 2013). Cows are finally slaughtered for meat once they are “spent” and unable reproduce (ibid.).

Cows killed for beef are raised on feedlots by the thousands and fed a fattening diet of grain. Grain is not a natural food source for bovine animals whose physiology is designed to eat grasses; thus, grain has a deleterious effect on the digestive systems of cows (Pollan 2006). Still, a diet predominantly comprised of
grain is fed to cows in order to help them gain weight quickly. Once they weigh enough, they are sent to slaughter (Fiber-Ostrow and Lovell 2016).

Cows and pigs are slaughtered in a similar manner. First, they are transported to the slaughterhouse without food or water (Foer 2009). At the slaughterhouse, they are stunned in order to render them unconscious. Cows are shot in the skull with a penetrating captive bolt gun (in which a metal bolt is fired into the brain) while pigs can be stunned either by captive bolt gun or electricity (Fiber-Ostrow and Lovell 2016). After being stunned, the animals are hung by their back legs, have their throats slit, are dismembered, skinned, and have their organs removed (Pachirat 2011; Gillespie 2011). Pigs are additionally placed into a “scalding tank” full of boiling water in order to remove their hair and skin (Fiber-Ostrow and Lovell 2016). If the animals are not stunned correctly, they can be conscious for minutes after their throats are slit (Pachirat 2011). Therefore, many animals are still conscious when they are dismembered, skinned, and/or boiled (Pachirat 2011; Fiber-Ostrow and Lovell 2016). In fact, Foer writes that one in four slaughterhouses do not render the animal unconscious on the first attempt, and slaughterhouses often intentionally make stunning less effective because they want the animals’ hearts to keep pumping so they bleed out quickly (2009, 229-230).

**Environmental impacts of factory farming**

In addition to animal well-being, factory farming has detrimental effects on the environment and contributes heavily to climate change. Animal agriculture emits large amounts of greenhouse gases (GHGs) through clearing land to raise livestock and grow feed, supporting the farmed animals during their lives, processing and transporting animal products, farmed animal respiration and release of carbon dioxide, and methane production from both digestion and the breakdown of animal waste (Goodland and Anhang 2009; Geiling 2016). In fact, according to a
study by Goodland and Anhang, “livestock and their byproducts actually account for at least 32,564 million tons of CO₂ per year, or 51 percent of annual worldwide GHG emissions” (2009, 11). In comparison, transportation accounted for only 14% of GHG emissions in 2010 (EPA 2017).

Factory farming also consumes large amounts of finite resources, such as water. Water is used on the crops grown for farmed animal consumption, given to the animals to drink during their lives, and used to clean places the animals are raised and killed. Gerbens-Leenes et al. found that almost one third of freshwater on Earth is used in the production of animal products (Gerbens-Leenes et al. 2013). In fact, George Borgstrom calculated that producing one pound of beef requires 2,500 gallons of water (Environmental Working Group 2011). Non-meat animal products also require large amounts of water; for example, one pound of eggs uses 477 gallons of water and one pound of cheese uses almost 900 gallons of water (ibid.). In comparison, tofu requires 219 gallons of water per pound (ibid.).

Analyzing the amount of water consumed per gram of protein, plant-based protein is the most conservation-friendly. A study conducted by Mekonnen and Hoekstra found that “the water footprint per gram of protein for milk, eggs and chicken meat is about 1.5 times larger than for pulses [lentils, chickpeas, and beans]. For beef, the water footprint per gram of protein is 6 times larger than for pulses” (2010, 5). Therefore, industrial animal farming negatively impacts the environment by wasting water, a finite and essential resource, without any superior nutritional benefit.

Additionally, animal agriculture dominates the earth’s land. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, a third of the earth’s land surface is used to raise livestock and grow livestock feed (Matthews 2006). Deforestation occurs as more and more forests are cleared. For example, animal
agriculture has caused up to 91% of the destruction of the Amazon rainforest, largely due to cattle ranching (Margulis 2004). Deforestation is concerning because trees can no longer absorb greenhouses gases such as carbon dioxide; also, deforestation leads to species loss through habitat destruction. In fact, up to 137 species become extinct every day due to the destruction of the rainforest (NASA 1998). Moreover, animal agriculture negatively impacts ocean and river biodiversity by causing “deadzones.” Deadzones occur when runoff from agriculture deposits excess nutrients (due to the use of fertilizers) into oceans and rivers, causing an overgrowth of algae. The algae consume all of the oxygen present so other marine species cannot survive (National Ocean Service 2014).

Last, factory farming is detrimental to the environment due to the production of animal waste. The USDA estimates that over 335 million tons of waste are produced every year (GRACE Communications Foundation 2017). This is 130 times as much waste as humans in the US produce (Foer 2009, 174). Factory-farmed animals are so heavily concentrated that it is impossible for the surrounding fields to absorb even a fraction of their waste, so it is stored in lagoons (ibid., 177). These lagoons often leak, allowing waste to escape and contaminate groundwater, lakes, rivers, and oceans. The waste kills wildlife and pollutes the environment (ibid., 178). In 1995, Smithfield, one of the largest pork producers in the US, spilled over 20 million gallons of pig waste into a North Carolina river, resulting in 7,000 violations of the Clean Water Act (ibid.). The EPA estimates that as of 2009, farmed animal waste has polluted 35,000 rivers in 22 states (ibid., 179).

Therefore, factory farming has detrimental consequences for the environment. Animal agriculture strongly contributes to climate change by producing more GHGs than all forms of transportation combined (Goodland and Anhang 2009; EPA 2017). Almost one third of the earth’s freshwater is used for
animal farming (Gerbens-Leenes et al. 2013) as well as one third of the earth’s land, therefore causing large-scale deforestation and destruction of wildlife habitats (Matthews 2006). Finally, farmed animal waste as well as fertilizers pollute groundwater, rivers, and oceans, causing deadzones and killing wildlife.

**Factory farming impacts on human health**

The massive production of farmed animal waste is dangerous to human health, and people living near factory farms are particularly vulnerable. When waste lagoons are full, farmers will often spray manure onto surrounding areas to “get rid of it.” Smithfield simply sprays liquefied manure up into the air (Foer 2009, 176), causing people who live nearby to inhale it. This is harmful as pig feces, for example, contain methane, ammonia, cyanide, carbon monoxide, heavy metals, and over 100 pathogens than can infect humans, such as salmonella and giardia (ibid., 175). Communities of people living near factory farms complain about “persistent nosebleeds, earaches, chronic diarrhea, and burning lungs” (ibid., 176). Situating factory farms in low income communities of color will be discussed in chapter 1.

Additionally, factory farming is dangerous to public health as the animals are fed antibiotics to prevent the outbreak of disease due to their close confinement (Foer 2009). According to Farm Sanctuary, “Upwards of 75 percent of the antibiotics fed to farm animals end up undigested in their urine and manure. Through this waste, the antibiotics may contaminate crops and waterways and ultimately be ingested by humans” (Farm Sanctuary 2017c). Thus, humans are exposed to large amounts of antibiotics, which leads to antibiotic resistance, a major health concern. Antibiotic resistance occurs when antibiotics have been used widely and microorganisms have adapted to these drugs, making them less effective. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Each year in the United States,
at least 2 million people become infected with bacteria that are resistant to antibiotics and at least 23,000 people die each year as a direct result of these infections” (CDC 2017). Institutions including the American Medical Association and the World Health Organization (WHO) have called for a ban on the use of nontherapeutic antibiotics on factory farms in an attempt to decrease resistance (Foer 2009, 141).

Factory farming also increases the likelihood of zoonotic pathogens being created. Zoonotic pathogens are pathogens, such as viruses, that move between humans and nonhumans. Animal agriculture can aid in this because domesticated (and wild) birds harbor flu viruses. These viruses, spread through feces, can infect mammals such as humans (Foer 2009, 128). Consuming the flesh of farmed animals such as birds and contaminating the environment with their feces greatly increases the chances of humans becoming infected with a zoonotic pathogen. In fact, we already experience illness due to our nonhuman associations. For example, the swine flu, or H1N1, combines bird, human, and pig viruses (ibid., 125). In fact, Robert Webster proved that all human influenzas actually incorporate genes from flu viruses in birds (ibid., 127). The 1918 pandemic (better known as the Spanish Flu) killed between 50 and 100 million people worldwide; it was discovered in 2005 that this pathogen was a flu from birds (ibid., 124-126). According to the WHO, a future pandemic is inevitable due to our associations with farmed animals (ibid.). Factory farming further contributes to this by keeping farmed animals with weakened immune systems (due to stress, genetic manipulation, and lack of exercise) in close confinement and filthy conditions; this facilitates the growth and mutation of viruses (ibid., 142).

Industrialized slaughter additionally increases the chances of spreading nonhuman pathogens to humans through unclean slaughter and carcass-cleaning
practices (Striffler 2005; Foer 2009). When birds are dunked into a scalding tank, the feces on their feathers are transferred to the water, and fecal pathogens are absorbed into their bodies through open pores (Foer 2009, 134). The machines that remove their internal organs often accidentally rip open the intestines and contaminate the body cavity with bacteria (ibid.). Feces are not considered a “contaminant” by the industry, and these bodies are sold to consumers (ibid.). At the end of the slaughter process, chicken corpses are placed into a refrigerated tank of water to cool them. This water has been termed “fecal soup” due to all of the feces and bacteria in it; this contaminates even healthy chicken bodies, which soak up the fecal water (Striffler 2005, 163; Foer 2009, 135). In fact, 83% of chicken meat purchased is infected with bacteria (Foer 2009, 139). Consuming this flesh increases the chances of a pathogen being transferred to humans.

**Labor conditions for meat industry workers**

In *Every Twelve Seconds* (2011), Timothy Pachirat documents his experience working in a cattle slaughterhouse in Omaha, Nebraska. The unpleasant and grueling nature of slaughterhouse work is exemplified by his description of the paunch-opening room, in which workers in a tiny, six foot by twelve foot room, cut open cow stomachs and dump out their contents. Pachirat writes:

> This miniscule room...has no ventilation...When the stomachs are cut open, a thick odor escapes; it is like a combination of the acrid smell of vomit and the sulfuric stench of rotting eggs...The air in the paunch-opening room is warm and humid with the heat and gases of the thousands of...bovine stomachs. An hour or two into their work, the paunch workers are drenched in sweat. (2011, 74-75)

Over and over, thousands of times per day, the paunch workers must make the same motion of cutting into the stomachs and emptying them. If the employees do not complete these tasks quickly enough, they will be fired (Pachirat 2011; Spangher 2014). These repetitive motions cause severe pain and injuries, especially
because meat industry employees work ten or more hours per day (Spangher 2014). Pachirat describes how one of his coworkers experienced inflamed knees and hands from constantly standing in the same place and doing the same motions. He had to quit before finishing a full year of work (Pachirat 2011, 210). Similarly, Foer interviewed a woman who has worked in chicken processing for over forty years; she has had five surgeries due to work injuries, and can no longer use her hands to do the dishes. She is paid eight dollars an hour (Foer 2009, 132). Indeed, a 2005 Human Rights Watch Report states that every meat industry employee they interviewed “bore physical signs of a serious injury” from their work (Striffler 2005, 129).

In addition to repetitive motion, the 2005 report describes how working in close quarters with others, minimal training, a lack of safety equipment, and long hours plus mandatory overtime creates dangerous and abusive conditions for meat industry employees (Striffler 2005, 129). The average employee is paid $23,000 a year for their labor (Spangher 2014). The low pay and abusive working conditions are often experienced by people who are undocumented and in constant fear of deportation if they refuse to comply or attempt to organize (Pachirat 2011; Striffler 2005; DeMello 2012). Race and citizenship status in terms of slaughterhouse work will be further discussed in chapter 1.

Pachirat also discusses the “almost unbearable psychological discomfort” due to the repetitive and monotonous nature of slaughterhouse work (2011, 217). During his first job as a “liver hanger,” Pachirat had to remove a liver from the “line,” wipe the hook, and impale the liver on a cart, hundreds, if not thousands of times per day (Pachirat 2011). Steve Striffler, who worked for two summers at a Tyson chicken processing plant in Arkansas, writes that “the oppressiveness of routine” is “perhaps the most devastating part of work in the poultry industry” (2005, 127).
Furthermore, women working in the meat industry often experience sexual harassment and/or sexual assault from their superiors (Spangher 2014). Pachirat describes women who work as foot trimmers in the slaughterhouse having to “work with their backs facing the main ramp” and “male supervisors...sitting on the ramp with their legs dangling over the side...openly exchanging| comments about the relative degree of attractiveness of the foot trimmers’ bodies, jeering, laughing, and leering when the women have to bend over to pick up feet out of a metal tub to pack them into the boxes” (2011, 74).

Slaughterhouse workers’ mental health is also negatively impacted due to the psychological effects of killing (McWilliams 2011). Pachirat discusses “knocking” (firing a bolt into cows’ skulls to stun them) as being universally seen as the most traumatic slaughterhouse position. Upon telling someone that he had “knocked” three cows the day before, his coworker responded, “Man, that will mess you up. Knockers have to see a psychologist or a psychiatrist or whatever they’re called every three months...that’s killing...that shit will fuck you up for real” (Pachirat 2011, 153). Indeed, James McWilliams writes that a large number of slaughterhouse workers are treated for job-related PTSD (McWilliams 2011).

Thus, factory farming negatively impacts the well-being of the industry workers, the well-being of farmed animals, the environment, and human public health. Due to these harmful effects, there has been a “push” among consumers and small farmers to move from industrialized animal agriculture to small, humane, family farming (SHFF).

Part II: Small, Humane, Family Farming As The Solution?

Small, humane, family farming is seen as a preferable alternative to factory farming and its detrimental impacts. For example, Farm Forward is a nonprofit
organization based in Portland, Oregon that works with farmers and animal advocacy groups. They advocate for the abolition of factory farming and strive to promote “agriculture that combines the best in traditional husbandry and animal welfare science by increasing the market share of more humane, sustainable family farms” (Farm Forward 2016). Similarly, Beyond Factory Farming is a Canadian organization that promotes “livestock production that is safe, fair and healthy for the environment, farmers, workers, animals, neighbours, communities and consumers” “as an alternative to industrial livestock operations” (Beyond Factory Farming 2017). Both organizations view small-scale farming as the solution to the evils of factory farming.

In *Eating Animals*, Foer explores the problems with industrialized animal agriculture. He contrasts factory farming with small, humane, family farming, for which his support is clear:

> After having spent nearly three years learning about animal agriculture...I simply don’t want anything to do with the factory farm...In another direction, though, the vision of sustainable farms that give animals a good life...and an easy death...has moved me. Paul, Bill, Nicolette, and most of all Frank [small farmers] are not only good people, but extraordinary people...Their farms are what I want our elected officials to strive to create and our economy to support. (Foer 2009, 241-242)

Similarly, Michael Pollan, author of *The Omnivore’s Dilemma*, criticizes industrialized agriculture in the US and glorifies small farms, such as Joel Salatin’s Polyface Farm, as superior alternatives (Pollan 2002). Polyface Farm, located in Virginia’s Shenandoah Valley, is a 550-acre “humane, family” farm on which Salatin and his family raise chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys, and rabbits for meat (ibid.). Pollan claims that at Polyface, “animal happiness is unmistakable” and “Salatin’s chickens live like chickens; his cows, like cows; pigs, pigs” (ibid.). Indeed, the chickens and cows graze in pastures, while the pigs spend time rooting through compost. Thus,
Pollan advocates for consuming “nonindustrial animals” such as the ones raised at Polyface; by doing this, he writes that “when we did eat animals, we’d eat them with the consciousness, ceremony and respect they deserve” (ibid.).

Alice Waters is another figure who is considered “a champion of local sustainable agriculture” (Chez Panisse Restaurant & Café 2017). She is credited with launching the “farm to table” movement, which advocates for eating locally-sourced food directly from the farmer or producer (Hetter 2016). In response to industrial agriculture, Waters opened Chez Panisse, a California restaurant that prides itself on serving “local, seasonal, and organic” food (Hetter 2016), which she considers to be “real food” (Eckelkamp 2016). Waters argues that the industrialized food system is “broken,” and believes that by paying more for fresh, seasonal, and organic food, she is supporting small farmers in addition to “making a donation to the future of the planet” (Eckelkamp 2016).

Thus, organizations such as Farm Forward and Beyond Factory Farming, as well as figures such as Foer, Pollan, and Waters, advocate for a movement from industrialized agriculture “back” to small, humane, family farming. Small farms are thought to “solve” the problems factory farms posit through improved farmed animal well-being, support of small, family businesses instead of corporations, more environmentally-friendly, sustainable practices, and allowing consumers to feel “connected” to the production of their food.

First, small farming is heralded as being a preferable alternative to factory farming because the farmed animals are thought to experience better well-being during their lives as well as during slaughter. Well-being is defined as “what makes life good for the individual living that life” (Crisp 2001). Essentially, well-being describes how one’s life is going for her; for example, if someone is in severe pain, they have poor well-being. Well-being can also be thought of as whether a life is
worth living. For the individual who is consistently in terrible agony, her well-being has decreased so much that her life may be worse than no life at all, and therefore is not worth living (Crisp 2001). Well-being differs from welfare in that welfare is more of a political concept used to simply mitigate suffering (i.e. the Animal Welfare Act) while well-being actually describes how someone’s life is going for her. The idea of improved well-being on a small, humane, family farm is communicated by its “humane” aspect. Humane is defined as “having or showing compassion or benevolence” (Oxford University Press 2017a). Therefore, treating someone “humanely,” or with compassion, would make someone’s life go better for her and improve her well-being.

Instead of the extreme captivity and cruel treatment that factory-farmed animals experience, “humanely” raised animals on small farms are thought to have enjoyable and fulfilling lives grazing in open pastures, socializing, and being able to exhibit species-specific behaviors (such as dust bathing for chickens). For example, the website for Karl Family Farms in Modena, NY boasts:

We are a small family farm...Our goal is to provide our customers with...humanely raised meats. Our animals spend their lives playing, grazing, and relaxing happily on our pastures and in our woods while expressing their natural instincts. This means that our pigs can roll in the mud while our chickens cluck away and the goats eat up a tree. Our cattle, sheep and goats are exclusively grass-fed and our pasture-raised/free-range chickens, pigs, and turkeys receive organic and non-gmo grains. (Karl Family Farms 2017)

Another aspect of this “humane” treatment is improved farmer-animal relationships. It is thought that a small farm gives farmers the opportunity to connect with the animals on a more personal level. For example, Lisa Kaiman owns a small dairy farm in Chester, Vermont, called Jersey Girls Dairy. Local Vermonters I chatted with explained to me that they believe Jersey Girls is wonderful because Kaiman knows every one of the twenty-two cows she raises by
name, and plays music for them in the barn in the evenings. These kinds of caring, intimate farmer-animal relationships are seen as preferable to the way in which factory farms raise thousands of nameless animals.

Furthermore, purchasing products from SHFFs is seen as better because one is supporting families and small businesses instead of multi-billion-dollar corporations, such as Smithfield or Perdue. Large corporations are viewed as problematic, first of all, due to their “excessive economic power” (Mathews 1996). This economic power enables corporations to have political power, which can negatively impact peoples’ lives when policies are implemented based on the interests of the corporation. For example, the US Department of Agriculture’s dietary guidelines are heavily influenced by the meat and dairy industries; this negatively impacts the health of Americans who are told to consume animal products (Nestle 2002; Heid 2016).

Because large corporations control much of what is bought and sold, they limit purchasing options for consumers. For example, almost all of the pork sold in an average supermarket is produced by Smithfield. Consumers may be compelled to buy poor quality products, sometimes at higher prices, as there is little competition from other vendors. Moreover, much of the profit acquired by corporations does not go to the workers who produced the goods, but the owners of capital (i.e. stockholders). According to a report from Glassdoor, companies such as CVS Health, Walmart, and Chipotle pay their CEOs over 1,000 times the pay of an average employee (Che 2015).

Therefore, instead of purchasing meat and animal products from large corporations such as Smithfield, Perdue, and Tyson, conscientious consumers often prefer to buy from small, family-run farms. SHFFs are thought to be less exploitative than farms run by corporations; ideally, if the family who owns the
farm were working it, the profits would go to the workers. Small farms also allow for competition from other small businesses, which ensures that prices are fair and that quality is kept high. Moreover, small farms do not have the massive economic and therefore political power that corporations do to sway policy in their favor and negatively impact peoples’ lives. Small farms are also viewed as favorable for contributing to the local economy; they do business with other local businesses, benefitting the community and creating jobs for those living in the area. Local businesses can also create a sense of community and identity, reflecting the culture of that town or area and attracting visitors from other places (Mitchell 2000).

The value of the “local” is also a reason why SHFFs are heralded as being better for the environment, or more sustainable, than industrialized animal agriculture. Sustainable is defined as “of, relating to, or being a method of harvesting or using a resource so that the resource is not depleted or permanently damaged” (Merriam-Webster 2017d). Factory farming is unsustainable due to the large amounts of resources (i.e. water, land) used and the pollution produced; this kind of environmental degradation cannot continue indefinitely. Some advocate for small-scale animal farming as a more sustainable alternative. For example, Pollan argues that eating locally-produced meat and animal products from small farms has less of an environmental impact than eating a non-local plant-based diet due to the fossils fuels burned by transporting food across long distances (Stanescu 2010, 11).

Additionally, small farms are thought to be better for the environment than large, industrial ones because they do not produce the massive amounts of waste that factory farms do when they keep thousands of animals in extremely close quarters. Instead, on a small farm, animal waste is ideally used as fertilizer and therefore “recycled” back into the ecosystem. For example, free-roaming cows on a small farm would graze on grass and fertilize the grass by producing waste. In fact,
Pollan argues that animal farming is actually necessary to “cycle nutrients” (Pollan 2002). Moreover, many small farms, such as Karl Family Farms, pride themselves on only distributing antibiotics for therapeutic reasons (i.e. when an animal is sick), therefore not contaminating the environment or endangering public health (Karl Family Farms 2017).

Finally, small farming is seen as a preferable alternative to factory farming due to its alleged “transparency” in allowing consumers to see exactly where their food comes from. Instead of a corporation having a massive, gated warehouse-like farm in a rural area, small farms sometimes allow consumers to visit the location and meet the farmers and the farmed animals. For example, the website of Karl Family Farms reads, “We believe that people should know where their food comes from and are happy to show our customers around our farm...We believe in being open about our practices and hiding nothing from our customers, no corner of our farm is hidden and we are always happy to answer any questions about what we do and why” (Karl Family Farms 2017). This emphasis on visibility and transparency is comforting to consumers who would like to know where their food comes from, ensure that the animals are treated humanely, and feel like they are “connected” to what (or who) they eat.

Part III: Sanctuary as Solution

Although the above description makes small, humane, family farming seem like a solution to the problems of industrialized animal agriculture, I argue that it is not. SHFFs are problematic and morally objectionable spaces due to the violence they enact and the values they carry. Small farms will be critiqued at length in chapter 1. Instead, I propose sanctuary as an alternative to all types of animal farming.
Nonhuman animal sanctuaries are spaces in which nonhumans are able to live out the rest of their natural lives, free of violence or exploitation. The nonhuman “residents” are not viewed as commodities or a means to obtain a profit as they in farming, but as individuals who are valued in themselves. Patrice Jones, co-founder of VINE Sanctuary, defines sanctuary as “a safe-enough place or relationship within the continuing hazards that menace everybody” (2010b, 370). Although nobody is ever truly, completely “safe,” those at sanctuary are “safe-enough” from the system of nonhuman exploitation and violence. At sanctuaries, staff or “caregivers” care for the residents on a daily basis, tending to their physical needs (i.e. food, water, veterinary care, a clean home) as well as their emotional or psychological needs (i.e. an enriching environment, nonhuman and human friends, and the ability to exhibit species-specific behaviors).

There are different kinds of animal sanctuaries, such as wildlife sanctuaries, exotic animal sanctuaries, and companion animal sanctuaries. My research specifically concerns farmed animal sanctuaries, which provide refuge to formerly farmed animals and their offspring. Chapter 2 will explore the “ideal” farmed animal sanctuary space.

I conducted the majority of my research during my internship at VINE (Veganism Is the Next Evolution) Sanctuary, an LGBTQ-led farmed animal sanctuary located in Springfield, Vermont. VINE describes its mission:

VINE Sanctuary offers refuge to animals who have escaped or been rescued from the meat, dairy and egg industries or other injurious circumstances, such as cockfighting and zoos...In addition to sheltering and advocating for animals, we conduct research and education aimed at creating systemic changes in agriculture, trade, and consumption as well as human attitudes about animals and the environment. We work within an ecofeminist understanding of the interconnection of all life and the intersection of all forms of oppression. Thus we welcome and work to facilitate alliances among animal, environmental, and social justice activists. Our sanctuary was the first to figure out how to rehabilitate roosters used in
cockfighting and continues to both shelter and advocate for these birds. We were founded and are predominantly staffed by LGBTQ people and have taken a leading role in the effort to understand the connections among speciesism, sexism, and homophobia. (Facebook 2017c)

Currently, VINE is home to 613 nonhumans, including 42 cows, 12 sheep, three alpacas, one pig, ten cats, 313 chickens, 79 pigeons, 42 ducks, 27 doves, ten geese, eight turkeys, eight guinea fowl, five emus, three peafowl, two parrots, and two parakeets. Additionally, 24 pigeons and 18 ducks have rewilded themselves but still reside on sanctuary property (VINE Sanctuary 2016).

At VINE, I worked as a full-time animal caregiver during May and June of 2016. My day-to-day activities included raking the ground to clear away waste and food scraps, scrubbing and refilling water bowls, cleaning coops, and scraping the ladders and ramps used by the birds in the coops. Furthermore, I “opened” in the mornings and “closed” in the evenings. “Opening” refers to letting the bird residents out of the coops when the sun comes up, making sure everyone is healthy and accounted for, and putting out food and water. “Closing” refers to putting the birds into the coops when the sun goes down and, again, making sure everyone is accounted for. The birds return to the coops at night to prevent predation, while larger residents, such as cows and sheep, are able to stay outside if they choose (they have access to a barn at all times). I also completed other tasks, such as passing out donated fruits and vegetables, unloading bags of feed, digging up thistles from the pastures, and putting up fencing. At times, I assisted with veterinary care, such as putting anti-parasite medication on the necks of the birds. Of course, I also spent plenty of time with the nonhuman residents, getting to know those who were interested in being my friend. I conducted my research through observing sanctuary life as an intern and through informal discussions with VINE staff.
In addition to VINE, I conducted research at Funny Farm Rescue Animal Sanctuary in Mays Landing, New Jersey, during July and August of 2016. Their Facebook page describes their mission:

We are personally and professionally committed to the well being of abused and abandoned animals by providing food, shelter, medical care, and compassion and love for the rest of their natural lives in a permanent, safe and healthy environment. The Funny Farm continues to function as a sanctuary and shelter, allowing for adoptions when possible, and being a forever home when impossible. To us, our mission is simple and clear: To ensure the permanent wellbeing of all animals. The Funny Farm is the embodiment of this mission. (Facebook 2017b)

Funny Farm is home to species such as chickens, horses, emus, peacocks, dogs, cats, rabbits, goats, pigs, alpacas, sheep, guinea pigs, donkeys, ducks, turkeys, geese, pigeons, doves, and a skunk. While I interned at VINE full-time, I volunteered at Funny Farm only on Tuesdays, when it was open to the public as a “visiting day.” My work involved helping to clear waste from the pastures where the horses and cows lived. I conducted my research as a member of the public through general observation and informal discussions with Laurie, the founder of Funny Farm, as well as other volunteers.

My research at both VINE and Funny Farm has contributed to an extended discussion of the “ideal” sanctuary space in chapter 2, as well as thinking about how sanctuaries can differ from (as well as possibly resemble) small farms. In chapter 2, I also discuss Farm Sanctuary in Watkins Glen, NY. I did not visit this location in person, and I acknowledge that this limits my analysis; instead, I conducted my research online through Farm Sanctuary’s websites (www.farmsanctuary.org and www.animalsoffarmsanctuary.com) as well as the sanctuary’s Facebook page (www.facebook.com/farmsanctuary). Additionally, I did not formally conduct thesis research at any small farms. I have been to “small, humane, family farms” at various points in my life; however, I acknowledge that a lack of formal research
may limit my analysis. Instead, I conducted my research on small farms through reading industry information, writing of those involved in small farming (e.g. blog posts from small farmers), those who visited small farms in their own research (e.g. Foer’s *Eating Animals*), and proponents of small farming (e.g. Michael Pollan).

Part IV: Language

When discussing nonhuman animals (especially in terms of animal agriculture), language often perpetuates oppression (see Dunayer 2001). Even the term “animal” connotes someone who is dirty, uncontrolled, un-thinking, and violent (i.e. “Stop behaving like animals”). Therefore, by referring to nonhuman individuals as “animals,” they are already being labeled as “less than” and the oppressive human/animal binary and hierarchy is perpetuated. Additionally, euphemized terms such as “pork,” “beef,” and “meat” work to oppress nonhumans by distancing the commodity from the life and suffering of the nonhuman (for example, it would be more difficult to deny the fact that a cow dies to produce beef if it were called “cow’s flesh”). I do not want to perpetuate what Adrienne Rich calls the “oppressor’s language” in this thesis (Rich 1971), and I struggled with whether to put quotations around problematic words or substitute euphemisms for more “accurate” terms (i.e. nonhuman for animal, flesh for meat, etc). For ease of reading, I have decided to include these terms as they are, but I acknowledge that they are problematic. I hope to challenge, not reinforce, the oppression of nonhuman animals in this project.

Part V: Chapter Overview

In chapter 1, I argue that small-scale animal farming is a morally objectionable alternative to industrialized animal agriculture due to the farm spaces
themselves as well as the values associated with small-scale farming. The farm spaces are objectionable as they negatively impact nonhuman well-being and the environment, commodify and instrumentalize farmed animals, and devalue “subhuman” bodies. The values associated with small farming, such as intimacy, visibility, and nostalgia, are problematic due to betrayal, normalization of violence, dignity denial, erasure of violence and colonization, and underlying sexism, heterosexism, racism, xenophobia, and classism. Thus, small-scale animal farming perpetuates violence and oppression.

As even small-scale animal agriculture is morally objectionable, chapter 2 poses the solution of incorporating formerly farmed nonhuman animals into society as members of an intentional community, or what I call a “Type IV” sanctuary model. I contrast this Type IV model with “lesser” Type I, II, and III sanctuary models (I will elaborate on these categorizations later) and discuss the ways in which these limit residents through association, reproduction, and environment. Furthermore, I argue that lesser sanctuaries can actually resemble small farms and perpetuate “small farming” structures and values that they should be attempting to remedy. Finally, I discuss rewilding efforts as an essential characteristic of Type IV sanctuaries.

Last, in chapter 3, I argue that Type IV sanctuary spaces are politically subversive, and therefore, revolutionary. Sanctuaries such as VINE are subversive in that they undermine the established system of human use, exploitation, and domination of nonhumans, and the widespread belief that this use, exploitation, and domination are justified due to a “natural” human superiority. Furthermore, sanctuaries subvert a Western, capitalist logic that views farmed animals as expendable commodities and views human and nonhuman individuals as separate, independent (as opposed to interconnected) beings. The revolutionary nature of
sanctuaries such as VINE is demonstrated by sanctuary as a space that exists solely to fulfill the interests and well-being of farmed animals, privileges nonhuman interests over human ones, recognizes farmed animals as individuals instead of commodities, allows humans to witness nonhuman lives, and grieves for, cares for, and creates knowledge about farmed animals.
Chapter 1: A Critique of Small, Humane, Family Farming: Considering Well-Being and Beyond

In response to the detrimental impact of large, industrial “factory” farms (in terms of nonhuman well-being, environmental impact, human public health, and worker well-being), there has been a recent “push” to support small, humane, family farms (e.g. Foer 2009; Pollan 2002). SHFFs are glorified as a favorable alternative to industrial farming due to (alleged) improved animal well-being, improved farmer-animal relationships, support of small, local businesses instead of corporations, decreased environmental impact, and knowledge of where one’s food comes from. However, despite this, the small, “humane,” family farm is not a favorable alternative to factory farming; in fact, the glorification of SHFFs demonstrates underlying sexism, racism, heterosexism, xenophobia, and classism. In this chapter, I argue that SHFFs are morally objectionable as both the farm spaces themselves as well as the values communicated by upholding small farms as the preferable alternative to industrial farms perpetuate violence and oppression. I critique SHFF spaces in terms of animal well-being, commodification and instrumentalization of animal lives and bodies, environmental impact, and perpetuation of a system that devalues and normalizes violence against “subhuman” individuals. I also critique the values associated with small farming, such as intimacy, visibility, and nostalgia. I explain how these values make small farming problematic due to betrayal, normalization of violence, dignity denial, erasure of violence and colonization, and underlying sexism, heterosexism, racism, xenophobia, and classism.

Part I: Considering Well-Being
As previously described, many support SHFFs because they believe that the animals are treated more “humanely” than on factory farms, and therefore, have improved well-being. I argue that any size farm, including SHFFs, negatively impacts animal well-being due to genetic manipulation, cruel “routine” or “standard” farming procedures, slaughter, and captivity. In fact, well-being on SHFFs can actually be worse than on large, industrial farms due to a lack of regulation and veterinary care.

It should be noted that food labels such as “free range,” “cage free,” and “humanely raised” are misleading as they do not prove good nonhuman well-being. “Free range” means that animals simply have access to the outdoors; “free range” chickens, for example, may be so densely packed into a shed that they cannot reach the door. In Jonathan Safran Foer’s words, “I could keep a flock of hens under my sink and call them free-range” (2009, 61). Similarly, “cage free” in an industrial setting means that the animals are not housed in cages; they could be living in a crowded, filthy warehouse and be considered “cage free.” Therefore, while these labels suggest images of animals running in open pastures, the reality is quite different. My critique of nonhuman well-being on SHFFs concerns farms on which animals actually have “good” well-being, exemplified by their ability to graze in pastures, spend time outdoors, socialize with others, and exhibit species-specific behaviors. For example, cows raised for beef on Niman Ranch in California have many acres to roam and graze, and the farmers pride themselves on providing the best life possible for the cows (Foer 2009).

First, nonhuman well-being on any size farm is negatively impacted due to human-centered genetic manipulation. For example, in order to generate the most profit, the poultry industry has manipulated chicken genetics to create a “broiler chicken.” Broiler is the breed of chicken raised for meat (in contrast to “layer
hens,” who are raised for eggs). Broilers have been genetically engineered to have very large breasts, grow to adult size three times faster than old-fashioned chicken breeds, and survive on half the amount of food (Gauthier and Ludlow 2017; Striffler 2005). Foer writes, “To gain a sense of the radicalness of this change, imagine human children growing to be three hundred pounds in ten years, while eating only granola bars and Flintstones vitamins” (2009, 107). This genetic manipulation ensures that the industry will produce the most chicken flesh for the least amount of money; unfortunately, it also causes chronic pain and early death for the chickens as their skeletons and organs cannot support their fast growth rate and large breast size. Because their hearts cannot pump enough blood for their rapidly-growing bodies, broilers often have enlarged hearts and fluid build-up in their lungs and abdomens (called ascites), which causes pain and discomfort (Gauthier and Ludlow 2017). Many broilers also experience fatal heart attacks, leading to premature death (ibid.). Furthermore, as their skeletons cannot support their rapid growth and large weight, broilers experience painful twisted and/or bowed legs and spines (ibid.).

Similarly, pigs have been genetically manipulated due to the demand for “lean pig meat” (Foer 2009, 157). Unfortunately, pigs with lean meat “suffer not only more leg and heart problems, but greater excitability, fear, anxiety, and stress” (ibid., 157-158). These pigs experience such increased levels of stress that a tractor driving near some caused them to drop dead (ibid., 158). In fact, factory-farmed pig breeds are not able to survive anywhere other than indoors (ibid., 159).

The same genetically modified breeds raised on industrial farms, such as broiler chickens, are raised on small farms. Therefore, the well-being of animals on SHFFs is compromised due to genetics. Indeed, Frank Reese, a small turkey farmer, says, “Everyone’s saying buy fresh, buy local. It’s a sham. It’s all the same
kind of bird, and the suffering is in their genes” (Foer 2009, 113). SHFFs have the same bird breeds as industrial farms because small farms get their chicks from hatcheries run by the factory farm industry (ibid., 235). Farmers must obtain the next generation of birds from a hatchery because genetically engineered birds cannot reproduce by themselves. For example, Fabio, a turkey who lives at VINE, cannot reproduce because his body is so large due to genetic engineering that he would break the spine of any female turkey he tries to have sex with. Thus, bird reproduction must be controlled by humans through hatcheries. It is too difficult for the average small farmer to run their own hatchery, so they must purchase chicks from a larger one. Therefore, even on SHFFs, nonhuman well-being is negatively impacted by human-centered genetic manipulation that causes suffering and an early death. Furthermore, sending chicks through the mail from a hatchery to a small farm negatively affects well-being (ibid.).

Nonhuman well-being is also compromised on SHFFs due to cruel “standard” farming procedures including debeaking, branding, tail docking, castration, debudding/dehorning, artificial insemination, and killing “unprofitable” individuals. These actions, performed on any size farm, are legal due to “Common Farming Exemptions,” or CFEs, which “make legal any method of raising farmed animals so long as it is commonly practiced within the industry. In other words...corporations...have the power to define cruelty” (Foer 2009, 50). For example, if most factory farms are castrating animals without anesthesia, then it becomes legal.

First, farmed birds, such as layer hens and turkeys, are “debeaked,” in which the end of their beak is sliced off with a hot blade. This prevents the birds from pecking and injuring one another out of frustration due being in over-crowded conditions (United Poultry Concerns 2016). The Brambell Committee, an animal
welfare committee in the UK, writes, “The hot knife blade used in debeaking cuts through...complex horn, bone and sensitive tissue causing severe pain” (ibid.). Gentle et al. found that after being debeaked, chickens experience chronic pain for the rest of their lives (Gentle et al. 1990). Furthermore, birds are unable to use their beaks as tools for species-specific behaviors, such as preening (grooming), foraging for food, or exploring, which negatively impacts their well-being (United Poultry Concerns 2016).

Second, farmed animals such as cows experience branding, even on SHFFs. Branding is accomplished by pressing a hot iron into an animal’s side in order to burn off the hair and burn the skin enough to leave a permanent scar in the shape of the iron (Stachowski 2013). This is done without anesthesia and is extremely painful and traumatic for the recipient. Branding is allegedly done in order to identify the animals and prevent their theft (Foer 2009, 223). However, others argue that branding occurs simply because it is a longstanding cultural tradition among ranchers and farmers. Bernie Rollin, an animal welfare expert, says:

> Branding is cultural. These brands have been in families for years, and ranchers don’t want to give them up. They know it’s painful, but they did it with their fathers and their grandfathers. I know one rancher, a good rancher, who told me that his kids don’t come home for Thanksgiving and they don’t come home for Christmas, but they come home for branding. (ibid.)

Although this procedure is unnecessary, it is widely practiced, even on small farms that pride themselves on being “humane.” For example, Bill and Nicolette Niman run Niman Ranch, a cattle ranch in Bolinas, California. Niman Ranch prides itself on providing “an animal a life with joy and freedom from suffering,” and thus the best well-being possible (ibid., 207). However, Bill and Nicolette brand all of their cattle, causing them to unnecessarily suffer.
Third, male farmed animals are castrated. Castration is the process of removing the testes. This is generally performed on species such as cows, pigs, and sheep. Carter et al. explains that castration is done using either a surgical or bloodless method (Carter et al. 2011). With the surgical method, a knife is used to cut through the scrotum, cut the spermatic cord (which leads to the testes), and remove the testes. With bloodless castration, an elastic band or emaculatome is placed at the top of the scrotum to crush the spermatic cord, preventing blood flow to the testes. Eventually, the testes will atrophy and fall off. Similar to branding and debeaking, this process is done without anesthesia, causing the animal to suffer. There is severe, short-term pain during the procedure, as well as long-term pain after the procedure (Carter et al. 2011). Castration is done in order to reduce aggressiveness in the animals (by lowering their testosterone levels) as well as to improve the quality of their flesh for human consumption (Wessler 2011). For example, if castrated, a steer’s flesh will be more tender and marbled, which makes it more appealing to human taste buds (Carter et al. 2011).

Fourth, farmed pigs, sheep, and cows often experience tail docking, in which all or part of their tail is removed without anesthesia. Similar to castration, this occurs in two ways – either banding or cutting. Banding is the most common method, in which a rubber ring/band is placed onto the tail, cutting off blood supply and causing the tail to fall off after a week or so (Schoenian 2011). Alternatively, an electric docking iron, emasculator, or knife can be used to simply cut the tail (ibid.). Docking is done for the convenience of the farmers as well as (allegedly) for the well-being of the animals. For sheep and cows, docking is supposed to prevent feces from accumulating on one’s tail, improves udder health in cows, makes it easier for the farmer to observe problems with the udders, improves the quality of the milk, prevents a tail from being caught on any automatic
machinery, and prevents workers from being hit with the tails (New York Farm Bureau 2009; Schoenian 2011). Pigs experience tail docking to prevent them from biting each other’s tails when in a captive environment (American Veterinary Medical Association 2017). Of course, these issues only occur because the animals are raised on a farm in close confinement, unable to clean themselves and surrounded by dangerous machinery. Tail docking is widely practiced. The New York Farm Bureau states that approximately three fourths of cows in the state of New York have their tails docked, and that “herds of all sizes dock tails, from as small as 50 cows” (New York Farm Bureau 2009). Thus, tail docking is something that occurs frequently on farms with a small number cows, which almost certainly pride themselves on being small, “humane” farms.

Next, Brenda Lee explains how farmed sheep, goats, and cows are dehorned or debudded (Lee 2013). Dehorning removes the horns of an animal, and debudding removes the horn buds, thus preventing the horns from growing.

Dehorning/budding is done to prevent injuries to humans working with the animals, prevent injury to the animal as horns can get caught in fencing or machinery, and prevent conflicts between the animals (goats, sheep, and cows sometimes use their horns to fight, a typical herd animal behavior). Debudding is done to young animals (a few days to a few weeks old) whose horns have not grown in yet; they simply have horn “buds,” or the beginnings of horns. Debudding is accomplished by using a “debudding iron,” which burns off the horn bud and prevents a horn from growing. To do this, the iron temperature must reach 800-1000 degrees Fahrenheit and is placed on the horn bud for three to five seconds, multiple times. Alternatively, a dehorning paste can be used, which chemically burns off the horn bud. The paste must be left on for a few days, and the young animal must be separated from others to prevent the paste from rubbing off and
causing burns. Furthermore, they must be kept inside until the buds are removed, as rain could cause the paste to run into their eyes and blind them.

If the animal is older and horns have grown in, they must be dehorned. This is done through surgery, in which the “skull is scraped clean of the horn” (Lee 2013). The recovery process takes about eight weeks, during which the animal must be separated from everyone else in the herd, as to not cause trauma to the open wound or spread infection. Even Lee, a proponent of dehorning goats, describes this surgery as a “very traumatic...long term process” (Lee 2013). Clearly, undergoing either dehorning or debudding is detrimental to well-being.

Another “standard” farming procedure is artificial insemination. Every species of farmed animal, from cows to pigs to goats to turkeys, is artificially inseminated. Farmed animals are artificially inseminated instead of being allowed to reproduce through sexual intercourse because it is more efficient. In order for the farmer to make a profit, new animals must be constantly brought into existence to produce eggs and milk or to be raised and killed for meat; if baby animals are not created, then commodities are not created. Farmers cannot rely on selective mating to continue this ongoing reproductive cycle. Furthermore, artificial insemination allows the farmer to control the genetic line. Semen from male farmed animals is selected based on the qualities the farmer would like in the next generation of offspring (AnimalSmart.org 2016). Last, as previously mentioned, many farmed species have been genetically manipulated so they are unable to reproduce on their own.

Artificial insemination is accomplished by forcing an inseminating instrument into the reproductive organs of a female. For example, in order to artificially inseminate a cow, the farmer inserts their hand into her rectum to position her reproductive organs and then inserts an insemination gun into the
cow’s vagina to reach her cervix and deposit semen into her uterus (Gillespie 2013, 6). Similarly, to inseminate a female turkey, the farmer must hold her upside down and insert a hypodermic syringe into her vagina. Female turkeys experience this every seven to ten days in order to yield “optimal fertility” (Bramwell 2016). Feminists have criticized artificial insemination as a form of sexual violence (e.g. Alexis 2015). The violence inherent in artificial insemination is demonstrated by the fact that a cow is placed into a device called a “rape rack” in order to be inseminated; this use of language is an acknowledgment that the cow is experiencing sexual violation (Gillespie 2013, 11).

Kathryn Gillespie argues that the process of artificial insemination is not only a violation of female animals; it is also a violation of the males (Gillespie 2013). She explains that in order to obtain semen, chosen male cows, or bulls, are forcibly ejaculated many times per week using either an artificial vagina or electroejaculation. To illustrate how violating this is, electroejaculation requires inserting a probe into the rectum of a bull to reach his prostate. The probe uses electrical currents to make the bull involuntarily ejaculate (Gillespie 2013, 8). Thus, both male and female farmed animals experience sexual violence on any size farm.

Additionally, even on SHFFs, baby animals are removed from their mothers. If the babies are intended for meat, they are taken away before they have been weaned and placed in a separate enclosure or feedlot until they are killed. If the mothers are being used in the dairy industry, her babies will be removed almost immediately after birth so all of the mother’s milk can go to human consumption. Peaceful Prairie Sanctuary discusses how traumatic this separation is:

The separation is as devastating to the mother as it is to the child. Some mother cows try to fight off the attackers, some try to shield their babies with their own bodies, some chase frantically after the transport, some cry pitifully, some withdraw in silent despair...They bellow, they cry, they moan. Many continue to call for their babies
for days and nights on end. Some stop eating and drinking. They search feverishly. (Peaceful Prairie Sanctuary 2016)

Thus, nonhuman well-being is detrimentally impacted by the destruction of mother-child relationships. In fact, the dairy industry acknowledges that this separation is traumatic. Snowville Creamery, a small, “sustainable” Ohio dairy processing company, writes that the majority of their farmers separate the calves almost immediately from their mothers as it is “much less stressful for everyone involved” (Snowville Creamery 2017).

The final “routine” farming procedure that is done on any size farm and negatively impacts well-being is killing individuals deemed “unprofitable.” Farmers want to make sure that they are obtaining a profit from each of the farmed animals. One example of this is the “Feed Conversion Ratio,” which is “a measure of an animal’s efficiency in converting feed mass into increases of the desired output” (OMICS International 2014). For cows used in dairy, the desired output would be milk, and for animals raised for meat, the desired output is the weight gained by the animal (ibid.). If a farmed animal does not appear to be “efficiently” converting feed, they will be killed.

Indeed, farmed animals not up to “industry standards” are routinely killed. An “On-Farm Humane Killing” guide created by the Humane Slaughter Association, Sheep Veterinary Society, and British Cattle Veterinary Association counsels farmers, writing, “In some...cases you may decide that due to welfare or other reasons an animal requires killing in its best interests. This is applicable to unmarketable calves, mal-formed neonates or animals that ‘just aren’t doing’ and maybe haven’t recovered from chronic illness” (Red Tractor Assurance 2017). Even on SHFFs, animals deemed “unmarketable,” “mal-formed,” or “just not doing” are killed. For example, “runts,” or the smallest piglets in the litter, are killed because
they are not thought to reach market weight quickly enough. Although the “Humane Killing” guide claims that killing is done in the animal’s “best interests,” this is untrue, as “unmarketable” individuals such as smaller piglets have a strong interest in living and have the potential to lead good, fulfilling lives. Furthermore, terms such as “just not doing” are vague and not based in veterinary medicine, leaving it up to the profit-driven farmer’s discretion to determine who is worthy of life. Peaceful Prairie Sanctuary writes that sick farmed animals are often killed because it is cheaper than paying for veterinary care to treat them (Peaceful Prairie Sanctuary 2016). In fact, the guide lists “[hasn’t] recovered from chronic illness” as one justification for death (Red Tractor Assurance 2017).

Additionally, even the means with which these “unprofitable” individuals are killed is inexpensive; for example, “runts” are “thumped,” which means that they are swung by their hind legs and “bashed headfirst into the concrete floor” (Foer 2009, 187). Indeed, the guide outlines “external blunt trauma + bleeding” as an “acceptable” method for killing newborn lambs. The farmer is instructed to “Hold the animal by the back legs and deliver a firm blow to the back of the head with a blunt instrument, e.g. an iron bar or hammer” or to “Hold the animal by the back legs and swing it through an arc to hit the back of its head with considerable force against a solid object, e.g. a brick wall or metal stanchion” (Red Tractor Assurance 2017). Therefore, profit motive on any size farm leads sick, small, or otherwise “unmarketable” individuals to be killed, such as by being slammed into a brick wall or struck with a hammer.

Additionally, farmed animals are killed as they are considered “unprofitable” due to sex. For example, male chicks born into the egg industry are killed, usually by suffocation or crushing, as they cannot produce eggs so they provide no profit (Jaksch 1981). This mass killing is supported even by SHFFs because all layer hens
come from industrial hatcheries that kill the males (Foer 2009, 235). Similarly, male calves are of no use to the dairy industry as they cannot produce milk; instead, they are sold to veal farms and slaughtered after only about 20-22 weeks of life (American Veal Association 2016). The film Peaceable Kingdom follows a small, family farm that milks goats; they must sell the young males to be killed for meat because they cannot afford to care for them as they do not provide a profit like the females do (Peaceable Kingdom: The Journey Home 2009).

Next, any size farm negatively impacts animal well-being due to the inevitability of slaughter. Every farmed animal’s life ends in slaughter. Even cows in dairy who are raised to provide milk are slaughtered for meat once they are “spent,” or unable to produce milk at the desired efficiency, usually after about six years of exploitation (Ansari-Lari et al. 2012). Slaughter is morally objectionable, first of all, because it is wrong to kill someone who has an interest in continuing to live. To have an interest in something means to have a stake in something; in this way, interests are conducive to well-being. For example, if I am hungry and interested in eating, I have a stake in eating, and whether or not I am able to eat impacts my well-being. Most animals have an interest in living, evidenced by attempts to escape predators in the wild and struggling against human violence in a slaughterhouse (for example, chickens twisting to avoid the neck-cutting blade) (Wadiwel 2015). Thus, being killed frustrates an animal's interest in living and negatively impacts their well-being.

Furthermore, slaughter is morally objectionable because it is violent and causes suffering. As previously discussed, industrialized slaughter had been critiqued for the cruelty and suffering that occurs; for example, skinning and dismembering cows while they are still conscious (Pachirat 2011) and boiling conscious chickens (Foer 2009). Thus, many people have turned to buying products
from SHFFs, believing that the animals experience less cruel deaths. However, this is, for the most part, untrue. Most animals raised on SHFFs are, in fact, victims of industrialized slaughter as it is very difficult for small slaughterhouses to survive and make a profit in an industry dominated by large corporations (Foer 2009, 153; Gillespie 2011, 153). Thus, small farmers are forced to transport animals to industrial slaughterhouses where they experience the same cruel deaths that factory-farmed animals do (Foer 2009, 153).

Second, there is no substantial difference between the methods of killing for “humane” and industrialized slaughter (Gillespie 2011, 153). Gillespie writes, “The laws and regulations governing alternative [humane] slaughter are the same as those governing industrial slaughter, meaning that alternative slaughter is not held to any higher standards” (2011, 154). Both industrial and “humane” slaughter involves stunning the animals (usually by a blow or electric shock), cutting them open and allowing them to bleed out, and then skinning, cleaning, and removing the organs (Gillespie 2011). The violence inherent in even “humane” slaughter is demonstrated through the experience of Mac McClelland, a journalist, who visited Prather Ranch, a “certified humane raised” cattle ranch in California, to observe the process of “humane” slaughter. She observed, “One hanging cow being sliced, another hanging cow being skinned and a third, just-stunned cow hanging and being cut open while 5 gallons of blood gush from its body a few feet away from me. Moments ago, we heard this very cow mooing from the knock box on the other side of the wall” (McClelland 2013). In fact, Prather Ranch is one of the few farms that slaughters its animals on-site, in a small, USDA-inspected slaughterhouse. This is one way in which “humane” slaughter can be more conducive to well-being than industrialized slaughter. The transport to a large slaughterhouse is traumatic and stressful for the animals, and often results in injuries, heart failure, heatstroke,
suffocation, and fighting (Gillespie 2011, 153). Therefore, slaughtering animals at
the farm and avoiding transport can improve well-being. Gillespie discusses the
emergence of Mobile Slaughter Units (MSUs) in Washington State as an alternative
to industrialized slaughter (ibid.). These units are trucks that travel to farms to
slaughter the animals on-site. Although the animals are killed in the same manner,
their stress is decreased due to eliminating transport (ibid.). The only other tangible
difference between “humane” slaughter and industrialized slaughter is the speed at
which the animals are killed and processed (Gillespie 2011). For example, at
Paradise Locker Meats, an independent, “humane” slaughterhouse in the Midwest,
the pigs are killed one at a time (Foer 2009, 154). In contrast, industrial
slaughterhouses kill one cow every twelve seconds (Pachirat 2011). This decrease in
speed can potentially lead to more care and attention being paid to each individual,
possibly reducing suffering and cruel “mistakes,” such as skinning an animal while
she is still conscious (Gillespie 2011, 153). Of course, this is not always the case.

In fact, Gillespie describes witnessing an MSU killing in Stanwood,
Washington (Gillespie, forthcoming). While volunteering at Pigs Peace Sanctuary,
she watched a white truck (the MSU) pull up to the small, family farm across the
road from the sanctuary. Three pigs were brought behind the truck and shot using
a firearm. Instead of being the careful and “humane” process that MSUs potentially
offer, the slaughter was drawn-out and cruel. The first pig was shot twice in the
head before finally being killed by a third shot, and the other two pigs were forced
to watch as their injured companion “thrashed around on the ground letting out
piercing shrieks” before they were shot and killed as well (ibid., 54). Therefore,
even “ideal” slaughter by way of MSU can be violent and cause suffering.

Although “humane” slaughter may offer two minor benefits to animal well-
being, it is still a violent, traumatic, and painful process. There is no such thing as
a painless way to kill a living being; slaughter always entails suffering. Peaceful Prairie accurately writes, “Not a single one of [the animals] experiences his or her own brutal, untimely death as ‘humane’” (Peaceful Prairie Sanctuary 2016). In fact, Gillespie discusses how “humane slaughter” is a “contradiction in terms,” akin to “kindhearted carnage” or “benevolent brutality” (2011, 157). Despite this, some refer to slaughter to as “euthanasia,” thereby making it appear to be an act of care. Euthanasia is ethically justified as a form of end-of-life care for humans or nonhumans who are suffering. In this case, the act of euthanasia strives to maximize well-being and minimize suffering. However, animal slaughter for meat is the opposite of care, and referring to it as euthanasia obscures the violence it enacts. For example, Temple Grandin argues that a penetrating captive bolt, used to stun the animal to be slaughtered, is an “acceptable [method] of euthanasia,” defining euthanasia as “a humane death that occurs without pain and distress” (Grandin 1994). This “painless” death is achieved as long as the captive-bolt gun is aimed at exactly the correct position on the animal’s head (which varies based on the species), is placed firmly against the skull, is constantly cleaned and maintained, and is “supplied with sufficient air pressure and air volume” (ibid.). If any of these criteria are not met, which is highly likely due to human error and the industry’s general disregard for animal well-being, the animal will not be rendered unconscious before being killed.

Even if Grandin is correct and animals do experience a painless death if stunned properly, the slaughter of young, healthy farmed animals for meat does not quite measure up to the act of euthanizing a beloved companion animal who is suffering at the end of her life. Referring to animal slaughter as euthanasia obscures violence behind slaughter (i.e. shooting a healthy, sentient being in the skull) as well as detracts from the legitimacy of euthanizing humans or nonhumans
to minimize suffering. It is also important to note that the act of “thumping,” or slamming piglets into the cement floor in order to kill them, is referred to by the industry as “euthanasia” (Foer 2009, 187-188). Therefore, although the term “euthanasia” implies that slaughter is an act of care, it is actually an act of violence, and compromises nonhuman well-being.

The death of an animal raised on a SHFF can be thought of as “worse” than the death of an animal raised on a factory farm. In “Death as a Social Harm,” Lori Gruen considers why death is seen as “bad” when there is “no one there to experience the badness once one dies” (Gruen 2014a). She writes that the “deprivation view,” for one, states that death is bad because one is missing out on the good things that they would have experienced had they continued to live. However, death can also be “not bad” if the individual would have experienced a life not worth living (ibid.). Thus, slaughter and consequent death may actually be “less bad” for animals raised on factory farms than SHFFs, as life for them would have continued to be miserable and possibly not worth living. However, for individuals with “good” well-being on SHFFs, who are able to graze and socialize, death is worse than continuing to live as they are being deprived of these continued experiences.

In addition to slaughter, any size farming compromises farmed animal well-being due to captivity. A farm is a captive environment, in which humans decide on every aspect of the animal’s life, often not taking their interests or preferences into account. Peaceful Prairie elaborates:

Humans decide where they [the animals] will live; if they will ever know their mothers; if, and how long, they will nurse their babies; when, and if, they will be permitted to see or be with their families and friends; when, where, or if they will be allowed to socialize with members of their own species; when, how, and if, they are going to reproduce; what, when, and how much they will eat; how much space they will have, if any; if, and how far, they will be allowed to
roam; what mutilations they will be subjected to; what, if any, veterinary care they will receive; and when, where, and how they are going to die. (Peaceful Prairie Sanctuary 2016)

Due to this human interference, farmed animals, even on a SHFF, are un-free. Freedom is defined as being free from constraint (Cochrane 2009, 663). Because humans control every aspect of a farmed animal’s life, they are not free; their lives are not theirs to live how they would like. As freedom is thought to be constitutive of a good life, or good well-being, this denial of freedom negatively impacts well-being and makes one’s life go worse for her. Nonhumans value freedom as “Not all animals in a social group do exactly the same things, eat exactly the same things, or spend time with the same individuals. They are making independent choices within the context of their biological and physical capabilities” (Gruen 2011, 150). For example, a species-typical behavior of chimps is grooming, but they autonomously choose who to groom and when. Similarly, although migration is a species-typical behavior for some birds, the populations themselves decide who leads the migration and in what direction (ibid.). Thus, nonhumans value freedom, and a lack of freedom in a captive farm environment negatively impacts their well-being.

Of course, I acknowledge that farmed animal sanctuaries are also captive environments. However, as I will discuss in chapter 2, Type IV sanctuaries strive to maximize the agency and freedom of the nonhuman residents within their captivity. At these sanctuaries, residents are actually able to take part in shaping the community. This is much different from a SHFF model, in which animals are viewed as the “farmed,” passive recipients of human care. Furthermore, at a sanctuary, the purpose of captivity is to ensure well-being, while on a farm, animals are held captive in order to obtain a profit from their bodies. Sanctuary captivity will be elaborated on in chapter 2.
Next, farmed animal well-being can actually be worse on SHFFs than on large, industrialized farms. First, factory farms have an on-call or on-site veterinarian to care for the animals, while small farms usually do not. For example, Michael Doran owns a small beef farm in Maine, and despite his efforts, has had trouble finding veterinary care over the last few years (Goad 2015). A lack of local veterinarians can be detrimental to the well-being of animals on small farms who require medical attention.

Furthermore, while the base level of care for animals on a factory farm is poor, at least there is a base level of care, unlike on small farms. Dan Weary explains this, saying, “Larger farms have to be professional in order to succeed, and therefore are more likely to have specialized staff, formal SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) and performance incentives” (Wadsworth 2015). While large farms have a required level of care due to SOPs and performance incentives, small farms have little management or regulation. This often results in cruelty and neglect. For example, Blake, a cow who lives at VINE Sanctuary, was raised on a small, single-family dairy farm. She was seized due to extreme neglect; people driving past saw a group of cows standing outside in the winter, clearly starving, and called the authorities. Blake and her friends had been left outside without any food to die. Although she would not have had a “good” life on an industrial farm, Blake would not have experienced this severe neglect.

Part II: Beyond Well-Being

As discussed, any size farm, including SHFFs, negatively impacts animal well-being. However, well-being is only one aspect of why SHFFs are morally objectionable; my critique of animal farming strives to go beyond well-being. In this section, I critique SHFFs in terms of their commodification and
instrumentalization of farmed animals, environmental impact, and normalization of violence against and devaluation of “subhuman” bodies. To aid in my critique, I will reference Frank Reese’s poultry farm, Good Shepherd Poultry Ranch, located in Kansas. Good Shepherd has possibly the best well-being of any animal farm. First, Reese’s birds have exceptional well-being because they do not suffer due to genetics. They are “heritage birds,” which means that the chickens, turkeys, ducks, and geese on his farm resemble the first domesticated species, instead of the genetically modified commercial birds of today (Foer 2009). Indeed, the turkeys on Reese’s farm resemble wild turkeys more than large-breasted, white, farmed turkeys. Heritage birds are able to mate “naturally” instead of through artificial insemination, have a long lifespan, are able to be outdoors, and have a slow growth rate, which allows them to develop strong, healthy skeletons and organs (Good Shepherd Poultry Ranch 2016b). These birds do not suffer due to the health problems associated with fast growth rates and large bodies.

The birds are also healthy as they are not vaccinated or fed antibiotics, and Reese claims that they never die because of health problems; these birds have strong immune systems due to genetics, living outdoors, and constant exercise (Foer 2009, 111). Reese’s birds “get as much pasture as they want” and are even able to fly onto his roof or into trees on the property (ibid., 110-114). Furthermore, unlike most every farm, Reese does not castrate or debeak the birds (ibid., 234). Mother birds are even allowed to raise their babies, something that is almost unheard of in agriculture (ibid., 110).

Of course, the lives of these birds end in slaughter, during which suffering is inevitable. However, Reese does his best to minimize their suffering. He will not transport them if the weather is too cold or too hot, and only transports them during the night when they are calmer to decrease stress. He does not put as many
birds as possible onto one truck to decrease costs (ibid., 114). Furthermore, he makes sure that the birds are not hung upside down by their feet in the slaughterhouse, and pays the slaughterhouse twice as much to slaughter the birds “half as fast” (ibid.). This ensures that the birds are removed carefully from the truck, one by one, to avoid stress and broken bones and that each is carefully stunned before they are killed (ibid.). Clearly, Reese strives to optimize the well-being of the birds he raises, even during slaughter.

I mention Reese’s farm in order to illustrate how, even with the best standards of animal well-being, farming is still morally objectionable. The first issue with farming that goes beyond the question of well-being is the commodification of animal bodies and lives. Commodification is the act of turning someone into a commodity; a commodity is defined as “something that is produced for the purpose of exchanging for something else” (Encyclopedia of Marxism 2016). In agriculture, animals are turned into commodities to be exchanged for a dollar value. It is wrong to commodify an individual, such as a farmed animal, because commodification strips away anything valuable about that individual and turns them into an object to be bought or sold. For example, turkey Fabio was rescued from a “humane” farm that supplies the likes of Whole Foods. Fabio is friendly, affectionate, and confident. He enjoys the company of most humans, and will “puff up” his feathers and “show off” when someone visits him. Fabio should be valued for who he is as an individual and the qualities that make him special, such as his friendliness, enthusiasm, and affection, and his valuable relationships with others. However, at the farm on which he was raised, he was commodified and stripped away of these qualities, and instead, viewed only as an object having monetary value for the farm.

Not only are the live bodies of farmed animals commodified, but the products extracted from their bodies, such as milk, eggs, and flesh are commodified
as well. In order to produce these commodities, everything about the animal from whom they came is erased: the products are fetishized. For example, the life of the chicken who produced the eggs is not reflected in the carton of eggs sold in a grocery store. This commodity fetishism is further demonstrated by the way that animal products are often sold in white or clear packaging; for example, meat is sold on white, Styrofoam trays with clear wrapping and milk is traditionally sold in clear, glass containers. This packaging aims to show the consumer that the product is “clean” and “pure” of any contamination or bodily suffering, completely removing the product from the life and body of the animal. Carol Adams calls animals whose bodies are consumed “absent referents” because an animal is made “absent” through the consumption of her flesh. She writes that “Animals...[must be] made absent as animals for meat to exist...they are absent from the act of eating meat because they have been transformed into food” (Adams 1990, 20-21). Similarly, Noëlie Vialles writes that the bodies of animals killed for meat are “de-animalised”; the “carcass...no longer has anything to do with the animal from which it has...been extracted...It is a foodstuff, a substance; all the links that attached it to a once living body have been severed” (1994, 127). Thus, commodifying an animal’s flesh or bodily products erases the animal herself.

Moreover, the remains of farmed animal bodies, such as cows, are rendered in order to produce commodities such as leather, soap, cosmetics, and glue (Gillespie 2013). Gillespie writes that commodities such as these are even more removed from the body of the animal; they are fetishized so that they are in no way tied to the suffering of the cow (2013, 7). Although eggs are removed from the body and life of the chicken, they are still recognizable as the products of someone’s body, whereas it is impossible to recognize that there is a dead animal in a bar of soap. This additional commodification further erases the life of the individual.
Erasing the life and experiences of the nonhuman from whom meat, cheese, or leather was produced is problematic because it denies their existence and the fact that they are a victim of violence and exploitation. If one does not recognize the existence of another, there is no room to improve their existence or oppression. Furthermore, by erasing the existence of another, not only is one denying their indirect relationship to the animal whose flesh or secretions they are consuming, but there is no possibility of a “good” relationship with them.

In addition, viewing an individual herself as a commodity also precludes the possibility of a good relationship with her. Barbara Smuts argues that viewing animals as individuals creates opportunities for relationships (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 39); however, if someone is viewed as an object or commodity instead of as an individual, there is no room for a meaningful or constructive relationship. For example, viewing a woman as an object makes her into “something” to be used or consumed instead of a person to get to know and value. Commodification strips away the important qualities someone has and only acknowledges value based on exchange value. Valuable qualities, such as kindness, empathy, and care are the foundation for any good relationship. Without these, good relationships are not possible; thus, commodities cannot have “good” relationships with others. Additionally, commodifying an animal denies her relationships with nonhuman individuals. For example, because a male calf is viewed as a commodity existing solely to produce veal, it is okay to remove him from his mother only hours after birth; if we were to view him as an individual with his own meaningful relationships, destroying his bond with his mother would not be justified. Collard and Dempsey support this idea in their analysis of the commodification of exotic animals as “pets” (Collard and Dempsey 2013). Although this is different from farmed animal commodification, as farmed animals are
brought into the world as commodities, whereas wild animals are turned into commodities, the idea of destroying an animal’s nonhuman relationships overlaps. Collard and Dempsey write, “The process of coproducing an individual, encounterable life is centrally one of severing an animal from its previous sociofamilial and ecological relationships, and entering it into new linkages that are at best a trace of their former colorful complexity and at worst lethal” (2013, 2689). Thus, commodification not only precludes the opportunity for human-nonhuman relationships, but also rips away nonhumans from their previous connections.

Smuts argues that we, as humans, lose something when we fail to recognize another (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 112); seeing someone as a commodity is indeed failing to recognize that someone. Obviously, viewing someone as a commodity negatively impacts the well-being of that individual (for example, farmed animals being killed for human consumption) but it also impacts the individual doing the viewing. If I look at a turkey and view her as an object to be consumed, I lose the opportunity to form a meaningful connection with her. James Stanescu explains how this is concerning, writing, “The connections we make with others are what give us livable lives; denying those connections renders our lives less livable” (2012, 569). Our relationships with others are (or should be) the most important and defining aspect of our lives, and denying these relationships takes away something valuable from our own lives. My life is infinitely richer and more “livable” due to my connections with my nonhuman friends at VINE – viewing these formerly farmed animals as individuals, recognizing the opportunity for relationships, and building those relationships has added so much happiness and a sense of community to my life. If I were to view my nonhuman friends as commodities, or their body parts as commodities, I would not have these connections, and my life would not be as meaningful.
The commodification of farmed animals is additionally problematic because it is often sexist (Gillespie 2013); this will be discussed at length later in this chapter. Therefore, even small farming is morally objectionable because it turns individuals into commodities, thus stripping away someone’s valuable qualities, perpetuating sexism, changing the opportunity for relationships, and making our own human “lives less livable” (Stanescu 2012, 569).

Also, the idea of animals being “humanely raised” on SHFFs further commodifies farmed animals, as consumers will buy a product specifically due to this label and will pay more for it (Gillespie 2013). Gillespie explains that “Discourses of ‘happy cows’ and improved well-being for animals in the food system work to further fetishize the animal as commodity...welfarist practices fetishize not only the animals’ flesh and outputs but also the animal’s ‘improved well-being’” (2013, 14). Thus, small, humane, family farming commodifies animals in a particular way that industrial farming does not.

Once commodified, farmed animals are placed into categories of “killable,” “edible,” and “ungrievable.” First, putting a farmed animal into the category of the “killable” makes her disposable, ignoring any individuality or intrinsic worth she has. Gillespie and Lopez argue that once an individual is deemed “killable,” killing her is not an outrageous act of violence, but a mundane one (2015, 3). Thus, we feel better about the killing because she has already been classified as “killable” since birth. In contrast, killing is vilified when the individual has not been put into the category of the killable (for example, white humans). According to Gillespie and Lopez, the purpose of making “marginalized human and animal bodies” killable is capital accumulation (2015, 9). Killability allows certain bodies to be used and discarded in order to accumulate capital as well as support “certain lifestyle preferences” (ibid.). For example, farmed animals are made killable in order to
support the dietary preferences of humans who would like to consume meat, cheese, and eggs.

Furthermore, Gillespie and Lopez argue that “making certain bodies killable impacts which lives and deaths are grievable” (ibid.). Those who are killable are also “ungrievable.” For example, the deaths of Black individuals who were lynched were not grievable, as they were put into the category of the killable. Also, the deaths of farmed animals today are not grievable, as they are brought into the world as “killable” commodities. Considering someone to be ungrievable means that their life did not matter; the loss of life is not something to be upset over. Deeming someone killable and ungrievable denies them any individuality or intrinsic worth, and instead normalizes the loss of valuable life.

Next, a similarly problematic category is that of the “edible.” Edibility connects to killability, as one needs to be killed in order to be eaten; thus, “edible” individuals are also killable, disposable, and ungrievable. Similar to “killable,” “edible” is also a category of usability. Edibility is problematic because once we view someone as edible, it changes our possibilities and desires towards them. Instead of looking at a chicken and imaging a mutual, positive relationship of care with her, one might imagine the possibility of chicken nuggets. Thus, edibility devalues individuals by reducing them to objects to be consumed. Indeed, in Animal to Edible, Vialles writes that “de-individuation” is “required to turn a living creature into something that may be eaten” (1994, 64). This deindividuation and devaluation can be seen through the fact that cannibalism is not accepted in Western society; we do not put humans into the category of the edible, as this would change our desires towards each other and violate aspects of human dignity. Thus, any animal farming at all is problematic as it supports this system of usability; intrinsically valuable individuals are made into killable, edible, disposable, and ungrievable commodities.
In addition to commodification, SHFF is morally objectionable due to its instrumentalization of the lives and bodies of the farmed animals. To instrumentalize someone is to use them as a means to an end. For example, a small farm that raises chickens for eggs uses the chickens as a means to produce the eggs (an end). It is wrong to instrumentalize farmed animals, as they are individuals, and individuals should only be viewed as ends in themselves. Tom Regan’s “animal rights” position supports this; Gruen explains Regan’s view that “any action that fails to treat the animal as a being with inherent worth would violate that animal’s right and is thus morally objectionable. According to the animal rights position, to treat an animal as a means to some human end, as many humans do when they eat animals or experiment on them, is to violate that animal’s right” (Gruen 2003). I will delve further into the concept of “animal rights” in chapter 2; the critical aspect here is Regan’s point that it is morally wrong to treat an animal as a means to a human end. Animal farming does just this, regardless of size; therefore, even small farms are morally objectionable.

Dinesh Wadiwel further explains how farmed animals are instrumentalized. He writes that the only means of value an animal life has is its value upon death; “livestock” are only worth something due to their capacity to be made dead (Wadiwel 2015, 176). Thus, farming dictates that animals are only valuable in death. However, animals and the lives they live, day to day, have intrinsic value; they should not be brought into the world and given lives solely for the purpose of extinguishing them.

Next, small farming is morally objectionable due to its negative environmental impact. Some argue that small farming is an environmentally-friendly or sustainable alternative to factory farming; however, any animal agriculture is detrimental to the environment. First, energy is lost when it is
converted from one trophic level to another, such as when the energy in grass, a primary producer (lower trophic level) is converted into a cow, a primary consumer (higher trophic level). This is because cows only store a small amount of the energy that they consume. Most of the energy from the grass and other plant-based foods is “wasted” on a cow just being alive; the majority of the calories an animal consumes are burned by necessary bodily processes such breathing, pumping blood, and regulating body temperature. If humans were to eat the plants the cow eats, instead of the cow, we would theoretically “save” all of the calories that the cow would have burned in her life. For example, one calorie of animal flesh results from anywhere between six and twenty-six calories of plant matter (Foer 2009, 211). Thus, with a plant-based diet, more calories would be available to the human population, helping human hunger. David Pimentel, a professor of ecology at Cornell University, states, “If all the grain currently fed to livestock in the United States were consumed directly by people, the number of people who could be fed would be nearly 800 million” (Cornell University Chronicle 1997). Furthermore, the land used to grow crops for farmed animal consumption could be used to grow crops for humans.

Water is also “wasted” on animal farming. Water is needed to produce crops for the animals to eat, consumed by the animals during their lives, and used to clean animal carcasses and kill floors at slaughterhouses (Weis 2013, 133). Next, wild ecosystems are affected by farming; using land to grow crops for animal feed causes habitat fragmentation, negatively impacting ecosystems and species diversity (ibid., 131). Additionally, growing crops means an increased use of artificial fertilizers, which degrade soils and contaminate the water supply (ibid., 131-132). Fertilizers can cause algal blooms, which deplete oxygen from the water and block out sunlight; this has a detrimental impact on ecosystems (ibid., 133). The use of pesticides for these crops leads to increased pesticide resistance, a major threat to
crop production (ibid., 132). Additionally, animal waste and bacteria from even small farms contaminate the environment. For example, during my time at VINE, I stayed in a bed and breakfast in Vermont downstream from a small dairy farm. I was told to avoid swimming in the river after a rainstorm, as the rain would wash cow feces and therefore bacteria into the river. This is an environmental as well as a public health concern.

Any size animal farming inevitably leads to the production of greenhouse gases (GHGs) such as methane and nitrous oxide, through the flatulence of ruminant animals, such as cows (ibid., 134). Even species such as pigs, who are not ruminants and release less methane, emit carbon dioxide and methane from respiration and the production of feces and urine (ibid., 135). Furthermore, fossil fuels are burned to operate farm machinery, hatcheries, processing plants, and slaughterhouses (ibid.). Animal products, unlike plant-based foods, must also be refrigerated, which uses energy (ibid.).

Some may argue that formerly farmed animals living at a sanctuary would also produce methane, use water, and consume crops that could feed humans. However, sanctuary residents would use resources on a much, much smaller scale, as sanctuary animals are not being produced by the billions for the purposes of human exploitation and consumption. Resources are wasted on agriculture and GHGs are released because humans continue to bring more and more farmed animals into existence to satisfy human desires for animal products. Sanctuaries do not attempt to bring more animals into the world, but provide a space for farmed animals to live out the rest of their natural lives. In fact, animal reproduction is often discouraged at sanctuaries, which will be discussed at length in chapter 2.

Small, humane, family farming can actually be worse for the environment than industrialized farming. James McWilliams discusses how grass-fed cows emit
more methane than grain-fed cows, contributing to greenhouse gas emissions and therefore climate change (McWilliams 2012). Furthermore, if we were to raise all of the cows currently in the US on land instead of feedlots, we would need almost half of the land in the US (ibid.). This is just the land needed for cows, not including all of the other species that humans farm. This is because every grass-fed cow needs, on average, ten acres to roam and feed (ibid.). Converting forests and other ecosystems to farmland would lead to even more greenhouse gases being released (Weis 2013, 134). Additionally, free-range chickens are destructive to the environment; pasture-raised, organic chickens have a 20% greater impact on the environment than factory-farmed chickens (McWilliams 2012). This is because humanely-raised, sustainable chickens take longer to raise and consume more feed (such as Reese’s “heritage” birds). Furthermore, organic eggs have a 14% greater impact on the environment than conventionally raised, caged chickens’ eggs (Stanescu 2010, 13). In James McWilliams’s words, “Nothing about this is sustainable” (McWilliams 2012).

However, despite this evidence, some argue that eating locally-based meat and animal products is actually better for the environment than eating a plant-based diet. As previously described, advocates of this “locavore” movement include author Michael Pollan and Joel Salatin, who owns a locally-based, humane farm. Pollan argues that the transportation of plant-based foods from non-local sources is more harmful to the environment than consuming locally-produced meat and animal products. Furthermore, he argues that animal agriculture is actually needed to “cycle nutrients” (Stanescu 2010, 11). These claims are unfounded.

First, Stanescu refutes the claim that transportation of plant-based foods contributes more to climate change than consumption of locally-farmed meat, dairy, and eggs. He cites a 2008 study by Weber and Matthews, which states:
Transportation as a whole represents only 11% of life-cycle GHG emissions...different food groups exhibit a large range in GHG-intensity; on average, red meat is around 150% more GHG intensive than chicken or fish. Thus, we suggest that dietary shift can be a more effective means of lowering an average household’s food-related climate footprint than “buying local.” Shifting less than one day per week’s worth of calories from red meat and dairy products to chicken, fish, eggs, or a vegetable-based diet achieves more GHG reduction than buying all locally sourced food. (Stanescu 2010, 12)

Eating vegetables just one day per week combats climate change more effectively than eating only locally-sourced foods. Therefore, a continuous plant-based diet would be much more conducive to decreasing GHG emissions than eating “local.”

Next, McWilliams counters Pollan’s claim that animal agriculture is necessary to “cycle nutrients” (McWilliams 2012). An example of nutrient cycling in agriculture is “rotational grazing,” in which animal manure fertilizes the soil to grow crops. Thus, synthetic fertilizer is not needed, and animals are “necessary” for crops to be produced sustainably. Joel Salatin, owner of Polyface Farm, is a proponent of rotational grazing; he allows the chickens he raises to fertilize grass for the cows. However, McWilliams argues that this nutrient cycle is undermined when Salatin “feeds his chickens with tens of thousands of pounds a year of imported corn and soy feed” (McWilliams 2012). It is impossible for any farmer to grow all of the food the animals need; therefore, the idea of nutrient cycling is unrealistic. Furthermore, McWilliams argues that the nutrient cycle is broken when a healthy, living animal is slaughtered, which happens to every farmed animal. The nutrients that this animal contains leave the cycle and “land in sewer systems and septic tanks (in the form of human waste) and in landfills and rendering plants (in the form of animal carcasses)” (ibid.). Thus, nutrient cycling on SHFFs provides little to no environmental benefit. Overall, small animal farming is not sustainable.
Last, animal farming is problematic as it perpetuates violence against and devaluation of “subhuman” bodies. Maneesha Deckha argues that the category of the “subhuman” is a “violence-producing category” (2010, 30). “Humans” are thought to be deserving of moral consideration (demonstrated by “human rights” discourses), while anyone outside of the “human” category is viewed as “less than” (Deckha 2010). Therefore, violence against “subhuman” or “animal” individuals is viewed as tolerable and justified (Ko 2014). For example, Deckha writes that violence experienced by farmed nonhuman animals (specifically, in the slaughterhouse) is “perceived as legitimate violence because of the nonhuman status of the species involved” (2010, 31). Indeed, in The Cow With Ear Tag #1389, Gillespie discusses how violence against nonhuman bodies in the dairy industry is normalized and often not perceived as violence (Forthcoming, 12).

Furthermore, Deckha argues that “violence against beings designated subhuman serves as both a justification and blueprint for violence against humans” (2010, 37). First, because we do violence to nonhuman animals, violence against anyone labeled “less than human” is also justified. Individuals can be considered “subhuman” due to categories of race, gender, culture, sexuality, ability, and class. (I will explain how both women and people of color are seen as “less than human” shortly.) For example, during the Holocaust, Jews were dehumanized as insects such as “lice,” therefore justifying violence against them (Raffles 2007). Second, as Deckha argues, violence against nonhuman animals serves as a “blueprint” for violence against human groups. During the Holocaust, the killing of people at concentration camps was made to “resemble the slaughter of animals...in order to make the killing seem more palatable and benign” (Deckha 2010, 37). Thus, normalized violence experienced by nonhumans (such as slaughter) allows for violence against “subhuman” human bodies.
Once human groups are dehumanized due to categories of race, gender, class, or culture, they can be exposed “to violence from which humans are meant to be shielded” (Deckha 2010, 34). In particular, Deckha describes how individuals at Abu Ghraib were dehumanized due to race and culture; this dehumanization then enabled violence against them (Deckha 2010). Thus, “animal” is a category that works to justify violence against both nonhuman and certain human bodies. Deckha argues that instead of appealing to “human” justice campaigns such as “human rights” in order to end violence, we should challenge the category of the subhuman from the start (2010, 44).

In farming, the devalued “subhuman” bodies are most obviously those of farmed nonhuman animals, such as cows, pigs, and chickens, who are viewed as objects to be exploited and killed in order to accumulate capital and support frivolous dietary preferences. By devaluing and normalizing violence against nonhuman bodies, animal agriculture perpetuates a system of “human” superiority that devalues and normalizes violence against any body labeled “animal.” Thus, the system of animal agriculture also devalues humans who fall into the category of “subhuman.” This includes, but is not limited to, people of color, women, queer individuals, impoverished individuals, disabled individuals, and non-Western individuals. I argue that animal agriculture produces and reinforces devaluation and oppression of these “subhuman” groups. To illustrate this, I will discuss how sexism and racism are manifested in and reinforced by the system of animal agriculture.

To begin, human women are seen as “less than human” because just like nonhumans, women have been placed into the category of “closer to nature” or “animal.” Simone de Beauvoir argues that women are seen as closer to nature due to their inescapable reproductive capacities, such as pregnancy, menstruation, and
birth (Kheel 2008, 39). While women are tied to nature, men are free to “transcend” nature by transforming nature into culture (ibid.). Therefore, as Marti Kheel writes, “masculine identity has been viewed as a storied achievement that transcends biology,” while women are unable to transcend biology; just like animals, women remain tied to the “natural” or “animal” realm (2008, 38-39). One example of this is how women have been grouped together with animals and children as “property” of the male head of the household (VINE Sanctuary 2017b). Women are devalued due to their apparent “closeness to nature,” as masculinized culture is valued over feminized nature in the nature/culture binary. Therefore, a system that values “human” over “animal” also values “man” over “woman,” as women are seen as close to “animal.”

Farming reinforcing sexism and the devaluation of women can be seen through the exploitation of farmed animals’ reproductive capacities in agriculture. Ecofeminists have traditionally examined this in terms of female animal bodies (Gruen 1993; Adams 1990); for example, Carol Adams refers to milk and eggs as “feminized protein,” as female reproductive capacities are exploited in order to produce these (Adams 1990). Similarly, in pig farming, female pigs, or sows, are held captive in “6 by 2 foot metal stalls” in order to produce the next generation of pigs who will be killed for meat (Gruen 1993, 73).

However, Gillespie argues that female farmed animals are not the only ones to experience gendered reproductive exploitation. She analyzes the lives of both male and female cows in the dairy industry, using the terms “gendered commodification” and “sexualized violence” to describe their experiences, as the commodification and violence they endure is tied to whether they are male or female (Gillespie 2013).
Female cows are commodified as “reproductive machines,” whose purpose is to produce as many calves and as much milk as possible. Gillespie writes:

[A female cow’s] value is explicitly tied to her function as a reproductive machine... a cow’s purpose for living is to “stay pregnant.” A dollar value is placed not only on her body as a reproductive unit but also on each individual pregnancy. This is certainly a reflection of...the need to maximize the capital extracted from each body. Indeed, if a cow becomes infertile, or if a female calf is born sterile, her only remaining function is to be slaughtered and sold for her flesh. This industry discourse is...a reflection of the way the female animal body is viewed – that because biologically she can reproduce, “staying pregnant” must be the inherent function and purpose of her life. (2013, 9)

As well as being highly gendered, Gillespie writes that this commodification is “sexually violent” (ibid., 5). As previously described, female cows used in dairy are forcibly inseminated; a farmer inserts one hand into the cow’s rectum and the other hand into the cow’s vagina to reach the cervix and deposit the semen using an insemination gun (ibid., 6). Once the cow gives birth, her calf is taken away several hours later; Gillespie writes that cows usually bellow for two entire weeks for their calves (ibid.). Then, the cow will be milked repeatedly, likely to suffer from mastitis (infection of the udder), lameness, and nutrient depletion due to the constant grueling cycle of birthing and milking (ibid.). Finally, she will be killed once she is unable to produce milk at the desired efficiency (ibid., 6-7). Her body will become ground beef and the rest of it rendered to produce commodities such as glue, fertilizer, and leather (ibid., 7). Thus, every aspect of the female cow’s life is marked with violence. Indeed, Gillespie writes that “the commodification of the cow is so complete in life and again in death that at no point is her life and body her own” (2013, 7).

Gillespie explains that male cows experience their own gendered commodification and sexualized violence. Most male calves, useless to the dairy industry as they cannot produce milk, are commodified as “veal” and raised alone
in small spaces, such as pens, hutches, or crates (ibid.). A small number of male calves are also raised to produce semen for artificial insemination. These bulls experience sexualized violence by being forcibly ejaculated two to three days per week and two to three times each day (ibid., 8). Once a bull is no longer able to produce viable sperm, he is sent to slaughter for meat (ibid.). Furthermore, these bulls are portrayed as the perpetrators of sexualized violence against the female cows; for example, the dairy industry has created discourses of the bull “making” the next generation of cows used for dairy, thus making him responsible for the violence the females experience (ibid., 10).

Gillespie discusses how industry discourses also work to sexualize and objectify female cows (Gillespie 2013). In fact, the sexualization and objectification of female cows reflects and reinforces the sexualization and objectification that human women experience. Gillespie discusses catalog images, which display “cows with engorged udders and tails pushed aside to display prominently the cow’s vagina” (2013, 10). She argues that the fetishization of the cow’s reproductive organs in these catalogs is reminiscent of pornographic images of human women. Just as the cow’s swollen udder is displayed, large-breasted women are also displayed to convey fertility and the ability to produce milk (ibid.). Similarly, the image of the cow’s exposed vagina is used to convey that she is “open and ready for business,” just as women’s exposed genitals are meant to convey the same message in porn (ibid.). Thus, the industry discourses that objectify and oppress female cows in agriculture reflect and reinforce the oppression of human women.

Next, sexism is manifested and reinforced by animal agriculture through the compulsory heterosexuality of farmed animals (see jones 2014a). Adrienne Rich discusses compulsory heterosexuality in terms of human women; it is assumed that women are “innately” sexually attracted to men and structures are in place that
force male sexuality onto women, such as rape, idealized heterosexual love narratives, and arranged marriage (1996, 131). Male power is maintained through compulsory heterosexuality because “enforcement of heterosexuality for women [is] a means of assuring male right of physical, economic, and emotional access” (Rich 1996, 135). If women are no longer dependent on men sexually, emotionally, or economically, men lose their power, and the patriarchy ceases to exist. Thus, compulsory heterosexuality creates and reinforces sexism.

Just as heterosexuality is assumed and forced onto women, heterosexuality is assumed and forced onto farmed animals. This can be seen by the way in which female farmed animals are conceptualized as “reproductive machines,” forcibly penetrated and injected with semen in order to produce the next generation of living commodities. Male animals, as well, are assumed to be heterosexual; for example, in semen production, a bull’s penis is forced into an artificial vagina in order to make the bull ejaculate (Gillespie 2013, 8). However, the cultural norm of heterosexuality does not exist in nonhuman animals; in fact, a variety of sexualities and genders are manifested (McHugh 2009). Because compulsory heterosexuality is a tool of the patriarchy, the compulsory heterosexuality in animal agriculture perpetuates sexism.

Additionally, animal farming reinforces the oppression of women through the production of meat and animal products. In The Sexual Politics of Meat, Carol Adams argues that veganism is a feminist act, as the oppression of women is tied to the oppression of animals. First, she discusses how “manhood is constructed in our culture, in part, by access to meat eating and control of other bodies” (Adams 1990, xxvii). Meat eating is seen as masculine (i.e. “real’ men eat meat”) while eating a salad, for example, is seen as feminine (ibid., 12). Thus, masculinity is defined by the ability to access animal bodies for consumption and women’s bodies for sexual
pleasure. Female farmed animals are consumed both sexually and literally through the production of “food” products from their reproductive capacities. Women and animals are objects for male consumption, and agriculture provides the animal bodies to fuel this consumption.

To illustrate the way in which the oppression of women is linked to the oppression of nonhuman animals, Adams conjures the image of a Perdue poster aiming to “encourage chicken consumption” that reads, “Are you a breast man or a leg man?” (1990, 39). Here, both the chicken and the implied woman are objects of consumption; the chicken, literally, and the woman, sexually. Both the chicken and the woman are “butchered” in that they are transformed from whole, living individuals into mere body parts to be consumed. Both the chicken and woman are made “absent referents” through their consumption (Adams 1990, 20-21). When someone is eating a chicken leg, they are (usually) not thinking of the chicken who died, nor does the live chicken exist. Similarly, by transforming a woman into a pair of legs and breasts, the woman is made absent. One is not looking at a woman or a chicken, but a set of legs and breasts to be consumed, sexually or literally. Thus, women who are raped or otherwise sexually objectified/exploited often describe being treated “like a piece of meat” (ibid., 34). Adams writes that this is because “to feel like a piece of meat is to be treated like an inert object when one is (or was) in fact a living, feeling being” (1990, 35). Thus, a system of animal agriculture that turns animals into literally consumable body parts also supports a sexist system that turns women into sexually consumable body parts.

Next, animal agriculture/meat consumption producing and reinforcing sexism is demonstrated by the fact that it is usually women who are forced to prepare animal bodies and “feminized protein” meals for their husbands and children (Gruen 1993; Adams 1990). In fact, women often sacrifice their own
nutrition for the nutrition of their husbands by giving him a greater share of the meat (ibid.).

Finally, farming perpetuating sexism can be seen through Hannah Miller’s experience. Miller is the daughter of Russel and Christine Miller, who own a small dairy farm in Pennsylvania. Sexism is evident in the fact that Miller was “crowned the 2014-15 Schuylkill County Dairy Princess” (Pytak 2014). This “Pennsylvania State Dairy Princess Pageant” is essentially a beauty pageant for young women who come from a dairy farm and must also demonstrate their knowledge of the dairy industry. The pageant website writes that the contestants “must be single and be between the ages of 16 and 24” (Pennsylvania Dairy Princess and Promotion Services, Inc. 2015). The fact that the women must be single is sexist and reminiscent of men controlling women’s sexuality, as well as the sexuality of the female cows these young women work with. Because the dairy industry rests on the control and exploitation of the female animal body, it is not surprising that the bodies of human women who work in this industry are also controlled and objectified, as demonstrated by this sexist beauty pageant.

In addition to women, people of color have been and are seen as “less than human.” Historically, people of color have been placed into the category of the “animal.” For example, in Dangerous Crossings, Claire Jean Kim describes how British explorers during the 1500s first encountered Africans and described “Africans as apes who were tailless and walked upright” (2015, 36). Similarly, Ali Rattansi discusses how Christopher Columbus encountered the Caribs and Arawaks, indigenous South American peoples, and viewed them as “a primitive people, unclothed and dark, and therefore close to nature and uncivilized” (2007, 21). In fact, Kim argues that people of color have never been seen as fully human, and instead occupy the “borderlands,” or gray area, between human and animal (2015,
During the Enlightenment, people of color were placed under white people in various “Great Chains of Being,” reinforcing the idea that only white humans are “human” and that people of color are all “subhuman” (Rattansi 2007, 25-26).

Today, people of color are also seen as “subhuman.” David Livingstone Smith and Ioana Panaitiu argue that Black men, in particular, are seen as outside the category of the human (Livingstone Smith and Panaitiu 2015). They discuss the killing of Michael Brown, an 18 year old Black man who was fatally shot by police officer Darren Wilson in 2014. In his testimony, Wilson described Brown as looking “like a demon” and making “grunting” sounds (ibid., 15), therefore “excluding him from the category of the human” (ibid., 16). Livingstone Smith and Panaitiu explain that “white Americans have very often thought of black Americans (especially black men) as superpredators with praeterhuman strength, insensitivity to pain, superhuman sexual appetites, and so on, as embodied in the iconic racist image of King Kong” (ibid.). Viewing Black men as “superpredators” and therefore “subhuman” works to justify police and other forms of violence against them (Livingstone Smith and Panaitiu 2015).

Thus, the oppression of nonhumans has informed the oppression of people of color through the animalization of non-white individuals. Indeed, Kim argues, “Animality and nature have been integral, not incidental, in the production of racial difference” (2015, 24). Similarly, Deckha writes that “it is the ‘species thinking’ that helps to create the racial demarcation” (2010, 38). Once placed into the category of the “animal” due to race, violence is then normalized and justified. A. Breeze Harper discusses how the “subhuman” categorization works to justify violence by describing her experience in fifth grade when her teacher told her to drop a worm in alcohol, claiming that worms cannot feel pain. Harper remembers how the same was said about Black humans during historical slavery, writing that
“pro-slavery whites deeply believed that Africans could not feel pain; that we were believed to be ‘just like animals’ who had no feelings, spirits, souls; we were just machines available to serve the purposes of white America” (Harper 2011, 76). Here, both Black humans and nonhuman animals are placed into the category of “less than human,” therefore justifying violence against them because they are “unable to feel pain.”

By devaluing and normalizing violence against nonhuman bodies, animal agriculture perpetuates a system of “human” superiority that devalues and normalizes violence against any body labeled “animal,” including people of color. Racism being perpetuated by animal agriculture is demonstrated on the website for the Pennsylvania State Dairy Princess Pageant; all of the women pictured are white (Pennsylvania Dairy Princess and Promotion Services, Inc. 2015). Furthermore, racism is manifested in agriculture itself. Alison Alkon of Critical Sustainabilities explains why sustainable agriculture, as well as agriculture in general, is a white domain:

Historically, USDA loans were much more easily accessible to white male farmers...African American farmers have alleged the most widespread discrimination...In the early 1900s, more than 900,000 black farmers owned over 15.6 million acres of land. By the end of the 20th century, just 18,000 farmers owned only 2 million acres...In 1997, the USDA settled a class-action lawsuit filed on behalf of almost 15,000 African-American farmers for $1 billion. The lawsuit claimed that black farmers were systematically given false information about government programs, denied loans, and given insufficient or arbitrarily reduced loans. (Alkon 2015)

African American farmers were not the only individuals to face USDA discrimination; other marginalized groups include Native American, Asian, Latinx, and women farmers (Alkon 2015). Racism and xenophobia in agriculture can also be seen with the “Alien Land Law,” which was passed by the state of California in 1913. This law forbade those without American citizenship from owning agricultural
land. It particularly targeted Chinese and Japanese immigrants, who were the only groups not eligible for US citizenship (Merriman 2015). Thus, it was almost impossible for these groups to farm. Even when Japanese farmers were finally able to obtain land by putting the title in their children’s name, they lost the land upon being sent to internment camps in the 1940s (Alkon 2015). Therefore, racism is present in farming policies and who has historically had access to farming.

The oppression of farmed nonhumans being entangled with the oppression of people of color can also be seen through the colonization of the Americas. Domesticated farmed animals, such as cows and pigs, were used by the European colonists to displace indigenous people of color (Nibert 2013; Cronon 1983). (Animal agriculture as a tool of colonization will be further discussed later in this chapter.) David Nibert discusses how the enslavement of indigenous people was also tied to animal agriculture (Nibert 2013). For example, Christopher Columbus first brought domesticated animals to the West from Eurasia in the fifteenth century when he landed in the West Indies. Columbus sent the native people of Hispaniola to Spain as slaves in exchange for more cows to be shipped over. Similarly, in 1518, Hernando Cortés invaded what is now Mexico, and enslaved many Native Americans. The ranching of the domesticated animals he brought with him made it possible to accumulate enough capital to begin mining for precious metals, which necessitated the enslavement and forced labor of Native Americans, as well as animals. Thus, violence against domesticated nonhuman animals enabled violence against those seen as “less than human”; in this case, those who are indigenous, non-white, and non-European.

Next, Adams discusses the meat-heavy Western diet as “an index of racism” in addition to male power (1990, 8). In the nineteenth century, meat was viewed as a food for middle-class, “civilized,” white men, while people of color, women, and
people of the lower classes should subsist on “cereals and fruits” (ibid.). According to George Beard, a doctor, meat was higher on the “scale of evolution,” just like the white man, and therefore appropriate for his consumption (ibid., 9). Adams writes, “Racism is perpetuated each time meat is thought to be the best protein source. The emphasis on the nutritional strengths of animal protein distorts the dietary history of most cultures in which complete protein dishes were made of vegetables and grains” (1990, 10). Furthermore, emphasizing meat and dairy in one’s diet, as the USDA does, is racist because these foods are often detrimental to the health of people of color. For example, the gene to digest lactose originated in Europe, so Europeans are, for the most part, able to digest dairy. However, most African-Americans as well as Asian-Americans are lactose intolerant. Thus, Milton Mills coined the term “dietary racism” in reference to the USDA dietary guidelines that make dairy and meat necessary for everyone (jones 2010a, 196).

Patrice Jones expands on this idea of “dietary racism,” writing about the Western diet as a form of colonization. She writes that the “desire for steaks and shakes and deep-fried mystery meats that clog the arteries of so many African-Americans might best be seen as a form of literally internalized colonialism” (Jones 2010a, 196). According to Jones, veganism is a way in which to resist this colonialism and the social processes that have shaped one’s desires. Thus, she calls on readers to “decolonize their desires” in terms of diet (ibid., 197). In this way, animal agriculture, a system that relies on meat consumption and encourages a white, Western diet, perpetuates racism.

Racism is also manifested in animal agriculture through labor. Those who work dangerous, difficult, and psychologically traumatic slaughterhouse jobs are disproportionately low income, undocumented people of color. Timothy Pachirat, who conducted research at a slaughterhouse Omaha, Nebraska writes that the “vast
majority” of people employed by the slaughterhouse were “immigrants and refugees from Central and South America, Southeast Asia, and East Africa” (2011, 17). Indeed, Margo DeMello writes that over 25% of slaughterhouse workers are foreign-born and undocumented (2012, 140). She discusses how meat companies prefer to hire undocumented immigrants as they are willing to accept lower wages and are “easy targets for intimidation and manipulation” because they are “fearful of losing their jobs or being deported” (ibid.).

Pachirat explains that race, gender, education, and citizenship hierarchies work to “coerce others into performing dangerous, demeaning, and violent tasks” (i.e. in a slaughterhouse) that benefit privileged groups who will never have to engage in this kind of work themselves (Pachirat 2011, 9). In this way, the meat industry capitalizes on the precarity of certain individuals due to race, class, and citizenship status (see Gillespie and Lopez 2015 for a discussion of precarity). Because animal agriculture benefits from the devaluation and oppression of people due to race, class, and citizenship, it leaves this oppression unchallenged.

Finally, the location of industrialized farms demonstrates and contributes to the oppression of people of color. CAFOs, or factory farms, are disproportionately located in low income communities of color (Harris 1997; Wilson et al. 2002). Wilson et al. looked at the prevalence of industrial pig farms and found that “[a]lternating levels of percentage African Americans and percentage of persons in poverty, there are 2.4-3.6 times more operations compared with the referent group” (2002, 195). Locating factory farms in communities of color is a form of “environmental racism” (Harris 1997) due to the negative environmental, health, and economic impacts of these operations.

As previously mentioned, industrialized animal agriculture endangers public health, particularly the health of those located near the farms. Factory farms
contaminate groundwater with antibiotics, bacteria, chemicals, nitrates, and heavy metals due to the large amounts of waste produced by the farmed animals. Because 70-90% of rural residents drink well water, this is highly concerning (Harris 1997). In fact, drinking water with nitrates can cause a potentially fatal disease in infants called “blue baby syndrome” (ibid.). Nearby bodies of water such as rivers can also be contaminated with feces when waste lagoons leak. This can be particularly damaging to low-income communities, some of which rely on fish from the rivers as a source of food (ibid.). Gases such as ammonia and hydrogen sulfide are also released into the atmosphere when animal waste breaks down, affecting air quality and causing breathing problems such as asthma (Foer 2009; Harris 1997). Foer discusses how communities living near factory farms experience chronic nosebleeds, earaches, and diarrhea, as well as mental health issues such as depression and anger (2009, 176-180).

These health problems, combined with the odors from CAFOs, work to drastically lower property value, disadvantaging already low-income people (Harris 1997). The quality of life of those located near factory farms is severely degraded (Wilson et al. 2002); David Harris describes how people are unable to open their windows or spend time outside due to the horrible smell (Harris 1997). Therefore, locating factory farms in low-income communities of color demonstrates the devaluation of the individuals in these communities due to race and class and further works to oppress these groups.

In conclusion, by devaluing and normalizing violence against nonhuman bodies, animal agriculture perpetuates a system of “human” superiority that devalues and normalizes violence against any body labeled “animal.” Categories of being due to gender, race, species membership, sexuality, gender identity, class, ability, and nationality can make someone “subhuman.” Therefore, farming, which
oppresses nonhumans, provides a basis for violence against and oppression of human groups viewed as “less than human,” such as women and people of color. Farming producing and reinforcing sexism can be seen through the gendered commodification and pornography of female farmed animals, compulsory heterosexuality of farmed animals, animal product consumption, and Miller’s experience as a “dairy princess”; farming producing and reinforcing racism can be seen through the exclusion of people of color from agriculture, farmed animal exploitation in the Americas producing the enslavement and displacement of indigenous people, the consumption of animal products as a form of “dietary racism” and internalized colonization, slaughterhouse work being done by a disproportionate number of undocumented people of color, and factory farms being located near low-income communities of color. Thus, animal farming is morally objectionable, as it devalues the lives of nonhumans and certain humans characterized as “subhuman.”

Part III: Why Do We Glorify Small Farms? A Critique of Associated Values

Although SHFF is morally objectionable in terms of its negative impact on animal well-being, commodification and instrumentalization of animal lives and bodies, environmental impact, and devaluation of anyone outside the category of the “human,” the movement towards small, humane, family farming is additionally concerning due to the values associated with the glorification of SHFFs over industrial farms, including intimacy, visibility, and nostalgia. Intimacy and visibility make SHFF problematic due to betrayal, normalization of violence, and dignity denial, while nostalgia perpetuates sexism, heterosexism, racism, xenophobia, and classism and erases histories of violence and colonization.
To begin, glorifying SHFFs over industrial farms demonstrates the value of intimacy. To some, farming is preferable if there is a personal “farmer-animal” relationship. With this kind of intimacy, humane farming is seen as a form of “care” instead of exploitation. The value of intimacy is demonstrated in an article written by Gianaclis Caldwell, a small-scale dairy goat farmer in Oregon, entitled “Getting Started in Small-Scale Dairy Farming.” She writes:

The small dairy can be any size that still allows you to feel personally engaged in the animals and the process...people are surprised that we can recognize nearly a hundred goats - and know their names. I remind them that they likely know far more than a hundred people whom they can recognize on sight. To the farmer the animals are not only “people” we know; they are our business partners. (Caldwell 2014)

The value of intimacy in small farming is demonstrated through Caldwell’s desire to link “her animals” to her life and her obvious pride in the fact that she knows all the goats by name. While there are clearly issues with Caldwell’s view (for example, by identifying the goats as her “business partners,” she makes the relationship appear mutualistic when it is clearly exploitative), all in all, this description of the idyllic small, family farm does not seem too terrible.

However, the problematic nature of intimacy in small-scale farming becomes clear in the section of her article entitled “Signs That You Might Be A Small-Scale Dairy Farmer.” The second “sign” she lists is when she asks her readers, “Can you give hours of care and love trying to save the life of a weak bull calf and still come to terms with his being served as steak in a year or two?” (Caldwell 2014). The idea of caring for and having a “good” relationship with an animal who you will then betray and allow to be killed illustrates exactly why SHFFs with intimate farmer-animal relationships are problematic in a different way than factory farms. Having a good, intimate relationship with an animal who you slaughter or allow someone else to slaughter is actually worse than not having one, as it is a betrayal of the
relationship. This is because being in a good relationship with someone, whether it is a family member, friend, romantic partner, or nonhuman, necessitates reciprocity of care and “looking out” for the interests and well-being of that individual. (Otherwise, it would not be a “good” relationship, and there would be no supposed “good relationship benefit” to small farming.)

Gruen’s definition of “entangled empathy” further demonstrates how good relationships necessitate responsibility and attending to another’s interests and needs. She defines entangled empathy as:

[An] type of caring perception focused on attending to another’s experience of wellbeing. An experiential process involving a blend of emotion and cognition in which we recognize we are in relationships with others and are called upon to be responsive and responsible in these relationships by attending to another’s needs, interests, desires, vulnerabilities, hopes, and sensitivities. (Gruen 2015, 3)

Thus, at first, Caldwell is demonstrating entangled empathy in a good relationship with a weak calf in which she is being responsive to the calf’s needs, interests, and vulnerabilities by caring for him and making sure he is healthy, comfortable, and can continue living. However, by sending him to slaughter a year later, she is betraying their relationship by being irresponsible and unresponsive to his interests and desire for life.

Furthermore, this betrayal is manifested by Frank Reese’s experience on his poultry farm. Reese discusses the intimate relationships he has with his turkeys, saying, “Tonight I’ll go out and make everybody that jumped the fence come back in. These turkeys are used to me, they know me, and when I go out there, they’ll come running, and I’ll open the gate and they’ll come. But at the same time, I put thousands on trucks and send them off to slaughter” (Foer 2009, 115). Reese is betraying the turkeys by caring for them and then allowing them to be killed. In
fact, Reese himself discusses how this is emotionally difficult and morally questionable. He says:

In the fall, when other people are giving thanks, I find myself apologizing. I hate seeing them on the truck, waiting to be taken to slaughter. They’re looking back at me, saying, “Get me off of here.”...Sometimes I justify [killing] in my mind that I can at least make it as good as possible for the animals in my custody. It’s like...they look back at me and I tell them, “Please forgive me.” I can’t help it. I personalize it. Animals are hard. (Foer 2009, 115)

Reese’s feelings of guilt for sending the turkeys to slaughter demonstrate the betrayal that occurs on small farms with intimate farmer-animal relationships.

Moreover, even without killing, exploiting someone you are in a relationship with is also morally objectionable. Even if a farmed animal, such as a cow used in dairy, could live out the rest of her life on the farm instead of being slaughtered, the fact that she was used as a means to an end by someone she was in a relationship with is objectionable. I use the term “intimate exploitation” to refer to exploiting someone you are in a relationship with. Intimate exploitation is problematic because one is instrumentalizing someone instead of appreciating them for their intrinsic worth as an individual. For example, romantically dating someone for their money or being friends with someone for their social status are both morally objectionable (especially if the person is not aware that you are doing this). Good relationships should be based on recognizing someone’s intrinsic worth instead of using them as a means to an end.

Intimacy connects to the second value present in SHFF, the value of visibility. On a small farm, the exploitation and suffering of the animals is visible, due to the personal farmer-animal relationships and the hands-on interaction the farmer has with the animals. Instead of being a nameless collective on a factory farm, on a family farm, animals’ lives and experiences are more visible to the humans in charge, as well as to other humans who visit the farm. Some argue that
this visibility makes exploitation on small farms “better” because it makes it more
difficult to view individual animals as killable and disposable, so the killing and
disposing are more “justified.”

While there is definitely something valuable about witnessing and understanding exploitation, instead of not being exposed to it at all, Timothy Pachirat argues that visibility normalizes exploitation and suffering (Pachirat 2011). Pachirat questions the “if slaughterhouses had glass walls” idea by writing, “A world where slaughterhouses are built with glass walls might lead in turn to one in which enterprising slaughterhouses charged people admission to witness or participate in repetitive killing on a massive scale” (2011, 254). To explain this idea, he cites an example of burning cats alive during a famous ceremony in sixteenth-century Paris. People would assemble to watch, and even “reveled in [the cat’s] caterwauling” (ibid., 250). Thus, viewing slaughter could normalize its violence and even turn it into entertainment. Susan Sontag explains this normalization by writing, “For photographs to accuse, and possibly to alter conduct, they must shock” (ibid., 253). Visibility decreases the “shock value” of violent actions; therefore, the violence becomes “normal” and accepted. The value of visibility on small farms is problematic in that it normalizes the exploitation and violence farmed animals experience.

Indeed, visibility normalizing exploitation is demonstrated by Fair Oaks Farm, a sort of “farming amusement park” that prides itself on making small farming practices visible to the public. Fair Oaks has a “Dairy Adventure,” in which one can view cows being milked. Guests can also visit the “Birthing Barn” and see calves being born and taken away from their mothers. The website describes this by saying, “You will have the opportunity to witness the miracle of life right before your very eyes!” (Fair Oaks Farms 2017a). Additionally, Fair Oaks has a “Pig
Adventure” featuring the “Farrowing Barn,” where one can “step inside one of the many viewing pods to witness the birth of our piglets right before your eyes” (Fair Oaks Farms 2017b). Again, there is an emphasis on visibility and the value in something happening “right before your eyes.”

Just as Pachirat argues, the visibility of these exploitative and cruel processes at Fair Oaks normalizes them and makes them “okay” because they are communicated as “this is just what happens.” Observing these in person and having Fair Oaks position this violence and exploitation as “family fun” and “educational” makes it more acceptable. For example, a child might question the cruelty of separating a calf from her mother from just hearing about it, but if that same child were to go on the “Dairy Adventure” with her family, watch calves be taken away, have this cruelty painted as “isn’t this fun and interesting,” and get ice cream afterwards, she might view it as more normal and okay. Thus, as Fair Oaks demonstrates, the value of visibility on small farms is morally objectionable as it can normalize exploitation and violence.

Furthermore, this visibility is problematic because it is one-sided. Humans, who are already privileged over nonhumans, are able to ogle someone giving birth at Fair Oaks, a very private and vulnerable experience. The animals being viewed are reduced to objects of the human “gaze,” which undermines their dignity, as they are unable to either escape this gaze or gaze back at humans in the same way (Gruen 2014b, 242). Watching cows give birth, for example, simply reinforces the human-animal power dynamic and denies female cows dignity as their reproductive capacities are exploited and used as entertainment.

Last, visibility is problematic because it is misleading to the consumer. For example, the website for Polyface Farm claims that “transparency” is a “guiding principle” of Polyface and that “[a]nyone is welcome to visit the farm anytime. No
trade secrets, no locked doors, every corner is camera-accessible” (Polyface Farms 2017). This emphasis on visibility is supposed to make the consumer feel better about purchasing animal products from Polyface, believing that because the farm has “nothing to hide,” the practices must all be ethical. However, just because something is visible does not mean it is ethical (i.e. calf removal at Fair Oaks); moreover, it is highly unlikely that many violent practices are actually visible to the consumers. For example, it is doubtful that visitors are able to view someone being castrated without anesthesia. Most likely, Polyface visitors simply see cows grazing and pigs rooting in pastures and think that is all there is to animal farming. Marketing one’s farm as “visible” or “transparent” leads the consumer to believe that they are seeing everything, and that what they do see is “okay” or ethically justified.

In addition to intimacy and visibility, glorifying small farms over industrial ones demonstrates the value of nostalgia. Nostalgia is problematic due to the racism, sexism, heterosexism, xenophobia, classism, and anti-immigrant sentiment inherent in the idea of returning to the “traditional.” Furthermore, nostalgia erases the violence and colonization historically tied to animal agriculture. To begin, nostalgia is defined as “a wistful or excessively sentimental yearning for return to or of some past period or irrecoverable condition” (Merriam-Webster 2017a). In the case of farming, one might feel nostalgia for times when meat and animal products came from small, independent farms run by families in the community; i.e., “simpler” or more “traditional” times. Sarah Searle discusses this feeling of nostalgia and the romanticization of farm life:

The craze for rustic, weather-beaten barns, long farm tables and the other aesthetic trappings of traditionally conceptualized farm life has reached a fever pitch. We demand it in our weekend getaways, our dining experiences, and our leisure time. We travel to “farm stays” where we can pet sheep and book facials; we shell out cash for farm-
to-table cuisine and go apple-picking...Nostalgia for farm life or animal husbandry is nothing new...Literature has long taken advantage of the apt metaphors of country versus city life and of the imagery of the rural landscape. The “pastoral ideal” appeals through romanticizing the simplicity of the unindustrialized past and glorifying a time when middle-class folks didn’t wake up early for hectic commutes but to tend to chickens. (Searle 2014)

However, this desire to return to more “simple” or “traditional” times contains underlying racism, sexism, heterosexism, and xenophobia. Indeed, Stanescu writes, “The danger of this literary pastoral fairytale is...that it also possesses the potential to mask the darker side of the nostalgic past” (Stanescu 2010). This “darker side” can be demonstrated by the trope of the idyllic “mom and pop” traditional family farm: a white, Christian, American, middle class, cisgender, gender normative, heterosexual couple who owns the farm and passes it on to their children. Indeed, this is the “face” of small farming in the US.

First, nostalgia for SHFFs reveals sexism and heterosexism. This can be seen by the emphasis on the “family” aspect of “family farm,” which conjures an image of a normative nuclear family. Nuclear family is defined as “a group of people who are united by ties of partnership and parenthood and consisting of a pair of adults and their socially recognized children” (Merriam-Webster 2017b). Thus, “family” refers to a heterosexual, cisgender, gender-normative couple with heterosexual, gender-normative, cisgender children. Nostalgia for a “family” farm contains underlying heterosexism and precludes queer or alternative family structures.

Furthermore, nostalgia for a traditional family structure reveals sexism. In a traditional family, there are gender roles and a division of labor. When imagining a family farm of times gone by, one sees a woman/wife/mother cooking, cleaning, and caring for the children, while the man/husband/father tends to the animals outside and completes the more “masculine” tasks such as mowing the fields with a tractor.
Vasile Stanescu criticizes the locavore movement for tending to negatively portray feminists for “abandoning” their role of making locally-grown, home-cooked food and calling for a return to the “traditional” in which “heterosexual men [are] farming and ranching while heterosexual women cook and clean” (Stanescu 2010, 20). Indeed, as previously described, the sexist and heterosexist aspect of “family” farming is demonstrated by Miller’s experience in the dairy beauty pageant. In fact, the article in which she and her family are interviewed is entitled “West Penn Twp. Farm Emphasizes Family Values.” The farm is also described as a “mom-and-pop business,” and Miller herself claims, “We have family values” (Pytak 2014).

Furthermore, sexism and heterosexism are demonstrated by the emphasis on inheritance. The value of inheritance is obvious through the common narrative of “our farm has been in our family for ‘x number of’ generations.” For example, the owners of Lathem Family Farms in Georgia pride themselves on being “a family-run business, with Mr. Lathem’s nephew, Evan, working to preserve the Lathem legacy” (Certified Humane 2017a). Similarly, “Ludwig Farmstead Creamery sits on a 150-acre dairy farm in the Central Illinois town of Fithian. The farm has been operated by the Ludwig family for five generations” (Certified Humane 2017b). This passing down of property to the next generation is reminiscent of controlling women’s sexuality and reproduction in an imposed heterosexual relationship in order to make sure the property is given to the “rightful” male “heir.”

In The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, Friedrich Engels explains that the origin of private property led to the subordination of women. He writes, “Monogamy arose out of the concentration of...wealth in the hands of...a man...and out of the desire to bequeath this wealth to the man’s children...For this purpose, monogamy was essential on the woman’s part, but not on the man’s” (Engels 1978, 745). Thus, to make sure that property would go to the husband’s
biological son, a woman’s sexuality was controlled and she was forced into a monogamous, heterosexual relationship; the same standard was not expected of men. Therefore, the common narrative of a farm “being in the family for generations” demonstrates sexism and heterosexism in that women are expected to be heterosexual and monogamous in order to make this happen. Additionally, controlling sexuality and reproduction does not stop with humans; as previously described, on farms, the sexuality, reproduction, and bodies of farmed animals are also regulated. Controlling women’s sexuality and reproduction in order for the farm to be inherited - on which nonhuman sexuality and reproduction are also controlled - further demonstrates how these oppressions construct each other.

Finally, sexism is apparent in farming through the emphasis on appearing unemotional. The value of unemotionality is demonstrated in the film Peaceable Kingdom, which explores the lives of several small farmers who exploit and kill the animals they raise, only to realize that “humane” farming is a myth and turn to veganism. Harold Brown, who was raised on a beef farm, discusses the importance of never showing emotional attachment to the animal you are auctioning off, saying, “You never talked about how you felt about your animal. You...kept a stiff upper lip, and you moved on. The last thing you ever want to be is weak, you know. Weak farmers don’t survive” (Peaceable Kingdom: The Journey Home 2009). This emphasis on not showing emotion is sexist in that emotion is seen as feminine and therefore “weak.” Because of the patriarchy, “masculine” qualities, such as rationality, are valued over “feminine” qualities, such as emotionality and care. In order to appear “respectable” and “strong,” the farmer must appear as “masculine” as possible and try to repress their more “feminine” qualities. Thus, “effective” animal farming is tied to masculinity.
Furthermore, the value of unemotionality is clear in the way that farmers must repress their emotions in order to do cruel or morally objectionable actions to the animals in their care. For example, Bill Niman, the owner of Niman Ranch, tells Foer about the moments when he doubted the ethics of his work. He says, “That’s when you realize, ‘God, do I really want to exercise dominion and transform this wonderful living creature into commodity, into food?’” (Foer 2009, 225). When asked how he resolved these feelings, Niman responded, “Well, you just take a deep breath” (ibid.). By taking a deep breath, he is presumably “pushing down” his emotions and steeling himself for whatever cruel act he is about to commit.

Similarly, throughout Peaceable Kingdom, farmers mention needing to “turn off” their emotions in order to exploit the animals (Peaceable Kingdom: The Journey Home 2009). Thus, sexism is evident in valuing masculinized rationality and devaluing feminized emotionality in farming.

In addition to sexism and heterosexism, glorifying SHFFs over industrial farms reveals racism, xenophobia, and anti-immigrant sentiments due to the emphasis on “the local.” Small, family farms are connected to the “locavore” movement as they are generally the source of locally-grown and slaughtered food. Vasile Stanescu questions why the locavore movement has so much support if the production of local meat actually has a greater environmental impact than non-local plant-based foods. He argues that the value of the local has underlying racism, xenophobia, and anti-immigrant sentiments (Stanescu 2010).

Stanescu references Ursula Heise, who argues that the locavore movement has connections to the Nazi rhetoric of “blood and soil,” through which a concern for the environment contains “conservatism against those viewed as alien to the speaker’s sense of his/her ‘local’ community” (2010, 19). Stanescu argues that the desire to return to the time of locally grown food on small, family farms has a dark
side of fear and exclusion towards anyone from another place, or anyone “unlike” the locals. People of different races, ethnicities, cultures, and beliefs would not be welcome while locality is valued. Buying “local” is essentially “buying from someone like me.”

Stanescu writes that the value of the local also connects to an “All-American” rhetoric, further demonstrating xenophobia and racism. He argues that the “Buy Local” movement is linked to the “Buy American” movement of the 1970s-90s as the reasons for these are similar, including “fears of globalization, support for union labor and critiques of exploitive labor practices in other countries, all interwoven with a desire to protect traditional ‘American’ ways of life” (Stanescu 2010, 24-25). The idea of only “buying American” is clearly exclusionary and supports an “othering” or anyone not American, just as “buying local” supports an othering of anyone not in the community. Indeed, Stanescu writes that “any movement which seeks to prevent the importation of goods from certain countries possesses the danger of justifying nationalistic fears of those nations and groups of peoples” (2010, 25). Thus, the value of locality perpetuates racist, xenophobic, and anti-immigrant sentiments.

Racism tied to an “All-American” rhetoric is demonstrated by the glorification of farmed animals themselves. For example, on Good Shepard Poultry Ranch, Reese prides himself on raising “heritage” birds devoid of genetic manipulation. The Good Shepard website describes the heritage turkeys as the “quintessential American poultry” (Good Shepard Poultry Ranch 2016b). Furthermore, the website reads, “Heritage Chicken must be from parent and grandparent stock of breeds recognized by the American Poultry Association (APA) prior to the mid-20th century; whose genetic line can be traced back multiple generations; and with traits that meet the APA Standard of Perfection guidelines
for the breed” (ibid.). The emphasis on “heritage,” “genetic lines,” “quintessential American,” and “breed” are reminiscent of a racist and xenophobic “pure blood” rhetoric. Indeed, Patrice Jones writes that the concept of race evolved from the idea of breed in nonhuman animals (2010, 372). Thus, racism, xenophobia, and “All-American-ness” manifest themselves in the way that breeds of farmed animals are discussed and glorified, especially on small, humane farms such as Reese’s.

Next, the feeling of nostalgia for traditional, small, family farming conceals the long history violence and colonization behind pastoralism, or the raising of “livestock.” In Animal Oppression & Human Violence, David Nibert argues that pastoralism, or the oppression of “domesecrated” nonhuman animals, has “enabled and promoted” the violence against, colonization of, and oppression of devalued humans (2013, 91). Nibert argues that human domestication of nonhumans is itself a form of oppression and chooses to refer to “domestication” as “domesecration,” explaining:

The “domestication” of highly social animals...was no partnership at all but, rather, a significant extension of systemic violence and exploitation. The emergence and continued practice of capturing, controlling, and genetically manipulating other animals for human use violates the sanctity of life of the sentient beings involved, and their minds and bodies are desecrated to facilitate their exploitation: it can be said that they have been domesecrated. Domesecration is the systemic practice of violence in which social animals are enslaved and biologically manipulated, resulting in their objectification, subordination, and oppression. (Nibert 2013, 12)

Nibert discusses how the use of “domesecrated” animals promoted violence eight thousand years ago, when people began to practice nomadic pastoralism on the Eurasian steppes (ibid., 13). In order to increase the number of animals under their control and gain access to better pastures, pastoralists would violently raid others (ibid., 14). Horses were used as “instruments of war” in these raids by allowing pastoralists to travel longer distances, retreat quickly, and attack entire
cities (ibid., 15). Thus, the oppression of farmed animals was the impetus for pastoralist violence and destruction, which was further enabled by the oppression of animals such as horses. Pastoralism has never existed without violence against both humans and nonhumans.

Thousands of years later, pastoralism continued its long history of violence through the colonization and oppression of indigenous peoples in the Americas. In the early 1600s, Jamestown was founded in North America. European investors sent over “domesecrated animals to support successful colonization,” such as cows and pigs; without them, the colonists would have starved to death (ibid., 70). As the number of farmed animals in New England increased, so did the violence against the Native Americans. In Changes in the Land, William Cronon describes how pastoralism led European colonists to violently displace Native Americans and permanently change the ecology of New England (Cronon 1983).

First, Cronon describes how the Europeans did not recognize the Native Americans as having a claim to the land they lived on because they did not have the same ideas of private property and land ownership as the colonists (1983, 58). Instead of having houses and farms and fields and fences, the Native Americans were more mobile, migrating seasonally and operating in hunter-gatherer communities. The colonists saw this as indicative of Native American laziness and “failure to improve” the land, “improvement” being a euphemism for destroying forests through farming and animal agriculture (ibid., 55). Thus, the colonists felt justified in taking other people’s land and “improving” it by cutting down the forests, growing crops, and raising domesticated animals, such as cattle, pigs, and sheep.

“Improving the land” was, of course, colonization, but calling it “improvement” made it a less obvious and therefore more effective form of
colonization. As Michael Parenti states, “the most insidious oppressions are those that so insinuate themselves into the fabric of our lives...that we don’t even realize they are acting upon us” (Nibert 2013, 1). The rhetoric of “improvement” made the violence against Native Americans seem less like violence and more like progress. Indeed, Cronon writes that farming was “little more than an ideology of conquest conveniently available to justify the occupation of another people’s lands” (1983, 57). “Improvement” as colonization can be seen through the ways in which animal agriculture violently displaced Native Americans. For example, English pigs competed for food with the natives, as they would root for clams and oysters in coastal regions where Native Americans gathered shellfish (ibid., 136). Animals such as pigs and cows also roamed freely and destroyed Native American crops, leading to violent conflicts between the natives and the colonists (Nibert 2013, 71).

Furthermore, raising animals such as cows altered the forest ecology on which the Native Americans depended. Cows destroyed the native species of plants and allowed European species, which were better adapted to grazing, to replace them (Cronon 1983, 144). Cows and pigs also tore up the ground, changing the soil composition and contributing to long-term forest deterioration (ibid., 145-146). Because of this deterioration, the colonists needed to keep expanding their territory, finding more and more land to farm and therefore destroy (ibid., 146). Also, raising farmed animals necessitated settler expansion, as domesticated animals required more land than the wild animals Native Americans hunted (ibid., 138-139). In fact, Virginia-area governor Francis Wyatt told the colonists, “Our first work is expulsion of the savages to gain the free range of the country for the increase of cattle, swine, etc.” (Nibert 2013, 72). Because farmed animals were profitable commodities, roads were constructed to connect rural areas to cities where the
animals were sold, further destroying forests and infringing on Native American territories (Cronon 1983, 140). Thus, due to animal agriculture:

By 1800s, the Indians who had been its first human inhabitants were reduced to a small fraction of their former numbers, and had been forced onto less and less desirable agricultural lands. Their ability to move about the landscape in search of ecological abundance had become severely constrained, so that their earlier ways of interacting with the environment were no longer feasible and their earlier sources of food were less easy to find. Disease and malnutrition had become facts of life for them. (ibid., 159)

Millions of Native Americans also died due to the transmission of zoonotic diseases from the Europeans, which originated from the domestication of nonhumans (Nibert 2013, 74).

Essentially, animal agriculture was a tool of colonization; through the justification of farming and “improving” the land, white settlers displaced and oppressed millions of Native Americans. In fact, Nibert argues that without the use of “domesecrated” animals, this colonization likely would not have happened (2013, 67). Therefore, nostalgia for the “good old days” of early farming erases the violence and colonization inherent in pastoralism. The positive, wistful feeling for green pastures, grazing cows, rustic barns, and home-cooked meals conceals the historical reality of these pastures and barns being obtained through the death and displacement of native peoples. Indeed, Nibert writes, “The idyllic-sounding, romanticized term ‘pastoralism’ should actually be seen as ‘a subsistence strategy often associated with territorial expansion, social stratification, and military aggressiveness’” (2013, 30). Thus, nostalgia is problematic because it does not accurately reflect the past, and instead conceals history’s violent or oppressive facets.

Indeed, Susan Stewart discusses the “inauthenticity” of nostalgia:

Nostalgia is a sadness without an object, a sadness which creates a longing that of necessity is inauthentic because it does not take part in lived experience...Nostalgia...is always ideological: the past it seeks has never existed except as narrative...Hostile to history and its
incredible origins, and yet longing for an impossibly pure context of lived experience at a place of origin, nostalgia wears a distinctly utopian face, a face that turns toward a future-past, a past which only has ideological reality. (Stewart 1993, 23)

As Stewart writes, nostalgia is misleading because it “does not take part in lived experience”; it points to an idealized, inaccurate version of history.

Indeed, Jamie Huff writes about “Old South nostalgia” erasing the history of slavery and Black oppression in the Southern US. She explains:

The image of the South and its history that is projected is one of a genteel, aristocratic antebellum society graced with mansions and Spanish moss, moonlight, and magnolias. If slavery is represented, it is often in the figure of the faithful, content slave...rather than...a target of legal and social violence. These images hide the labor, the interpersonal violence, and the legal violence that created the profits and social systems that sustained the Old South. When Southern history is presented in this manner, it conveniently elides the fact that chattel slavery was part and parcel of creating the “beautiful” Southern cities, the “stately” plantations, and the “genteel” life of parties and balls. The enslaved people who labored in and outside of plantation houses, small farms, and in cities are shunted to the side or reimagined as content with their status - their history, so central to the creation of the South, is misrepresented. (Huff 2015)

Huff argues that nostalgia is problematic as it suggests a “benign past” in which racial violence and oppression never occurred (ibid.). This allows white supremacy to continue unchallenged; if oppression does not exist, structures of power cannot be challenged or remedied (ibid.). Thus, nostalgia fuels the system of white supremacy that historically oppressed Black individuals and Native Americans. Because nostalgia conceals a violent and oppressive past, it allows violent and oppressive systems to go unrecognized.

In addition to nostalgia, the multigenerational aspect to family farming, i.e. “this farm was in our family for ‘x’ generations,” erases the fact that indigenous people once occupied the land in question by making it seem as though it has always belonged to that family. In fact, the very desire to “keep” the property in the family for multiple generations led to the development of private property and
“fixed boundaries” such as fences, which displaced Native Americans, who did not have the same “rules” for property/land ownership (Cronon 1983, 77).

Finally, classism is evident in the nostalgia for “simpler” times of small, humane, family farming. A romantic view of small-scale farming ignores how difficult working on a farm is; farming means early wake-ups, intense physical labor, and never being able to take a day off from tending to the animals. The reality of farming is not glamorous or romantic, and viewing it as such is indicative of privilege. To illustrate this classism and privilege, Sarah Searle discusses the idea of “farmstays,” in which working farms make a secondary income from tourism. More privileged people, usually from cities, choose to vacation at a bed-and-breakfast-like working farm to get a “taste” of farm life, while not having to participate in actual farm work. The official travel website for New Zealand advertises farmstays, saying:

Farmstays are a unique accommodation option if you want a real taste of rustic, authentic Kiwi farm life. Roll up your sleeves and be prepared to pitch in! Wake to the smell of a hearty farmstead breakfast. Maybe help on the farm if you feel like it; feeding the calves, mending a fence, rounding up the sheep. Often similar to a Bed & Breakfast, with a few extra hands-on activity options thrown in, you stay in the home of your hosts. Farmstay accommodation lets you feel like part of the farming family and is great if you’re travelling with a couple of friends or children. (100% Pure New Zealand 2017)

There is nothing “authentic” about leisurely waking up to breakfast prepared by someone else and helping around the farm only “if you feel like it.” One should not feel like they are “part of the farming family,” when they have the privilege of lounging around and leaving after a weekend. The brief stint of time spent on the farm and the knowledge that one will return to “normal” life in a few days is in no way indicative of actually working on a farm for an extended period of time (or possibly one’s entire life) in order to make ends meet. Farming is a very real and
very difficult, but necessary, way of earning a living for many people, and romanticizing it as a tourist destination is classist in that it obfuscates the lived reality of less privileged people. Indeed, Searle writes, “Consumer demand for the romantic pastoral ideal means denying the realities of farming and production” and that “[t]he gloss of a beautiful farm made for spectatorship allows us to avoid bearing witness to the reality of farming in the U.S.” (Searle 2014).

Additionally, Searle discusses how nostalgia for small, family farms erases the experiences of racial minorities in the US who do most of the agricultural labor. Because the face of small farming is a white, nuclear, “All-American” family, consumers are not aware that most farm workers are foreign-born people of color. According to the United States Department of Labor, a 1995 study on the demographics of agricultural workers found that “Farm workers were predominantly Hispanic...Almost 7 out of 10 farm workers were foreign-born. Of the foreign-born workers, 94% were born in Mexico. Among the remaining 3 out of 10 farm workers born in the United States, approximately two-thirds were non-Hispanic whites, and one-third were of Hispanic background” (United States Department of Labor 2004). Thus, romanticizing farm life with the image of a traditional, white, “All-American” family ignores the actual experience of most workers.

Classism is also evident through the fact that animal products produced by SHFFs are often much more expensive than those produced commercially from industrial farms. For example, most commercially-raised turkeys cost about $0.80 per pound, while a turkey from Reese's farm costs about $10 per pound (Heritage Foods USA 2017). Simply being able to afford “free-range” or “humanely raised” animal products is indicative of privilege. Nostalgia for and glorification of small farms ignores the fact that these products are accessible to so few people.
Furthermore, classism is demonstrated through not only the ability to purchase SHFF products, but the “animal lover” identity that validates these purchases. People may view themselves as “animal lovers” because they choose to buy products from farms or companies that allegedly promote good animal well-being. However, this choice is not based in ethics, but based on one’s privilege and socioeconomic status; having the ability to spend more money on “humanely raised” animal products does not make someone a “better” or more ethical person. In fact, the “feel good” “animal lover” effect of purchasing products from SHFFs is worse, in some ways, than simply buying commercial animal products. This is because buying meat, dairy, or eggs in any form contributes to the exploitation and suffering of farmed animals, but buying “humanely-raised” products gives someone the added satisfaction of feeling “good” about this purchase. There is no guilt over or further questions about the ethics behind the purchase, as there may be with factory-farmed products. Indeed, Matthew Cole argues, “‘Happy meat’ is very bad news for the goal of animal liberation” because “‘happy meat’ and ‘animal friendly’ well-being discourses attempt to remoralize the exploitation of ‘farmed’ animals in such a way as to permit business as usual, with the added ‘value’ of ethical self-satisfaction for the consumer of ‘happy meat’” (2011, 84). Privileged individuals are simply spending more money to feel better about their exploitative and violent purchases, while believing that they are making “better” choices than less privileged people who are unable to do so.

Finally, class is tied to the movement towards small-scale farming because if all farming became small farming (as SHFF advocates would like), meat and animal products would be available to very few, very privileged people. As Stanescu writes, these would become luxury items because there is simply not enough land to raise all farmed animals as “free range” (2010, 15). Thus, the meat, dairy, and eggs from
the small number of “free range” animals would be accessible to few people. The glorification of SHFFs ignores the reality that this “ideal” would make animal products inaccessible to most people and create further class divisions.

In essence, small, humane, family farming is not a favorable alternative to industrialized animal agriculture; it perpetuates violence and oppression, and therefore is morally objectionable. SHFFs are objectionable due to both the farm spaces themselves as well as the values demonstrated by upholding small farms as the better alternative to factory farming. The SHFF space negatively impacts animal well-being and the environment, commodifies and instrumentalizes animal lives and bodies, and normalizes violence against anyone outside the category of the “human.” Furthermore, the values associated with small farming, such as intimacy, visibility, and nostalgia, are problematic as they entail betrayal, normalization of violence, dignity denial, erasure of violence and colonization, and underlying sexism, heterosexism, racism, xenophobia, and classism. Therefore, a radical, more ethical reworking of our relationships with “farmed” animals is needed. Sanctuary, discussed in the next chapter, offers the opportunity for this reworking.
Chapter 2: Sanctuary as Solution

As even small-scale farming is morally objectionable, I pose the solution of incorporating formerly-farmed nonhuman animals into society not as commodities, but as members of an intentional community, or what I call a “Type IV” sanctuary. I contrast this Type IV sanctuary model with “lesser” Type I, II, and III models and discuss the ways in which these limit nonhuman residents through association, reproduction, and environment. Through this discussion of sanctuary types, I demonstrate the importance of considering more than well-being in sanctuary spaces. Furthermore, I argue that these “lesser” sanctuaries can actually resemble small farms and perpetuate “small farming” structures and values that they should be attempting to remedy. Finally, I discuss rewilding efforts as an essential characteristic of Type IV sanctuaries.

I would like to note that I use the term “sanctuary” to refer to all spaces that identify as sanctuaries. However, I argue that Type I and II “sanctuaries” are not true sanctuaries because they are not spaces free (or almost free) of exploitation, instrumentalization, and commodification; therefore, using Patrice Jones’s definition of sanctuary, they are not “safe enough” (Jones 2010, 370). For this reason, sanctuary will be put in quotations when referring to those that are Type I or II. While Type III sanctuaries can engage in some nonhuman commodification and/or instrumentalization, I do believe that they are “safe-enough” spaces; thus, they are true sanctuaries, as are Type IV.

Part I: Type I “Sanctuaries”

Type I animal “sanctuaries” are the least ethically justifiable type. They do not prioritize nonhuman well-being; life itself is simply prioritized. For example,
some “sanctuaries” in New York City rescue sick or injured pigeons and house them in tiny cages in an apartment. The birds have little room to move around, cannot interact with others, and are often kept in unclean conditions. They do not experience rich or fulfilling lives. In fact, there is little difference between these “sanctuaries” and industrial farms; in both, well-being is not considered and the animals are simply kept alive in extreme captivity. (Of course, Type I “sanctuaries” are not using the animals as a means for food production.) It is unclear whether the lives of animals at a Type I “sanctuary” are even worth living.

Part II: Type II “Sanctuaries”

Type II “sanctuaries” are an improvement from Type I’s as they do consider nonhuman well-being. However, they do not necessarily prioritize well-being; furthermore, Type II “sanctuaries” perpetuate structures of human domination and commodify and instrumentalize the nonhuman residents. Funny Farm Rescue Animal Sanctuary in Mays Landing, New Jersey is a Type II “sanctuary.” In general, the residents of Funny Farm are given plenty of food, water, shelter, veterinary care, and space to move around and interact with others. However, there are exceptions to this, and at times the animals’ needs and interests are not met. For example, while volunteering, I witnessed a goat with a leg injury resting in the barn, without food or water near him. He was unable to stand and walk to where they were located at the end of the barn. Although he presumably would have been fed in the morning and evening, having access to food and especially water at all times is critical for well-being. Additionally, in general, drinking water at Funny Farm was not replaced regularly, negatively impacting well-being by forcing the residents to drink murky or unclean water.
Next, many residents are housed in cages or other small enclosures. For the most part, these individuals are rabbits and birds. For example, a mother peahen and her peachick were placed into a circular enclosure that was only about six feet in diameter. I was told that this was done in order to give the peahen “space” to raise her young; however, a larger enclosure, or possibly no enclosure, would have been conducive to well-being. Being a part of the interspecies community and interacting with other residents may have actually benefitted the peahen and peachick more than being housed separately. Also, Funny Farm’s rabbit residents are housed in cages with an area of only two or three feet. This increased captivity and isolation from other residents negatively impacts well-being. Therefore, while Funny Farm absolutely considers nonhuman well-being, it is clearly not prioritized.

In addition to not prioritizing well-being, Type II “sanctuaries” such as Funny Farm have other issues that go beyond well-being, such as instrumentalization, commodification, and perpetuating structures of human domination. Funny Farm’s “zoo-like” quality instrumentalizes animal lives and bodies. Funny Farm resembles a petting zoo in that the public is allowed to come visit on Tuesdays and Sundays; they are not there to volunteer, but to view the animals. In this way, the residents are instrumentalized as a means for human entertainment. Most visitors are parents who take their children to Funny Farm for a “fun day out” so they can look at and touch the residents. For example, skunk Biff is passed around from person to person so everyone can hold him. Biff is not viewed as an individual with intrinsic value, but a means of entertainment.

Funny Farm’s “zoo-like” feel also perpetuates a structure of human domination, as there is a clear dynamic of human power over nonhumans. Most of the residents are kept behind fences (although many are able to wander the grounds freely) and human visitors will go up to the fences, stare at the animals, touch
them, and feed them bread. The animals are unable to move away from the visitors, and it is obvious that the humans feel entitled to access residents’ lives and bodies.

At Funny Farm, I witnessed people becoming upset when a resident did not eat the bread that was offered to her, people chasing after residents who were moving away to avoid being touched, and language undermining the personhood, dignity, individuality, and intrinsic worth of the residents (such as referring to someone as “it”). All of these actions perpetuate a structure of human superiority, power, and domination. Furthermore, on certain visiting days, humans are able to “ride” the horse residents, which is a clear manifestation of domination.

The zoo-like nature of Funny Farm undermines the dignity of nonhuman residents. Gruen explains, “Thinking of animals as things to be looked at and believing that doing so makes for an enjoyable weekend outing, precludes seeing animals as having dignity” (2014a, 242). Indeed, at Funny Farm, residents are considered “things to be looked at.” Their dignity is violated because their lives are not being recognized as intrinsically valuable. This denial of dignity is obvious through actions such as human visitors throwing bread at the animals’ bodies.

Moreover, nonhuman dignity is violated through the human “gaze” (Gruen 2014b). Funny Farm residents are all objects of the human gaze, demonstrated by visitors standing outside of a resident’s enclosure and staring at her. One day, I witnessed a group of about fifteen people watching dog Chuck eat his lunch. He has stomach problems and needs to eat upright in a specially-made chair in order to keep his food down. Staring at Chuck and taking pictures of him eating denies him dignity and reinforces feelings of human domination. Recipients of the human gaze, such as Chuck, are unable to avoid this gaze or even gaze back in the same way. Also, a resident’s inability to escape the human gaze precludes dignity because there is no opportunity for privacy. Gruen writes, “Part of the value of privacy is that,
outside of the sight and judgment of others, we can experiment in living” (2014b, 242). Thus, “sanctuary” spaces such as Funny Farm are problematic because their zoo-like feel perpetuates human domination and precludes seeing the residents as having dignity.

Finally, the last issue with Funny Farm that goes beyond nonhuman well-being is its commodification of residents and their bodily products. First, the eggs that the chickens produce are sold for a profit, generally to Funny Farm visitors. Commodifying these eggs erases the chicken’s life and experiences and denies the buyer a good relationship to her. Selling the bodily products of sanctuary residents will be discussed at length later in this chapter.

Funny Farm also occasionally purchases residents, such as skunk Biff. Purchasing a nonhuman makes her a commodity, as she is being exchanged for a dollar value. While commodifying individuals can be seen as ethically justified on an individual level (i.e. purchasing a calf who would be killed for veal and bringing him to sanctuary, thereby “decommodifying” him), at a systemic level, this can be counterproductive because one is financially supporting and participating in a system that treats animals as commodities and benefits from their exploitation. Just as vegans abstain from purchasing animal products in order to avoid supporting exploitative systems, abstaining from purchasing animals eschews a system that views individuals, such as skunks, as objects or commodities.

As described in the previous chapter, commodification of animal bodies is morally objectionable because it strips away what is valuable about the individual and changes the opportunity for relationships with them. Selling Biff, for example, makes him into an object to obtain a profit, not an individual with intrinsic value. Furthermore, by transforming a wild animal, such as a skunk, into a commodity, one is removing her from any previous relationships she may have had in the wild.
and turning her into a valuable object to be “owned” by humans (Collard and Dempsey 2013). Thus, “sanctuaries” such as Funny Farm are morally objectionable and therefore only classified as “Type II” due to the commodification of nonhuman residents. Even if well-being at Funny Farm were ideal, the space would still be problematic due to commodification, instrumentalization, and perpetuation of human domination.

Part III: Type III Sanctuaries

In contrast to Type II “sanctuaries,” Type III sanctuaries prioritize resident well-being. Residents at a Type III sanctuary, such as Farm Sanctuary in Watkins Glen, NY, have access to plenty of food and clean water, have space to run and play, are able to socialize with others and exhibit species-specific behaviors, and are given excellent veterinary care. Indeed, when discussing cow resident Issac, Farm Sanctuary writes, “Like every individual who comes to our sanctuaries, Isaac’s every need will be met. His well-being and personal comfort is our priority, because at Farm Sanctuary...every individual, from the smallest chickens to the largest cattle, is treated as someone, not something” (Animals of Farm Sanctuary 2016a).

Type III sanctuaries embody what Donaldson and Kymlicka call a “refuge and advocacy model” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2015). They define sanctuaries with a “refuge and advocacy model” as places where “[r]escued animals live out their lives in safety and comfort, and also serve as ambassadors to the visiting public for all of the animals who remain trapped in the animal-industrial complex” (ibid., 1). For example, one can visit Farm Sanctuary and meet a pig rescued from the pork industry, thus prompting human visitors to think about where their food comes from and ideally become vegan. The interactions with formerly farmed animals shatter illusions about farmed animal capabilities and personalities, and allow
visitors to see farmed animals as social, vibrant individuals. In this way, a pig would serve as an ambassador for the millions of pigs who are killed each year in agriculture.

In fact, some sanctuaries may strive to offer residence to a variety of species and make admissions decisions based on the species of the animal in need in order to attain what Donaldson and Kymlicka call a “Noah’s Ark model” (2015, 10). They explain, “For some sanctuaries, the goal of creating a visitor outreach experience with animal ‘ambassadors’ means choosing a representative sample of animals to reflect the spectrum of agricultural exploitation, and the spectrum of experiences that animals have within the system” (ibid.). Therefore, if a sanctuary already has many pigs but few cows, they may choose to offer residence to a cow over a pig, so visitors have the opportunity to learn about and interact with cows.

Farm Sanctuary, as a Type III, certainly embodies a “refuge and advocacy model”; their website reads:

We have rescued thousands of animals and cared for them at our sanctuaries...We educate millions of people about their plight and the effects of factory farming...We advocate for laws and policies to prevent suffering and promote compassion, and we reach out to legislators and businesses to bring about institutional reforms. (Farm Sanctuary 2017a)

Thus, Farm Sanctuary provides refuge to formerly farmed animals in addition to publically advocating for them. While this seems to be and is very noble, it is not without issue, making “refuge and advocacy” sanctuaries “Type III” instead of “Type IV.”

To begin, treating sanctuary residents as “ambassadors” instrumentalizes them, as they are being used as a means to educate the public by representing their conspecifics. Ideally, sanctuary should be a space that allows farmed animals to be viewed as ends in themselves and to not exist for anyone else. The problematic
nature of making residents “ambassadors” is demonstrated by the “Noah’s Ark model,” in which sanctuaries may decide to accept potential residents not based on their personalities or how they would fit into the sanctuary community, but their species membership. Rejecting someone simply based on species is discriminatory (assuming that the sanctuary can, indeed, care for that species; i.e. a sanctuary is justified in not accepting more chickens because they do not have the funds to build another coop). Indeed, Donaldson and Kymlicka illustrate the problematic nature of considering sanctuary residents “ambassadors” by writing that nonhumans held captive in zoos are also considered “ambassadors” for “less fortunate” wild animals of the same species, just as sanctuary residents are ambassadors for “less fortunate” farmed animals in agriculture (2015, 6). Thus, at Type III sanctuaries, farmed animals are instrumentalized as representatives for their species in order to educate the public.

Additionally, at a Type III sanctuary, residents are instrumentalized in order to gain support, financial or otherwise, for the sanctuary. This can be seen through the distribution of and voyeuristic nature of the residents’ stories. Because the nonhuman residents are viewed as ambassadors, their photos and stories are shared widely, especially online, in order to raise awareness of the horrors of farming and to demonstrate farmed animals’ individuality. Farm Sanctuary, for example, posts photos and descriptions of the residents on social media sites such as Facebook as well as their site entitled “Animals of Farm Sanctuary,” which contains extensive photos and descriptions of the residents’ “stories.” A resident’s “story” is the culmination of knowledge about her life and who she is. Someone’s story includes her history (where she was rescued from and how long ago, what condition she was in, what health problems she has experienced), her relationships (siblings, parents, friends, significant others), and her preferences or personality traits (what her
favorite foods are, where she likes to spend time, if she is a troublemaker or peacekeeper, social or a loner, etc. (Chapter 3 discusses how knowledge of residents’ stories is necessary to recognize farmed animals as individuals.) However, sharing their stories can instrumentalize the residents, as they are being used as a means to gain sanctuary support. This instrumentalization is demonstrated by the voyeuristic feel to their stories; intimate, disturbing, and dramatized details are included to “pull in” readers and elicit emotional responses.

Merriam-Webster defines “voyeur” as “a prying observer who is usually seeking the sordid or the scandalous,” “particularly...[an observer] interested in squalid or shocking details” (Merriam-Webster 2017e). There is also an emphasis on a voyeur seeing something private or intimate that is generally not supposed to be seen. Indeed, the “Animals of Farm Sanctuary” website includes many intimate details and photographs of the residents. For example, cow Billy’s story was shared on this site. There is a total of 20 pictures of Billy on the page, and 1,300 words describing his story. Intimate details about Billy’s life are revealed to the reader, such as the fact that he had trouble fitting in and making friends and that he had physical altercations with the first two nonhuman friends he made. Photographs show him nervously exiting the trailer he arrived in; one is captioned “Larry coaxes out a nervous Billy, who is a bit scared about coming off our trailer” (Animals of Farm Sanctuary 2017). Including intimate details about Billy’s social struggles and photos showing him scared and vulnerable allows the reader to be a voyeur and “see” aspects of Billy’s life that would otherwise be private and only available to those working at the sanctuary. This is also an invasion of privacy; many humans, including myself, would not want details of their personal struggles or shortcomings published online, as well as photos of ourselves during vulnerable moments.

In addition to intimate details, particularly alarming or upsetting details are
included. For example, Farm Sanctuary wrote that Billy was going to be hit in the head with a sledgehammer as he was of no monetary value to the farmer (Animals of Farm Sanctuary 2017). They also wrote about Billy’s best friend, Orlando, saying that he and his four brothers were kept in a dirty basement to be raised for cheap beef. Farm Sanctuary included a photo of a dead calf in the grass outside the home, and wrote that the farmer said he would shoot the calves instead of paying for medication to treat their pneumonia (Animals of Farm Sanctuary 2016b). While it is important to demonstrate the horrors of animal agriculture, including these disturbing details and photographs contributes to voyeurism as they serve as “shock value” entertainment for the reader. In this way, Billy and Orlando’s trauma are being used to attract and enthrall human readers who will ideally support the sanctuary. Farm Sanctuary is capitalizing on residents’ trauma, as people will be more likely to lend support after reading about someone’s upsetting, violent, and dramatic past.

Additionally, the “Animals of Farm Sanctuary” stories are dramatized, further contributing to voyeurism. Billy’s story is titled “Billy: When Fate Stepped In,” increasing the dramatic feel of his story. Similarly, Orlando’s story is titled “Orlando Narrowly Escaped Death.” These dramatic titles attempt to “pull in” and entertain the reader. Including intimate, disturbing, and dramatized details of the animals’ stories is done to attract sponsors and therefore instrumentalizes individuals such as Billy and Orlando as a means to gain support for the sanctuary.

Another important aspect of the Type III “refuge and advocacy” model is educating the public through sanctuary tours. These tours allow humans to visit the sanctuary grounds and interact with the residents, while a tour guide educates them about the sanctuary, the residents, and the detrimental impacts of factory farming. Hopefully, the visitors will choose to adopt a vegan lifestyle and/or donate to the
sanctuary. At Farm Sanctuary’s Watkins Glen location, tours are given five times a day on Saturdays and Sundays in May, September, and October (Farm Sanctuary 2017b). In June, July, and August, tours are given five times a day, five days per week (ibid.). This amounts to a large number of human visitors; Elan Abrell states that “Farm Sanctuary sees between 4,000 – 5,000 people come through on guided tours each year” (2016, 202). Unfortunately, these tours are problematic as they can reinforce ideas about human superiority and undermine the dignity of nonhuman residents.

Sanctuary tours can feel very zoo-like, as with both zoos and tours, humans are viewing captive animals. Donaldson and Kymlicka write that sanctuary tours can “enable forms of animal viewing that may reinforce implicit assumptions about a human entitlement to confine and display animals” (2015, 6). Instead of leading people to question conceptions of human superiority and entitlement, sanctuaries may perpetuate them by allowing humans to walk through and view captive animals for, essentially, entertainment. Although sanctuaries may argue that these tours inspire change in people by allowing them to interact with farmed animals who they may have viewed before as “food,” Donaldson and Kymlicka counter that zoos also justify having visitors through the “educational” experience provided to them (ibid.). Furthermore, they argue that it is unknown how much impact a sanctuary visit actually has on someone’s choices (i.e. deciding to go vegan and continuing to do so) (ibid., 4).

Of course, tours at Type III sanctuaries are very different from the petting-zoo-like “visiting days” at Type II “sanctuaries” such as Funny Farm. At Funny Farm, there is absolutely no tour guide or “educational” component, bread is being thrown at captive residents, and visitors are generally not respectful of the animals’ interests or space (i.e. children screaming close to the animals and people forcibly
touching the animals when they are clearly not interested in being touched). I do not mean to suggest that the “zoo-like” nature of Type III sanctuary tours is the same as the zoo-like reality of “sanctuaries” such as Funny Farm. I do believe that the residents at Type III sanctuaries are deeply respected and viewed as individuals in ways they are not at Type II “sanctuaries,” and a tour led by an informed sanctuary advocate who will direct the public and tell visitors if they are being too loud or if a resident does not want to interact is much more respectful and conducive to dignity than the “free-for-all” Funny Farm visiting days. Indeed, Farm Sanctuary’s website states that visitors may not be able to directly interact with a resident if she is not comfortable with new people (Farm Sanctuary 2017b). However, there is still room for critique with Type III sanctuary tours, even if they are a stark improvement to Type II “sanctuary” spaces.

In addition to reinforcing ideas of human superiority by allowing captive animals to be on display for humans, sanctuary tours undermine the dignity of nonhuman residents through encouraging the human “gaze” (see Gruen 2014b). Because there are tours throughout the day during summer months, the residents are almost constantly being gazed at by humans, and there is little opportunity for privacy.

Furthermore, in addition to being philosophically problematic, sanctuary tours can negatively impact nonhuman well-being because residents may not want to be looked at or disturbed by human visitors. The sanctuary is home to the residents, and visitors coming into their home, staring at them, and touching them/their friends/their loved ones may be annoying or even upsetting. Many (if not most) of the residents have been abused or exploited by humans, and may feel scared or uncomfortable in their presence. Therefore, tours can negatively impact resident well-being by causing feelings of fear, distress, or agitation. Moreover,
Abrell writes that tours actually impact where an animal is able to go in the sanctuary (2016, 205). For example, if a resident is aggressive or does not get along well with human visitors, she may be housed farther away from where the tours are conducted or kept behind a fence. This increased captivity or change in location can negatively affect well-being.

Finally, the last characteristic of a Type III sanctuary is veganism. Type III and IV sanctuaries must be vegan because true sanctuaries address systemic nonhuman oppression in addition to caring for individuals who live at the sanctuary; otherwise, they risk being privy to “animal lover hypocrisy.” “Animal lover hypocrisy” refers to the idea of identifying as an “animal lover” but making choices that contribute to the oppression of nonhumans. For example, one might call herself an “animal lover” because she loves and cares for the cats she lives with, but contributes to the suffering of nonhumans in agriculture by purchasing meat. Alternatively, someone might identify as an “animal lover” because she abstains from eating meat but continues to eat dairy and eggs. If a farmed animal sanctuary is not vegan, it is caring for some nonhumans and preaching compassion while supporting a system that exploits and kills billions of others; this is hypocritical.

At a “vegan” sanctuary, the staff are vegan, the food given to the residents is vegan, products and appliances used at the sanctuary are vegan, and the products of the residents’ bodies are not commodified or consumed by humans. Of course, within the structure of nonhuman exploitation, it can be impossible to be completely vegan at all times; for example, the medication needed by a sick or injured resident may be the product of animal testing. If there is no alternative, sanctuary staff may decide to purchase it in order to save the life of the resident. I do believe that this action is ethically justified, as sanctuary staff have a direct
responsibility to the residents in their care; they have made a commitment to these animals, and not purchasing the medication and therefore allowing the resident to die would be a betrayal of the relationship and a shirking of one’s responsibilities. The important aspect of being a “vegan sanctuary” is that the staff make *every effort* to be vegan, while acknowledging that at times, veganism can be almost impossible, and difficult decisions must be made. Indeed, Lori Gruen and Robert Jones argue that veganism should be considered an “aspiration” rather than an “identity.” They view “veganism not as a lifestyle or identity, but rather as a type of practice, a process of doing the best one can to minimize violence, domination, and exploitation” (Gruen and Jones 2015, 156). Sanctuaries such as Farm Sanctuary and VINE Sanctuary do their best they can to minimize violence, domination, and exploitation; therefore, I consider these “vegan” sanctuaries.

However, other Type II and Type I “sanctuaries” do not make any significant effort to be vegan and therefore engage in “animal lover hypocrisy.” Funny Farm, for example, is not vegan. During my internship, I witnessed a visitor feeding cow’s milk cheese to pig residents. Funny Farm’s Facebook page also posted multiple times requesting visitors to donate gallons of whole cow’s milk for a calf resident, Yogi. The founder, Laurie, is vegetarian but not vegan. Clearly, the staff are not making every effort to minimize violence and exploitation. Funny Farm has good intentions (i.e. spending time and money caring for the residents), but intentions are not enough. For example, providing Yogi with a home and food is noble and compassionate, but if purchasing his food (cow’s milk) supports an industry that kills millions of male calves like him every year, it is less compassionate, especially when there are many better vegan alternatives. (In fact, whole milk one would buy in a supermarket is not appropriate food for a calf; the milk that comes out of the mother cow is very different and much more nutritious
than store-bought whole milk.) Farmed animal sanctuaries cannot be true sanctuaries if they contribute to exploitation and violence, even if it is not the individuals at the sanctuary who are being exploited.

Therefore, Type III sanctuaries differ from Type IIIs as they prioritize nonhuman well-being and are vegan. However, they are still not quite the ideal sanctuary space because they embody a “refuge and advocacy” model, in which nonhuman residents are instrumentalized as ambassadors. Type III sanctuary tours can also negatively impact resident well-being, deny the residents dignity, and reinforce ideas of human superiority. Instead, the ideal sanctuary space will be explored in part IV.

Part IV: Type IV Sanctuaries

I argue that Type IV sanctuaries are the ideal space for formerly farmed animals. Just like Type IIIs, Type IVs prioritize the well-being of the nonhuman residents. However, instead of a “refuge and advocacy” model, Type IV sanctuaries embody what Donaldson and Kymlicka call an “intentional community” model (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2015). In this model, residents are viewed as members of an interspecies community; unlike at Type III sanctuaries, they are not instrumentalized as ambassadors. The “intentional community model” also minimizes human domination. Furthermore, Type IV sanctuaries maximize the agency, self-determination, and freedom of the residents and allow them to “explore different possible lives” (ibid., 8) without compromising well-being. To do so, a Type IV sanctuary strives to not limit residents in terms of association, environment, and reproduction; these are areas that Donaldson and Kymlicka argue can hinder animals in terms of experience, learning, and the ability to control their own lives (ibid.). VINE is the only sanctuary I have encountered that I would classify as a
Type IV, as it meets all of these criteria.

To begin, Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that many farmed animal sanctuaries can resemble “total institutions.” A “total institution,” a term coined by Erving Goffman, is defined as “a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life” (ibid., 7). Examples of total institutions include prisons, nursing homes, and shelters. The goal of these is to provide care for a group of individuals; however, these spaces can be paternalistic, with one group of individuals (the caretakers or staff) making decisions for and controlling the lives of the cared-for. Donaldson and Kymlicka write that this kind of institution “gives some people the power to structure other people’s lives, and ‘the cared for’ have limited means to counteract this power” (ibid.). Especially in situations in which the institution is a permanent reality or “becomes home” for the individual (for example, nursing homes or farmed animal sanctuaries), this paternalism and control can be especially problematic as it is not just a “temporary evil” (ibid., 15).

Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that sanctuaries that resemble “total institutions” (in my view, Type I, II, and possibly Type III) can be problematic because they limit “animals’ participation in key decisions affecting their lives...which results in policies and practices that may diminish animals’ wellbeing and infringe their rights” (2015, 8). While I agree that sanctuary residents should participate in decision-making and that this participation can improve well-being, I do not think that “rights infringement” is the best way of understanding the importance of this participation. Rights are not the most useful approach to conceptualize what is owed to nonhumans we are in relationships with. First of all, it is difficult to determine which nonhuman species would be granted rights and
what kinds of rights they would have. For example, what would grasshoppers’ rights look like? Second, granting rights in general perpetuates pre-existing structures of power and domination. This is because those in power are the ones who decide who has rights and which rights they have. In the case of nonhuman animals, humans would be the individuals granting rights to nonhumans, which perpetuates human domination and the human/nonhuman hierarchy. Therefore, Wendy Brown writes that “rights almost always serve as a mitigation – but not a resolution – of subordinating powers” (Wadiwel 2015, 38-39). Rights are given by a sovereign to those under the sovereign’s control in order to make the sovereignty more palatable, but do not challenge that sovereignty in the first place. Indeed, Wadiwel responds to Donaldson and Kymlicka’s argument for nonhuman rights within a citizenship model (extensively discussed in their book, Zoopolis), stating:

> [T]he model put forward by the authors relies upon humans...standing at the borders to determine eligibilities and entitlements. The human prerogative to decide remains in the background of the Donaldson and Kymlicka model: in this sense, we do not find a clear contestation of the idea put forward by John Webster that ‘Man has dominion over the animals whether we like it or not.’ A human sovereignty over other animals, in other words, prevails. (Wadiwel 2013, 753)

Therefore, the idea of “animal rights” granted by humans perpetuates a structure of human domination instead of challenging it.

Moreover, rights are not the most useful concept because, as Judith Butler argues, rights pertain to individuals or bounded communities (Butler 2004). For example, someone might argue for rights over her own body or a queer community may argue for “equal rights.” In both cases, rights are awarded to individuals or groups of individuals seen as separate from the larger population. Therefore, in order to obtain rights, Butler writes that “we have to present ourselves as bounded beings – distinct, recognizable, delineated, subjects before law, a community defined
by some shared features” (2004, 24). However, she argues that we are not simply individuals or members of bounded communities. We are interdependent beings and forever implicated in the lives of others; we live “in certain ways beside ourselves” (ibid.), not “by ourselves.” Thus, rights are not an accurate depiction of who we are and the way we exist in the world. Butler explains:

But perhaps we make a mistake if we take the definitions of who we are, legally, to be adequate descriptions of what we are about. Although this language [of rights] may well establish our legitimacy within a legal framework... it does not do justice to passion and grief and rage, all of which tear us from ourselves, bind us to others, transport us, undo us, implicate us in lives that are not are [sic] own, irreversibly, if not fatally. (2004, 25)

Similarly, Gruen discusses her concerns about the individualistic nature of a “rights approach.” She explains:

Rights are claims that we make against each other and assert to protect ourselves from the encroachment of others. Our legal system may be structured in such a way as to see rights holders at odds with one another, but that is a fairly grim view of how we interact with one another in our communities. Indeed this framework, in which we have to protect ourselves from others, may serve to reinforce a relatively dark view of our relationships with each other and with other animals. We end up focused on what we can extract from each other or how we can protect what we have, rather than focusing on how we might work together to improve each other’s lives. (Gruen 2014c)

Instead of being concerned with what we can extract from others, Gruen argues that we should focus on what we owe one another. By doing this, “our relationships become a more central concern” and we can work to improve these relationships (ibid.). Indeed, Gruen’s concept of “entangled empathy” explains the importance of recognizing our relationships with one another and bettering these relationships by attending to others’ interests, needs, and vulnerabilities (Gruen 2015).

Therefore, I argue that the issue with paternalism in sanctuaries is not that it infringes upon the rights of nonhumans, but that it infringes upon the agency, dignity, and personhood of nonhumans and perpetuates a structure of human
superiority. Making decisions for another based on what you think is best for them limits someone’s agency, as she is hindered from making these choices herself. Furthermore, viewing someone as incapable of making her own decisions and making them for her “for her own good” is destructive to that person’s dignity and personhood, as she is not being viewed as an autonomous individual. Last, when we believe that humans alone know what is best for nonhumans, we maintain a structure of human superiority and ability to control the lives of nonhuman others.

The “intentional community” model of a Type IV sanctuary reduces the paternalism that can be present in total institutions by viewing sanctuary residents as members of an interspecies community. Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that the “first and most fundamental step” of creating a sanctuary community is to “recognize animal residents as full and equal members of the community, with a right to help shape the community,” (2015, 19) instead of viewing them as passive recipients of care at a “refuge.” By this definition, VINE is absolutely an intentional interspecies community. (VINE’s interspecies community consists of the human staff, human volunteers and supporters, nonhuman residents, and wild nonhumans who live around the sanctuary or visit the sanctuary.) First, the residents at VINE are seen as “full and equal” members of the community; humans are not viewed as “above” or “better” than the nonhumans, but equal-status individuals who live together, work together, and care for one another. In fact, as I argue in chapter 3, nonhuman interests are actually prioritized over human interests in this sanctuary space. VINE staff even refer to the nonhuman residents as “people,” blurring the divide and hierarchy between human and nonhuman.

Second, nonhuman residents help to shape the VINE community. For one, they communicate their interests and preferences, which are acknowledged and put into effect by the human staff, thereby changing community dynamics. Many
residents “decide” where they would like to live or spend time at the sanctuary, and therefore change community social structures. For example, Maddox, a young cow, wanted to spend time with his mother, Moxie, in the front pasture instead of the back pasture when she arrived at the sanctuary. Thus, Maddox “moved” into the front pasture. Maddox’s presence changed the dynamic in the front pasture, as a younger, often rambunctious individual, among more elderly cows. Furthermore, just this year, VINE welcomed two new emus to the sanctuary, Thelma and Louise. Thelma and Louise prefer not to sleep with the emus who already live there (Tiki, Breeze, and Adele) so the VINE staff are building them a new shelter. In this way, nonhuman residents help to shape the community structure by advocating for their interests.

Moreover, even if residents are not directly communicating their interests, VINE staff make sure to take them into account when making decisions. Pattrice Jones, co-founder of VINE, discusses how decisions are made with the input of nonhuman residents. She writes:

We stood in the barn surrounded by sanctuary residents, as we like to do when making important decisions. Miriam and I have always believed that decisions about animals ought to be made, insofar as possible, in consultation with animals. If that’s not possible, the next best thing is to be in physical proximity to animals like those you’re thinking about, so that you don’t make the mistake of treating them as abstractions. (Jones 2014b, 73)

Therefore, the nonhuman residents help to shape the sanctuary community by advocating for their preferences as well as being a part of the human decision-making.

Of course, even though residents are recognized as equal members of the sanctuary community and help to shape it, this is not to say that there is no human/nonhuman power dynamic present. Formerly farmed nonhumans are domesticated animals, and they are therefore dependent on humans for food, water,
shelter, veterinary care, and protection from predators. Sanctuary staff have power
over the nonhumans in their care as they provide these necessities. Because
sanctuaries are captive settings, human staff constantly make decisions regarding
the lives of the residents: what kind of food to give to them, how often they are fed,
when they are let out in the mornings and brought in in the evenings, who will be
given medication and what kind, who will be allowed to reproduce, etc.

Miriam Jones, co-founder of VINE, argues that captivity, even in the context
of a sanctuary such as VINE, is less than ideal because nonhuman residents (as
captives) are never truly free. She writes:

Certainly, true freedom escapes almost all farmed or formerly farmed
animals. We use the term “as free as possible” deliberately, as fences,
enforced routines, involuntary medical procedures and regimes
(including everything from forced sterilization to force feeding), and
other impositions certainly do not comprise a free state of being for
those on the receiving end. Those of us in the sanctuary movement
routinely make decisions about the animals in our care (and under
our control) that we, as ethical individuals, should find extremely
problematic. How can one justify taking the reproductive ability away
from another individual?...The answer is simple: we justify these
decisions because the alternatives are unacceptable. (Jones 2014, 91-
92)

Jones argues that sanctuary captivity is ethically justified only because the
alternative for formerly farmed animals is death (ibid., 92). She writes that the
purpose of VINE is to “offer formerly farmed animals a chance to live life as much
on their own terms as possible” (ibid.) and advocates for “making a captive situation
feel less captive...by allowing captives as great a degree of choice as possible within
the context of captivity” (ibid., 95). Thus, the important part of creating an
interspecies sanctuary community is not that there is no dependence or power; it is
that the human caregivers do everything to maximize the agency of the nonhumans
in their care and minimize their own domination within these structures.

It is also important to recognize that domesticated animals’ dependence on
humans for food, shelter, and protection (such with formerly farmed animals or companion animals such as dogs) is not necessarily deplorable. Every one of us is dependent on others for survival; indeed, Butler argues that we are dependent simply because we are embodied, so we rely on others not to kill our bodies (Butler 2004). “True” independence does not exist, and contemning the dependence of domesticated nonhumans is inconsistent with our own human existence, as every one of us operates within structures of power and dependence. Moreover, it is not as though domesticated nonhumans are helpless, passive, recipients of care, unable to advocate for themselves or exert any control over their lives. Nonhumans are certainly able to exhibit agency within their dependence, and do (for example, Maddox choosing to live with Moxie). Of course, I would not go as far as to say that this dependence is not morally problematic or that it is preferable to a life in the wild, outside of human control. I agree with Jones in that captivity is not ideal, and that the only reason human domination in a sanctuary setting is justified is that there is simply no other (good) alternative for domesticated and/or farmed animals. Nonhuman dependence on humans through domestication should absolutely be problematized and critiqued; I simply want to point out that the tendency to view dependence as a negative state of being is unrealistic and inconsistent, and even within structures of dependence and power, individuals are able to express agency and advocate for themselves. In the last section of this chapter, I discuss the importance of rewilding efforts as a way for formerly domesticated nonhumans to escape human captivity, power, and control.

Thus, in line with Jones’s argument for maximizing the freedom of formerly farmed nonhumans within a captive sanctuary space, Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that sanctuaries can limit or create opportunities for animal agency and control through decisions surrounding association, reproduction, and environment
Donaldson and Kymlicka 2015). Indeed, VINE, as a Type IV sanctuary, maximizes the freedom, agency, and self-determination of the nonhuman residents by not limiting them in regards to environment, association, and reproduction; except, of course, when well-being would be negatively impacted.

Most Type I, II, and III farmed animal sanctuaries separate their residents by species or sex, therefore limiting them in terms of who they are able associate with (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2015, 9). For example, Funny Farm segregates most of the residents by species, housing the horse residents in one place, the chickens in another, and the pigs in another. This kind of segregation is problematic because it limits the agency of the residents. For example, as a Type IV sanctuary, VINE allows individuals of different species to interact, thereby allowing the residents more control over who they spend time with and who they form relationships with. Donaldson and Kymlicka write that this kind of “least restrictive environment” allows “individual preference [to] emerge” (2015, 9), while places such as Funny Farm restrict preferences by limiting association.

Furthermore, this kind of segregation negatively impacts resident well-being, as it precludes the possibility of having fulfilling interspecies relationships. Our lives are made infinitely richer by the relationships we have with others; by segregating by species or sex, the richness of one’s life is limited. At VINE, interspecies relationships abound; for example, rooster Nevaeh is often found resting on sheep Lemon’s back, and duck Ready and rooster Sharkey adopted and cared for duckling Junebug, whose mother was not interested in raising her. Indeed, Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that the reason certain species were domesticated by humans was due to their desire and capacity to be social with humans; therefore, it makes sense that domesticated animals would want to make interspecies friendships (2015, 9). Thus, limiting the residents in terms of who they
are able to associate with limits their agency and negatively impacts well-being.

Of course, at times, VINE must separate individuals to ensure well-being. For example, sheep Broggy was separated from the others the first time I visited VINE, due to being aggressive and “bullying” other residents. To ensure everyone’s safety and well-being, he was placed behind a fence at the edge of the property. Similarly, VINE houses former fighting roosters that are currently being rehabilitated in cages throughout the property, as they will start fights with others and cause injuries or even deaths. However, separating residents is rare, and is only done to ensure well-being. Most of the time, individuals are able to work out disagreements between themselves; in fact, some residents are self-appointed peacekeepers and actively break up arguments between others. However, sometimes conflicts cannot be resolved, at least immediately, and responsible sanctuary stuff must intervene and separate individuals. Most of the time, these separations are temporary. Broggy stopped bullying others within a short amount of time and is now happily integrated into the rest of the VINE community, as are rehabilitated fighting roosters. Moreover, even when physically separated from others, individuals are still a part of the community. For example, fighting rooster cages are placed in the middle of social areas, so the birds can observe and interact with others. On one occasion, I witnessed a turkey resident and a former fighting rooster having a “conversation” through his cage. Therefore, even when residents are limited by association to ensure well-being, they are still able to observe, interact with, and form relationships with others.

However, there are situations in which individuals have to be separated from others permanently. For example, turkey Fabio cannot interact with female turkeys because if he tries to have sex with them, he could break their backs due to his large body size. Although Fabio is separated from female turkeys, he lives in
“Wayne’s World,” a smaller community within VINE that is home to two chicken breeds, many duck breeds, and former fighting roosters. Fabio is an integral part of this community and has many acquaintances of different sexes and species; thus, he is only socially limited in terms of whom he might unintentionally injure. Therefore, Type IV sanctuaries such as VINE only limit residents by association in order to protect well-being; otherwise, they are not restricted, which allows residents more agency and improves well-being through fostering interspecies relationships.

In addition to association, Type IV sanctuaries do not limit residents in terms of environment. Donaldson and Kymlicka write that, unfortunately, “FASes often look like (idealized) farms – a series of structures or enclosures on relatively flat or gently sloping, cleared, monoculture pasture in a pastoral setting” (2015, 12). Farm Sanctuary in Watkins Glen, for example, is almost completely flat. While this homogenous environment absolutely has its benefits (Donaldson and Kymlicka mention that it is easier to keep track of the residents in a flat area and to spot poisonous plants, there may be fewer injuries from uneven or dangerous terrain, and it is easier for human staff and machinery to get around), they write that “if one’s entire life is lived in this environment, then it might also become barren or boring” (ibid.). A varied environment allows residents to exert control over their lives as they have more options of where to spend time and what to do. As a Type IV, VINE’s environment is incredibly varied. The sanctuary has hills, flat areas, fields, woods, ponds, barns, and many bird coops. Residents are able to choose whether they want to swim in a pond, lounge under a tree, sleep in a coop, or sun themselves in a field. Miriam Jones discusses the importance of making the lives of sanctuary residents as “free feeling” as possible within the captive sanctuary space by providing a variable, enriching environment. She writes, “For the chickens in
particular, the yards [at VINE] are large and include trees, bushes, shelters, rocks, and other things that they find interesting to explore, climb upon, or hide under” (Jones 2014, 91). A varied environment is essential to nonhuman agency, self-determination, and well-being.

Additionally, Type IV sanctuaries offer an expansive environment. For example, VINE spans a total of 100 acres. Formerly farmed residents live on 50 acres, while the other 50 are preserved as a wildlife sanctuary, which residents do not have access to. This large area allows for nonhuman agency as residents have more space and therefore more options of where to spend time. If a resident wants to be alone or move away from someone they had a disagreement with, VINE’s large area makes this possible. Furthermore, having half of the acreage dedicated to a wildlife sanctuary allows for a more varied, enriching environment because wild animals often interact with the domesticated residents (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2015). For example, wild turkeys and other birds often visit the sanctuary and share the residents’ food. These interactions provide enrichment to those living at the sanctuary, as well as the wild nonhumans. For instance, the wool sheared from sheep residents in the summer is placed in the woods for wild birds to build their nests with; thus, wild animals benefit from the sanctuary space as well.

VINE, as a Type IV, also attempts to maximize the agency of the residents in terms of reproduction. Most sanctuaries limit residents by prohibiting reproduction; in fact, as Donaldson and Kymlicka write, this is often necessary to be seen as an ethical sanctuary (2015, 11). For one, nonhuman captivity is not thought to be ideal, so bringing more individuals into captivity is morally objectionable. Furthermore, realistically, a sanctuary has a limited amount of funds, space, and staff to care for residents. It may make more sense to offer space to animals in need of sanctuary who already exist instead of those being newly
brought into existence (ibid.).

However, preventing reproduction can infringe on nonhuman freedom and negatively impact well-being. Many residents have a strong interest in producing offspring. During my time at VINE, I witnessed various hens sitting on their eggs, day after day, only leaving the nest to eat and drink. They would become very distraught if they perceived me as being too close to their nests. Additionally, youngsters can be good for the entire sanctuary community, providing enrichment and excitement to many. Thus, it is difficult to justify taking away residents’ reproductive freedom. Personally, I strongly protest the idea of anyone telling me what I can and cannot do with my reproductive capacities. As Donaldson and Kymlicka point out, although human population growth has terrible implications for the ecosystem, we would be enraged if someone were to put a limit on our freedom to have children (2015, 11).

When thinking about this dilemma, first of all, it is important to note that sex and reproduction are not one and the same. One can lead to the other, but usually does not. Residents at VINE are able to engage in a variety of non-reproductive sexual activities, such as same-sex acts. These residents derive physical and emotional pleasure from sex without producing offspring. By not segregating residents, VINE allows for a multitude of sexual relationships to flourish. Furthermore, even when engaging in sexual activity that can potentially lead to reproduction, many do not have an interest in producing offspring, and therefore do not reproduce. This is mostly applicable to birds, who must sit on their fertilized eggs for extended periods of time in order to have babies. Many choose not to, and the fertilized eggs do not become chickens or ducks. Also, even those who want to reproduce are often unable to. Peeper, a hen at VINE, spent weeks sitting on eggs in May of 2016, only to emerge from her nest without any results. Therefore,
controlling reproduction does not necessitate a control of sexuality.

Of course, there are times in which sex can and does lead to offspring. In this case, VINE allows bird residents who demonstrate a strong interest in reproducing to do so. Resident hens lay eggs, usually in “nesting boxes” inside the coops. For the most part, these eggs are unfertilized, and only a fraction of the hens that lay fertilized eggs actually demonstrate an interest in sitting on them. If the eggs were left in the nesting boxes, they would rot, negatively impacting the well-being of those living in the coops. Therefore, when the coops are cleaned each day, the eggs are removed. However, if a hen shows a particular interest in sitting on her eggs (hens become “broody,” and those who have sanctuary experience can easily tell which hens want to reproduce), she is allowed to, and her eggs are not removed. In this way, VINE maximizes the freedom and self-determination of bird residents by allowing those particularly interested in having offspring to do so.

With mammal residents such as sheep and cows, reproductive freedom is a bit more complicated, as they do not have to actively sit on fertilized eggs in order to reproduce. Most male residents arrive at VINE already castrated from the farm on which they were born, making this generally a non-issue as they are unable to impregnate anyone. However, the sanctuary sometimes does take in intact male calves or even intact adult males. In this case, VINE makes the decision to castrate. According to Patrice Jones, this is done for two reasons (Patrice Jones, personal communication [Email], March 22, 2017). First, another pregnancy would be detrimental to the health and well-being of dairy survivors, who have been reproductively exploited for years before coming to sanctuary, as well as elderly female animals. For example, sheep Broggy came to VINE partially castrated, and caregivers made the decision to fully castrate him in order to ensure the well-being of the elderly ewe residents. Second, VINE does not have unlimited space and
resources. While the birth of a few chicks would not put a strain on the sanctuary’s resources, the birth of a larger animal would, as they consume more food, for example. Thus, in order to protect the well-being of other residents and work within the limits of a capitalist system, the reproductive freedom of individuals such as Broggy is limited.

However, Jones says that VINE differs from many other sanctuaries in that they acknowledge that this limitation on reproductive freedom is unjust (ibid.). She explains that with additional land and other resources, VINE would have a pasture in which intact males, and females whose well-being would not be negatively impacted by reproduction, could have total reproductive freedom (ibid.). For the time being, VINE recognizes the morally objectionable aspects of this reproductive control and seeks to maximize reproductive liberty (while prioritizing well-being and working within the limits of a capitalist system) by allowing bird residents to reproduce.

In addition to maximizing the agency of residents in terms of association, environment, and reproduction, Type IV sanctuaries do not engage in any form of nonhuman instrumentalization or commodification. First, residents are not instrumentalized as “ambassadors” for the sanctuary. This is demonstrated by the fact that VINE does not give tours to the public. Because tours subject residents to the human gaze, avoiding them is conducive to nonhuman dignity. Of course, volunteers are able to visit VINE on specified volunteer days, and vegan or animal liberationist college groups sometimes visit the sanctuary. However, these visits differ from a traditional tour in that the visitors “become” a part of the sanctuary community by doing work. When I visited VINE with three other Wesleyan students, I spent the afternoon removing dead thorn bushes from Wayne’s World and therefore making the habitat more comfortable for the residents. In this way, I
was serving the nonhuman residents and contributing to the community. Being a part of the sanctuary community and dedicating one’s time and effort to improve the lives of those in it is much different from walking around the sanctuary and staring at the residents for entertainment. Furthermore, because the sanctuary is not open to the public, VINE can be certain that those who do visit are respectful and do not negatively impact resident well-being.

In fact, in order to ensure nonhuman dignity, Jones discusses the importance of “reciprocal looking” at sanctuary. She writes:

> Here at VINE, we not only respect nonhuman privacy but also welcome reciprocal looking. Cows Maddox, Luna, and Princess (who is also an avid bird-watcher) all sometimes watch me while I am in my trailer. When I am working outside, I will sometimes glance up to catch former fighting rooster Sharkey standing on the table, keenly observing me. Cows and chickens alike often watch, and sometimes seem to be supervising, the people cleaning the coops and barns. And I’ll never forget the time that my dear departed “brother” Thunder (a 3,000 lb cow) noticed that I was having a hard time showing newly-arrived turkeys how to go into the coop for the night. He looked at me significantly and then demonstrated what he thought I should do, using his giant forehead to gently steer one of the birds toward the coop door. (Jones 2015)

Indeed, Gruen writes that this kind of “mutual viewing” “promotes animal dignity” (2014a, 245). Instead of being objects of the human gaze, VINE residents are able to “gaze back.” A lack of public tours and instead allowing for “mutual viewing” ensures nonhuman dignity at VINE.

Of course, sanctuaries such as Farm Sanctuary use tours as a means to attract donations to support the sanctuary, while places such as VINE must rely on private donations, which may be more difficult to obtain. Because they operate within a capitalist system, sanctuaries must work to find a balance between the need for financial support and the dignity and well-being of the residents.

Next, VINE avoids instrumentalizing residents as ambassadors by not following a “Noah’s Ark” model in which residents are accepted based on species
membership. Instead, VINE residents are accepted based on who will flourish and positively contribute to the sanctuary community. For example, when I left VINE in June, there were many roosters “up the hill,” and no hens, leading to a more aggressive bird culture. However, in September and October, VINE accepted over 90 hens into the community. The addition of these hens has led to less aggression and fewer skirmishes between the birds. The hens have positively contributed to the community, and are flourishing among the other residents. In this way, a potential resident is not instrumentalized as an “ambassador” for her species and accepted into the sanctuary because of this; in a Type IV intentional community, she is accepted on the basis of whether she will flourish at the sanctuary and contribute to her co-residents’ flourishing as well.

Finally, at a Type IV sanctuary, animals are not instrumentalized in order to obtain donations. There is no voyeuristic feel to their stories; intimate, disturbing, and dramatized details of trauma are not widely shared. When VINE’s website and Facebook page share photos and stories of residents, it is done in a respectful manner. Generally, VINE will post a photo of a resident or multiple residents, with a caption such as “Back pasture cows Jack, Daisey, Brutus, and Oryx enjoy a pile of hay placed aside for them to snack on before starting their day” (Facebook 2017c) or “Peahen Adrienne can often be found perching on a gate watching the day go by” (ibid.). In this way, moments of sanctuary life are shared with supporters, and the VINE community can extend itself to those not physically present, but the animals’ stories are not being circulated to entertain and lure in potential supporters.

Therefore, Type IV sanctuaries, unlike Type IIIs, do not instrumentalize the residents as ambassadors. Instead, nonhumans are viewed as members of an interspecies community. This model allows for human domination to be minimized and resident agency to be maximized. Type IV sanctuaries only limit residents in
terms of association, environment, and reproduction when not doing so would negatively impact nonhuman well-being or in terms of the realistic limits of a sanctuary - for example, sanctuary space is not infinite, so residents are limited in terms of environment in this way; also, completely uncontrolled reproduction (i.e. not castrating intact males) is not realistic given the limited space, funds, and staff that sanctuaries have. In this way, the agency, freedom, and self-determination of nonhuman residents are maximized within a captive sanctuary space. Thus, VINE challenges the traditional farmed animal sanctuary structure by allowing residents to shape their own lives as well as the sanctuary community. Indeed, Donaldson and Kymlicka write:

What is missing [from traditional farmed animal sanctuaries] is a commitment to creating communities that are more spacious, complex, varied, open, unpredictable, and free, in which animals are actively enabled to have a say in how they will live. And this, we will argue, requires moving away from ideas of sanctuary as refuge to sanctuary as a new kind of intentional community whose future directions can be shaped by all of its members. (2015, 14)

VINE Sanctuary, as a Type IV, certainly creates this kind of interspecies community.

Part V: Work and Use with Sanctuary Residents

Along with environment, reproduction, and association, Donaldson and Kymlicka write that sanctuaries have the potential to limit residents in terms of “work” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2015). They argue that sanctuaries can and should “engage animals in activities, roles, ‘jobs’” (ibid., 13) in order to improve well-being and make sanctuary life more meaningful for the residents, as nonhumans have a “strong inclination to be part of things, to participate, to belong” (ibid.). They argue that encouraging and allowing the residents to do “work” at a sanctuary is not inherently exploitative, and instead enriches their lives and
contributes to their flourishing. The authors explain:

Some dogs like to guard. If, as members of a FAS [farmed animal sanctuary], they take the job of alerting other animals to potential threats, are they being exploited? Some pigs like to root. If their rooting activity is used to help create productive garden plots to grow food for a sanctuary community, is this exploitation? If a sanctuary rescues orphaned infant animals, and adult members of the sanctuary community are willing and able to nurse and raise them, is this exploitation? When animals welcome newcomers to the community and show them the ropes, is this exploitation? If chickens lay eggs and abandon them, and some of these eggs are used to feed cat or pig members of the community (or neighbor foxes), is this exploitation? When sheep are shorn, if their wool is used to produce products that are sold to help finance the sanctuary, is this exploitation? If an ox carries hay bales on his back to feeding stations for other animals, is this exploitation? If humans who are part of the sanctuary community derive psychological benefit, companionship, and emotional sustenance from their interactions with the animals, does this exploit the animals? (ibid.)

I agree with Donaldson and Kymlicka in that sanctuary residents should not be hindered in terms of choosing a “role” for themselves or participating in an activity that would benefit the sanctuary community. Personally, I do not want to sit at home and watch TV for the rest of my life; I want to contribute to the world in some way and work towards something bigger than myself. Nonhumans may also like to contribute and feel like they are part of something. For example, Strubbie, my canine companion, has taken it upon herself to bark from inside our house at people who step on the lawn or cars that park by the curb. I do believe she thinks that protecting the house from strangers is her “job,” often looking quite pleased with herself when the car or person moves away. Also, it is true that “use” does not necessarily entail exploitation. Everybody is used in one way or another (for example, asking a friend for a favor is “using” them), but not everybody is exploited. Donaldson and Kymlicka explain that use only becomes exploitation when individuals are coerced or manipulated, the work is dangerous or overwhelming, or if their effort is trivialized or ignored (2015, 13).
I agree with the authors that use itself is not inherently problematic in the same way that exploitation is. However, “use” that exists within a larger system of exploitation and entails domination, differential vulnerabilities, and commodification is problematic, as it has the strong, almost-inevitable potential to become exploitative. Indeed, the kinds of work Donaldson and Kymlicka outline for sanctuary residents entail human domination, vulnerability of domesticated nonhumans, commodification of individuals’ bodies or bodily products, and exist within a system of human exploitation of and violence against nonhumans. Thus, I argue that these forms of “work” are likely to become exploitative for residents and therefore are not ethically justified. Instead, I argue that simply by not limiting association, environment, and reproduction at sanctuary, residents will be able to take on roles of their choosing and contribute to the community in a meaningful way. Therefore, I do not include “work” in my criteria for a Type IV sanctuary because I believe that the three other areas for nonhuman opportunity and control “set the stage” for work and allow the residents to contribute to the community in a self-determined, non-exploitative way.

First, some types of nonhuman work outlined by Donaldson and Kymlicka have a strong potential to become exploitative due to human domination. In order to avoid exploitation, the role of a resident in a sanctuary community must be something she chooses for herself, without human interference. When humans collect chicken eggs and feed them to other residents, or shear sheep and sell their wool for a profit, humans are deciding how the chickens and sheep will contribute to the community, without obtaining consent from them. In contrast, when a dog warns others about a potential threat, a resident “adopts” a baby, or a resident welcomes a newcomer, they are doing so because they want to and deciding for themselves how to contribute to the sanctuary community. Therefore, types of
“work” that entail human interference in the lives of animals perpetuate structures of human control and domination. Human domination of animals (i.e. on a farm) has led to exploitation of and violence against them; therefore, “work” that necessitates human control, manipulation, and interference dangerously resembles this.

Moreover, according to Donaldson and Kymlicka, the purpose of not limiting the residents in terms of “work” is to allow them more control over their lives and over their involvement in the community. A human making a choice about how an animal will contribute simply perpetuates a structure of human control and decision-making, and does not empower the nonhuman resident. Additionally, “work” due to human interference and domination is problematic in that the nonhumans who produced the eggs and wool may not be aware that they are contributing to the community through this. The sheep knows that she has been shorn and may feel more physically comfortable, but she does not know that her wool was sold to purchase supplies; her view of herself as a community member has not changed. Therefore, in this case, Donaldson and Kymlicka’s argument that resident well-being and flourishing are improved by feeling like one is contributing to her community is inconsistent.

Second, these kinds of work (selling wool or eggs) are problematic and can easily lead to exploitation due to the vulnerability of the nonhumans in question. Because farmed animals are dependent on humans for survival, humans are in a position of power. In this way, sanctuary residents are particularly vulnerable to exploitation; if sanctuary staff were to begin exploiting the residents, it would be more difficult for them to resist this. With humans, child labor laws are in place to protect children, a similarly vulnerable and dependent population. Moreover, residents are rendered additionally vulnerable due to the traumatic experiences they
have endured at the hands of humans. Especially upon arriving at the sanctuary, many are in recovery and simply learning how to function, day to day, in a place that allows them more freedom than they have ever had. Exploitation of these vulnerable individuals would not be difficult; thus, extra caution must be taken to ensure that sanctuary residents are not exploited in any way. Actions such as selling wool, having a bull carry heavy objects, or feeding chickens’ eggs to cats all use very vulnerable individuals, and therefore have a strong potential to become exploitative.

Donaldson and Kymlicka address the use of vulnerable populations in their book, *Zoopolis* (2011). They argue that selling a sheep’s wool is not inherently exploitative, and that there can be “stoppers” in place to prevent the “slippery slope from use to exploitation” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 137). For example, the authors write that humans could argue on the behalf of the sheep (ibid.). However, this is problematic in that humans, who currently kill nonhumans by the billions for their own selfish interests, are being relied upon to prevent exploitation. They also argue that nonhumans can “exercise forms of resistance,” just as human workers can resist reduced pay, increased hours, or unsafe workplaces (ibid.). However, many humans are, in fact, unable to successfully resist (at least without losing their jobs), and work for little money in incredibly exploitative and unsafe conditions (for example, slaughterhouse workers). Moreover, it is unfair to compare autonomous, adult, human resistance to the resistance of traumatized, domesticated animals who are dependent on humans for food, water, and shelter in a captive sanctuary setting. I do believe that domesticated animals can and do resist (for example, in *The War against Animals* (2015), Wadiwel argues that slaughterhouses are constructed in order to account for nonhuman resistance), but this resistance is more constricted than that of adult humans. Therefore, Donaldson and Kymlicka’s “stoppers” are not sufficient to prevent the exploitation of vulnerable sanctuary
residents.

Next, these types of “work” are worrisome due to the system of nonhuman exploitation they take place in. If we lived in a world in which individuals of different species were respected and treated as equals instead of devalued and exploited, selling a sheep’s wool might not be as worrisome. However, decisions at sanctuaries are made in the midst of a world that exploits and kills nonhumans by the billions every year. Therefore, we must proceed with caution when making choices that can easily become exploitative or resemble exploitation. Donaldson and Kymlicka acknowledge this worry, writing:

Most sanctuaries are wary of any activity that looks like animal work. This often reflects a philosophical position that asking or expecting animals to work as part of a mixed human-animal society inherently amounts to exploitation of animals by humans. What this overlooks is that work, activity, cooperation, and contribution can be critical dimensions of flourishing. (2015, 13)

I believe that the authors are too quick to dismiss the system of normalized animal suffering, exploitation, and death, in which all sanctuary decisions take place, with their argument that selling wool is not “inherently” exploitative. Actions take place within structures and histories, and context is often necessary when determining whether something is problematic or not. I worry that selling eggs or wool simply reinforces exploitative structures instead of resisting them. Moreover, sanctuaries are viewed by others and make a political statement about nonhuman lives. To a visitor, there is no obvious difference between a sanctuary selling sheep’s wool or eggs and a small, “humane” farm selling these. The types of work that Donaldson and Kymlicka defend may simply reinforce small-farm exploitation to the less-informed observer.

Last, “work” involving selling eggs or wool is not ethically justified because it involves commodification of an individual’s bodily products. As discussed,
commodification is problematic because the life of the animal is not reflected in the commodity itself. This erases the animal’s existence and experiences, and denies the buyer a good relationship with her. For example, if a sanctuary sells the wool of the sheep residents, someone who buys it to knit socks is most likely not thinking about the sheep from whom the wool came from. Thus, it is easier to do harm to the sheep, as her life and suffering are removed from the final product. However, it could also be the case that in order to support a particular sheep resident, someone would buy that resident’s wool; therefore, they are thinking about the resident. In this case, commodification is still problematic because the individual is being associated with what she can produce for the human. When I think about my nonhuman friends at VINE, I think of the time we spent together and the emotional connections we forged, not of what their bodies can produce for my use.

Furthermore, commodifying and profiting from someone’s bodily products can easily become exploitative and make someone themself a commodity instead of an individual with intrinsic worth. For example, there is debate and concern over organ donation because if a human’s organs are each worth a dollar value, it would be easy to view someone as an “organ farm” and not as someone with intrinsic worth. Profiting from one’s body changes the way we view that individual.

Similarly, if a sanctuary begins to make a profit from selling sheep’s wool, they may begin to accept more and more sheep solely for the purpose of wool production. In this way, the sheep are being instrumentalized as a means to obtain money, even if that money is going back into the sanctuary.

I argue that not limiting residents in terms of association, environment, and reproduction allows them to take on roles and contribute to the community in ways of their choosing. Being able to associate and interact with a variety of other residents allows someone to become a peacekeeper and break up fights between
others, welcome newcomers, or help in raising the young of another species. Next, not limiting birds in terms of reproduction allows residents to raise their own young or another’s young and contribute to an enriching, multigenerational community. Finally, a varied environment allows chickens, for example, to scratch in the dirt and uncover food to share with others, or a cow to accompany a friend when exploring unknown territory. By allowing nonhumans freedom and control over their lives through association, reproduction, and environment, they are able to choose what kind of role they would like to have and contribute to their community in their own, non-exploitative, empowered way.

Part VI: How Some Sanctuaries Resemble Small Farms and Perpetuate Small-Farm Values

I argue that “lesser” type sanctuaries, such as Type I, II, and possibly Type IIIs, can actually resemble small farms and perpetuate “small farm” values that they should be attempting to remedy. In this way, sanctuary may actually be unintentionally supporting a system of exploitation and violence instead of challenging it. “Lesser” type sanctuaries can resemble small farms by commodifying residents’ bodily products, instrumentalizing the residents, and being human-dominated spaces; furthermore, they can perpetuate “small farm” values such as nostalgia and “animal lover hypocrisy.” This further emphasizes the idealness of a Type IV sanctuary such as VINE.

“Sanctuaries” can resemble small farms by commodifying residents’ bodily products (for example, Funny Farm selling chickens’ eggs). As mentioned, there is little tangible difference between a SHFF selling eggs or wool and a sanctuary selling them, especially to the uninformed observer. Commodification is also present at Funny Farm through the names given to the residents. For example, a
cow is named “T-Bone” and a pig is named “Bacon Bits.” By identifying these individuals by the commodities created from their bodies, Funny Farm is perpetuating a system of viewing animals and their bodies as commodities. Furthermore, the language the visitors use when addressing or discussing the residents and the lack of guidance from the sanctuary staff perpetuates an “animals as objects” mentality. Many visitors refer to the animals as “it” instead of “she,” “he,” or “they.” I witnessed a parent telling her child to “Give the bread to something that will eat it” after an emu did not eat the food her child offered. This language, which was not corrected by the sanctuary caregivers (and even used by them), reinforces the view that animals are objects or commodities instead of individuals.

The instrumentalization at a Type II “sanctuary” and even Type III reinforces the instrumentalization of animal bodies on a farm. In agriculture, nonhumans are used as a means for the farmer to obtain profit. At a Type II “sanctuary,” the residents are used as a means for human entertainment, seen through the petting-zoo-like quality of a place such as Funny Farm. Because the residents are not viewed as ends in themselves, the instrumentalization of nonhumans in agriculture is reinforced; both agriculture and Type II “sanctuaries” preclude seeing animals as having intrinsic worth. Even Type III sanctuaries can instrumentalize residents by using them as a means to attract support and donations through circulating their stories or considering them “ambassadors” for their species.

Third, lesser-type “sanctuaries” perpetuate human domination that is also present in farming. At Funny Farm, the human/nonhuman power dynamic is evident in the way that humans are able to walk around and gaze at nonhuman residents behind fences. Operating as a “petting zoo” and allowing humans to access the bodies of nonhumans as a “fun day out” perpetuates domination. At a Type III
sanctuary, there is reduced human domination, but sanctuary tours can reinforce ideas of humans being entitled to view animals and allow for the human “gaze.” Finally, human domination is evident at lesser-type sanctuaries through increased captivity and control. At Type I “sanctuaries,” nonhumans are kept in small cages and humans control every aspect of their lives. At Type II and IIIIs, there is decreased captivity and control, but residents are still limited in terms of who they are able to spend time with, whether they are able to reproduce, and how large or varied their environment is. In this way, Type I, II, and III sanctuaries reinforce a structure of human domination and control present in animal agriculture.

Sanctuaries can also perpetuate “small farm” values, such as nostalgia. Funny Farm creates nostalgia for the past through activities such as making homemade animal-based foods at their summer day camp for children. The campers are taught to make cow’s milk ice cream and cow’s milk butter (Facebook 2017a). By encouraging children to make these foods as they might have done years earlier, Funny Farm creates feelings of wistfulness and desire for the “days gone by” of small animal agriculture. This is problematic because nostalgia erases the violence, exploitation, and oppression that animal farming entails.

In addition to nostalgia, “sanctuaries” and SHFFs both perpetuate “animal lover hypocrisy.” As previously mentioned, this refers to identifying as an “animal lover” but making choices that contribute to violence against and oppression of nonhumans. Small farms perpetuate this hypocrisy by claiming to care for and prioritize the well-being of the nonhumans in their care, but also castrating, branding, and dehorning them, separating mothers from babies, and eventually killing them. The people who buy products from SHFFs often identify as “animal lovers,” choosing to ignore the fact that they are consuming an animal who wanted to continue living. Similarly, places such as Funny Farm perpetuate “animal lover
hypocrisy” by caring for male calves while feeding them store-bought cow’s milk and preaching compassion while encouraging children to make cow’s milk ice cream. In this way, sanctuary spaces perpetuate “animal lover hypocrisy,” just as SHFFs do.

Finally, as Donaldson and Kymlicka argue, “refuge and advocacy” (or Type III) farmed animal sanctuaries may actually reinforce support for “traditional farms,” or what I call SHFFs. They write:

> [At sanctuaries] visitors observe animals living in circumstances that support the expression of a range of individual preferences and species-typical behaviors, providing a sharp contrast to the horrors of factory farming. But few members of the public have ever witnessed factory farms or feedlots, so what might strike visitors is not how different FASes are from factory farms, but rather how similar FASes are to traditional farms...some FASes resemble idealized traditional farms from children’s books—pastoral settings with fenced pastures and yards, and red-roofed barns with animals segregated by species, being cared for by human stewards. Rather than challenging our ideas about farmed animals, this kind of setting may inadvertently reinforce assumptions about where farmed animals belong, what forms of society and behavior are “natural” for them, and their relationship to humans. (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2015, 5)

Therefore, instead of challenging animal agriculture, sanctuaries may unintentionally reinforce the belief that animals belong in a farm-like setting. This is due to sanctuaries often physically resembling small farms, with coops, barns, pastures, and human caregivers. Of course, the purpose of human care is much different (on a farm, care is given in order to raise animals to obtain a profit, while at sanctuary, care is given as means to ensure animal well-being for the sake of well-being), but this may not be apparent to visitors, especially those who do not have any point of comparison. This further emphasizes the importance of Type IV sanctuaries; VINE, for example, challenges the “traditional farm” image by allowing residents of all species to intermingle in a varied environment. Seeing cows laying under trees in the woods or chickens running down a hill among sheep and emus
does not resemble a traditional, small farm, and instead challenges the idea that farmed animals belong in an agricultural setting.

Part VII: Why Considering Well-Being Is Not Enough

Through my discussion of SHFFs as well as farmed animal sanctuaries, I have emphasized the importance of well-being. Well-being is extremely important – maybe even the most important aspect of existence to consider – as it describes how someone experiences her life. However, I am hopeful that my discussion has also emphasized that considering well-being is not enough. For example, take Cowboy, a goat who lives at Funny Farm. He is able to roam the grounds and interact with friends of different species. He has food, water, and plenty of care from the staff; in fact, he was flown across the country to be treated for his broken leg. For argument’s sake, let’s assume that Cowboy is not bothered when people come during visiting days, and even enjoys having visitors; he gets different snacks, attention from people, and social stimulation. Even though Cowboy has fantastic well-being, Funny Farm is still not an ethically justifiable space. This is because we must look beyond well-being, to the instrumentalization, commodification, and human domination present at Funny Farm. Even though Cowboy’s well-being may not be negatively impacted by visiting days, the visiting days are problematic because they instrumentalize the residents as entertainment and perpetuate human power and domination. This power and domination are concerning because they reinforce ideas of human superiority and shape how we view, behave towards, and relate to other species.

Similarly, as previously described with SHFFs, even the most “humane” farms (for example, Frank Reese’s poultry farm) are problematic spaces due to instrumentalization, commodification, devaluing and normalizing violence against
“subhuman” bodies, and perpetuating “small farming” values. Therefore, I argue that being concerned with only well-being is a limited ethics. One can have the best well-being possible and still have morally objectionable experiences. Indeed, Wadiwel argues that simply being concerned with “welfare” (in this case, interchangeable with well-being) is limited, as it allows for the structure of human power and domination to go unchallenged. He writes:

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\text{Ethics constructed after sovereignty works only to regulate or mitigate the violent effects of that sovereignty, while leaving the basic structure of domination intact. This result, in other words, is welfare. We might then understand welfare as precisely an “ethical” action that is limited or governed by a sovereign prerogative for continuing utilization. We offer welfare to those we have dominion over, and wish to continue to dominate for our own benefit, but have the freedom to provide forms of limited consideration that do not temper our dominion right (captured perfectly in that diabolical phrase “unnecessary suffering”). (Wadiwel 2015, 22)}
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As Wadiwel writes, concern over well-being or “welfare” simply improves conditions under human sovereignty but does not challenge the sovereignty that creates the conditions in the first place. This can be seen through the example of Cowboy: Funny Farm is a space of human domination and control; well-being simply improves how the residents experience this domination. For true liberation, domination itself must be challenged. Thus, in the case of sanctuaries and small farms, we must consider more than well-being in order to subvert the system of human power over, violence against, and exploitation of nonhuman animals. A Type IV sanctuary such as VINE is the most ethically justifiable because well-being is not the only aspect of sanctuary life taken into account. VINE strives to minimize instrumentalization, commodification, and human domination, thus “pushing past” simply being concerned with well-being and challenging structures of sovereignty and oppression.
Part VIII: The Importance of Rewilding at Type IV Sanctuaries

Last, I argue that sanctuaries should support, not discourage, the rewilding of residents. In fact, supporting the rewilding of those who are able to rewild themselves and actively choose to do so is the last aspect to a Type IV intentional sanctuary community. By supporting rewilding, a Type IV sanctuary encourages nonhuman agency and self-determination; first, by allowing residents to make the decision to rewild themselves and second, by rewilding itself, as they are able to escape captivity and live on their own terms. Thus, rewilding efforts should be supported by sanctuaries that believe in true liberation. I argue that Gruen’s model of entangled empathy should be used to ensure well-being at all points during rewilding.

To begin, rewilding at sanctuary occurs when residents are no longer completely dependent on humans for survival, and instead live “on their own terms.” Rewilded residents, for the most part, are birds such as chickens who choose to sleep in trees and therefore come and go as they please. VINE Sanctuary, a Type IV that supports rewilding, explains:

Chickens go feral more easily than any other “domesticated” animal, with the possible exception of cats. Because they are genetically very close to the Red Junglefowl from which chickens descended, roosters exploited in cockfighting (and the hens used to breed them) eagerly “rewild” themselves if allowed the opportunity to do so. At the sanctuary, we believe in self-determination and freedom for everybody. So, any bird who demonstrates that she or he can do so safely is welcome to choose the trees over the coops. Pacifico [a former fighting rooster resident] and many others made that choice, eventually forming several feral flocks who ranged widely during the days, coming back to the grounds of the sanctuary to sleep at night. (VINE Sanctuary 2017a)

Thus, rewilded residents, such as Pacifico, are not confined to the sanctuary property and are not dependent on human caregivers to bring them into a coop at night and out in the morning. They can “go off” and roam, and come back to the
sanctuary when they choose. In addition to chickens, many pigeons at VINE have rewilded themselves. Instead of sleeping in the pigeon aviary, they sleep in the trees and return to the sanctuary to eat. During my internship at VINE, I put out food every morning specifically for the rewilded pigeons. In this way, rewilded residents are not completely removed from human care; most, if not all rewilded birds choose to eat sanctuary food, even if they are able to find food elsewhere (such as from foraging in the woods). Therefore, the term “partial rewilding” can be used to describe their existence. However, the critical aspect of rewilding is not complete and total independence from humans; it is that residents are able to live on their own terms. Nobody is telling them when to go in at night, when to get up in the morning, and what kind of fenced space they must exist in.

Additionally, rewilding is a necessary aspect of the “intentional community” Type IV sanctuary because it allows for nonhuman agency and self-determination by allowing residents who would like to rewild to do so. The residents who prefer to sleep in trees are able to, and those who feel more comfortable returning to the coops at night do so (or a combination – some even choose to alternate between trees and coops). Instead of forcing someone down from a tree and into a coop, they can choose to stay, and therefore have a say in what kind of life they would like to have.

Of course, well-being must also be considered, and at VINE, rewilding is only supported if human caregivers believe that rewilding will be conducive to well-being. VINE does not allow someone to rewild themselves if they believe that the resident will be eaten by a predator or harmed in any other way. Patrice Jones discusses balancing freedom and well-being in terms of rewilding:

Back when Miriam and I founded the chicken sanctuary that would grow up to be VINE, we decided that one of our tenets would be “let birds be birds.” By that we meant that we intended to set the stage
for the chickens to be themselves and then get out of the way...We’d...let everybody make their own decisions, insofar as this was possible to do safely within the boundaries of a world rent into bits and pieces of private property controlled by people, as well as any failures of judgement due to their own histories of circumscribed choices. So, no, we would not allow anyone to wander where other people might hurt them, and no we would not allow a newly-arrived egg factory refugee to nest for the night in a bush from which we knew (but she didn’t) that she might be snatched by a predator. But we would, and eventually did, allow birds who had or developed sufficient “bird sense” to essentially rewild themselves, sleeping in tree and foraging in the forest. (jones 2015)

Thus, at VINE, only individuals who are ready and have enough “bird sense” to successfully rewild themselves are allowed to do so. However, for those who are and do, the decision to rewild is supported by sanctuary caregivers, therefore contributing to nonhuman self-determination and agency.

Moreover, rewilding contributes to agency, self-determination, and freedom by allowing domesticated animals to escape human captivity and live on their own terms. Although Type IV sanctuaries such as VINE have large, varied environments and strive to maximize the freedom of the residents, they are still spaces of human control. For those birds who are able to, rewilding provides an opportunity in which they can escape this control and live their lives exactly how they would like.

For example, Jones writes about a wild-born rooster named Albert, who “slept up in one of the tallest pine trees on the property with about thirty other feral and wild birds, came down to eat and drink during the day, and generally lived exactly as he pleased” (2014, 90). Albert’s freedom allowed him to live his life on his own terms. In fact, wildness being conducive to his well-being was demonstrated when Albert was brought into captivity because VINE’s neighbors threatened to kill him and his friends for occasionally wandering onto their property. While living in a barn, Albert injured his leg, preventing him from returning to the trees even when a new fence was erected. Jones writes that Albert
was “never the same” in captivity and he died a few months later because “once he finally accepted he would never walk well again – that he would never be free again – his life simply wasn’t worth living, and so he died” (2014, 91). Freedom is so conducive to well-being for birds such as Albert that without it, life is not worth living.

Unfortunately, it is also true that there is little “wild” to rewild to, as humans have encroached on and destroyed so much wilderness. Even the bit of “wild” that is left is not truly “wild”; it has been dominated and divided up by humans. For example, although national parks could be considered “wild,” human-created lodges, hiking trails, and streets all exist within them; even the fact that these area were preserved as “wild” was a human decision. Therefore, even the “wild” that Albert returned to was somewhat under human sovereignty. However, in comparison to the truly captive farm or sanctuary setting, even a more limited “wild” offers significant freedom from human control and captivity, and is valuable as such.

While living “wild” and therefore on one’s own terms can greatly improve well-being for some individuals, others do not want this kind of life. For example, especially upon first arriving at sanctuary, many egg-industry survivors are uncomfortable in a large, varied environment such as VINE, as they have only known living in a small, cramped space. During my time at VINE, a hen, after being held in the infirmary due to an injury, did not want to leave the cage even after recovering. She was more comfortable being in a small, indoor space than roaming around outdoors. Similarly, three hens I worked with did not want to be in one of the bigger yards with the other birds; they had their own cage in the coop at night and their own smaller enclosure in the yard. They did not have any physical injuries to prevent them from mingling and running around with the others; they
simply did not feel comfortable doing so. Every night, I would carry them into the coop, and every morning, from the coop to their enclosure. One night, one of the hens actually ran up to me so I could carry her inside. Individuals such as these birds would absolutely not feel comfortable in a wild setting. While, unfortunately, this is largely due to a traumatic, human-created past, their needs and desires are still legitimate. Therefore, I argue that Gruen’s model of entangled empathy (Gruen 2015) should be used to ensure nonhuman well-being at all points during the rewilding process.

First, entangled empathy must be used to determine who is able to rewild. As patrīce jones writes, even though some individuals would like to sleep in a tree or a bush, they have not yet developed enough “bird sense” to avoid predation, and are instead moved into a coop. In this way, sanctuary caregivers are sensitive to their needs and vulnerabilities, and do not allow them to be preyed on. For example, in order to determine who is ready to rewild, VINE caregivers will place their hands near a bird in a bush or tree; if she moves away, they can safely assume that she will be able to move away from predators.

Additionally, entangled empathy must be used in caring for those who have already been rewilded. Even though birds such as Pacifico and Albert are not under direct human control, sanctuary caregivers are still in relationships with them, as they are individuals who were brought to the sanctuary. Caregivers demonstrate entangled empathy for rewilded individuals when they prioritize someone’s well-being over their freedom, such as when VINE caregivers brought Albert into captivity to prevent him from being killed. Similarly, when moving the sanctuary from Maryland to Vermont, caregivers captured Pacifico and his friends in order to transport them to the new location (VINE Sanctuary 2017a). Although the birds most likely did not appreciate the captivity and transport, it was the best decision
for their well-being, as staff would be able to continue providing food, water, and care at the new location. Indeed, in Vermont, Pacifico had a wonderful, free life; he chose to sleep every night in a tall evergreen tree, and came down for food and water during the day (VINE Sanctuary 2017a).

Failure to employ entangled empathy in rewilding efforts is demonstrated by the morally objectionable Oostvaardersplassen (OVP). OVP is publically-owned tract of land in the Netherlands on which a “rewilding experiment” is being conducted. Frans Vera, an ecologist, has introduced cattle, deer, and horses to the area in an attempt to “de-domesticate” (rewild) them (Lorimer and Driessen 2014). This has been detrimental to the well-being of the nonhumans involved in this experiment. Forty percent of the large herbivores in OVP die every year, and death tolls only increase during harsh weather (Kolbert 2012). Elizabeth Kolbert states, “Often the dying animals are shown huddled up against the fences of the Oostvaardersplassen” (ibid.). Due to public outcry, the Dutch government began a policy of “reactive culling,” in which a wildlife ranger would shoot animals who were not thought to make it through winter (ibid.). This has been termed “eye of the wolf” as the ranger is apparently supposed to mimic the “natural culling” of the herbivore herds that would be done by wolves (Lorimer and Driessen 2014, 47-48). However, humans do not know how wolf populations interact with bovine populations, and therefore instead use welfare criteria from animal agriculture to determine whom to kill (ibid.). This “rewilding experiment” has only led to suffering and death for the nonhumans involved.

Oostvaardersplassen demonstrates what happens when entangled empathy is not incorporated into rewilding efforts. Although they may have good intentions in attempting to recreate a balanced ecology, Vera and his colleagues are being neglectful of the needs, vulnerabilities, and interests of the cows, deer, and horses.
involved. In contrast, VINE incorporates entangled empathy into rewilding by catering to the needs and interests of the nonhumans. I term the kind of rewilding VINE does “empathetic rewilding.”

The most important aspect of empathetic rewilding is creating opportunity for individuals to rewild themselves, but not forcing it upon them. At VINE, the nonhuman must make the choice herself to sleep in a tree; there is no human “push” to do so. For example, the hens who prefer to stay in their own enclosure instead of the big yard would not be suitable candidates for rewilding, and forcing them to rewild would be detrimental to their well-being. At OVP, thousands of nonhumans are forced to somehow spontaneously rewild, even if they are physically unable to survive in a wild environment. By not forcing everyone to rewild, and instead giving those who would like to rewild the opportunity to do so, VINE is being attentive to individuals’ interests, needs, desires, and vulnerabilities, as well as offering them an opportunity for self-determination and agency. VINE is taking into account individual preferences and abilities, and making choices and allowing nonhumans to make choices that maximize well-being. Therefore, empathetic rewilding is an important aspect of the Type IV intentional sanctuary community because it allows for agency, freedom, self-determination, and improved well-being.

To summarize, I argue that farmed nonhuman animals should be liberated from agriculture and incorporated into Type IV intentional community sanctuaries. Type IV sanctuaries, such as VINE, minimize human domination and maximize nonhuman agency by not limiting residents in terms of association, environment, or reproduction (unless well-being is at stake) as well as supporting rewilding efforts. In this way, VINE allows residents to shape their own lives and contribute to the flourishing of others in the sanctuary community. However, “lesser” Type I, II, and
III sanctuaries limit residents in these areas in addition to instrumentalizing them, commodifying them, perpetuating human domination, and compromising their dignity. Furthermore, these “lesser” sanctuaries can actually resemble small farms and perpetuate “small farming” structures and values that they should be attempting to remedy. Therefore, Type IV sanctuary is the ideal space for formerly farmed nonhumans. In fact, as I will discuss in the next chapter, Type IV sanctuary spaces subvert oppressive systems to radically change human relationships with and conceptions of nonhuman animals.
In this chapter, I argue that Type IV farmed animal sanctuary spaces are subversive, and therefore, revolutionary. *Subversive* is defined as “tending or intending to subvert or overthrow, destroy, or undermine an established or existing system, especially a legally constituted government or set of beliefs” (Dictionary.com 2017b). Type IV sanctuaries are subversive in that they undermine the established system of human use, exploitation, and domination of nonhumans in agriculture, and the implicit belief that this use, exploitation, and domination are justified due to a “natural” superiority of the human species. Furthermore, although they operate within a capitalist system, sanctuaries subvert a particular Western, capitalist logic that views farmed animals as expendable commodities and views individuals of all species as separate, independent beings (as opposed to interconnected). Due to its subversive nature, sanctuary is also revolutionary, as *revolutionary* is defined as “radically new or innovative; outside or beyond established procedure, principles, etc.” (Dictionary.com 2017a) and “constituting or bringing about a major or fundamental change” (Merriam-Webster 2017c). By subverting these established systems and beliefs, sanctuary is bringing about radical change in the way that farmed nonhumans are viewed and treated. The subversive and therefore revolutionary nature of sanctuary is demonstrated by sanctuary as a space that exists solely to cater to the interests and well-being of farmed animals, privileges nonhuman interests over human ones, recognizes farmed animals as individuals instead of commodities, allows humans to witness nonhuman lives, and grieves for, cares for, and creates knowledge about farmed animals. In order to discuss these aspects, I will focus on VINE Sanctuary in my analysis.
I would also like to recognize and emphasize that there is something particularly subversive about farmed animal sanctuaries. While sanctuaries such as wildlife rescues are indeed meaningful in the way that they care for individuals who are otherwise uncared for by humans (for example, Wild Baby Rescue Center in Blairstown, New Jersey, rescues young wild animals who would otherwise die and releases them once they are rehabilitated), there is something particularly revolutionary about spaces such as VINE. This is because farmed animals, unlike wild animals, are brought into existence for the sole purpose of human use and exploitation. Farmed animals are not conceptualized by the system as anything other than commodities that exist for humans, and are created by the billions as such. In fact, species such as chickens, cows, and pigs would not exist as they do today without human interference through domestication and genetic manipulation in order to selfishly benefit from their lives and bodies.

Thus, within this framework, sanctuary spaces that value, recognize, care for, and grieve the lives of farmed animals are revolutionary. On the other hand, while wild animal lives are not necessarily particularly respected or valued by humans (demonstrated by actions such as hunting, poaching, and habitat destruction) wild animals are not brought into existence by humans as commodities; they are recognized as existing, somewhat, for themselves, even if they are transformed into commodities at some point (see Collard and Dempsey 2013). Although they are, of course, valuable in their own right, wildlife sanctuaries do not accomplish the same particular subversion that farmed animal sanctuaries do.

To begin, farmed animal sanctuary spaces are subversive in the way that they exist solely to cater to the interests and well-being of farmed animals, whose interests and well-being are rarely considered in the system of agriculture. Industrialized factory farming very clearly ignores them, and while “humane”
farming may somewhat consider them or claim to prioritize them, its actual lack of concern for nonhuman interests and well-being is demonstrated by “routine” farming occurrences such as branding, artificial insemination, the division of animal families, and slaughter. In contrast, sanctuaries such as VINE are spaces that exist solely to cater to the interests and well-being of farmed animals. The well-being of nonhuman residents is a Type IV sanctuary’s absolute priority, and every decision revolves around how to better their lives. As previously mentioned, Patrice Jones discusses how decisions at VINE are made “in consultation with the animals” to ensure that they are in their best interests (2014b, 73). This kind of sanctuary space is therefore radically different than the world outside of it, in which the interests of farmed animals are generally considered last, if at all.

By prioritizing the well-being and interests of farmed animals, Type IV sanctuaries privilege nonhuman interests over human ones. For example, during my time at VINE, I woke up at five am in order to arrive at the sanctuary at six am and open the coops for the birds. I was interested in sleeping past five am, but the birds were interested in beginning their day as soon as the sun came up. As a human, my frivolous interest in sleeping late came second to the birds’ more crucial interest in being let out of the coops and given food and water. Also, a staff member may have to care for residents when they are sick or otherwise not feeling well. They may be interested in resting and sleeping, and while other staff, of course, would do their best to step in and help, sometimes human caregivers have to work even when they would rather not. In this way, sanctuary spaces are revolutionary; putting nonhuman interests first challenges the widely-accepted idea that humans are “naturally” superior to all other animals and therefore their interests are priority.
Moreover, Gillespie argues that the act of dedicating one’s life to caring for individuals deemed unimportant by the dominant system (i.e. farmed animals), as sanctuary caregivers do, is subversive in itself (Kathryn Gillespie, personal communication [Email], March 24, 2017). For example, as previously mentioned, cow Blake was tied up outside and left to die at the dairy farm on which she was raised. This violence occurred and was seen as justified due to Blake’s existence as a domesticated cow used in dairy; her life and well-being were not seen as mattering. Those who work at VINE and bring food to Blake every morning and evening, spend time with her, make sure she is happy and comfortable, and pay a vet to tend to her health (thus actively prolonging her life) are resisting a system that tells us that people like Blake do not matter because of their species membership and perceived “use” for humans. Choosing to care for formerly farmed animals as one’s “job” or purpose in life challenges narratives of who matters and therefore whom we should care for.

Sanctuaries such as VINE are subversive in that they also recognize farmed animals as individuals, challenging a Western, capitalist logic that views them as commodities to be sacrificed in the pursuit of capital accumulation. One way in which farmed animals are recognized as individuals is through knowledge of their “stories.” As previously mentioned, a resident’s “story” is a culmination of knowledge about her life and who she is. Of course, sometimes information is missing due to a hidden, exploitative past (for example, the exact size of the dairy farm Blake was rescued from is unknown because Blake and her friends were seized by the authorities) or information is simply hard to deduce, such as who someone’s father is when none of the males seem particularly invested in the young. However, as much as it is possible, VINE staff know the details of every resident’s life. This knowledge is important because farmed animals’ stories are
ignored within the larger system of animal use and exploitation, in which they are conceived of as commodities and removed from any connections or relationships with others.

Knowing someone’s story is subversive in that it acknowledges the nonhuman as an individual with a life. Indeed, Gillespie writes, “Telling the stories of those whose lives often go unremarked is a act of resistance that makes a statement about whose lives matter and have meaning” (2016, 577). Telling someone’s story means that hers is a story worth being told. Additionally, Chloë Taylor writes that one way we “derealize” animal lives is by refusing to give them “faces, names, and biographies” (2008, 63). Instead, nonhumans are simply masses or numbers, and violence can be done to them with “greater ease” (ibid.). Sanctuaries subvert this by “realizing” nonhuman lives through actively sharing faces, names, and biographies. Telling someone’s story (in a non-voyeuristic, respectful manner) is a recognition of her individuality and intrinsic worth.

Type IV sanctuary residents are seen as individuals, as opposed to commodities, by avoiding the commodification of any bodily products, such as eggs or wool. At VINE, eggs produced by the bird residents, such as turkeys, chickens, and ducks, are fed back to them. Eggs are also cooked and scrambled as food for sick birds. This is done to replenish the nutrients their bodies lose due to the daily production of eggs. In the wild, Red Junglefowl (the ancestor of domesticated chickens) lay four to six eggs once or twice per year (Encyclopedia of Life 2017). Humans have genetically manipulated domesticated birds to lay multiple eggs every day; this takes an enormous toll on their bodies, and consuming eggs can help replenish lost nutrients. Additionally, wool produced by the sheep is sheared in the early summer and placed in the woods so wild birds can use it to build nests.
Finally, animals themselves are never commodified as VINE does not purchase potential residents.

Furthermore, recognizing farmed animals as individuals challenges the categories of the “killable” and the “edible,” into which farmed animals are placed by the system of animal agriculture. At VINE, formerly farmed residents are viewed as individuals or “people” to respect and have relationships with, not “edible” or “killable” commodities. In fact, to challenge the category of the “killable,” sanctuaries actively care for and prolong the lives of nonhumans by providing food, shelter, water, an enriching environment, and veterinary care. Also, as a vegan sanctuary, VINE staff challenge the category of the “edible” by avoiding all animal products in their diets as well as not consuming or selling eggs from residents. Resisting these categories provides the opportunity for mutually fulfilling, non-exploitative relationships with residents. Outside of this sanctuary space, it may be unusual to view a chicken as a potential friend, as chickens are generally considered “edible” and “killable.” Fortunately, spaces such as VINE subvert these views and reinforce the idea that farmed nonhumans are individuals with intrinsic value.

Moreover, one essential way in which sanctuary spaces allow farmed animals to be seen as individuals is through witnessing. Witnessing is generally defined as “seeing for oneself” (Merriam-Webster 2017f). However, Gillespie argues that witnessing also necessitates “an emotional engagement and a recognition of the political function of emotion” (2016, 573); it is not just simply “seeing.” In fact, she contrasts witnessing with observation, as observation “implies an objective, removed, or potentially apolitical viewpoint” (ibid.). Instead, witnessing requires empathy and political engagement (Gillespie 2016). I use Gillespie’s definition when discussing witnessing in this chapter.
VINE is a space in which witnessing takes place due to the proximity of humans to nonhumans. Witnessing occurs constantly between the sanctuary staff and the nonhuman residents, as much of the sanctuary work is hands-on care work during which the animals are present. During my time at VINE, I was always surrounded by residents and able to witness their lives, interactions, and experiences. Because most of the staff live on sanctuary grounds, witnessing occurs around the clock, not just during work hours. Additionally, although this kind of “witnessing” occurs in a more limited way, VINE allows those not physically present at the sanctuary to witness the lives of the residents through sharing photos and tidbits about them on their Facebook page as well as their website and blog. This is different from the sharing a Type III sanctuary does because intimate, dramatized details are not included; quick snapshots of sanctuary life are shared, protecting the dignity and privacy of the residents. In this way, outside observers can learn about and have a connection to the VINE community without being voyeurs to a resident’s trauma.

Witnessing in a sanctuary space surpasses simple, objective “observation” because those doing the “seeing” are emotionally invested. The caretakers are a part of the sanctuary’s interspecies community and are deeply invested in the lives of the nonhumans they care for. Also, sanctuary visitors all have a prior interest in farmed animal oppression, whether they are vegan, vegetarian, part of an animal liberation group, activists, etc. Therefore, the empathy and political engagement Gillespie describes are present in the sanctuary space.

Through witnessing, animals are recognized as individuals instead of objects or commodities. Gillespie describes witnessing as “a moment of recognition of the animal subject that...requires a new understanding of subjectivity that extends beyond the human experience to multispecies lifeworlds” (2016, 576). She cites
Naisargi N. Dave, who describes the intimate moment of “locking eyes” with a nonhuman, and Gillespie writes that “this moment of locking eyes involves seeing the animal as an embodied individual, rather than as an abstract, faceless population, and is integral to the act of witnessing” (ibid.). Indeed, the first time I visited VINE, I experienced “locking eyes” with Blake; I immediately saw her as an individual being, just as I am an individual. Thus, witnessing disrupts the notion that farmed animals are nameless, faceless commodities and instead allows the human witness to “see” the nonhuman as an individual and a subject-of-a-life.

Similarly, Taylor argues that witnessing through face-to-face encounters makes animal lives “real,” so in order to continue with the current system of viewing animal lives as “unreal,” we must avoid witnessing. She writes:

We need to keep animal lives and deaths derealized in order to continue with our plans...we wish to avoid having a face-to-face relationship with animals because we want to avoid our ethical responsibility. We censor the truth about the lives and deaths of animals because we want to keep animals outside of the frame of what we consider “real lives,” lives worthy of moral consideration, grievable lives. (Taylor 2008, 64)

Sanctuary spaces allow for face-to-face encounters with nonhumans, therefore “realizing” their lives and threatening a system that considers animals to be “unreal” commodities and the violence they experience nonexistent.

Furthermore, Gillespie argues that witnessing is subversive because it “is a political act that resists the erasure of animal lives, suffering, and deaths” (2016, 576). Bearing witness to a farmed animal’s life and experiences means that she did indeed have a life and experiences. In order to continue accumulating capital, the system would like consumers to believe that the piece of meat on one’s plate never had friends or a family or a favorite food; if this were acknowledged, the “meat” would become a corpse and consuming it would be difficult. Thus, a cow or turkey’s
life is “erased” in order for animal agriculture to continue. Witnessing the lives of animals – therefore “resisting this erasure” (Gillespie 2016) – threatens the system.

Moreover, witnessing is subversive in that it destroys someone’s preconceived ideas and the common-sense beliefs perpetuated by the system of animal agriculture (see Gillespie 2016). Dave discusses how witnessing changes an individual, writing that “in witnessing...[a person’s] skin is shed, so that something in the person ceases to exist after the event is over. The fiction of the self is blown apart” (2014, 440). We become something other than what we were before the witnessing occurred, and “truths” we may have taken for granted cease to exist. For example, before my internship at VINE, I never imagined having any sort of relationship with a turkey; turkeys had always been conceptualized as “food” for me, unlike dogs or cats, whom I viewed as “friends.” After being at VINE and witnessing the lives of the turkey residents and their wonderful, engaging personalities, my inaccurate preconceptions of turkeys were shattered. To this day, some of the nonhuman relationships I treasure the most are with turkeys Fabio and Paula. Additionally, Dave argues that witnessing “compels a new kind of responsible life in a previously unimaginable skin” (2014, 442). Once someone is changed, they have a new responsibility to affect change. After bearing witness to turkey lives at VINE, I became even more determined to resist the system of animal agriculture that exploits individuals such as Fabio and Paula.

Next, witnessing is subversive in that it destroys social boundaries and “expands the boundaries of possible relationality” (ibid., 445). Dave argues that a “moment of witnessing constitutes an intimate event in tethering human to non-human, expanding ordinary understandings of the self and its possible social relations, potentially blowing the conceit of humanity apart” (ibid., 452). In recognizing the “other” as a subject, the invisible boundary between human and
nonhuman is torn down. Upon locking eyes, one is not human and the other animal; they are two embodied individuals recognizing one another. For example, Dave describes a human named Erika witnessing the lives and deaths of nonhumans at the sanctuary she runs. On one particular occasion, Erika asked the sanctuary staff to be witnesses to a cow’s death, to sit on the ground next to them and “just be there” (ibid., 448). Dave writes:

In these moments of being-with, she [Erika] added, the social boundaries between humans, too, fall apart, when they are together, all from their varying backgrounds of caste and race, with their butts equally on the shit- and piss-strewn ground and their hands on the crusted body of an animal in pain, sometimes crying, sometimes stoic, sometimes calm, but all the time, and all of them, there, facing the boundary between life and death that will someday hunt us all down, regardless of the skin we wear. (ibid.)

In this way, witnessing allows the human/animal boundary to fall apart; as Dave describes, there is something particular about witnessing death that destroys this boundary, as death is recognized as universal and inevitable. Witnessing the death of another embodied individual challenges the perceived supremacy and invincibility of the human species, as animals of all species, humans included, will die. This is something humans tend to forget, as we ravage the earth and justify the killing of billions upon billions of animals due to our apparent “superiority.” Therefore, sanctuary spaces such as VINE and Erika’s sanctuary are subversive in that they allow humans to witness the lives and deaths of animals, destroying constructed interspecies boundaries.

Finally, witnessing in a sanctuary space is subversive in that it creates knowledge about farmed animal lives. New knowledge challenges ideas and beliefs that have previously been accepted as “truths.” First, veterinary knowledge is generated at sanctuary, challenging how we view farmed animals. In agriculture, nonhumans are killed when they are only a few years, months, weeks, or even days
old. Geriatric farmed animals simply do not exist. However, sanctuaries allow nonhumans to live out the rest of their natural lives, so many residents become quite old. Scotty, a VINE resident, is currently 22 years old, which is fairly old for a cow. Therefore, sanctuary spaces create veterinary knowledge about how to care for geriatric farmed animals. For example, a cow resident at VINE had to have part of her eyelid removed due to developing cancer from sun exposure; this has not been documented in cows because they generally do not live long enough to develop cancer.

Veterinary knowledge about geriatric sanctuary residents subverts a system of only recognizing farmed animals as commodities to be killed as soon as they reach “market weight,” and shows that they can have long, fulfilling lives. Furthermore, much of the veterinary care animals in agriculture receive is to ensure that they can continue being productive (for example, a cow’s infection may be treated so she can continue producing milk); providing veterinary care for farmed animals for the sake of well-being challenges a system that views them as units of production. Indeed, Donaldson and Kymlicka write that:

FASes have expanded our understanding of the possibilities for animal well-being. Indeed, the best FASes are helping to develop a whole new field of farmed animal veterinary care – care that is aimed not at keeping juvenile animals alive just long enough to be slaughtered, but rather, care designed to benefit animals for their own sake, and to support their flourishing, insofar as possible, for the duration of their natural lives. (2015, 7)

Next, knowledge is created in sanctuary spaces that challenges constructed beliefs about farmed animals. Stereotypes and language are often used to oppress farmed animals: “Don’t be such a chicken.” “You’re eating like a pig.” “They’re just following blindly like sheep.” After spending time at VINE, it was abundantly clear to me that none of these stereotypes are true; chickens are incredibly brave and smart, sheep are not “sheepish,” nor do they follow a single leader mindlessly “like
sheep,” and pigs are not dirty slobs. Stereotypes such as these work to oppress farmed animals as it is easier to do violence to someone you believe is cowardly (even “cowardly” has the word “cow” in it), sheepish, a mindless follower, or a slob. Sanctuaries subvert these stereotypes by allowing humans to witness farmed animals’ true personalities and capabilities.

Furthermore, sanctuaries challenge human-constructed ideas about nonhuman heterosexuality and reproduction. In order to naturalize our own human norms, we claim that nonhuman males mate with nonhuman females in order to reproduce and pass on their genes to offspring. By doing this, Jones argues that we oppress both humans and nonhumans; queer human desires are thought to be “unnatural,” and “[b]y denying that animals have sex for pleasure or form pair bonds that aren’t about reproduction, it’s easier to claim that animals are automatons who don’t have feelings and are not sentient individuals” (Jones 2005). Viewing nonhumans as not being sentient and queer humans as “unnatural” works to justify violence against them.

However, at VINE, queer and non-reproductive nonhuman relationships and interactions abound, challenging this naturalization of heterosexuality and sex as a means of reproduction. For example, Jones writes about trying to separate two male ducks from “fighting” (they were actually having sex) in the earlier days of the sanctuary (Jones 2010b). Three ducks currently living at VINE are “pair”-bonded, challenging the assumed single male-female bond. Sanctuary spaces also subvert assumptions about normative, nuclear family structures by allowing interspecies and non-biological families to flourish. For example, as previously mentioned, rooster Sharkey and duck Ready raised duckling Junebug instead of her biological mother. In fact, during my internship, now-adult Junebug attempted to hatch eggs that she did not lay herself; some of them were even chicken eggs. The existence of these
non-biological and interspecies families challenges the notion that human and nonhuman families are comprised of a same-species male and female couple with biological offspring, making room for queer, interspecies, and other non-normative family structures. As Jones writes, acknowledging that nonhuman species have emotional bonds with others and have sex for pleasure, not just reproduction, undermines preconceived ideas about animal emotions and sentience (Jones 2005).

In fact, sanctuaries subvert the belief that farmed animals are not “sentient individuals” and do not have emotional lives. Although we recognize nonhuman species such as elephants and chimps as having deep emotions, we do not see this in farmed animals (Gillespie 2016). Of course, insisting that farmed animals lack emotional lives works to justify exploitation of and violence against them. Gillespie explains:

> The grief of farmed animal species is a vastly understudied area of scholarship on emotion, though anecdotal accounts of emotion in farmed animal species are plentiful within animal care communities. It is not surprising that farmed-animal emotion is not well researched; there are, indeed, potentially profound implications of recognizing emotion in farmed animals. Learning that chickens have been known to die of grief...or that farmed animals can help one another heal...may destabilize the socially constructed hierarchies we have created to alienate and appropriate other species for our commercial and consumptive uses. (2016, 581)

Not only would it be more difficult to exploit individuals we know emotionally suffer due to our actions, but our human “superiority” that justifies this exploitation is, in part, based on our complex “human” emotions and cognition. As Gillespie writes, recognizing that these deep, complex emotions are present in other animals challenges the species hierarchy we have constructed for our benefit (ibid.). Spaces such as VINE subvert assumptions about farmed animal emotions by allowing humans to witness, and therefore create knowledge about, their vibrant emotional lives.
For example, VINE staff witnessed the complex emotional bond between a mother cow and her calf. As a male calf born into the dairy industry, Maddox was taken away from his mother, Moxie, when he was only a day old, and brought to VINE. Three years later, VINE was able to reunite the pair when Moxie arrived at sanctuary. VINE's blog states:

This was among the most meaningful moments in the life of everyone who witnessed the moment when grown-up Maddox recognized the moo he had heard in the womb (and during the one day he had been allowed to spend with his mother) just as Moxie somehow recognized him and they began walking slowly toward each other until their noses met in a kiss. (VINE Sanctuary 2016)

After being reunited, Maddox spent many weeks in the front pasture with Moxie, instead of with his cow friends in the back pasture. Observing Maddox and Moxie's reunion creates knowledge about the deep emotional bond that mother cows have with their calves, and subverts ideas about the dairy industry being non-violent.

Additionally, the emotional lives of farmed animals are demonstrated through witnessing grief at sanctuaries. Jones and Gruen write about chicken Chickweed, who grieved the death of his best friend, Violet, at VINE. They write, “Chickweed watched her burial, then stood staring at the spot where she had disappeared into the ground. The next day, and for weeks thereafter, he stormed and stomped, wanting nothing to do with anyone. Over time, he became less angry and more sociable, but he never recovered his sunny personality” (Jones and Gruen 2016, 189). Chickweed's emotional bond to his best friend was so strong that he was never the same after her death. Farmed animal sanctuaries allow humans to witness these emotions; recognizing that species such as cows and chickens have emotional lives challenges the system of animal agriculture that relies on seeing farmed animals as “machines” and humans as superior due to our “unique” and complex emotions.
Not only do sanctuaries witness grief of nonhuman residents, sanctuaries themselves also grieve nonhuman deaths. Each resident at VINE is valued, and their deaths, which occur almost weekly, are mourned. I worked with VINE staff who would tell me about their favorite residents who had passed away, months or even years later. Clearly, a loss was still felt, and would never be unfelt. In “Keeping Ghosts Close: Care and Grief at Sanctuaries,” Jones and Gruen discuss the ways in which sanctuaries mourn the deaths of residents. One common way of mourning is to create memorials for the deceased. A memorial can be an obituary on social media or the sanctuary’s website, a tree or garden planted over the grave of a resident, or naming a fund or sanctuary program after someone. Through memorials, sanctuaries are able to “keep the ‘ghosts’ of sanctuary residents close,” allowing their spirits and memories of them to “enliven the people and the place” (Jones and Gruen 2016, 191). Grief makes sanctuary a revolutionary space because grieving the deaths of farmed animals subverts common assumptions of what kinds of lives matter and contains the potential to replace a capitalist logic based on competition, independence, and disavowal with one of community, care, and empathy.

Judith Butler discusses how certain lives are more “grievable” than others. For example, she describes how obituaries generally mention happy, heterosexual, monogamous, married or soon-to-be-married people; these lives are grievable (Butler 2004, 32). In contrast, obituaries are not written for the victims of war in foreign countries (ibid.). Butler argues that less grievable lives are also more vulnerable lives. While we are all vulnerable beings as we are embodied, certain individuals are more vulnerable than others. For example, farmed animals are particularly vulnerable as they are bred for human consumption; even before they are born, they are categorized as expendable (Taylor 2008). Also, for example, trans
women of color lead more vulnerable lives than cis white men, as evidenced by police violence. Butler discusses how these vulnerable lives go ungrieved because they were never considered lives at all; she writes that “[these lives] cannot be mourned because they are...already lost or, rather, never ‘were’” (2004, 33). Therefore, farmed animals are ungrieved because their lives never existed. Indeed, pieces of a slaughtered cow’s carcass in a grocery store are euphemized as “steak” or “hamburger meat,” not a “body.” The “meat” did not come from somebody who lived and died, and thus there is no mourning involved. This disavowal almost completely erases the life (and death) of the farmed animal.

Thus, grief is an acknowledgement that a life existed and, in fact, mattered. Grief is subversive in that it “signals to others that the subject in question ought to be grieved; it disrupts the dominant narratives that circulate to reinforce the notion that some lives and deaths simply matter less than others” (Gillespie 2016, 580). For example, Stanescu discusses how grief upon seeing animal corpses in a supermarket is socially unintelligible, as most people do not view these deaths as being important enough to mourn (Stanescu 2012). Mourning makes a political statement by challenging this assumption.

Unfortunately, the system of capitalism relies on the devaluation of certain individuals. For example, more vulnerable, ungrieved lives and bodies are used as sources of cheap and dangerous (or even unpaid) labor. Similarly, billions upon billions of dollars are accumulated through animal agriculture because the lives and deaths of farmed animals are thought not to matter. Indeed, Gillespie and Lopez write about grief as an act of political resistance against an economic system that relies on some lives mattering less than others (Gillespie and Lopez 2015). In this way, grief undermines a capitalist logic that benefits from the devaluation and ungrievability of marginalized individuals.
In fact, Stanescu argues that mourning has such a “radical potential” that it has been feminized and become something one does in private (2012, 578). He cites Butler, who writes that mourning has been made into a private act to keep “civic order” and allow the system to continue unchallenged (ibid.). Similarly, Gillespie discusses the individualization of grief as a way in which the current system propagates itself. She writes that it makes “grief the personal problem or failing of the griever instead of acknowledging the ways in which grief signals a political response to broader structural conditions of injustice” (Gillespie 2016, 580). Thus, feminization, privatization, and individualization all work to dismantle grief’s political power, demonstrating that it does indeed threaten a system that relies on certain deaths being ungrieved.

Furthermore, grief is subversive in that it proposes a system based on care, community, and empathy rather than a capitalist one based on independence, disavowal, and competition. First, grief challenges notions of independence, as Butler discusses how grief is evidence that we are not simply individual, bounded beings. This is because, when grieving, “one undergoes something outside one’s control and finds that one is beside oneself, not at one with oneself...we are, from the start and by virtue of being a bodily being, already given over, beyond ourselves, implicated in lives that are not our own” (Butler 2004, 28). The way in which grief consumes us, destroys us, and changes us is a testament to how invested in and connected with other lives we are. Our relationships with others construct us, while the loss of others undoes us (ibid., 22-23). Grief thus challenges a system that tells us that we are separate, individual bodies; instead, it shows us that we are necessarily connected and interdependent.

Moreover, grief undermines notions of independence because grief is an acknowledgement of vulnerability and dependence. We are all embodied; thus, we
are all vulnerable, and we depend on others to care for and protect our vulnerable bodies. Also, because we are embodied, we die. Grief is recognition of our vulnerability, dependence, and the inevitability of death. Instead of trying to deny our vulnerability, Butler and Stanescu suggest that we use it as an opportunity for connection and community. Stanescu writes:

Vulnerability is the basis of sociality, the basis of community. If we were immortal and capable of being entirely sustainable individuals, there would be no need for society or culture. It is our very ability to be wounded, our very dependency, that brings us together. Mourning is a testament to such a shared embodiment. (2012, 578)

Similarly, Butler explains that grief can be used to create connection and responsibility for one another, asking:

Is there something to be gained in the political domain by maintaining grief as part of the framework within which we think our international ties? If we stay with the sense of loss, are we left feeling only passive and powerless...Or are we, rather, returned to a sense of human vulnerability, to our collective responsibility for the physical lives of one another? (2004, 30)

Thus, grief provides an opportunity for connection and community as we acknowledge our vulnerability and dependence on one another.

In fact, Gruen and Jones describe how collective mourning at sanctuaries creates community and connection. For example, photos and stories of departed residents are often shared on posters, leaflets, Facebook, and the sanctuary’s website or blog. In this way, supporters outside of the sanctuary space are invited to learn about the life and mourn the death of a beloved resident. Gruen and Jones write, “When sanctuary workers write and tell the stories of the lives and deaths of sanctuary residents, they invite readers or listeners to share in both celebration and mourning” (2016, 189). Thus, mourning is not a private and isolating action, but a collective one, bringing people together and creating community. Indeed, Stanescu writes, “Mourning is never just about grief, but it is also about celebrations,
memories, and stories. Mourning doesn’t just bring with it moments of isolation, it also sets up connections and reaches out for celebration” (2012, 580). Through mourning, sanctuaries challenge Western, capitalist notions of independence by acknowledging our shared vulnerability and creating community and connection.

Finally, by acknowledging our interdependence and vulnerability, we can create a system based on connection, care, and empathy. This is because vulnerability necessitates care; in fact, “vulnerable” is defined as “in need of special care, support, or protection” (Oxford University Press 2017b). We are all vulnerable, thus we are all in need of care and support from others. Unfortunately, care has been feminized and devalued, while independence and self-sufficiency have been upheld in a patriarchal, capitalist society. Just as Stanescu discusses for grief, care has been devalued due to its “radical potential.” A system based on care for one another is, indeed, revolutionary, in a capitalist society that tells us not to care for or about one other. In “Sick Woman Theory,” Johanna Hedva states that care is the most radical, anti-capitalist action one can do. She writes:

The most anti-capitalist protest is to care for another and to care for yourself. To take on the historically feminized and therefore invisible practice of nursing, nurturing, caring. To take seriously each other's vulnerability and fragility and precarity, and to support it, honor it, empower it. To protect each other, to enact and practice community. A radical kinship, an interdependent sociality, a politics of care. Because, once we are all ill and confined to the bed, sharing our stories of therapies and comforts, forming support groups, bearing witness to each other's tales of trauma, prioritizing the care and love of our sick, pained, expensive, sensitive, fantastic bodies, and there is no one left to go to work, perhaps then, finally, capitalism will screech to its much-needed, long-overdue, and motherfucking glorious halt. (Hedva 2016)

Hedva explains that in a capitalist system, care is seen as temporary, if anything, and “not normal” (ibid.). This is because in order to accumulate capital, some individuals must be thoroughly un-cared for. While capitalism depends on the devaluation, exploitation, and death of certain bodies, care aims to
“support...honor...[and] empower” individuals (ibid.). Thus, caring for each other consistently, not just temporarily, challenges this capitalist logic.

Indeed, farmed animals sanctuaries exist in order to consistently care for those who have been systematically uncared for. Sanctuary work is, essentially, carework. Caring for someone makes a statement that their existence matters and that their happiness and well-being are important, subverting dominant narratives that tell us otherwise. By caring for formerly farmed nonhumans, sanctuaries challenge a capitalist logic that radically un-cares for farmed animals; instead, sanctuary communities acknowledge, support, and empower these individuals.

Care as the basis of sanctuary is evident in human staff striving to provide the best emotional, physical, and veterinary care for the nonhuman residents. Similarly, the nonhumans care for the humans. Every day, I would spend time with Blake, and she would lick me from head to toe – a cow’s way of caring for another. The humans at VINE care for each other as well; during my time there, I felt incredibly supported by the people I worked with. Finally, the nonhuman residents demonstrate care for each other by “adopting” young residents or becoming “peacekeepers” and intervening in squabbles to create a more peaceful community. The care evident in a space such as VINE challenges a competitive, individualist, uncaring capitalist mentality and proposes a more empathetic, empowering, and harmonious way of being with one another.

In essence, Type IV farmed animal sanctuaries, such as VINE, are subversive in that they undermine the established system of human use, exploitation, and domination of nonhumans in agriculture, and the belief that these are justified due to a “natural” human superiority. Furthermore, sanctuaries challenge a Western, capitalist logic that views farmed animals as expendable
commodities and views human and nonhuman individuals as separate, independent beings. Instead, sanctuary offers an opportunity for community, empathy, and connection with others. The subversive nature of sanctuary is demonstrated by sanctuary as a space that exists solely to cater to the interests and well-being of farmed animals, privileges nonhuman interests over human ones, recognizes farmed animals as individuals instead of commodities, allows humans to witness nonhuman lives, and grieves for, cares for, and creates knowledge about farmed animals. Thus, sanctuary spaces are revolutionary in that they seek to bring about radical change in the way we view, treat, and relate to “farmed” nonhuman animals.
In Conclusion

I opened this thesis with a quote from Patrice Jones, in which she describes how “disconnected” humans are from other species as well as our own selves and asks her readers, “[H]ow can we hope to do the things that we need to do to make things right?” (Jones 2010, 191). I hope that I have in some way responded to her question through offering sanctuary as an alternative to our current “disconnected” state with farmed nonhuman animals. Indeed, animal agriculture demonstrates how removed we are from other nonhumans; we believe we are so “different” from and “superior” to cows, chickens, and pigs that we are justified in killing, exploiting, and enacting violence against them.

Even when we do acknowledge the cruelty of our actions (i.e. in the current push back against industrial farming), we replace the overt violence and destruction of these systems with more insidious violence, such as that of small-scale farming. In chapter 1, I discussed how both the “small, humane, family farm” space itself as well as the values associated with the movement back to small-scale farming perpetuate violence and oppression. Unfortunately, narratives we have constructed as obvious “truths,” such as the idea that humans are superior to other animals or that the purpose of a cow’s existence is to produce milk for human consumption, work to distance us even further from other animals and delude us into believing that our violence is justified.

Although we can never truly “make things right” with farmed animals, who have been manipulated and exploited by humans through pastoralism for thousands of years, we can try our best to move forward by making our relationships with these individuals the best relationships possible (see Gruen 2015). To do so, I call for an end to all forms of animal agriculture and, in chapter 2, proposed “Type IV”
farmed animal sanctuary as the ideal space for nonhumans previously used in agriculture. While formerly farmed animals must exist in human-controlled captivity as they have been bred to be dependent on humans for food, water, shelter, and protection, Type IV sanctuaries strive to maximize nonhuman agency, freedom, and self-determination within this captivity. VINE Sanctuary, as a Type IV, offers a varied, extensive environment, the ability to socialize with individuals of different species and sexes, reproductive freedom for bird residents, and the opportunity to rewild. Sanctuary residents are able to choose what kind of life they would like to lead, help to shape the sanctuary community, and contribute to the flourishing of their fellow human and nonhuman community members.

In fact, as I wrote in chapter 3, Type IV sanctuaries work to subvert violent, oppressive systems as well as the narratives we have adopted as truths in order to propagate these systems. Sanctuaries such as VINE challenge a capitalist logic that views animals as commodities and individuals of all species as separate, independent beings; they also undermine the “legitimized” system of nonhuman use, exploitation, and domination. Unfortunately, some lesser “sanctuary” spaces can reinforce, instead of challenge, these structures. As described, Type I, II, and possibly Type III sanctuaries perpetuate small-farming structures and values through actions such as commodifying residents or operating as “petting zoos.” This demonstrates how insidious these systems are - even spaces that have the best intentions; that seek to care for and improve the lives of otherwise-exploited nonhumans - are simultaneously reproducing oppression. The revolutionary Type IV sanctuary space is only made more necessary and valuable in order to undermine these systems.

At places such as VINE, nonhumans are individuals, not “things,” “people,” not “animals”; their lives are grievable, important, and worthy of care. By
challenging systems, structures, and narratives that tell us otherwise, sanctuaries like VINE offer a radical rethinking of how we conceptualize, treat, and relate to “farmed” nonhuman animals. Instead of violence, exploitation, death, and domination, sanctuaries embody justice, community, empathy, and care. Indeed, these sanctuary spaces offer a means to begin, as Jones writes, “to make things right” with nonhuman others. It is my hope that we take advantage of this, and continue to improve our ways of being with formerly farmed nonhumans.
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