La France aux Français: Continuities in French Extreme-Right Ideology from Maurice Barrès and Charles Maurras to Jean-Marie Le Pen

by

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Jean-Marie Le Pen served as president of the Front National (FN) from its founding on October 5, 1972, until the succession of his daughter, Marine Le Pen, on January 16, 2011. Since stepping down, Jean-Marie Le Pen has continued to publicly express his controversial opinions on a variety of topics concerning municipal, regional, national, and international affairs. Jean-Marie Le Pen’s rabble-rousing rhetoric is not a new phenomenon, but it has begun to clash, especially recently, with Marine Le Pen’s concerted effort to dédiabolise (de-demonize) the FN. Jean-Marie Le Pen’s repeated claim that gas chambers in Nazi death camps were simply a “detail in the history of World War II,” led Marine Le Pen to first suspend Jean-Marie Le Pen from the FN on May 4, 2015 and then to officially exclude him from the party on August 20, 2015 (she has also attempted to strip him of his title as Honorary President of the FN, for which there is an ongoing legal dispute). Marine Le Pen’s campaign of de-demonization is also a long-standing political tactic of the FN. That is to say, Marine Le Pen’s attempt to distance herself—and the “new FN”—from the views of her father were similarly employed by Jean-Marie Le Pen as a way of presenting the FN as distinct from the extreme Right: as a break with, rather than a continuation of, French extreme-Right political movements, ideologies, writings, and rhetoric. As Nonna Mayer explains,

‘Extreme Right’ is an infamous label, associated in the French collective memory with Nazism and Fascism, the collaborationist Vichy regime, and the extermination of Jews. Le Pen fiercely rejects it, calling himself a ‘populist’ and proud to be so. But ever since his comments about the gas chambers as a ‘detail’ in the history of World War II in 1987, he has been assimilated to the extreme Right, and considered by a large majority as a ‘danger for democracy.’

2 Michelle Hale Williams, “A new era for French far right politics? Comparing the FN under two Le
Le Pen’s attempt to de-demonize the FN is indicative of the existence of certain demons. That is to say, the need to distinguish the FN from the historical extreme-Right, to apologize for—or to cleanse the movement of—the actions and beliefs of the far-Right tradition demonstrates that these former demons linger. Furthermore, a glaring problem faced by Le Pen at the beginning of the de-demonization campaign in the 1980s was that, among other factors, “the FN of the 1970s had made overtly racist and white supremacist remarks in its official party publications.”

Although it is not surprising that Jean-Marie Le Pen would fight to distinguish the FN from its association with “Nazism and Fascism, the collaborationist Vichy regime, and the extermination of Jews,” the FN is definitively the inheritor of this historical tradition. A detailed analysis of the rhetoric of Jean-Marie Le Pen in comparison with two intellectual icons of the historical French extreme-Right, Maurice Barrès and Charles Maurras, reveals that the FN not only stands as a continuation of this ideology, but that it also expands on far-Right themes of martyrdom, sacrifice, blood, soil, rootedness, historical (Greco-Roman) tradition, fatherland, ultra-nationalism, racism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and Islamophobia. Where to begin?

Defense Against Xenophobia and Racism: Political Proposals and the Front National as a Scapegoat

As a way of distinguishing the FN from former extreme-Right figures and political movements, Jean-Marie Le Pen has vehemently rejected claims that the FN promotes racism and xenophobia. Le Pen has consistently denied these accusations, which are usually directed at his immigration policies, by underscoring that the FN does not advocate hostility: “Nous sommes débités dans l’opinion publique d’être des

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xénophobes et des gens renfermés sur eux-mêmes. Pas du tout ! Ces propositions prouvent que nous ne sommes pas hostiles à ces pays pour autant qu’ils ne nous le sont pas, évidemment.”

In this speech delivered on June 1986 to a crowd of Italian Social Movement supporters in Palermo, Le Pen argues that in addition to not being xenophobic, the FN offers political propositions that are beneficial towards foreign countries, so long as these countries are not hostile towards France. In this context, the countries to which Le Pen refers constitute the Maghreb region (more specifically, in the context of French colonialism, the Maghreb designated Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco). His proposals consist of a newly delineated relationship between Europe and North Africa:

Et nous disons même que, en dégageant des formes de cohabitation et de coopération qui nous permettraient de rendre à ces pays les immigrants qu’ils nous ont envoyés en excédent et créer dans ces pays à forte démographie des pôles de prospérité, nous préservons par là même la sécurité de nos pays […] en particulier pour notre production agricole puisqu’ils ont des millions et des millions de bouches à nourrir.

In order to successfully return the immigrants to the Maghrebin countries of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco—“the countries with large populations”—policies and legislation favorable to cohabitation and cooperation must be discarded. Le Pen argues that as a first step to sending back these immigrants, European countries must invest money and resources into “countries with large populations,” such as Algeria and Tunisia, thereby creating an incentive for immigrants to remain at home. In Le Pen’s consideration, if Maghrebin immigrants are not returned home, France’s—as well as Europe’s—capacity

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4 The Italian Social Movement, a far-right Italian political party, was founded in December 1946 and dissolved in January 1995.
5 Ibid.
6 Throughout the essay, when the author provides his own English translation of a French citation, the original text will be included in a footnote. In this instance: “les pays à forte démographie.”
to take care of its own citizens will suffer. Moreover, he views immigration as a security risk due to the blow the agricultural system will suffer upon having to feed such a massive influx of immigrants. Le Pen argues that anti-immigration policies are thus in the best interest of the French nation, and the FN, knowing this, is the sole voice of reason that will save France before problems intensify. Furthermore, as Le Pen has repeatedly insisted, he does not object to immigrants as individuals: “Toute ma vie témoigne par des faits que je ne suis pas racist et que je ne pratique à l’égard des étrangers ou immigrés ni haine, ni racisme. Je répète d’ailleurs dans tous mes discours que les drames de l’immigration sont dûs non pas aux immigrés mais aux politiciens français qui sont seuls responsables.” In effect, Le Pen’s response to critiques directed at his seeming disdain for immigrants is that he has no quarrel with the immigrants. Rather, he objects to the incompetent French politicians who are responsible for the immigrants’ arrival and the subsequent “drames” that unfold. Le Pen’s critique of French politicians is tied into a greater argument alleging that the French government and the media unfairly persecute the FN.

Le Pen frequently claims to be a scapegoat for the government’s failures and a general punching bag for the media. In Le Pen’s estimation, he is the quintessential victim upon whom unwarranted attacks and critiques are piled: “Monsieur Chirac-Juppé a ainsi usurpé l’estrade du professeur, non pour annoncer des mesures sévères contre les délinquants, les dealers, les gangsters ou les escrocs, mais pour mener une attaque en règle contre Le Pen.” According to Le Pen, rather than confront the real issues that France is facing—organized crime, crooks, drug dealers, delinquents—President Jacques

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8 Ibid., 22.
Chirac and Prime Minister Alain Juppé instead carry out unproductive and unfair attacks upon Le Pen. This unfair singling out, he argues, constitutes a veritable “anti-lépenisme”:

“Harcélé par les lobbies, taraudé par les pseudo-autorités morales, Chirac-Juppé se trouve aujourd’hui acculé, dos au mur, et n’a d’autre ressource que de se lancer dans l’anti-lépénisme. […] C’est pour masquer vos [Chirac-Juppé] échecs, donner le change, esquiver vos responsabilités, que vous êtes passé brutalement à l’attaque contre le Front national.” Thus, from Le Pen’s perspective, the government’s weakness has pushed it to engage in a dishonest, defamatory campaign against the FN as a way of shifting attention away from its own failures. For Le Pen, the FN is targeted precisely because it represents a shift from mainstream politics; whereas the FN stands firmly by its convictions, the government vacillates according to the “the moral pseudo-authorities.” Moreover, Le Pen claims that the government and media both engage in “l’anti-pénisme” to overtly harm the electoral success of the FN: “La stratégie utilisée à l’encontre du Front national 18 mois avant les législatives est claire. Elle répond à deux exigences: mettre en valeur la prétendue violence qui serait, selon les fantasmes des ténors de l’Établissement, l’apanage du Front national ; ensuite, mettre en évidence un prétendu racisme (tout aussi fantasmatique) de notre Mouvement.” Le Pen asserts that the objections leveled against the supposed violence and racism of the FN are both defamatory and fantastical. He argues that the government and media’s rebukes constitute brutal attacks—rather than measured critiques—aiming to concentrate the ire of France upon the FN, which he portrays as a helpless scapegoat and the lone voice of reason in politics.

10 “les pseudo-autorités morales”
11 Ibid., 12-13.
Le Pen considers the media, specifically the liberal media, to have an incredibly negative impact upon politics, society, moral values, as well as the public perception of the FN. Le Pen argues that “[le] matraquage médiatique qui vise à me faire passer pour le croque-mitaine de cette fin de siècle”\(^{12}\) is one of the primary reasons for common misunderstanding and dislike of Le Pen and the FN. As Pierre Jouve and Ali Magoudi explain, he goes further still, claiming that the media challenges democracy itself: “Ainsi [Le Pen] voit-il le pouvoir médiatique s’exercer ‘sans aucune règle, sans aucune limite, sans aucun déontologie’… avec ‘risque de remettre en cause la démocratie.’ ”\(^{13}\)

According to Le Pen, the media enjoys a total lack of regulation or reproach that allows it to express whatever it likes about any topic, political party, or individual. The basis for Le Pen’s argument concerning the anti-Democratic nature of media lies primarily on his supposition of its tenebrous influence upon politics:

Mais la classe politique n’est pas seulement soumise à la classe technocratique, elle est aussi soumise à la classe médiatique. […] Celle qui part l’intermédiaire des journaux, des radios et des télévisions véhicule des valeurs. C’est elle qui a imposé un laxisme croissant en matière de mœurs et qui a rendu tabous certains sujets : l’insécurité et l’immigration dont il a été interdit de parler jusqu’à ce que le Front National réussisse à les porter sur la place politique.\(^{14}\)

In Le Pen’s consideration, the “media class”\(^{15}\) dominates the government due to its influence upon public discourse and societal values. Le Pen asserts that through the media’s undeniable, omnipresent role in daily life (newspapers, radios, television) it has effectively infiltrated the minds of the French, contesting traditional French values and restricting discourse on certain topics that it deems taboo.

\(^{12}\) Ibid., 24.
\(^{15}\) “la classe médiatique”
Le Pen engages in two strategies to distract from the accusations of the FN’s racism. On the one hand, Le Pen veils FN racism by presenting his anti-immigrant views as essential to safeguarding the French nation. On the other hand, Le Pen defends against accusations of racism by claiming that widespread media bias and the government’s libelous campaign have polluted the true image and political program of the FN. In reality, the government and media represent a threat to Le Pen because they fact-check and decry his fear-mongering, xenophobic, and racist rhetoric. Ultimately, Le Pen uses each strategy of misdirection to avoid having to directly address the actual accusation that the FN is racist.

**Le Pen’s Vague Rhetoric: Traces of the Extreme-Right**

Excluding a few instances when Le Pen has severely miscalculated the significance of a public claim (e.g. gas chambers as a “detail of World War II”), Le Pen employs calculatedly vague rhetoric. Le Pen’s intentional vagueness serves the dual purpose of conveying the racism or anti-Semitism in a statement, while protecting himself from any legal action:

Les adversaires du leader du Front national qui l’accusent d’antisémitisme ont perdu nombre de procès en diffamation en raison de ces subtilités linguistiques. Peut-on affirmer que la phrase : ‘Philippe Alexandre, qui malgré son nom et son prénom n’est pas macédonien...’ relève de l’antisémitisme ?

Le Pen has mastered voicing rhetoric that is specific enough to convey anti-Semitic or racist sentiments but vague enough to not be legally admissible as anti-Semitic or racist. In order to further defend his statements against the accusation of racism, Le Pen puts into question the existence of racism itself, twisting the definition of the term so that it

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applies only to “the French”: “Jean-Marie Le Pen ne cesse de répéter que l’antiracisme s’impose à tout le monde et qu’il n’y a pas ‘d’autre racisme en France que le racisme antifrançais.’” 17 Once again, as a defense against any accusation of his racism, Le Pen flat out challenges the existence of racism, a challenge that takes on a sinister form of discrimination when he applies it to a wider context: “Quand il affirme que ‘le racisme antifrançais est aussi condamnable que peut être le racisme antisémite ou antinoir’, il exclut logiquement les Noirs et les juifs de la ‘race française.’” 18 Le Pen shifts emphasis to le “racisme anti-français,” (or even “le racisme anti-Le Pen”) 19 and thus diminishes the severity of racism directed towards “Jews” or “Blacks.” As Jouve and Magoudi demonstrate, this phrasing of racism is also problematic because it implies an incongruity between “Frenchness” and either “Jewishness” or “Blackness.”

Over the course of his political career, Le Pen has repeatedly made libelous claims about political opponents, journalists, academics, and international leaders under the thin guise of free speech. One of Le Pen’s most common strategic defenses for his defamatory remarks is to decontextualize them:

Ainsi [Le Pen] compare-t-il Houari Boumediene à ‘Hitler qui parlait de son espace vital.’ Ainsi utilise-t-il les mots de ‘racisme antifrançais’ pour se défendre de tout racisme. Ainsi dit-il à propos de séquences télévisées diffusées par TF1 à l’occasion d’un de ses séjours en Nouvelle-Calédonie : ‘Joseph Goebbels, le ministre de la Propagande d’Hitler, ne faisait pas mieux.’ 20

Le Pen makes insulting and inaccurate allusions to historical figures responsible for condemnable enormities like Hitler and Goebbels, but in such a way as to decontextualize the force of his claims. In Le Pen’s assertion, Houari Boumediene, the Chairman of the Algerian Revolutionary Council (1965-1976) and second Algerian

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17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., 168.
19 Ibid., 162.
20 Ibid., 30 (emphasis added).
President (1976-1978), is not actually Hitler—he only shares the same ambition for territorial expansion. However, comparing Boumediene’s assistance in establishing Algerian Independence to Hitler’s theory of Lebensraum is an evident attempt to ascribe a malevolent nature to Boumediene while hinting at supposed Nazi-esque ambitions of Algeria, which now liberated, would theoretically direct its gaze towards neighboring countries. Similarly, claiming that TF1 is better at disseminating propaganda than Goebbels not only associates the television channel with the Nazi propagandist, but also trivializes Goebbels’ role in the rise and functioning of the Third Reich, distracting from the enormities in which he was complicit. As Pierre Jouve and Ali Magoudi explain: “Dans ces différents exemples, les mots sont dissociés définitivement de leur contexte. Goebbels est séparé de l’environnement nazi, Hitler de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, le racisme de la notion de violence sur une minorité (ou une majorité) qui ne détient pas le pouvoir, et du concept même du race.”

Ultimately, Le Pen’s capacity to obfuscate terms has proven one of the most dangerous components of his rhetoric.

Le Pen’s process of both decontextualizing and obscuring his definition of race is intended to distinguish the FN from extreme-Right thinkers who rarely, if ever, worried about their racist or anti-Semitic remarks being perceived for what they were. In fact, the goal of many of these historical far-Right ideologues was to explicitly underscore rather than to veil their racist, anti-Semitic, and xenophobic rhetoric. These thinkers openly and publicly expressed such sentiments in both written and oral formats. During the pre-World War II era, legal action was not taken against individuals voicing racism and anti-Semitism. In 1925, Charles Maurras made direct threats to the life of Jewish Minister of the Interior Abraham Schrameck: “It would be without hatred as without fear that I

21 Ibid., 31.
would give the order to spill your dog’s blood.”

Although Maurras was prosecuted for “threats and insults,” he was not prosecuted for anti-Semitism since French legislation forbidding anti-Semitism and racism had not yet been enacted. Further, as Eugen Weber notes—and as was quite common in similar instances—Maurras faced few legal repercussions: “Prosecuted for threats and insults, Maurras was sentenced in July 17 to two years in prison and a fine of 1,000 francs. He appealed, and on October 29, 1926, the sentence was reduced to only one year in prison; after a second appeal the sentence was confirmed but suspended on February 8, 1927. This was the fate of several other apparently severe sentences—suspension or amnesty always intervened.”

However, unlike Maurras, Le Pen cannot legally voice openly anti-Semitic and racist views.

Since the pre-World War II era of Maurras, laws have been enacted to combat anti-Semitism and racism, such as the 1972 Loi Pleven and the 1990 Loi Gayssot. The Loi Pleven prohibits written or oral incitements to racial hatred (it also prohibits preferential hiring of a French citizen, as well as general workplace discrimination) while the Loi Gayssot forbids any anti-Semitic, racist, or xenophobic statement, incitement, or action. Unsurprisingly, Le Pen has voiced repeated condemnation of the severity of these laws. He has argued that the combined effect of the Loi Gayssot and Loi Pleven will deem it racist, religiously discriminating, and legally accountable for an elected official to perform an action that peripherally concerns race or religion, such as, any legal action against an immigrant association; any expulsion of a “dangerous squatter [illegal immigrant],” any refusal of a government subsidy to a cultural or religious group; or

23 Ibid (emphasis in the original).
24 “squat dangereux”
any denial of lodging to a foreign family. The inaccuracy of Le Pen’s predicted misapplications of these laws displays the fear-mongering for which he has become so well-known: “Alors face à la menace d’une loi de guerre civile, il est temps de rappeler que ‘la liberté d’expression’ et ‘la résistance à l’oppression’ sont au cœur de la Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du citoyen inscrite dans le préambule de notre Constitution.” By presenting the enforcement of laws intended to combat racism, anti-Semitism, and xenophobia as a form of oppression capable of provoking a civil war as well as infringing on free speech, Le Pen attempts to veil the actual intention of these laws: prohibition of racist, anti-Semitic, and xenophobic rhetoric. Therefore, Le Pen’s indistinct language may actually be a direct consequence of the Loi Pleven and the Loi Gayssot, as these laws have forced him to employ more creative and vague rhetoric so as not to be legally accountable for his statements. By stating that “the liberty of tens of millions of French citizens will be threatened,” Le Pen strives towards establishing a rapprochement between himself and the average French citizen. Through his insistence upon how these laws will directly impact all French citizens’ liberty of expression, he creates a common ground between the French everyman and himself, while presenting his rhetoric as neither racist, nor anti-Semitic, nor xenophobic. Furthermore, Le Pen’s vehement opposition of the Loi Pleven and Loi Gayssot reflects his desire to enjoy—like his extreme-Right predecessor, Maurras—the overt expression of racism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism, rather than to purportedly defend freedom of speech.

Le Pen also attempts to distinguish himself from the historical extreme-Right by claiming that he never actually speaks in a racist manner. Le Pen’s defense is two-fold:

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25 Le Pen, Le Pen La Liberté, 44.
26 Ibid., 46-47 (emphasis in the original).
27 Ibid., 45: “ce sont des dizaines de millions de Français qui seront menacés dans leur liberté”
first, he claims that speaking about race does not make one racist, which is a correct statement until one realizes how Le Pen discusses race. Second, Le Pen defends his discourses on race by demonstrating that intellectuals and non-extreme-Right individuals also engage in discussions regarding race. In his “Discours à la Fête Bleu-Blanc-Rouge” on September 29 1996, Le Pen concluded a lengthy defense of a controversial claim he made regarding the inequality of races with the following question: “Est-il interdit, illégal ou immoral de parler des races? Notre constitution reconnaît pourtant leur existence, les lois aussi, le débat est constant dans le monde scientifique entre anthropologues, généticiens, sociologues.” Excepting his contention that scientists constantly debate the existence of race, Le Pen is correct: there is nothing legally or morally objectionable about recognizing and talking about race. To further support his assertion that one can talk of races, Le Pen cites André Lwoff, who was awarded the Nobel Prize in Medicine in 1965: “Selon le Prix Nobel de biologie de André Lwoff - dans une déclaration au Monde du 24/25 avril 77 : ‘Une race c’est un groupe d’individus, apparentés par intermariage par la fréquence de certains gênes. Ces ‘races,’ ces ‘groupes d’individus,’ ne sont ni égaux, ni inégaux, ils sont tout simplement différents.’” Although Le Pen cites Lwoff’s statement that races “are neither equal nor unequal,” he italicizes the adjective different, this adherence to the difference in races ultimately forms a large part of Le Pen’s rhetoric.

Le Pen’s flawed reasoning lies in his belief that talking about race equates claiming the supremacy of certain races. Le Pen reveals this error when he attempts to

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28 In this claim, which will be discussed in great depth, Le Pen confirmed to a journalist that he believed in the inequality of races.
29 Le Pen, Le Pen La Liberté, 27.
30 Ibid., 28 (emphasis in the original).
31 “ne sont ni égaux, ni inégaux”
justify his claim of inherent racial inequality by situating it in a historical context of French political discourse on racial supremacy. To do so, he cites Jules Ferry, Léon Blum, and Charles de Gaulle:

[Jules Ferry:] ‘Le devoir des peuples civilisés est de mettre dans leurs rapports avec les peuples barbares la plus grande longanimité, celle d’une race supérieure qui ne conquiert pas pour son plaisir,’ ou Léon Blum, ‘Nous admettons le droit et même le devoir des races supérieures d’attirer à elles, celles qui ne sont pas parvenues au même degré de culture et de les appeler aux progrès réalisés grâce aux efforts de la science et de l’industrie,’ ou encore Charles de Gaulle qui parlent, eux, de races supérieures. Est-il encore en France possible d’ouvrir la bouche sans être aujourd’hui vilipendé et demain poursuivi ?

It is clear that Le Pen carefully selected the three cited French politicians in order to provide cover for his own racist claims. Jules Ferry, vilified by conservatives of the late 19th century, enacted the famous Jules Ferry Laws, which, among other significant reforms, “outlawed religious training in the public schools and substituted civic education.” Further, Ferry is the reason for the establishment of the National Education system (in public schools); Le Pen has made his opinions on the inadequacies of National Education known innumerable times. Léon Blum, a reputed socialist (who was also Jewish), represented the powerful influence of Socialism in politics, an influence that Le Pen abhorred in historical and contemporary France. Finally, many far-Right conservatives, including Le Pen, detested Charles de Gaulle for successfully decolonizing the French empire. However, in the French collective memory, de Gaulle has also come to symbolize the epitome of Resistance and anti-Vichyism. Le Pen chooses these figures to justify his racist beliefs by claiming that these hugely influential historical French

32 Ibid., 27.
33 Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times: From the Enlightenment to the Present (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995), 229.
34 Le Pen, Pour la France, 21 [. . .] 26 [. . .] 32 [. . .] 143. Later in the essay, Le Pen’s dissatisfaction with the National Education system will be further detailed.
politicians shared the same views. By placing himself in the context—and in a way, highlighting an inheritance of the beliefs—of politicians not from the far-Right tradition, Le Pen hopes to redefine his character and to reduce the perceived extreme nature of the FN’s views. However, there is a fundamental oversight in Le Pen’s reasoning. The fact that other politicians, regardless of political orientation, made statements based on prejudice does not excuse the FN from its characterization as a continuation of the historical extreme-Right. Le Pen’s reliance on politicians like Ferry, Blum, and de Gaulle to defend propagating racist rhetoric rather than upon extreme-Right thinkers like Barrès and Maurras is woefully misguided.

Although Le Pen purports that the FN is distinct from the extreme-Right tradition, his rhetoric reveals otherwise. An analysis of arguably the two most important extreme-Right intellectuals, Maurice Barrès and Charles Maurras, demonstratively proves that Le Pen not only directly and incontrovertibly reiterates these thinkers’ core beliefs, but he also expands on their ideology. In fact, Le Pen frequently advocates scientific racism and revisionist history. However, to better comprehend the relation between the rhetoric of Le Pen and that of Barrès and Maurras, it is necessary to analyze the formation of the extreme-Right in the late 19th century through two key events: the Boulanger Affair and the Dreyfus Affair, both of which endowed the extreme-Right with a formerly lacking intellectual respectability.

The Boulanger and Dreyfus Affairs: the Emergence of Maurice Barrès and Charles Maurras and the Birth of the Intellectual Extreme-Right

The Boulanger Affair, which commenced in roughly the year 1887, was one of the first great threats to the integrity of the seventeen-year-old Third Republic. By 1887, the Republic was plagued by corruption, inefficiency, and a stagnant economy. The
Republic’s poor management of these issues gave rise to the emergence of a demagogue onto the political scene: General Georges Boulanger, the Minister of War. The immediate and widespread support for General Boulanger was attributable to his widespread appeal:

[General Boulanger appealed to] workers protesting the mechanization of work, to artisans reduced to the condition of employees, to small businessmen impoverished by economic crisis, to manufacturers troubled by imports of German goods, to farmers hurt by the lowering of agricultural prices, bad crops and phylloxeria, to those who had lost their savings in the crash of the Union Générale.\(^35\)

Although General Boulanger ultimately failed in his attempt to enact a coup d’état, the significant support garnered by the Boulangist movement during a time of difficulty “was an indication of the danger, perpetually lurking just below the surface of French political life, of the ability of the demagogue or the strong man by an appeal of national unity to rally around himself all those bearing resentment toward the regime.”\(^36\) In addition to heralding the age of mass politics,\(^37\) the aftermath of the Boulanger Affair produced a monarchist right that would become increasingly supportive of an authoritative ruler, a powerful army, a strengthened Church, and the end of the parliamentary system. Moreover, one of the most important, long-term effects of the Boulanger Affair would be the unprecedented emergence of a largely absent intellectual respectability, which the extreme-Right would use to defend and propagate its views.

Maurice Barrès (1862-1923) was a renowned novelist, journalist, and Boulangist politician who served as a deputy to the Chamber of Deputies from 1898 to 1893. Barrès played an essential role in the Boulanger Affair by contributing a much-needed literary

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\(^{36}\) Ibid., 23.

backing to Boulanger’s movement: “It was Maurice Barrès […] who was to give
Boulangism a dose of intellectual respectability. […] [Revanchisme], of course, was an
omnipresent theme in the new right but Barrès injected it with a new passion and a new
thirst. Boulanger’s crude rhetoric was replaced by a sophisticated and almost lyrical
approach, and pro-revenge, anti-German discourse was taken to a new plane.”

The consequences of Barrès’ contribution to Boulangism and to the literary output of the
extreme-Right, were a newfound respect for the movement as well as the support of a
greater audience: “From the moment he became politically active, Barrès brought
General Boulanger the support of the younger generation.”

The importance of the
Boulanger Affair in the history of the extreme-Right thus lies in its intellectual and
popular rebirth granted by the emergence of Barrès onto the political scene. Ultimately,
Barrès’ success in conveying extreme-Right beliefs into a popular, literary format would
have a monumental impact upon the extreme-Right—inspiring figures such as Maurras
and Le Pen—through the establishment of a concrete, intellectual grounding for
prejudiced beliefs that at their core are violent, anti-Semitic, xenophobic, and racist.

Excluding World War II, the Dreyfus Affair has come to symbolize one of the
most controversial and divisive moments in French history, pitting French citizens
against one another from October 1894 (the date of Alfred Dreyfus’ arrest) to decades
after Dreyfus’ official acquittal, rehabilitation, and reception of the Cross of the Knight
of the Legion of Honor in July 1906. The Dreyfus Affair came to represent “the struggle
between the individual and the state; between civilian government and military authority;
between the politics of parliamentary institutions and the politics of the mob; between

38 Peter Davies, The Extreme Right in France, 1789 to the Present: From de Maistre to Le Pen (London: Routledge,
2002), 67-68.
39 Sternhell, Neither Right nor Left, 254.
the belief—religious or secular—in a common humanity and the modern calculus of racism.\textsuperscript{40} The Dreyfus Affair caused an enormous rift in the French nation, from which two definitive camps emerged: the supporters of Dreyfus, “les Dreyfusards,” and the opponents of Dreyfus, “les anti-Dreyfusards.” The Dreyfus Affair led to an enormous amount of violence which manifested itself in duels (at the height of the affair, duels were reported to have been a daily occurrence), anti-Semitic attacks, attempted assassinations, suicides, intimidation, as well as general physical and verbal abuse.\textsuperscript{41} Furthermore, there were internal divisions among the Dreyfusards and the anti-Dreyfusards regarding the use of rhetoric, the political (ab)use of a development in Dreyfus’ case, or general opinions on what should be the best course of action to either help or harm Dreyfus. A range of individuals with different intentions and interests represented the constituents of each camp:

There were differing motives behind the Dreyfusards—love of abstract justice or national honor, as with Péguy, love of truth irrespective of the consequences, as with Picquart, antimilitarism, which had been growing since Boulanger, and reaction against the nationalist, clerical, and anti-Semitic threats. […] The anti-revisionist [anti-Dreyfusard] belief, partly the crystallization of anti-intellectual reaction to the excessive faith in science of the nineteenth century, was in large measure a desire to maintain the order of traditional authorities.\textsuperscript{42}

The results of the Dreyfus Affair were widespread and long lasting. In the short term it deepened mistrust among the Left regarding the army and the Church, which would lead to measures reducing the Church’s influence in society as well as in the army ranks (the Dreyfus Affair also contributed to the landmark loi de 1905 which separated Church and

\textsuperscript{40} Michael Burns, \textit{France & the Dreyfus Affair: A Documentary History} (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1999), viii.
\textsuperscript{41} Curtis, \textit{Three Against the Third Republic}, 35.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 36.
Ultimately, the Dreyfus Affair is relevant to understanding the FN because the divisions between the liberal Dreyfusards, and the conservative, often far-Right anti-Dreyfusards, highlighted the priorities of the extreme-Right. These priorities defined the major themes—racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, authoritarianism, nationalism, patriotism, sacrifice, blood, soil—of extreme-Right ideology that have persisted to this day.

Charles Maurras (1868-1952) was a prolific poet, journalist, political theorist, and temporary member of the Académie Française. Throughout his literary career, Maurras espoused monarchist, ultra-nationalist, xenophobic, and anti-Semitic views that would significantly impact extreme-Right ideologues. The Dreyfus Affair is relevant for understanding Maurras’ influence upon future generations like Le Pen because it signaled his entrance into French political life when he famously defended Colonel Henry, following the officer’s suicide in 1898:

Know that along with your precious blood, the first French blood shed by the Dreyfus Affair, there is not a single drop that does not still steam wherever the heart of the nation beats. […] Before long, in Paris, in your village, monuments to expiate our cowardice will rise from the soil of the fatherland. […] Your ill-starred ‘forgery’ will be counted among your best feats of war, and that which is most lamentable, its failure, has been paid and overpaid by your blood. In your memory, my colonel, count on the French to redeem that excess of noble blood.

In this passage one detects the essential elements of extreme-Right ideology: notions of fatherland, patriotism, blood, soil, martyrdom, the supremacy of the Nation over the individual, the integrity of the Nation to be defended by any means, including forgery. The Dreyfus Affair, like the Boulanger Affair, provided the extreme-Right with a

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43 Wright, *France in Modern Times*, 244.
44 Maurras was elected to the Académie Française in 1938. Following his sentencing to life imprisonment and national degradation in 1945, Maurras was excluded from the Académie Française.
45 Burns, *France & the Dreyfus Affair*, 122-123.
provocative, literary intellectual: Charles Maurras. Furthermore, the legacy of the Dreyfus Affair has survived in the collective memory of the extreme-Right: during his sentencing to life imprisonment and national degradation after World War II, Maurras exclaimed, “C’est la revanche de Dreyfus!”;46 years later, Le Pen described his “persecutors” (those who criticized him for his gas chamber comment) as having “put in place ‘a Le Pen Affair just like the Dreyfus Affair.’ ”47

At the height of the Dreyfus Affair in 1898, Charles Maurras, Léon Daudet, and Maurice Pujo founded the Action Française movement. Eventually, Maurras would represent and lead both the Action Française movement and newspaper. The Action Française newspaper, which ran from March 21 1908 until August 24 1944, disseminated the extreme-Right views and theories of Maurras, Daudet, and Pujo, among other ideologues of the far-Right. Over its thirty-six year span, it amassed a large and fiercely loyal readership from all strata of society: manual laborers, students, doctors, politicians, royalists, Catholic priests, army officers, and intellectuals such as Marcel Proust, André Gide, Anatole France, Joachim Gasquet, and Augustin Cochin.48 The newspaper often either endorsed or incited violence49 and was considered by the police and government to have a dangerous influence upon society.50 The controversial nature of the views espoused in the Action Française newspaper eventually led Pope Pius XI to place it (as well as all of Maurras’ works) on the Catholic Church’s Index Librorum Prohibitorum from December 29 1926 until July 7 1939.51 In short, the Action Française newspaper had a profound influence upon politics, culture, literature, and the French public during a

46 Weber, Action Française, 475.
47 Jouve and Magoudi, Les dits et les non-dits, 133.
“mis en place ‘une affaire Le Pen comme il y eut une affaire Dreyfus.’ ”
48 Weber, Action Française, 111.
49 Ibid., 141 […] 160.
50 Ibid., 43 […] 101 […] 106.
51 Ibid., 235 […] 251.
formative period covering the pre-World War I years through the Interwar period and the Vichy era. Therefore, as the leader of the Action Française movement and newspaper, Maurras would become the definitive porte-parole of the extreme-Right, exercising a considerable influence during the Vichy regime:

When Maurras and Pujo were tried at Lyon in January 1945, part of the indictment concerned the ‘preponderant’ influence Maurras had exercised over French thought during the preceding few years: ‘Maurras’s articles are quoted on the radio every day, reprinted in all the papers, circulated abroad, to the extent that a great many people who never bought a single copy of the Action française know every day what Maurras, who reflects the Marshal’s thought, is thinking.’

Maurras’ profound influence upon the ideology and thought of Vichy speaks to his immense legacy, which commenced with his emergence on the political scene as a young anti-Dreyfusard. Building upon the ideological groundwork laid by Barrès, Maurras was arguably the first extreme-Right ideologue to effectively employ print media as a way of propagating theories and ideas that would influence generations of extreme-Right figures from Pétain to Jean-Marie Le Pen.

National Identity: déracinement, les quatre États confédérés, and l’anti-France

Maurice Barrès placed great stake in providing a definition of French national identity. Ultimately he described it as an amalgam of land, blood, death, historical tradition, and one’s enracinement (rootedness)—or lack thereof—in French culture. Le déracinement (un/uprootedness) was arguably the most important component of Barrès’ definition of the French identity. In the logic of rootedness, the ideal French citizen had metaphorical roots not only in France, but also in his/her specific region and town or city of birth. The strong regionalism expressed by rootedness speaks to Barrès’ lifelong

52 Weber, Action Française, 442.
struggle with the question of identity. Barrès was born in Lorraine and experienced the Prussian invasion at the age of eight. The invasion of Lorraine marked Barrès for life and significantly contributed to his formulation of the concepts of individual identity (Self) and national identity (collective Self): “Lorraine exemplifies the ideal collective Self in Barrès’s terms, not because it has remained identical to itself and unscarred throughout the ages, but rather because it ‘was born by constituting itself as a homeland through an effort against foreigners.’”

For Barrès, the importance of Lorraine lay in its capacity to remain a home for the true, rooted Lorrains (the inhabitants of Lorraine) regardless of border changes and military invasions. Rather than undermine the integrity of Lorraine or diminish the rootedness of its inhabitants, such military invasions in fact strengthened the regional identity. In Barrès’ view, rootedness thus became a complete manifestation of French identity because it reflected an aspect of the wider community while also representing incredibly strong ties to one’s specific locality.

Barrès’ obsession with regionalism and rootedness constituted his theory of *la terre et les morts* (the soil/earth and the dead). For Barrès, since one’s region, “the earth,” was crucial to individual and collective identity, it was worth dying for: “The earth gave him [Barrès] the *racinement* which was essential to preserve tradition and encourage development. […] The heritage from the past had to be preserved and passed on to others. [Barrès:] ‘The soul which today lives in me is made of thousands of dead, and that sum, increased by the best of myself, will survive me when I am dead and forgotten.’”

In Barrès’ estimation, tradition was the natural consequence of rootedness, which was formed by the region’s soil as well those who had died on this land. Therefore, those

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54 Curtis, *Three Against the Third Republic*, 113.
who perished defending Lorraine during the Prussian invasion, as well as those who died during times of peace—while rebelling after the annexation of Lorraine—were shining examples of rootedness. It is for this reason that Barrès considered that the Lorraine collective Self was the result of its inhabitants’ “effort against foreigners”: their readiness to die on the soil of Lorraine in order to repel the Prussians during times of war and peace.

Inherent in the logic of déracinement lies a fundamental discrimination against those who are considered to lack French roots. As Peter Davies explains, “‘Rootedness’ implies stability and loyalty and is viewed as the key to a happy and prosperous nation; this is contrasted with ‘unrootedness’ (déracinement). Barrès was contemptuous of the ‘unrooted’ (les déracinés) and portrayed the Jews as a particularly non-rooted people.”

Therefore, the uprooted individual is not only incompatible with a notion of “Frenchness,” but also presents a risk to the French nation as an invasive species. This perspective is strongly illustrated by Barrès in his description of Alfred Dreyfus:

[Dreyfus is] the deracinated individual who feels ill at ease in one of the plots of your old French garden … because he had no roots that associated him strongly enough with the soil and conscience of France to keep him from looking for his happiness, his peace, his life, in foreign lands. I don’t need to be told why Dreyfus betrayed. Psychologically speaking, it is enough for me to know that he is capable of betraying to know that he betrayed. The gap is filled in. That Dreyfus is capable of betraying, I conclude from his race.

It suffices that Dreyfus be Jewish for him to be a treacherous déraciné. In Barrès’ estimation, it would be impossible for Dreyfus to be a true Frenchman, in spite of the fact that he was born in Alsace, was similarly marked by the Prussian invasion (which he experienced at the age of eleven), and specifically joined the army as a result of the 1871

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55 Davies, The Extreme Right in France, 70.
56 Carroll, French Literary Fascism, 28.
French defeat and subsequent Prussian annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. “Guilty by association” clearly sums up the danger presented by the déraciné in Barrès’ view. The existence of any doubt, however farfetched it might be, incontrovertibly proves the guilt of the déraciné. Barrès’ theory of déracinement fundamentally influenced Maurras’ “Integral Nationalism,” a concept similarly based in notions of blood, land, and place of birth, the antagonist of which Maurras dubbed the anti-France.

Maurras’ theory of Integral Nationalism largely built on Barrès’ theory of déracinement, which Maurras rebranded as the anti–France. The anti–France first emerged as a component in Maurras’ ideology in the July 6 1912 edition of the Action Française newspaper. In an article entitled “Hospitality,” Maurras discussed how “the nationalist crisis” commences with the “professional crisis,” which itself is created when the young French doctor, blue-collar worker, employee, and farmer all realize that they cannot find employment because “l’Allemand, l’Italien, le Suisse, le Belge, le Polonais, le Juif leur font la guerre économique dans les rue de Paris, ou sur les chantiers de Marseille, dans les campagnes du nord ou dans les usines de l’est.” Further, Maurras argued that in addition to being manipulated and at an economic disadvantage, the true Frenchman was powerless to act since the nation had become invaded by a coalition of foreign elements:

Par en haut, par en bas, le Français est bloqué. Il ne perd plus beaucoup de temps à se plaindre, car si haut que puisse monter sa réclamation, il voit qu’elle est soumise avant d’être écoutée, à quelque délégué des quatre États confédérés, – juif, protestant, maçon, métèque – avec qui s’identifie nécessairement le pouvoir réel.

Maurras believed that the Frenchmen had become a foreigner in his own country, that he had lost his position of power due to an invasion of foreigners—of déracinés, of the

57 “L’hospitalité”; “la crise nationaliste”; “la crise professionnelle”
59 Ibid (emphasis added).
anti-France. It is worth noting that the quatre États confédérés (the four confederate States) consisted primarily of non-Catholics and of those deemed unworthy to share a part of French identity. Maurras’ coined the pejorative term métèque in order to create a wider vocabulary with which to discriminate against members of the quatre États confédérés: “In December 1894, in an article in Barrès’ journal, La Cocarde, Maurras introduced the word “métèque” into the French language (it was officially admitted by the Academy in 1927), meaning by it a recently domiciled or naturalized guest or his children.”60 In Maurras’ future writings, the supposed quatre États confédérés would become an increasingly sinister force responsible for contributing to decadence, oppression of true French citizens, and perversion of the French nation, values, and collective identity.

Maurras considered that each État confédéré had a different manner of weakening France: “They were the ‘États Confédérés,’ the masons, cosmopolitan and servile; the Protestants, Swiss, English, and Germans who influenced through their thought; the Jews, who were powerful through their money; and the métèques, who connived.”61 The quatre États confédérés thus formed a strong, international, conspiring coalition—whose obsequious and sinister influence infringed upon French thought and economics—bent upon ruining the French people, hence their status as the anti-France.

Maurras was quite specific in the way he described and explained the phenomenon of the ‘Anti-France.’ He questioned the loyalty of the four groups he identified and said they embraced what he called ‘constitutional patriotism.’ […] Maurras defined this creed [Integral Nationalism] as ‘the exclusive pursuit of national policies.’ […] Love of France had to be unconditional, not conditional.62

Individuals who embodied Integral Nationalist principles of absolute, unconditional love and devotion to France were definitively French in Maurras’ view. Integral Nationalists

60 Curtis, Three Against the Third Republic, 206.
61 Ibid.
62 Davies, The Extreme Right in France, 84.
were thus the anti-Dreyfusards who supported France during the Dreyfus Affair, as well as the Boulangists, who were opposed to parliamentary corruption and inefficiency.

Maurras defined Patriotism and Nationalism as co-dependent states of being:

Patriotisme s’est toujours dit de la piété envers le sol national, la terre des ancêtres et, par extension naturelle, le territoire historique d’un peuple : la vertu qu’il désigne s’applique surtout à la défense du territoire contre l’Etranger. […] Nationalisme s’applique en effet, plutôt qu’à la Terre des Pères, aux Pères eux-mêmes, à leur sang et à leurs œuvres, à leur héritage moral et spirituel, plus encore que matériel.”

For Maurras, Patriotism and Nationalism were completely tied to Barrès’ theory of la terre et les morts. Patriotism relied on a pious devotion to “the soil” which France’s ancestors—died for and—defended from “the Foreigner.” Thus, Maurras’ conception of Patriotism and Nationalism sharply recall Barrès’ consideration of the defense of Lorraine against the Prussians as indicative of rootedness; in a manner evoking Barrès’ contention that “the soul which today lives in me is made of thousands of dead.” Maurras believed that the soil and blood of France’s dead fathers formed contemporary French identity.

Maurras contributed to Barrès’ theories—specifically upon the latter’s firm attachment to family, fatherland, and the eternal nation—to such an extent that they visibly permeated throughout his writings, such as in the section “La Patrie” (Fatherland) of Mes Idées Politiques:

Quand on comprend qu’une patrie a pour fonction de résister aux orages du Temps, quand on conçoit la nation, comme Barrès, ainsi qu’« une chose éternelle », quand on sait que la France n’est pas une réunion d’individus qui votent, mais un corps de familles qui vivent, les objections de principe s’évanouissent et le sens historique réclame comme nécessité ou convenance ce qui semblait d’abord faire difficulté.

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63 Charles Maurras, Mes Idées Politiques (Paris: Fayard, 1937), 286 (emphases added).
64 Curtis, Three Against the Third Republic, 113.
65 Maurras, Mes Idées Politiques, 279.
Maurras relied upon Barrès’ writings in order to support his explanation of the nation and the family as “an eternal entity.”

Melding family with nation consequently lent itself to a specific definition of Frenchness, especially if one believed that France was not an “agglomerate of individuals who vote, but a community of families who live.” Through this definition, Maurras excluded the anti-France, such as Jewish déracinés, from the French nation; that is to say, although Dreyfus was an individual who could vote, in Maurras’ view, this would be irrelevant since he did not constitute part of the French family, and thus, was the anti-France. Therefore, like Barrès, Maurras had a specific definition of the French identity, which relied heavily on underscoring those who belonged—the Catholic, unconditionally patriotic racinés—and those who did not belong, the anti-France: the non-Catholic, foreign déracinés.

Barrès’ first text to elaborate on the theory of déracinement and the great ills that accompanied it was Les Déracinés. In this novel, Barrès indicated the danger in Professor Bouteiller’s lack of foresight when he decided to relocate seven of his best students from their school in a small town in Lorraine to Paris:

À la façon d’un masseur qui traite les muscles de son client d’après le tempérament qu’il lui voit, le professeur devrait approprir son enseignement à ces natures de Lorrains et aux diversités qu’elles présentent! C’est un système que M. Bouteiller n’examine même pas. Déraciner ces enfants, les détacher du sol et du groupe social où tout les relie, pour les placer hors de leurs préjugés dans la raison abstraite, comment cela le gênerait-il, lui qui n’a pas de sol, ni de société, ni, pense-t-il, de préjugés?

For Barrès, M. Bouteiller was the quintessential déraciné who was unaware of the negative consequences of “uprooting” his students since he had no attachment to either soil or society. Rather than instruct the students according to how he saw fit, M. Bouteiller...

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66 “une chose éternelle”
67 “réunion d’individus qui votent, mais un corps de familles qui vivent”
should have instead modified his teaching to suit the “Lorraine nature.” Moreover, “detaching these children from their land and social group,” presented a fundamental problem for Barrès since it would place them “outside of their prejudices.” Thus, in this view, prejudice, specifically prejudice against the land and social groups of those unlike oneself, was considered essential to national identity. In other words, removal from their place of origin weakened the children and rendered them more susceptible to the influence and ideas of others, of non-French déracinés.

Although it might not seem surprising that Jean-Marie Le Pen would reiterate themes stemming from Barrès’ theory of déracinement, the extent to which he replicates the language of rootedness exposes the influence of Barrès upon Le Pen. Le Pen adopts a nearly identical perspective concerning the danger of déracinement as Barrès does in Les Déracinés. Le Pen finds that the process of déracinement can also occur due to a lack of enracinement. That is to say, Le Pen considers that if an individual has been poorly instructed from a young age, they will be especially susceptible to losing their identity. Le Pen repeatedly voices his disdain for the National Education system, which, he believes, fails to teach the disciplines of enracinement: “De même, l’enseignement des disciplines d’enracinement comme l’histoire et la géographie a été sciemment détruit par disparition pure et simple dans le cycle primaire, par dissolution de l’enseignement chronologique (telle époque) et territorial (tel pays) dans l’enseignement secondaire.” Le Pen believes that French children who are not learning disciplines of enracinement, such as history and geography, will be at a complete loss: “Dans le même temps, l’identité nationale est mise en cause. L’histoire, la langue, la culture de notre pays sont de moins en moins bien

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69 “les détacher du sol et du groupe social”
70 “hors de leurs préjugés”
71 Le Pen, Pour la France, 143-144 (emphasis added).
connues et maîtrisées par les jeunes générations qui subissent de plein fouet l’échec de l’éducation nationale." Throughout, “Section XI: Séparer l’Ecole de l’État” (“Separate School from the State”) of Pour La France: Programme du Front National (1985), Le Pen repeatedly stresses the importance of a firm knowledge of the geography of the French territory, regions, and departments, recalling a Barrèsian obsession with la terre et les morts. The number of times that Le Pen underscores the importance of enracinement throughout his works, and especially in Pour La France, demonstrates the irrefutable presence of Barrès in Le Pen’s writings; this presence is evident, whether Le Pen is critiquing the education system for not teaching “l’enracinement national” or the Left for privileging “la rupture avec les valeurs traditionnelles pour couper les citoyens de leurs racines et les déposséder de leur identité.” For Le Pen, the Left perverts traditional French values, consequently severing the French from their roots and robbing them of their identity; in short, the Left acts in as irresponsible and dangerous a manner as Monsieur Bouteiller in Barrès’ Les Déracinés.

Furthermore, when Le Pen mentions the necessity of “l’acquisition d’une culture et d’une morale civique indispensable à l’enracinement des citoyens et à la fraternité des Français au sein de la Nation (l’enseignement de l’histoire et de la littérature française est essentiel),” he argues that the formation of French rootedness lies in a civic culture and morality based on an inherited tradition. When Le Pen urges “la redécouverte des racines et non la table rase,” he directly critiques the French State and the National Education system for having neglected traditional French values to such an extent that French roots

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72 Ibid., 26.
73 Ibid., 171.
74 Ibid., 166.
75 Ibid., 147 (emphasis added).
76 Ibid., 171 (emphasis added).
must be “rediscovered.” According to Le Pen, France is on the verge of forgetting its heritage due to the grossly negligent policies of the decadent National Education system run by the French State: “Pour le Front National, l’Etat a pour mission de défendre la langue, la culture, la patrimoine, les traditions, y compris morales, de la nation. Défendre, c’est-à-dire protéger et étendre et pour cela prendre parti pour la vie, pour l’enracinement, pour la continuité, pour l’inscription du futur dans le passé.”

Le Pen considered that the French state headed by Socialist François Mitterrand had failed to properly root French citizens in the tradition, culture, and soil of France, thereby “cutting the citizens’ roots and stripping them of their identity.”

Xenophobia imbued with notions of déracinement and anti-France is one of the strongest elements in Le Pen’s discourse that recalls both Barrès and Maurras. In “Chapter IX: Immigration: National Preference” of Pour La France, Le Pen begins his subsection, “Immigration degrades the daily life of the French,” with the following Barrèsian description of the negative consequences of immigration: “Dans la réalité de tous les jours, le heurt des cultures est parfois difficile à supporter. Encore faut-il ajouter que le déracinement des populations étrangères débouche sur une délinquance grave.” To Le Pen, the interaction of different cultures, which alone is already difficult to tolerate, creates tension; he asserts that these cultures are inherently at odds with that of France. In addition to the supposedly inherent incompatibility of the French and the anti-French, stands Le Pen’s contention that these deracinated immigrants are more prone to delinquency simply because they are foreign—the logic being that they are likely to commit crime because they are déracinés, and thus unfamiliar with French culture and

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77 Ibid., 170-171 (emphasis added).
78 “couper les citoyens de leurs racines et les déposséder de leur identité”
79 “L’immigration dégrade la vie quotidienne des Français”
80 Ibid., 111 (emphasis added).
laws. Le Pen’s belief in unequivocal immigrant delinquency recalls Barrès’ presumed guilt of Dreyfus based solely on his status as a *déraciné*. In Le Pen’s view, since immigrants have been uprooted from their cultures and countries, they have absolutely no allegiance to—or care for—France. Thus, without openly dubbing immigrants the *anti-France*, Le Pen implicitly equates the two.

Le Pen elaborates on the theme of the incompatibility between France and the *anti-France* in the following terms: “[Le government] n’a pas voulu reconnaître que c’est la cohabitation d’hommes et de femmes aux cultures, aux mœurs, aux modes de vie différents et souvent incompatibles avec les habitudes de vie des Français qui crée le mal des grands ensembles.”81 In short, the reason for tension in public housing communities is a result of the interaction between the French and uprooted immigrants. Simply put, Le Pen believes that heterogeneity creates conflict. Le Pen extends his anti-immigrant argument to make the following claim: “Il ne faut pas s’y tromper: c’est l’existence même du peuple français qui est en cause. Il n’était pas nécessaire de mobiliser la France contre l’Allemagne en 1914 et en 1940, si nous devons tolérer aujourd’hui une invasion – provisoirement pacifique – du territoire national.”82 In a direct replication of the notions of *déracinement* and *anti-France*, Le Pen argues that immigration threatens “the existence of the French people” culturally and physically as much as war. Further, Le Pen compares immigration to a secretive invasion of France, comparable to the German invasions in World War I and World War II. Le Pen draws his audience’s attention to an especially tender part of French history: the invasion of France by Germany, which occurred three times in a span of seventy years (1870, 1914, and 1940). Le Pen’s tactic of recalling separate invasions of France during a time of peace evokes Barrès’ *la terre et les morts*. Recall that

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81 Ibid., 111.
82 Ibid., 113 (emphasis added).
when Barrès formulated his theory of *la terre et les morts*, Alsace-Lorraine had been annexed but France and Prussia were no longer at war; Barrès developed his theory at a time of peace to specifically incite the French to reassert their rootedness by rebelling against the occupying uprooted Prussians: “The deracinated are both the exterior enemy, the foreigners or barbarians, and the interior enemy, those in France who serve the foreign, either knowingly or unknowingly.”

Similarly, Le Pen makes allusions to World War I and World War II to argue that although France is currently at peace with the immigrants, they constitute a latent threat—since they represent, knowingly or not, “the interior enemy [...] who serve the foreign”—to French rootedness; thus, immigrants must be rebelled against. Therefore, Le Pen’s insinuation that immigrants are invading France like the Germans in World War I and World War II, is a direct evocation of Barrès’ notion of *la terre et les morts*. That is to say, at a time of peace Le Pen recalls when France lost a considerable amount of land and suffered widespread death at the hands of foreign invaders in order to rouse in his audience a mixed feeling of pride and shame that he hopes will manifest itself in anti-immigrant sentiment and action.

Le Pen’s rhetoric also echoes Maurras’ fear of the *quatre États confédérés*, specifically the *métèque*. For Maurras, the *métèque* signified “a recently domiciled or naturalized guest or his children” —a definition that can broadly be applied to any immigrant in Le Pen’s discourse. Though Le Pen never overtly uses the pejorative term *métèque* to refer to immigrants, his characterization of the latter as being invasive, violent, criminal, excessively fertile, racially unequal, and having exorbitant

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84 Curtis, *Three Against the Third Republic*, 206.
85 Le Pen, *Pour la France*, 111.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
influence over the economy, politics, and the French identity, indicates a strong correlation with Maurras; Le Pen’s “violent invader” is just like Maurras’ “conniving métèque.” If the veiled reiteration of métèque were not enough, Le Pen defends against accusations of FN racism while employing damning rhetoric: “Le Front national tient un langage de bon sens. C’est lui qui se trouve traité de ‘raciste’, alors qu’il ne demande qu’une chose : que les Français restent maîtres chez eux.” The notion of “remaining masters” in France contains a number of allusions, one of the most notable concerning the colonialist rhetoric of the Poujadist movement (l’Union de défense des commerçants et artisans: UDCA), a short-lived, populist, anti-system party: “With no discernable ideology and only a rag-bag of policy ideas, UDCA leaders had to mix and match. [Jean-Pierre] Rioux talks about the ‘almost desperate… mobilisation of any theme likely to make their voices heard: anti-parliamentarism, hostility to Paris and the technocrats, protest over taxation, a defence of l’Algérie Française.’” Le Pen was an important member of the Poujadist movement during the Algerian War of Independence, and began his political career running on the Poujadist ticket: “Le Pen had been a paratrooper in Algeria and a loyal supporter of the anti-independence movement. He also became a leading light in the Poujadist movement and in 1956, on the UDCA ticket, became the youngest-ever parliamentary deputy.” Therefore, although Le Pen never openly voices terms such as anti-France and métèque, his coded rhetoric mirrors Maurras’ ideological beliefs, as Peter Davies illustrates:

88 Ibid., 112-113.
89 Le Pen, Le Pen La Liberté, 24.
90 Le Pen, Pour la France, 122.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 Le Pen, Le Pen La Liberté, 49.
94 Davies, The Extreme Right in France, 132.
95 Ibid., 133.
What we can say is that in 1940 the political ideas of Maurras acted as a guiding force for Pétain, and it is also true that many activists in the modern-day Front National (FN) look upon the founder [Maurras] of the AF [Action Française] as a prophet. Here the notion of 'Anti-France' has been especially important, informing and impacting upon nationalist movements for almost a century.  

**Scientific Racism**

Although Le Pen evidently reiterates Barrèsian-Maurrassian preoccupation with national identity—evoking terms such as *la terre et les morts*, *enracinement*, *anti-France*, and *métèque*—he diverges from his predecessors on the subject of scientific racism. Whether one considers that cultural racism is comparatively less objectionable than scientific racism, Maurras and Barrès did not espouse the latter, whereas Le Pen supplements Maurrassian-Barrèsian cultural racism with a scientifically racist grounding. Despite the virulent anti-Semitism and xenophobia expressed by Barrès and Maurras, they engaged in a form of cultural racism that did not ground its arguments in “scientific fact.” In Barrèsian ideology, the “culte de moi” (the cult of the Self) first begins on an individual level, then shifts to a larger National Self, at which point a definitive national identity is firmly established. Ultimately, this transformation develops into cultural racism in Barrès’ discourse. That is to say, the National Self serves to distinguish those who are part of the French Self, *les racinés*, as opposed to those who are excluded from it, *les déracinés*: “The other, the barbarian, constantly menaces the Self and must be ‘hated’ and constantly combatted.” However, as Michael Curtis explains, “Barrès agreed with Maurras in much of their analysis of nationalism, in the rejection of an emphasis on race. [...] He [Barrès] agreed that there were a French type, an English type, a German type, but not a race. Peoples were products of history. For Barrès there was no French race, but a

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96 Ibid., 87-88.
97 Carroll, *French Literary Fascism*, 23.
French nation which continued to develop every day.”

Although the danger and virulence of xenophobia—as well as primarily basing one’s understanding of people as “products of history”—should not be diminished, the lack of biological racism in Barrès’ and Maurras’ writings should be noted: “The AF leader [Maurras] was as pro-revenge and as anti-German as anyone else on the far right but, nevertheless, he did not feel the need to resort to notions of ‘blood’ or ‘race.’”

To be sure, cultural racism is exclusionary, objectionable, and malevolent, but it does not carry the same weight as scientific racism, which grounds its hateful views with pseudo-scientific claims. The dangerous assumption latent in scientific racism is that “inferior races” are at a hopelessly lower evolutionary stage than “superior races,” and are thus less intelligent and less human, furthermore, inherent in this understanding lies the belief that an “inferior race” will contaminate a “superior race” if they have any offspring.

Le Pen has articulated elements of scientific racism in his descriptions of races’ relative evolutionary histories. As mentioned earlier, after confirming that he believed in the inequality of races, Le Pen cited biologist André Lwoff’s definition of race to demonstrate that it is acceptable to openly talk about races: “‘Ces ‘races,’ ces ‘groupes d’individus,’ ne sont ni égaux, ni inégaux, ils sont tout simplement différents.’”

Although Le Pen cites Lwoff’s affirmation that races “are neither equal, nor unequal,” he italicizes Lwoff’s usage of the word different. Although this distinction might not seem problematic at first glance, it becomes so when one realizes that Le Pen correlates norms of sexual development and activity with evolutionary history and intelligence. In a discussion comparing the sexual development of what Le Pen describes as temperate

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100 Le Pen, *Le Pen La Liberté*, 28 (emphasis in the original).
countries (Western Europe) versus non-temperate countries (North Africa), he pairs sexual activity with intelligence: “‘Je pense que la chance qui était donnée aux natifs des pays tempérés d’avoir une sexualité relativement retardée expliquait, sans doute, le développement intellectuel de nos civilisations. Depuis, nous avons régressé, et sommes revenus à une certaine barbarie.’”¹⁰¹ The implicit scientifically racist assumption here is that the historically delayed sexual activity of “our civilizations” (Western European countries), explains a supposed superior intellectual development of Europeans over the “prematurely sexually active” North Africans. Furthermore, asserting that France has become barbaric due to the rise of premature sexual activity carries two assumptions: 1) non-Western European countries are barbaric; 2) France’s increasingly premature sexual activity must be a result of the growing number (due to lax immigration laws) of sexual interactions between the temperate French and the non-temperate immigrants. As Pierre Jouve and Ali Magoudi explain, “Les dangers inhérents à la pratique de rapports sexuels précoces et libres des entraves qui ont pesé sur eux [the immigrants] pendant des siècles sont, selon Le Pen, la décadence et le retour à la barbarie. Il pose aussi une série d’équivalences : sexualité = décadence, décadence = comportements sexuels des pays non tempérés, décadence = envahissement par l’étranger.”¹⁰² Le Pen’s equivalences indicate the pernicious nature of scientific racism. In his assertion of how immigrants barbarize France—and thus diminish “the intellectual development of our civilizations”—through their sexual influence, one detects strong elements of scientific racism prevalent in the theories of 19th century Social Darwinists like Arthur de Gobineau: “The world of art and great literature that comes from the mixture of blood, the improvement and ennoblement of inferior races—all these are wonders for which we must needs be thankful. The small have been raised. Unfortunately, the great have been

¹⁰¹ Jouve and Magoudi, Les dits et les non-dits, 73 (emphases added).
¹⁰² Ibid., 73-74 (emphasis added).
lowered by the same process; and this is an evil that nothing can balance or repair.”

Le Pen echoes de Gobineau’s assertion that the mixing of “inferior races” with “superior races” leads to an irreparable evil when he equates the sexual influence of immigrants upon the French to a “regression to barbarism.”


Unsurprisingly, this response—alluding to a racial hierarchy based on a supposed unequal evolutionary history—provoked an enormous amount of outrage from French citizens as well as public institutions such as Le CRIF (Conseil représentatif des institutions juives de France) which decried “la montée en puissance du discours de Jean-Marie Le Pen qui, par petites touches successives, est en train de progresser dans l’expression du racisme qu’on n’avait pas entendu dans toute l’Europe depuis 1945.”

However, as is Le Pen’s wont, rather than admit his racism, he went on to defend his statement in his speech at the annual FN event, “La Fête des Bleu-Blanc-Rouge”:

J’avais répondu ‘oui’ [à la question du journaliste], parce que cela [l’inégalité des races] me paraissait évident, comme à l’immense majorité des Français, même si cela n’avait aucun rapport avec la conférence de presse. Il me semblait que j’en avais le droit puisque ne touchant pas aux sujets

104 “le retour à la barbarie”
Once again, Le Pen defends his overt racism by appealing to freedom of speech and expression, while attempting to assert that “the vast majority of the French”\(^{108}\) share his opinion. Furthermore, by arguing that he did not perceive his “widely shared” opinion to be a taboo subject, Le Pen attempts to decontextualize his racist claim. Le Pen’s decontextualization serves as a way to argue that those who object to his assertion are simply overreacting since the subject in question is not taboo.

After this decontextualization, Le Pen attempts to distract from the flagrant racism his claim carries:\(^{109}\) “Outre que je n’ai fait que constater une évidence qui éclate aux yeux de tous, je n’ai, moi jamais affirmé la supériorité globale d’une race sur une autre. Je n’ai de surcroît bien sûr jamais professé à l’égard de quelque race que ce soit de mépris ou de haine, termes qui sont étrangers à mes discours, mais omniprésents dans la bouche de ceux qui nous attaquent.”\(^{110}\) Le Pen’s assertion that he neither affirms “the global superiority of a race” nor professes “scorn or hatred towards any race,” is a gross manipulation of his rhetoric, especially if one recalls his comments regarding the superior intellectual development of the inhabitants of “temperate countries.” Le Pen does not need to express blatant scorn or hatred towards a race to convey racist sentiments; by stating that races are evidently unequal due to evolutionary lapses, Le Pen absolutely voices scientific racism. Le Pen’s defense that he is innocent because he did not explicitly voice the superiority of a specific race is tenuous at best since it denies the implicit suggestions in


\(^{108}\) “l’immense majorité des Français”

\(^{109}\) As argued earlier, after decontextualizing his claim, Le Pen argues that the term “race” appears in French Law. Then, he lengthily analyzes the writings of politicians who were not of the extreme-Right (Charles de Gaulle, Jules Ferry, and Léon Blum) and of biologist André Lwoff, who was awarded the Nobel Prize in Medicine in 1965.

his racist rhetoric. Asserting that a race has neither “the same capacity nor the same level of evolutionary history”\(^{111}\) dehumanizes that race on the basis of pseudoscientific grounding. Le Pen’s publicly expressed beliefs are directly in line with evolutionary racism dating back to 19\(^{th}\) century Social Darwinists like de Gobineau.

To be clear, Le Pen’s scientific racism marks an explicit departure from Barrèsian and Maurrassian ideology. Just as in Barrèsian discourse—“‘Race’ is not a natural, biological concept, therefore, but a cultural ideal that must be created and then vigorously protected”\(^{112}\)—Maurras expressed the same “war[iness] of the idea of race.”\(^{113}\) As Michael Curtis explains, for Maurras, “‘Race’ in biology was far from corresponding to ‘race’ in history and politics, and there were laws of human society different from those of biology. […] It was not surprising to find Maurras denouncing Gobineau, who had placed the Aryan race so high in his hierarchy, as ‘inept, false, lying.’ ”\(^{114}\) Maurras’ condemnation of de Gobineau stands in juxtaposition to Le Pen’s de Gobineau-esque assertion of the evolutionarily-grounded superiority of the temperate Western European countries, as well as his claim that races have neither “the same capacity nor the same level of evolutionary history.” Although Maurras contends in Mes Idées Politiques that “il est vrai que la nationalité n’est pas une phénomène de race,”\(^{115}\) it would seem that for Le Pen, nationality is fundamentally a phenomenon of race. Le Pen borrows the Barrèsian-Maurrassian attachment to historico-cultural racism and injects it with scientific racism.

Ultimately, Le Pen’s fusion of scientific racism with Barrès’ and Maurras’ historico-cultural racism may be just as malevolent and hateful in practice as the latter’s

\(^{111}\) “la même capacité ni le même niveau d’évolution historique”
\(^{112}\) Carroll, French Literary Fascism, 26.
\(^{113}\) Curtis, Three Against the Third Republic, 214.
\(^{114}\) Ibid (emphasis added).
\(^{115}\) Maurras, Mes Idées Politiques, 283.
“science-free” racism. However, Le Pen’s elaboration on these already sufficiently xenophobic views is deeply troubling, especially if one recalls how Barrèsian-Maurrassian ideology inspired anti-Semitic legislation under the Vichy regime. Therefore, by compounding his scientific racism with Barrèsian-Maurrassian historico-cultural racism, it seems that Le Pen hopes to rewrite biology—and the definition of race—in a manner suited to his hateful beliefs. Furthermore, Le Pen’s discourse on these themes becomes more alarming when one considers his elaboration on the extreme-Right’s obsession with historical tradition, especially Barrès’ belief in the historical incompatibility between Jews and the French, as well as Maurras’ detailed definition of France as the inheritor of Greek, Roman, and Holy Roman tradition.

**Historical Tradition**

Maurice Barrès based many of his arguments on a historical context to demonstrate how deracinated peoples, such as immigrants and Jews, invade and corrupt France. Jews were one of Barrès’ primary targets throughout his political career, a fact exemplified by his election campaign speech from November 1 1898: “The Jewish question is linked to the national question. […] Still further, in the army, in judicial offices, in ministries, in all our administration, they [Jews] far exceed the percentage to which their numbers in the general population may entitle them.” One easily detects three important elements in Barrès’ thought: Jewish identity versus national identity; Jewish infiltration of high-ranking positions in the French nation; and the notion that minorities should be entitled to very little in France. As has been argued, Barrès considered Jews to be incompatible with Frenchness due to their déracinement. Building

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further upon the theory of déracinement, Barrès attributed a historical component to his arguments: “[… We] must do away with that dangerous inequality and obtain more respect for our authentic citizens, the children of Gaul and not of Judea…. For the past twenty years, the opportunist political system has favored the Jew, the foreigner, the cosmopolitan.” For Barrès, Jewish identity was so incompatible with Frenchness, that one could not be both “a child of Judea and of Gaul”; authentic citizens had suffered at the hands of a corrupt political system that favored les déracinés over the true children of Gaul. In an attempt to lend more credence to his views, Barrès based them in a pseudo-historical context that Le Pen similarly employs.

Le Pen props his arguments on a historical crutch, making sure to repeatedly hammer in the notion of tradition, inheritance, and duty: “dans le mot ‘nation’ il y a le mot ‘naissance’; la France est une lignée inscrite dans l’histoire; elle est faite des morts et des vivants, mais aussi des hommes à naître.” Le Pen’s reliance upon “les morts” and the duty to the future generation is strongly in keeping with Barrès’ ideology of la terre et les morts. Further, in this case, Le Pen highlights traditionally nationalist preoccupations with birth, tradition, lineage, death, youth, and a ruling class constituted of virile men. Women are meant to simply bear children and remain at home while men run the country: “Voilà pourquoi le Front National propose de mettre en place une politique de préférence familiale: c’est-à-dire une législation favorable à la vie, favorable au mariage, favorable à la famille nombreuse, favorable à la mère de famille.” Such instances of deeply nationalist language that prevailed in the works of Barrès and Maurras also abound in a variety of Le Pen’s writings, such as in his opening lines at the 1996 Fête des

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118 Ibid., 7-8.
119 Le Pen, Pour La France, 129.
120 Ibid., 131:

121 By beginning his speech in this manner, Le Pen draws a direct link between himself and Clovis. However tenuous such a historical comparison might be, Le Pen’s goal is clear. He couches the incompatibility between the true Christian French and the non-French (constituted by all foreigners or those who are non-Christian déracinés) in historical terms by recalling the founding of the Merovingian dynasty to his audience. The subtext in Le Pen’s opening lines is effectively a call upon his fellow FN supporters to make sure that France does not lose its historical, Catholic identity.

Le Pen’s exhaustive discussions on National Preference are a further example of a Barrèsian attachment to historical tradition. Take, for instance, “Chapter IX: Immigration: La Préférence Nationale” of Pour La France: Programme du Front National, 122 in which Le Pen argues for a number of reforms: making naturalization less easy and disallowing citizens to have a dual nationality, 123 strengthening border control and redefining the status of a refugee; 124 ending inter-cultural pedagogy in the national school system; 125 refusing university access “aux faux étudiants étrangers”; 126 establishing employment preference for the French at the expense of foreigners; 127 revising legislation according to national preference so as to “differentiate the situation of foreigners from that of citizens.”

121 Le Pen, Le Pen La Liberté, 6 (emphasis added).
122 Also consult “Chapter XII: Emploi: Priorité à la Dignité des Français” of the same book.
123 Le Pen, Pour La France, 118-119.
124 Ibid., 120.
125 Ibid., 116.
126 Ibid., 120.
127 Ibid., 122-123.
128 Ibid., 117: “différencier la situation des étrangers de celle des citoyens.”
propagation of xenophobic rhetoric and the enforcement of discriminatory legislation. Le Pen imbeds in his argument for National Preference the idea that a multi-cultural society will lead to the crumbling of French laws: “C’est aussi se préparer des lendemains qui déchanteront car une fois engagé sur la logique d’une société multi-culturelle, il faudra renoncer à l’état de droit et admettre que des droits différents s’appliquent à des communautés différentes.”129 In short, Le Pen argues that the more France become culturally varied, the more French laws and values will be modified so as to suit the increasing foreign influence upon society; when this shift occurs, French laws will instead be replaced by laws that are relative to each community. By correlating the influx of immigrants with the dissolution of French rights, Le Pen alludes to one of the foundational documents of the French Revolution, “la déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen”; Le Pen thus attempts to stir patriotic fervor in his audience by hinting at the destruction of core French values inscribed in the founding of the French Republic.

Following his warning about the impending dissolution of French rights, Le Pen argues that immigrants must either become completely French or return home: “C’est à dire connaître et aimer la France et adopter ses valeurs et sa loi civile. Cela n’exclut pas de rester fidèle ni à ses origines, ni à ses traditions pour peu qu’elles ne soient pas incompatibles avec les normes culturelles et le droit français.”130 Le Pen’s seemingly innocuous contention that immigrants can be French and remain faithful to their origins and traditions incontrovertibly belies what Le Pen expresses concerning the interaction of different cultures. That is to say, whether one is permitted to remain faithful to origins hinges on whether or not these are deemed incompatible with French law and cultural norms; of course, if the criteria are draconian in nature, which is certainly the case for Le

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129 Ibid., 116.
130 Ibid., 116-117.
Pen, most immigrants’ origins and traditions will be deemed incompatible with those of France. Recall that Le Pen compares immigration to an invasive force comparable to the German invasions of France during the World Wars, that immigrants are violent, unassimilated criminals predisposed to “délinquance,” or finally his theory of the Muslim “law of blood”: “les pays musulmans qui ne connaissent que la loi du sang et le principe de l’allégeance perpétuelle (quand on naît musulman, on meurt musulman: quand on naît Algérien, on meurt Algérien quels que soient les événements qui peuvent survenir).”

Similar to Barrès who considered it unthinkable for a Jewish déraciné like Dreyfus to be loyal to France, Le Pen finds it impossible to imagine that immigrants, especially North African Muslim immigrants, could ever be faithful to France due to the “perpetual allegiance” they feel towards their home country. In short, just as French blood and tradition are integral to the French identity, a Muslim immigrant’s “perpetual allegiance” for his/her country is inscribed in a supposed “loi du sang” (“law of blood”) that negates a Muslim’s ability to even partially assimilate into French society. Thus, when Le Pen claims that immigrants can remain in France so long as their traditions are not incompatible with those of the French people, the subtext is that absolutely no immigrant can ever be fully French and thus, they must all be expelled. Therefore, although Le Pen does not refer to immigrants with a single catch-all term, it is manifestly clear that his rhetoric directly echoes the language and ideological principles of Barrès’ déracinement and Maurras’ anti-France.

Le Pen also repeats Barrès’ perspective on the influence of foreigners upon job opportunities for the French worker. In his election campaign speech from November 1, 1898, Barrès posited the parasitic nature of the foreigner: “At the summits of society as

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131 Ibid., 118.
in the depths of the provinces, in the moral order as in the material order, in the commercial, industrial, and agricultural world and on to the building sites where French workers face competition, the foreigner, like a parasite, poisons us.”

Thus, for Barrès, the foreigner not only plagued French morality, but also “poisoned” the French, especially the workers. The phrase, “and on to the building sites where French workers face competition, the foreigner, like a parasite, poisons us,” finds a strong echo in Le Pen’s belief that France is suffering an “invasion of North African immigrants.”

Embedded in Le Pen’s rhetoric are multiple examples of Barrès’ nationalist language of *la terre et les morts*: “[La France] c’est *la terre* de nos Pères, *le sol* défriché et défendu par eux au long des siècles; le pays façonné dans ses paysages, ses cités, sa langue, son histoire et enrichi de leurs efforts, *fertilisé de leur sueur et sang*. Être patriote, c’est être d’ici plutôt que d’ailleurs et en être heureux. […] Elle a derrière elle une histoire de 1500 ans et un passé de 40 siècles.”

Once again, Le Pen situates the origin of French history to the rule of Clovis I in early 6th century CE. Additionally, Le Pen stresses the importance of land (“*la terre,*” “*le sol,*” “*paysages,*” “[*le pays*] fertilisé”), patriarchy (“*la terre* de nos Pères”), and the death and hard labor of France’s ancestors (specifically, “*nos Pères*”), who fertilized the land through their “sueur et sang.” In other words, Le Pen *precisely reiterates* Barrès’ ideology of *la terre et les morts*.

Finally, Le Pen’s contention—immigrants constitute a foreign invasion upon French soil—is comparable to a Barrésian fear of the depopulation of the French nation: “un pays qui se dépeuple est condamné à terme à devenir la propriété de l’étranger, la

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132 Burns, *France & the Dreyfus Affair*, 7 (emphasis added).
133 Davies, *The Extreme Right in France*, 20.
134 Le Pen, *Pour la France*, 29 (emphasis added).
victime de tous les pillages et le cadre de toutes les oppressions.”¹³⁵ For Le Pen, the depopulation of France is the result of the perversion of traditional French values—family, virility, strength, fertility—through decadent acts such as birth control, divorce, and marriages between the French and “non-French.”¹³⁶ Viewed in this manner, France will be enslaved, pillaged, and oppressed by the foreigner. Therefore, the only way for the French to “remain masters at home”¹³⁷ is to defend against the foreign forces that are attempting to pervert French values. The notion of fending off this immigrant “invasion of the national territory,”¹³⁸ constitutes a major component in Le Pen’s rhetoric that is only further illustrated by his repeated Maurrassian-inspired statements concerning the importance of reverting to a former time of Catholic supremacy: a time in which France was a more loyal inheritor of Greco-(Holy)Roman tradition.

Maurras and Le Pen: a Shared Obsession with Classical Antiquity

Charles Maurras expressed an intense preoccupation with Greco-Roman tradition throughout his life, in keeping with a long line of French Humanist intellectuals dating to the beginning of the Early Modern Period. Maurras considered that all beauty, art, and culture originated in Ancient Greece, survived in Rome, and was spread by the latter throughout the world, but specifically in France as a result of Roman colonialism:

l’art grec inventa la beauté. [...] Cette Civilisation tout en qualité s’appela seulement, dans ses beaux jours, la Grèce. Elle fut Rome qui la dispersa dans l’univers, d’abord avec les légions de ses soldats et de ses colons, ensuite avec les missionnaires de la foi chrétienne. Les deux Romes conquièrent de cette sorte à peu près le monde connu et, par la Renaissance, elles se retrouvaient et se complétaient elles-mêmes, quand la Réforme interrompit leur magnifique développement.¹³⁹

¹³⁵ Ibid., 129.
¹³⁶ Ibid., 129-130.
¹³⁷ Le Pen, Le Pen La Liberté, 49; “maîtres chez eux”
¹³⁸ Le Pen, Pour la France, 113; “invasion du territoire national”
¹³⁹ Maurras, Mes Idées Politiques, 145 (emphasis added).
According to Maurras, France exists as the definitive heir to Greek culture as a result of Roman military invasion, colonialism, and its Catholic “civilizing mission.” However, as Maurras indicated, the integrity of this Greek heritage in France was vulnerable. In his consideration, the Protestant Reformation interrupted the magnificent rebirth of Greek culture in France. To Maurras, Protestantism, as well as the three other États confédérés—Jews, Free Masons, the métèques—were a direct challenge to Roman Catholicism, and thus to the true identity of the French Nation. They constituted the anti-France, a force that challenged France’s status as “the only legitimate heir to the ancient world”¹⁴⁰: “[la nationalité française du 16ᵉ, 17ᵉ, et 18ᵉ siècle était] si complet, si brillant, d’une humanité si parfaite que la France est devenue l’héritière légitime du monde grec et romain. […] Le genre humain, c’est notre France, non seulement pour nous, mais pour le genre humain. Les devoirs qu’elle a envers lui peuvent mesurer nos obligations envers elle.”¹⁴¹ In Maurras’ estimation, France holds the exalted title of representative of the genre humain (humankind). As such, France is entrusted with a divine mission to preserve and propagate this Greco-Roman tradition. Writing Mes Idées Politiques in 1937, Maurras attempted to underscore that as the inheritor of Greek culture, France had a responsibility to this tradition, a responsibility that it had recently neglected in events such as the nationalization of a secular education system, the loi de 1905 establishing the separation of Church and State, and the Dreyfus Affair, which resulted in increased scrutiny of the Catholic Church’s influence on society and the army. Thus, for Maurras, those who neglected responsibility to this Greco-Roman tradition were the unpatriotic anti-France who disdained the Nation.

¹⁴⁰ Carroll, French Literary Fascism, 83.
¹⁴¹ Maurras, Mes Idées Politiques, 145-146.
Le Pen shares Maurras’ obsession with the Greco-Roman tradition. In a discussion concerning socio-economic reform, Le Pen directly references Maurras to back his claims: “Cependant, il est vrai que les nationalistes font leur la formule ‘Politique d’abord’ […] Si la Politique est l’art d’assurer la survie de la Nation, il est évident qu’il n’y a pas de prospérité économique ni de progrès social quand il n’y a plus de Nation. ‘Quand Syracuse est prise, écrit Maurras, Archimède est égorgé et tant pis pour le théorème.’” 142 Maurras’ most well-known political slogan, “La Politique d’abord” (Politics First) meant “that the nation—as an organic work—*has to come first.*” 143 As Maurras explained, “Quand nous disons ‘politique d’abord,’ nous disons: la politique la première, la première dans l’ordre du temps, nullement dans l’ordre de la dignité.” 144 Le Pen borrows Maurras’ example of Archimedes’ death during the Siege of Syracuse and extends it to apply to the nation on a grand scale. That is to say, in Maurras’ example, when Syracuse falls and Archimedes dies, Archimedes’ principle is irretrievably lost to the great detriment of Ancient Greek culture. In the instance above, Le Pen replaces “Syracuse” with “the nation” and “Archimedes” with a hypothetical French equivalent of the mathematician in order to formulate a convoluted argument: if the French nation succumbs either to the forces of immigration or to the poor socio-economic policies enforced by an incompetent government, the contemporary French Archimedes will die and France will suffer the consequences of diminished cultural-scientific-artistic production. Through Maurras’ example, Le Pen argues that hindsight is useless and that the only way to ensure the integrity of the French Nation is to take measures that will

143 Carroll, *French Literary Fascism*, 87.
protect France from losing its hypothetical Archimedes at the hand of foreign invaders. In Le Pen’s rhetoric, this is code for expelling all anti-French forces.

Moreover, like Maurras, Le Pen argues that Europe originated in Ancient Greece: “L’Europe est née en Grèce. S’y est épanouie la culture la plus pure, la plus belle ; s’y est développé l’art de conduire les hommes et de diriger les cités ; y sont nés les mots politique et démocratique, exprimant comment organiser au mieux la vie des gens (demos) au sein de la cité (polis) dont ils sont issus et pour laquelle il vaut la peine de vivre et de mourir.”145 Le Pen first establishes a tenuous connection between Greece and Modern Europe before attributing a sense of duty and obligation to this beautiful and pure earlier culture for which one should be willing to die. It should also be noted that the above citation issues from Le Pen’s written definition and program for an international political group that he founded in July 1984, “Le Groupe des Droites Européennes.” This group consisted of five members of the extreme-Right Italian Social Movement (MSI, dissolved in 1995)146 and a member of the Greek extreme-Right National Political Union (EPEN, dissolved in 1996).

In addition to contending that “Europe was born in Ancient Greece,” Le Pen echoes Maurras’ declarations on the significance of Rome:

Rome, ville symbole et héritage mais aussi ville éternelle et centre du rayonnement du catholicisme. Héritiers de la Rome antique, de ses idéaux et de ses valeurs, nous le sommes totalement. Là est née l’idée de l’État et la gloire de son service. Les fils de Rome ont crée, conquis et développé le plus bel empire de l’histoire – celui de la ‘pax romana’ dont l’éclat brille encore, malgré sa décadence et sa chute, par delà les siècles.147

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145 Le Pen, Europe: Discours et Interventions, 149.
146 The FN’s logo was inspired by the MSI’s logo. It is identical to the MSI’s logo save for the fact that it displays the French national colors (blue, white, red) rather than the Italian national colors (green, white, red).
147 Ibid., 151.
For Le Pen, as for Maurras, the value of Rome lies in its immense legacy: its Catholicism, its long-standing influence upon the European continent, its military expansion, its civilizing mission, and its eternal nature. Just as Maurras praised Rome for dispersing Greco-Roman culture “throughout the universe, first with its legions of soldiers and its colonists, then with its missionaries of the Christian faith,”148 Le Pen also praises the “sons of Rome” for creating, conquering, and developing “the most beautiful empire in history.”149 Furthermore, Le Pen takes Maurras’ notion of France as the sole inheritor of Greco-Roman culture, and applies it to his vision of Europe as embodied in “Le Groupe des Droites Européennes.” Le Pen concluded a speech in Rome (April 11 1985) detailing the political ideas of “Le Groupe des Droites Européennes,” by explaining his responsibility as a Frenchman: “Président du Front National, je suis Français et fier de l’être mais ici, ce soir à Rome, je suis Européen et fier de l’être, conscient de mes droits, conscient de mes devoirs.”150 In other words, similar to Maurras’ proclamation of French responsibility for preserving Greco-Roman culture for the sake of the “genre humain”, Le Pen also asserts the necessity of carrying out his duties, which—based on his xenophobic and racist rhetoric—seems to consist of creating a homogenous, Catholic, white, patriarchal France.

Le Pen, much like his intellectual predecessors, utilizes a specific vision to embed the notion of innate, historical conflict between the French and the anti-French. In his writings, Le Pen repeatedly cites a specific understanding of European history:

L’histoire de l’Europe, c’est d’abord Marathon, c’est Salamine, c’est Lépante, c’est Vienne, c’est Poitiers. Et que l’Europe, que sa jeunesse, sache que, quel que soit son avenir, elle aura au moins l’immense mérite –

148 “dans l’univers, d’abord avec les légions de ses soldats et de ses colons, ensuite avec les missionnaires de la foi chrétienne”
149 “le plus bel empire de l’histoire”
150 Ibid., 155.
si elle se bat, si elle ne fait pas Marathon – de faire au moins les Thermopyles et de pouvoir répondre devant son propre pays ‘qu’ici ses fils sont morts pour respecter sa loi’.\textsuperscript{151}

In addition to voicing the trope that it is honorable to die for one’s country, Le Pen presents European history as the victory of the West over the East: a perspective that illuminates his unique historical vision. Le Pen deliberately calls to an ancient Greek heritage through the references to Marathon (c. 490 BCE) and Salamis (c. 480 BCE), in which the outnumbered Greek forces inflicted crushing defeats upon the invading Persian army. Following this, Le Pen references the Battle of Poitiers (732 CE) to draw attention to the Frankish victory over the Umayyad Caliphate. Finally, through the examples of the Battle of Lepanto (1571 CE), the Siege of Vienna (1529 CE) and the Battle of Vienna (1683 CE), Le Pen underscores historic victories of the Holy Roman Empire against the Ottoman Empire. Le Pen’s emphasis on a history of Greco-Persian, Franco-Umayyad, and (Roman-)Catholic-Ottoman battle serves to both create a rapprochement between France and the Greco-Roman tradition, as well as conveying to his audience (the European youth, in this discourse) a sense of historic tensions between West and East, between Catholicism and Islam.

Le Pen also combines historical tradition with a strong stress on geography, specifically the role of the Mediterranean in shaping European history:

Avec la chute de l’Empire romain et les invasions germaniques, puis islamiques, la Méditerranée a cessé d’être un lac intérieur de paix pour devenir un lieu de rivalités, de convoitise et de conflits. En fait, depuis douze siècles la Méditerranée est partagée entre la chrétienté occidentale au nord et l’islam au sud.\textsuperscript{152}

The implications of this historical understanding are wide reaching and troubling. In Le Pen’s particular understanding of history, he makes the following assertion: the

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., 10.
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., 86.
Mediterranean was an “inland lake of peace”\textsuperscript{153} under the reign of the Roman empire, but over the last twelve hundred years, it has become a place of conflict and division between Catholics and Muslims, each of which must be delegated to their own demarcated regions from which they are not meant to stray. Furthermore, although Le Pen implies that both Catholics and Muslims must remain in their respective historical regions, he is speaking with the southern Mediterranean—or North African—Muslim region in mind. Le Pen underscores his preoccupation with the negative effects of the mixing of Catholics and Muslims by illustrating the danger posed by North African Muslim immigration to France, specifically the “fertility of foreign Muslim women”: “la fécondité des femmes étrangère musulmanes est trois fois plus forte que celle des françaises; de 4,5 à 5,5 enfants par femme pour les Marocaines, les Tunisiennes, les Algériennes, les Turques.”\textsuperscript{154} Le Pen couples his fear of Turkish—and primarily North African Muslim women’s—fertility with his historical view of Catholic-Muslim conflict in the Mediterranean. Le Pen conveys two messages with this pairing: 1) Le Pen reminds his audience of the historical incompatibility of Muslim immigrants living in France (i.e. Muslim-Catholic cohabitation does not work since each religious group should remain in its historically delineated region); 2) Le Pen also voices a sinister historical “moral” purportedly proving that Muslim immigrants living in France can only have one thing in mind and that is to invade the country in order to spread Islam, like their ancestors once did. Finally, Le Pen’s use of language—specifically, “invasions germaniques, puis islamiques” and “rivalités, convoitise, conflits”—indicates his belief that the Mediterranean belongs solely to the descendants of the Greco-Roman tradition; since he

\textsuperscript{153} “lac intérieur de paix”

\textsuperscript{154} Le Pen, \emph{Pour La France}, 112-113.
considers that the Mediterranean was unjustly stolen from the Romans, it is thus both the right and the duty of the Greco-Roman descendants to seize it back.

In order to reinforce his anti-immigrant sentiment, Le Pen equates North African immigration to Persian-Ottoman invasion of Greco-Holy Roman lands. This equivalence serves as a means of further grounding his xenophobic views in a specious historical vision. In Le Pen’s estimation, Europe faces a host of foes that can be traced back to the times of Ancient Greece:

La décadence morale, sociale et politique qui frappe l’Europe, affaiblit nos chances de survie face à l’explosion démographique du Tiers Monde. Si nous ne nous redressons pas avec courage et détermination, nous serons submergés par des vagues conquérantes comme celles que nos ancêtres brisèrent hier à Marathon, à Salamine, à Lépante, à Poitiers, à Vienne.\(^{155}\)

In short, Le Pen argues that socio-politico-moral decadence weakens Europe by causing internal divisions, which are the result of a lack of homogeneity. The factors contributing to a lack of homogeneity are clear for Le Pen: the introduction of foreign peoples, cultures, religious beliefs, and historical traditions to the European soil. If one takes Maurras’ definition of the second État confédéré (“the Protestants, Swiss, English, and Germans who influenced through their thought”) and replaces “Protestants” with “Muslims,” the “Swiss, English, and Germans” with “North Africans,” and “thought” with “thought, abundant fertility, incompatible historical traditions and culturo-religious beliefs,” then one recognizes the extent to which Le Pen has borrowed Maurras’ rhetoric and modified it according to contemporary circumstances. Furthermore, if one recalls Barrès’ belief that les déracinés such as Dreyfus cause internal divisions,\(^{156}\) one detects a direct correlation to Le Pen’s desire for homogeneity on the French soil.

\(^{155}\) Le Pen, *Europe: Discours et Interventions*, 153 (emphases added).
\(^{156}\) Carroll, *French Literary Fascism*, 28: “[Dreyfus is] the deracinated individual who feels ill at ease in one of the plots of your old French garden … because he had no roots…that associated him strongly enough
According to Le Pen, Europe is confronted by moral and spiritual decay. Le Pen repeatedly decries Europe’s weakness, which he attributes to the continent’s disturbing trend towards decadence: “Nous sommes exposés à des menaces de ruine morale et spirituelle qui se traduisent par le laxisme des mœurs et l’abandon des nécessaires et salvatrices disciplines sociales, familiales et civiques.” The first step towards resolving this moral and spiritual decay is to reassert traditional values that have suffered from a “laxity” on both the familial and societal-scale. However, the only way to properly reassert traditional values is to confront the “demographic explosion of Third-World immigrants” in Europe with “courage and determination”; the invasive immigrants, who Le Pen equates to the historical Persians and Ottomans, are incompatible with traditional European values and culture. Le Pen does not expect Turkish and North African Muslim immigrants to be capable of contributing to European homogeneity or producing anything beneficial for the continent. After all, Le Pen’s history demonstrates that Europe has been warring with the Persian Empire, Ottoman Empire, and the Umayyad Caliphate for over two thousand and four hundred years.

Le Pen also believes that modern immigrants have developed a new strategy for continuing this historical battle: “il faut se garder des apparentes pénétrations pacifiques de populations qui demain peuvent créer dans l’interland européen de véritables souches étrangères capables à tout moment de se trouver activées par des mouvements incontrôlables par nos autorités.” Le Pen believes that these immigrants are the modern iteration of the Persian-Ottoman invading forces; only now, they have adopted a clandestine form of

with the soil and conscience of France to keep him from looking for his happiness, his peace, his life, in foreign lands.”

157 Le Pen, Europe: Discours et Interventions, 10.
158 “le laxisme”
159 Ibid., 116-117 (emphasis added).
attack that essentially likens them to sleeper agents, “capable of being activated at any moment.”160 The sleeper agent metaphor strongly resembles late 19th to early 20th century theories about the supposed International Jewish Conspiracy,161 as well as Barrès’ supposition that Dreyfus must be in league with the Germans because he is Jewish: “I don’t need to be told why Dreyfus betrayed. Psychologically speaking, it is enough for me to know that he is capable of betraying to know that he betrayed.”162 Just as Barrès employed his theory of *la terre et les morts* to incite the French to reassert their rootedness by rebelling against the occupying Prussians, Le Pen equates immigrants to uprooted invaders who sever French roots by virtue of their presence on French soil; furthermore, they constitute a latent and sinister threat since they have the potential to wreak even greater havoc upon France when they inevitably become “activated.” Le Pen’s consideration of immigrants as sleeper agents coupled with his “East versus West, Islam versus Catholicism” historical understanding conveys to his audience a sense of grave, imminent danger that can only be remedied by direct anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim action and legislation. Therefore, through this historical lens, North African and Turkish immigration to Europe, specifically to northern Mediterranean countries like Greece, Rome, and France, is nothing more than a modern iteration of the “conquering waves” of invaders confronted at Marathon, Salamis, Lepanto, Poitiers, and Vienna.

In addition to repulsing the “conquering waves” of immigrants from Europe, Le Pen desires the reestablishment of former “European glory” in the form of a reborn pseudo-Roman Empire. At the Strasbourg Parliament on April 6 1988, Le Pen delivered a speech, “Discours à La Jeunesse d’Europe,” to five hundred young delegates from

160 “capables à tout moment de se trouver activées”
twenty-five European countries. Le Pen covered a range of extreme-Right themes that are well exemplified by a selection of a few of the most notable subsections from the FN’s printed edition of this discourse: “L’Europe Sera Impériale ou ne Sera Pas,” “Marathon…,” “Une course de vitesse entre la décadence et la renaissance,” “Terre où l’homme est mesure de référence,” “L’Europe possède les moyens de la renaissance.”

In the section “Marathon…” Le Pen concisely presents the essential components of his strong attachment to Greco-Roman tradition:

Vous [la jeunesse d’Europe] saurez le faire avant tout par votre courage à concevoir un nouveau projet politique fondé sur le respect du passé et de sa tradition mais aussi tourné vers l’avenir, audacieux et ambitieux : celui de la renaissance d’un vaste empire européen : mythe fondateur et tâche exaltante pour une jeunesse qui devra refuser l’appétit dévorant des étatismes et des bureaucraties pour s’inspirer de son passé glorieux et se souvenir que si l’Europe existe en tant que telle, c’est parce qu’elle n’a jamais accepté de se soumettre au sens matérialiste de l’histoire. C’est parce qu’elle a lutté, c’est parce qu’elle a su se sacrifier. Rappelez-vous que l’histoire de l’Europe c’est avant tout d’abord Marathon, Salamine, Lépante, Vienne, Poitiers.

Le Pen reiterates his respect for tradition and his longing for a glorious, idyllic European past, as well as illustrating his vision of the “rebirth of a vast European empire.” Much like politicians from all ends of the Left-Right spectrum, Le Pen calls on the European youth to unite and take action for the benefit of Europe. However, unlike most contemporary politicians, Le Pen extensively imbeds his language with ideas of sacrifice and battle, which, applied to his unique historical perspective, ultimately advocates the development and expansion of a massive European empire, the likes of which have not

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163 Le Pen, Europe: Discours et Interventions, 107-129.

A more complete list of the subsections follows: “L’Europe Sera Impériale ou ne Sera Pas,” “Europe, réveille-toi ! Il faut s’unir,” “Marathon…,” “Se rassembler pour se défendre,” “Une course de vitesse entre la décadence et la renaissance,” “L’Europe vieillissante et frileuse ne fait plus d’enfants,” “La menace épidémique du sida,” “L’Europe se doit d’être ou de disparaître,” “L’Europe, première puissance du monde,” “Terre où l’homme est mesure de référence,” “L’Europe possède les moyens de la renaissance,” “L’Europe doit oser être européenne.”

164 Ibid., 110 (emphases added).

165 “renaissance d’un vaste empire européen”
been seen since the fall of Rome. Le Pen leaves out specific details regarding this “rebirth of a vast European empire,” but given his obsession with ancient Greece, the Roman Empire, and the Holy Roman Empire, as well as his inclinations towards Catholicism, patriarchy, nationalism, xenophobia, islamophobia, and scientific-cultural racism, Le Pen’s call to arms for the youth to unite under the banner of a new European empire appears overwhelmingly sinister.

**Historical Revisionism**

Despite Le Pen’s attachment to tradition, values, and his “faithful” rendition of French history, he extensively engages in historical revisionism. Here it suffices to recall Le Pen’s comments regarding the gas chambers as a detail of history, as a clear instance of Le Pen’s revisionism concerning the subject of World War II. In the section “Let the dead bury the dead”\(^\text{166}\) of his “Discours à La Jeunesse d’Europe,” Le Pen proposes a particularly objectionable view of how World War II, specifically Vichy France’s collaboration with Nazi Germany, should be remembered:

\[\text{Cessons de nous entre-déchirer, de gratter nos plaies et de battre notre coule. Que l'Europe cesse de faire son propre procès devant l'histoire. Il ne faut pas craindre d'affirmer que, dans le déclenchement puis dans le déroulement inexorable de la Seconde guerre mondiale, les responsabilités furent partagées. Ayons le courage de comprendre que certains n'eurent pas l'exclusivité des crimes et les autres l'exclusivité du bon droit et de l'héroïsme. Cessons de marcher à reculons vers l'avenir. À vous jeunes d'Europe, je dis : ‘Laissez les morts enterrer les morts!’}\(^\text{167}\)

Le Pen argues that the legacy of World War II has borne far too much an influence upon the European collective memory. Le Pen’s contention—that responsibilities were shared and that it would be unfair to dwell upon the actions carried out by one individual or one single country—is a direct attempt to cloud the history of French Collaboration. This

\(^{166}\) “Laissez les morts enterrer les morts”
\(^{167}\) Ibid., 109 (emphases added).
attempt to neatly hide the atrocities of World War II, to which Vichy France significantly contributed, is an incontrovertible example of revisionism. Furthermore, if he were to succeed in obscuring the history of Vichy collaboration, knowledge of Vichy’s complicity in crimes against humanity would become muddled. If this history were forgotten, Vichy would become historically redeemed (as simply resisting Nazi Occupation and never collaborating), meaning that the image of the extreme-Right would have to be drastically redefined. Consequently, the FN would become a viable party descended from a legitimate and honorable political legacy.

Le Pen’s exhortation that “the dead should bury the dead” coupled with his other revisionist statements and actions, paint a rather clear image of which aspects of the past Le Pen would like to preserve. Throughout his political career, Le Pen has expressed support for Pétain, defended Vichy, stated that “the Gas Chambers were only a detail of World War II,” declared that the German occupation “n’avait pas été” a reduc
tive notion of “universal collaboration” came to replace the false conception of “universal resistance” in the French collective memory. In Vichy, un passé qui ne passe pas (1994), Henry Rousso and Eric Conan addressed this issue, arguing that the initial French ignorance of the past had now shifted to an unproductive obsession with it that had become counterproductive to national reconciliation. However, unlike the multi-decade-long nuanced scholarly debate concerning collaboration, Le Pen’s urging in 1988 to simply “let the dead bury the dead,” advocates a distinctly revisionist perspective of history.

168 It should be noted that there was scholarly debate in France, specifically in the early 1990s, concerning the negative consequences of repeatedly reinforcing the idea of “universal collaboration.” That is to say, after Vichy’s role in collaborating with Nazi Germany, and even going beyond Nazi demands, had become firmly established—due to a number of works, two of the most influential being Robert Paxton’s Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order (1972) and Henry Rousso’s Le Syndrome de Vichy (1944-1987) (1987), as well as films such as Marcel Ophüll’s Le Chagrin et la Pitié (1969), which was banned from French television until 1981, and Claude Lanzmann’s Shoah (1985)—a reductive notion of “universal collaboration” came to replace the false conception of “universal resistance” in the French collective memory. In Vichy, un passé qui ne passe pas (1994), Henry Rousso and Eric Conan addressed this issue, arguing that the initial French ignorance of the past had now shifted to an unproductive obsession with it that had become counterproductive to national reconciliation. However, unlike the multi-decade-long nuanced scholarly debate concerning collaboration, Le Pen’s urging in 1988 to simply “let the dead bury the dead,” advocates a distinctly revisionist perspective of history.


particulièrement inhumaine,” supported Nadine Morano’s contestation that France is a country “de race blanche,” and openly backed the views of controversial revisionist historian Éric Zemmour, who erroneously argues in *Le Suicide Français* (to the outrage of French and international historians) that Pétain and the Vichy regime sacrificed Foreign Jews in order to successfully not deport a single French Jew. Furthermore, after interviewing and shadowing Le Pen for months, Pierre Jouve and Ali Magoudi noted that many vendors at the annual Bleu-Blanc-Rouge (BBR) event sold revisionist history books covering a range of topics: from homages to Pétain and high-ranking Vichy officials, to justifications of French collaborators and biographies of Léon Degrelle (the Belgian politician who founded the far-Right Rexist Party and joined the Waffen SS). As Jouve and Magoudi explain, “elles [the revisionist history texts] sont là parce qu’il y a des acheteurs, admirateurs et fanatiques dans la masse des BBR. Pour ceux-là, rien de surprenant à trouver bien sagement rangés dans le coin d’un étal les écrits négateurs du génocide nazi, comme les *Annales d’histoire révisionniste* ou *Le Mythe d’Auschwitz*.” Le Pen makes no attempt to stop vendors from selling revisionist history books at FN events such as the BBR:

Les sous-entendus, les non-dits peuvent aussi constituer un programme. […] Pourquoi, trois mois après [“the gas chamber as a detail” affair], devant Anne Sinclair et Jean-Marie Colombani, continue-t-il [Le Pen] de dire qu’il n’est pas chargé de juger les travaux des ‘historiens

révisionnistes’? Ceux-là ont pourtant pour spécificité de nier par l’absurde le martyr juif, donc de réinstituer l’antisémitisme, puisque le génocide ne serait selon eux qu’une propagande intéressée du sionisme. Jean-Marie Le Pen n’est non plus ‘pas responsable’ de la vente des Annales d’histoire révisionniste aux BBR, une semaine seulement après l’affaire du ‘détail’.175

Le Pen’s repeated support for revisionist history as well as his complete lack of effort to stop the sale of revisionist texts—even one week after “the gas chamber affair”—at the BBR all speak to the doctored historical view to which Le Pen subscribes. The significant danger presented by Le Pen’s attempt to disseminate these views is clear: “À écouter Le Pen réviser l’histoire, on pourrait penser qu’il n’y a jamais eu de débat en France sur le colonialisme. Qu’aucun référendum national n’a jamais été organisé par le général de Gaulle sur l’autodétermination des Algériens. Qu’il n’y a jamais eu de militaires factieux et que la France n’a pas été au bord d’une guerre civile.”176 The clouding of history—and thus, the overt attempt to redeem the historical extreme-Right—constitutes one of Le Pen’s fundamental tactics of de-demonizing the FN.

Le Pen knows that if he successfully de-stigmatizes the FN through the propagation of revisionist history, he would effectively re-legitimate the ideological beliefs of the historical extreme-Right. Although Le Pen’s attempt to de-demonize the FN does not derive from the far-Right tradition (Maurras and Barrès never had to mince their words or obfuscate their true beliefs because anti-racist and anti-Semitic legislation did not yet exist), his usage of revisionism is a carefully planned strategy to re-legitimize the ideas of the historical extreme-Right. Barrèsian-Maurrassian ideology pervades Le Pen’s thought so deeply and thoroughly that he must revise history if he ever wishes to de-demonize the FN and liberate it from its damning, unflattering past characterized by

175 Ibid., 107-108.
176 Ibid., 141.
collaborationist Vichy France. However, the mere fact that Le Pen needs to rewrite history in order to recast the FN in a positive light speaks volumes. Le Pen’s reliance upon revisionist history reaffirms, without question, that the FN stands as a direct descendant of the historical extreme-Right, to which it is so attached that Le Pen is willing to rewrite history rather than change his beliefs. Fortunately, Le Pen’s tactical usage of—and support for—historical revisionism has not yet proven to be influential enough to provoke a reassessment of history on a national scale. Certainly, that many supporters of the FN have been won over by Le Pen’s recasting of history should not be lightly dismissed. However, Le Pen’s revisionist bombast has not swayed France at large. Moreover, his ideology has made it abundantly clear that there exists no “new FN” distinct from the historical extreme-Right tradition. Le Pen’s rhetoric and beliefs reflect those of Barrès and Maurras—xenophobia, national identity, the uprooted anti-France, blood, soil, racism, historical tradition, Antique Greece and Rome—to so precise a degree that it irrefutably proves the immense influence the historical extreme-Right exerts on Le Pen’s thought. Consequently, Le Pen’s endeavor to de-demonize the FN has come to naught.

**Marine Le Pen: a “new FN” ?**

Jean-Marie Le Pen’s attempts to de-demonize the FN have manifestly failed, but his daughter, Marine Le Pen, has picked up the mantle since becoming president of the FN in January 2011. Has Marine Le Pen succeeded where her father failed, or has she proven to be a replication of her father and his traditionally extreme-Right views? Since Marine Le Pen’s succession, the constituent body of the FN has remained ideologically and socially similar save for one crucial contrast: “the gender difference. Le Pen’s
daughter appeals more to women, who until now seemed more reluctant than men to support the extreme right.\textsuperscript{177} As Nonna Mayer explains, Marine Le Pen’s appeal to female voters has granted the FN an unprecedented boost in popularity that continues to broaden its electoral base. Furthermore, she has made considerable inroads in expanding the FN’s constituents: Marine Le Pen “attracts even more working class voters than her father,”\textsuperscript{178} she “gets the same level of support from elderly Catholic respondents of both sexes and from young women as much as from young men,”\textsuperscript{179} and, like her father, she “achieve[s her] best scores among the less-educated voters, those who failed to pass the ‘baccalauréat’ examination at the end of high school or stopped school before.”\textsuperscript{180} Marine Le Pen’s expanded group of constituents has largely been a product of her increasingly successful de-demonization of the “new FN”:

In France, Marine Le Pen seems to be taking a similar turn, condemning anti-Semitism, adopting gay-friendly positions, and presenting herself as a defender of the French secular republican model she considers threatened by Muslims. […] She is a woman, young, divorced twice, with three children, living ‘out of wedlock’ with her present companion, and giving a ‘modern’ and softer image than her father. She condemns anti-Semitism, she considers the Holocaust as ‘the summit of human barbarism’ and she says that she understands women who abort even if she is opposed to the practice.\textsuperscript{181}

Central to Marine Le Pen’s de-demonization is the rebranding of the FN as a modern, progressive party that respects women, condemns historical extreme-Right anti-Semitism, supports green energy, and does not outright denounce homosexuality or non-traditional family structures. Marine Le Pen’s condemnations of anti-Semitism serve as a primary distinction from her father, whom she first suspended from the FN on May 4

\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., 171.
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid., 172.
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid., 169.
\textsuperscript{181} Ibid., 163 […] 175.
2015 for repeating his assertion that the gas chambers were a detail of the history of World War II, before altogether expelling him from the party on August 20 2015. She has also attempted to strip him of his title as Honorary President, for which there is an ongoing legal dispute. Marine Le Pen’s staunch rejection of her father’s controversial views concerning the Holocaust further contribute to the notion of a “new FN” that has cast aside the prejudices of the past:

Both [Marine Le Pen and Jean-Marie Le Pen] have exuded charisma and relatability, employing a populist style of speaking directly to the average citizen, although by many accounts Marine Le Pen gives a more polished interview or public speech than her father. In sum, the analysis above suggests that rather than being a substantial departure from the ‘old FN,’ in many ways Marine Le Pen represents a continuation of the style and strategy that brought her father’s FN to a culmination point in 2002. However, one differential factor stands out: she appears to be doing it all in a way that is both quantitatively and qualitatively better than he did.182

Marine Le Pen’s newfound constituent body of female voters as well as the modern appeal that she has garnered for the FN has bolstered the party. These factors largely explain the FN’s unprecedented first-round victories (six out of thirteen regions in mainland France) in the December 2015 regional elections. Another significant factor contributing to this unexpected victory has been Marine Le Pen’s reinforced fear-mongering anti-Muslim rhetoric, which, since the November 13 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris that left 130 people dead and 413 injured, she has argued demonstrate the veracity of her claims regarding the danger of Islam in France. These acts of terrorism have served as a sort of justification—a “told-you-so”—for the FN’s xenophobic, racist, and Islamophobic rhetoric under Jean-Marie Le Pen as well as Marine Le Pen.

In many regards, Marine Le Pen’s FN seems distinct from the “old FN.” Indeed, Marine Le Pen’s attempt to rebrand the FN has indicated a departure from Jean-Marie

Le Pen’s political beliefs. Unlike her father, Marine Le Pen has made open attempts to reach out to a Franco-Arab and Franco-Jewish audience:

Through a sequence of sometimes symbolic gestures, she [Marine Le Pen] tried to reorientate the FN even on its central issue of immigration, using Beur FM radio and Al-Jazeera television as platforms for a new strategy of engagement with the communities of Arab origin in France. Efforts were made, too, to reach out to France’s Jewish community in a bid to dispel the FN’s image as a racist and anti-Semitic party.\(^{183}\)

Although reaching out to a community for which the FN used to bear contempt does not indicate a complete ideological turn-around, it nonetheless distinguishes the FN under Marine Le Pen’s leadership. Furthermore, Marine le Pen does not espouse her father’s scientifically racist views: “The shift from an ethnic to a cultural discourse on identity—stressing religious secularism or ‘laïcité’ as part of the ‘one and indivisible Republic,’ denouncing not Muslim immigrants but the ‘islamisation’ of France—gave the FN’s referential framework a more politically respectable tenor.”\(^{184}\) As James Shields notes, Marine Le Pen has steered clear from making blanket statements about ethnic groups; she does not ground her beliefs in pseudo-science, and as a result, her views are less easily swept aside. Finally, under Marine Le Pen, the FN has appeared eager to become included in mainstream politics: “In that regard too, the apparent readiness to reach accommodation with the ‘Republican right’ in the 2012 parliamentary elections, though dismissed by UMP leaders, marked a major departure from the self-perpetuating isolationism espoused by Jean-Marie Le Pen in the past.”\(^{185}\) Rather than relying upon provoking outrage (which, the FN continues to do, but with less frequency), Marine Le Pen’s FN has presented a better-delineated political platform that is being taken more

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\(^{184}\) Ibid., 191-192.

\(^{185}\) Ibid., 192.
However, despite the divergences between Jean-Marie Le Pen’s FN and that of his daughter’s, compelling similarities indicate Marine Le Pen’s adherence to her father’s ideology.

An analysis of a short selection of Marine Le Pen’s statements on immigration and Islam reveals the manner in which the “new FN” she is championing echoes the “old FN.” Marine Le Pen has exclusively voiced Islamophobia, whereas Jean-Marie Le Pen openly expressed anti-Semitic and Islamophobic sentiments. Although Islamophobia was absent from the writings of Barrès and Maurras, this should not come as a surprise since they did not view Muslims as a particular threat to France. Instead, Barrès and Maurras utilized notions of the “dangerous other” to mobilize political parties and the French nation against Jews. The only difference for Marine Le Pen’s FN is that the “dangerous other” are Muslims, not Jews. The extreme-Right’s target may have changed, but the century-long strategy of vilifying a religious minority remains consistent. In December 2010, during a campaign speech in Lyon, Marine Le Pen made a controversial statement comparing Muslims praying in the streets to the Nazi Occupation of France:

Je suis désolée, mais pour ceux qui aiment beaucoup parler de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, s’il s’agit de parler d’Occupation, on pourrait en parler, pour le coup, parce que ça c'est une occupation du territoire. C’est une occupation de pans du territoire, des quartiers dans lesquels la loi religieuse s’applique, c’est une occupation. Certes, il n’y a pas de blindés, pas de soldats, mais c’est une occupation tout de même et elle pèse sur les habitants. 187

Marine Le Pen received widespread condemnation across the political spectrum as well as from the media for making this statement. In 2011, an initial investigation into these

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186 Ibid., 182.
remarks was closed until anti-racism groups filed a new complaint that led to a judicial inquiry in 2012, which culminated in Marine Le Pen being “stripped of her immunity from prosecution by the European Parliament in 2013.”\footnote{188} On October 20 2015 in Lyon, Marine Le Pen defended herself in court against the accusation “of ‘incitement to discrimination, violence or hatred towards a group of people because of their religious affiliation’ and if found guilty could face up to a year in jail and a fine of €45,000 (£33,000; $51,000).”\footnote{189} Marine Le Pen’s ongoing judicial proceedings resemble those of her father following his comments about the gas chambers, which resulted in a fine of one million two hundred thousand francs to eleven associations.\footnote{190}

Marine Le Pen’s malevolent historical comparison both vilifies Muslims by likening them to Nazis and incontrovertibly recalls similar comments made by Jean-Marie Le Pen. First, the affirmation that Muslim prayer in the street weighs upon the implied “French, non-Muslim, inhabitants” of religiously diverse neighborhoods strongly resembles Jean-Marie Le Pen’s assertions that “le heurt des cultures est parfois difficile à supporter”\footnote{191} and that “la cohabitation d’hommes et de femmes aux cultures, aux mœurs, aux modes de vie différents et souvent incompatibles avec les habitudes de vie des


\footnote{189}Ibid.


\footnote{191}Le Pen, Pour la France, 111.
Français […] crée le mal des grands ensembles.”192 Second, the notion that Muslims are occupying France despite the absence of “tanks and soldiers” is a direct echo of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s description of immigration as “une invasion provisoirement pacifique du territoire national.”193 Just as Jean-Marie Le Pen appealed to a sense of wounded French pride—by arguing that fighting against Germany during World Wars I and II would have been for naught “if today we tolerate a provisionally peaceful invasion of the national territory”194—in order to mobilize citizens against immigration, Marine Le Pen also utilizes the same tactic; in effect, by comparing public Muslim prayer to Nazi occupation, Marine Le Pen extends her father’s analogy to contend that the momentarily tank-less and soldier-less (e.g. “provisionally peaceful”) Muslims are already invading French land in full force. Furthermore, her contention that Muslims occupy France despite the absence of a standing army strikingly recalls her father’s description of Muslim immigrants as pseudo-sleeper agents “capables à tout moment de se trouver activées.”195 Thus, in Marine Le Pen’s rhetoric, one detects strong allusions to her father’s ideological underpinning, which itself is descended from Barrès and Maurras: one notices an attachment to notions of sacrifice and la terre et les morts through the tacit allusion to the loss of French territory and lives at the hand of invading Nazis; one also observes a distinct Jean-Marie Le Pen-esque vision of history intended to vilify Muslims—and, in a way, present them as the anti-France, as déracinés non-Catholic individuals who pray in the street and disrupt the traditional French way of life—by inspiring mixed feelings of shame and anger in her audience through the recollection of Nazi-Occupied France.

192 Ibid.
193 Ibid., 113.
194 “Il n’était pas nécessaire de mobiliser la France contre l’Allemagne en 1914 et en 1940, si nous devons tolérer aujourd’hui une invasion – provisoirement pacifique – du territoire national.”
195 Le Pen, Europe: Discours et Interventions, 117.
Marine Le Pen’s “new FN” continues to express an attachment to antiquity as well as déracinement rhetoric. On March 4 2012, Marine Le Pen began a speech to a crowd of FN supporters in a manner evoking Jean-Marie Le Pen: “Puisque je suis aujourd’hui à Marseille, Marseille qui fut si longtemps grecque et même un archétype de ce que les Grecs nommaient la *polis*, la Ville, Marseille cité presque autonome et prospère sous l’empire d’Auguste.” Just as Jean-Marie Le Pen established historical connections between contemporary France and an Antique legacy, so does Marine Le Pen; that Marseille was “an archetype for what the Greeks called the *polis*, the City,” imparts a sense of urgency to her audience in the importance of preserving such a heritage. Thus, in the context of a speech centered on immigration, Marine Le Pen urges the necessity of reducing the tenebrous influence of *deracinated* immigrants who impede the conservation of this legacy: “L’immigration de masse, […] acceptée et encouragée par le mondialisme, idéologie du déracinement et de la lutte contre le sentiment national, a rendu impossible ce long et patient travail d’assimilation.” In short, Marine Le Pen underscores that “the long and patient process of assimilation” will never be realized. Assimilation has been rendered impossible because immigrants are *déracinés*. For Marine Le Pen, globalization is nothing more than “the ideology of déracinement and of the fight against national sentiment [national pride].” Because immigration severs immigrants from their roots, they will never foster a feeling of national pride towards France—since this is the case, it would be not only unreasonable, but also harmful to the country to continue welcoming such an influx of immigrants. Thus, identically to her father and Maurice Barrès, Marine Le Pen argues

197 “un archétype de ce que les Grecs nommaient la *polis*, la Ville.”
198 Ibid (emphasis added).
199 “le mondialisme, idéologie du déracinement et de la lutte contre le sentiment national.”
that immigrants can never be assimilated simply because they have been uprooted from their country of origin.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the theory of déracinement extends beyond Marine Le Pen to FN party officials. On March 10 2016, FN deputy Dominique Martin expressed his disapproval of EURES—a service available to European citizens that assists them in finding a job, whether it be in their country of origin or in another European Union Member State—through the usage of enracinement rhetoric:

En effet, sous couvert d’offrir plus d’opportunités, il [EURES] s’agit en fait d’institutionnaliser le déracinement des citoyens qui seront, à terme, pris en otages : un demandeur d’emploi n’aura plus d’autre choix que de quitter son pays car son refus sera perçu comme un manque de recherche active de travail, au risque de perdre le bénéfice de l’allocation chômage dans son pays d’origine. 

Le citoyen européen du futur sera un citoyen sans racine, sans identité, sans origine.

According to Martin, rather than a service aiming to redress the unemployment rate in Europe, EURES is nothing more than a form of institutionalized déracinement that will take European citizens hostage. Indeed, in his argumentation, EURES provides the unemployed European citizen with “no other choice than to leave his country”, consequently, future European citizen will have “no roots, no identity, and no origin.”

The characterization of EURES as a sinister entity intending to essentially turn Europeans into refugees overwhelmingly echoes Jean-Marie Le Pen’s usage of Barrès’ theory of déracinement.

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200 EURES was established in 1991 by the European Commission and the Public Employment Services of the European Economic Area member states. EURES assists with job recruitment by providing information services and contacts to European Union citizens in order to facilitate finding a job in Europe.


202 “un demandeur d’emploi n’aura plus d’autre choix que de quitter son pays.”

203 “Le citoyen européen du futur sera un citoyen sans racine, sans identité, sans origine.”
Following the terrorist attacks in Paris on November 13 2015, Marine Le Pen issued a statement in which she underscored that “France is no longer safe” due to lax border control and immigration regulations which had allowed the spread of Islamic fundamentalism: “Enfin, le fondamentalisme islamiste doit être anéanti. La France doit interdire les organisations islamistes, fermer les mosquées radicales et expulser les étrangers qui prêchent la haine sur notre sol, ainsi que les clandestins qui n’ont rien à y faire.”

Although much of this statement is not altogether objectionable, if one considers that Marine Le Pen has compared Muslims praying in the streets to Nazis, then, in her definition, it seems that a significant percentage of Muslims could theoretically be categorized as “preaching hatred on our soil,” and consequently expelled from France. Evidently, the usage of intentionally vague language tied into a specific historical understanding has survived Jean-Marie Le Pen’s FN into Marine Le Pen’s “new FN.”

Moreover, like her father, Marine Le Pen employs remarkably similar language concerning a unique history rooted in Catholic-Muslim battle, as exemplified by her comments concerning the city of Calais. On October 2 2015, Marine Le Pen delivered an hour-long speech to a group of supporters in Calais in which she solely discussed “la crise des migrants” (at the time of this speech there were about 3,000 migrants in Calais waiting for an opportunity to cross the English Channel): “Calais est une ville assiégée, au sens propre du terme. […] Je n’accepte pas de voir des Français se sentir étrangers

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chez eux. Ne baissez pas la tête. N’oubliez pas que nous sommes ici chez nous.”

Marine Le Pen’s fear that the French will become strangers in their own country recalls when Jean-Marie Le Pen argued “que les Français restent maîtres chez eux.” Further, her assertion that immigrants are besieging Calais is strikingly reminiscent of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s West-East, conflict-centered understanding of history: “Si nous ne nous redressons pas avec courage et détermination, nous serons submergés par des vagues conquérantes comme celles que nos ancêtres brisèrent hier à Marathon, à Salamine, à Lépante, à Poitiers, à Vienne.”

Furthermore, Marine Le Pen—who refers to migrants as “ces vagues humaines de clandestins”—significantly replicates her father’s fear of France becoming submerged under the conquering waves of immigrants: “Aujourd’hui on se retrouve, honnêtement, avec une véritable submersion migratoire.”

Indeed, the FN’s website even has a page inviting readers to sign “la pétition contre la submersion migratoire en France.”

The speech Marine Le Pen delivered following the FN’s victory in six out of thirteen of French mainland regions in the first-round of the December 2015 regional elections further elucidates her repetition of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s historical and political beliefs:

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206 Le Pen, Le Pen La Liberté, 49.
207 Le Pen, Europe: Discours et Interventions, 153.
Mais il [the FN] est aussi le seul [political party], soyez-en sûr, qui pourra reconquérir les territoires perdus de la République, de Calais, où nous faisons ce soir 50% des voix, ou de nos banlieues, et remettre à l’honneur les territoires oubliés de nos campagnes. Il est le seul à défendre une République authentiquement Française, une République qui n’a d’autre vocation que l’intérêt national, le développement de l’emploi français, la préservation de nos modes de vie.\(^{211}\)

Marine Le Pen’s assertion that the FN is the only political party capable of “reconquering lost territories,” is over-laden with themes from Jean-Marie Le Pen’s rhetoric, such as his interpretation of history as the Western, Franco-Greco-Roman forces defending their cities from the invasive waves of Eastern (and North African) Muslims. Thus, when Marine Le Pen argues that Calais, the besieged city, and the suburbs, “many of which have sizable Muslim populations,”\(^{212}\) must be reconquered, she invokes Jean-Marie Le Pen’s conception of European history: “L’histoire de l’Europe, c’est d’abord Marathon, c’est Salamine, c’est Lépante, c’est Vienne, c’est Poitiers.”\(^{213}\)

Although Marine Le Pen has tirelessly worked to brand a “new FN,” the content of her rhetoric reveals a significant adherence to the ideological beliefs of the “old FN.” As detailed earlier, the FN under Marine Le Pen has undergone changes in an attempt to present itself as a progressive party that respects women and their reproductive rights, expresses support for green energy, condemns anti-Semitism and the Holocaust, and does not denounce homosexuality or non-traditional family structures. Furthermore, in addition to attracting more working class voters than her father and an unprecedented


\(^{213}\) Le Pen, Europe: Discours et Interventions, 10.
female constituent base, as well as garnering the same level of support from elderly Catholics as from young men and women, the FN has also attempted to draw in French Arabs and Jews. The FN thus appears to have significantly changed. However, this unprecedented transformation constitutes a veneer, which once etched away, reveals a clear attachment to Jean-Marie Le Pen’s ideological beliefs. As James Shields explains,

Marine Le Pen has been firm in distancing herself from any suggestion of sympathy for Nazism (‘an abomination’) or for the collaborationist Vichy regime of Marshal Pétain; but when she used the term ‘occupation’ to describe the spectacle of Muslims praying in the streets of French towns, she drew knowingly on the same historical repertoire and showed the same talent for provocation as her father.\textsuperscript{214}

Indeed, there are numerous instances when Marine Le Pen has unwittingly exposed her loyalty to the views of the “old FN”: Marine Le Pen has likened Muslims to Nazis, alluded to a Jean-Marie Le Pen-esque understanding of historical Catholic-Muslim battle, exploited World War I and II—like her father—to instill shame and anger in her audience towards immigrants, replicated the idea of being submerged by provisionally peaceful waves of conquering immigrants, and invoked the theories of \textit{la terre et les morts} and \textit{déracinement}.

However, in spite of the abundant examples indicating that the FN has not substantively changed beneath the surface, Marine Le Pen’s campaign of de-demonization has made considerable progress in casting aside its old image. The FN’s constituent base has grown considerably, and if the December 2015 regional elections are any indication, the FN will continue to garner an increasing number of supporters, especially as it fortifies attempts to draw in the middle and upper classes.\textsuperscript{215}

The FN cannot be disregarded. Despite the FN’s defeat during the second round of the December 2015 regional elections, its unprecedented first-round victory in six out of thirteen mainland regions as well as its greatly increasing popularity illustrate an alarming trend in its rise to higher positions in politics. It is of the utmost importance to remain vigilant. In her effort to de-demonize the FN, Marine Le Pen continues to employ an ever-evolving—and increasingly sophisticated—rhetoric intended to veil the influence of the doctrines of the historical extreme-Right explored in this essay. These doctrines, which influence and motivate the FN’s current political aspirations, are rooted in an ideology based on anti-Semitism, xenophobia, Islamophobia, and culturo-scientific racism, as well as dogmatic principles of sacrifice, blood, soil, rootedness, historical (Greco-Roman) tradition, fatherland, and ultra-nationalism. Ignoring the FN’s historical origins ensures that Marine Le Pen’s campaign of de-demonization will continue to obscure them. If the Front National rises to power, France risks being plunged back into the maelstrom of hatred and persecution that it became the last time the extreme-Right led France, catastrophically, during World War II.
Bibliography


