The City as Social Laboratory: Rethinking the University of Chicago’s Role in Hyde Park’s Urban Renewal

by

Amanda Marguerite Faraone
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“...If the city is the world which man created, it is the world in which he is henceforth condemned to live. Thus, indirectly, and without any clear sense of the nature of his task, in making the city man has remade himself.”

Robert E. Park, “The City as Social Laboratory”

“An urban renewal program is the moment of truth in the life of any city or neighborhood. This is the moment when determinations have to be made as to goals and objectives, as to the future character of development and change over at least the ensuing quarter century. It is also the moment when assets and liabilities have to be cast up, when what is wrong and what is right has to be defined.”

Julian H. Levi, Executive Director, South East Chicago Commission, Commencement Address to the John Marshall Law School, 1961

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1 Emphasis mine, Robert E. Park, “The City as Social Laboratory” in Human Communities: The City and Human Ecology (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1952), 73.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis was the culmination of a lifetime of experience and academic exploration in the Hyde Park community, and my first acknowledgment must go to this group of extraordinary thinkers, scholars and community members who raised me. Specifically, I would like to thank my parents, Chris and Susan Faraone, for guiding me throughout this process, editing various drafts and patiently listening to my questions; Professor Danielle Allen, for offering me her knowledge and expertise on the subject; the staff at the University of Chicago Special Collections, for helping me find what I was looking for; Professor James M. Redfield, for telling me so many wonderful stories about the neighborhood as I grew up; Clare and Cordelia Johnson (honorary Hyde Parkers), for being the best sisters I never had, and lending me books and support throughout; and Charles Carpenter, whose kindness and generosity impacted me greatly.

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ABSTRACT

In this thesis, I will explore the role of the University of Chicago in the implementation of Hyde Park’s urban renewal, which took place between 1952 and 1963. Hyde Park—a neighborhood on the South Side of Chicago, which covers the area between 47th Street and 60th Street, from Cottage Grove Avenue to Lake Michigan—experienced significant changes in its built environment as well as its demographics through urban renewal. I have conducted historical archival research on Hyde Park’s renewal, using the tools of comparative historical analysis to present alternative readings of the subject at hand. In this work, I have employed traditional sociological analyses of race, political economy, and power, and contrasted these with the more recent theory of biopower as proposed by Michel Foucault. In examining the role of the University as a white elitist group forwarding an ideology of racial exclusion, an institution of great economic wealth within the “growth machine” and as a knowledge-producer of an ecological urbanism that arises within biopower, I come to argue that all three analyses of the role of the University can be understood through identifying the source of its power.
THE UNIVERSITY AND THE MODERN URBAN PROBLEMATIC:
AN INTRODUCTION TO URBAN RENEWAL

“How uncommonly embarrassing that at a university we accept such a high degree of ignorance about our own circumstances.”
Danielle Allen, Talking to Strangers

Mysteries of Modern Urban Life

On May 26, 2007, a man was shot while walking home on the South Side of Chicago. Charles Carpenter, thirty-eight years old and a father of four, was murdered during “an altercation” on the 2500 Block of East 79th Street, the details of which still remain hazy. The death was reported in detail by only one news outlet, The Chicago Maroon, the University of Chicago’s student newspaper. Carpenter was a long-time employee at a popular student hangout, the Medici Bakery, and so his loss was one felt throughout the University community and the neighborhood of Hyde Park. One of the managers interviewed at the time said, “It’s tough...He had a big impact on everyone in the neighborhood.”

The University’s police, who operate from 39th to 64th Streets, had no authority over the area where Carpenter was shot, and though he was beloved by many in the community, he had no professional affiliation with the school.

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Six months later, on November 19, 2007, Amadou Cisse, a 29-year-old graduate student at the University from Senegal, was shot walking home south of the Midway Plaisance—a strip of parkland separating the north and south sectors of campus—around the 6100 block. (For current maps of Hyde Park and the University of Chicago campus: see Appendix B, Figures 5.1-5.2.) The New York Times ran a piece three days later in which journalist Catrin Einhorn lamented the loss of this student just “weeks before he was to receive his doctorate.” Einhorn described the University’s location as “an island of privilege butted uncomfortably against areas of poverty and crime” and cited the fact that no student had died in or near the campus since July 1977 to emphasize how much of an anomaly Cisse’s death was. One student who was interviewed referred to the invisible boundary Cisse had crossed (south of 61st Street), with fatal consequences: “Once you cross this one little line, you feel like you’re in a different world.” However, no mention was made of Carpenter’s death just six months earlier, or the various under- or un-reported deaths in between. Cisse’s murder is described as shocking, sending “ripples of fear” throughout campus, with police investigating its ties to other crimes that occurred the same night.

No attempt is made, however, either by the journalist, the policemen, or members of the university to relate the murder to the University’s neglect of neighborhoods to its south, including Woodlawn, where Cisse was shot.

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5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
Additionally, there is no mention of the University’s role in the mid-century urban renewal projects that reshaped the landscape of the entire South Side and left many poorer community members without homes and jobs. Although Hyde Park is an affluent middle and upper-middle class community today, the neighborhoods surrounding it have not fared so well. Poverty and crime have resulted in areas, where, according to journalism scholar Alex Kotlowitz, “trust has evaporated because of the absolute, unmitigated destructive power of violence.”

According to Kotlowitz, over 15,000 people have been murdered in Chicago over the past twenty years, a figure greater than the soldiers killed in the recent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq combined. The violence in Chicago, often described as an “epidemic” or “disease” has hit one demographic the hardest: young black men. In 2008, according to a study by the University of Chicago’s Crime Lab, nearly half of people who died from gun violence in Chicago were young black men between the ages of ten and twenty-five.

In neither of these articles, however, is Cisse or Carpenter’s race ever mentioned within the wider discourse about the violence faced overwhelmingly

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7 Alex Kotlowitz, "Khalid,” *Granta* 108 (Summer 2009), 50.
by poor black men on the streets of the South Side of Chicago, and the city as a whole—or the historically-instituted reasons for this violence. The mystery of Cisse’s death, when examined in terms of the wider context, is not a mystery at all. It is merely evidence that issues in the urban environment identified over a hundred years ago are still alive and yet to be solved. These problems of violence, race and class in the city are not new phenomena—in fact, the University of Chicago’s original raison d’etre arose in large part from John D. Rockefeller’s commitment to studying and solving modern problems of city life.

Central Questions

In this thesis project, I examine the role that the University of Chicago played in the urban renewal process that transformed the Hyde Park-Kenwood area between 1952 and 1963. I will analyze in the classic Weberian mode the role of status (i.e. race), class and power. In “Class, Status, Party” (1946), Weber establishes the nature of power and its distribution within a community through the three aforementioned groups.10 According to Weber—in a response to Marx no doubt—“economically conditioned power” is not identical to “power as such,” and his argument resides in complicating the relationship between the two. Although classes represent possible “bases for communal action,” this is only if they share a causal component in life chances, one that is “represented

exclusively by economic interests” and under the conditions of the market.\textsuperscript{11} Status groups, on the other hand, are communities “of an amorphous kind” who share a specific style of life that distinguishes their honor status as higher than those of other groups.\textsuperscript{12} Although these two groups often overlap, the fundamental distinction, according to Weber, lies in the fact that classes are determined according “to the production and acquisition of goods” and status groups are distinguished according to the principle of the consumption of goods.\textsuperscript{13} Parties, on the other hand, attain power in a variety of ways, and might come about because of class or status group interests—or neither. They are interested in gaining political power.\textsuperscript{14} I will contrast this classical model with the more modern writings of Foucault on power, and its relation to knowledge.

More specifically, I am interested in asking the following questions: How did the University enact the program of urban renewal in Hyde Park in the late 1950s? What role did the University play in the implementation of the program—as an association of white elitists employing a racist ideology, a capitalist institution forwarding a growth-machine ideology, or as a center for knowledge-production that sought to answer a new crisis in governance?

\textit{Methodology}

I conducted historical archival research on Hyde Park’s urban renewal, using the tools of comparative historical analysis to present alternative

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid, 186-7.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid, 193.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid, 194-5.
explanations and analyses of the subject. I have examined archival University records, primary studies of the renewal, secondary historical texts, and relevant theoretical texts. Specifically, I ask: Through what mechanisms or strategies of power and control was renewal accomplished? What arguments, narratives, ideologies or theoretical conceptions were used to persuade people at the individual, community, municipal and federal level of its necessity? What was the constellation of forces employed to make urban renewal a reality?

The City as Problematic

At the turn of the nineteenth century, as changes in industrialization caused a massive migration of poor workers into urban centers, increasing population density precipitated issues of poverty, disease, social relations and crime. The intense concentration of human populations existing in one place meant that issues of control, transportation and infrastructure became necessary to confront. Modern thinkers were not only worried about the commodification of space, a problem Marx had noted long before, but also the impact the city had on man’s relationship to man (Simmel, Jacobs, etc.)—what had been lost in the move from small village to large urban center and how alienated the state of modern life had become. In the highly concentrated and intensified daily life in the city, all of society’s problems, it seemed—issues of class, ethnic and racial intolerance, violence, crime, poverty, disease, sexual lasciviousness and other forms of vice—were captured perfectly in the
microcosm of the city. It was not a seamless transition from the village to the city: legislation, policies, and improved technology with regard to improving working and living conditions, plumbing systems and transportation, and mitigating the spread of disease were slow in developing.

The relationship of people to space was rapidly changing—no longer was man at ease in an endless countryside, but he found himself in intense competition and in need of capital in order to own space. Space itself, as Henri Lefebvre famously wrote, as a symbolic representation of social relations, is also both produced as a commodity and a means of production:

Though a product to be used, to be consumed, it is also a means of production; networks of exchange and flows of raw materials and energy fashion space and are determined by it. Thus this means of production, produced as such, cannot be separated either from the productive forces, including technology and knowledge, or from the social division of labour which shapes it, or from the state and the superstructure of society.

Robert Ezra Park, a scholar of sociology at the University of Chicago, was profoundly interested in the problem of urban space, and the competition that ensued in the urban sphere, writing in The City: “We may express the relation of the city to this fact in general terms by saying that the effect of the urban environment is to intensify all effects of crisis.” In his work, along with other scholars at the University, he developed theories that explained how populations

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moved within the city, and how surviving the crises inherent to city life could result in greater “mental stimulation and greater intelligence” for man.\textsuperscript{18} Furthermore, Park believed, because of this stimulation, and the erosion of tradition, that the city was actually the birthplace of “the individual man as a unit of thought and action.”\textsuperscript{19} In his work, we see a turn towards \textit{urbanism}, the study of the city as a unique social realm.

Scholars and institutions of higher learning, usually confined to rural havens, began conducting research in the city, and, at the turn of the twentieth century, the city became a major locus of analysis. Before the University of Chicago’s founding in 1892, soon-to-be President William Rainey Harper gave a speech at Columbia University, and addressed the advantages and challenges of the newly formed urban university:

\begin{quote}
A university which will adapt itself to urban influence, which will undertake to serve as an expression of urban civilization, and which is compelled to meet the demands of an urban environment will in the end become something essentially different from a university located in a village or a small city.\textsuperscript{20}
\end{quote}

With the opening of these new urban universities, new research technologies were developed as well—the social sciences used quantitative analysis and created statistical models to explore these emerging theories of the city. The University of Chicago in particular saw investigating questions about the city as central to its mission, because it was in the city where the problems of modern life could be studied, and hopefully one day, be solved.

\begin{flushright}\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.  \\
\textsuperscript{19} Park, \textit{The City}, 73.  \\
\textsuperscript{20} Bachin, \textit{Building the South Side}, 27.\end{flushright}
Defining Urban Renewal

Urban renewal, like that in Hyde Park in the early 1950s, was a relatively new phenomenon in post-war American cities. Although cities had practiced programs of “slum removal” for some time, urban renewal sought to protect and rescue certain parts of the urban environment from extinction while removing other perceived negative elements. In practice, this meant the systematic evaluation of positive and negative influences of the built environment on social and economic problems. New federal legislation on home and housing, which underwrote the mass exodus of many urbanites into the suburbs—in partnership with expanding auto and consumer goods industries—gave municipal authorities and eventually private corporations and individuals the power of eminent domain to combat ill-defined notions of “slums” and “blight.” The Illinois Blighted Areas Redevelopment Act of 1947 established the precedent of using legislative tools to combat blight, which was later adopted at the federal level.\(^\text{21}\) Mass migration from the American South at the turn of the century flooded the housing market and resulted in extreme population densities, made more problematic by a racially segregated housing market. Violent clashes, bombings, and riots in cities across the nation—most notably in Chicago (1919) and Detroit (1943)—as well as the economic downgrading of inner-city neighborhoods through the Federal Housing Administration's biased mortgage-lending practices, (i.e. redlining) meant that the issue of race in the housing market could no longer be ignored.

Urban renewal, and planning generally, became important to academic disciplines as well as part of a newly expanding real estate market that sought to extract profit by increasing rents in the urban sphere. Programs of urban renewal, which aimed to address issues of blighted and near-blighted neighborhoods in order to save the city, arose during a wave of conservationist policies starting during the New Deal.22 Hyde Park’s renewal was one of the first projects of urban renewal in the United States and piloted legislation that would be applied to cities across the nation, often with disastrous results. The legacy of urban renewal has since been criticized variously: for, much like the older programs of “Negro removal,” excluding blacks from the best neighborhoods in the city; for producing legislation that destroyed low-income housing in the city without ever replacing it; and, for veritably paving the way for gentrification.

Key Sources

The research I have conducted for my thesis project has come out of various archival, primary, secondary and theoretical sources. In terms of primary resources about Hyde Park’s renewal, I was lucky to have access to

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22 Jennifer S. Light writes about a shift in the discourse surrounding cities that emphasized their naturalness starting in the 1920s: “Renewal emphasized a comprehensive strategy of redevelopment, rehabilitation, and conservation that targeted phases of cities’ “life cycles” and relied on collaboration between national experts and local grassroots volunteers. The program marked the culmination of four decades of work from academic social scientists, city planners, and real estate appraisers who sought to deliver the prestige and predictability of the natural sciences and scientific management of nature to the development of urban research and policy,” The Nature of Cities: Ecological Visions and the American Urban Professions, 1920-1960 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 1-2.
manifold documents on the topic. Much of these came from Special Collections Research Center at the University of Chicago’s Regenstein Library, where the University had a dozen boxes of primary materials on Hyde Park’s renewal, including letters and documents from the President’s Office, official press releases, magazine and newspaper clippings, official municipal plans for the area, and speeches made by University and city officials on the topic. Of these, one of my greatest finds was an oral history of Julian H. Levi’s experience in Hyde Park, conducted in 1994 by Daniel Meyer, Associate Director & University Archivist, Special Collections Research Center, Regenstein Library. Another invaluable primary resource came in the form of Julia Abrahamson’s A Neighborhood Finds Itself (1959). Abrahamson was a community member heavily involved in the renewal process, and her book details the role of the Hyde Park Kenwood Community Conference (HPKCC) in actualizing the renewal.

Around the time of the renewal, there were several academic texts written about Hyde Park’s case in particular, and these have been central in grounding my own understanding of the project. Peter H. Rossi and Robert A. Dentler wrote the seminal text on Hyde Park’s urban renewal, The Politics of Urban Renewal: the Chicago Findings (1961), a close quantitative and qualitative analysis of the renewal. In Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960 (1983), Arnold R. Hirsch outlines the larger history of the Great Migration and demographic change in Northern American cities, as well as the structure of racism that allowed for the building of the modern urban ghetto. In “A neighborhood on a hill: Hyde Park and the University of Chicago,” he
outlines the effect of this structure in Hyde Park's renewal project. In another study of Hyde Park's renewal, Brian J. L. Berry, Sandra J. Parsons and Rutherford H. Platt focused on how small businesses were affected (most were destroyed) in *The Impact of Urban Renewal on Small Business: the Hyde Park-Kenwood Case* (1968).

For a general history of Hyde Park, Chicago and the University of Chicago, several other texts proved central. Robin F. Bachin's history of the South Side of Chicago, *Building the South Side: Urban Space and Civic Culture in Chicago, 1890-1919* (2004), was an incredible exploration of the area's history. The history of the Chicago School of Sociology, important to my last chapter, was helped greatly by Andrew Abbott’s *Department and Discipline: Chicago Sociology at One hundred* (1999). More recently, Rebecca Janowitz, a native Hyde Parker and daughter of Chicago sociologist Morris Janowitz, wrote a more informal history of Hyde Park's culture, focusing on the neighborhood as a birthplace of independent thinking and politics that contributed to Barack Obama's success, entitled *Culture of Opportunity: Obama's Chicago: the People, Politics, and Ideas of Hyde Park* (2010). For a history of the conservationist movement and the genealogy of ecological urbanism at the Chicago School, Jennifer S. Light's *The Nature of Cities: Ecological Visions and the American Urban Professions, 1920—1960* (2009) has been an invaluable resource. The works of Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Homer S. Hoyt are also elemental to my exploration of the shifting sociological understandings of the urban landscape.
Theoretical grounding came from many different texts: on urban renewal, on the production of space, on critical race theories, political economy, and power, as well as many others. In my analysis of the role of race, I rely heavily on Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton’s *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of an Underclass* (1993), Eduardo Bonilla-Silva’s *Racism Without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States* (2006) and the work of Mary Pattillo. For my analysis of political economy, I rely on the theoretical texts of Max Weber, Robert A. Dahl, C. Wright Mills and G. William Domhoff on power and elites. More importantly, I have adopted the concept of the “growth machine” which powers urban development from John R. Logan and Harvey L. Molotch’s *Urban Fortunes: the Political Economy of Place* (1987). For my last chapter, on the changing role of governance, I employ Michel Foucault’s 1978-1979 lectures on biopower at the Collège de France, as well as other related material, which I summarize and examine in great detail.

*Chapter Summary*

In this thesis, I will examine urban renewal in Hyde Park from three different angles: racism, political economy and biopower. In my first chapter, I will provide a general history of Hyde Park, the University of Chicago and the urban renewal area. In my second chapter, I will provide a more general history of the Great Migration and the history of residential segregation in Chicago and Hyde Park. Through an examination of the particular role of the University and
the Community Conference, I ask whether we can see Hyde Park’s renewal as a successful project of integration—or merely a newer form of racism. Next, in chapter three, I will look at the role capitalism played in the way urban renewal functioned, and ask if the University was merely acting out of institutional preservation and capitalist expansion, or if it was part of a larger growth machine in post-war American cities. In my last chapter, I will take a different approach from the current literature on urban renewal, and examine the project as an example of Foucault’s conception of biopower. In my conclusion, I will bring these radically different approaches into play with one another and ask to what extent we can see the role of the University in Hyde Park’s renewal as being defined by racism, political economy or biopower.

My Problematic

I grew up in Hyde Park. My father is a professor at the University and my mother worked there as a fundraiser for sixteen years. We lived in Burton-Judson, a dormitory built on South Campus, for four years. My brother and I both attended the University’s Laboratory Schools, which housed and was a pilot project of the University’s Department of Education for over a hundred years before the department closed. My friend’s father, Professor James Redfield, of an older generation, would tell us stories of the days when members of the Department would do experiments on the children at Lab to test John Dewey’s theories of pragmatism. His father, James Redfield, was a famous anthropologist at the University of Chicago, and his grandfather was Robert E. Park, who many
associate with the birth of American Sociology—or at least name as the father of Chicago School sociology. Another of Jamie’s ancestors, a Kennicott, was one of the first people to move to the Hyde Park area, and he named the neighborhood Kenwood after the great house on Hampstead Heath in London.  

Charles Carpenter was shot a week before I graduated from high school. I was a regular at the café—just a block from my school—and had known him since the age of thirteen. He never remembered my name but would call me “Beautiful” or “Sweetheart” and would sometimes give my friends and me free drinks. The younger brother of a friend of mine, when asked to interview one of his heroes, chose Charles. He spent hours writing up a report on Carpenter’s life: how he had four children, worked several jobs and was in school getting a degree. When Amadou Cisse died several months later, I couldn’t help but feel indignant that Carpenter’s life had gone almost unacknowledged, though the deaths seemed so similar. Carpenter lived twenty blocks south of the University, but he was a prominent figure in Hyde Park—the neighborhood lines dividing “Hyde Park” from “Woodlawn” and “South Shore” were just that to me: lines on a map that had no grounding in reality. I felt, rather, that this was a community—that we were all in this together, that violence of that nature was not to be accepted no matter how far south of the Midway it occurred.

23 Although Abrahamson writes that it was John Kennicott who named Kenwood after his mother’s birthplace in Scotland, Jamie assures me that this is a common misconception, and it was John’s brother, the dentist, who named Kenwood, Julia Abrahamson, *A Neighborhood Finds Itself* (Harper: New York, 1959), 4; Email: Re: Questions About the Redfield Legacy, from James Redfield to the author April 6, 2011.
To say that this work is rooted in personal concerns is a colossal understatement. My initial forays into the matter at hand were propelled by anger, shame and guilt about what this meant about the University, which had shaped my identity in so many ways, and its relationship to the community—my community. Carpenter’s death struck a chord within me, and the two different responses to the deaths of Cisse and Carpenter incited in me endless contemplation of the matter. The urban renewal that the neighborhood went through in the 1950s had something to do with it, I was sure, but how? What had the University done, exactly, and what did it mean? How had it influenced the physical and demographic makeup of these communities that I had accepted my whole life as “natural”? This thesis, far from being a culmination of ten months’ research and work, has been percolating in my mind since the day Carpenter died, and is informed—and often, perhaps, misinformed—by a lifelong relationship with the University and the community of people who raised me.

Eventually, the question, as these things do, evolved gradually into something else, a concern for what kind of process urban renewal was and what role the University had played in it—whether renewal was the product of a racially exclusive community, an institution imbued within the growth machine, or a site of knowledge-production. Over time, I began to question whether the commonly told narratives of guilt and pain vis-à-vis renewal—of racial tensions, hatred and capitalist greed—were helpful in understanding what had happened, or whether they perhaps merely reinscribed a discourse of that pain. I started to
question my own problematic, my own guilty conscience, and my own role in the community. Throughout, I remained, above all, interested in how the different manifestations of the University's role and its different functions bled into the surrounding world, and how the University of Chicago, formed to answer questions about the urban problematic, ended up creating its own.
I. THE UNIVERSITY AND THE HYDE PARK STORY:

PIONEERS OF URBAN RENEWAL

“...Urban Renewal has not been an isolated experience. The fact that we could build a stable, interracial community is only the latest example of Hyde Park’s ability to *transcend justice* into human terms...We are justifiably proud of our achievement. People come from all over the world to look at us and be amazed. They should. We are living our beliefs.”

Helen Robbins Bitterman, “The Biggest Little Village in the World—Its First One Hundred Years”

“I don’t consider myself a Chicagoan. I consider myself a Hyde Parker,”

Richard Epstein, James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago

Native Son

When little known United States Senator Barack Obama first stepped onto the national political stage, widespread interest in his background led droves of journalists and political pundits into fixating on his history as a community organizer in Chicago. As his 2008 presidential campaign progressed, the neighborhood where Obama had spent most of his adult life, Hyde Park, became a topic of national interest. Like the man himself, Hyde Park was a unique and complex place “different from anywhere in America”—perfect for biracial Obama, because it was also “the most racially integrated neighborhood


in the nation’s most racially segregated city.”

Part of Hyde Park’s uniqueness, according to a *Weekly Standard* article, lies in decisions made in the 1950s in an urban renewal project. According to now deceased community leader Rabbi Arnold Wolf, this project was based on “a rational, progressive philosophy based on experience.” And, according to Wolf, “This neighborhood is genuinely integrated. We did it here, we really did it!” In the interview, he also acknowledged, however, that this integration came at the cost of older neighborhood traditions as well as the complete eradication of the lower class. Even so, Ferguson wrote that Hyde Park’s urban renewal, one of the first of its kind in the country, led the way for a generation of similar projects, and in Hyde Park’s case at least worked “like a Swiss watch.”

During the campaign, many highlighted Hyde Park’s uniqueness in order to cast doubt on Obama’s background and ability to understand America. The neighborhood of Hyde Park, from an outsider’s perspective, was often described as alienating. Michelle Obama, who grew up nearby, also on the South Side of

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4 Ibid. The claim that Chicago is the most racially segregated city in the United States as well as the claim that Hyde Park is the most integrated in Chicago are often contested, as are the tools of analysis used to determine those levels of segregation/integration.

5 Wolf, in addition to being the rabbi of KAM for many years, was in his younger days a radical Jewish leader famous for criticizing the Jewish community as being racist and bourgeois, and once said: “The bourgeois Jew will hold art fairs for civil rights organizations and not demand to know where the money goes, because he does not really care” as quoted in Seth Forman, *Blacks in the Jewish Mind: a crisis of liberalism* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 67.

6 Ferguson, “Mr. Obama’s Hyde Park,” 3.

7 Though similar projects were being developed in Chicago, at Illinois Institute of Technology, for example, in Hirsch, 135.

8 Ferguson, “Mr. Obama’s Hyde Park,” 3.
Chicago, had a very different experience of the Hyde Park community as a child than in later years. In a TIME cover story, she told reporters that “[The University of Chicago] was a fancy college, and it didn’t have anything to do with me.”\(^9\) Though her mother worked as a secretary at the University for many years, Michelle told reporters: “I never set foot on campus...We came through, we picked [my mom] up, we left.”\(^10\) It is clear in her statements that the relationship between Hyde Park and surrounding neighborhoods was an uneasy one, shaped undoubtedly by the legacy of the renewal project. The separateness of the Hyde Park community from the rest of Chicago was evident as well in claims made during the election that Obama was an intellectual elitist too distant from “mainstream” America, who had chosen to live in a neighborhood so “different” from everywhere else. None of the journalistic attempts to categorize Hyde Park during the election captured the total narrative of its development, however. Hyde Park’s story is one with a complicated trajectory, influenced in no small part by the history of the University of Chicago and the urban renewal that happened there.


"A Community Fights For Its Life"\textsuperscript{11}

On March 27, 1952, two thousand residents of Hyde Park congregated in an ornate room used for large gatherings named Mandel Hall at the University of Chicago. The Chancellor of the University, Lawrence A. Kimpton, had come to speak about growing concerns in the community over increasing rates of crime in the area. This was the first time that University officials met with the community to address these concerns.\textsuperscript{12} At the meeting, Kimpton established the Committee of Five, with himself as chairman, to address the issues at hand, primary among them: crime prevention and "the attack against illegal conversions of old houses and apartments." At a later meeting in May, the Committee formed the South East Chicago Commission, a University-run organization, which would "act as a listening post for the entire community," in terms of crime and changes in the community.\textsuperscript{13} This would be the organization that was responsible for organizing Hyde Park’s renewal. (For a detailed timeline of Hyde Park and its urban renewal, please see Appendix A.)

Urban renewal in Hyde Park, which began at the end of World War II and came to completion in the late ‘50s, changed both the physical and demographic make-up of the neighborhood. Leading up to renewal, the percentage of non-whites in the total population, mostly black, increased from 6 percent to 36


\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
percent between 1950 and 1956: an increase of 500 percent in absolute terms.\textsuperscript{14} This was due in general to the migration of workers from the South following World War II, and specifically by the clearance of the Lake Meadows site to the north of Hyde Park, which precipitated a sudden increase of blacks to the Hyde Park area.\textsuperscript{15} As was the case in other neighborhoods faced with racial turnover, this meant that many community members, either by choice or because of demolition projects, left before, during and after renewal. Among the 20,000 whites who left Hyde Park in the late ‘50s were half of its Jewish population,\textsuperscript{16} a phenomenon noted in communities across the South Side. Other ethnic groups left during this time period as well: after renewal, the Japanese-American population of Hyde Park had disappeared almost entirely.\textsuperscript{17} Through renewal, and the resulting demolition projects, half of the uprooted white families in Hyde Park and less than a fifth of uprooted black families were re-located within Hyde Park; the rest were forced to leave.\textsuperscript{18}

The project of urban renewal in the Hyde Park neighborhood,\textsuperscript{19} which took place in a series of four different projects over roughly a decade (1952-1963) was undertaken with the support and leadership of the University of Chicago, in order to create a community “appropriate for our faculty members

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid, 21; 47.
\textsuperscript{15} Hirsch, \textit{Making the Second Ghetto}, 136.
\textsuperscript{16} Rebecca Janowitz, \textit{Culture of Opportunity} (Ivan R. Dee: Chicago, 2010), 129.
\textsuperscript{17} Abrahamson, \textit{A Neighborhood}, 320.
\textsuperscript{18} Hirsch, \textit{Making the Second Ghetto}, 169.
\textsuperscript{19} Which also included some sections of Kenwood, the neighborhood directly to the north of the University.
and students.” Renewal, unlike older forms of slum removal, endeavored to renew and improve an entire neighborhood instead of focusing only on the destruction of blighted areas. According to Julian H. Levi, head of the SECC, renewal in Hyde Park occurred through the combined action of the University, the community, and the city, and included: changes in law enforcement, better enforcement of building codes, federal grants awarded to the University for planning purposes, and changes in state and federal legislation which enabled the University to make changes to the built environment surrounding it. (For images of the University campus before and after renewal, see Appendix C, Figures 6.1-6.3.)

The renewal entailed a type of urban planning and competition for commercial development never before seen. The end result was the demolition of nearly 200 acres surrounding the University; the development of three new shopping centers, 250 townhouses, and two apartment buildings; five

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21 Hirsch on the move from “slum removal” to “urban renewal”; “The movement across the urban racial frontier and redefinition of ghetto borders also led directly to the next phase of the government’s postwar revitalization program: urban renewal. Redevelopment had always been closely associated with slum clearance. The semantic shift to ‘urban renewal’ indicated a substantive de-emphasis of the concern with slums. A new approach was justified, the National Commission on Urban Problems later concluded, ‘as a broader design to rebuild the cities,’” emphasis mine, ed. Arnold R. Hirsch and Raymond A. Mohl, Urban Policy in Twentieth-Century America (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1993), 89.


buildings for married student housing to the northwest of campus; new student dorms south of the Midway; as well as the renovation of existing buildings and other construction projects. In 1954, five different redevelopers, keen to be a part of such a high-profile development, submitted plans for Hyde Park A and B. As an editorial in the Chicago Tribune noted, “No other project of this kind in the United States...has ever attracted this kind of competition.”

New York firm Webb & Knapp, headed by William Zeckendorf, was chosen, with a plan that assigned well over half of the 35.1 acres for residential use, one third for shopping and parking, and the rest for public and institutional purposes.

Due to the enactment of these plans and the increased commercial development in the area, Hyde Park in 1964 boasted rising property values, a competitive financial loan market, a residential vacancy rate much lower than the city average and a 50 percent reduction in crime, according to some sources.

What happened in Hyde Park, however, was not an entirely unique case, although the outcome might have been. The decisions that Hyde Parkers faced

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24 Abrahamson, A Neighborhood, 206.
26 Dentler and Rossi, The Politics of Urban Renewal, 93.
27 Editorial in the Chicago Tribune, as quoted in Abrahamson, A Neighborhood, 201.
28 Ibid.
29 Friedman, To Mr. George Allen, 2-3; The accuracy of recorded crime rates before and after renewal, a cornerstone of many of the arguments in favor of renewal, is one that is still contested today, see Herbert J. Gans, “The Failure of Urban Renewal: a Critique and Some Proposals,” American Jewish Committee (1965).
in those early years of "encroachment" by black neighborhoods were decisions confronting neighborhoods across Chicago and cities across the nation. A new urban landscape—formed by the in-migration of new racial groups, changing industries after the war, the razing of neighborhoods for the new interstate highway system, and federal housing policies that implicitly underwrote a mass white exodus from urban centers into the newly built suburbs—seemed ready-made to shield wealthy white Americans from the truth of integration, the full realization of Brown. Before endeavoring to understand the full complexity of urban renewal in Hyde Park and the larger political scene at the time, however, one must understand the history of the neighborhood itself and how it overlaps with the University's own history.

*The University and the Village*

Pioneered by developer Paul Cornell, Hyde Park was born with the arrival of the train. When Cornell gave sixty acres to the Illinois Central Railroad in 1853, Hyde Park became the first suburban outlet south of the Loop. Cornell, who bought the land for Hyde Park in the 1840s, envisioned it as a suburban resort town where people could retreat to the quiet and beauty of the lakeshore. In order to accomplish this dream, Cornell fought hard to keep Hyde Park free of industry and to preserve the public ownership of parks in

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Chicago.\footnote{Janowitz, \textit{Culture of Opportunity}, 24.} “A pioneer in urban design,” according to Janowitz, Cornell was not alone in his fight to preserve a nature that all could enjoy: city planner Daniel Burnham worked alongside him to keep Chicago true to its official motto, “urbs in horto.”\footnote{Translation: “The city in the garden,” ibid, 25.} With the development of a second rail station, Hyde Park was officially incorporated as a village of 48 square miles in 1861.\footnote{Dentler and Rossi, \textit{The Politics of Urban Renewal}, 11.}

Following the Great Fire of 1871, Hyde Park and Kenwood, the neighborhood just to the north, experienced a surge in growth that affected both its physical and demographic make-up. Property values around 53rd and 55th streets increased from $100 to $15,000 an acre.\footnote{Bachin, \textit{Building the South Side}, 38.} The “neighborhood” at this point actually consisted of three separate areas: Hyde Park; Kenwood, and; South Park, where middle- and working-class people lived in cottages on the outskirts of the city.\footnote{Ibid.} As Hyde Park’s center became more commercialized, workers, mostly immigrants from Germany, Sweden and Ireland, moved into the center. Older residents moved north to Kenwood, where sprawling mansions on deep lots housed the likes of Martin Ryerson, leading lumberman and capitalist in the city,\footnote{“Guide to the Martin Ryerson. Papers 1858,” \textit{The University of Chicago Library, Archive and Manuscripts Finding Aids}, accessed on April 1, 2011, http://ead.lib.uchicago.edu/rs3.php?eadid=ICU.SPCL.RYERSONM&format=raw-xml&collection=project/SCRC.} Julius Rosenwald of Sears, Roebuck and Co., and Joseph Schaffner of Hart, Schaffner and Marx.\footnote{Bachin, \textit{Building the South Side}, 39.} The residents of Kenwood were middle- and upper
class, mostly Protestant and white, with a minority of German Jews. In 1870, according to one analysis, there were only eight African Americans in Hyde Park-Kenwood: five domestic servants and three children.

In 1890, with a population of 85,000, Hyde Park-Kenwood announced itself as “the largest village in the world.” All was not well in the village, however: tensions between class and ethnic groups had translated into attempts to divide the area into Hyde Park, Kenwood and South Park several times. When the Illinois Supreme Court approved in 1889 the bill that would allow for annexation to the city of Chicago and consolidation of adjacent territories, the three neighborhoods voted on the fate of their “village.” (For a map of Hyde Park in 1888, see Appendix B, Figure 3.1). Many opposed annexation, especially the rich Chicagoans in the northern sector, who feared infringement by municipal government and a loss of liquor controls. However, the South Park contingent, who approved of annexation, outweighed the rest. Hyde Park then became a part of the city, for better or for worse, just three years before the opening of the University of Chicago.

The University’s location in the City was also no accident—the original charter stipulated that it must be in a city. Chicago, at the turn of the century

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40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
44 Ibid, 41.
46 Bachin, *Building the South Side*, 27.
the “Hog Butcher for the World,” certainly faced the consequences of industrialization and rapid urbanization in the modern city: poverty, densely populated slums, and unsanitary and dangerous working conditions, as described famously in Upton Sinclair’s *The Jungle* (1906). Nonetheless, the City was the “commercial, political, social, religious, educational center of a wide empire,” according to Goodspeed. This was apparent at the University’s opening on October 1, 1892, which came just two weeks before the dedication of the fairgrounds of the World’s Columbian Exposition on plots neighboring the University. The first Ferris Wheel was constructed on a field directly adjacent to campus, a symbol of American progress and innovation.

From its inception, the founders saw the University as an institution that would use the highest ideals of knowledge in order to solve persistent social and industrial ills in the urban sphere. Founded as a Baptist institution, oil tycoon and philanthropist John D. Rockefeller donated $600,000 for the University of Chicago’s initial development, about $14 million today. Rockefeller would

49 As quoted in Bachin, *Building the South Side*, 29.
50 Ibid, 5.
51 The original University of Chicago, established by Stephen Douglas in 1857 as a Baptist mission school, shut down two decades later due to financial problems, until Thomas Goodspeed, a member of the University community, resurrected it when he heard that Rockefeller wanted to found a Baptist school, ibid, 28.
52 Ibid, 31.
later describe it as the “best investment” he ever made. President William Rainey Harper, a leading scholar of the Old Testament, believed that it would form “a new type of university,” which saw the city as a laboratory and sought to solve contemporary problems through the scientific method. According to Martin Ryerson, president of the Board of Trustees, “We know that in the presence of the great social and industrial problems of the day we cannot afford to leave concealed any part of the truth which the human is capable of grasping.” This was apparent, too, in the social sciences developed there. Albion Small, a sociology professor at the University, later remarked that “it is doubtful if higher education in the United States ever received as much stimulus from a single event as came to it from the founding of the [University].” The University’s relationship to the city, especially in the social sciences, was apparent early on. Bachin writes, “A discussion of the Sociology Department’s relationship with the city identified Chicago as ‘one of the most complete social laboratories in the world.’” Later, social theorists would form the Chicago School of sociology, which led the way in capturing and quantifying city life in a new theory of urbanism, which saw the city as a living and breathing organism or ecology.

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55 Bachin, Building the South Side, 25; 27; 29.  
58 Bachin, Building the South Side, 106.
Beginning in the 1920s, a nation-wide focus on the American city, funded in large part by the federal government, directly involved many faculty members at the University in studying problems of urban life. This coincided with the inception of the Chicago School of sociology, and its members played a role in not only defining neighborhoods and positing theories about racial secession but also in determining the real policies that these theories engendered. As early as 1926, sociologist Ernest W. Burgess assisted Northwestern University economics professor Richard Ely, the Director of the Institute for Research in Land Economics and Public Utilities, with his work on the Chicago Housing Commission—a organization that would play a major role in Chicago's renewal.59 These academics not only devised the theories that veritably defined our understanding of the city, but also were actively engaged in enacting policies to change it.

The influence of the University of Chicago’s urban research became most explicit in the land-use and mortgage-ratings policies of the Federal Housing Agency. A former student of Louis Wirth, Chicago economist Homer S. Hoyt worked for the nascent Federal Housing Agency in Washington, D.C. The research Hoyt conducted and assembled during this time was later published in his landmark book, *The Structure and Growth of American Cities* (1939), which

was used as the benchmark for federal mortgage-rating systems for years to come. Hoyt returned to Chicago in 1935, where he had been asked to head a land use survey under the Works Progress Administration.\textsuperscript{60} He formed a preliminary technical advisory board for the survey, which included Wirth.\textsuperscript{61} When the survey began in 1939, Hoyt hired many alumni and continuing students in the University of Chicago’s social sciences departments to head and staff its research division: “university documents suggest faculty viewed such extracurricular collaborations as essential to students’ training.”\textsuperscript{62}

Much of the research on urban blight and conservation at the time was conducted in Hyde Park and neighboring areas, a fact that no doubt led to the relative ease with which Hyde Park carried out its renewal plans. In 1939, the Home Owner’s Loan Corporation (HOLC) experimented with two surveys in American neighborhoods: Waverly, in Boston, and Woodlawn, directly south of Hyde Park. The focus was on “neighborhood conservation” in the case of “borderline” neighborhoods—places where racial change, codified as “blight,” was becoming an issue. Assisting the project was a cast of governmental and municipal organizations: the Chicago Plan Commission, city departments, Chicago businesses, and federal agencies including the US Housing Authority and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, many which would be later involved in Hyde Park’s renewal.\textsuperscript{63}

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid, 76.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid, 77.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid, 77.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid, 64.
The early interest in Hyde Park on the national level would continue on in later studies of the area leading up to the renewal. In 1945, Reginald Isaacs of the Urban Development Division of the National Housing Agency eventually wrote the reports that enabled the South Side to be the first area that qualified for redevelopment. In 1950, at Harvard, he founded the Community Appraisal Study, which assessed the Hyde Park-Kenwood neighborhood in collaboration with the University of Chicago, the Graduate School of Design at Harvard and the Illinois Institute of Technology. Later studies based in Hyde Park, such as those conducted by the Chicago Land Clearance Commission (1953), the Metropolitan and Planning Council (*Conservation*, 1953) and the Community Conservation Board Study (conducted through the National Opinion Research Center, 1956), would play a central role garnering federal attention and resources towards Hyde Park’s plan, in large part because they were based on research that had been conducted there for decades.

*The Effects of Renewal*

The University of Chicago’s plan for urban renewal in Hyde Park entailed the movement and dislocation of many community members and local businesses. In the end, the renewal consisted of four separate projects, between

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64 Ibid, 117. Its members also included famous architects such as Mies van der Rohe, Walter Gropius, Louis Wirth and Martin Meyers.
1952 and 1963. The first project, “Hyde Park A and B,” made possible through the Chicago Land Clearance Commission and a Field Foundation Grant of $100,000, cleared 48 acres at a public cost of $11.5 million. (See Appendix B, Figures 4.1-4.3.) The second project, carried out by the South West Hyde Park Redevelopment Corporation, was made possible by the corporatization of a private neighborhood association under the trusteeship of Levi and other University administrators, using University capital, and consisted of roughly 54 acres from 55th to 59th Streets, and Cottage Grove Avenue to Woodlawn Avenue, excluding the University campus. (See Appendix B, Figure 4.4.) The Hyde Park-Kenwood Urban Renewal Plan, the third project, gave the University control over 591 acres, of which 100 would later be rebuilt, in a tract of land bounded by Cottage Grove Avenue, 47th street, Jackson Park and the Midway. The fourth and final project, named South Campus, took place between 60 and 61st Street from Stony Island to Cottage Grove. The University acquired 27.1 acres in this final project, which was a significant expansion of the University’s physical plant, costing an estimated $6.5 million in federal funding.

The ability to undertake renewal in Hyde Park only came about with the assistance of and interaction between local, municipal, state and national actors. In the end, four different legislative tools would be implemented in the four

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67 Ibid, 4.
68 Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto, 153.
71 Levi (1960), 4-5; Berry, Parsons, Platt, The Impact of Urban Renewal, 48.
72 Friedman, To Mr. George Allen, 15.
projects carried out in Hyde Park, many of them written or amended by University officials. In 1947, the Illinois legislature passed the Blighted Areas Redevelopment Act, which established the right of eminent domain in slum or "blighted" areas, but not in neighboring areas.\(^7\) This would be the legislation used to enact the first project, Hyde Park A and B, but would not cover the area to the west of Ellis Avenue.\(^7\) Levi, a lawyer by trade, convinced the State legislature in 1954 to amend the Neighborhood Redevelopment Act of 1941 so that instead of needing to own 60 percent of the land in a designated redevelopment area, a corporation with consent of 60 percent of property owners would be enough.\(^7\) This would eventually be used to form the South West Hyde Park Redevelopment Corporation, under which the second project would be carried out.\(^7\) The new amendment passed just three months after the Illinois House of Representatives passed the Metropolitan Committee's Conservation Act, and just as the Chicago Land Clearance Commission began its survey of the "most blighted" sections of Hyde Park.\(^7\)

\(^7\) Light, *The Nature of Cities*, 101. The actual definition of "slums" and "blighted areas" is never consistently defined in the legislation. According to Scott Greer, "When one reads the legislation to find the target of the program, the phrase [sic] turns up repeatedly; it is the key term in the program's raison d'être. Yet nowhere in the law is the phrase defined." Furthermore he writes that, "There is a considerable likelihood that the terms 'blight' and 'nonblight' will not be mutually exclusive. Thus, one man's blight may be another man's nonblight, depending upon how important he thinks a condition or characteristic to be. Yet people's homes are condemned and destroyed because they fall in the blight category, and billions of dollars are spent in blight removal. The problem is a crucial one; it is no less than that of defining the official norms of housing in American society," Scott Greer, *Urban Renewal and American Cities* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965), 20-21.


\(^7\) Ibid, 151.

\(^7\) Abrahamson, *A Neighborhood*, 205-6.

\(^7\) Ibid, 195.
Conservation Act of 1953 made “slum prevention a public purpose,” expanded the municipality’s authority over eminent domain, empowered the Community Conservation Board to make repairs on structures, and allowed for community participation in the drafting of local conservation plans. This would be the legislative tool used on the third and largest project, Hyde Park-Kenwood, which, according to Fourteenth Ward Alderman Clarence Wagner, “look[ed] like a U[iversity] of C[ho]icago bail-out.” After this long period of survey work and legislative changes, the arrival of the Federal Housing Act of 1954 gave approval for the urban renewal plans for Hyde Park under its special section on urban redevelopment, and enabled the University to garner federal funding. The Housing Act, which had emerged from President Eisenhower’s Committee on Housing Policies and Programs, was heavily influenced by the legislative changes being enacted in Chicago as well as the Illinois Urban Community Conservation Act. A special subsection of the Federal Housing Act of 1959 entitled Section 112, arrived at through Levi’s appeals to the government, created a special subsidy for universities, which would be used to gain control in the South Campus section.

Through renewal, in order to combat blight, many areas were razed, resulting in the dislocation of many community members. According to a survey in May 1954 by the National Opinion Research Center, which was based at the

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78 Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto, 150.
79 Ibid, 151.
81 Abrahamson, A Neighborhood, 197.
University, out of the 892 families displaced in the first project area (A and B), 72 percent were white, 18 percent were black, 6 percent were Asian and 4 percent were Mexican and Puerto Rican; 45 percent had incomes under $3,500, compared to a median income in 1956 in Hyde Park of $5,862. Of those eligible for public housing, 112 white and 80 nonwhite residents “preferred to continue to live in Hyde Park,” the meaning of which remains ambiguous. In the second project, undertaken by the South West Hyde Park Neighborhood Corporation, the acquisition site which would be sold later to the University for married student housing (14.5 acres) was 79.9 percent black-occupied, in comparison to a racial composition of 54.3 percent black in the surrounding area. In the third project (Hyde Park-Kenwood), which covered all of Hyde Park-Kenwood, with the exclusion of Jackson and Burnham Parks, 4,087 families would be displaced: 41 percent were white, 59 percent were non-white. A total of 3,997 dwelling units were lost in this process, and the new structures were built almost entirely by private developers. The existence of low- and mid-priced housing, therefore, was left entirely up to the market, and the limited

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84 Ibid, 203.
85 Abrahamson, A Neighborhood, 206; Dentler and Rossi, The Politics of Urban Renewal, 159.
87 Ibid.
and scattered public housing built to replace demolished buildings meant that many people were forced to leave Hyde Park altogether.\textsuperscript{88}

The effect on businesses over the course of renewal was great although “not excessive,” according to Berry, Parsons and Platt.\textsuperscript{89} Local businesses’ buildings were acquired by the University, the Redevelopment Corporation or the City, and often they were not compensated for their loss of real estate at all, forcing them to eventually go out of business. In the two main redevelopment projects (Hyde Park A and B, Hyde Park-Kenwood), 641 businesses were displaced—of those, 207 were immediately liquidated, 201 went out of business shortly thereafter, and 233 continued operations elsewhere.\textsuperscript{90} Nearly two-thirds of businesses were liquidated in the wake of the renewal, and, of those still in business, only 13 percent remained in those areas.\textsuperscript{91} In all of Hyde Park-Kenwood, the number of businesses in operation decreased during renewal from 1490 to approximately 700.\textsuperscript{92} Hardly any compensation was given to the businesses lost in the first two projects, and these business owners took their case to the federal level, eventually resulting in the “just compensation” clause in the Housing Act of 1964, which gave them monetary compensation for their lost

\textsuperscript{88} As Levi stated, “there’s no room for public housing except on a very limited basis,” “Oral History Interview,” 34.
\textsuperscript{89} “Not excessive” because: “it was not as it might have become if renewal had not taken place and Hyde Park had experienced the same transition as Woodlawn” and that it “hastened the inevitable” closing of businesses who would not have survived much longer anyway, Berry, Parsons, and Platt, \textit{The Impact of Urban Renewal}, xv.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid, xiv.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid, 83; xiv.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid, xiv.
property.\textsuperscript{93} The lack of monetary compensation to the local businessmen, combined with zoning laws that restricted where businesses in Hyde Park could be located, as well as the arrival of large commercial chains (Walgreen’s) in the new shopping centers, meant that this change was in most cases permanent. Local industry was pushed out and never reestablished. This meant that the process of renewal not only destroyed the local urban ecology it was intended to save, but created barriers to ever rebuilding the business community in Hyde Park.

The numerous losses incurred through urban renewal had a marked effect on the physical appearance of the neighborhood as well as the community. Levi later remarked, when referring to the loss of Second City and the Compass, a beloved theater and bar that had been located in Hyde Park prior to the renewal, that this was something in particular he had regretted deeply: “that was awful,” he said.\textsuperscript{94} Post-renewal, Hyde Park was a neighborhood very much changed in terms of the lack of locally owned businesses and public culture (by way of jazz clubs, hotels, theaters, the 57\textsuperscript{th} Street artist colony, etc.). It would also be obvious in the absence of many community groups, as has already been stated, including large proportions of the Japanese, Jewish, and black communities, and most lower-class residents.

\textit{Narratives of Urban Renewal}

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid xiv, xvi.
Today, Hyde Parkers have inherited the losses of urban renewal along with many conflicting narratives about the process. Two, according to Janowitz, stand out. The first is a story about a community "under the lordship of the University of Chicago," which ignored and therefore condemned the fate of surrounding impoverished neighborhoods to abandonment. The other—arguably the one Janowitz is intent on telling—is one about "fair-minded citizens, many of them women" who resisted white flight and built a racially integrated middle-class community.²⁵ Hyde Park, and its community, was alternately painted as a saintly figure trying to save itself and as a white exclusive enclave viciously resisting attempts at true integration.

The plan of urban renewal realized in Hyde Park over the next decade was used as a national example of the success of urban planning and redevelopment. The history of Hyde Park is seen by some as heroic: in the '50s, when most white Americans in urban centers fled to the suburbs for fear of encroaching slums, Hyde Parkers resisted—they rallied and they stayed. Some of them, at least. Even to this day, Hyde Park is trumpeted by many as an experiment in racial integration that worked: Janowitz writes of its "rare racial balance."²⁶ Others, such as former Chicago humanities professor Danielle Allen, see more ambiguity in Hyde Park’s race relations: she writes that it is a "neighborhood [that] remains biracial more than integrated" and which

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²⁶ Ibid, 6.
continues to experience a residually “poisonous” relationship between community and University members.\textsuperscript{97}

The central question underlying my research on the urban renewal project evolves out of the many contradictory narratives about race, class and identity that are told in this neighborhood, this city and this nation today about what “urban renewal” at the time of its inception meant and how it has shaped the geography of our lives that we understand as \textit{natural} today.\textsuperscript{98} Without the existence of this University, as many have noted, not only would urban renewal have occurred differently in Hyde Park, it might not have happened \textit{at all}. To that end, I am interested in one part of this story that sets what happened in Hyde Park, as the first large-scale project of redevelopment, apart from others: the University. Or more specifically—because Yale, Columbia, and others have since experienced comparable situations—how \textit{this} University, which was built with the intention of studying and solving problems in the city, changed not only the physical environment surrounding it, but how we conceive of man’s relationship to the city itself.

\textsuperscript{97} Allen, \textit{Talking to Strangers}, 180; 184.\textsuperscript{98} Massey and Denton themselves cannot help but begin their explanation of the construction of the ghetto by noting that, “the residential segregation of blacks and whites has been with us so long that it seems a \textit{natural} part of the social order, a normal and unremarkable feature of America’s urban landscape,” Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, \textit{American Apartheid: Segregation and The Making of an Underclass} (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 17, emphasis mine.
II. THE UNIVERSITY AND AN “APPROPRIATE COMMUNITY”:

URBAN RENEWAL AND RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION

“How do you tell desirable from undesirable Negroes?”
James Cunningham, Executive Director of the
Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference,
on the university’s neighborhood policies

“...In Chicago
They've got covenants
Restricting me

Hemmed in
On the South Side,
Can't breathe free...

Langston Hughes,
"Restrictive Covenants" (1948)

A Dream Deferred

In “A Raisin in the Sun,” Lorraine Hansberry’s depiction of residential segregation on Chicago’s South Side, the black Younger family decides to buy a house in an all-white Chicago neighborhood, Clybourne Park. After years of living in a “kitchenette apartment,” the Youngers have finally attained the funds

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1 Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto, 170.
4 A “kitchenette apartment” refers to an illegally subdivided apartment building, usually lacking central heating, gas, electricity, private kitchen and bath. In 1938, 67 percent of all black Chicagoans lived in such conditions, according to a Chicago Housing Association study, Washington, 150. Gwendolyn Brooks, who grew up on the South Side of Chicago, as referenced in George E. Kent, A Life of Gwendolyn Brooks (Lexington, KY:
necessary to move into their dream house. Before moving, however, they are visited by Karl Lindner, chairman of the Clybourne Park Improvement Association, who informs the family “a man, right or wrong, has the right to want to have the neighborhood he lives in a certain kind of way.” Furthermore, although Lindner states that it has nothing to do with racial prejudice, he is of the opinion that “for the happiness of all concerned [we think] that our Negro families are happier when they live in their own communities.” Beneatha Younger later comments on the irony of the message Lindner had imparted to them: “He talked Brotherhood. He said everybody ought to learn how to sit down and hate each other with good Christian fellowship.” Ignoring the warnings of Lindner and others, the Youngers move into their dream home at the end of the play, despite lingering trepidations.

According to bell hooks, Hansberry’s play articulated the worst fears of blacks at the time, especially in relation to white norms. It was “counter-hegemonic,” according to hooks, because “[t]he play ‘interrogated’ the fear within many black people that being out of our place—not conforming to social norms, especially those set by white supremacy, would lead to destruction, even death.” This fear was especially salient in the housing market, but Hansberry

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6 Ibid.

7 Ibid, 121.

8 Bell Hooks, Yearning: Race, Gender and Cultural Politics (Boston: South End Press, 1990), 1.
produced characters that fought against it and moved into a white neighborhood without assimilating to white culture: “they wanted better housing” and nothing else.\textsuperscript{9}

At the beginning of the play, the Younger family lives in Woodlawn, the neighborhood just south of the University of Chicago. This is not a coincidence: Hansberry grew up in Woodlawn, and this play was based on her own experiences with residential segregation. Her father, Carl Hansberry, was the first plaintiff in the 1940 Supreme Court case \textit{Hansberry v. Lee}, which called into question the use of racially restrictive covenants. An earlier case upholding the use of restrictive covenants, \textit{Corrigan v. Buckley} (1926), had been “dismissed for want of jurisdiction,” meaning that the Court had insufficient jurisdiction to give a ruling on the case, because it did not hang upon questions of constitutional law, but upon questions pertaining to the common law of the District of Columbia.\textsuperscript{10}

In the wake of \textit{Corrigan v. Buckley}, the Chicago Real Estate Board started a program to cover entire neighborhoods with restrictive covenants; previously, individual deeds had been used.\textsuperscript{11} Restrictive covenants were legal documents that prevented occupancy by blacks, or other racial and ethnic groups, binding

\textsuperscript{9} Ibid.
both the signer and subsequent purchasers of the property in this agreement.\textsuperscript{12} Hansberry filed the case when his landlord in South Park tried to evict him when he bought a house covenanted by the Woodlawn Property Owner’s Association. There was some dispute at the time as to whether the University was involved, perhaps in its attempts to create a “buffer” zone along 60\textsuperscript{th} Street. Professor Louis Wirth helped to prepare the brief along with Dr. Robert C. Weaver of the Chicago Housing Authority.\textsuperscript{13} Hansberry’s lawyer was Earl Dickerson, a founding member of the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference, who, also black, felt that open occupancy should be a right. Although Hansberry won, it was on a technicality related to the precedent case, a class action suit, and did not change the status of racial covenants before the law.\textsuperscript{14}

*Hyde Park’s Fight Against Blight*

On March 27, 1952, University President Lawrence Kimpton announced at a meeting in Mandel Hall the University’s involvement in the neighborhood, which would dramatically change the demographic future of the neighborhood and those surrounding it. The meeting, called because of a supposed increase in crime, was also in response to a changing population in the neighborhood. Soon

\textsuperscript{12} Kamp writes that although blacks were banned from the property, an exception was made for janitors, chauffeurs and house servants, ibid, 484.


after, at another meeting on May 19, 1952, the SECC was established. As an article in the *Hyde Park Herald* reported a few years later:

> The Commission started because of a rising crime rate in the community and the inability of any existing organization to deal with the problem on an area-wide basis. The organization, which started to handle one specific problem, soon found that all community problems are related to one another.  

According to Dentler and Rossi, between 1950 and 1956 the percentage of nonwhites in Hyde Park increased by forty-five percent and 20,000 whites abandoned the neighborhood. (For table of nonwhite population by land tracts, see Appendix B, Figure 3.3.) The “Black Belt,” Chicago’s densely populated, historically black enclave was just a mile north of Kenwood and the “slums” were fast approaching. (For map of Hyde Park and the “Black Belt,” see Appendix B, Figure 3.2.)

Though race was not explicitly stated as the reason for the University’s interference in the changing neighborhood, the University was well aware of community fears about the encroaching black neighborhoods. At the first community-wide meeting establishing the South East Chicago Commission, it was quite probable that some present community members had heard about the recent rumored abduction and rape of a faculty wife. Kimpton used this fact to his advantage: “We used a rather sensational kidnapping and attempted rape

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18 Ibid, 22.
19 Ibid, 21.
case,” he later wrote, “to bring the community together and announce a plan for the organization of the South East Chicago Commission.” Clearly, the University had its own reasons for intervening in the surrounding neighborhood—namely, the preservation of the University’s success and the distinctive community that existed around it—and was willing to use whatever means available to enact a plan of renewal. In this way, I read the alleged rape and its supposed black perpetrator as much a symbolic representation of the community’s collective id as a real and present fear: the belief that the imminent black invasion would violently violate and destroy white property, threatening the community and University’s very existence.

Through the subsequent urban renewal, the University of Chicago dramatically changed not only the built environment but the local culture and community as well, in order to attain—as the SECC’s Julian H. Levi would later put it—a more “appropriate” community. According to Berry, Platt and Parsons, businesses most likely to be liquidated immediately after renewal were taverns, residential hotels, automobile-related businesses, and ‘ribbon’ concerns (such as service, repair and household supply businesses; as well as wholesalers and manufacturers) decisions that were ultimately shaped by the university’s objectives for the neighborhood. These objectives, according to Jack Meltzer, Director of Planning, were:

(1) To provide an environment suitable to a person who works at the University or who wants to live in a pleasant community near a university;

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21 Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto, 144.
23 Berry, Parsons, and Platt, The Impact of Urban Renewal, 132.
(2) to obtain a community which is open to residents on the basis of free choice, meaning the freedom for anyone who can afford the cost of accommodations to move in; (3) to obtain an integrated community.24

The rhetoric of suitability, appropriateness and compatibility in terms of who was allowed to continue residence in the area, as well as openness and integration, were central to the narrative that the University and community members used to explain the renewal at the time. No matter what words were used, however, it is apparent that urban renewal was contingent upon substantial displacement of populations, and was, furthermore, a tool that allowed the University to draw distinctions between who was going to be a part of the community and who was not. Moreover, it was underwritten by federal funding and federal legislation, which clearly condoned ideas of improvement and degradation tied to race. The unclear and undefined idea of “blight” at the heart of renewal gave license to those in power to take away people’s ownership of land, tear down buildings and force them out of the neighborhood.25 As we will explore in the next section, however, the tactic of urban renewal as a buffer against blacks moving into the neighborhood was merely a continuation of a history of racial residential segregation that the University had been participating in for decades.

24 Emphasis mine, Interview with Jack Meltzer, former Director of Planning, University of Chicago Planning Unit, August 1966, as cited in ibid, 11.

25 As Scott Greer examines in Urban Renewal and American Cities; The Dilemma of Democratic Intervention, while lamenting the elusive definition of blight in federal legislation: “There is a considerable likelihood that the terms ‘blight’ and ‘nonblight’ will not be mutually exclusive. Thus, one man’s blight may be another man’s nonblight, depending upon how important he thinks a condition or characteristic to be. Yet people’s homes are condemned and destroyed because they fall in the blight category, and billions of dollars are spent in blight removal. The problem is a crucial one; it is no less than that of defining the official norms of housing in American society,” (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), 21.
Knowing the history of residential segregation in Northern cities like Chicago is paramount in understanding the Hyde Park case. Issues of racism lie at the heart of Hyde Park’s story—and I argue that both the University and the community were well aware of this as they developed one of the first American urban renewal projects. In this chapter, I argue that race, as a category fundamentally distinct from class, is the factor that determined how and why urban renewal took place the way it did in Hyde Park. And despite some bright-eyed liberal sentiment and democratic involvement, in the end, renewal was merely a newer, more acceptable plan for ensuring residential segregation in the city and controlling the movement of the black population. When Executive Director of the SECC Julian H. Levi asked for an “appropriate” community for students and faculty members, it was clear—despite his emphasis on class—that he meant one that reflected white cultural norms, as will be explored later on. Similarly, the Conference, fighting for an “integrated” community, wanted at the same time to restrict who was allowed into the neighborhood.

The Second City

Chicago, the stage for this narrative, embodies the deep contradictions about race that history has impressed upon it. In order to understand the circumstances that led to renewal in Hyde Park, it is essential to understand the historically contextualized reasons for blacks’ segregation within the city. Founded in the late 1700s by a free black man, Jean Baptiste Point DuSable, Chicago from the first was formed and influenced by its black residents. At its
incorporation in 1837, out of 4,170 residents, only seventy-seven were black. By 1844, there were one hundred and fifty-five black residents, five of whom owned property in the city. When Congress passed the Fugitive Slave Law in 1850, many of these early residents were driven to Canada and lost their property. The majority of those that stayed lived in an area of the city just south of the Chicago River, already forming a nascent "Black Ghetto." Despite some animosity towards black migration during Reconstruction, blacks in Chicago created a “Colored Convention” to demand, “equal school privileges throughout the state.” Over the next twenty years, they gained the right to vote (in 1870), experienced the end of segregation of schools (in 1874) and passed a civil rights bill (in 1885).

When Martin Luther King, Jr. came to visit the city one hundred years later, Baptiste, the city’s Underground Railroad traffic and its existence as a briefly liberating or at least tolerating space for blacks had long been forgotten. Arriving in Chicago late in his life to support the struggle for “open housing,” King was met with extreme resistance, remarking that the task that lay before him in Chicago in 1967 was "greater than even we imagined.” After Dr. King was shot, his death was mourned in some of the largest and most destructive

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28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid, 139.
31 Ibid, 137.
riots Chicago’s black community had ever witnessed.\textsuperscript{33} Something had changed significantly in racial relations between Chicago’s early history and the mid-twentieth century, and the struggle for space in the urban sphere was perhaps its most salient effect.

\textit{Restrictive Covenants, Environmental Injustice and Northern Racism}

With the emancipation of blacks in the South following the Civil War and rapid industrialization, Chicago, centrally located and in need of workers, was the number one destination for these migrants.\textsuperscript{34} Between 1890 and 1930, it experienced a massive wave of black migration known as the “Great Migration.”\textsuperscript{35} At the end of the Civil War there were around 1,000 African-Americans in the city,\textsuperscript{36} but by 1930, 233,000 black residents, roughly two hundred times as many, would call Chicago home.\textsuperscript{37} Even more astounding is the fact that most of these migrants arrived between the years of 1910 and 1920, when the black population increased by one hundred and forty-eight percent.\textsuperscript{38} By the onset of the twentieth century, the “first ghetto,” or the complete isolation

\textsuperscript{33} As Hirsch vividly captures, “Martin Luther King, Jr., recognized the irony [of the public housing project] and dramatized it by moving into that West Side tenement in 1966. At his death, less than two years later, Richard K. Daley was observing the smoke and flames enveloping much of that district from the helicopter. The electronic media carried the mayor’s orders to shoot arsonists on sight and to maim or cripple looters,” \textit{Making the Second Ghetto}, 275.

\textsuperscript{34} Washington, \textit{Packing Them In}, 130.

\textsuperscript{35} Hirsch, \textit{Making the Second Ghetto}, 3.

\textsuperscript{36} Washington, \textit{Packing Them In}, 138.

\textsuperscript{37} Hirsch, \textit{Making the Second Ghetto}, 17.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid, 16.
of the black community into certain areas of the city, had already been solidified.\(^{39}\)

The history of the black ghetto is for many scholars quite simply a story of Northern racism, instituted through both extralegal violence and legally instituted exclusionary tactics.\(^{40}\) In *Packing Them In* (2005), Sylvia Hood Washington writes that the history of Chicago’s urban form is one in which “planning and planners created and formed separate geographical spaces for African American communities that would for generations be subjected to environmental disenfranchisement.”\(^{41}\) This type of disenfranchisement, or *environmental racism*, as Washington above defines it in her book, can be seen explicitly in the neighborhoods of Hyde Park-Kenwood and Woodlawn, where community organizations encouraged policies and practices that maintained this segregation, including the use of restrictive covenants or violence towards newly arrived black families.\(^{42}\) As Mary Pattillo notes in *Black Picket Fences* (1999), the continued isolation and segregation of blacks in urban areas was not a “failure,” but rather a wild success:

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\text{The history of almost continuous racial conflict over housing in the twentieth century evinces not so much a problem of inadequate enforcement by government agencies or the inadequacy of the laws themselves as a determined effort on the part of white home owners, landlords and tenants to keep their neighborhoods white, which has resulted in most blacks being disinclined to alter that condition. Realty companies, lending institutions, and governments have engaged in activities that sustain the community's segregationist wishes.}^{43}\]

\(^{39}\) Ibid, 3.

\(^{40}\) See Hirsch (1983), Washington, Pattillo (1999), Massey and Denton, and many others.


\(^{42}\) Ibid.

\(^{43}\) Mary E. Pattillo, *Black Picket Fences: Privilege and Peril Among the Black Middle Class* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 221.
This can be seen from the outset of Hyde Park’s story: community and University members used every available outlet to ensure racial segregation, so the “racial balance” of the neighborhood remained intact. This would include the University’s imposition of restrictive covenants within the neighborhood, the enactment of federal and state legislation to change laws regarding eminent domain and urban renewal and public statements and meetings that reflected a concern about a “changing neighborhood.”

Nationally, using racially restrictive covenants to enforce segregation became increasingly more important as black migration to the North increased. As Thomas Philpott wrote in *The Slum and the Ghetto* (1978), in 1900 the residential segregation of blacks in Chicago was “nearly complete.” When the Supreme Court voted that “separate, but equal” was constitutional in *Plessy v. Ferguson* in 1896, the establishment of Jim Crow laws in the South was accompanied by “legally sanctioned” segregation policies across the nation. Over the next fifty years, this would take shape in Chicago’s housing market in a number of ways: in the creation of neighborhood organizations and “block clubs,” racially restrictive covenants on housing and the “redlining” of black neighborhoods by the National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB), among others. After the Chicago Real Estate Board started a program covering not just individual blocks with covenants—as it had in the past—but entire

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neighborhoods, within a few years up to eighty-five percent of Chicago’s neighborhoods were restricted in this way.\textsuperscript{47}

Extra-legally, and probably more effectively, the use of direct violence was often the preferred method of ensuring racial segregation following the first wave of the Great Migration. This was due in part to its terrorizing power and also the lack of interest, inability or ignorance on the part of the legal system to persecute these crimes. \textit{The Defender}, Chicago’s leading black newspaper, was founded in 1905 to protect “not just the interests of black people in the political arena but to defend them literally—by protecting them from extralegal physical violence.”\textsuperscript{48} Race riots started by whites like the infamous one on July 27, 1919 were accompanied by other forms of violence: bombings became the way to mark out territory and dissuade black families from moving into white neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{49} Between July 1, 1917 and March 1, 1921, a bombing occurred an average of once every twenty days in Chicago.\textsuperscript{50}

Through the creation of the “second ghetto” after another period of migration, the system of residential segregation became even more solidified and impenetrable, this time with the help of the national government. The “Second Great Migration,” which occurred after World War II and continued until around 1960 as black veterans returned home desperate for work, resulted in the arrival of 500,000 new black Southern migrants to Chicago.\textsuperscript{51} (For maps

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{kamp}Kamp, “The History Behind Hansberry v. Lee,” 483-484.
\bibitem{janowitz}As quoted in Janowitz, \textit{Culture of Opportunity}, 91.
\bibitem{hirsch}Hirsch, \textit{Making the Second Ghetto}, 1.
\bibitem{washington}Washington, \textit{Packing Them In}, 141.
\bibitem{hirsch2}Hirsch, \textit{Making the Second Ghetto}, 16.
\end{thebibliography}
of the demographic change in Chicago between 1940 and 1960, see Appendix B, Figures 2.1-2.3). The “second ghetto” that arose with this new group was, according to Hirsch, fundamentally different from the first, even though it maintained the “color line”; it was sanctioned and supported by the government through federal legislation and funding.\textsuperscript{52} As Massey and Denton argue, the building of the “second ghetto” was made possible through “institutionalized discrimination in the real estate and banking industries, supported by widespread acts of private prejudice and discrimination.” These acts were, in turn, underwritten by federal policies that encouraged white flight from inner cities through subsidized mortgage interest deductions, investment in interstate freeways and denial of credit to families in inner cities.\textsuperscript{53} It was through this new federal program of urban renewal and public housing that local governments, “with federal acquiescence,” were given a green light to isolate the black population.\textsuperscript{54}

The violence associated with the building of the “second ghetto” was also different: it tended to be directed towards property, not people. Between 1945 and 1954, there were a recorded nine major riots and two hundred seventeen attacks against black property in what historian Christopher Reed has described as a period of “racial terrorism.”\textsuperscript{55} Although the Supreme Court ruled racial segregation unconstitutional in 	extit{Buchanan v. Warley} in 1917, it was not until 1948 that the Court ruled the use of racially restrictive covenants in real estate

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid, 9.
\textsuperscript{53} Massey and Denton, \textit{American Apartheid}, 187.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{55} Washington, \textit{Packing Them In}, 175.
sales unconstitutional, and even this law would not be enforced until 1950.\textsuperscript{56}

The government, then, acting through the recently established Federal Housing Association (FHA), the Home Owner’s Loan Corporation (HOLC) and through the funding of urban “renewal” and “slum clearance” projects, “pioneered” a program to be replicated across the nation.\textsuperscript{57} This program, along with the practice of block-busting by real estate agents, the use of restrictive covenants, as well as white prejudice in general, would lead to what Massey and Denton refer to as “American Apartheid,” resulting in the mass exodus of whites from inner cities to the suburbs and diminished chances for economic and social success within poor black communities.\textsuperscript{58} In this way, the federal government helped to generate the extreme geographic isolation of blacks that continues in the United States today.\textsuperscript{59}

\textit{Racial Exclusion}

Hyde Parkers in particular had a long history of controlling the racial make-up of their neighborhood. They were not alone: both the city government and the University’s policies usually supported this goal. According to Washington, as early as 1906, Hyde Parkers formed the Hyde Park Improvement and Protective Club to “make sure that no blacks resided outside [the vice]

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{56} Press, \textit{A Case Study of Urban Renewal}, 7; Hirsch, \textit{Making the Second Ghetto}, 90.
\textsuperscript{57} Hirsch, \textit{Making the Second Ghetto}, 136.
\textsuperscript{58} Massey and Denton, \textit{American Apartheid}, 2.
\textsuperscript{59} This can be seen, according to Pattillo, in that “racial inequalities in employment, education, income, and wealth are inscribed in space. Predominantly white neighborhoods benefit from the historically determined and contemporarily sustained edge that whites enjoy,” \textit{Black Picket Fences}, 3.
\end{footnotesize}
districts,”60 places where municipal authorities did not enforce laws cracking down on prostitution.61 The club worked alongside the Chicago Real Estate Board to maintain “the color line.”62 The Hyde Park-Kenwood Property Owner’s Association, founded in 1918, tried to establish “exclusively white” neighborhoods on Grand Boulevard between 29th and 39th Streets and on Michigan Boulevard from 49th to 63rd Streets. Although “two other race-based property associations” existed at the time, it was only the Hyde Park-Kenwood Association that became actively associated with the bombing of black residents who did not stay in the designated areas.63

As time went on, the use of restrictive racial covenants became an alternative to violence in maintaining Hyde Park’s racial exclusion. In 1917, when the Supreme Court outlawed residential segregation by race, it did nothing to stop the use of restrictive covenants. In the same year, the Chicago Real Estate Board set out a formal policy of racial segregation and voted to expel any member who sold blacks property on white blocks.64 In fact, it was not until 1948 that the Court ruled in *Shelley v. Kraemer* that racially restrictive covenants

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60 As quoted in Washington, *Packing Them In*, 140.
64 Bachin, *Building the South Side*, 58.
were unconstitutional,\(^\text{65}\) and not until 1950 that the Federal Housing Administration actually enforced this change.\(^\text{66}\) *The Defender* described the use of restrictive covenants around 1920 in Woodlawn, where “many of the real estate owners in the area refer to the Restrictive Covenants as ‘the University of Chicago Agreement to get rid of Negroes.’”\(^\text{67}\) As a legal strategy to reinforce racial lines, covenants were indeed an agreement to keep blacks out, mandated by the University and other key players in the real estate industry. In 1927, Nathan William MacChesney, a former resident of Hyde Park and Kenwood and member of the Chicago Plan Commission,\(^\text{68}\) became the advisor to the Chicago Real Estate Board and the general counsel to the National Association of Real Estate Boards, based in Chicago. MacChesney wrote Article 34 of NAREB’s Code of Ethics,\(^\text{69}\) which forbade realtors from allowing “members of any race or nationality” into neighborhoods where they could damage property values. It only applied to African-Americans—persons who were at least one-eighth “negro”—and was effective for twenty-one years.\(^\text{70}\) In *The Principles of Real Estate Law* (1927), a standard text for real estate law, MacChesney identified only one group as undesirable in this circumstance: blacks.\(^\text{71}\) When these


\(^{66}\) Even this, according to Hirsch, *Making the Second Ghetto*, “served the purpose of alerting developers and encouraged many to hasten their applications for covenant-bound property before the announced deadline,” 90.

\(^{67}\) Ibid, 60.

\(^{68}\) Philpott, *The Slum*, 190-91.

\(^{69}\) Ibid.


\(^{71}\) Philpott, *The Slum*, 190.
covenants were applied in Hyde Park in 1928, the *Hyde Park Herald* proudly reported that “a fine network of contracts” now extended “like a marvelous delicately woven chain of armor” from 35th Street and Drexel in the north of Hyde Park to Woodlawn, Park Manor, South Shore and Windsor Park in the south. Nor did these actions go unnoticed: The Chicago Urban League re-formed its Civic Department in 1934 to combat these “racially restrictive activities,” with an explicit emphasis on those in Hyde Park and the surrounding communities.

As the population of black migrants continued to increase in surrounding neighborhoods, intervention by the University in the community become more extreme, especially in the implementation of restrictive covenants. Hirsch calculates that between 1933 and 1947, the University spent $83,597.46 on restrictive covenants alone. In 1944, Chancellor Hutchins convinced the Board to create a “revolving fund” of $500,000 for “area protection” after taking the Board on a bus tour of typical black neighborhoods in the city, presumably to show them what would happen if they did not act. During this same time, the University also served as headquarters for the Federations of Neighborhood Associations, which sought to oppose citywide efforts on the part of the black

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72 Ibid, 192-3.
73 Washington, *Packing Them In*, 166.
75 Ibid, 147. Hirsch also includes a verse, written by Hutchins, praising a local man for buying up property in the area, revealing the true intent behind the program:

> The Chancellor and the President gazed out across the park, 
> They laughed like anything to see that things were looking dark. 
> ‘Our neighborhood,’ the Chancellor said, ‘once blossomed like the lily.’
> ‘Just seven coons with seven kids could knock our program silly.’
> ‘Forget it, said the President,’ and thank the Lord for Willie.’
community to pass legislation declaring restrictive covenants invalid. The University also invested in the Hyde Park Planning Association from 1947 until 1952 in order to increase enforcement of code violations, neighborhood clean up, traffic control and the extension of racially restrictive covenants. Almost since its inception, administrators at the University and certain community members were willing to use every available avenue in order to define who would and who would not be a part of their neighborhood. The University’s officials took control of neighborhood demographics by using its wealth and resources, concerned that a racial change might mean the end of its institutional life.

*The Conference and the University*

The narratives surrounding urban renewal, as previously stated, tend to be conflicting and confusing. One fact remains clear, however: the University decided to change the role it previously played in the neighborhood by distancing itself from the older practices of restrictive covenants and groups that were public proponents of racism. Members of the Conference, too, felt that they were creating a new plan to address racial change, one that had not been tried before—that they really were “pioneers” in racially integrated living. Many have critiqued the actions of the University and the Conference, nonetheless, arguing that the same old “Negro removal” logic applied, that this was merely a newer resurrection of the racial exclusion the University had been enacting for decades.

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76 Ibid, 145.
How can one read the role of the University in the community, in terms of discourses about race and racism at the time? Was the University and, by proxy, the Conference, wrapped up in a racist ideology masked by liberal intentions—or were they doing what they could to fight for “justice” at a time when other communities were giving up and moving to the suburbs?

In the 1940s, the community of Hyde Park found itself at the strange center of this national maelstrom over racial segregation. As “racial” violence swept the country in the Detroit Riot of 1943 and others, Chicago experienced its own host of violent riots. Hyde Park, as one of the first case studies of conservation—a movement to preserve American cities—was seen as a pilot test for what would happen across the nation, especially in terms of its racial relations. As planning for slum clearance and renewal started, the Chicago Commission on Human Relations sent one of its delegates, Thomas H. Wright, to Hyde Park to discuss the issues of race relations and conservation. He contacted the Hyde Park Planning Association, only to find that it was not a planning association, but rather, according to one of its former presidents, primarily concerned with keeping the area white. Soon after, he would be contacted by a nascent community organization, the Hyde Park Community Council (HPCC),

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78 One must be careful when reading the literature, which tends to be ambiguous, to not lose the point that most of the racial violence apparent in the Detroit Riots, as well as in Chicago’s, was white-on-black. William M. Tuttle emphasizes descriptively who is the target of this violence: “Shootings. Beatings. Lootings. Property destruction. Car-burnings. Maimed and wounded innocents. A terrified populace. A horrified minority, inadequately protected and besieged in an American city,” emphasis mine, Race Riot (New York: Antheneum, 1970), 2.

79 Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto, 43.

80 Washington, Packing Them In, 175.

81 Abrahamson, A Neighborhood, 11.
which would later become the Conference, for his advice on matters relating to racial relations, an issue the Conference wished to address. As Hyde Park’s renewal would be a testament to, the question of conservation—a response to changing neighborhood demographics—was always one about race.

Religious and community groups in Hyde Park, concerned with the increasingly rapid rate of white flight from the area, came together to discuss issues pertaining to race relations. This shift towards “white flight” and “integration,” as opposed to more volatile racial discourse, still demarcated a position that found the idea of open and unrestricted housing troubling. One of our central questions remains then: Why is there such a dramatic shift in priorities concerning race during this time period? What did the Conference mean by “integration” exactly? Did it mean the “end of racism” or was the logic of integration itself a new kind of racism? I will argue that it did not imply an entirely open community, which allowed for true diversity, but one that wished to manage and control the extent of integration. Perhaps inspired by changing ideas about racial relations emerging at the eve of the civil rights movement and through federally mandated laws and statutes, the discourse could no longer be so outwardly racist.

As white flight in the area increased, the multiracial Conference saw that action needed to be taken in the neighborhood, and that older forms of racial exclusion in the neighborhood would not be a solution. Members of the American Veterans Committee asked Reverend Leslie Pennington, chairman of
the HPCC, to form a group on race relations, to which he agreed. Faculty members involved in the University’s Committee on Planning also asked the administration to put together a community planning unit and begin a neighborhood improvement plan. Concerned about the increased white flight from Kenwood, Rabbi Jacob Weinstein of KAM and some other synagogue members spoke with Thomas Wright, detailing their commitment to racial integration and their willingness to explore methods of conservation other than restrictive covenants. The Conference, as a racially integrated organization, consisted of a wide range of community members; the Steering Committee, according to Abrahamson, would eventually include:

...four ministers, two lawyers, three office workers, five housewives, a social worker, six university professors (from the fields of planning, sociology, political science, education, the humanities), a race relations specialist, a school administrator, a recreation leader, a doctor, three [black] businessmen, an editor, a salesman, two members of the labor movement and a student.

Black members of the Conference, including such prominent figures as St. Clair Drake, Oscar Brown, and Earl Dickerson, argued that the problem of white flight affected the black community of Hyde Park, too, and was as much caused by whites as blacks. In short, the issue of race, central to community debates surrounding blight and renewal from the University’s founding, was couched by Conference members—both white and black—in a new discourse of integration, as opposed to one based on racial exclusivity.

82 Ibid, 11-12.
83 Ibid, 12.
84 Ibid, 12.
85 Ibid, 50.
86 Ibid, 29; 16-17.
Hyde Parkers involved in community action saw their role as pivotal in determining not only the course of their own neighborhood’s future, but as setting a precedent for the city and the nation: according to the Conference, integration could work through concerted democratic action. After the Social Order Committee of the HPCC met for the first time in September 1949, they invited Wright to speak, at which time he announced: “Nothing constructive is being done...Not here in Hyde Park, nor in Chicago nor anywhere in the country that I know of...If new patterns are to be developed, they’ll have to start here.”

The Conference would later come to address Wright’s charge of passivity with a narrative of democratic engagement, human rights and integration, which was central to the Conference’s plan for the neighborhood. The Conference declared its own purpose as starting from the precept of human rights regardless of “race, creed, or national origin.” They saw this occasion as a chance to creatively use their community as an experiment: the first interracial neighborhood. As one Quaker said at an early meeting, “If we succeed, we will have created a demonstration that might set a pattern for other communities throughout the country. We will have given the world an example of democracy at work.”

When examining how democratic and representative the Conference actually was in the neighborhood, as well as what the goal of a “stable interracial”

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87 Ibid, 13.
88 Ibid, 27.
89 Ibid, 27.
90 Ibid, 18.
91 See Gans, “The Failure of Urban Renewal.”
community really was, still implied that the ultimate control of the neighborhood, the decisions concerning who lived where, would not be “open” but remain in the hands of those in power.

With influential members of both the community and the city on its side, the Conference was able to wield a certain degree of influence. For example, in 1952, Harvey S. Perloff convinced Hyde Park alderman Robert E. Merriam to set up a conference with the building commissioner to propose the question: “Why not use Hyde Park as a testing laboratory [for studying blight]?” Soon after, the commissioner began a house-to-house inspection looking at the enforcement of building codes in five neighborhoods, including Hyde Park. Although the Conference wielded a certain power in the city, it was clear that the University was a necessary ally in all endeavors. As Julia Abrahamson, Executive Director of the Conference for most of the period, wrote: the members of the Conference knew that the University of Chicago “as the major institution and the largest property owner” in Hyde Park would have the final say in what happened. No plan would work without direct support and communication with the University. In this way, the liberal ideology of the Conference would always bend under the weight of the University’s decisions, as we will see later.

Although the University was involved for many years in Hyde Park’s development and residential exclusion, it refused to become officially involved

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92 Abrahamson, A Neighborhood, x.
93 Ibid, 39.
94 Ibid, 39.
95 Ibid, 45.
with the Conference until the formation of the South East Chicago Commission.\(^6\) (The SECC, acting directly under the president of the University, will henceforth be referred interchangeably with the University.) It was no secret that the University’s opinions about development and “neighborhood change” differed from those of the Conference. The University business office was rumored to refer to itself as “a white island in a black sea”\(^7\) and already had its hands in many community organizations, including the Hyde Park Planning Association and Woodlawn, Inc., who tended to view the “race issue” more conservatively (with segregation still a priority).\(^8\) Some at the University would even go so far as to complain that the Conference itself, run by left-wing extremists, was the reason so many blacks were moving into the neighborhood.\(^9\)

Despite differences in approaching the matter, both the Conference and the University were concerned, above all, with the threat of succumbing to the slums and the ensuing total racial turnover. Or, as Hirsch put bluntly, the question was “not whether there would be any blacks in Hyde Park [in the

\(^6\) Although the University had been approached about the issue much earlier, it had failed to take action until the development of the SECC. According to some accounts, Louis Wirth approached Chancellor Hutchins as early as the 1930s to discuss the racial changes in the neighborhood; members of the Conference sought his advice for the first time officially on March 17, 1950. However, he refused to participate, giving only a brief statement on the matter. Ibid, 46. As Levi would recount, years later Hutchins said to him: “you know, this neighborhood thing, as far as I was concerned was just a disaster…I was schizophrenic about it.” Levi, “Oral History Interview,” 37.

\(^7\) “The university’s past support of restrictive covenants was no secret. Rumor had it that the university still followed the policy of excluding Negroes from the immediate university area. This, it was said, was now accomplished through the real estate practices of the university business office, whose representative was accused of having referred to the university and its public policy in terms of ‘a white island in a black sea,’” Abrahamson, A Neighborhood, 46.

\(^8\) Ibid, 46-47.

\(^9\) Ibid, 47.
future], but rather would there be any whites?”

Although the extent to which the fear was manufactured and manipulated in order to attain other ends, the narrative at the time was, as Abrahamson writes, that Hyde Park was in grave danger: “It was surrounded by blighted and near-blighted sections, and the blight was spreading. There was no comfort in history.” In other words, there were no success stories: every other instance of racial turnover had ended in complete white flight. Furthermore, she writes, “The predictions of some of the social scientists and planners were full of doom.”

The Conference and the University, both unwilling to leave Hyde Park, also knew that they needed one another in order to succeed.

Although Levi thought the Conference was “a bunch of good-doers trying to talk their way out of a difficult situation,” he recognized the strategic importance of the group. In 1955, the University established the Committee of Six, which represented the interests of the Conference and the University as a whole.

Later, Levi remarked that despite the tension, “I recall time after time on effective building prosecutions and that sort of thing, getting the announcement made by the Conference and not the Commission.” Both served necessary functions, with the Conference as the socially and politically conscientious mask behind which the University could carry out its own intentions in the neighborhood.

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100 Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto, 169.
101 Abrahamson, A Neighborhood, 9.
102 Ibid, 10.
103 Ibid, 218.
104 Ibid, 226.
When the University, under Kimpton, finally entered into the debate, it was clear that its needs would be met regardless of its impact on the community or the Conference’s idealistic goals because of the pull it had over local and municipal leadership. Although the University initially became involved to address the publicly stated “crime situation,” Kimpton did not attempt to hide the planning of Hyde Park’s conservation as one of his “high priority projects.”

Despite the Conference’s best efforts—educating the community about the reasons for “blight” and the crime rate in Hyde Park, its outreach through the “block groups” and involvement of city and national organizations in its appraisal—the University wanted to take direct action.

Kimpton founded the SECC as an arm of the University, later headed by Julian H. Levi, to address this problem, to crack down on crime, enforce code violations, and work with government officials on commencing Hyde Park’s renewal. With the University’s help, the Chicago Land Clearance Commission (CLCC) began a survey of sections of Hyde Park to determine its status in terms of blight and redevelopment. In doing so, the CLCC declared in mid-1953 that it would not engage in redevelopment for Hyde Park alone, but it would need to be part of a greater plan for the entire area of South East Chicago that the University was supposed to represent through the SECC, which included Kenwood, North Kenwood-Oakland, Woodlawn and Washington Park. The failure of the University to adequately address problems in these other areas is a part of the

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106 Ibid, 190.
107 Ibid, 192.
108 Abrahamson, A Neighborhood, 194.
story that is important to acknowledge: the University was concerned with the future of Hyde Park, not the neighborhoods surrounding it. As Levi said, “We lose all of Oakland and North Kenwood, we lose all of Woodlawn.”

To the extent that it was involved in other neighborhoods—in the building of South Campus in Woodlawn, for example—the University was not concerned with stopping the spread of blight or “managing integration” in those other areas, because it was too late: white flight was too far advanced. Hyde Park, more than those other areas, according to Levi, had “enough in the way of population to give you a high school base,” meaning, enough of a middle-class white population to constitute a “pre-collegiate” population for the University.

For Levi, letting those other areas go was necessary because it would “buy time” for their plan. The University, as an institution of wealth and prestige with connections to many public officers and policy makers, was able to institute the renewal program and choose the direction of the community’s future, while maintaining a discourse of racial integration and inclusivity.

The role the University played in the urban renewal project did involve an evolution from the older policies regarding its involvement in the neighborhood. In terms of the University’s cooperation with the Conference, it is possible to posit that those in power actually believed in the rhetoric of integration espoused by the Conference. Although Levi sometimes used this language mockingly—like when he signed letters to Kimpton, “interracially

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110 Ibid, 66.
111 Ibid.
yours”\textsuperscript{112}—he clearly felt that any program that outwardly supported racial segregation was not something he could sign on to.\textsuperscript{113} It is also possible that the University saw the renewal project as the best option available in preserving its community, and accepted “stable integration” as a price they were willing to pay for it. Recalling the first Board of Trustees meeting in 1953, at which he brought up the “neighborhood issues,” Levi said:

...there’s no reason under any circumstance that the University ought to be doing any of this unless its academic mission is involved. We’re not a public improvement organization. We’re not supposed to be a developer. We’re not interested as a good government association. The only standard you ought to apply to this is whether the University of Chicago as an academic entity requires a compatible community.\textsuperscript{114}

Levi’s approach to the matter was entirely pragmatic, and based on his commitment to the University and its mission of pursuing knowledge. Any other effects that might accompany his quest to save the University were purely coincidental, including good race relations. For Levi, allowing for integration in the plan was not about taking a political stance but common sense, in that a plan fought for on the basis of racial exclusion would ultimately not be the best strategy for the University—perhaps because it would damage the University’s progressive reputation on the national scene—or more importantly: because older methods of control simply would not work in a situation where more than a third of the population was already black.

Many at the time also questioned the concentration of so many resources and efforts in such a small area when those involved acknowledged the inter-\textsuperscript{112} Ibid, 128.  
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid, 34.  
\textsuperscript{114} Emphasis mine, Ibid, 34.
relatedness and interdependence of the South Side community. Why Hyde Park? Why not Oakland? Why not Woodlawn? Abrahamson writes that although Oakland and Woodlawn had more serious issues of deterioration, “[Hyde Park] offered greater hope than any other Chicago community” because of the existence of the University of Chicago, important physical resources and “the high degree of citizen interest and leadership.”

Throughout the urban renewal process, the question of whose interests were being represented—and whose were ignored—was brought to the fore again and again. This was clear in the fact that the University tended to overlook surrounding neighborhoods, except in the case their proximity posed a direct threat to the University community. For example, the University abandoned a proposed research park in the northwest section of Hyde Park after suspicion, based on the lack of new housing units and its location, that it was merely an attempt by the University to create a barrier against the neighboring black communities. The Southwest Hyde Park Neighborhood Redevelopment Association was also attacked for its renewal plan. St. Clair Drake, sociologist and author of *Black Metropolis* (1962), along with lawyer Michael Hagiwara, felt that the group had not proven the need for renewal, and moreover, “the basic purpose of this plan and the acquisition of this area is to allow the University of Chicago to set up a buffer against the presence of Negro residents in large numbers.”

\[116\] Ibid, 238.
\[117\] Ibid, 237.
University was concerned about maintaining Hyde Park for its residents, but only ones who it deemed to belong.

Ultimately, the Conference and the University succeeded in their shared goal: to preserve the community and maintain a certain population within it. Hirsch himself attributes the “success” (in the eyes of many) of Hyde Park’s story to two factors: the University’s commitment to the area and the “liberal ideology” of many Hyde Parkers that allowed for more flexibility on racial issues (most importantly, their willingness to accept integration). At face value, neither of these considerations seems to be part of a racist ideological system. After further analysis, however, it is clear that these two factors worked together to achieve, as Hirsch concludes, “a predominately white and economically upgraded community.” Meaning: the “success” of Hyde Park’s story came out of the University and Conference members’ agreement over who should not be a part of the neighborhood. Even Conference members later concluded: “The demonstration of a really stable interracial community DOES justify the kind of manipulation that is required to achieve it.” Once again, the word “stable” here is key: members of the Conference wanted integration that was controllable, containable and, ultimately a product of their own decisions.

By the time renewal had been implemented, however, the University’s interest in maintaining a certain kind of community had become a replacement for the Conference’s liberal goals of integration. Members of the Conference

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118 Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto, 137.
119 Ibid, 157; 170.
120 Emphasis mine, Abrahamson, A Neighborhood, 143.
realized that they would have to compromise some of their beliefs in order to prevent the neighborhood from total racial changeover. With the creation of the Tenant Referral Office in 1956—which carefully screened all candidates who wished to move into Hyde Park-Kenwood and purposefully prevented the movement towards “all Negro” sections—this final abandonment of the Conference’s ideological stance can be seen. Despite the high hopes of democratic participation and the development of a quasi-“grass roots” leadership, the Conference knew that the University ultimately had the final say. Or, as Hirsch writes: they knew that “the good fight could be fought without the fear that it might be won.” Whatever the high-minded ideals of Conference members, the end result still reflected Levi’s interest in maintaining an “appropriate” community, one that reflected in every way the white elitist culture of the University.

*American Jewish Liberalism and Early Civil Rights Rhetoric*

In examining this dramatic shift in the University and Conference’s positions vis-à-vis race during the renewal, I would like to offer an alternative explanation for the sudden appearance of an anti-racist discourse: the influence of a progressive Jewish movement in Hyde Park. The necessity of liberalism for the Jewish community has been well documented, as will be explored—as has the internal contradiction it often leads to: the preservation of Jewish identity through a shared vision of ethics vs. the physical preservation of the Jewish

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community in the face of racial change. This fight for civil rights and equality for all as an expression of Jewish morality—as in the case of the Conference—was called into question by the very real fear of dissolution of that Jewish community, whose own status level in American society was incredibly vulnerable. Unable to rely on race as a category of exclusion (because it would entail their own exclusion), Jews faced with this contradiction were forced to create another category of exclusion, one that will include them: that is to say, class becomes the marker of inclusion instead.

Levi, grandson of Rabbi Emil Hirsch, when describing his own participation in the Hyde Park community prior to the renewal project, said: “I had no involvement [in Hyde Park] whatsoever,” except for his role as the Director of Temple Isaiah Israel and later the Chicago Sinai Congregation. Both of these synagogues had been abandoned when racial turnover had led to an erosion of the congregation, and Levi realized similarly how bad the result could be to the community of Hyde Park if they did not do anything. Even so, when approached as the Director of Temple Isaiah Israel by the Hyde Park Planning Association to sign a restrictive covenant, Levi refused, explaining that he thought restrictive covenants were “morally wrong and legally ineffective.”

Recall that the earliest vocalizations of the Conference were by religious leaders,

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124 Ibid, 17.
125 Ibid. Levi also noted: “I recall making a wise crack that was not appreciated when the discussion came up about the building of the new Sinai Temple over on Lake Shore Drive; that if they put the Star of David up there that they ought to do it on a revolving basis so that when they had to sell the temple it would be easily switched to something else. That was something I was acutely aware of,” ibid.
126 Ibid.
many of them Jewish: Rabbi Jacob Weinstein was one of the first people to approach Thomas Wright vis-à-vis integration. The reason that the total area of Hyde Park-Kenwood was covered in the plan, according to Abrahamson, lay in the fact that KAM was on the border between the neighborhoods: preserving this Jewish congregation was, then, an essential, though perhaps unnamed, aim and consequence of the renewal project as well.

At the time of renewal, the Jewish residents of Hyde Park had been active in pushing for racial equality for some time, since they themselves had been the victims of racialization and ghettoization in the United States. At the time of renewal, Jews of Russian and German background made up 40 percent of Hyde Park’s total population, and were the largest minority. After World War II, two Jewish women, Marian Altschuler Despres, wife of alderman Leon Despres, and Fruma Gottschalk, pressed the administration of the Laboratory Schools to admit blacks. According to Janowitz, “as Jews they specifically referred to the irony of opposing Hitler’s Germany while maintaining segregation at home.” In Chicago, although there had not been as uniformly instituted covenants and restrictions as there were towards the black population, the Jewish population tended to stay segregated in tightly knit enclaves. In 1928, Louis Wirth of the Chicago School wrote *The Ghetto*, a description of the first Jewish settlement in

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128 Ibid, 30.
129 Ibid, 7.
Several other majority Jewish communities on the West Side, such as North Lawndale, had, in the process of black in-migration, rapidly disappeared. Rosenthal wrote that “while large-scale systematic discrimination is not practiced within the city, ‘pockets of discrimination’ against Jews as tenants” is found in all areas of the city. In the suburbs, however, there were many neighborhoods that remained almost entirely closed to Jews, including Kenilworth and Lake Forest. These existing constraints contributed to the growth of segregated Jewish enclaves or ghettos, where up to 90 percent of a tract might be Jewish. Of the city’s surrounding suburbs, nearly 90 percent would not allow Jewish entry; Jews were, for all intents and purposes, stuck in the city. But as restrictive covenants were declared illegal, the suburbs became open to Jews in the 1950s, leading to a mass exodus that has resulted in a drastic shift: in 1950, only 5 percent of the metropolitan Jewish population lived in the suburbs, while today it is nearly 70 percent. The intense white flight in Chicago in the early 1950s was, therefore, often Jewish in character, especially on the South Side, one of Chicago’s best established and

132 Ibid, 277.
133 Ibid, 280.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid, 281.
most fashionable Jewish enclaves at the time. At the time the University intervened, the area was already quickly transforming.  

The issue of integration for Jewish Americans during this time was the fact that it directly brought into contradiction two important facets of Jewish identity: Jewish community life vs. dedication to the civil rights movement. In the context of post-war America, according to Forman, this came to be realized in the form of an intense Jewish liberalism, which manifested itself through the support of liberal political candidates and “disproportionate” involvement in civil rights groups. The integration of schools and the loss of a Jewish majority, however, meant the destruction of Jewish identity for many, as “Jewish education, the most important instrument of Jewish group survival, would thus be destroyed to the benefit of no one.” However, in the end, Jews tended to fight for integration, as they realized that any ambivalence towards the civil rights movement by Jews “itself posed the greatest threat to American Jews as Jews.”

In fighting so hard for racial equality, however, Jewish liberals, themselves discriminated against, often needed a mechanism for exclusion that would work in their favor: class. Silberman, a militant proponent of civil rights and critic of Jewish liberalism, attacked their mind-set as follows: “We’d like to participate in the fight for racial justice, all right, but not if it means that we must

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138 Ibid.
139 Forman, Blacks in the Jewish Mind, 56.
140 Ibid, 59.
141 As quoted in ibid, 64.
142 Ibid.
soil the middle-class garments of respectability all of us—rabbis and laymen—have to wear.” 143 Rabbi and activist Arnold Jacob Wolf, later one of Hyde Park KAM’s longest-serving and most charismatic rabbis, was “perhaps the most radical” critic of Jewish middle-class involvement in black rights. He accused the Jewish community of being “incurably racist and ‘bourgeois.’” 144 Wolf’s critique could be applied to Levi’s plan, especially in terms of the lack of public housing for the lower-class and his insistence on maintaining public schools with pre-collegiate students in the community, 145 as a testament to what “compatible” meant in this context. As we examine the role of Jews in Hyde Park’s renewal, it is possible that the intense pressure to preserve the community, through tactics other than racial exclusion, stemmed from a specifically Jewish ethos, which saw their own position in American society as precarious, 146 and knew that the liberal fight for integration was simultaneously for them as well. Nonetheless, in order to preserve their Jewish community and stay in the city, they would need more than just empty integration talk. They realized that total inclusion of blacks in Hyde Park would necessarily entail the complete disintegration of the Jewish community. As Levi realized early on, they needed a plan to preserve and control the future of the neighborhood in a way that protected their own community—one that would still be coded and enforced through the appropriation of white norms, whether it was categorized as class or race.

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144 Ibid, 67.
146 Recall that by the end of renewal, Hyde Park lost half its Jewish population, as cited in Janowitz, Culture of Opportunity, 129.
“Managed” Integration

Although “racial exclusion” was not the mechanism the University claimed to use for preservation, the language of “managed integration” and “compatible community” had a similar effect. Both the University and the Conference were unwilling to give up their control over the racial make-up of the neighborhood entirely, which made open integration of the housing market an impossibility. Both groups believed that to let go completely of the racial balance would inevitably mean one thing: complete racial changeover. The University, at the time and to this day, argues that the actions it took during renewal were about one thing—preserving the University—and had nothing to do with a racial bias. Levi was adamant about this fact. He recalled his standpoint at a Board meeting presentation when he tried to persuade its members to intervene in the neighborhood:

There’s no way in the world that we can look at this on the basis of racial exclusion. We’re going to have to look at it on the basis of an economic screen... You can develop what they think is a successfully integrated program provided that you have the proper economic and social compatibility. 147

Later in the same statement, Levi added, “Economic and social compatibility” also meant “there’s no room for public housing” except on a limited basis. 148 This implied, among other things, that most of those who could not afford to pay for relocation would be displaced entirely. In the same passage, he stated that, “you’d better understand what that ‘compatible community’ means, unpleasant

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148 Ibid.
as it is.”\textsuperscript{149} Though he was loathe to spell it out, and took on an anti-racist discourse at times, Levi knew what the effects of this “compatible community” strategy would mean—the resulting community, developed using a criteria of similar attitudes and attributes, though perhaps not intentionally racially exclusive, would be recognized as such. Similarly, according to Hirsch, for Kimpton, class was a substitute for race when he spoke of a community of “similar tastes and standards.”\textsuperscript{150} In other words, class-based segregation was a way to ensure racial segregation without claiming to. Even the Conference, whose mission was to achieve an “integrated community,” could not help but add the word “stable,” implying that any racial balance that tipped too far towards one direction (read: black) would not be tolerated. The influence of this language can be seen in federal legislation that Levi helped to write: Section 112 of the Housing Act of 1959 cites “the goal of compatible community” as part of the university’s aim in an urban renewal project.\textsuperscript{151}

The rhetoric of controlled integration was the method through which many blacks were denied access to Hyde Park, even as Conference leaders preached the opposite. Massey and Denton, describing similar “integration maintenance schemes” in the ‘60s and ‘70s, write of the ultimate paradox these programs embody: “[r]ather than seeking to change this discriminatory system of housing allocation, integration management programs accept it and seek to

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{150} Kimpton quoted in Hirsch, \textit{Making the Second Ghetto}, 170.
\textsuperscript{151} Levi, “The University and Preservation,” 11.
preserve a few islands of integration within a larger sea of racial exclusivity.”

Out of the fear that the neighborhood will “turn,” these groups actively promoted white in-migration to the neighborhood while trying to keep black in-migration at a bay. The methods included increasing white housing demand through better security and improved schools; diminishing “panic selling” by whites; training realtors in “reverse steering,” or, encouraging whites to buy in integrated neighborhoods; public relations programs; “recruiting white home seekers at local universities”; and others. In a 1962 memorandum explaining the University’s housing policies, the Faculty Committee on Rental Policies wrote:

Faced with the prospect of neighborhood blight and decay and of occupancy by white and Negro in-migrants, with styles of life incompatible with the operation of a great educational and research institution, the University initiated and participated in one of the first major efforts at urban renewal in the United States—a major experiment to renew and preserve a deteriorating urban area and to create a stable, inter-racial community with high standards.

Later, in a subsection titled “managed integration,” the committee details the way in which housing can be obtained through the Office, stating, “that race and color as such are never to be used as a basis for excluding a person from occupancy of University-owned accommodations.” Nonetheless, the University could give priority to its faculty, students and administrative staff and “in all other cases consider the contribution which any occupancy, white or Negro,

152 Massey and Denton, American Apartheid, 227.
153 Ibid, 226.
154 Memorandum to the President of the University, From: the Faculty Committee on Rental Policies (Allison Dunham, Chairman, Philip M. Hauser, and George P. Shultz), February 23, 1962, 6, emphasis mine, Office of the President, Beadle Administration, Records, 1916-1968, Box 354, Folder 9: Urban renewal, University rental policies, 1962, Special Collections Research Center, The University of Chicago, Chicago, IL.
makes to its community” objectively. Clearly, the University, as the largest employer and real estate owner in the area, was able to manipulate the market significantly under the guise of the Conference’s liberal narrative of integration. Though renewal was brought about within a discourse of racial inclusivity and social justice, its full realization—as can be seen in the program of “managed integration”—revealed the persistent need for control over racial groups in the area.

“Color-Blind” Racism

Both the University and the Conference practiced naïveté or ignorance in the face of the race question, which, according to Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, is a structured tactic of modern racist ideology. “Whites express theoretical...support for the principles of integration in contemporary America,” Bonilla-Silva writes, “yet maintain systemic privilege by failing to do anything about racial inequality.” Levi and Kimpton would not publicly state that “compatible” or “appropriate” behaviors were coded as white and normative, nor would the Conference members admit that their utopian dream of integration would not be achieved without radical changes to their neighborhood, changes they were not comfortable with. Unlike the openly violent techniques employed against blacks entering the neighborhood in earlier times, or the more conservative approach of denial used by the University, the

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155 Ibid, 14-5.
Conference employed a language of inclusivity and liberalism that posed a marked contrast to older racist rhetoric, what Bonilla-Silva has described as “color-blind racism.” This post-Civil Rights movement ideology might be accessible to the reader in contemporary discourse in the phrase: “Some of my best friends are... [black].” Or, one could read the University as “conservative” and the Conference as “liberal” in the terms Cornel West ascribes in “Race Matters”:

...for liberals, black people are to be ‘included’ and ‘integrated’ into ‘our’ society and culture, while for conservatives they are to be ‘well behaved’ and ‘worthy of acceptance’ by ‘our’ way of life. Both fail to see that the presence and predicaments of black people are neither additions to nor defections from American life, but rather constitutive elements of that life.

In light of Bonilla-Silva and West’s analysis, I will read the role of the University and the Conference as defining their desired community by the standards of white normative society. For both groups, allowing entrance into “our” (read: white) society is a special opportunity or something that must be earned. In this way, blacks are allowed entrance into the neighborhood, but only first by proving that they are the “appropriate” (read: white-assimilating) kind of blacks; they are integrated, but only in small amounts, as is apparent in the type of Bonilla-Silva discourse that could potentially be used: “Some of my neighbors are...[black].” In no way does the “success” of Hyde Park’s integration signify a triumph over racism or an ability to “transcend justice,” because the groups at


158 Ibid, 57.

159 Cornel West, “Race Matters,” in *Race, Class, and Gender: An Anthology*, edited by Margaret L. Anderson and Patricia Hill Collins (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2004), 123.
play allowed it to happen only on their terms, and used the program of renewal as a way to create racially-based definitions of appropriateness.

In Janowitz’s account of Hyde Park today, she comes close to identifying this liberal-masked racism. “White people who feel that merely living in Hyde Park provides excellent left-liberal credentials,” she writes, “can annoy their black neighbors.” She adds, though, that in contrast to these white liberals of today, “white people who chose to live in the neighborhood sixty years ago were pioneers in building an interracial community.”160 Over the course of her narrative, once integration is achieved, race ceases to be an issue.161 Though some black families of a certain standing were allowed to live in Hyde Park—and many did—the University and the community were able to define and choose which black families would be appropriate. In so doing, they instated a hegemonic ideology of normalcy and appropriateness, which, although never explicit, was always couched in terms of its proximity to white cultural norms.

We see this as realized through the careful screening of residents by the Tenant Referral Office, the University’s program of “managed integration” and its ultimate control over the area as the largest employer, real estate owner and law enforcer.

The Specter of Race

As has been established in this chapter, racial exclusion had been a strategy for maintaining control over space for decades—both by the University

160 Emphasis mine, Janowitz, Culture of Opportunity, 14.
161 Ibid, 136.
and community groups in Hyde Park, and by people in communities across Chicago and the nation. The well-documented and immense history on the subject of racial injustice in American history—and in the housing market in particular—is one that I have attempted to illustrate briefly, in order to contextualize both the cause of the racial change in the community and the climate in which the University and the Conference were operating. It is clear, in examining the history of the University’s neighborhood policies that a marked shift in priorities in terms of the “race question” and in the discourse in which it was discussed came about at the time of renewal. I have introduced several tentative explanations of this shift; including, the role of Jewish liberalism and its internal contradiction; the role of “managed integration” as a solution to total racial changeover; and, finally, the role of color-blind racism in the rhetoric of the Conference and the University, one that tends to reinscribe the racial categories it attempts to ignore.

I conclude that urban renewal, as a strategy to interfere in the physical and demographic make-up of neighborhoods, allowed community groups to remove populations and blighted buildings that downgraded the neighborhood without ever addressing the source of blight and black urban poverty—namely, the system of racist ideology and oppression that had continued uninterrupted from slavery on. Despite claims by the University and the Conference that they were embarking on a project whose goals were not mired in issues of racism, the historically contextualized moment of renewal and its execution in Hyde Park were part of a greater narrative about racial residential segregation. As the
actions of both groups reveal, Hyde Park’s renewal was defined and engineered in response to the specter of race, and despite their insistence that “managed” integration was the solution to their racial problems, it merely produced an even more insidious form of racism.
III. THE UNIVERSITY AND THE GROWTH MACHINE:

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBAN RENEWAL

"...[Too] few Americans value our great urban universities as a national resource on which this nation will depend increasingly in the years ahead. It is just as important—and in fact, I believe more so—to conserve our centers of higher learning in our mushrooming cities today and tomorrow as it is to worry about our coal supplies in the year 2000," Carl W. Larsen, Public Relations Official, “The Hyde Park Story” (1961)

“Well, if this were a steel mill worth a half a billion dollars and somebody told me that I had to spend thirty million dollars for a dike, I'd want to know the name of the nearest engineer,” Edward L. Ryerson, Chairman of the Board, University of Chicago (1953-1956), on what should be done in Hyde Park

For The University’s Sake

In a presentation to the Board in August 1953, Julian H. Levi stressed the need for the University's participation and intervention in the surrounding neighborhood. According to Levi, the reason for the intervention should not under any circumstances be misconstrued as civic engagement, but merely taken for what it was—an institution’s last attempt to save itself. “We’re not a public improvement organization,” said Levi: “We’re not supposed to be a developer. We’re not interested as a good government association.” The University had

4 Ibid, 34.
one goal, according to Levi—to continue to function as a university, and all
interventions in the surrounding neighborhoods were means to that end. As
stated in the previous chapter, the University’s intervention in the neighborhood
was not about racism for Levi; rather, it was a pragmatic decision grounded in
the reality of the world. University officials knew that diminishing property
rates and a “down-scaling” of the neighborhood, evidenced already by increasing
crime rates, could mean the destruction of the University through the loss of
their student and faculty populations. Additionally, it would mean the loss of
Rockefeller’s investment, an endowment that in 1963 was estimated at $252.3
million,\(^5\) and a physical plant worth an estimated $1.4 billion.\(^6\) The University
officials were willing to “let go” of other surrounding communities—“We lose all
of Oakland and North Kenwood, we lose all of Woodlawn,” said Levi—as long as
it meant that Hyde Park, and therefore, the University, could be salvageable.\(^7\)
The University’s administrators, acting on behalf of the institution, made two
decisions: first, that they could not leave in the face of racial turnover, like other
corporate enterprises had the ability to do; and second, they would have to act
quickly, in a unified manner.\(^8\)

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\(^5\) Friedman, To Mr. George Allen, Subsection: “The University as Corporation—
Land and Taxes,” 16.
\(^8\) Kimpton, as quoted in the London Economist: “We are a part of the community
and, if we leave it, our absence will only worsen the situation. Many other urban
American universities have similar problems and Chicago has broken new ground for
them,” as cited in the August 1, 1963, Statement on Rental Policy, the Committee on
Business Administration, 5, Office of the President, Beadle Administration, Records,
1916-1968, Box 354, Folder 6: Urban renewal, university public relations, 1956-1964,
Special Collections Research Collection, The University of Chicago Library, Chicago, IL;
Levi also noted that they would have to move quickly, “Oral History Interview,” 35.
If the University were only involved in Hyde Park’s renewal for the sake of institutional preservation, one would expect the downgrading of property, issues of growth, and problems of the greater urban sphere to not necessarily be important components addressed in their plan. An institution might have lower operating costs in a neighborhood with decreasing rents, and it might be easier for faculty members to afford living in a city neighborhood. In order to continue operating, the University did not have to invest time and energy in finding private developers to build shopping centers and townhomes that would cater to citywide capitalist interest groups. Lastly, an institution just concerned with its own self-preservation would only be interested in citywide problems that directly affected its ability to continue operating. In the case of Hyde Park’s renewal, I argue that the University was at every juncture concerned about the devaluation of property and the loss of exchange value, actively in pursuit of growth and terribly anxious about the fate of the City of Chicago.

The question I am interested in is not why the renewal happened the way it did, but why it was so unanimously approved in the first place. Specifically, I will explore the nature of the University’s intervention in Hyde Park in terms of its economic interests and power. In so doing, I will examine three separate arguments for the institution’s actions. First, I will consider various theories of

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9 Of course there were protests against the renewal’s targeted areas, most notably by The Woodlawn Organization in opposition to the fourth project, because group members felt the land to be cleared was chosen because of racial considerations and did not want to be pushed out of the neighborhood. However, opposition to renewal and redevelopment as such was not the dominant question, Carrie Breitbach, “The Woodlawn Organization,” AREA Chicago 68/08: The Politics of Inheritance (2008), accessed on April 7, 2011, http://www.areachicago.org/p/issues/6808/woodlawn-organization/. 

power, status and class available in American sociology, and explore how they could be applied to this case. Second, I will argue that through renewal, the University was pursuing economic growth under the traditional capitalist belief that growth benefits everyone, unconditionally. Lastly, using John Logan and Harvey Molotch’s idea of the growth machine, defined as a group of individuals who “make money from land and building,” I will argue that the University was part of a city- and nation-wide coalition of groups with a vested interest in pursuing growth no matter the cost. Before returning to Hyde Park’s case, however, I wish to examine the nature of power in elite groups (of which I propose the University is an example) and outline theories that will ground our later discussion.

Power, Elites, Cities

The power elite of America is a well-studied group in the social sciences, one that has led to many theoretical examinations of the nature of power itself. Modern American theorists of power, following in the footsteps of the Weberian model, focused on the location of power in society, whether determined through an interlocking system of power directorates, a pluralist democratic system, or the elite networks of the upper class. In The Power Elite (1956), C. Wright Mills wrote famously of an increasing blurring between the institutional power in our society and the tendency of “the warlords, the corporation chieftains, [and] the

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political directorate” 11 to join together as the power elite. In Robert Dahl’s seminal work on power dynamics in the pluralist democracy in New Haven, Connecticut (1961), he wrote of a vast discrepancy between two groups: on the one hand, the “slack” resources of the majority of citizens, never able to fully realize their potential influence, and a core of professional politicians who exert great influence on all decisions. 12 Dahl also noted that the influence of both these groups was constrained by a self-operating limitation of the system itself; meaning, that influence could not exceed the bounds of the political realm of power. G. William Domhoff, in direct reaction to Dahl’s work, argued against the pluralist understanding of power and instead introduced the question of class in explicit terms. The elite social institutions of America—“private schools, elite universities, the ‘right’ fraternities and sororities, gentlemen’s clubs, debutante balls, summer resorts, charitable and cultural organizations,” 13 among others—are the domain of the upper class. Members of the upper class, then, are socialized through many institutions into further serving the interests of their class, and “selected for advancement” based on this class interest. 14 “Would members of other classes,” Domhoff asks, “make similar decisions on key issues?” 15 This question of power—who has it, where it is located and through which institutions it is acted upon—is central to understanding the political

14 Ibid, 144.
15 Ibid, 151.
economy of Hyde Park’s urban renewal. Through the lens of Weber’s analysis, I have already examined renewal in terms of status groups in the chapter on race, but have not yet explicitly discussed its implementation along class lines. Positing for a moment that a racial analysis does not fully explain the way renewal was implemented, I will explore some other alternatives.

In terms of a class-based argument, Dahl’s argument seems at first glance convincing—not in terms of a class Marxist model of class—but as a group of elites who want to maintain their wealth and privilege vis-à-vis the less fortunate. An analysis of Hyde Park’s urban renewal is undeniably tied to an interest group—namely, the University—which was made up of individuals with high status and wealth who were able to determine the course of action in terms of the physical and demographic make-up of their neighborhood. An “elite” university, as Dahl writes, is the breeding ground for the ideological reproduction of the upper class, and it is not at all a secret that the University understood the process of renewal as an “economic screen” which would rid the neighborhood of incompatible members of society.\textsuperscript{16} An argument could be made that members of the University community exorcised their neighborhood of lower-class elements whose existence might bring into question the teachings of the upper class. Or, in more economic and simplified terms, they were simply consumed with questions of losing property value in the face of racial turnover.

Dahl’s theory of a pluralist democracy, in which a core of professional politicians exerts great influence on all decisions within the nation, does not

seem to fit the case of Hyde Park. In fact, although Hyde Park’s renewal came about with the help of many political figures on the municipal, state and national levels,\textsuperscript{17} it was University officials who developed many of the legal tools later used in renewal. The relationship between the University and the City was essential to the full realization of renewal; however, the ability of non-state actors (those with “slack” resources, according to Dahl) to gain power and control over land and property would be an argument that fundamentally subverts his main point. In other words, the democratic action of non-state actors was the way in which key decisions about Hyde Park’s renewal were made.

A theory of \textit{interlocking power directorates}, such as Mills suggests, more than a class-based argument or one that uses a pluralist account of power, is what I would like to apply to the case of Hyde Park. The University was undoubtedly an elite institution of the upper class as well as a community of high status within the City and the nation, and over the course of the renewal did cleanse the neighborhood of most of the lower class. However, I will argue that those involved in renewal saw the project as innovating a new technology of growth that would transform the future of American cities, and that class exclusion was not the motivation per se. A collection of powerful institutions, including the University, local capitalists, the City, the State, and the federal

\footnote{Politicians are a group whose influence I have not and will not explore in detail in this thesis, except when they become a part of the University’s plan. The Chicago Machine, as well as an entire sub-field in Chicago historiography on “race and politics,” are topics so great in scope that to approach them concretely in my argument did not seem possible, nor entirely necessary considering that my main actor throughout is a private university.}
government became involved and invested in this pursuit of growth, no matter what its effect on disadvantaged groups would be. Furthermore, although the ideology that fueled renewal was that of growth and improvement in the face of slum invasion, what it actually entailed was an incredible opportunity to seize power through a newly expanding market. In this way, I will argue that what happened in Hyde Park had to do with a capitalist relationship to land and space which was focused on exchange-value, and a nearly unanimous desire to expand the wealth, power, and status of the City through a newly developed growth machine, no matter its repercussions.

*Facing the Urban Crisis*

There was no alternative to urban renewal presented in the public discourse during the planning stages of Hyde Park's renewal. To the elites who controlled the neighborhood's fate, there were no other feasible strategies to maintain control. As Rossi and Dentler wrote, community members elected to the Board of the SECC (South East Chicago Commission), a sixty-member auxiliary to President Kimpton's Committee of Five, saw this position as a token of status. Therefore, “it became more important to belong to and to support the organization than to shape its goals and techniques.”

Among these members were what the University considered to be “power groups” in the community, including hotel owners, real estate firms, business and professional men's

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associations, and several other institutions.\textsuperscript{19} In the wake of the neighborhood’s racial transition, these powerful figures all found common ground: a fear of decreasing property values which united “the University, business interests, home owners, and residents” alike.\textsuperscript{20} This unity of thought went further, however. Hyde Park, being no “ordinary neighborhood,” had elite members whose resources of wealth, prestige and knowledge\textsuperscript{21}—not to mention political ties—could appeal to and were a part of the elites of Chicago as well. As Rossi and Dentler note, in 1952, more than one-third of the members of the Board of the Metropolitan Housing and Planning Committee, a municipal organization that was pivotal in jumpstarting the process of renewal, lived in Hyde Park-Kenwood or had graduated from the University.\textsuperscript{22} Clearly, the people involved in the great institutions of the City, who were able to make decisions about its future, had interlocking (if not overlapping) interests with those in charge of the University. In the face of white flight, these networks could be read as an interest party in the Weberian sense: their positions of wealth and status in Chicago meant that the City’s power within the national framework was of utmost importance to their honor and vital in maintaining their economic wealth as well.

As would be expected, according to Levi, the problem of Hyde Park’s deterioration was increasingly a problem for the City of Chicago as well. “City people,” said Levi, “particularly in the light of Mayer Daley’s attitude, recognized

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid, 76.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid, 99.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid, 98-99.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid, 78.
that the one thing the city of Chicago couldn’t have was for the University of Chicago to abandon the city.”

As Carl W. Larsen, head of publicity for the University, wrote in a letter on community relations to University President George W. Beadle in 1961:

The University is an important part of the day to day life of this community. It employs 8,000. Its investment policies are concentrated in Chicago; we put our money in the healthy growth of the City of Chicago. The University is one of Cook County’s largest taxpayers. Expenditures of the University are primarily expenditures in Chicago.

The City of Chicago, at a time when Los Angeles was well on its way to claim its title as the “second city,” needed to grow, both economically and physically. The increasing deterioration and white flight on the South and West Side gravely threatened this hope.

As the situation in Hyde Park became more important to the City of Chicago as a whole, the University’s plan in Hyde Park became part of a greater attempt to increase growth in the City. Trustee Ferd Kramer, owner of the real estate firm Draper & Kramer, President of the Metropolitan Housing and Planning Commission, who “had a leadership role in virtually every major urban renewal in Chicago over the last 50 years,” saw renewal as essential to

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24 The University paid “a total of $1,743,739.67 in real estate taxes to the government of Cook County” in 1963, Friedman, To Mr. George Allen, Subsection: “The University as Corporation—Land and Taxes,” 15.
26 “Most of us have assumed for so long that we are the second metropolis of the United States that it has not yet penetrated that we are now the third metropolitan city,” Ferd Kramer, “Pressures, Plans, and the Metropolitan Citizen,” Remarks by Ferd Kramer—4th Annual Metropolitan Area Planning Conference, September 18, 1961, Pick-Congress Hotel, 13, Office of the President, Beadle Administration, Records, 1916-1968, Box 354, Folder 4: Urban renewal, university personnel, speeches, 1961-1962, Special Collections Research Center, The University of Chicago Library, Chicago, IL.
maintaining Chicago’s power. In a 1961 speech entitled “Pressures, Plans and the Metropolitan Citizen,” Kramer spoke of an already occurring “urban revolution” and the ways in which cities were rapidly evolving and creating wealth in the market. Kramer outlined the importance of citizens’ support for policymakers and planners in their attempts to deal with the problems the urban revolution brought on. In his speech, he emphasized that Chicago was in “crisis”: it was losing its status to “younger areas whose rate of growth is of such startling proportions that it may not be many years before our third place is threatened.” The problem, then, was not urban blight and racial turnover, but losing out in the marketplace, and in doing so, forfeiting the power and sway the City of Chicago had on the national scene. And if this was the “crisis” in Chicago—though it might be manifested on the local level in smaller issues of population distribution and the devaluation of rents, like in Hyde Park—then the answer would almost always be the same: growth.

Post-War American Cities and The Growth Machine

If the University was involved in Hyde Park’s renewal as a strategy for growth, how does this relate to the concept of the growth machine? It is possible that University officials and Board members, already part of Chicago’s elite, believed that growth in a laissez faire market was a utilitarian matter. Growth, in

29 Ibid, 12.
this sense, would always lead to the greatest good for all. If the market expanded, and more wealth was created, than everyone within the capitalist system benefited. For Hyde Park, this would mean that the increased commerce and rent increases brought on by renewal would ultimately benefit everyone in the community, even those who were the most marginalized in the economic system. Under this argument, acts of “creative destruction” (e.g. large-scale demolition projects), so central to renewal, would inevitably lead to a more profitable commercial industry and improved transportation flow of workers within the City’s economy. In this light, the eradication of blighted and nearly-blighed housing was part of a greater endeavor to improve the market in an attempt to make life better for everyone.

In Molotch and Logan’s conception of the growth machine, however, the trend towards growth is not a purely positive phenomenon, but has severely negative consequences for most of society. In reacting to a long history of urban thought in sociology, geography and economics that rely on the free market in determining the development of cities, Logan and Molotch argue that these theories overlook “conflicting interests, contested plans, and policy choices or the assumption that a highly specialized market was ‘free.’” Growth, no matter how it is achieved, is seen in the market as “urban success.” The university and the arts, as attractive elements of the city, become a conscious strategy of growth. They are not outside the system, but a valuable asset to its correct

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32 Ibid, xiv-xv.
33 Ibid, xix.
functioning. In indicting members of the Chicago School as establishing “the centrality of markets and the assumption of a free market system” as a core element of urban social science,\textsuperscript{34} Logan and Molotch nonetheless concede that the theoretical standpoint of laissez faire—perhaps even to this day—maintains “a theoretical consistency” which makes it hard to dispute or discredit.\textsuperscript{35}

The real issue the free market model overlooks is the role of the market itself. In Molotch and Logan’s argument, the market, far from being “free,” is inevitably “bound up with human interests in wealth, power, and affection.”\textsuperscript{36}

To talk about the “invisible hand” is to uncritically acknowledge power without looking for its source. The question for Molotch and Logan, then is not, who rules—but “for what?”\textsuperscript{37} In viewing the city as a growth machine, they discover that:

the desire for growth rate creates consensus among a wide range of elite groups, no matter how split they might be on other issues...Although they may differ on which particular strategy will best succeed, elites use their growth consensus to eliminate any alternative vision of the purpose of local government or the meaning of community.\textsuperscript{38}

This hegemonic belief in the growth machine means that although conflicts may occur between different members of the elite, the conflict never calls into question the idea of growth itself. As Paul Peterson noted, the goals of development are “inherently uncontroversial” and “consensual,” because they are always aligned with the “collective good.”\textsuperscript{39} Internal conflicts over where in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{34} Ibid, 4.
\item \textsuperscript{35} Ibid, 4.
\item \textsuperscript{36} Ibid, 9.
\item \textsuperscript{37} Ibid, 51.
\item \textsuperscript{38} Ibid, 51.
\item \textsuperscript{39} As quoted in Ibid, 85.
\end{itemize}
the city a convention center should be built never considers whether it should be built at all. In this way, the growth machine ideology blurs the distinction between use value and exchange value, and obfuscates the question of who growth really benefits.

Urban renewal became yet another strategy for growth because the total commodification of the community could only be achieved by getting rid of those at the margins. These were usually community members “who damage identities, who lower rents, who are not appropriate constituents of viable organizations.” In most cases, this meant preserving the presence of whites and devaluing and discouraging blacks from living there, thus replicating in the modern capitalist order the material oppression of blacks forged through colonialism and slavery. Campaigns to “save” rich white communities were championed as necessary to the city or civilization as a whole, because the loss of the (white) city would mean a loss of growth in the market, and a loss of value. In urban renewal, this push for growth results in a deep paradox, according to Logan and Molotch; namely, “it becomes necessary to destroy at least part of the neighborhood in order to save it.” Once again, the “rent intensification dynamic” rules all: anything that threatens its growth is seen as

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40 Banfield as referenced in ibid, 65.
41 Ibid, 85.
42 Cox as cited in ibid, 145.
43 Ibid, 145.
44 Ibid, 143-44.
46 Ibid, 135.
threatening the viability of the community as a whole.\textsuperscript{48} Urban renewal, ostensibly a process for the preservation of homes and neighborhoods, in reality becomes a commercial endeavor for growth. By the 1980s, less than 20 percent of urban renewal land nationwide was used for housing, while over 80 percent was used for commercial, industrial and public infrastructure.\textsuperscript{49} What is more, renewal actually destroyed more housing than it created: by Roger Friedland’s calculations, 90 percent of low-income housing destroyed in renewal was \textit{never} replaced.\textsuperscript{50} The fallacy that urban renewal was done for the “collective good” is revealed in this instance, as is the project of the book. In revealing the exploitation of labor, environmental destruction and severe poverty rates hidden behind the “problem-free” zones, Logan and Molotch attempt to dismantle the hegemonic system of growth ideology.\textsuperscript{51}

\textit{Members of The Growth Coalition}

In light of Logan and Molotch’s argument, the decision by the University to intervene in the surrounding neighborhood is completely logical. As an entity very much concerned with land-use decisions in and around its campus, the University was willing to invest large sums of money and effort into “rescuing” its haven from dissolution. The University, as the most powerful local business in the neighborhood, joined other localized members of the “growth coalition,” including real estate developers and businessmen’s associations, who came

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid, 145.
\textsuperscript{49} Friedland as referenced in ibid, 168.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid, 169.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid, 293.
together in order to increase property rates and secure growth.\textsuperscript{52} Other members of the growth coalition, according to Logan and Molotch, include owners of local news media companies,\textsuperscript{53} which gain profit from circulation and, consequentially, population growth (and which have been historically tireless promoters of boosterism); as well as owners of semi-public utilities\textsuperscript{54}; and auxiliary players, such as universities,\textsuperscript{55} museums, theaters,\textsuperscript{56} professional sports teams\textsuperscript{57} and organized labor.\textsuperscript{58} This coalition seems to fit nicely within the Mills’ theory of \textit{interlocking power directorates}: a group of elites acting through institutions to gain and maintain power.

In the case of the University of Chicago, its ties to local and citywide real estate developers are well documented in the history of renewal. The activities of the SECC, supported by the University’s desire to expand its real estate holdings, were “eloquent testimony, as far as downtown political authorities and local realtors were concerned, of the clear intent to resist conversion.”\textsuperscript{59}

Furthermore, the University commissioned the largest real estate management firm in Chicago, Baird and Warner, to manage its newly acquired properties—and the firm, therefore, was “obliged to coordinate its activities with the director of the Commission.”\textsuperscript{60} This resulted in a system that, by 1955, was so perfected

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid, 62.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid, 70.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid, 73.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid, 75.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid, 76.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid, 79.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid, 81.
\textsuperscript{59} Dentler and Rossi, \textit{The Politics of Urban Renewal}, 81-82.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
that “applicants for housing in selected sectors of Hyde Park and Kenwood were being screened by the Commission staff.”

The relationships between the University, this “community” organization (the SECC Board) and the real estate agencies were blurred to the point of no distinction. One could argue that the University was actively manipulating the firm to forward its own preservation, and there was a conflict of interest between the University and City officials. Or, one could argue that the University’s ties to the real estate industry, including many involved in the renewal plans itself and on the Board of Trustees (as in the case of Ferd Kramer), make a claim of institutional preservation invalid. Instead, I argue that far from being an isolated attempt to save the neighborhood, the renewal in Hyde Park was itself a mechanism for citywide power interests to strengthen the growth machine.

Recall that the make-up of the SECC itself was heavily stacked with members of the real estate business. Newton Farr, appointed by University of Chicago President Kimpton to the Executive Committee of the SECC, was a leader of the real estate firm Farr and Company, President of the Chicago Real Estate Board and the National Association of Real Estate Boards (1940), President of Chicago Railways, Director of Chicago Title and Trust Company, executive committee member of the Chicago Association of Commerce and on the Chicago Planning Commission. Within the larger SECC Board, Farr was head of the Real

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61 Ibid.
Estate Development Committee,\textsuperscript{63} and Levi noted in an interview how valuable it was to have a “poobah in the real estate business” to help crack down on realtors who were breaking the law through the practice of illegal conversions.\textsuperscript{64}

The members of the Board of Trustees and their ties to the broader Chicago political scene also formed an invaluable part of the growth coalition. Trustee Ferd Kramer, mentioned earlier, was President of the Metropolitan Housing and Planning Council of Chicago and played a pivotal role in renewal, along with his close friend Sydney Stein, Jr. Stein, also on the Committee, served as Chairman of the Conference\textsuperscript{65} and played an essential role in encouraging the University to take part in community affairs: “[Stein]...took advantage of every opportunity to discuss with the University of Chicago Trustees the need for the University to become directly involved in community planning.”\textsuperscript{66} Top University administrators also realized the necessity of getting the Board involved. Levi told Kimpton that “this is a political thing” and they would have to get the Trustees “in the front line trenches” if they were to ever get anything passed at the City level:

If Marshall Field or Howard Wood walks in, the mayor and whoever else understands it’s either a castigating or a supporting editorial. If Edward Eagle Brown and David Kennedy walk in, there’s either a friendly attitude on financing for the city or there ain’t. If Fairfax Cone walks in, it’s the campaign committee of the mayor. If Jim Downs, it’s the mayor’s housing coordinator.\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{63} Dentler and Rossi, \textit{The Politics of Urban Renewal}, 226.
\textsuperscript{65} Dentler and Rossi, \textit{The Politics of Urban Renewal}, 78.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid, 193.
James Downs, Jr., in particular, would play a crucial role in Hyde Park’s realization of renewal. The President of the Real Estate Research Corporation and member of the real estate firm Downs and Mohl, he was appointed chairman of the Interim Housing Commission by Mayor Kennelly in July of 1952, and delivered a report in November of that year calling for “the creation of a permanent Community Conservation Board,” through which Hyde Park’s renewal would eventually be realized.\(^{68}\) By his own account, Downs had been appealing to University of Chicago administrators to take a role in community redevelopment since 1948.\(^{69}\) Hermon Dunlop Smith, a Trustee of both the University and the Field Foundation, suggested the University appeal to the Foundation, an idea that would eventually win the University $100,000.\(^{70}\) The number of well-connected businessmen on the Board and their ties to local media, local politicians and high-level government actors is a recurring theme in the plot of Hyde Park’s urban renewal.

Local businessmen in Hyde Park, many of whom had formed their own associations, also played a role in actualizing redevelopment and renewal. As stated in the previous chapter, local businessmen were often hit the hardest in the process of renewal. By the time renewal was finished, nearly two-thirds of businesses were liquidated. More than one-third were never compensated for lost real estate or revenue.\(^{71}\) Despite the vastly detrimental impact of renewal on small business owners, Berry, Parsons, and Platt note that many businessmen

\(^{68}\) Dentler and Rossi, *The Politics of Urban Renewal*, 77.

\(^{69}\) Ibid.


\(^{71}\) Berry, Parsons, Platt, *The Impact of Urban Renewal*, 77; 171.
were in favor of renewal, at least initially. For example, Hyde Park’s 55th Street Business and Professional Men’s Association voted with overwhelming approval for the original plan—perhaps before they realized the full effect it would have on their businesses. In his effort to alter legislation surrounding urban renewal, Levi mobilized a group of powerful players in the community, including the 55th Street Business and Professional Men’s Association. Levi and other administrators were well aware of the costs these local businessmen had incurred after the Hyde Park A and B projects, and after their protests became public, he went to Washington, D.C. with the Hyde Park Herald’s Bruce Sagan and Alderman Leon Despres to testify to Congress about enacting federal legislation to compensate the men. Local business owners, unaware of what “growth” would mean for their individual businesses, played an important role in mobilizing community action towards renewal—even as the “improvement” and “redevelopment” resulted in their own destruction.

The media, as was the case for most urban renewal programs, often served as an avenue for the promotion of growth and redevelopment. Following the completion of the Webb & Knapp townhomes in Hyde Park, the Sunday Tribune ran an extensive spread with large pictures showcasing how beautiful and innovative the modern townhomes were. The piece reads more like an

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72 Ibid, 28.
74 Abrahamson, A Neighborhood, 232.
advertisement than a journalistic article. Although earlier leadership at the Hyde Park Herald refused to write about the Conference or civic engagement, all of that changed when Sagan came aboard, according to Dentler and Rossi. Sagan, publisher of the Hyde Park Herald, founder of the Hyde Park Savings and Loan, used his position in this major local media outlet to “further the conference’s efforts.” Unsurprisingly, the first time the plan for renewal was publicly distributed, the University did so in “a special issue of the Hyde Park Herald, which, irrespective of subscription or mailing list, was distributed by hand to every household in the community.” This was thought to be the best way to reach the greatest number of people in the community vis-à-vis the University’s plans. When confronted by a political attack from Second Ward Alderman William Harvey regarding some property in the Hyde Park A and B area, Levi recalled discovering “one of our great secret weapons” in the person of Ruth Moore at the Chicago Sun-Times, a friend of Marshall Field, who wrote an in-depth article disproving all of Harvey’s claims.

Media outlets did often report on controversies surrounding the renewal plans, and opponents launched attacks through media outlets. For example, Monsignor John J. Egan and Nick Van Hoffman’s series of articles in the

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76 Dentler and Rossi, The Politics of Urban Renewal, 110.
78 Abrahamson, A Neighborhood, 158.
80 Ibid, 48.
newspaper for the Archdiocese of Chicago, the *New World*, attacked the University's plans because Levi was unwilling to answer their demand: “Can you give us an assurance that your black relocatees will not move into our white parishes?” However, the general narrative told by local media outlets—the story of a university and a community “fighting for its life”—was replayed and retold across the nation and the world, in publications like the *The London Economist, The New York Times, House & Home, St. Louis Dispatch, Christian Science Monitor* and *Town & Country.* “Few stories of community action,” reads the article in *CSM,* “are as rich as Hyde Park’s in displaying a blend of individual courage, enterprise, ideals and hard-headed business practicality.” The media, it seems, was either enamored by the Hyde Park story or had a vested interest in promoting it; namely, rewarding and encouraging the growth of cities.

In Logan and Molotch’s schema, politicians are confronted by a well-organized, resource-rich group of ambitious and like-minded people with a plan of action. Conflict with politicians over policy issues, therefore, tends to be minimal, especially since “local government is primarily concerned with increasing growth” and nearly all politicians are dependent on private campaign financing, making their vulnerability to the growth machine even

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84 Friedman, To Mr. George Allen, 5.
85 Ibid.
86 Stone as quoted in Logan and Molotch, *Urban Fortunes,* 62.
87 Ibid, 62.
88 Ibid, 63.
more pronounced. Local politicians may, in turn, hold sway over higher-level authorities in the government, who are dependent on “local political operators...for their own party base.” In the case of Hyde Park’s renewal, local politicians could lose their entire base if renewal was not successful. Though City officials were initially unhelpful in pushing the renewal plan forward, the University gained a major ally in City Hall when Mayor Richard J. Daley came into office in 1955. According to Levi, the support of Daley was hugely important. In a speech to Harvard on urban renewal in 1964, Daley highlighted the success of Hyde Park’s initiative, dubbed “Chicago’s Pilot Conservation Program.” According to Daley, “this is the pioneer effort of its kind in the nation.” When the University received $28 million dollars of federal money to pay for renewal, Daley instructed Levi how it would work: “Number one, every policy decision has to be made by the City, not the University. Number two, this University must not receive one single inch of land as a result of the plan.” In this instance, it is apparent how the University’s alliance with

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89 Ibid, 67.
90 Ibid, 69.
the City meant that even its interests in Hyde Park were sometimes forfeited for the growth of the City, as will be described in further detail later. 94

The University's partnership with the City of Chicago was only the first of its alliances with governmental actors. As renewal required more complex tools for gaining access to money and support, the University petitioned state and national legislatures to change existing laws and pass new legislation to assist Hyde Park's case. These would include amendments to the Illinois Blighted Areas Act (1947) and the Neighborhood Redevelopment Corporation Act (1953), as well as Section 112, a special addendum that allowed for universities to earn federal credits, which would be assigned to their cities for any federal funding given to them. 95 In the case of the Neighborhood Redevelopment Corporation Act, Levi himself presented before the State Legislature, arguing to broaden its applications: “to include conservation of deteriorating housing and commercial sites,” as opposed to only blighted areas. 96 In practicality, this meant creating a broader basis for conservation programs, and, therefore, funding, that included buildings that did not meet the conditions of blight. Levi relied on his previous experience lobbying for a change in legislation regarding municipal codes to get the bill passed. He also benefited from the assistance of Trustee Earl Kribben, at whose insistence the Urban Community Conservation Act was eventually passed, 97 and they decided to share the burden of both bills: “I had this

97 Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto, 212.
magnificent group of Trustees that I could call on,” Levi said later. Noble Lee, Dean of the Law School of the University of Chicago and Illinois Congressman, and Illinois Senator Marshall Korshak helped pass the amendments. This legislation made the Southwest Hyde Park Neighborhood Redevelopment project feasible. Officials at every level of the government were willing to assist the University because they realized that Hyde Park’s success or failure would inevitably impact growth in the City, state, and, in some cases, the nation as well.

The University as National Resource

In certain instances, higher-level administrators at the University had direct ties to the White House and were able to shift national politics to realize their wishes as well. When the University was finalizing its plans for the Hyde Park-Kenwood Urban Renewal project, it needed the stamp of approval from the FHA. Levi recounted this problem:

I said, “Well, David [Rockefeller?] has had me in and out of Columbia. I know Eisenhower is aware of this kind of thing. Why don’t we get to the President and talk about what are the difficulties of operating an urban university?” Larry simply picked up the phone and called Ed Ryerson. I think the meeting was arranged ten days thereafter.

According to Levi, he went down to Washington and walked out of the Housing and Home Finance Agency after forty-five minutes with a contract that approved

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100 Ibid, 4.
101 Ibid, 45.
federal funding for the Hyde Park-Kenwood Urban Renewal Plan. Levi’s brother, Edward H. Levi, would go on to be the Provost and President of the University after Kimpton and later became the United States Attorney General under President Gerald Ford. Julian H. Levi would be appointed as the vice-chairman to the White House’s task force on cities. Section 112 of the Housing Act of 1959 allowed the University to garner $21 million in federal urban renewal credits, only a small portion of which would be used up in its plans. The bill was represented in Congress as one for all universities through the American Association of Universities, and was not specifically in the University of Chicago’s name. Furthermore, this law allowed, according to O’Mara, “a savvy university [to] undertake most massive construction programs with little or no expenditures of its own,” which cemented the logic of universities as growth machines in the national schema. Although an argument could be made here that this was an instance of institutional preservation as well—that the University only became involved with the greater group in order to forward its own interests—why would so much of the federal money be sanctioned for the City, and in the case of the Hyde Park-Kenwood Urban Renewal Plan, specify that

102 Ibid.
104 Levi does not specify whose presidency this position was under, but it is quite likely that it was under President Gerald Ford, in whose administration his brother also worked, “Oral History Interview,” 84.
105 Friedman, To Mr. George Allen, 15.
107 O’Mara, 78.
the University would not be allowed to gain ownership over any land through
the process? If the University had these relationships to the national
government, why would it fight for a policy that in actuality benefited the City
more than the University as an institution?

Through growth machine ideology, the University was able to position
itself as an indispensable resource to the City and the nation. In a speech at the
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee in 1960, Levi very clearly outlined the ways
the University had attained its goal of a “compatible” community, and described
the renewal program as a “cooperative venture” between the community, its
institutions and organizations, the City administration, the University
administration, Mayor Daley, the Chicago Land Clearance Commission, the
Community Conservation Board, the Chicago Planning Department, among
others; as well as the federal Urban Renewal Administration, the City Council,
the Illinois State Legislature and the US Congress.108 At first glance, the story of
Hyde Park’s renewal—the influence the University was able to gain over actors
on the municipal, state and national levels; the resources it garnered; the
legislative changes it enacted—seems unbelievably serendipitous. Or, the
invisible hand of the market was clearly guiding not only the University, but also
the nation, towards a different attitude, towards cities that were reliant on
planning and officials who understood the importance of land values. As Levi
said in his speech, “the very presence of the University has a stabilizing effect on

real estate values.”¹⁰⁹ The University’s argument for its actions throughout renewal was always centered on a pragmatic, ambitious approach, which could simply be read as an institution’s fight to stay afloat—nothing more, nothing less. However, I argue that the defense of the University as profitable to the City and the nation as a source of growth is not accidental. Levi’s statement that “Profound National interests ride upon the struggles now pursued at Chicago and at other campuses throughout the Nation”¹¹⁰ was indicative of something else, a subsumption of the University itself as part of the urban growth machine. This is similar to the logic apparent in a speech by the president of the University of Texas after it exceeded the success of other similar institutions, when he said: “The battle for national leadership among states is being fought on the campuses of the great research universities of the nation.”¹¹¹ Universities, even in claiming to encompass a separate sphere from the market, have themselves become interpolated into the growth machine ideology.

*The Infallible Logic of Growth*

In taking on the growth machine as a point of departure for an analysis of Hyde Park’s urban renewal, a very different story begins to emerge in relation to earlier arguments. Rather than understanding urban renewal in Hyde Park as the triumph of civil society and democracy—or its antithesis, a new and more insidious incarnation of racism in residential segregation—this approach sees all

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, 9.
¹¹⁰ Ibid.
¹¹¹ King (1985), 12; as quoted in Logan and Molotch, *Urban Fortunes*, 76.
elements as subsumed by a totalizing ideology to hold on to power that is never *in itself* questioned. All important players within the marketplace, having a vested interest in the valuing and devaluing of space for its exchange value, preach a sermon of growth and unbridled market power as the *solution* to the urban problematic, without realizing that it is the market itself which is the *source* of the problematic.

It is not the conflicts over where renewal would occur and who would be displaced that are central to our analysis as they were in past chapters. It is the *compliance* and *collaboration* of actors, and their dogmatic pursuit of capital, that requires further critique. It is not individuals acting from racial prejudice that is at stake. Arguments over integration and racial exclusion will never lead to questions about the production of space itself, which requires analysis. Racism, according to Logan and Molotch, and as described by countless other theorists, is so deeply embedded in our capitalist system that the devaluation of blacks cannot be answered outside of the capitalist totality because their oppression and exploitation have fueled the growth machine for so long. A widely accepted ideology of value-free growth and a blind acceptance of the free market as “free” is the underlying assumption of our modern society. Therefore, the strength of Logan and Molotch’s critique is not revealing how certain members are “left out” and marginalized, although some certainly are, but how—even more frighteningly—we are all already *in* the growth machine, and no one even realizes it. In the case of Hyde Park’s renewal, this critique allows one to see how the concept of growth, viewed as an unequivocally positive phenomenon,
becomes a strategy through which elites are able to gain control and power without anyone noticing. Members of the growth machine, who framed their plan in terms of the market—and thereby proved its effectiveness and necessity—never allowed other questions to be asked.
IV. THE UNIVERSITY AND THE CITY:
A FOUCAULDIAN ANALYSIS OF URBAN RENEWAL

“[The immigrants’] invasion of the city has the effect of a tidal wave inundating first the immigrant colonies, the ports of first entry, dislodging thousands of inhabitants who overflow into the next zone, and so on and so on until the momentum of the wave has spent its force on the last urban zone.”
Ernest W. Burgess, The City (1925) 1

“Actually, an urban renewal program represents the objectives, the work, the very essence of government.”
Mayor Richard J. Daley, in a speech on Hyde Park’s urban renewal, in 1964 2

Blight, Natural Metaphors and the City as Ecology

Like the biological allusions the word invokes, the idea of blight is similar to cancer in the modern imaginary: invisible displaced agents, multiplying and threatening to destroy the make-up of a correctly functioning organism. As members of the quickly disappearing white communities on Chicago’s West Side have stated, the choice to leave the neighborhood seemed inevitable. According to one study, even sixty years later, community members still use “the language of natural disaster—‘a shock wave,’ ‘tidal wave,’ ‘lava’—to describe their departures.” 3 In this case, natural metaphors are invoked alongside a teleological understanding of history: it could not have happened another way, “there was nothing we could do.” In his master’s thesis, Benjamin Lorch describes “blight”

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as “the master narrative” for urban renewal on Chicago’s South Side. Those experiencing this process of urban change understood it as a natural occurrence, one that involved human processes that could not be separated from the natural ecology.

Under plans that called for urban renewal, as opposed to mere slum removal, the aim was not the complete eradication of blight. Urban renewal meant rehabilitation and reorganization of the physical spaces: it was not simply a demolition or relocation project. During this post-war period, I argue, in light of Foucault’s later lectures on biopower, a new governance arises, one that works through environmental interventions. This governance is worried about responding to natural processes in the milieu as opposed to the behavior of individuals. Assuming that an ecological understanding of the city becomes dominant at the turn of the twentieth century and human populations become the site of intervention in American politics, how can this shape our understanding of why urban renewal happened the way it did? How do the University of Chicago and its focus on the city as the definitive problematic contribute to these new forms of knowledge? How do these new conceptions of the urban, as well as the human, influence the way urban renewal occurs? What does this mean for our understanding of what governance does? Lastly, what new methods of power are employed, and where do they reside place in a genealogy of knowledge/power?

The University, Biopower and Urban Renewal

In Michel Foucault’s *Security, Territory, Population* (2009), a collection of lectures given between 1977 and 1978, he reveals for the first time a new “general strategy of power” that arises in the modern period and changes how governance functions. In this formation of power, governance addresses human beings as a *species*, and not as *individual subjects*. Foucault calls this phenomenon *biopower*, a term which reflects his understanding of power as not deriving from a particular source, but rather existing within material conditions. According to Foucault, the use of biopower comes about in the nineteenth century as a means to address the “problem of circulation” and of the town in the face of a newly expanded market. Or, to put it more simply, biopower strives to solve the issues that emerge when human beings live in an increasingly constructed and planned environment. Earlier forms of governance, such as sovereignty and discipline, focused on the individual subject as the field of intervention. Biopower, however, uses the *milieu* to intervene at the level of the population: “a multiplicity of individuals who are and fundamentally and essentially only exist biologically bound to the materiality within which they exist.” The site of power, then, is no longer bound to sovereign notions of subjecthood, but to a biological understanding of the human species. He traces this movement from disciplining the subject to studying and

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6 Ibid, 1-4.
7 Ibid, 13.
8 Ibid, 21.
securing the population as one that is no longer couched in ethical language, but in the language of statistics. It does not hang upon a moral distinction between right and wrong, but aims to create a distinction between true and false.  

Foucault traces this change to a crisis in older forms of governance as the market expanded to encompass territory outside of the sovereign’s control. Instead of exercising power over a territory in sovereignty or over individual bodies through discipline, biopolitics exercises power over a population. This change, however, notes Foucault, is “not the point.” This change in governance does not only change who is governed or how they are governed, but how knowledge and space are conceived and constructed. It relies on material givens, it works on statistics, it seeks to organize for poly-functionality, and most importantly it “works on the future.”  

In doing so, it tries to modify “something in the biological destiny of the species.” Instead of disciplining current subjects, biopower endeavors to improve an imagined future population.

The arrival of liberalism, or political economy, and later neo-liberalism, coincides with the emergence of this new type of governance. Political economy, in its insistence on economic analysis, “reflects on governmental practices themselves, and it does not question them to determine whether or not they are

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9 See Alan Agresti and Barbara Findlay, *Statistical Methods for the Social Sciences* (Upper Saddle, NJ: Pearson Education, 2009): Although this is how Foucault conceived it, in the field of statistics, absolute “truth claims” are never valid; rather, the aim is to come to a probability about the extent to which something may or may not be true through the falsification of tentative hypothesis.

11 Ibid, 10.
legitimate in terms of right."\textsuperscript{12} In \textit{The Birth of Biopolitics} (2008), Foucault notes how this new governance is no longer concerned with the question of morality (good/bad) or even of legitimacy (i.e. sovereignty); political economy asks the question of \textit{effect}, not \textit{origin}.\textsuperscript{13} The organizing principle of this new governance is not, then, morality but truth.\textsuperscript{14} In this way, the relationship of government to nature also changes: no longer the source of legitimation for sovereignty, nature is something that “runs under, through, and in the exercise of governmentality.”\textsuperscript{15} The relationship of nature to the mechanisms of power has shifted: in biopower, it is within nature itself where power exists. The market is understood as only as effective as its ability to react to natural mechanisms that limit and change it.\textsuperscript{16} It is no longer a question of right or wrong, but of effective governance, which can be proven or disproven according to the market. This new governance must arbitrate between “the freedom and security of individuals” and this new “political culture of danger”\textsuperscript{17} that arose in the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{18} The code words of this new apparatus are \textit{case, risk, danger} and \textit{crisis}.\textsuperscript{19} In this way, \textit{democratic freedoms} are only arrived at through

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{12} Ibid, 15.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Ibid, 31-32.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Foucault, \textit{The Birth of Biopolitics}, 15-16.
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Ibid, 31.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} Foucault describes “the political culture of danger in the nineteenth century,” in which “everyday dangers appear, emerge, and spread everywhere, perpetually being brought to life, reactualized and circulated,” Foucault, \textit{The Birth of Biopolitics}, 66.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} Ibid, 66.
  \item \textsuperscript{19} Foucault, \textit{Security, Territory, Population}, 61.
\end{itemize}
economic interventions, because risks within the market threaten the capacity of the human species to succeed.\textsuperscript{20}

This new type of governance sees “this project of structuring of space and territory” as central.\textsuperscript{21} It is at this point, according to Foucault, that a new problem arises: “the ‘naturalness’ of the human species within an artificial milieu.”\textsuperscript{22} The natural dynamics of human populations continually come into contact with the constructed environment of the city. To address this problem, biopower as a strategy of power is no longer concerned with the relationship of the individual subject to the sovereign or to the state. Law, therefore, is no longer the site of control. Instead, biopower uses “physical” or “natural” processes—what Foucault calls “elements of reality”\textsuperscript{23}—to intervene at the level of the population. According to Foucault, this new kind of governance implies:

\begin{quote}
a society in which the field is left open to fluctuating processes, in which minority individuals and practices are tolerated, in which action is brought to bear on the rules of the game rather than the players, and finally in which there is an environmental type of intervention instead of the internal subjugation of individuals.\textsuperscript{24}
\end{quote}

As the above quote reveals, Foucault sees this shift as fundamentally changing how governance works on the individual—or, rather, that it no longer does. By analyzing biopower, the concern for the population as the site for governance, and not the sovereign subject, creates tolerance for diverse practices and individuals, and is more concerned with how “the game” has been constructed.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid, 68. 
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid, 30. 
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid, 22. 
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid, 65-66. 
\textsuperscript{24} Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 260.
than whether people play by the rules. Consequently, nature becomes an important subject to study and observe because it is by understanding the fluctuations of natural processes and developments that we can predict or prevent the next crisis in the market from happening. In so doing, we secure the population.

As this new conception of governance and relations of power arises, “a whole new series of knowledge” also arises. Then, according to Foucault, “the theme of man, and the ‘human sciences’ that analyze him as a living being, working individual, and speaking subject, should be understood on the basis of the emergence of the population as the correlate of power and the object of knowledge.” Governance that functions on truth needs information; governance that intervenes on the level of the population in order to maximize efficiency needs statistical analysis.

In Foucault’s theory of biopower, interventions on the level of the population and the environment seek to preserve democratic freedoms. In order to address the “‘naturalness’ of the human species within an artificial milieu,” certain steps must be taken to intervene in the field of fluctuating human processes. If the capital city is where the market originates, and its artificial

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26 Ibid, 79.
27 “The capital must be the place where the holy orators are the best and are best heard, and it must also be the site of the academies, since they must give birth to the sciences and truth that is to be disseminated to the country. Finally, there is an economic role: the capital must be the site of luxury so that it is a point of attraction for products coming from other countries, and at the same time, through trade, it must be a distribution point of manufactured articles and products, etcetera.” *Security, Territory, Population*, 14.
construction is the most obvious, then the emergence of this new crisis of the natural would be apparent in the city most of all, where the planned “economic grid” has not prevented the spread of natural diseases, blight and poverty. In other words, if the city represents the ultimate progress of rational human construction, how does it also create previously non-existent social problems? What steps are taken to address these new problems, and do they signify a new relationship of governance to the governed? For example, if we take on Foucault’s theory of biopower in order to examine urban renewal, particularly in the case of Hyde Park, how can this inform our understanding of what kind of governance was used to solve this new problem in the urban sphere?

*Sociology, the Chicago School and Ecological Urbanism*

If we are to center our analysis on the new types of knowledge that arise lateral to this new governance at the turn of the twentieth century, then the Chicago School of Sociology is one example that cannot be ignored, whose existence, if not paramount, was central to the creation of the new social sciences. Although the content, importance and even existence of the “Chicago School” are constantly contested, its influence on the discipline and historiography of sociology seems to be unanimously accepted. In Craig Calhoun’s *Sociology in America: A History*, Calhoun immediately affirms this fact: “[Sociology’s] first great institutional base was at the University of Chicago, itself
a new institution receptive to new approaches to knowledge.” This new type of scientific inquiry, I argue, focused its study at the level of the population, was mainly concerned with the problematic of the city, and inherited older biological and evolutionary understandings of the human, and in doing so, marked a change from earlier forms of knowledge. This meant that humans could be studied as a species in nature, as opposed to individual rational subjects outside or apart from the natural world. Furthermore, studying sociology at its birthplace at the University of Chicago—in the same city where the earliest programs of urban planning took place and among politicians, academics, and administrators who literally wrote the book on urban renewal and who changed state and national laws—will hopefully inform our understanding of biopower and the strategies that were employed to realize it.

According to Abbott, the “Chicago School” conventionally refers to a group of professors and students working at the department during the interwar years, between 1915 and 1935. The most important, and perhaps mythologized, faculty members were Robert E. Park (1914-34) and Ernest W. Burgess (1916-52). Ellsworth Faris (1920-40) and W.I. Thomas (1895-1918) as well as Louis Wirth (1931-52) and Herbert Blumer were also important figures. The students, mostly of Park and Burgess, also were an essential part

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29 Andrew Abbott, Department & Discipline: Chicago at One Hundred (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 5.
31 Wirth was also a student of Park and Burgess, ibid, 6.
32 Ibid, 6.
of the legacy, and included Martin Bulmer, Charles S. Johnson, Nels Anderson, Everett Hughes, Harvey Zorbaugh, E. Franklin Frazier, Horace R. Cayton, St. Clair Drake, and Charles E. Merriam to name a few.  

Famous for their ethnographies, many books written by Chicago School members are considered seminal texts of sociology. The influence and achievements of the School were manifold and have been well documented by historiographers of the field.

From the outset, sociology at the University of Chicago embodied the mission of the School: to study the unique problems facing the city. This meant, more specifically, the shifting social relations found in this environment, as well as new manifestations of disease, poverty and crime that arose within the urban sphere. Although sociology had existed in Europe in a more philosophical vein in the writings of Weber and Marx for some time, Albion Small’s department at Chicago initiated a new phase of sociology that was distinctly American and approached the subject in new ways. According to Abbott, the members of the Chicago School believed that “[s]ocial facts are located,” and separate from the geographic location and temporal context, they are meaningless. Location, then, was paramount in Chicago School ideology.

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34 These include The Polish Peasant in Europe and America (1918-20), The Negro in Chicago (1922), The Hobo (1923), The City (1925), Introduction to the Science of Sociology (1921), The Gang (1927), The Ghetto (1929), The Gold Coast and the Slum (1929), The Negro Family in Chicago (1931), Black Metropolis (1945) as well as countless others in Bulmer, 3; Burgess, 62. See Abbott.
35 See Hughes; Abbott, Bulmer; Calhoun.
36 Abbott, Department & Discipline, 197.
When Small became the first chair of the department, he wrote, with George Vincent, *An Introduction to the Study of Sociology* (1894), which instructed young sociologists on the topic of community study. In an article for the *American Journal of Sociology* in 1896, Small wrote of “the vast sociological laboratory which the city of Chicago constitutes” and the potential it offered students to investigate “conditions within their own observation.” Park himself, in *The City* clearly saw the city as the place to study the social, a “laboratory for the investigation of collective behavior.” The Chicago School, according to Martin Bulmer, was “characterized by a commitment to empirical research on the city of Chicago, focusing upon its ethnic and racial intermixture, its social problems, its urban form and its local communities.” In “Chicago, expérience ethnique,” Maurice Halbwachs wrote in 1932, “If there exists, at the University of Chicago, an original school of sociology, this is not unrelated to the fact that these scholars do not have to look very far for a subject of study.” The unique nature of the projects being undertaken at the Chicago School was inspired by the city within which it existed, and its subject matter and contributions to science were based on observations made in this surrounding

40Park and Burgess, *The City*, 22.
environment. Why did this new line of inquiry, which now saw the city as the site of social analysis, emerge when it did? Why is Chicago the city where so much of this new methodological research took place? Research at Chicago, both qualitative and quantitative, covered topics varying from new social structures and groups found in the city (e.g., gangs, hobos), an increasingly widening socio-economic gap between neighborhoods (e.g., the Gold Coast, the slum), issues of race and ethnicity, and the demographic make-up of the city itself. I argue that these new conceptions of the city and the human, borrowed from biological theories of the organism, emerged at the Chicago School because of its location in one of the most rapidly industrializing cities of the time, and the need to address social problems arising from this change.

Through this development of ecological urbanism, the Chicago school conceived the city’s processes as natural and biological. The three most salient characteristics of Chicago schoolwork, according to Abbott, lay in social psychology, social organization and ecology.\(^{43}\) It is the latter two that will be explored and taken up in this chapter, although all three clearly intersect and should not be seen as isolated fields of study. Park and Burgess were inspired by R.D. McKenzie’s work, also published in *The City*, who defined human ecology as “a study of the spatial and temporal relations of human beings as affected by the selective, distributive, and accommodative forces of the environment.”\(^{44}\) Ecological conceptions of the city, which lay at the heart of Burgess and Park’s

\(^{43}\) Ibid, 6.

work, looked for the natural and social processes that create the city organism. Deploying natural metaphors and borrowing from evolutionary language, Park and Burgess construct a city of *growth, decay, disequilibrium* and *crisis*. With the deep conviction that the city was “the natural habitat of *civilized* man,” Park and Burgess strove to uncover the *natural* or biologically driven laws and cycles that guided its behavior.46

*Chicago’s Legacy: Racial Succession, Zonal Maps and Rating Systems*

The effects of the Chicago school on both the discourse surrounding the urban sphere and the plans implemented through renewal are apparent in Park and Burgess’ work in particular. The legacies of Park and Burgess can be seen in two of their most famous theories: Park’s theory of racial succession and Burgess’s zonal model hypothesis. Park’s “race relations cycle” depicted the way in which different groups in the city compete over resources. The cycle occurred in four stages: competition, conflict, accommodation and, eventually, assimilation.47 In this cycle, new immigrant groups would arrive in the city, compete for resources, come into conflict with previously existing groups, learn

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45 Emphasis mine, Park, *Human Communities*, 73.
46 The idea of the city as an organism can in no way be solely attributed to the legacy of the Chicago school, although the school did contribute to its widespread influence. According to Peter Langer, in “Sociology-Four Images of Organized Diversity,” the four predominant images of the city in sociology are as follows: the bazaar, the jungle, the organism, and the machine (97). Langer attributes the largely influential work of social Darwinist Herbert Spencer to the rise of this image (100), but goes as far back as Emile Durkheim’s “organic solidarity” (110) to trace its origins, in *Cities of the Mind: Images and Themes of the City in the Social Sciences*, ed. Lloyd Rodwin and Robert M. Hollister (New York and London: Plenum Press, 1984).
to accommodate and eventually assimilate into the city’s population. Here, again, Park uses an evolutionary understanding of human processes to explain how new groups eventually become a part of city life. Burgess’s zonal hypothesis, based on Park’s work, traced the outward expansion of the city’s main concentric zones, which included the downtown business district (Zone I), transition area (Zone II), the zone of workingmen’s houses (Zone III), the residential zone (Zone IV) and the commuters zone (V).48 (See Appendix C, Figures 7.1-7.2.) The succession of these neighborhoods took place through invasions of one zone into the other.49 Again, the ecological term “succession” is used to explain the replacement of one community by another, or, in Burgess’s case, one zone by another. Burgess compares the effects of disorganization and organization within the zones of the city as “analogous to the anabolic and katabolic processes of metabolism in the body.”50 Once again, Burgess posits that these are natural processes without acknowledging any structural constraints affecting where these groups are located, such as economic class or race. In other words, his theory tends to naturalize, and even, as we will see later, biologize differences within the human population. Both of these theories are important in understanding how urban policymakers understood, analyzed and “strategically” intervened at the level of the milieu in the city in later years.

The significance of the Chicago School’s discourse of ecological urbanism on national housing policy has been noted. One of the most convincing

48 Burgess, The City, 51.
49 Ibid, 50.
50 Ibid, 53.
arguments connecting the Chicago School and national policy comes in Jennifer Light’s *The Nature of Cities*, which examines ecological conceptions of urbanism and their impact on the American urban renewal project. Light notes the use of Chicago School rhetoric in the official language of renewal:

> From ‘conservation areas’ to ‘rehabilitation districts,’ then, the technical and legal categories that local public agencies employed to inform their analyses of urban data aligned the nation’s cities’ programs of acquiring land for demolition and modernization through eminent domain, relocating neighborhood populations, and enlisting citizens to repair the communities with the natural laws of *urban growth and decay*.51

The language used by human ecologists—imbued with militarism, according to Light, and concerned with, I argue, *danger, risk* and *security*—is reflected in every step of the urban renewal process: “human ecologists spoke of ‘invasion’ and ‘occupation,’ federal housing agencies created residential ‘security’ maps as part of their ‘united front’ against urban decay.”52 The natural metaphors used by Burgess and Park can be seen in the language of policies used to fundamentally change the nature of cities in the 1950s, as they did in the case of renewal in Hyde Park-Kenwood.

In reading Light’s work further, past the co-option of language and metaphor, we arrive at a person who broke down the barrier between academia and the city (and the national government) completely, who bridged the period between the early Chicago School and the time of the renewal, and whose role was paramount in the Hyde Park case. Homer S. Hoyt, author of the groundbreaking *One Hundred Years of Land Values in Chicago* (1933), is the link

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52 Ibid, 170.
between the Chicago School and Chicago’s urban renewal. Not a sociologist by trade, Hoyt was trained at the University as an economist, in another rapidly developing social science. In the preface to *Land Values*, his PhD dissertation, Hoyt writes that he had been “greatly stimulated by the ecological studies” created at the University of Chicago, in particular by “helpful suggestions made in the works” of Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, Robert D. McKenzie and Louis Wirth. (For an example of a land use map, see Appendix C, Figure 8.2).

At the Federal Housing Authority, Hoyt was the “Principle Housing Economist” after its establishment in 1934, leaving in 1941 to return to Chicago. In his term at the FHA, his superior, “Economic Advisor” Ernest M. Fisher, had also written an “account of urban growth based on the Chicago morphological model.” Not only an academic and policymaker, Hoyt had also been involved in the “real estate game” and later formed his own consulting firm, which “counted major city agencies and businesses among its clients.” The influence of his land use theories on federal policies, adopting much from Burgess’s zonal hypothesis, is undeniable. Although the federal government established the Homeowner’s Loan Corporation (HOLC) in 1933 (before Hoyt’s landmark study), its rating system also derived from assumptions about neighborhoods based on

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56 Ibid, 830.
57 Hoyt, *One Hundred Years*, xiii.
59 Ibid, 831.
“both an ecological conception of change and a socioeconomic one.”\textsuperscript{60} The result, as Jackson notes in \textit{Crabgrass Frontier}, instated in officials a belief that the natural tendency of a neighborhood was towards decline, both due to the aging of physical plant and the arrival of lower-income families. Thus, “physical deterioration was both a cause and an effect of population change.”\textsuperscript{61} Hoyt’s later work on neighborhood change, notes Jackson, was instrumental in codifying and legitimizing HOLC’s system as time went on.\textsuperscript{62}

The ties between Hoyt and federal housing policies go further, however, culminating in the establishment of a rating system for mortgages. Hoyt’s \textit{The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighborhoods in American Cities} (1939), which was published by the FHA, was cited by the agency as “a definitive model of urban development” until at least the early ‘80s.\textsuperscript{63} Hoyt returned to Chicago in 1941 to finish drafting the \textit{Chicago Land Use Survey} and to conduct a survey under the Works Progress Administration.\textsuperscript{64} Chicago was one of the sixty-four cities in the survey, upon which he based the book.\textsuperscript{65} In the introduction to \textit{Structure and Growth}, Hoyt notes “inharmonious racial groups tend to have an influence upon rents in urban residential areas.”\textsuperscript{66} His analysis of cities hinges on two modalities: the \textit{static} structure and composition of the city and “the

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{61}{Ibid, 198.}
\footnotetext{62}{Ibid, 199.}
\footnotetext{63}{Kucklick wrote her article in 1980, “Chicago Sociology,” 830.}
\footnotetext{64}{Light, \textit{The Nature of Cities}, 76.}
\footnotetext{66}{Ibid, 5.}
\end{footnotes}
movement of land uses and neighborhoods” over time. In explaining the rate of growth in cities, he focused on the importance of immigrant workers from Europe and rural America and the loss of population at the city center as the periphery grows. The study is full of maps, including, “dynamic factor maps,” which “trace the movement of different types of urban residential rent areas.” These “dynamic” maps, adopted later by mortgage lenders, are the most emblematic and inescapable sign of the Chicago School’s legacy (See Appendix C, Figures 8.4-8.5.) In these maps, environmental change is inevitable but measurable, comprised of a number of factors that can be categorized, measured and improved in the future. His maps show rent rates, racial demographics, structural quality of buildings, as well as several other factors, which can change over time due to the arrival of new populations, changes in land use, etc. As in any scientific line of inquiry, change is the assumed constant upon which his theory is based.

Using the block as the unit of analysis, Hoyt was able to determine the static structure and segregation of different neighborhood types at a specific moment in time. (See Appendix C, Figures 8.1 and 8.3.) In defining this structure, Hoyt studied patterns of average rent, age of structures, owner occupancy, condition of structures, units lacking private bath, nonwhite occupancy, dwelling units lacking heat and overcrowded dwelling units. Race,

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67 Emphasis mine, ibid, 5.
68 Ibid, 6.
69 Ibid, 6.
70 Ibid, 27.
71 Ibid, 33-34.
though a factor in his analysis, was only one determinant of rents, and therefore, nonwhite occupancy “[was] not necessarily indicative of low quality housing.”

Furthermore, in the same city where slums exist, there may also exist areas where only nonwhites live and “where acceptable housing conditions prevail.” In completely nonwhite areas, the same factors contribute to determining rent as in white areas; it is the integration of nonwhites into white neighborhoods that introduces a problem. Even the presence of one nonwhite person, according to Hoyt, “may initiate a period of transition.”

In the “twilight zone” where members of different races reside, “racial mixtures tend to have a depressing effect upon land values—and therefore, upon rents.” Although the connotations of Hoyt’s work, and, perhaps, the material history of his categories, are products of a racist system, it does not seem that an ideology of racism could tell the whole story here. It may be argued, of course, that an ecological understanding of the city, and of human populations, hardly escapes a biological conception of race, but I argue that this is related to a larger shift in thought, which hangs upon a new understanding of the human as a natural species.

In introducing his method of structural analysis, which evaluated the different factors affecting neighborhood rents, Hoyt acknowledged that he was

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72 Ibid, 54.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 In establishing that racial groups tend to live in segregated areas, Hoyt writes: “No statistical demonstration is required to prove the existence of Harlem in New York, the ’Black Belt’ in Chicago, or the Chinese quarter in San Francisco. It is a mere truism to enunciate that colored people tend to live in segregated districts of American cities,” emphasis mine, ibid, 62.
also determining the framework for mortgage-lending practices. Engaged in a federally sponsored survey, published by the FHA, Hoyt did not try to hide the important weight his analysis holds. Aware of the gravity of this task, Hoyt wrote in the following chapter of his role in the determination of mortgage-lending practices:

The segregation of areas within which to promote slum eradication activities will require the selection of different items and limitations than the location of areas of modern and well-kept homes. The selection of proper factors, and, of equal importance, the limits to be imposed upon the factors chosen, is thus completely left to the analyst.

Hoyt, the analyst, was aware, even if the readers of this survey may not have been, that the methodologies he used, the factors he chose, and his interpretation would come into play in the federal policies enacted later on. In determining what these “proper factors” were, Hoyt knew that he would shape our understanding of the phenomenon and the solutions that arise from this conception. In an Appendix section titled “Research in Urban Growth—An Aid in Selecting Mortgage Risks,” Hoyt wrote that his procedure of analysis was conceived “in an endeavor of measuring the relative risk underlying operation in certain areas...as a method of approach in the formulation of mortgage policy.”

His academic endeavor was, from its inception, a part of larger project that

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76 Interestingly enough, when explaining how to determine gradation of rent from the medium to high ranges, Hoyt writes that these changes tend to capture factors not usually recorded in real property surveys, such as “topography, style of architecture, accessibility to schools and shopping centers, the incomes of the residents, the proximity to adverse influences, restrictive covenants, and other features,” in Hoyt, Structure and Growth, 56. In determining the best areas of the city, Hoyt implicitly acknowledges the importance of the structure of racism in restricting access to the best areas of the city.

77 Emphasis mine, Ibid, 56.

78 Ibid, 132.
needs categories in order to assess *risk*. For Hoyt, the ultimate risk was the downgrading of rents within urban neighborhoods; the categories he created were intended to predict future problems in order to prevent large-scale decline.

Through his selection of factors, Hoyt’s model revealed that the introduction of a black family into a neighborhood would inevitably “precipitate a drastic decline” in land values.79 Here, then, we have it: the fluidity and disequilibrium of Park and Burgess’s conceptions of the city have been lost. Demographic change and the process of zonal movement have been omitted in Hoyt’s static conception of the city: residential segregation and the decline of the central city are understood as *natural laws*.80 Even graver, the determination of prices lies not only in the neighborhood’s physical structure but also in its “*social characteristics*.”81 In this theoretical move, the distinction between cause and effect has completely collapsed. As we saw earlier in the “master narrative” of urban renewal, blight *blights* and *is blighted*. The problem groups within the city—the black race, the impoverished—are also the cause of their downgraded position. It is clear that this academic essentialization of the black race with poverty, degradation and decline influenced the way these policies were written, instituted and realized.82 Hoyt’s model ensured the justification for decades of

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80 Kucklick, “Chicago Sociology,” 831.
81 Emphasis mine, ibid, 831.
82 Hoyt’s theory, of course, was one of many coming out of the Chicago school, and did not stand alone in its ideological stance. In *Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S. History* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), Alice O’Connor traces theories of race and class in Chicago sociology that eventually culminate—or are co-opted—in Gunnar Myrdal’s *An American Dilemma; the Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (New York: Harper,
inner city abandonment to follow: the racist practices of NAREB and banks were legitimized and a housing system based on segregation and neglect remained untouched. This was not necessarily, however, his intent. In fact, it was NAREB, in 1941, which set up Metropolitan Land Commissions and pushed for the power of eminent domain and federal ‘write-downs,’ while simultaneously denying the need for any form of public housing subsidies. This meant that groups living in blighted areas, often black, were forced out of their homes and usually not offered any place to relocate. These were claims that would have been harder to realize had Hoyt not unintentionally labeled the decline of the inner city as inevitable. In Chicago at the beginning of federal renewal plans, of the 374 FHA-guaranteed mortgages in the metropolitan area, only three were in the central city. In the section that follows, I will examine, using Foucauldian analysis, not why racism was so essential in the writing of these laws, but how racism functioned under the larger shift in governance towards biopower.

Twilight Zones, Biological Impurity and Racism as a Technology of Biopower

Recall that for Hoyt, it was the “twilight zones” where rents were depressed, and it was these areas that were the most worrisome. As different

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1944). In the writing of this book, Myrdal relies on the data from Drake and Cayton’s *Black Metropolis* and more caste-like racial theories of W. Lloyd Warner, also of the Chicago School, to create his own theory (O’Connor, 94). The result was an understanding of poverty “as itself a breeder of poverty” (O’Connor, 98) and greater legitimization of the “vicious cycle.” Even better, Myrdal was able to resolve dissonances between social ecology and anthropology by arguing that black poverty was caused by cultural disorganization and racial oppression (O’Connor, 96).


races moved into the same zones, there was a loss of racial purity that caused loss of value—and, eventually, the downgrading of the inner city. In the concept of “twilight zones,” we see the containment of blight as a process of excising impure elements—or to use the metaphor of blight—sickened and diseased pockets that threaten the healthy functioning of the city organism. This understanding of racial difference, or deviation from the white norm, as abnormal or sick, fits perfectly with a Foucauldian understanding of the racism that arises along with biopower. This racism, according to Foucault, functions in two ways: first, in order to fragment, or “to create caesuras within the biological continuum addressed by biopower”; and, second, as a justification for killing in the modern state, not to let live and make die, as it was in sovereignty, but to let die. This is apparent, specifically, in Foucault’s “right to intervene to make live.” This is different from older forms of racism used in staging sovereign wars, because it is not about domination but proving the purity and biological superiority of one’s own race:

The fact that the other dies does not mean simply that I live in the sense that his death guarantees my safety; the death of the other, the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal) is something that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer.

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85 Washington notes: “This articulation of African Americans as threats to the larger white social body and their subsequent (and occasionally violent) segregation was an excellent example of the exercise of Foucault’s biopolitical power throughout white American society,” Packing Them In, 133-34.


87 Ibid, 247.

88 Ibid, 248.

89 Ibid, 255.
Racism, for Foucault, is not an ideology but a technology of power, one that is necessary for the functioning of the modern state. Hoyt's analysis of rents and his attempts to create a system that marked out dangerous areas as those of mixing and miscegenation emerged from this biopolitical understanding of race. The separation of races was necessary for Hoyt to achieve a healthy and functioning city, a separation that had been established for centuries through interventions by the state in family, marriage, education, social hierarchization, and property.

If we accept Foucault's central problematic—governance reacting to a crisis in its ability to govern—I argue that though race and class-based analyses are important in understanding certain dynamics and material conditions, seeing this change as a case of biopolitics might enable us to understand the location of power in Hyde Park's urban renewal in a radically different way vis-à-vis truth. As opposed to my earlier arguments, which tend to focus on ideology and conceive of power as outside of truth, Foucault's analysis and his theory of biopower are based instead on an understanding of truth as produced in the materiality of the world, through mechanisms of governance—and, therefore,

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90 Ibid, 256-8.
are fundamentally indistinct from power. The question for Foucault is truth itself.92

The use of the case to study dynamics in the urban sphere, in order to improve and modify what happened in the future; the focus on human populations as the site of interference and control; an understanding of dynamic social processes as natural; the national use of widespread attempts to categorize, quantify and map the city; and the use of these statistics to re-organize the city in a way that would be most efficient and profitable, to improve (although not necessarily perfect) future capacity—these seem to be strategies of security, and not of discipline or sovereignty. These methods, conceptualized partially or wholly from a new ecological conception of the city, born out of a new social science, I argue, arose from a problematic in the city: an inability to reconcile natural human processes within the artificial milieu. And they were undoubtedly implemented using racism as a tool of governance, a form of intervention. This problematic of the city—that the founders of the University of Chicago saw as critical and that Park and Burgess dealt with so profoundly—is one that needed a new conception of the human. We see this new concept of the human, as well as its relation to governance, taken up federally via Hoyt’s structural analyses, and enacted in policies that, to this day, continues to shape our understanding of the city.

Levi, Eminent Domain and the Case of Hyde Park

In the story of the University of Chicago and Hyde Park, the Chicago School’s ecological modes of thinking and Hoyt’s rating systems are not the only examples of these new technologies of governance. In the Hyde Park case, rather, the newly privatized right to eminent domain and the formation of the neighborhood corporation played a much larger role than rating systems and the ensuing redlining that affected structural and demographic change in the neighborhood. Returning to Hirsch’s assertion that Chicago served as a pioneer in this new process of urban renewal, let us review the creation of these eminent domain laws. According to Hirsch, the Illinois Blighted Areas Redevelopment Act of 1947 and “related legislation” not only allowed for eminent domain but also the “‘write-down’ formula” that allowed local governments to pass down territory, acquired through eminent domain, to private developers “for a fraction of the cost.”93 This, in turn, created a blueprint for the federal legislation that would follow in the Housing Act of 1949.94 Hirsch notes that racism alone does not explain the total effect of this legislation, but “an anti-urban bias also informed much of the FHA’s actions.”95 Ironically enough, this national trend towards urban renewal was silently sabotaging and destroying the urban centers of this country. However, we could also apply a different approach. If, as Hirsch contends, an ideology of racism alone cannot suffice to explain this new

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93 Hirsch and Mohl, Urban Policy, 88.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid, 87.
development, how can we once again apply a Foucauldian analysis using biopower as our point of departure?

It was Julian H. Levi, Executive Director of the Committee of Five and the SECC and a lawyer trained at the University of Chicago Law School, who petitioned the Illinois and the US government to change and amend urban renewal legislation. As Hoyt was with redlining, Levi with this action becomes the person who directly links the University of Chicago—and one could argue, universities generally—to the future of urban renewal. Levi would go on to chair the Chicago Plan Commission and serve as vice-chairman of the White House task force on cities.96 When Lawrence Kimpton first approached Levi about the problems in Hyde Park before renewal, Levi’s initial response was lackluster to say the least, as Levi recalls:

I said to him at the time, ‘You know, I don’t know anything about this sort of thing. Why are you asking me to do it?’ He said, ‘Well, we don’t know anything, either, but,’ he said, ‘we’d better learn together.’ My initial reaction was that this was something so amorphous and confused that to take it on just didn’t make sense at all.97

Levi, who had grown up in Hyde Park, attending the Laboratory Schools, the College and the Law School of the University of Chicago,98 had nonetheless spent most of his life unconcerned with community issues outside of his role as the congregation director. He attended the meeting at Mandel Hall in 1952 without “the slightest idea” as to what the University administrators were talking

97 Emphasis mine, Levi, “Oral History Interview,” 18. Levi recalls that this exchange took place in Billings Hospital, where Kimpton was “having one of these bouts with his recurrent fever that had come as a result of overexposure to radiation during the Manhattan Project days.”
98 Ibid, 1.
about. This was not something that Levi had been personally invested in previously, but a new problem of crime, poverty and decay that no one knew how to solve and one that Kimpton realized was threatening the existence of the university. We could even say that this issue of slum encroachment was a new problematic of the urban university that arose through shifts in populations and changes in industrialization, one that threatened the functioning and existence of American cities themselves.

Levi, by developing new legislative “techniques” or “tools,” took on the most significant role in the case of Hyde Park. The amendments to the Neighborhood Redevelopment Corporation Act in 1953, the passing of the Community Conservation Act in 1953; and Section 112 of the Federal Housing Act of 1959, which allowed for control of eminent domain, would not have been available had the University of Chicago not intervened in state and national politics. Levi, as President Kimpton’s right-hand man, persuaded the State legislature in 1953 to amend the Neighborhood Redevelopment Corporation Act (and to instate the Illinois Urban Community Conservation Act in the same year), which previously restricted redevelopment corporations to eliminating slums, not neighborhoods in danger of becoming slums. Although the distinction was ambiguous, it meant that Hyde Park could not apply for redevelopment corporation status under the older law. Under the new amendment, a

99 Ibid, 17.
redevelopment corporation that got the agreement of sixty percent of property owners in a given area could gain rights to eminent domain.\textsuperscript{101} Therefore, the radical notion that private corporations could gain the already controversial state power to take private land from individuals was amended to include the right of non-state actors to gain eminent domain over land that was “in danger of becoming” a slum. Putting the huge concession of state power aside, which we will shortly return to, the malleability of this clause meant that private individuals who made up the majority of a population could decide to take over privately-owned land if they could make an argument that it was in “danger.”

In a speech given to the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee in 1960, Levi borrowed ecological rhetoric, stating that: “Universities are complicated \textit{organisms}.”\textsuperscript{102} He described in detail how the University of Chicago, through the SECC, enabled and executed the task of “urban rebuilding.”\textsuperscript{103} In this retelling, it is clear that three of the four major projects in Hyde Park’s renewal (South West, Hyde Park-Kenwood, and South Campus) were only made feasible through changes to legislation, which Levi himself was responsible for. The first project, executed through the Chicago Land Clearance Commission and a Field Foundation Grant of $100,000, included the clearance of 48 acres at the public cost of $11.5 million, but did not require the use of eminent domain as in the three other projects.\textsuperscript{104} Legally, it was enacted through the Illinois Blighted

\textsuperscript{101} Dentler and Rossi, \textit{The Politics of Urban Renewal}, 85.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid. Levi does not use the term renewal or redevelopment to describe what is happening in Hyde Park.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid, 4.
Areas Act of 1947.\textsuperscript{105} The second project, carried out by the South West Hyde Park Redevelopment Corporation, was very clearly enacted only through amendments to the Neighborhood Redevelopment Corporation Act drafted by Levi himself.\textsuperscript{106} In the case of the third project, the Hyde Park-Kenwood Urban Renewal Plan itself, both this amendment and the creation of the Illinois Urban Community Conservation Act enabled the University, through the City of Chicago and the Conservation Board, to take control of 591 acres, 100 of which were rebuilt.\textsuperscript{107}

The last project, which Levi later noted was the most difficult to complete, covered South Campus (between 60\textsuperscript{th} and 61\textsuperscript{st} Street, south of the Midway) and could only be enacted by a change to federal legislation with the introduction of Section 112 to the Federal Housing Act of 1959. A total of 26 acres was cleared, allowing the University to expand its physical plant significantly.\textsuperscript{108} This change in federal law allowed the University to earn the city extra renewal credits from the FHA, and thus gain citywide support for its efforts.\textsuperscript{109} Levi was able to get this law passed, according to him, because they pitched it to Congress not as “a bill for the relief of the University of Chicago” but as a collective issue through the Association of American Universities.\textsuperscript{110} Section 112, according to Levi, tried to address the fact that urban universities must combat environmental problems, most noticeably, the fact that they are land-locked or “land-
starved.” At its heart, then, federal law allowed universities to acquire land, whether it was threatened by blight or not. The law was no longer focused on blight, but on “environmental problems” for the university, arising from the existence of the human population within the artificial milieu.

_Urban Revolution, Universities and Evolving Techniques of Governance_

Carl W. Larsen, head of the university’s public relations team at the time of renewal, wrote in 1961 that urban universities in the US were an undervalued national resource, and that the plan in Hyde Park:

...is the largest of its kind in the nation and the first of its kind to combine all of the available resources, legal tools and techniques thus far known. Many of the innovations utilized in the project were never used before. Thus the project is a pioneering effort for the nation.

Furthermore, he writes that these new legal techniques will allow for a new phenomenon that will soon be undertaken: “America,” Larsen writes, “is about to launch an urban revolution.” In _Cities of Knowledge: Cold War Science and the Search for the Next Silicon Valley_, Margaret Pugh O’Mara writes that within five years of the writing of Section 112, seventy-five universities and other

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111 Ibid, 11.
112 Emphasis mine, Larsen, “The Hyde Park Story,” 5. Larsen would go on to be a leading advocate for developing a Center for Urban Studies at the university, noting “There was a time when the University of Chicago was performing the pioneering function of bringing understanding to the processes of urban life. On our faculty were such outstanding social scientists as Charles Merriam, Louis Wirth, Louis Brownlow, Leonard D. White, etc...we have lost the recognition of leadership in this area that looms so bright on the social science horizon,” “Subject: The University and the City,” from Carl W. Larsen, James M. Sheldon and Sheldon Garber to George W. Beadle, Chancellor, May 25, 1961, 2, Office of the President, Beadle Administration, Records, 1916-1968, Box 354, Folder 4: Urban renewal, university personnel, speeches, 1961-1962, Special Collections Research Center, The University of Chicago Library, Chicago, IL.
institutions of higher education had taken advantage of the law. It was these “Section 112 projects” that added to “the growing conviction that research institutions were key to urban survival in this new post-industrial age.”\textsuperscript{114} It is not the university alone, then, that has a stake in this new process of urban renewal, but the city itself, which is viewed as experiencing an increasingly dire crisis in post-industrial, newly suburbanized America. As William Slayton, federal urban renewal commissioner, wrote in 1962: “A new city form—heavily dependent upon our cultural and educational institutions—is clearly in evolution.”\textsuperscript{115} The formation of the city itself, reacting to changes in the market and technologies of production, has fundamentally changed in this period. If the city is the problematic not only of universities and academia at this time, but also governance itself, how can we read this “evolution” in techniques as one that employs biopower as opposed to older modes of governance?

Not only do we see the play of biopower (the focus on the wellness of the population as opposed to the legal rights of the individual) in this shift towards urban renewal plans, but we also see the heightened importance of “risk assessment”—the categories as Hoyt envisioned them—and the population as the site of intervention, as gaining increased significance. In this way, an individual entity, like the University of Chicago, was able to change state and national laws in order to privately gain control over the surrounding neighborhood. Instead of focusing on the University as the site of analysis, however, let us examine this case in terms of where we see power located. Why

\textsuperscript{114} O'Mara, Cities of Knowledge, 78-9.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid, 79.
is the state willing to relinquish its power over land to private individuals, and in so doing, pave over the rights of the sovereign subject? Because for Foucault the shift in governance to biopower implies a shift away from sovereign power—a realization that it is the market, and not the state, where power is located, and the population as the producers in the market can be manipulated to increase that power—then this change makes complete sense. Furthermore, the emergence of the ‘write-down’ formula and the willingness on the part of the government to encourage the expansion of the capitalist market also point to the rise of biopower, as opposed to sovereign forms of governance.

In sum total, the structures and mechanisms of power we have seen in Levi’s and Hoyt’s work, reacting to the expanding importance of the market, no longer see people as sovereign subjects with rights but as a total population. The concern, then, is not how to control every individual, but how to control populations. The example of eminent domain in the case of Hyde Park fits perfectly within this analysis. Reacting to a new problematic—the expansion of slum areas that interrupted the normal flow and labor of the population—new theories are produced and employed in order to assess risk, create statistical analyses, and intervene strategically at the level of the milieu, or environment, to increase the biological strength of the population, and thereby, its production capabilities. Instead of seeing the role of the university, or the government, as operating under racist ideologies or an elitist or classist agenda, let us read the story in a different way, using a materialist perspective. If the University of Chicago always envisioned its role as addressing and engaging critically with the
problematic of the city, which arose at the turn of the century in response to changes in labor markets and production, then these new theories and changes in state and national policies emerging from the University sought as well to solve a problem that was becoming too big for anyone—the University, the state, or the federal government—to ignore. Namely, that our understanding of the human subject would have to undergo a radical transformation in order to improve our cities, which were quickly becoming sites of criminality, disease, and poverty. This problematic of the human in the artificial milieu needed a new language, new tools and a new science to improve its future within the market.

In a commencement speech at the Law School in 1961, Levi urged young lawyers to take up the issues that haunted the modern city, noting the monetary burden the “social trauma” of suburbanization had had on urban municipal governments in terms of increased poverty, crime and deteriorating health conditions within the population.\textsuperscript{116} Observing the inability of the American city “to deal with cycles of city growth and change,” Levi cited Chicago School concepts of “integration, equilibrium and disintegration” as accepted doctrine, and the fact that neighborhood change tended to occur rapidly in the face of growth and expansion.\textsuperscript{117} Levi concluded by quoting the words of another man, Mr. Justice Holmes, who thought that in the free market of ideas, “the best test of


\textsuperscript{117} Levi cites “The Appraisal of Real Estate,” \textit{American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers} (1951), 104 in his speech, ibid, 4.
truth is in the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which [these] wishes can be
safely carried out.”\textsuperscript{118} This is the idea that morality is no longer the best judge of
worth; rather, that we have shifted to a regime of truth, which, according to
Foucault, “allows one to judge all these practices as good or bad, not in terms of a
law or moral principle, but in terms of propositions subject to the division
between true and false.”\textsuperscript{119} Previously, one would assert moral principles or
ideals about the human and human action, but under a “regime of truth” one no
longer needs to make claims to morality, but rather can prove through analysis
that something has been effective. And, increasingly, the “site of truth” becomes
the market, and we see a shift towards the question of veridiction as opposed to
jurisdiction.

In the case of Hyde Park’s renewal, Levi does not argue for a moral
understanding of the University’s actions—he does not have to. In his eyes, it
was reacting to changes in the market to improve its own future, even if this
meant changing the laws that guided the market itself:

It’s a matter of trying to reach for whatever the prevailing economic and social
forces are that will bring you to where you want to be, and that is something that
you constantly, constantly have to work at. If you don’t, then market forces take
your destiny away from you…I think that’s the challenge that anybody who is
looking at the long-term future of an institution has to worry about. It’s both
[sic] a challenge, a threat and an opportunity.\textsuperscript{120}  

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\textsuperscript{118} Ibid, 7.  
\textsuperscript{119} Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 18.  
\textsuperscript{120} Emphasis mine, Levi, ”Oral History Interview,” 142.
Levi understand the necessity of gathering knowledge about the market forces that would determine the future of Hyde Park and the University in order to plan for the future. Urban renewal, and its implementation through changes in legislation which increasingly privatized the right to eminent domain, as well as allowing private developers to take a larger role in its redevelopment, both reveal the importance of shifting the legal structure surrounding the housing market which was in a large part responsible for the problem of white flight. In this move, “action is brought to bear on the rules of the game rather than the players.” And Levi had, indeed, changed “the game” in a profound way.

There are ways in which Foucault’s theory of biopower does not, however, entirely hold up in the case of Hyde Park. Although the urban renewal plans were constructed within a marketplace, and in response to changes in the market, as witnessed in the housing market in the post-war American city, the social context within both the University and the market existed—especially the structural racism in American society—mean that dogmatically accepting a Foucauldian analysis of urban renewal might create some blind spots in one’s argument. As other scholars have criticized Foucault for, his insistence on the market could be read as reproducing a late Chicago School neo-liberal ideology in which supply and demand rules all. However, I believe that this is a misreading of Foucault’s argument and his definition of “market” as discussion in *The Birth of Biopolitics*:

> In this sense, inasmuch as it enables production, need, supply, demand, value, and price, etcetera, to be linked together through exchange, the market constitutes a site of veridiction, I mean a site of verification for governmental
practice...The market determines that a good government is no longer simply government that functions according to *justice*.\(^{121}\)

Instead, I posit that Foucault’s conception of the market transcends this limited system of analysis, and is more interested in the *construction of truth* through the market, and how governance acts in response to market mechanisms. Although there are moments in the case of Hyde Park’s renewal when the solutions enacted are not based in a free market system, the knowledge that is used as the basis for the control of populations and the reason for the intervention, does emerge, I argue—at least partially—because of a market, albeit one that was clearly faulted and not at all free. This knowledge, which borrows natural and biological conceptions of the human as population, and works through statistical analysis, and is worried about the future, however, is what I would like to focus on in Hyde Park’s case.

One could also make the argument that certain aspects of renewal, especially in Hyde Park’s case, seem to be evidence of an older form of governance. The University’s attempts, for example, to take control over legislation in order to gain complete dominion over the territory within which they operate could be seen as the act of the sovereign. Following this argument, however, one would expect all “bad subjects” (read: community members who did not form a ‘compatible community’) would be cast out or killed. As we have seen in the “successful” integration of Hyde Park, however: this is not the case at all.

\(^{121}\) Emphasis mine, Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, 32.
Using Foucault’s analysis, one could argue that the founding of the University of Chicago itself, with its specific city-centered agenda, was from the first a laboratory and incubator for a type of governance which was focused on biopower. This can be seen in the new and quintessentially Chicago disciplines of sociology and economics and the overwhelming emphasis on statistical analysis as the source of unbiased, methodological truth. It is not just that the University of Chicago acted as pioneer in its examination of this new problematic, which dealt explicitly with notions of population and intervention, but that the University would probably not have had the same trajectory had these problems not arisen the way they did. Remember, the location of the University in a city was, from the beginning, central to its founding, and many of its greatest discoveries would not have been possible had it been in a suburban or rural setting. Certainly, American sociology would have had a very different path had the University of Chicago been anywhere else. More importantly, the development of the social sciences at the University under this new conception, meant that our understanding of the human has been drastically reshaped. University scholars, and later administrators, understanding that it was the market itself (embodied in the image of the city) as the last gasp of the “natural,” where one could record the “spontaneous mechanisms” of the human species, meant that their plan for renewal would use all the tools of this knowledge in order to solve the crisis most effectively, whether or not it was right or wrong.\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{122} Foucault, \textit{The Birth of Biopolitics}, 31.
THE UNIVERSITY AND URBAN RENEWAL:

REFLECTING ON THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

“The city has been described as the natural habitat of civilized man. It is in the city that man developed philosophy and science, and became not merely a rational but a sophisticated animal. This means, for one thing, that it is in the urban environment—in a world which man himself has made—that mankind first achieved an intellectual life....”

Robert E. Park, “The City as a Social Laboratory” (1967)

“No discipline has ever been more troubled than sociology by the question of knowledge...”

Charles Lemert, “Knowledge or Knowledges?” (1997)

The Mother of All Interdisciplinary Problems

In April 2004, Danielle Allen, the Dean of the Humanities, organized a conference at the University of Chicago entitled “Cityspace: The Past of Urban Renewal and the Future of Community Development.” Among the speakers on the panel were scholars such as Arnold Hirsch and Mary Pattillo, and politicians like alderwoman Toni Preckwinkle and former alderman Leon Despres. President Don Randel gave a speech entitled “State of the University Within the Community,” in which he outlined his plan to increase the role of the University throughout the South Side, especially in light of the destruction of the Robert Taylor Homes, massive public housing complexes along State Street. Part of this effort, according to Randel, would involve changing the traditional role of the University, which during the “heart of Urban Renewal” simply held the world at

1 Park, Human Communities, 73.
bay and raised its drawbridges. The Chicago Maroon, the student newspaper, reported that Randel listed three prerequisites for a “successful community”: safe streets, good public education and affordable housing. In particular, he focused on education and the University’s role in the creation of a new charter school in North Kenwood. This goal would also be realized through new campus architecture that is more engaged with the surrounding environment, and hopefully, one day, reallocating some of the $5 to $6 million spent on police enforcement between 39th and 64th street for scholarships. Randel conceded that the question of new redevelopment opened up the “mother of all interdisciplinary problems: How to create successful communities” and the University would have to rise to meet that challenge today or risk waiting another fifty years to set it right. The question of the University’s role in the urban renewal fifty years ago is one that is still being asked—and one that is worth rearticulating in terms of current plans for expansion and redevelopment.

The reason for the University’s founding—to investigate and solve the new problems of city life—turned out to be more than just an empty mission statement. As the tumultuous period of white flight and disinvestment in the

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6 Stevens, “Learning from the ‘terrible mistakes.‘”

7 Ibid; It was Mary Pattillo, however, who gave the final remarks, about research she had conducted on the South Side that would eventually turn into Black on the Block (2007), in Mary Pattillo, Email: Re: Questions About UChicago’s CitySpace Conference, to the author, received March 23, 2011.
urban housing market began in the 1950s spelled out the decline of the surrounding area, the University was faced with two alternatives. As Julian H. Levi said: it could do nothing, and wait until the loss of faculty, students and revenue ended in closing its doors forever, or, it could intervene in the neighborhood and make it a place where its faculty and students would want to stay. The story of Hyde Park’s urban renewal, as broadcast to the nation through national media outlets and through the adoption of legislation in the federal housing law, was therefore a narrative of triumph: the ultimate success of democratic action. It was a story of a community coming together in the face of great turmoil and saving what they cared about. On the brink of the civil rights movement, it was also the story of “fair-minded” and generous intellectuals, mostly white, welcoming black families into their neighborhood, thus reversing the trend of white flight that had devastated neighborhoods across the city in the years preceding. Moreover, it was a story about “doing the right thing.”

In a historiography that tends to be dominated by criticism towards urban renewal, as reiterated in my first two arguments, the University is cast in a less flattering light. Its role is understood alternately as forwarding a racist ideology, with its real intent to cast out the blacks and the poor from the community in order to keep its privilege intact; or, as a member of great institutional wealth, and part of a city-wide machine that would stop at nothing to increase growth, regardless of costs to the collective good.

Although these critical analyses of the University’s role are compelling—and do the necessary work of unraveling, questioning and destabilizing previous
historical narratives about urban renewal—I argue here, using a Foucauldian critique, that both these theories fall short in a number of ways of explaining what happened in Hyde Park vis-à-vis the University. Arguments centered on race, which rely on an ideological analysis, posit an ideology that stands in opposition to something that is true (or truer), existing outside; are tied necessarily to the subject as their point of analysis; and are always reliant primarily on materiality, and so are always constructed secondarily. Even in the case of a political economy approach, indeed more based on materiality, the theories understand power as inherently negative and oppressive, disregarding the possibility that its effects could be positive, productive or creative.

Race, the Growth Machine and Biopower

In this project, I have introduced three alternative readings of the University’s role in the urban renewal. In each case, I have tried to situate the actions of the University within a larger historical context, asking if urban renewal was not an aberration of the university’s role in society—but rather a new strategy within the larger systemic role. In this vein, I have examined renewal as: the new resurrection of racist ideology with the University as a tool of white power and exclusion; a new example of the relentless ideology of growth and its niche within the larger growth machine, or; a new kind of thought-production, which arises lateral to—and is essential for—a new relationality within governance itself. In this way, I have explored various roles

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8 Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, 118.
9 Ibid, 119.
of the University, first examining it through a classical sociological analysis of race and power, and finally reading it as an example of Foucault’s theory of biopower. Obviously, these explanations are not exhaustive: there are many other points of analysis I could have pursued, but I was limited in the scope of this project, and these three readings encapsulated to some extent the distinct categories of analysis applied to the university’s role in society.

Having explored the arguments in detail in the preceding chapters, I wish to bring them into play with one another and ask, finally, which was the force determining the role of the University in renewal? Was it color-blind racism, the growth machine, or biopower? How can we compare the arguments? (Can we really compare them at all?) Are there places where it was one, two, or all three? Or is there one argument that overwhelmingly makes the most sense, given what we know of Hyde Park’s renewal?

First, let us analyze each argument separately. If it were an act of racist exclusion, as distinct from any other categories of analysis, then why would the University have needed to change its strategy? For decades, the University had been paying for the expansion of racially restrictive covenants and supporting local institutions that very closely monitored the housing market. Even if we follow the argument made in Chapter II, that this was a new racism, born out of a changing public awareness about racial relations in the wake of national concern over violence in the inner-cities in general, and out of the “progressive” nature of politics and forward thinking ways of Hyde Parkers, in particular, then why the need for the renewal itself? In other words, if the University and the Conference
had succeeded in removing the slums and blighted areas, and their aim was to control the racial demographic of the neighborhood, why did they invest so much money in changing other aspects of the built environment? Why build three shopping centers, a new section of campus south of the Midway and the Webb & Knapp townhomes, among other new developments? Why did they need to change state and federal laws in order to obtain special rights to take control of the land when, in several cases, traditional slum removal policies were already set up and available? Even if we accept as a given that any actions the University took in the community were imbued with racism and a need to control the “respectability” or “appropriateness” of their community members, an argument that simply relies on racism would not tell the whole story. The investment of time, effort and money into gaining control over the land and drastically changing the built environment was more than just a neighborhood’s defense against slum invasion and white flight. If it had started as fear, it quickly became clear that undergirding this fear was an incredible opportunity to gain power over land and populations at the community, city and federal levels.

If it were the growth machine that could best explain the role the University took in Hyde Park, as Molotch and Logan suggest, race would still be a central tool of this ideology. What is different about an argument based on the growth-machine model, as opposed to one based on race, is that it implies that the University was not all alone, fighting against the city, state and nation for resources to save its little haven from invasion. Although there were conflicts early on, the mayor, state authorities and members of the federal government
realized quickly that Hyde Park’s case was a perfect example of a new kind of growth, based on improved planning skills and a lust for rent-intensification that would not stop at the destruction of blighted, or near-blighted areas, but needed a constant influx of new capital, new production and increasing rents in order to succeed. By successfully encouraging the passing of Section 112, the University created a pattern for universities, capitalists, and city officials across the nation to work together to ensure increased growth, with the understanding that the university itself would be a central mobilizer of that growth.

This growth machine, I will argue, relied so heavily upon tools that arise within biopower (e.g., risk assessment, statistical analysis, mapping, etc.), that without the knowledge produced in part at the University itself, growth as a totalizing ideology would not have arisen in the same way. Furthermore, growth as a mechanism for gaining power and control would only make sense within a governance based on biopower, because a sovereign form of governance, seeking full control over a territory and individual bodies, would not see growth, and dominance over the market as its main objective. Nor would this governance bother with a program of renewal, which, in its essence accepted materials givens and sought to improve the future for the population.

As I argue in my last chapter, the new tools employed during renewal were themselves produced or derived from an image of the city predominantly created through the University’s own social science departments. The turn towards city planning as a discipline, accompanied by the necessary aspects of the social sciences—political economy, psychology and statistics—were
relatively new disciplines. Many of them had developed in tandem with the burgeoning post-industrial city. Burgess and Park’s ideologies surrounding the development of cities and the movement of populations were central to how these social sciences understood and created public policy for the city. This change in how humans were understood, analyzed and categorized—namely, as a species—is apparent in the legacy of the Chicago School. We saw this in Hoyt’s rating maps, used extensively by the Federal Housing Administration as well as in Levi’s “legislative tools” developed during renewal. Foucault’s assertion that biopower arises in the form of a problematic that cannot be solved by the current mechanisms of governance is apparent in the Hyde Park case. Time and time again, Levi and other officials refer to the fact that this was a new problem, one that they had never experienced before, and one that they did not know immediately how to solve. Rather than seeing the University as a nexus of white racist exclusionary tactics—though, its actions still might have that effect—or as caught up in the addictive ideology of the growth machine, I argue instead that the role of the University as knowledge-producer meant that it introduced solutions to the myriad problems of the modern city that were, in turn, a part of a shift in how governance worked on the societal level.

The scholars at the University were not looking for knowledge based in morality. They were interested in “effect not origin” in deciphering how to make changes to the city to improve its efficacy within the greater market, and if that meant displacing individuals of a certain race or class, or privileging rent-increases over public goods, then that was what it took. The University, as Levi
asserts, acted to preserve its academic mission, exemplified in its motto of

crescat scientia; vita excolatur\textsuperscript{10}:

We’re not a public improvement organization. We’re not supposed to be a
developer. We’re not interested as a good government association. The only
standard you ought to apply to this is whether the University of Chicago as an
academic entity requires a compatible community.\textsuperscript{11}

I have brought this passage into each of my arguments, reading it with various
degrees of suspicion as to Levi’s true meaning, what the University actually
sought to accomplish through renewal. But perhaps those questions, and even
my larger question of the role the university plays in the world, are beside the
point, because in asking them, I still posit a world “outside” of academia, and fail
to see the situatedness and interconnectedness of both within power. I
attempted in my last argument to take an entirely different approach, which sees
the new regime of truth conceived at the University as fundamental to renewal,
both in Hyde Park and across the nation, and as part of a larger shift in the
conception of man and his relationship to governance.

Through this production of knowledge, academics at the University
established truths, and, therein, effects of power, and created the discourse
within which renewal was later realized. In studying the city as ecological, they
helped to create a regime of thought that established the market as the
mechanism of veridiction, and humans as the species powering it. Or, in
Foucault’s words, this emergence of biopower “brought life and its mechanisms

\textsuperscript{10} Translation: “Let knowledge grow from more to more; and so be human life
enriched,” “About the University,” University of Chicago Website, accessed March 30, 2011, http://www.uchicago.edu/about/
\textsuperscript{11} Levi, “Oral History Interview,” 34.
into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life.”¹² In these terms, the transformation of Hyde Park, undertaken through explicit calculations based on the human population, as well as the development of juridical and other techniques to realize its enactment, produced knowledges, mobilized power and created discourses. At a time when other communities were buckling under the pressure of white flight, the University affirmed its right to exist in order to produce knowledge and to formulate discourses.

_A New Reading of Urban Renewal_

As stated in my last chapter, Foucault’s notion of biopower rested on a shift in how we conceive of the relationship between the governed and governance—one that no longer rests on sovereign understandings of the individual subject, but on the human as existing in the bounded materiality of the human species. Thus, the notion of the subject is replaced with the idea of a population, and the function of governance—in all its forms—is not to control or survey the sovereign subject or police its body, but to use material givens and statistics in order to “work[s] on the future.” For Foucault, who described his project as “a politics of truth,” the shift towards decentralized governance that no longer attempts to subject its citizens at all—but rather seeks to make changes to the milieu that will affect human behavior—is undoubtedly a positive one. As he writes on biopower in _The History of Sexuality, Vol I_, “It is not that life

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¹² Foucault, _Power/Knowledge_, 143.
has been totally integrated into techniques that govern and administer it; it constantly escapes them.”

I believe that Foucault saw this increasing reliance on the market as the source of truth, as a move towards governance that was no longer concerned with the individual body as such. In a biopolitical state, therefore, someone who is homosexual may be a statistical aberration or minority, but not a bad or amoral subject worthy of making die—and as the statistics change (e.g., the Kinsey Reports), so will the normalizing apparatus. As the market becomes the place where and through which truth is constructed, then the benefits to freedom, as Foucault saw them, could be tremendous.

For Hyde Park’s story, as examined previously, the University’s own use of the market within the strategies employed during renewal, is not an argument that entirely holds up in the last instance—nor is it one that I have explored in great detail. As Molotch and Logan’s describe, in their own critique of urban ecology: “The reigning sociological paradigm of ‘urban ecology,’ parallel to similar orientations in the other social sciences, too eagerly accepted a free market as a source for explaining—and justifying—how cities develop.”

In taking up Hyde Park's urban renewal as a case study of biopower, especially in terms of how truth itself is generated, this is precisely the point, however, and what I am interested in understanding. It is not whether or not these ideas of

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13 Ibid.
14 This, for Foucault, is one of the greatest shifts in from sovereign power to biopower: “I wouldn’t say exactly that the sovereignty’s old right—to take life or let live—was replaced, but it came to be complemented by a new right which does not erase the old right but which does penetrate it, permeate it. This is the right, or rather precisely the opposite right. It is the power to ‘make’ live and ‘let’ die,” Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”, 241.
15 Logan and Molotch, Urban Fortunes, viii.
urban ecology, arising as a technology to the human in the city, really was true, or instead, an ideology, but how these notions about the urban sphere could lead to their general acceptance as true. Even within Foucault’s concept of biopower, his project is to describe how knowledge as a technology of power comes to be proven or disproven through the market, and that it is governance’s own inability to have sovereign control over the individual subject which leads to this problematic. In my own work, I am interested in how this concept could help one to read the conceptual germination of urban renewal, and what this can tell us about the control over populations and the built environment in the city.

In light of Foucault’s analysis, then in the case of urban renewal, the University’s role could be read as a lateral development in the shift towards a truth apparatus that is based in the market. One could argue that the University of Chicago, founded in the midst of this change, had a mission to address a new problematic of modern life that no one had yet been able to adequately address. Thus, the University’s involvement in establishing the course of post-war housing policy was not incidental, but followed a long line of engagement with problems in the human milieu that had started with Hull House and early social work in the Back of the Yards. The rise and expansion of so many new disciplines at this time, in particular sociology, economics, and city planning, came out of this crisis in governance that posed challenges to the material make-up of the city.

The exact circumstances that led up to the intense white flight and full-fledged abandonment of cities in the 1950s undoubtedly relied upon older legal
and social norms regarding race held over from slavery, which were also central to the functioning of the capitalist system. The solution, however, that the University came up with, which was followed in similar projects across the nation, involved combating statistically analyzed problems (i.e. crime, illegal slum conversions, abandoned buildings) that threatened the security of the population at large. Indeed, instead of total destruction of an area (as in slum removal), urban renewal entailed working on material givens for an improved future result. Total control or eradication of poverty, crime, or even groups that seem most susceptible to these problems (i.e., blacks) was then not the aim of urban renewal. Instead, the aim was to make strategic interventions in the neighborhood to improve its functioning in the marketplace. What happened in Hyde Park mattered, therefore, for Chicago as well as for the national government because it was a response to the problem of racial changeover that sought to intervene using the tools of the market in order to halt the flow of white flight. It was a new strategy of power that used statistical analysis and mapping to make effective decisions that benefited the population as a whole, and whose effects could be proven. Even in its signification this is apparent: it was an act of renewal, part creative destruction and part preservation of what was already there.

Many have argued that urban renewal was in every instance a failure. That it uprooted local poor and minority populations, destroyed local businesses in favor of commercial chains, and spurred a spiraling real estate boom. In light of the rapid development of American cities at the turn of the twentieth century,
however, this does not seem like a new phenomenon—speculators, real estate developers, and railroad men were always central characters in the story of the city. Native Americans and indigenous populations were often uprooted or cast out in the creation of the city, and, as Burgess tried to show in his famous map, the lower classes were pushed to the marginal neighborhoods in the life cycle of the city organism. Ethnic groups in Park’s theory fought for resources, clashed and eventually assimilated to living with one another. The city, undeniably the product of human construction, always entailed a type of commodification, a new relationship with space that differed greatly from rural or agrarian lifestyles—and was an example, as Lefebvre wrote, of the “problematic of space.” The city, then, both in its construction and actuality, was a place of commerce, of trade, of the market itself, a place of struggle and competition, a place of change and flux. If urban renewal was a failure in these respects, it was a reflection of the imperfect nature of the modern city it sought to redeem.

At the time of the renewal, the official policy of the University was not carried out on the basis of maintaining total racial or class exclusion. In the

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16 The Chicago area, once a trading center for Potawatomi, Miami and Illinois peoples, saw a considerable decline in these groups as they were diminished and pushed out by disease, warfare, and treaties with the American government beginning in the 1800s. Chicago’s name itself is derived from a Miami and Illinois word for “striped skunk,” or wild leeks, Ann Durkin Keating, “Chicago,” and Louis Delgado, “Native Americans,” The Electronic Encyclopedia of Chicago (Chicago Historical Society, 2005), accessed on April 1, 2011, http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/874.html.

17 Park was well aware, according to Lal, that the case of blacks was different from that of other ethnic groups in the city. Members of the Chicago school, according to Lal, were not “naive enough to believe that all ethnic neighborhoods had once been ghettos, like the so-called ‘Black Belt’ of Chicago, or that blacks were ‘just another ethnic group, whose segregation was largely voluntary and would prove to be temporary,’” The Romance of Culture, 124.
complex reality of city life, complete exclusion or segregation seemed to no
longer be a possibility—instead, the University was concerned with creating and
maintaining a community that faculty and students would be secure living in.
Kimpton, Levi, and the Board came to the realization that the University was at
risk because of the community’s current state and that soon there would be a
citywide crisis. They understood that the relationship of the University to the
community would have to change. There would have to be interventions,
collaborations, and physical changes to the built environment in order to
account for this risk. And this shift in governance would not only happen at one
moment in time—it would be a continued neighborhood watch, enforced by its
policemen and Tenant Referral Office, reacting to changes in the marketplace.
And over time, it would not just be Hyde Park or the South Side of Chicago that
would be studied in order to produce applicable data and theories, but soon
every neighborhood in every city would become a valuable resource to study,
intervene in, and protect from the crisis.

For those involved in renewal, decisions were being made within a wider
discourse about the human’s relationship to the city. If we read the role of the
University as stated, that is, as a knowledge-producer, then we begin to
understand the locus of power differently than in previous arguments. Scholars
at the University, pursuing knowledge about their surrounding environment,
were unwittingly involved in a global modification of the current regime of
power in terms of man’s relation to his environment.\footnote{Foucault, \textit{Power/Knowledge}, 113.} When decisions to
address the University’s own problematic vis-à-vis the surrounding neighborhoods had to be made, this new discourse produced unforeseen ways of conceiving of and reacting to problems between human populations and the artificial milieu. In other words, it was not the University’s _secret_ role as gatekeeper to white society and privilege, as capitalist institution, or as growth-mongerer that shaped the urban renewal that transformed Hyde Park. It was its role as university, and the production of a regime of truth, which established:

the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.\(^\text{19}\)

And in so doing, it established the science through which renewal was researched, developed and enacted. Levi, it seems, _meant_ what he said about the University’s true intent in renewal. Or rather, the question of whether or not it was true misses the whole point, which was the regime of truth he was operating within, and how truth _itself_ was in that instance produced.

This is not, by any means, an attempt to apologize for the actions of the University, for the violence or hurt incurred by those who were displaced by renewal, or a panacea for the lingering resentment towards the ongoing exploitative relationship of the University to the surrounding neighborhoods. As I hope to have clearly illuminated in my earlier chapters, the University and the Conference were involved in making morally questionable decisions throughout renewal couched in liberal progressive terms, ones that were tainted with the specter of race, class and the fear of losing power. I argue rather, that an

\(^{19}\) Ibid, 131.
assertion of a morality of this kind—and a sociology grounded in it—inevitably understands power as “a negative instance whose function is repression”\(^\text{20}\) as opposed to something which “hold[s] good” and “produces pleasure.”\(^\text{21}\) In doing so, it reinscribes a discourse that focuses on the powerless (the poor blacks, the poor workers, the losers in capitalism) and tells them that they are powerless, instead of endeavoring to understand where the locus of knowledge/power is. As in the instance of biopower, by identifying how power might be actuated by all—not just the “powerful”—we see how this analysis might actually allow for more human freedom.

In the case of Hyde Park, understanding how renewal was discursively produced, within a regime of truth, and how its effects were codified, implemented and measured vis-à-vis that truth, enables one to see the fundamental error in my initial and underlying inquiry—that of the University’s role in the social world—because it sees the two spheres as distinct, when, in fact, they are, and always have been, located in relation to one another within the material world. In doing so, I reiterated the errors of others, who posit that there is “an outside” of knowledge, a “real” world where ideology can be dismantled and proven to not only be false but wrong in the moral sense. It is not that these analyses, which seek or demand an \textit{ethics} on the part of the University’s relations with the community, will have no bearing on determining its future actions in that regard (they probably will)—but that they have missed \textit{the point} as far as my question is concerned; namely, the role of the University as

\(^{20}\text{Ibid, 119.}\)
\(^{21}\text{Ibid.}\)
producer of knowledge. To put it another way: the role of the University in the
decisions surrounding urban renewal, interpreted variously by laymen and
theorists as that of a benevolent guardian or self-interested growth-mongerer,
was read insufficiently read in terms of its ethical ramifications, as opposed to an
example of the power constitutive to its very essence as a modern urban
university.
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APPENDIX A: URBAN RENEWAL TIMELINE

Beginnings

1853  Paul Cornell gives sixty acres to the Illinois Central Railroad, establishing Hyde Park as the first suburban outlet of the Loop (Dentler and Rossi, 11).
1857  The original University of Chicago is established by Stephen Douglas, but closes two decades later due to financial problems (Bachin, 28).
1871  The Great Fire. Property values increase in Hyde Park and Kenwood (Bachin, 38).
1889  The citizens of Hyde Park-Kenwood vote for annexation, and the neighborhood becomes a part of the City of Chicago (Dentler and Rossi, 12).
1892  The University of Chicago officially opens its doors (Bachin, 25).
1893  World’s Columbian Exposition is held on neighboring plots to the University (Bachin, 25).
1896  *Plessy v. Ferguson* upholds the constitutionality of “separate but equal.”
1905  *The Defender*, Chicago’s leading black newspaper, is founded. (Janowitz, 91).
1906  Chicago’s Hyde Park Improvement and Protective Club is founded to clean up vice districts in adjoining communities and to “make sure that no blacks resided outside those districts” (as quoted in Washington, 140).

The First Great Migration

1917  *Buchanan v. Warley* rules that racial residential segregation by law is unconstitutional.
1918  Hyde Park—Kenwood Property Owner’s Association is formed with over a thousand members. It sought to “establish an ‘exclusively white neighborhood’ along Grand Boulevard from 29th to 39th Streets and then along Michigan Boulevard from 39th Street to 63rd Street...only the Hyde Park—Kenwood association became associated with the bombing of black residents to keep them out” (Washington, 142-43).
1919  Drowning of Eugene Williams incites a race riot on July 27: there are 38 deaths (23 blacks, 15 whites), 537 injuries, and 1,000 people are displaced (Hirsch, 1; Washington, 134).
1927  Nathan William Machesney, former resident of Hyde Park and Kenwood, advises the Chicago Real Estate Board and is also general counsel to the National Association of Real Estate Boards and writes Article 34 (Washington, 145).

1928  *The Hyde Park Herald* reports that “a fine network of contracts” now extended “like a marvelous delicately woven chain of armor” from 35th Street and Drexel in the north to Woodlawn, Park Manor, South Shore and Windsor Park (Philpott as quoted in Washington, 145).

1933  The University of Chicago spends $110,923.72 on “community interests,” and $83,597.46 on defending restrictive covenants between 1933 and 1947 (Hirsch, 145).

1934  The Chicago Urban League reforms its Civic Department in order to combat “racially restrictive activities”: in particular the “active work” in Woodlawn, Hyde Park, Englewood, Oakwood and Kenwood which created a “veritable barrier,” confining African-Americans between 22nd and 68th Streets, Cottage Grove and Wentworth Avenues (Washington, 166).

1930  The University of Chicago serves as headquarters of the Federation of Neighborhood Associations in the 1930s and 1940s, its primary purpose being the opposition of efforts made by the black community to get legislation passed that declared restrictive covenants as invalid (Hirsch, 145).

1935  Homer S. Hoyt, former University of Chicago economist, is asked to leave the Federal Housing Agency in Washington, D.C., to head a land use survey in Chicago, with assistance from the WPA (Light, 76). He forms a preliminary technical advisory board for the survey, which includes Chicago sociologist Louis Wirth (Light, 77).

1937  The Civilian Conservation Corps publishes its landmark report *Our Cities*, in which it incorporates “cities” in the category of conservation. The urbanism committee includes University of Chicago public administration professor Louis Brownlow and is nicknamed “the Brownlow Committee” (Light, 48-9).

1939  Hoyt begins work on the *Chicago Land Use Survey* and hires many alumni and continuing students in the University of Chicago’s social sciences to head and staff its research division (Light, 77). He also publishes his landmark work, *The Structure and Growth of American Cities*.

1939  Home Owners Loan Corporation, under the Works Progress Administration, surveys and ‘experiments’ in two neighborhoods in Chicago: Waverly in Baltimore and Woodlawn in Chicago. In Woodlawn (which borders Hyde Park), its “Neighborhood Conservation Project” attempted to address the problems of “saving ‘borderline’ neighborhoods from deterioration” (Light, 62).

1939  The Ida B. Wells Home, the first federally-funded public housing project for African-Americans on the South Side is built and intended as a model for other such projects. It experiences trouble from neighboring white
communities of Hyde Park, Kenwood and Oakland “who try to stop condemnation proceedings by filing demurrers” (Washington, 172).

The Second Great Migration

1940 Between 1940-1960, the black population in Chicago increases from 277,731 to 812,637 (Hirsch, 16-17).
1940 Between 1940-1950, the black population in Hyde Park increases from 573 to 1,575, with most coming after 1948 (Hirsch, 139).
1940 Black infant mortality rate 16% higher than rest of city; tuberculosis rate twice as high, general mortality rate 5% higher (Hirsch, 18).
1941 Illinois Neighborhood Redevelopment Corporation Act (Hirsch, 37)
1943 After the riot in Detroit, “a dozen black community and political members were called into the offices of the Defender to study local conditions and seek ways to prevent violence” (Hirsch, 43).
1944 The university, under Hutchins, convinces the Board of Trustees to establish a “revolving fund” for “area protection” for 500,000. Over the next decade or so, the board will spend $4 million on the neighborhood (Hirsch, 147).
1945 End of World War II causes an increase in the stream of black migrants from the South to Chicago, creating Chicago’s “Black Belt” (Dentler and Rossi, 21).
1945 Governor Dwight H. Green appoints Judge Leonard C. Reid to the circuit court. Reid had openly supported and signed restrictive covenants (Washington 175).
1945 Reginald Isaacs, from the Urban Development Division of the National Housing Agency comes to Chicago. He works on the planning of Michael Reese Hospital and the South Side Planning Board, and writes the report that will later secure the South Side as the first area that qualified for redevelopment under the new act. He also studies planning at Chicago for several years under Wirth and Tugwell (Light, 115).
1945 Between 1945 and 1954, nine major riots and 217 attacks against property are reported (Washington, 175).
1945 The SPA’s Fred Henderson helps the village of Robbins, Illinois, to set up planning, zoning and legislation so it could qualify for aid under the redevelopment act. It never gains this right, but the bureaucratic groundwork is laid for Hyde Park’s redevelopment a few years later (Hirsch, 38).
1947 The Illinois Blighted Areas Redevelopment Act is passed, which establishes the use of eminent domain in slum or “blighted” areas (Light, 101).
1947 Starting in 1947, the University invests in Hyde Park Planning Association, to enforce zoning, inspect buildings for code violations, neighborhood clean-up and traffic control projects and the extension of restrictive covenants. This will continue until 1952 (Dentler and Rossi, 71).
1948 *Shelly v. Kramer*: Supreme Court outlaws use of racially restrictive
covenants in real estate sales. Alderman Leon Despres tries to dispute this ruling (Press, 7).

1948 Slum clearance and relocation begins in Chicago (Washington, 180).
1948 Rabbi Jacob Weinstein of KAM and Leslie Penington of First Unitarian approach the Chancellor Robert Maynard Hutchins and the University Real Estate Office about the rising crime rate, bars, neglected buildings and their desire for an “integrated racially and planned socially” community (Press, 8). The abduction and rape of a faculty wife around the same time was a potential motivating factor (Press, 8).

The Conference

1949 Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference (the Conference) first meets. It “recognized that a positive program of planning and redevelopment was necessary to maintain and improve our community” (Abrahamson, 13).
1950 Between 1950 and 1956, 20,000 whites leave the area and 23,000 non-whites move in (Dentler and Rossi, 22).
1950 Nearly 88% of Hyde Park’s units are renter-occupied (Hirsch, 138).
1950 At Harvard, Reginald Isaacs suggests the creation of the Community Appraisal Study as a joint venture of the Graduate School of Design, the University of Chicago and the Illinois Institute of Technology. Its members include Mies van der Rohe, Walter Gropius and Louis Wirth, among others (Light, 116).
1950 In March, the Committee of Three meets with Chancellor Hutchins but he remains unwilling to become involved (Abrahamson, 46).
1951 In May, Robert E. Merriam, Hyde Park’s alderman, is appointed as chair of the Chicago City Council’s Housing Committee, and he pushes “conservation” as a “major objective” of city policy (Hirsch, 149).

The Plan

1952 In March, mass meeting in Mandel Hall at the University to address crime, attended by 2,000 Hyde Park residents (Dentler and Rossi, 72). Committee of Five is formed, with Chancellor Kimpton as Chairman.
1952 In May, the Committee forms the SECC (Hirsch, 144).
1952 In the fall, Julian H. Levi is appointed Executive Director of SECC (Dentler and Rossi, 74).
1952 In November, City Council of Chicago passes resolution for the establishment of an Interim Commission on Neighborhood Conservation and elects Trustee James Down, Jr. as Chairman (Dentler and Rossi, 77).
1952 In November, a permanent Community Conservation Board is formed and they decide to use Hyde Park as an example (Dentler and Rossi, 77).
February 1953—*Conservation*, a report by the Metropolitan and Planning Council’s staff is published. The Urban Community Conservation Act is also passed (Dentler and Rossi, 84).

1953 Julian H. Levi persuades the State legislature to amend the Neighborhood Redevelopment Corporation Act of 1941 (Dentler and Rossi, 85).

1953 In July, the Metropolitan Council Committee passes the Urban Community Conservation Act (Dentler and Rossi, 86).

1953 The Chicago Land Clearance Commission (CLCC) surveys the “most blighted” segments of Hyde Park (Dentler and Rossi, 87).

1953 Kimpton and Levi meet with Hyde Park and Kenwood Council of Synagogues and Churches (Dentler and Rossi, 87).

1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* establishes that separate is not equal.

1954 In August, Jack Meltzer is assigned to head Field Foundation grant and draft a preliminary plan for the Land Clearance area as Director of the SECC’s Planning Unit (Abrahamson, 194).

1954 Renewal plans for “Hyde Park A and B” were approved by the Federal Housing Act of 1954, which had a special provision for urban redevelopment (Press, 9).

1954 The University arranges to use the Field Foundation Grant (of $100,000) to form a local Planning Unit and support “Hyde Park A and B” (Dentler and Rossi, 101).

1954 In May, the National Opinion Research Center conducts a survey in Hyde Park to identify the most blighted areas in Hyde Park-Kenwood (Abrahamson, 203).

1954 Mayor Kenelly and the University come to an agreement about the University’s role in redevelopment (Dentler and Rossi, 87).

1955 The University subsidizes the South West Hyde Park Redevelopment Corporation, creates corporate structures to systematically purchase real estate and develops the Saarinen Campus Plan in its Redevelopment Corporation plans for South West Hyde Park (Dentler and Rossi, 101).

1955 In May, demolition on Hyde Park A and B areas begin (Dentler and Rossi, 93).

1956 University joins with the Community Conservation Board of the City of Chicago to establish the “Hyde Park—Kenwood Urban Renewal Plan” (Press, 20).

1956 The Conference opens the Tenant Referral Office (Hirsch, 142-43).

1956 In June, the South West Hyde Park Redevelopment Corporation files a “Plan of Development” with the Chicago Neighborhood Redevelopment Commission (Dentler and Rossi, 159).

1958 The plans for the “Hyde Park—Kenwood Urban Renewal Plan” are approved by the Chicago City Council (Press, 9).

1959 The Federal Housing Act includes a new subsection, Section 112, which allows the University to gain a special subsidy in acquiring land for South Campus (Levi [1960], 5).

1960 The University asks the City of Chicago to act under Section 112 to incorporate the University’s plan to acquire the remaining 27.1 acres of

Figure 2.1 Percentage of black population, in census tracts, city of Chicago, 1940 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population and Housing Characteristics, 1960 as cited in Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto, 6).
Figure 2.2 Percentage of black population, in census tracts, city of Chicago, 1950 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population and Housing Characteristics, 1960 as cited in Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto, 7).
Figure 2.3 Percentage of black population, in census tracts, city of Chicago, 1960 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population and Housing Characteristics, 1960 as cited in Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto, 7).
Figure 3.1 The Village of Hyde Park ("Map of the Village of Hyde Park," 1888, Special Collections Research Center, as cited in Bachin, *Building the South Side*, 37).
Table 2.2—Nonwhite Population by Subcommunities and Tracts: Hyde Park–Kenwood, 1950 and 1956 *

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<th>Tract</th>
<th>Percentage Nonwhite of Total Population</th>
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Figure 4.1 Hyde Park A and B: Renewal Treatment, as recommended by the 1956 NORC Survey (Berry, Parsons and Platt, The Impact of Urban Renewal, 20).
Figure 5.1 Current Map of Hyde Park ("UChicago Maps," The University of Chicago Website, accessed April 10, 2011, http://maps.uchicago.edu/hydepark.shtml).
Figure 5.2 Current Map of the University of Chicago’s campus ("UChicago Maps," The University of Chicago Website, accessed April 10, 2011, http://maps.uchicago.edu/campus.shtml).
APPENDIX C: PHOTOGRAPHS OF CAMPUS

Figure 6.1 General Campus Views, 1941-1950. Along 59th Street and the Midway Plaisance. Note the stereotypical Gothic look of campus buildings. (Archival Photographic Files, apf2-02612, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library).
Figure 6.2 General Campus Views, Aerial, 1941-1950 (Archival Photographic Files, apf2-02610, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library).
Figure 6.3 General Campus Views, Aerial, 1961-1970 (Archival Photographic Files, apf2-02652, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library).
APPENDIX D: CONCEPTUAL MAPS

Figure 7.1 Burgess's Zonal Model: Growth (CHART I. The Growth of the City, “The Growth of the City,” *The City* [1967]).
Figure 7.2 Burgess's Zonal Model: Urban Areas (CHART II. Urban Areas, “The Growth of the City,” The City [1967]).
Figure 8.1 Settled Area Map Chicago Metropolitan Region, 1936 (Homer S. Hoyt, The Structure and Growth of American Cities, 14).
Figure 8.2 Land Survey Map, South Chicago, 1927 (Hoyt, *Structure and Growth*, 16).
Figure 8.3 Pattern of Non-White Population, Richmond, VA, 1934 (Hoyt, *Structure and Growth*, 43).
Figure 8.4 Growth of Settled Areas of American Cities (Hoyt, *Structure and Growth*, 158).
Figure 8.5 Growth of Residential Areas, Chicago, 1857-1930 (Hoyt, *Structure and Growth*, 166).