A comparative socio-economic study of integration between

North African and Southeast Asian immigrants to France

by

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Class of 2009

A thesis submitted to the
faculty of Wesleyan University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Bachelor of Arts
with Honors in General Scholarship

Middletown, Connecticut April 2009
Acknowledgements

There are many people who deserve recognition for making this thesis project possible. My academic advisor and thesis tutor, Joyce Jacobsen, merits special recognition for her unfailingly constructive criticism, tireless reading, and great support throughout my senior year. Thank you for always being there for me whenever I needed guidance.

I am equally grateful for Professor Typhaine Leservot, who inspired me to develop the interest in French immigration issues that led to this thesis, and Professor Catherine Ostrow, who continued to encourage and enlighten me in my topic during the final stage.

I am grateful as well for the financial support from Davenport Grant, which enabled me to carry out individual interviews and archival research in France. I am deeply indebted to those Asian immigrants in Paris, Lyon, and Marseille, who shared their difficult experiences with me in my lengthy interviews and enabled me to move toward a better understanding of minorities in France.

I also want to acknowledge my parents for making me motivated in finishing this project and providing continuous moral support. I wish to attribute my thesis to Lisa Reade, Mari Saakjan, Nicholas Alt, and Antoine Cadot-Wood for their invaluable feedback.

Last but not least, I am fortunate to benefit from the support and kindness of Connie Lee, Angela Allen, Mike Ramsey, Jimmy Ong, Sisi Dai, Rebecca Lee, Seitaro Takarabe, Benny Cheng, and Peter Frank.
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Abstract

This thesis examines the relationship between the French economy and non-European immigrants in France. Focused on North African and Southeast Asian immigrants in the twentieth century, the qualitative analysis particularly concentrates on the differences between the two ethnic groups and hypothesizes that because North Africans suffer substantially from the French society’s prejudice, they are less likely to integrate economically. Statistical studies show that influxes of North Africans are more dependent on the French economy than the Asian group and hence confirm the hypothesis. A detailed investigation of sociological perspective of community formations, economic view of the French labor market, and political angle of French immigration policies provide possible explanations for the statistical results.
Introduction

In France, the immigrant population is comprised of those born overseas who have acquired French citizenship. Today these people constitute more than 8% of the whole French population. Despite the long history and critical role that immigration played in the formation of France, the history of French immigration is marked by intolerance and xenophobia (Doty 2003). Today, immigration in France has been primarily a political issue, while also serving as an effective tool for economic and demographic development. My thesis explores the relationship between French migration dynamics and the domestic economy on both qualitative and quantitative levels. In particular, my focus will be on the emergence and development of non-European immigrants in the French society during the twentieth century because they first appeared in France after 1900 and migration statistics are more widely accessible for this period.

I start by presenting my motivation for writing about French immigration issues. Immigrants in France represent a large spectrum of ethnicities but the immigration issues discussed almost exclusively focus on the largest immigrant group - those from the Maghrebi, a term commonly used by the French to describe North African immigrants from Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria (De Hass 2005). In order to investigate the degree that immigrant groups, in particular those of different ethnicities, have integrated economically and socially into French society, I utilize a comparative socio-economic study of North African and Southeast Asian immigrants born abroad and living in France in the twentieth century. My hope is to examine how
public immigration politics can lend advantage to one group and disadvantage to another.

The history of colonization has caused the pattern through which most Asian immigrants come to France from Southeast Asia, including the southern part of China. Other migrant populations from Southeast Asia such as the Thai, Philippinos, Malaysians, Indonesians, and Singaporeans tend to migrate to the United States or Australia (Bhattacharya 2004). My thesis refers broadly to foreign-born Southeast Asians, but mainly focuses on the Chinese, Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians. The Southeast Asian immigrant community was selected as the comparison group to the North African community because by percentage it is the second fastest growing ethnic community in France (Thierry 2008). Unlike other former French colonies in the Caribbean or West Africa, the Southeast Asian communities are much larger. Moreover, Southeast Asian immigrants present many different ethnic characteristics from those of North African immigrants, a factor that would challenge the French’s immigration policies for North Africans. These differences will eventually lead to my hypothesis that even when different immigrant groups face parallel original conditions in France, they experience divergent economic fates. Studying the two groups in tandem will provide more complete insights into the overall immigration economic dynamics in France.

In addition to presenting a brief history of French economic development and its relationship with ethnic labor, the first chapter will examine three major waves of North African and Southeast Asian immigration, present the two groups’ similarities in each of the three waves, and analyze ways that France has treated each group in its
own past contexts of national economy. In the second chapter, I address the differences between North African and Southeast Asian groups, by their realities and by how the French public perceives them. Motivation behind the two groups’ decisions to immigrate and the backgrounds of their countries of origin play a critical role in each group’s relative level of integration into French society. A detailed qualitative analysis of the differences between these two groups in the eyes of the French people leads to a hypothesis for quantitative analysis. This quantitative examination will illustrate the statistical correlation between immigrant labor and national economic growth, as well as identify which immigrant group responds more readily to the state of the French economy. A sociological analysis accompanied by economic theories will then follow in order to explain the different degrees of integration between the two immigrant groups discussed.

In order to fully understand the relationship between immigration and the economy, my third chapter explores a notion that sociological and economic principles fail to address, the immigration policy evolution of the French government. I will detail the wide range of immigration laws passed in older and more recent contexts. This will help to understand why some policies worked well in facilitating immigrant assimilation and others failed. Because many immigration policies exclusively targeted North-African groups, they caused limitations and problems for Southeast Asian immigrants who were interacting with immigration laws and not restrained in the same ways.

My thesis is significant for several reasons. It challenges the popular view that Maghrebi immigrants are the only immigrant group of importance in France. Instead,
I take a more sophisticated look at the role of other immigrant ethnicities in France. Secondly, the economic integration aspect, using labor market and supply demand theory, can help explain why France rejected North African immigrants. Third, it shows that the French immigration policies do not only affect North African immigrants, Southeast Asian immigrants are also affected by policies implemented by the French government. By analyzing the role that North African and Southeast Asian immigrant communities play in the French economy, I have gained insight into the types of policies that could successfully be implemented in order to boost the domestic economy, as well as to connect immigrants groups to a broader national identity.

The different characteristics of minority ethnic groups, both in reality and as perceived by the hosting French public, determine their different economic fates in France. North Africans pose a challenge to French Republican values and, thus, they are paying a higher price than Southeast Asian immigrants, a group that has focused on achieving economic integration. France has passed laws designed to benefit itself economically and hoping to facilitate the integration process at the same time (Wilmsen and Patrick 1996). However, North Africans assimilate with difficulty into French society, reflecting the problems with these policies and calling for improvement. France made a clear tradeoff; it helped resolve its labor shortage at the cost of creating immigration problems. France concentrated on the economic profits that could be garnered from the immigrants and ignored the importance of their integration into the society. Thus, France should re-evaluate some of the immigration policies it has implemented before it can achieve a coherent and equal society.
Chapter 1. History

• Introduction

The economic climate in France can contribute to major fluctuations of immigration in France. A booming economy can generate more job opportunities, which is highly attractive to immigrants. In contrast, a poor economy causes the French government to protect the French native labor and thus resist immigration (Hayward 1986). Therefore, an overview of the French economy’s ups and downs is important as a background to understand changing dynamics of immigration. In this chapter, I will first present the history of the French economy. Then in order to understand different characteristics of the two ethnic immigrant groups, I will detail a historical overview of three chronological flows of North African and Southeast Asian immigrants respectively in the twentieth century. In conclusion, I summarize the similarities of the two immigrant groups in each wave of immigration before I discuss their differences in detail in the following chapter.

• The French Economy: A Snapshot

In the eighteenth century, France was one of the richest countries in the world. French industrialization started at the same time as in England, at the end of the eighteenth century. However, by the turn of the nineteenth century France had lost its momentum, and England and Germany took the lead (Mangin 1885). Part of this was
a result of France’s shift in focus to its colonies in Southeast Asia, North Africa and the Caribbean, slowing down its domestic development until the twentieth century. It was still primarily an agricultural nation, and its leading position in agriculture in the world continues even today.

The Second World War paralyzed France’s economic growth. In order to rebuild destroyed railways, factories, and towns, the French post-war economic revival program centered on implementing national economic development plans (Parodi 1981). This renewal movement for the economy was closely tied to the interaction with the Fifth Republic; coordination and leadership from the Republic prevailed through the comprehensive program of modernization and development. Charles de Gaulle, the founder of the Fifth Republic, granted official permission to Jean Monnet’s reconstruction plan in order to make France a large steel producer in Europe in 1946. According to economist Armand Colin (1981), the Monnet plan was considered a milestone in the economic recovery for France because government and private sectors successfully collaborated in the plan. Monnet also managed to convince the private businessmen of the importance of making investments, as well as increasing productivity under the policy of interventionism (“dirigisme”). Many sectors of the economy including railways, airlines, and automobile manufacturing came under state control shortly after World War II. The program of dirigisme was in favor of the State’s role as an interventionist in order to ensure sustainable and consistent economic growth. Since this regime required state control of industries including transportation, energy and telecommunication infrastructures, incentives for private corporations were extremely limited and subject to the government’s
supervision. Central planning under de Gaulle worked productively and France achieved a rapid growth rate of around 5% from the late 1950s to the 1970s (World Bank).

The interventionism regime did not stand forever. In many ways, economic development since World War II for France has been accompanied by mixed policies of socialism and capitalism. Capitalism had not received as much priority in France as in other western countries and France found itself torn between policies of further nationalization of industry, an approach that socialists strongly advocated, and privatization, or the “La droite” strategy. In 1981 when François Mitterrand, the newly elected socialist president from the Parti Social (Social Democratic Party), defended dirigisme and promoted increasing governmental control in the economy, the state nationalized even more private industries. For example, Mitterand proposed a 39-hour week work schedule, extended the vacation length to a five week holiday per year, and raised the minimum wage in 110 Propositions pour la France, the Socialist Party's program for the 1981 presidential election. Unfortunately, these reforms led to the unemployment rate to rise (Abowd and Freeman 1991). Many argued that the approach did not achieve economic efficiency because it lacked incentives for competition and there would be insufficient individual investments. French rulers eventually realized that “dirigisme was growing out of fashion” (Ardagh 1988: pp.40). Hence, the government decided to take more of a right wing perspective and liberalize the economy, diminishing the degree of intervention. The era of free market mechanism, an equivalent to laissez-faire policy, has prevailed
since then. With the decreasing degree of government ownership and influence, private businesses took the lead and replaced dirigisme.

Although France gradually transitions from a socialist economy that has featured extensive government ownership and intervention, to a mixed economy that relies more heavily on market mechanisms, the long legacy and custom of dirigisme and “etatisme”\(^1\) still distinguishes France from many other developed countries such as the United States. Overall, the French government’s control is still widely existent in major corporations of banking, energy, and automobiles (Hayward 1986)

In the twenty-first century, the French government continues to favor etatisme with the government’s central planning and socially responsible economic principles. Jacques Chirac, the two-term president of the state between 1995 and 2007, modified the regime after realizing that too much state influence would dampen private businesses’ initiatives, impeding a healthy economic development. Among these modifications, he lowered tax rates, removed price controls and carried about business privatization. In 2007, Nicholas Sarkozy was elected as new President in France and the current government has focused on introducing measures that strive to boost employment through increased labor market flexibility. Sarkozy has supported the freedom to work overtime and advocated the concept of working more to earn more. Under his administration, employers pay workers a 25% surplus on top of their hourly wage for every additional hour of work and the pay difference is exempt from the government tax. Sarkozy has also reduced government social assistance to the unemployed who refuse to take the work that is proposed to them. In 2008, the global financial crisis led to intense criticism of the free market capitalism and once again

\(^1\) Political theory according to which the State should have all the economic and social power
justified the French long-term interventionist approach. Ultimately, the trial for French style capitalism has come to an end, showing that market mechanism cannot function well without government’s intervention.

Author Bowman (2005) has argued, in comparing socialist dominance in the French economy with that in the U.S., stating that central planning has had a direct and disastrous effect on the French economy in the Twenty century.

“The economic situation in France today under socialism’s legacy is dismal. Captured Socialists are increasing France’s spending, increasing her debt, hindering her ability to grow and weakening her economy. It seems obvious that socialism has unleashed the forces that will inevitably destroy the French economy, and very likely France itself.” (Bowman 2005: pp.80)

Despite this criticism on the French style socialism, France remains one of the largest economies in the world. This explains why France is a popular country for immigrants. World Bank currently ranks it as the eighth largest economy, with the measure of purchasing power parity (PPP) at US $2,046,899 million in 2008. The GDP of the French economy in 2006 reached 2.2 trillion in current US dollars with an annual percentage growth rate of 2.0 percent. The growth rate of GDP has declined to 1.2 % in 2005 from 4 % in 2000.

Maintaining sustainable economic growth is the primary goal for most countries. Macroeconomic theory asserts that human capital and technology progress are the major components that impact long-term growth. France enjoys strong human capital assets and technology innovation endowments (Malinvaud 1972). For example, its adult literacy rate is equal to that of other high-income countries, a figure of about 99 %. France is ranked 16th out of 177 countries of the world in the human development index, a composite measure of three dimensions of human development
that was designed and proposed by United Nations Development Program. The criteria that contribute to a high HDI include living a long and healthy life, high educational attainment and having a balanced standard of living. The HDI for France is 0.955, which gives the country a rank of 11th out of 179 countries. This figure is a result of France’s commitment to educating the general public. National education is the primary public service in France and every year 20% of the total state budget goes to educating the French. The school system is highly uniform and centralized (Edmiston and Dumenil 2005).

As for the technological improvement, the economic growth experienced by France since World War II has been accompanied by substantial technological development. France has distinguished itself as a leader in science and medical research since the nineteenth century. Famous scientists include Marie Curie, the Nobel Prize recipient in physics. Since 1965, more than ten French scientists have won Nobel Prizes in physics and chemistry. France is a long-committed partner with other developed countries to continue major scientific invention and innovation research. As head of the European Union, France assumes responsibility for promoting more technological advances for the development of its agriculture, industries, and businesses (Malinvaud 1972).

In comparison with the overall French economic development, the ethnic range of the French economy is distinctly different from the mainstream economy. First of all, immigrants are major players in the French ethnic economy and they are marginalized population groups. Differences in cultures between host and origin countries can make immigrants suffer economically and politically (Entzinger 1985).
To a large extent, their fates are determined by the actions of the French government and economic fluctuation. Secondly, immigrant labor serves as an alternative to domestic labor in France (Borjas 2003). They are brought in to add to the native labor when an extra demand for certain industries emerges. For example, the French government took immigrants into the national army or infrastructure building at various points in time. Later on, immigrants tried to establish a long-term competition by taking advantage of their specialized skills, which the local labor lacked. They opened ethnic restaurants and provided ethnic services to fulfill the demands for ethnic commodities. Thirdly, a substitution effect is often observed in that foreign labor takes over the domestic labor force (Borjas 2003). Many immigrants are willing to work at lower minimum wages, and under poorer working conditions. They take on undesirable jobs that domestic workers refuse to do. Similarly, immigrants with high levels of knowledge, referred to as specialized immigrant workers, also take over native labor as they contribute to productivity growth and technological advancement.

In terms of industries immigrants get into after they move to France, French occupational structure is a defining factor for distributing them. Immigrants are usually brought into industries that were experiencing labor shortages. In France, most immigrants work in agriculture and manufacturing. France has long been an agricultural country, with its leading agricultural position in Western Europe, and second to the US in agricultural export, with about 7% of the labor force engaged in agriculture, forestry, and fishing. Many immigrants are involved in agricultural industry. Since the end of World War II, agricultural policy has been directed toward the modernization of agriculture, including raising productivity per hectare, and
consolidating numerous small holdings into larger, more efficient farms (Coffey 1973).

Manufacturing is another extensive industry in France and takes a significant number of immigrant workers. In the 1990s the manufacturing sector employed between 15% and 20% of the labor force. The principal industrial concentrations centered around Paris, in the Pas-de-Calais, the Lorraine coalfields, in the Lyon and Saint-Étienne complex of the Rhône valley. Many French business enterprises are small to moderate in size, although the competitive business climate created by membership in the European Union has forced many companies to restructure and merge to form powerful corporations. Moreover, immigrants have been involved in mining industry, which constituted 1% of the labor force in France. A small number of immigrants also work in tourism.

Job opportunities in these industrial sectors during economic boom periods provided a legitimate reason for immigration and development of the French ethnic economy. However, since high unemployment in France has been a major problem in the economy, many French people dislike the idea of immigration (Lazear 2000). For instance, in the late 1990s the unemployment rate, which remained in the neighborhood of 12%, was a reflection of the economic recession. Suffering from the rise of unemployment, one of the principal aims of the Jospin government, which took office in 1997, was to create new jobs. Unsurprisingly, not only did the government implement stricter immigration rules, but it also sought to accomplish this by introducing a 35-hour workweek in 1998.
“Vers la fin des années 1990, le gouvernement Jospin est entré en négociations avec le patronat et les syndicats pour lancer une réduction du temps de travail hebdomadaire des salariés, de 39 heures à 35 heures. Le but de cette réforme était de créer de nouveaux emplois afin de réduire le chômage”

(Venturini 1987: pp.20)

When unemployment rate surged, immigrants received harsh criticism for competing with domestic labor, especially with natives with a limited skill set. This observation was proved to be a biased assumption by “Three hundred million, three million unemployed? Immigration flows and the labor market in France” (Gross 2002), which has statistically illustrated a relaxed correlation between number of immigrants and the unemployment rate in France. However, the debate about correlation between immigration and unemployment rate in France still continues. No matter what conclusion one might reach, this ongoing discussion at least perpetuates the fact that the French economy’s performances can largely determine the destinies of immigrants.

• A Brief History of North African Immigrants and Southeast Asian Immigrants

France has long been an oasis for immigrants. Immigration increased sharply just after World War I and World War II in order to compensate for the decline in population due to war casualties. In addition, when domestic labor was not able to

2 “Toward the end of the 1990s, the Jospin government entered negotiations with employers and trade unions to reduce the workweek from 39 hours to 35 hours. The objective of this reform was to create new employment opportunities in order to reduce unemployment.”
keep up with a developing economy, a severe shortage of agricultural and industrial labor required that France introduce immigrants as a transition to meet its labor needs (King 1993). Focused on two major ethnic groups, the next section will explore the history of North African and Southeast Asian immigrants in three flows.

• Three North African Immigrant Flows

The North African immigrant community has gained attention in many ongoing debates about the prospects of incorporating new ethnic minorities into the mainstream French identity. For example, their broad visibility drew some serious criticism:

“Ce sont les Maghrébins qui constituent le plus grand groupe d’immigrés non européen (près de 40% des étrangers en France.) Plus visibles parce que plus nombreux, ils posent aussi le cas le plus problématique en ce qui concerne l’intégration dans la société française.”

Although North African immigrant groups are the most familiar among non-European immigrants for the French public, the media frenzy and hostility to the wearing of Islamic headscarves in public schools revealed intense French worries of North Africans’ inability to socially assimilate into the French community. Public opinion poll shows a high degree of reservations for a smooth integration process (Dominic 2005). To understand the influx dynamic, the North Africans’ influx is categorized into three main flows. The history of French colonization plays an

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extremely critical role in the waves of the North African immigrants and hence distinguishes the nature of the first flow from that of the second. The last wave refers to the most recent influx starting in 1990.

The first wave, during the colonial period, was considered a domestic migration as Algeria constituted part of France because of its colonial status. Immigrants from North Africa, due to political inferiority, income inequality, and imbalance in economic conditions in their countries of origin moved to big cities in France. They were first arranged to live in what were called “bidonvilles”, shantytowns in undeveloped suburbs and later on moved to government subsidized apartments called HLMs (Habitation à Loyer Modéré) (Etudes Sociales Nord-Africaines 1962 : a,b). Their homes were often associated with extremely poor living conditions,

“Ils sont venus vivre à plusieurs dans les HLM de la banlieue des grandes villes, et ils travaillaient comme main d’œuvres dans les usines et sur les chantiers. … Les travailleurs occupaient les postes les moins qualifiés et les moins bien payés, et leurs conditions de logement et de confort n’étaient pas bonnes.”4 (Etudes Sociales Nord-Africaines 1962 : c)

North African immigrants provided cheap labor in urban infrastructure and spent most of their time working. They were also assigned to the bottom of the occupational ladder, even among all other immigrant groups.

“Overall those types of unhealthy work which involved great heat, toxic gases, acids, dust, hot metals, and dyes had a predominance of immigrant workers among which North Africans make up the largest group.” (Neil 1997: pp.77-78)

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4 “They came to live in groups in the HLM housing in the suburbs of big cities and they worked in factories and on construction sites… The workers took the least qualified and lowest paid positions, and their housing conditions were not good.”
Author Memmi (1973) asserts that the power relationship of colonization made the Maghrebi immigrants inferior relative to the position of French people. This discrimination inevitably made the North African immigrants second-class outsiders because of their colonization status. All Maghrebi workers were recruited through an extremely strict policy procedure and for the most part they chose France for economic reasons more than political insecurity. Some historians explain that this flow of migration is only partly a result of economic disparity between North Africa and France, adding that the historical context of two major world wars provide motives for migration. The immense labor recruitment in the Maghrebi countries could be traced back to World War I, when an urgent lack of manpower in France led the government to actively recruit North African men for the army, industry and mines. Workers were required to possess a high degree of physical strength. Documentary movie *L’Algerie*, for instance, illustrates the selection process, where Maghrebi candidates had to shake hands with immigration officers and only those with hand calluses, an indication of hard work, would be chosen. During World War II, labor shortages again led to the recruitment of Maghrebi workers and soldiers. This phenomenon continued since the end of World War II in 1946. By 1954, an annual rate of increase of 32.5% in Algerians contrasted with the overall immigration growth rate, which was about 1.3% (Wihtol de Wenden 1999: pp.107-110). Algerian migration continued to increase, yet at a slower pace during 1954-1962 civil wars, when the political disruption in Algeria motivated more Algerians to migrate.

The colonization in all Maghreb countries had ended by 1961 and many North African immigrants left their countries of origin after national liberation, defined here
as the beginning of the second flow of North African immigrants. For example, six years after Algerian independence, because of an increased demand for workers in a booming French economy, Algerians were granted the legal right to move freely between Algeria and France (Wihtol de Wenden 1999). After Morocco and Tunisia became independent from France in 1956, colonial migration patterns also largely persisted among those Moroccans and Tunisians. France was evidently a proximate country in which to seek a better life, even after the colonization period. Family reunion was particularly common; relatives who had settled previously in France could lend a hand, which led to another flow of North Africans migrating to France. It is worth noting that the second wave of immigrants had much better linguistic skills; many of these immigrants had a good command of French as a second language, an indispensable pre-requisite skill to compete with local French labor. This linguistic advantage could help them integrate more easily because they could communicate much better with the French natives; however, they were not by any means exempt from the discrimination coming from the French, who consistently refused to accept their colonized people as equals.

On the French government side, a rapid post-war economic growth created increasing unskilled labor shortages in industries like mining, housing construction, and agriculture from the 1950s. Hence, there appeared a guest worker boom in 1963-1972, during the initial stage of the post colonization period (Safran 1992). The French government was aimed at recruiting an increasing emigration of guest workers from poorer countries. For example, Morocco and Tunisia signed formal agreements with France regarding the recruitment of guest workers. Between 1962 and 1975, the
Algerian population in France increased dramatically and more than doubled because of the boom (Mehdi 1990: pp.30).

In terms of recruiting immigrant workers, some specialized agencies were designated to handle the initial recruitment based on the number and specific requirements of the workers from the French side. For example, if the French government was looking for 600 mine workers, then the agencies would look out for qualified people, file the legal procedures, and introduce them to France. This regulated recruiting mechanism created incentives for illegal entrance and set the stage for subsequent chain migration. Limited spaces, long waiting lists and the accompanying bribery from the administration led people to risk circumventing the rules and to migrate instead as tourists who then attempted to overstay illegally (De Hass 2007). Meanwhile, the emigrating governments had agreed strongly upon pro-emigration policies because they believed that their countries would greatly benefit from these experiences, training and financial resources of migrants who were expected to return.

In 1973, the whole dynamic changed because of the well-known 1973 oil crisis. It was the turning point of a long history of Maghreb emigration to France. For Tunisia and Morocco, France was no longer the only place for migration. Instead, Arab oil countries like Libya became more appealing destinations. Algeria also realized that with its oil revenue, it could hire its own people. As a consequence, Algerian government soon decided to suspend emigration as a form of post-colonial dependence to support its own employment. On the other hand, European downturn provided another incentive for North African immigrants to stay in their countries of
origin. The oil crisis led to France sinking into a period of tightening economy and labor abundance, resulting in rising national unemployment rate and thus a lower demand for unskilled immigrants. This hit the guest workers disproportionately and led to their mass unemployment. In 1975, as the French economy worsened, the frontier officially closed down for immigrants that came from non-European countries.

Due to the deterioration of French economy, France and North African countries had expected that the migration in this period would be temporary and that many Maghrebi migrants would return to live a better life in North Africa after saving some money in France. However, this prediction never came true. As historian Gerard Noiriel (2004) articulated, the idea of leaving the host country collapsed was closely related to the economic downturns. A large number of Maghrebi migrants unexpectedly chose to stay in France permanently, despite efforts from France, Algeria, and Tunisia to repatriate them (Fargues 2004: pp.1359-1360). Return policies to attract immigrants in France failed for different reasons in North African nations, either because of the economic stagnation or psychological experiences of immigrants. For Morocco and Tunisia, economic downturn reinforced the stabilization of immigrants. Both countries suffered much more from the high oil prices and the global economic downturn. As a result, low employment and political instability made return the least attractive choice, let alone the process to reintegrate into the countries of origin. Unlike Tunisia and Morocco, Algeria had an economic revitalization, however, the increasingly restrictive immigration policies such as visa restrictions to migrate positively contributed to Maghrebi migrants settling in France. Fears about development and re-adaptation back to Algeria provided enough
incentives for the Algerian immigrants to be risk averse and kept their residence in France (Entzinger 1985: pp.263-275).

The ban on the recruitment of immigrant workers as well as the Bonnet Law by the Minister of the Interior Christian Bonnet to deport illegal immigrants outside the Europe in the 1970s did not stop the ethnic influx. North Africans still managed to come in through massive large-scale family reunification. The law brought tragic consequences for the North African immigrants through deportation as French government intended to increase the chance of employment for native workers. Blamed on for taking the jobs of French natives, hundreds and thousands Algerians were sent back. However, the immigration between 1975 and 1989, of North Africans still almost doubled (De Haas 2005), due to natural reproduction and the influx of illegal immigrants.

The third flow of North American immigrants refers to the post-1990 era. Migration has diversified in the last twenty years in a sense that there are a variety of migration reasons. First, there was an influx of Algerian refugees as a result of the Algerian civil war after 1991, which killed more than 150,000 people. Second, migration to France continued through the process of family formation. Spouses immigrating to France were common. Furthermore, the remarkable growth in agriculture, construction, and tourism in France has generated increasing demand for flexible, seasonal, and low-skill labor (Fargues 2004: pp.1357). Therefore, there appears to be a high demand for unskilled migrant labor. Last but not least, students from North Africa come to France to pursue education. Despite the fact that President Nicholas Sarkozy is trying to reduce the flow of immigrants coming legally from
North Africa and Africa, he has sensed that global competition calls for a high caliber of labor. Mirroring France to the U.S, Sarkozy has endorsed “selective immigration” (“Immigration Choisie”), a controlled immigration policy. The targets are those intellectuals or skilled labor that are beneficial to the progress of the French economy. In order to meet academic needs and international competition at universities, scholars from North Africa are highly encouraged to pursue diplomas, get involved in advanced levels of academic research, and contribute to the diversity of the student population. The admission policies of many top universities reflect this trend. For example, university Le Science Po in Paris has initiated scholarships and funds to make research possible in the fields of science and media for North Africans, a common initiative to improve French universities’ international prestige and the benefit of overall student demographics.

- **Three Southeast Asian Immigrant Flows**

Parallel to the French colonialism in North Africa, French colonization in Indochina, a federation of the three Vietnamese regions, Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina, as well as Cambodia, starting in 1887 and Laos, added in 1893, lasted more than half a century. This colonial tie has consequently led to an influx of this group into France in multiple defining periods. In order to form a consistent comparison with the North African immigration flow, Southeast Asian immigration is framed into three major waves. The first wave is comprised of those immigrants that came to France before World War II, i.e. pre-1945. The second wave falls between 1945 and 1990. The most current wave is from 1990 through the present.
The first Southeast Asian immigrant flow dates back to the early twentieth century, with a dominant number of Chinese and some Vietnamese. This immigration wave was unique in that it was constituted of groups of academic and political elites. The major purpose of immigration for this group, rather than an economic one, was to seek a better education. The group of political leaders included Zhou Enlai, the first Premier of the People's Republic of China, and Ho Chi Minh, who desired to oppose French colonization and was the founder of communist-governed Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

“Le second groupe réunit des individus immigrés en France entre 1919 et 1921, soit environ 2000 dont une forte majorité d’étudiants de Guang Dong, du Hunan, du Sichuan. La recherche de formations scientifiques s’associant à la lutte politique donne à cette migration un caractère militant. En 1927, la plupart d’entre eux repartent pour la Chine, quelques centaines restent en France.”5 (Le Khoa 1996 : pp.43)

In fact, many political and academic elites were sent to France as worker-students to learn about western democracy and scientific technology and later went on to serve the new Chinese Republic led by Sun Yat Sen, the first President of the Republic of China.

Aside from this first elite group in France, another major group of first wave of Southeast Asian immigrants were brought in during World War I as agricultural and industrial workers either to join or replace French workers mobilized in wars to meet the demand for labor. The French government enrolled 100,000 workers, many

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5 “The second group of individuals who immigrated between 1919 and 1921 in France, amounted to about 2000 people, of which the majority were students from Guangdong, Hunan, and Sichuan. The search for scientific bases associated with political conflict gave this migration a militant nature.” In 1927, the majority of them went back to China, while a few hundred of them stayed in France.”
of whom originated from Zhejiang, after an agreement with the Chinese government in 1916 and 50,000 from Tonkin, Vietnam. Workers were supposed to be young and fit for intensive labor; a five-year stay was required and they were paid a salary as well as free passage back to China and Vietnam. More than 300,000 workers came to France between 1914 and 1918; most of them were doing dangerous work during the war such as industrial production of explosives or bombs, rebuilding infrastructures near the front line, clearing corpses, wounded and mines from the battlefield, etc. Some were even trained as soldiers. The situation of these workers was tragic and their lives were cruel. Most of the workers had to live in poor shelters akin to concentration camps. Many were killed in battle while others died of diseases, mainly from the flu epidemic at the end of the war.

“L’installation du premier groupe chinois en France remonte à la première guerre mondiale. Venus pour la plupart des provinces septentrionales, beaucoup de ces Chinois sont originaires de Anhui, Hubei, Shandong. Ils ont été recrutés pour travailler dans les usines d’armement, les usines chimiques, les fabriques de munitions ou pour assurer le terrassement des tranchées, la construction de baraques…Apres la guerre, la majorité d’entre eux a été rapatriée en Chine et seul environ 3000 sont restés en France.” (Le Khoa 1997 : pp.3)

Many of these workers were sent back to Asia in 1919, but a minority managed to stay in France. These survivors managed to settle in a small district right after World War I, near the railway station along the river Seine, Gare de Lyon, in the east center of Paris.

6 “The settlement of the first Chinese group in France first appeared during the first world war. Many Chinese came from the northern provinces including Anhui, Hubei, and Shandong. They were recruited to work in weapon factories, chemical factories, and ammunition factories, or they worked in excavation and house construction. After the war, the majority of them were repatriated to China and only about 3000 stayed in France.”
This neighborhood built its first Asian restaurant in 1925 and from then on an era of immigration dawned.

This type of business continued and led to a scale of economy that is run by immigrant groups. For example, Southeast Asian immigrants began by resorting to the kind of work they used to engage in their countries of origin: opening ethnic restaurants, selling goods in the streets generally imported goods from Japan distributed by Jewish wholesalers. Hence, their entrepreneurship spirit led to their industry expansion beyond a couple of Asian restaurants. Most of them who were seeking new businesses had moved from their previous settlement to the Third District of Paris (Arts et Métiers district).

7 “The group originating from Wenzhou, arrived in Paris, France in the 1930s, before the second world war. They settled down in the district of Gare de Lyon.”
8 “We note that 1920s were the beginning of Chinese implantation in the Gare de Lyon district, in the form of small groups of restaurants that specifically targeted immigrants and students.”
9 “An important group settled down around the Rue du Temple district, in the third arrondissement, where the principal activities were leather production and handicrafts. Today, it is the same group who run the business of souvenir objects in Paris.”
These immigrants’ businesses involved the production of all kinds of items as well as establishing workshops, wholesale and retail shops in the area. Some even moved into garment production. Some of them were the bosses and others were workers in small workshops. A complete economic structure was therefore established and we could easily find Asian-funded small businesses, shopkeepers, workers exploited in small workshops as well as craftsmen or home-workers (Le Khoa 1996).

The profitability from this economic cluster also led to an urge to expand in locations, in particular a more significant development in the thirteenth arrondissement. The third district (Arts et Métiers) extended to the North and East to the Rue du Temple, then to the Rue du Faubourg du Temple, up to Belleville and the Boulevard Voltaire, and from the nearest railways stations Gare du Nord and Gare de l'Est up to the North East and East suburbs of Paris. Within less than a few decades, Asian shops started emerging in the Eleventh, Third, Eighteenth, and Tenth arrondissement (Boutet 1990). This boom in the market generated opportunities and motivated Southeast Asian immigrants to bring in more labor to meet the increasing demand for workers. Hence, through the continuation of the same development of strong and tight clan and family relations, new Chinese immigrants from Zhejiang (most of the Wenzhou district), for example, came in a regular flow to be exploited in these workshops and trade.

1945 became a turning point for French rule in the Indochina region and marked the era of second wave immigrants who wanted to migrate to France. The
back-to-back events of decolonization and with the rise of communist power in China and Vietnam directly motivated this migration influx. In the beginning of this year, Ho Chi Minh led a communist revolt against French rule, known as the French Indochina War. By 1953, colonization in Indochina area ended. Between 1945 and 1975, many Chinese people migrated to Vietnam to escape communism, which formed in 1949. Later on, many of those Chinese, along with Vietnamese immigrants, migrated to France after Ngo Dinh Diem implemented the law that forced Chinese immigrants to become naturalized. Eventually the Vietnam War led to the departure of more Chinese, the majority of whom came from Canton and Hainan providence (Chinese Immigration in France, 2007).

A distinctive characteristic of this group was that many of them fled to France illegally in order to escape communism. Because of that nature, they were known as the “boat people” or the “without papers” (“sans papiers”). This group also included those known as ethnically Chinese, who had previously traveled and worked in East Asia. According to the political and military situation of Southeast Asia, these new immigrants came in different flows. The first ones came after France evacuated Indochina in 1954-1955, and the second wave occurred after US troops evacuated Vietnam in 1975; after that still more succeeded in fleeing their countries. Some of them come from Mainland China following the rule of the Communist Party. This wave of population was also financially heterogeneous. Some relatively wealthy immigrants fostered entrepreneurial minds and engaged local commerce while some others had to be workers, obliged to be exploited by the first group under any conditions for survival (Gan and Poisson 2005). To host this second wave, the
"Choisy Triangle", a Chinese district in Paris established by the first wave of Southeast Asian immigrants, further extended to nearby suburbs in the southeast of Paris such as Choisy and Vitry (Le Khoa 1995b).

The rapid implantation of the Chinese and their economic success in France, in many ways, could be attributed to a strong network created by the Chinese Diaspora. In 1975 the arrival of Chinese in France from Indochina, especially those from Cambodia after the chute of Khmers Rouges, set the stage of financial supremacy in France. These Chinese continued the long tradition of economic dominance from the original minority group of Chinese, who had settled in Indochina and took the economic power as the minority (Ungar and Conley 1996). Their efficiency allowed them to impose their economic control on the Southeast Asian community in Asia and this economic power directly extended to their entrepreneurship spirits in France:

“Leur communauté de base en Asie du Sud-Est joue un rôle clé à tous les stades du développement de leurs investissements en France”10 (Le Khoa 1995a: pp.39)

The economic prosperity within this ethnic network, as well as the political freedom in France drew this second flow of Southeast Asian refugee boat immigrants to join their first settlers. After they entered the market, entrepreneurship continued to take root. The second wave started settling in the south of Paris, in the Thirteenth arrondissement area called, “Chinatown.” They often tried to integrate themselves into the existing Southeast Asian communities. The majority of the new immigrants

10 “Their community based in Southeast Asia plays a key role in all of the stages of development of their investments in France.”
had to work at the earlier-settled Southeast Asian workshops. For some wealthy immigrants who had the opportunity to be entrepreneurs, they took advantage of their trade networks in Asia and exploited this proletariat. In the 1970s, this formerly industrial and working class district soon changed. Economic prosperity triggered new restructuring. Industries started to move elsewhere and many of these immigrants moved and helped fill the empty apartments in buildings. (Dubet 1989)

Because the Chinese were such predominant leaders in constructing a locally concentrated Southeast Asian society, the district essentially became a separate town altogether with so many facilities to accommodate this Asian community. It attracted Asian people from the other surrounding districts of Paris - new immigrants as well as French people lured by "exoticism". Southeast Asian people could find there all the necessities for an "Asian" life: not only the traditional shops but also banks, doctors, lawyers, travel agencies, etc., even Chinese supermarkets, Vietnamese teahouses, Chinese mafia gangs, and local newspapers in Chinese. Sweatshops continued to increase in number, not only providing what was needed for all these trades but also working for outside districts, mainly for the garment industry (Gan and Poisson 2005). Some Chinese immigrant workers from Wenzhou explained in my interviews that they felt comfortable living there because they could communicate in Mandarin with their bosses. Thus they had no pressure to leave their comfort zone. They also expressed fierce competition in the environment. With the growing number of Southeast Asian immigrants and to make the business profitable for the owners, these second wave of immigrants competed with each other and were obliged to accept to work harder and harder at a cheaper price. Hence, most of these new comers were
overexploited workers. However, the French authorities did not intervene in this district as they did in other Chinese districts of Paris in their attempt to hunt down undocumented Chinese immigrants: they rely, for peace and control in this "Chinatown", on the way the Chinese community functioned itself, just as it had been built in the first place (Le Khoa 1995a).

Compared to the first two waves of immigrants, the third Southeast Asian immigrant flow was more heterogeneous starting from the end of 1980. First of all, there was a large group of Chinese student refugees that settled in France due to the Beijing Tiananmen Square tragedy in 1989. Many of these artists and intellectuals for example became scholars and wrote about the history of the Tiananmen Square incident. Also, there was a noticeably large influx of immigrants coming directly from China, in particular the district of Wenzhou in the south as well as from the north like Beijing. This migration was not a strict consequence of economic advantage but was rather tied to the immigrants’ concerns about the education and future of their children. This is especially true because of the One Child Policy in China, where to have a second child is illegal. Moreover, new generations in Southeast Asia are attracted to the advanced degrees that French institutions have to offer. Compared to British and American expensive tuitions, French universities charge little and hence provide an affordable opportunity to have access to a western education, which is considered more superior to local degrees. It is also observed that many top students from Southeast Asian countries substitute very few local French students to conduct PHD level research and meet high-level scientific research needs.
• Conclusion

The French economy experienced both glorious and tough times in the past century, the economic growth rate fluctuating between both positive and negative figures. This evolution of the French economy associated with major political events has provided different contexts for immigration in chronological stages. Poor economic performances impeded immigration flows and positive economic growth drew more immigrants to move to France. In addition, the history of North African and Southeast Asian immigrants presented various interactions between the two ethnic groups and the French economy. These two non-European immigrant groups have shared some similarities. They both, in the first wave, appeared as low paid immigrant labor into the French industrial sectors in the twentieth century. Although they first inserted into French society in small numbers, they were able to respectively develop their small ethnic communities into visible clusters in France within decades, in particular during the second flow. The third flows of the two immigrant groups showed progress in terms of level of education. Many immigrants are enrolled in French universities to gain competence. The histories of French economy and of the two ethnic immigrant groups, lay a foundation for sociological and economic analyses in the next chapter.
Chapter 2. Sociology and Economics

• Introduction

The first section of this chapter illustrates four distinct differences between the two previously discussed immigrant groups from the French public’s perspective. The second section combines a qualitative analysis with a quantitative approach, focusing on the relationship between social and economic aspects of integration. In order to explore the relationship between French economic growth and immigration flow, I introduce sample time-series data and regressions. In the overall immigration analysis section, I present the findings on immigration as a whole. The chapter then shifts its focus to North African and Southeast Asian incoming immigrants. The comparative analysis uses the regression results to show the degree of the economic integration for the two ethnic groups, discussing whether their economic contributions to the French economy align with the French public’s perceptions of them. I will also touch upon the problematic data limitations regarding the designed model. The fourth section discusses what the statistics imply about economic integration and explores sociological and economic reasons for the difference between North African and Southeast Asian immigrants in the degree of difficulty in integrating economically. I will summarize the findings from the statistical and sociological analysis and address the limitations of this economic approach, meriting a discussion of immigration politics evolution in the following chapter.
• **Articulating Ethnic Differences in French Society**

Chapter One presented many similar immigrants’ characteristics in the histories of the two immigrant groups. They are both socially marginalized groups that have difficulty integrating into the exclusive French culture. Yet, they have experienced different integration processes because integration is largely subject to the French mentality attitudes towards each group. In particular, the French public has longstanding biases of North Africans, perceiving them all as Arabs because of their religious connection to Islam. This discrimination and generalization toward the North Africans has today become a common French mentality:

> “Mais l’on sait aujourd’hui que les réactions hostiles visent surtout les Maghrébins, au point que dans l’esprit de l’homme de la rue, immigré signifie nécessairement Arabe.”¹¹ (Khellil 1991: pp. 11)

Southeast Asian immigrants, on the other hand, are usually distinguished according to their countries of origin. Drawing upon the French public’s ideologies and interpretations of difference between the two immigrant groups, the center of my debate falls into a discussion of the immigrants’ religious beliefs, colonial history, and physical clusters in the eyes of the French public. These characteristics not only distinctively define each immigrant group’s identity, they also draw the attention of the French media and constitute an indispensable part of the immigration issue. These variables distinguish Southeast Asians from North Africans, according to French values, and consequently determine their unequal social integration processes, leading to non-parallel economic performances.

¹¹ “But it is known today that the hostile reactions are aimed in particular at the Maghrebi, to the point where an average person on the street would believe that ‘immigrant’ signified ‘Arab’.”
Religion matters in France. North Africans have a tendency to appear more religious than Southeast Asians, which polarizes the two groups’ positions. North Africans are closely tied to Muslim culture that the French people find as opposing to western Christianity (Memmi 1982). This religious conflict manifests itself in multiple ways. North Africans tend to explicitly display their religious beliefs by building grand mosques in urban areas and wearing religious clothing, like black veils. These behaviors are perceived as an immediate threat to the native French Catholics, who constitute two thirds of the population, although very few of French people strictly practice Catholicism today. This religious display is also at odds with the secular French society, as it strives to promote public discretion in religious matters (Ungar and Conley 1996). In 2004, the French government showed strong opposition to the North Africans’ religion by enacting a policy that officially prohibited any clothing that could indicate a pupil’s religious affiliation in public schools. The religious beliefs of many North Africans are discriminated against in the French press and medias, which often “utilisaient l’expression « un Nord Africain et son coreligionnaire… », comme si on ne pouvait pas dire simplement deux Nord-Africains.”12 (Khellil 1991: pp. 11) The French press has a strong influence in shaping racism. Author Neil MacMaster(1997) explained this in Colonial Migrants and Racism when he wrote “the proliferation of such stereotypes, particularly through the press, played no small part in the creation a climate of racism which was to continue into the postcolonial period.”(Neil 1997: pp.8-9) Thus Islam, representing the majority of the North Africans’ religious beliefs, has caused a high level of

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12 “utilized the expression of a North African and his coreligionist as if they could not simply say two North Africans”
discrimination and doubts about their integration: “typical pointing to their religion or way of life, public opinion polls reveal profound doubts about the prospects for integrating North Africans into French society.” (Hargreaves 1995: pp.157)

In contrast to North African immigrants, the less visible religious practices among Southeast Asian communities have comparatively benefited Southeast Asian immigrants. They build few temples, wear little religious clothing, and are generally more discreet about their religious beliefs. They are perceived to pose less of a challenge to mainstream French culture in religious terms. Southeast Asians are viewed to align well with French religious expectations and are more apt to assimilate (Le Khoa 1995b).

A second difference in discrimination between the two groups is associated with their colonial relationships. The colonial history in North Africa is characterized by political and cultural dominance from the French. This has made the French public generally become accustomed to a feeling of being mentally superior to North Africans. The French people view the North Africans as second-class citizens destined to work undesirable jobs (Doty 2003). Over one hundred and thirty years of colonial rule has shaped French society long after the period of decolonization. The memory of decolonization still bothers the French, which contributes to significant degree of discrimination toward North Africans, as author Ungar and Conley (1996) argues:

“what we are witnessing today is the violent return of a repressed colonial past. Triggered by a period of change, the still bitter and unresolved memories of the Algerian War are resurfacing with a vengeance—often in the form of hostility toward the North African immigrant community.” (Ungar and Conley 1996: pp.6)
The associated racism was also attributed to a complicated postcolonial relationship between Algeria and France. Sociologist Khellil Mohand (1991) argued that because of the geographic proximity and the duration of colonialism, the French people came to believe that Algeria should always be part of its territory. It was painful for France and the French people when they lost Algeria and had to accept its independence. Their hostility towards the Algerians intensified. Mohand articulated that this postcolonial relationship was manifested through the racism towards North Africans from the black-feet (pied-noirs), who were the French colonists in Algeria and later fled after decolonization. The presence of the Maghrebi in France is painful for these pied-noirs because it reminds them of their suffering in Algeria (Hargreaves 2005). They were intolerant of the Maghrebi and responded with racism: “although North Africans represented no more than 40% of the foreign population, between 1980 and 1993 they accounted for 78 percent of all officially recorded racial crimes.” (Hargreaves 1995: pp.157)

On the other hand, this perception is less applicable to the Southeast Asian immigrants because the French postcolonization relationship was never as strong or complicated. Asia is far away that France did not associate with it as much as it did with North Africa. Also, the French colonial empire that occupied Indochina in South East Asia, lasted about half as long as the French occupation of North Africa. The independence of the Indochinese countries was followed by postcolonial relationships marked with weaker emotional links due to the long geographical distances. In addition, the French never colonized the Chinese population, except the people in the city of Shanghai. This made it harder for the French to associate Southeast Asian
immigrants with colonialism and they tend to be hesitant to categorize the Southeast Asian influx as a colonized group. The French discrimination towards the two groups of immigrants varies as a result of different levels of colonial invasion in Asia and North Africa.

It should also be emphasized that the leftover of racial theory, proposed by French aristocrat and novelist Goubineau (1860) in the nineteenth century, contributed to a more severe discrimination against the North Africans than Southeast Asian immigrants. According to Goubineau (1967), there are clear distinctions between the "black", "white", “brown”, and "yellow" races. He believed the white race was superior and defined Southeast Asians as superiors to the North Africans. Today many sociologists like Winant (2000) believe that the nineteenth century racial theory remains in French society. It seems that the French people were more prejudice against North African than towards Southeast Asian immigrants because of their skin color.

The social mobility of immigrant groups has a direct influence on ethnic spillovers, which could motivate economic conditions. Physical locations, as a result of different types of ethnic clusters, can either help or impede integration. North Africans have spatially assembled in a manner that has been viewed as generating negative externalities to the French society. They are well known for occupying the suburbs (“banlieues”), that “in French typically conjures up frightening images of failed urban communities torn apart by violence, drugs, delinquency, unemployment, and above all North African youth” (Derderian 2004: pp.145). They live in poor neighborhoods, usually subsidized housing HLMs and suffer from unemployment. In
several cases, the North Africans have initiated violent disruptions and caused social unrest for the local police due to their frustration with the French government’s lack of effort to help them. In October 2005, there were urban violent clashes that involved the burning of cars and public buildings in Clichy-sous-Bois, a commune in the eastern suburbs of Paris, which is home to a large population of North African immigrants. Soon the violence spread nationwide. Such riots, which have happened periodically over the past half-century, are not unusual events for the French people and often induce them to inevitably associate high crime rates with North Africans.

Southeast Asians tend to produce positive externalities by working and living with their fellows in the greater area of Paris and have even shown lower crime rates than French natives (Le Khoa 1996). The immigrants adapted themselves into the French society using the same means as the North Africans had, but the Southeast Asians established their communities within greater Paris. They have shown a history of exhibiting their entrepreneurial spirits and establishing disciplined work ethic, persuading the French public to separate them from the North African flow. These differential patterns of social mobility prevented North Africans, who were insulated in the suburban area, from having full access to the economic opportunities that the Southeast Asian groups gained.

Religious and colonial experience differences have caused much more severe French public discrimination and prejudice toward the North Africans than toward the Southeast Asians. Different ethnic networks, in different areas, seem to have provided Southeast Asians better economic chances. Southeast Asian immigrants are thought to be more favored socially, leading to an easier time integrating into French culture.
and way of life. As a result, are Southeast Asian immigrants’ social advantages, perceived in the eyes of the French public, reflected and reinforced by their better economic integration? To gain a more detailed perspective of economic integration, the next section aims to explore the relationship of French economy growth in relation to the immigrants’ inflow with some historical data.

- Analysis of Overall Immigration Patterns

Economic integration is important as France evaluates immigrants’ economic contribution to French society. Many theorists have argued that the French economy is a major drive for the high volume of immigration flows. In order to test the hypothesis that the French economy attracts immigration when it generates superior economic performances, this section examines the statistical correlation between French immigration and the state of the economy. I have data for real economic growth and the annual immigration flow growth rate from 1946 to 2004, fifty-eight-year observations that will span all the three waves of immigrants discussed in Chapter One. The analysis used to estimate the models was based on annual data set that came from three different sources: the World Bank, INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques), which collects and publishes information of France and carries out the periodic national census, and Offices des Immigrations, which provide detailed immigration information.

The regression equation is $Y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_t + e$. The dependent variable, $Y_t$, is the overall immigration flow rate at given year $t$. $X_t$, an independent variable, is French real economic growth rate at year $t$, which evaluates annual French economic
performance. Real economic growth rate was calculated as the growth rate of France’s gross domestic product (GDP) from one year to another. Included in this calculation is inflation and hence it is not impacted by inflation or deflation rates. Letter e is an error term; it captures the deviation of the regression from the actual $Y_t$.

The annual French real economic growth in the dataset averages to 3.17% per year and the average annual overall immigration inflow rate per year is about 6.88%.

Figure 2.A depicts the evolution of the two variables:

![Real GDP Growth](Image)

![Incoming immigration growth rate](Image)

*Figure 2.A Source: Offices des Migrations*

The entire equation shows that $Y_t$ is a function of $X_t$, meaning that immigration inflow in the year $t$ can be affected by $X_t$ (GDP growth). In other words, it captures
the correlation between the French economy and the incoming immigration influx. Any unobserved factors that are persistent for two years will result in biased estimates. By performing AR (2) regression, I am effectively correcting the bias. Figure 2.B and Table 2.1 illustrate the linear correlation and regression result:

![E-view regression scatter plot](image)

*Figure 2.B*  
**E-view regression scatter plot**
Dependent variable: Overall permanent workers’ flow

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_1$ (GDP delta)</td>
<td>3.753700</td>
<td>0.0200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_0$</td>
<td>-0.069090</td>
<td>0.2799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.114375</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durbin-Watson Stat</td>
<td>1.880939</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1

$\beta_1 = 3.753700$ in table 2.1 reflects a positive relationship between real economic growth and overall immigration flow. Probability = 0.02 in Table 2.1 indicates that $\beta_1$ is statistically significant at a 0.02 level, signaling a high level of power of this estimation. In other words, there is only 2.00% chance that the coefficient is invalid. The positive coefficient $\beta_1$ suggests that the more growth the French economy experiences, the greater the immigrant influx is, as a whole. The interpretation for $\beta_1 = 3.753700$ is that for every 1% increase in real GDP growth, the overall incoming immigration rate will go up by 3.7537%, which implies a strong economic influence from France on the incoming immigration flow in France. R-square = 11.44%, which provides a measure of how well immigration flow is likely to be predicted by the model, implies that the overall French economy cycle only explains one tenth of the immigration workers’ growth. This estimation is consistent with my expectation because total immigrants’ growth largely depends on, but is not just limited to the French economic conditions. Immigration is also motivated by other factors such as
the economic conditions in countries of origin and other immigration countries’ policies.

Pinpointing the exact reasons that lead to immigration is a complex issue. Economic theory often assumes that an individuals’ incentive is to maximize utility, or well being. In immigration decisions, the goal of immigrants is to choose the country that would benefit them the most with all financial and legal concerns considered. It is a complicated process that would involve careful consideration as immigrants evaluate all the possible options. To fully understand the motivation of overall immigration inflow, it is therefore important to analyze the demand and supply mechanism, as the economist George J. Borjas (1990) argued:

“There are three sets of players in the immigration market: the people contemplating whether to leave their home countries, the governments of immigrants’ home countries, and the governments of the various potential host countries. All of these players enter the immigration market with different objectives, and it is the interaction among them that leads to a particular sorting of immigrants among the various host countries”. (Borjas 1990: pp.9)

Thus, in addition to the France’s motives in either attracting or resisting immigrants for labor use, factors on the supply side in the labor market are important players in the immigration process and can have equally substantial impact on the immigration flows. This interaction of the demand and supply determines the optimal immigration volume.

First of all, countries of origin are one of the major components on the supply side. In other words, many emigration policies, as well as the political stability in the departing countries can have direct control on the outflow of immigrants. For example, shortly after decolonization took place in North Africa, Algeria actively
kept migration under their control. Algerian’s independence granted it direct authority over Algeria’s migration control. In order to meet the labor needs in the booming oil economy, the Algerian government started impeding emigration to France by implementing selective passport issuance policies and strict exit visa requirements. In 1971, the emigration law caused the immigrant flow from Algeria to France to decrease by more than a quarter (Wihtol de Wenden 1999). In the same time period, the Tunisians and Moroccans turned away from France and chose other booming economies like the United Arab Emirates for migration, leading to a decline of almost 20% in their number of immigrants respectively migrating to France (INSEE 1970-1975).

Another major element on the supply side is the alternative immigration countries’ conditions. France is certainly not the only immigrant destination. Other countries can offer appealing policies to compete for the labor force against France.

“Persons residing in any country of origin consider the possibility of remaining there or of migrating to one of a number of hosting countries.” (Borjas 1994: pp. 10)

In selecting the country to migrate to, cost is the most important concern for immigrants:

“International migration is costly. The costs include direct expenditures, such as the out-of-pocket expenses associated with the transportation of the immigrant and his family to their new home, along with indirect costs, such as the income losses associated with the transportation of the immigrant and his family to their new home, along with indirect costs, such as the income losses associated with unemployment spells that occur as immigrants look for work in the new country. Because only persons who have accumulated sufficient wealth and savings can afford to migrate, the potential migrant’s financial resources obviously influence the immigration decision.” (Borjas 2003: pp. 28)
Therefore, policies in other countries can also shift the immigrants’ labor supply to France. For example, when other immigrating countries, with a similar goal of attracting labor like France, demanded that immigrants join the army, and loosened up immigration restrictions during the world wars, French immigration could fluctuate because immigrants might pass over France for other options. Based on proximity, economic prospect, and personal preference, immigrants could potentially move to other countries, hence affecting the influx of foreign immigrants to France.

Thirdly, information asymmetry can affect the immigrant flow volume in France by misleading people in their countries of origin. Many immigrants were illiterate and did not have access to education in their countries of origin. Those who do not have access to accurate information about the French economy and discrimination from the French natives are most likely to perceive France as a wealthy, equal, and perfect paradise. France is their preferred nation without doubt. High expectations, yet imprecise predictions drive irrational decisions for many immigrants under all circumstances. Therefore, historian Noiriel (1997) believed that many uneducated immigrants would try their very best to move to France regardless of French economic fluctuations and the booming economy in their own countries.

After taking the labor market theory into account, we have to understand that host countries’ immigration politics are extremely influential. They impose various restrictions to directly impact immigration flow. The regulations can be enforced through restrictions on wealth, occupation, and nationalities. In the case of France, the skills of immigrants play an essential role on the supply side in recent immigration waves. As more immigrants want to move to France than it asks for, France can
choose desirable newcomers according to its will. France has set higher and higher qualifications for new incoming immigrants. For example, strong French proficiency and competitive technological skills have been widely considered as prerequisites to migrate to France under the *Immigration Choisie* politics of the Sarkozy administration. Inevitably, certain immigrants are eliminated by this rule. Hence, it is not hard to note that combining immigration politics with conditions in the labor market is critical in analyzing French migration dynamics.

We have looked at important components that impact demand and supply to understand the motives of new immigrants to France. It is interesting to take a glimpse into the composition of workforce among immigrants in comparison with the French natives. For example, below is a comparison of professional qualifications between the native French and overall immigration population in the year of 1987:

**Demandeurs d'emploi par qualification professionnelle, situation au 31 décembre 1987**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qualification professionnelle</th>
<th>Français</th>
<th>Etrangers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non précisé</td>
<td>13753</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manœuvre</td>
<td>179598</td>
<td>36593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouvrier spécialisé</td>
<td>425035</td>
<td>80035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouvrier qualifié</td>
<td>587318</td>
<td>86481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employé non qualifié</td>
<td>417242</td>
<td>39233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employé qualifié</td>
<td>866811</td>
<td>51350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agent de maîtrisé</td>
<td>24995</td>
<td>1083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicien</td>
<td>72765</td>
<td>3548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadre</td>
<td>89106</td>
<td>4334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2676623</td>
<td>304648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2.2*  
*Source: Offices des Migrations (Dubet 1989)*

Tables 2.2 has shown that in 1987, the foreign immigrants were more distributed in either specialized or low skilled labor and suffered from competing
against natives in competitive job positions, implied by immigrants’ higher percentage in semi-skilled workers: “Ouvrier spécialisé” (26.3% vs. 15.9%), “Ouvrier qualifié” (28.4% vs. 22.0%), and lower percentage in qualified employees such as business employees: “Employé Qualifié” (16.9% vs. 32.4%).

In terms of the distribution of sectors in the same year, as Figure 2.C shows,

![Figure 2.C](source: Offices des Migrations)

Immigrants performed much more poorly than the local French people in 1987. Immigrants lagged behind the French natives by 10% in the white-collar (Employés) industries such as business services. The blue-collar working class (Ouvriers) made up more than two-thirds of immigration workers, compared to less than one third among the French natives. The French natives also enjoyed a higher percentage of managing level positions (Cadres: 9% vs. 4%). This occupation pattern in the 2005 figures showed persistent advantages of native workers than immigrant workers. The ways in which social professional categories are distributed have well illustrated the discrepancies between the natives and the foreign in the French job market.

• **Comparative Analysis of the Two Ethnic Groups**

  Overall, immigrants’ entry to France is positively influenced by the French
economy, and immigrants, as a whole, have also shown substantially weaker performance than French natives in the workforce. Parallel to the analysis of overall immigration, the next section will exclusively concentrate on two ethnic immigrant groups: North African and Southeast Asian immigrants, with the goal of figuring out which ethnic group is more affected by the French economy and what drives the annual inflow of each group.

The French public has taken for granted that North Africans are more of a challenge to French society because they are associated with Islam, while believing that Southeast Asians are more likely to find their place in French society. The French government has viewed Southeast Asians as more successfully transplanted into French society and they are believed to respect the main French values. *Les Asiatiques en France*, published in 1993, cites Jacques Toubon, Deputy of Paris between 1986 and 1993, as acknowledging the successful integration process among Southeast Asian immigrants because they have adapted themselves well to meet the French people’s expectation and add to the diversity without threatening the proper French identity. He said in his presentation:

“Près de vingt ans – l’espace d’une génération — se sont écoulés depuis l’arrivée dans notre pays de dizaines de milliers de refugiés du Sud-est asiatique fuyant des régimes totalitaires venus au pouvoir dans leurs pays ruinés par plusieurs décennies de guerre. Ils ont confirmé leurs facultés d’adaptation au milieu desquelles ils se trouvaient transplantés. Aujourd’hui on reconnaît que leur intégration à la société française se poursuit dans les meilleures conditions possibles.” 13 (*Les Asiatiques en France Colloque 1993*)

13 “Almost twenty years - the space of one generation - have passed since the arrival in our country of thousands of Southeast Asians, who fled from totalitarian regimes that came to power in their countries, ruined by decades of war. They have conformed their adaptive capabilities to the place where they have found themselves transplanted. Today, we recognize that their integration into French society has continued under the best possible conditions.”
To either reinforce or reject this hypothesis that Southeast Asian immigrants are better at economically integrating to the French economy than North Africans requires some statistical evidence. Therefore, this comparison section will address the difference by observing statistical results of the correlation between each immigrant group and the national economic growth.

The data for Southeast Asians correspond to the analytical focus on the Chinese, Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians. The average annual growth rate for incoming Southeast Asian immigrants is 17.88%, while the rate for North Africans averages to 10.40%. Figure 2.D shows the details of annual growth rate of North African and Southeast Asian inflows.

![Maghreb incoming immigration rate](image)

![Asian incoming immigration rate](image)

*Figure 2.D  Source: Offices des Migrations*

The regression results have been shown in both scatter plots (Figure 2.E) and statistics (Table 2.3):
Dependent variable: GDP real growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Southeast Asian flow</th>
<th></th>
<th>North African flow</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>P-value</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>P-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_1$</td>
<td>-1.934433</td>
<td>0.5718</td>
<td>4.463110</td>
<td>0.0574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_0$</td>
<td>0.202300</td>
<td>0.1552</td>
<td>-0.071890</td>
<td>0.4500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.027948</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.090694</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durbin-Watson Stat</td>
<td>1.882903</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.253244</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2.3*

For North Africans, the model has generated a significant and positive coefficient $\beta_1= 4.463110$ (Table 2.3). P-value for $\beta_1$ is 5.47%, which means the parameter is statistically significant at a 0.10 level. In other words, the model is valid.
with a 90.00% confidence. There is only 10.00% chance that the coefficient is zero. The statistics matches my initial expectation and overall immigration result. The interpretation for this regression is that a stronger French economy would bring in more North African immigrants. Similar to the interpretation of the overall coefficient earlier, the value 4.463110 signifies that for every 1% increase in GDP growth, there will be a surplus of 4.46% of incoming North Africans immigrants. Compared to the impact that the French economy has on overall immigration, the greater coefficient for North Africans implies that with the same percentage increase in French economy, a higher percentage of North Africans will come to France than the percentage of all incoming immigration. In other words, incoming North Africans are more dependent on French economic fluctuation.

With the same method used for overall and North African immigrants, the coefficient of the French economic growth corresponding to Southeast Asian immigrants turned out to be insignificant, reflected by P-value > 50% (Table 2.3). That is to say, the results of the statistical analysis show little correlation between the annual French economy growth and new Southeast Asian influx. According to the data, the incoming Southeast Asian immigrants are not as responsive to French economic performance, making it an independent group in terms of the hosting country’s economy and immigration.

Inevitably, the data used to estimate this model has multiple restrictions resulting in a limitation for the results. First, data for immigrants based on race and religion is strictly discouraged in the public French census. This has posed hardships for my quantitative exploration because it is hard to make a distinction of economic
integration based on race difference or religion distinction. Secondly, due to the lack of data before World War II, I could only evaluate the immigration dynamics back to the year 1946 and as a result, this data is not representative for the first wave of immigrants. As a result, many interesting insights for the pre-war and inter-war period are lacking. Furthermore, immigration issues cannot be convincing without taking into account illegal immigrants because they constitute a substantial proportion of total immigrants. France is a typical case where illegal immigrants are an important part of the labor force. As Withol de Wenden (1999) pointed out, just in 1968, 82% of entries to France were illegal, who later became legalized. Their contribution to the French economy is something that merits comprehensive statistical research. Thus, the regression result can only tell a small piece of the whole immigration story.

- **Discussion of Unequal Economic Integration**

  The regression results have shown different levels of correlation between incoming North African immigrants and Southeast Asian immigrants in response to French economic fluctuations. From an economics perspective, the statistics have reinforced and confirmed the French public’s prediction that North Africans and Southeast Asians integrate differently.

  Economist George J. Borjas (1999) argued, “Ethnic skill differentials may persist for at least three generations” (Borjas 1999: pp. 13). Ethnicity plays a pivotal role in immigrants’ economic integration in France because it is closely associated with cultural values, attitudes, and tradition, which more than likely determine the immigrants’ skill sets and thus their capacity to create wealth in the new country.
Ethnic characteristics will determine ways in which immigrants from the two ethnic groups approach French society, build ethnic environments, and create economic opportunities through the ethnic networks. The ethnic environment also determines the process of immigrants’ social mobility and ensures that the major characteristics of the ethnic group continue to persist. Therefore, when one ethnic group uses a very different approach from the other group in their ethnic service creation and community building, it will lead to their unequal economic fates in the long run.

Employment in low paying jobs is a common characteristic of both North African and Southeast Asian immigrants in French society. To gain insight on the vulnerability of North African immigrants, let me emphasize the ethnic variation in their economic approaches by stressing the different behaviors of the Chinese, Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians as a group. To understand this distinction, it is important to keep in mind that there exist different motivations for these two immigrant communities. The three waves of immigrants, as discussed in the first chapter, occurred under different historical contexts and hence each group integrated in different ways. Economically, the first and second flow of Southeast Asian immigrants have exhibited a stronger sense of community with entrepreneurship in urban areas, generated more capital in France, and exhausted profits in markets of all sizes. In contrast, the first two North African flows simply lived in their “banlieue” community in rural areas and stayed insulated from the French people. The third Southeast Asian flow inserted themselves into the French market with more commitment to technology and schooling, as they were better educated than North African immigrants.
The first and second flow of North Africans initially lived in bidonvilles - shantytowns. They worked as infrastructure labor force for the French government. After the bidonvilles were eliminated in 1970 due to the unacceptably poor living conditions raised by the humanitarians, the North Africans were arranged at subsidized HLM housing in the banlieues, which “were perceived as repositories for all France’s social ills and unwanted populations.” (Dubet and Lapeyronnie 1992: pp.8) The housing in rural areas for the Maghrebi provided few opportunities to establish business districts and generate big profit. Most of the Maghrebi workers continued to work under the government and their lack of wealth did not allow them to start their own businesses (Etudes Sociales Nord-Africaines 1962: d,e,f,g,h). Film director Yamina Benguigui (1997) in Mémoires d'Immigrés: l'Héritage Maghrébin demonstrated vivid images of dull lives of Algerian male workers and their community life in HLMs. Those Algerian men spent most of their time working at low paid jobs in factories for the government and had no choice for other jobs, let alone set up their own businesses to gain economic independence of French economy. Therefore, economic fates of North African community were very much linked to the French economic needs.

The first flow of Southeast Asian immigrants pre-World War II and the Boat people in the second flow distinguished themselves from North Africans immigrants by building community networks in urban spheres like the greater areas of Paris and Lyon. For example, the geography of the Southeast Asian communities prevails in various parts of France. In the Third, Eleventh, Thirteen and Eighteenth arrondissements in Paris, the communities engaged in all sorts of economic activities.
Southeast Asians in the Third district in Lyon mainly focused on the trade of food products, and second district in Marseille was involved in clothing industries as well as leather-making workshops. The high concentration of Southeast Asian communities in urban areas has allowed opportunities to generate many economic profits through different channels (Marie 1992).

First of all, the formation of communities among Southeast Asians has created incentives for extensive specialization. The different communities produced goods based on their comparative advantages in the production processes. They took full advantage of social networks, collaborated with each other, and made the most economic profit. The specialization within the Third arrondissement in Paris is a typical example. The Chinese communities that lived there, mostly comprised of immigrants from Wen Zhou province, had specialized in the leather trade since the 1940s. Immigrants had gained the skills of making leather in their hometown and started businesses in leather fabrication. The huge success in France set the stage for more leather fabrication and consequently led to these Chinese improving their production,

“Travaillant en cohabitation avec d’autres ethnies fortement spécialisées rue du Temple, les Chinois du quartier cherchent à renforcer la dynamique des réseaux familiaux dans la production des articles artisanaux de bas prix.”14 (Le Khoa 1995a: pp.37)

Since other Southeast Asian communities were specializing in the production of other products using a similar process, all these Chinese had to make sure to do was to improve their productivity in their specialization of leather making. Sociologist Le

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14 “The Chinese in this district collaboratively worked with other highly specialized ethnicities in the Rue du Temple district, seeking to reinforce the dynamic of family networks in the production of handmade objects that had very low prices.”
Huu Khoa (1997) argues that the grouping in economic integration played an extremely important role in the Southeast Asian integration process because it intensified specialization within Southeast Asian communities in France:

“L’intégration professionnelle des Asiatiques va souvent de paire avec la recherche d’une autonomie économique dans le regroupement communautaire. Ce regroupement s’opère à travers des pratiques, des expériences, des stratégies commerciales et s’inscrit dans un enchevêtrement de réseaux d’affinités fondés sur l’entraide, sur les liens d’origine villageoise ou régionale, sur la spécialisation scolaire et professionnelle…” 15 (Le Khoa 1997: pp.5)

The specialization of communities was important because it created efficiency, which in turn benefited Southeast Asian immigrants’ businesses.

Secondly, the Southeast Asian communities created a platform for improving individuals’ skill sets, which eventually helped the communities produce more efficiently. In these communities, education became much easier and thus could lead to improvement of immigrants’ capital at a much lower cost. For example, the members of the communities could teach skills to each other so that these skills become “utilisable par tout les membres du groupe dans la société d’accueil”. 16 (Le Khoa 1995b: pp.21) Moreover, as Southeast Asian immigrants began adapting themselves to the new society, community connections made it much cheaper to train workers in professional and linguistic skills required for jobs and for day-to-day life. Ultimately, the progress in skill sets and language proficiency made by individuals not only made their life in France easier, but also in the long run it provided more

15 “The professional integration of the Asians often went hand-in-hand with the search for economic autonomy in their community grouping. The grouping operated across practices, experiences, and business strategies, and also characterized as a network based on mutual help, on links to native villages and regions, and connections to their original scholarly and professional specialization.”

16 “usable by all the members of the group in the host society”
skilled and productive staff to the community, resulting in the community economic development and long term growth.

Furthermore, many in the first two waves of immigrants became entrepreneurs during the process of establishing communities. Owner-worker relationships were established quickly in Asian stores and restaurants and it worked well in their businesses. Southeast Asian immigrants with large amounts of capital, predominantly Chinese immigrants, automatically became bosses and workers clearly understood their positions as workers. Especially combined with the advantage of specialization, the entrepreneurial leadership had gained great success in a spectrum of businesses in urban spaces,

Les chinois du IIIème arrondissement originaires de Chine continentale, développent une toute autre spécialisation: la maroquinerie de bas prix. Ceux du XVIIème, mélange de plusieurs sous-groupes venant de Thaïlande, de Hong Kong, s’imposent essentiellement dans la restauration. La formule selon laquelle les chinois détiennent les capitaux, les autres Asiatiques se contentant d’être leur main-d’œuvre” résume bien la logique commerciale, actuelle de la communauté asiatique.”17 (Le Khoa 1997: pp.37)

Besides, Southeast Asian enterprises of various sizes, all equipped with great capital, flexible labor force, and cooperative spirit, benefited considerably. This was particularly true for the Chinese immigrants:

“Chez les chinois, l’occupation de l’espace urbain et la mise en place d’actions économiques indépendantes sont favorisées de près ou de loin par trois atouts propres à cette communauté: la disponibilité de gros capitaux, la flexibilité de la main-d’œuvre communautaire et la confiance mutuelle qui régit les transactions et les formes de

17“The Chinese in the Third arrondissement originating from Mainland China developed completely different specialization: the production of low-priced leather. Those Chinese mingled with other groups from Thailand, Hong Kong in Seventeenth district and ran restaurant businesses. The formula in which the Chinese provided capital, and other Asians contented themselves with being their employees, sums up the commercial logic of the Asian community.”
coopération. Les entreprises de grande taille (plus de 50 employés), de
taille moyenne (entre 20 et 40 employés) et de petite taille (moins de
10 employés) bénéficient des niveaux différent de ces trois atouts."\(^{18}\)
(Le Khoa 1997: pp.8)

It is also worth mentioning that Southeast Asian immigrants thrived in the
competitive economic environment by working long hours and with high efficiency.
They prided themselves in expanding the size of the French foods and service market
because they had gained dominant power in certain products by undercutting the
existing prices. Cheaper prices led to more customers in their businesses. Also, more
goods and services provided in the society sped up the French people’s consumption,
driving more economic growth within the Southeast Asian communities. Growth led
to more demand for labor. Thus, many new Southeast Asian immigrants went into
these businesses, which explained our statistical result. Even if the overall French
economy might not be performing as well, the constant demand at all types of
specialized businesses in Paris, Lyon, and Marseille would still lead to a high volume
of Southeast Asian immigrations.

In addition to the community effect, the Southeast Asian immigrating
entrepreneurs, especially within the second flow, set themselves apart from the North
Africans by increasing the capital stock in France. In comparison with North African
immigrants, many more Southeast Asian came to France with a great amount of
wealth. Unlike many boats-people refugees, a large percentage of Southeast Asian

\(^{18}\) "For the Chinese, the occupation of urban space and their independent economic activities
were favored by roughly three assets of the community: the availability of big capital, the
flexibility of the community labor force and the mutual confidence that governs the
transactions and cooperation. The large companies (more than 50 employees), the medium
sized companies (between 20 and 40 employees), and small sized ones (less than 10
employees) benefited on different levels from these three assets."
influx between 1975 and 1979 never suffered from any poor conditions on their way into France:


These wealthy immigrants injected their capital into the French economy, opening up firms and often only hired their compatriots. Their entrepreneurial activities directly contributed to increasing the size of the capital stock in both the short run and the long run. When Southeast Asian owners first started businesses in France, the relatively abundant supply of Southeast Asian immigrant labor, in this Southeast Asian-only economic immigration market, allowed the owners to cut wages and pay less. Thus it tended to bring profits to a few entrepreneurs and generated economic gains for the government in the short run. Over the long run, these higher profits attracted more domestic investors to invest more of their capital to compete in the businesses. This profitability also induced more wealthy Southeast Asians to immigrate and thus contributed to some additional capital flows to France, increasing national French economic growth. Again, the decision of new wealthy Southeast Asians

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19 “These Asians already worked in the confectionary and clothing industries in Laos. They were professional and qualified tailors and hence created family based enterprises. They were excellent representatives of urban middle class during the American war in Indochina area. They had never experienced the cruel conditions of Vietnamese boat people such as storms, hunger, thirst and pirate attacks, nor did they undergo the Hell of the Khmer Rouge genocide that many Cambodian refugees had. They simply crossed the Mekong during the dry seasons and arrived in Thailand, knowing that they would then be welcomed by western countries.”
Asians’ immigrants in France had little relation to France’s overall economic performances. Microeconomics theory asserts that this phenomenon continued to exist until more business-starters further enter the market to the point where it is a perfectly competitive market with zero economic profit possible. Hence, the process, initiated by the Southeast Asian immigrant businessmen, enhances economic growth by attracting a great amount of capital stock to the French national economy.

In addition to creating an Southeast Asian community with entrepreneurship and boosting the French economy by bringing more capital, the success of the Southeast Asian businesses was also attributed to the positive externalities that the Southeast Asian immigrant community has brought to French native communities. According to economist Edward P. Lazear (2000), Southeast Asian immigrants’ active involvement in providing ethnic goods and services in French society impacted the society both on individual and group levels. Especially during the time when information did not travel across national borders as easily and countries like China did not encourage communication or exchange technology before 1979, Southeast Asian immigrants acted as useful resources, compensating for the overall information shortage. Their presence enabled many new interactions among workers and firms such that both native workers and local firms might potentially learn valuable information and knowledge without paying for it (Borjas 2003). The economic profit of this new information exchange would have been lost had the French economy stayed insular. For example, the long tradition and legacy of working with utmost efficiency in Southeast Asian restaurants and stores could benefit French native workers or owners in terms of conducting a familiar task in a different but more
productive manner. Therefore, French firms gained from Southeast Asian immigrants because they took advantage of the social and information networks that immigrants had with their countries of origin to improve the production of French commodities. It is not surprising that enterprises needed Southeast Asians because they “introduce new modes of thinking and more efficient ways of delivering goods and services.” (Lazear 2000: pp.123) Moreover, French consumers gained because Southeast Asian immigrants, who exploited their scale of economy in Chinatowns in France, produced exotic products and services that the French consumers never knew they wanted, but have since brought so much utility and convenience to their lives.

Apart from the commitment to building extensive Southeast Asian communities and exploiting their indigenous entrepreneurial ideas, the professional integration in the first two waves of Southeast Asian immigrants featured hard work, collaboration and specialization. Their effort certainly brought positive effects to the native French as well as French society.

In contrast to previous waves, the most recent wave of Southeast Asian immigrants shows a very high level of education. Many of them no longer accept the social status of working at Southeast Asian ethnic restaurants like previous immigrants; they look for other professions that require more specialized knowledge. For example, the Vietnamese are well recognized in the technical fields:

“Les vietnamiens s’orientent vers les secteurs techniques et scientifiques et donnent une place privilégiée à l’école du pays d’accueil. Ils sont le seul groupe à s’être orienté très tôt et massivement dans les domaines technologiques de pointe.”

(Le Khoa 1997: pp.10)

20 “The Vietnamese oriented themselves toward technology and science sectors and showed superior performance in schools in the hosting country. They are the only group who focused early and in great numbers in the technology domain.”
This wave of Southeast Asian immigrants has shifted away from service professions because of their higher education attainment. Many of them tend to apply to top schools and compete for positions with the French natives. In terms of the composition of immigration motives in France between the Southeast Asian immigrants and the North Africans, Southeast Asians have shown a stronger potential to bring more economic growth to French society. Table 2.4 shows migration motivation figures of North African and Southeast Asian immigrants in 2005:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motif de départ</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Dont Afrique</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Dont Asie</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membre de famille</td>
<td>89 486</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>63 017</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>8 529</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineur</td>
<td>13 290</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7 832</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>1 578</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conjoint d'étranger</td>
<td>13 535</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9 469</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>1 094</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conjoint de Français</td>
<td>42 279</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>30 624</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>3 613</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ascendant/descendant de Français</td>
<td>9 799</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8 512</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titre de séjour &quot;Vie privée et familiale&quot;</td>
<td>10 582</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6 580</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>1 916</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travailleur</td>
<td>7 208</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1 351</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1 813</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Étudiant</td>
<td>39 937</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>15 909</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>13 383</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection humanitaire</td>
<td>17 934</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>9 120</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>3 404</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Réfugié et apatride</td>
<td>11 914</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4 295</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2 920</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titre de séjour &quot;Etranger malade&quot;</td>
<td>6 020</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4 825</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Régularisation</td>
<td>2 466</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1 814</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indépendant économiquement</td>
<td>8 380</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4 016</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1 731</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titre &quot;Visiteur&quot;</td>
<td>6 318</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1 973</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1 731</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titre de séjour &quot;Retraité&quot;</td>
<td>2 062</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2 043</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motif inconnu</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensemble</td>
<td>164 685</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>95 309</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>29 274</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2.4 Source: Insee 2006*

In 2005, 17% of North African immigrants were pursuing education as students, while 66% were for family reunion purposes, compared to the 46% student population of Southeast Asian immigrants and 29% for family immigration. A bigger student population from Asia can potentially help the French economy grow because
of all the education expenses involved as well as enhancing the diversity of universities. The larger student population thus signifies that the Southeast Asian immigrants do not depend as much on the performances of the French economy as do the North Africans, who are experiencing a much higher migration of family reunions. Because family reunions are much more interwoven with the French economic climate, it is no wonder that the third wave of North Africans depend more on the French economy. Using the same reasoning, the migration motivations of the third wave of Southeast Asian immigrants makes them much less responsive to the effects of the French economy’s performances.

- **Conclusion**

The regression results have statistically illustrated the correlation between immigrant labor and national economic growth. The French economy has a positive impact on overall incoming immigration. The comparative regression on the two ethnic groups allowed us to conclude that the French public’s initial assumption was worthwhile. The fact that Southeast Asian immigrants are perceived to be socially integrated has been matched by their better economic assimilation. The sociological analysis of community network and the economic labor market mechanisms provided many explanations as to why Southeast Asian immigrants have enriched and empowered French society.

The Southeast Asian immigrants’ advantage over the North African immigrants in terms of their entrepreneurial communities, specialization focus, human capital improvement, location superiority, and endowed wealth has placed
them economically ahead of the North Africans and make them more immune to the overall French economy’s fluctuations. The North African influxes show a strong tendency to rely on the French economy according to the statistical results because their community building simply does not allow an opportunity to form their own business districts in large cities, where they can engage economic activities and become independent of the government’s employment. Therefore, the sociological and economic perspectives reveal the ties between economic integration and social integration. The position of Southeast Asians in the French economy is both more stable and more integrated.

To facilitate integration of immigrants while supervising the domestic economy, the French government has introduced immigration policies in order to relieve their concerns over North African immigrants. The French public remains critical of the immigration and their doubts “have manifested themselves in debates about the need to reinforce the laws and institutions that shape the process of integration.” (Body-Gendrot 1999) The third chapter will examine immigration laws that have been passed. By comparing the initial intentions and the actual consequences of the specific laws, the discussion aims to assess what policies have worked and in what ways. Essentially, the analysis on the immigration politics will complement this sociological and economic domain in making sense of the immigration myths in France.
Chapter 3. Politics

Introduction

The combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis in the preceding chapter presented an overview of the economic integration issues facing immigrants in France. The statistical results have shown that North Africans are more dependent on the condition of the French economy and Southeast Asian immigrants are more stable in response to the economic fluctuation in France. In addition, the sociological view of community formations, combined with the economic model of supply and demand for the labor market, explained the existing immigration dynamics, but that approach only partially constituted the complicated immigration conditions. To fully understand the immigration story, especially how the French government has influenced the French public’s perception of immigrants, it will be fruitful to analyze French government’s political participation in immigration issues.

This chapter will closely examine French immigration policies, which allowed France to control the flow of immigrants. By examining a wide range of immigration laws passed in both historical and more recent contexts, the changes in French policy will illuminate the evolution of the French government’s motives in controlling immigration.

This analysis is comprised of three sections. Section I gives a historical overview of immigration politics through five major chronological stages, and examines three major approaches to controlling immigration. The presentation of
each stage will address the theoretical goals of immigration policy, the practical outcomes of the policy, and the differences between the French government’s plans and the actual results. Section II will concentrate on immigration laws that apply to specific ethnic groups, focusing on North Africans. These policies, which for the most part aim to keep French identity and values intact, reflect the high degree of French discrimination towards North Africans. Because these policies were exclusively targeted at the Maghrebi, they also caused problems for French society as a result of dissatisfaction from the Maghrebi ethnic group. Section III will summarize why some policies were more successful than others. By analyzing a variety of policies, I will try to shed light on what future immigration policies will be most beneficial to France, both economically and with respect to immigrant services.

• **Historical Review of French Immigration policies**

For France, the regulation of immigration has always been motivated by economic reasons. Immigrants were welcomed because they added to France’s labor supply and helped compensate for loss of labor due to an aging population. The economic benefits of foreign workers have been the defining motivation behind French immigration policy throughout the twentieth century.

When France opened its doors to immigrants in the early 1800s, it was known for being the most liberal country for immigration in Western Europe. According to government professor Hollifield (2007), “what distinguished France was its early willingness to accept foreigners as settlers and even as citizens.” (Hollifield 2007: pp.184) Sociology professor Catherine Wihtol de Wenden (1999) argues that
immigration over the past century has transitioned from a category of politics solely controlled by the government to a central topic in which immigrants have become active players in shaping the direction of immigration policies. In France, immigration policies have gone through five different stages. The first stage was motivated by the need to cater to the distinct needs of foreign populations. Immigration policies in the second stage were made in response to the urgent need for labor force in the two world wars. In the third stage, the economic boom that France experienced after the World War II prompted the French government to maintain an open policy to immigration. Policy in the fourth stage aimed at protecting national unity, which was perceived to be at risk due to the growing influence of non-French cultures on French society. In stage five, the culmination of identity threats reached an extreme, leading to a zero immigration regime. Today, managing immigration has become a priority in French politics.

Stage I: Pre-1914: the formation of immigration politics

Although this thesis focuses on the twentieth century migration dynamics in France, the immigration policies first appeared back in the nineteenth century. The first stage of immigration politics was characterized as the developmental phase. The immigration movement, as a new idea to France, occurred without any government control. The majority of immigrants were primarily Europeans from Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium and Poland. The French government was not concerned with these immigrants because they were well behaved and there were very few of them. However, between 1830 and 1842, French workers complained that foreign labor was
undercutting the local workers’ wages. The national department of commerce began requiring factory owners to submit information regarding their foreign workers, including their nationalities. In 1848, conflict between French and foreign workers led to riots and demonstrations, where the French people degraded immigrants due to economic competition: “A bas les Savoyards! A bas les étrangers” 21 (Duveau 1946: pp.2). In December 1849, many French workers started demonstrations in order to make the government eliminate foreign labor through the form of expulsion. This caused the French government to take the foreign labor issue more seriously. Two years later, the census created a special category for immigrants in the population and reported the nationality and number of foreigners in France for the first time.

Throughout the following thirty years, the immigrant population in France expanded significantly. In 1881, the foreign population constituted more than thousands compared to a couple of hundred immigrants in the past. This enormous growth that resulted from relaxed immigration regulation caused many French people to worry that the number of foreigners would soon grow out of control and one day exceed the local population. Hence, discrimination against the foreign population increased significantly. In addition to the accusation that foreign labor was competing with local labor, many French people claimed that immigrants were incapable of integrating into French culture (Mangin 1885). They stuck to their own ethnic groups and refused to assimilate; they “vivent entre eux, ne se mêlent pas a la population, mangent et couchent par chambrées comme des soldats qui campent en pays ennemi.” 22 (Mangin 1885 pp.23) The economic disadvantage felt by the French

21 “Down with the Savoyards! Down with the foreigners!”
22 “They live among themselves and don’t mingle with other populations, eating and sleeping
natives motivated them to advocate expelling foreigners rather than helping foreign workers assimilate.

However, some economists like Arther Mangin (1885) argued that, if naturalization was enforced, there could be many advantages to keeping foreign labor. Immigrants worked undesirable jobs and instilled a hardworking aspect into the French identity. The mandatory naturalization process was crucial because it not only brought profits, but it was also the best way to solve the problem of an aging population:

“L’immigration n’est pas seulement une mesure équitable, destinée à rétablir l’égalité des charges et des profits entre tous ceux qui habitent la France. C’est encore le meilleur et le seul moyen auquel nous puissions recourir pour remédier au ralentissement regrettable de notre population. Puisque nous n’avons pas les enfants des autres.”

(Wihtol de Wenden 1999: pp.22)

Not only would naturalization have economic advantages, but it would also help immigrants integrate into French society. Attainment of French citizenship made immigrants feel more welcomed and increased their sense of belonging to France. Hence, they were more likely to develop patriotism for France and integrate more effectively into French society. In 1885, a law was proposed to impose military service and give French nationality to individuals who were born in France. The legal procedure for attainment of nationality was based on the principle of soil in place of the principle of blood. In other words, people who were born in France automatically became French citizens.

in barrack rooms like soldiers camping in an enemy country.”

23 “Immigration is not only an equitable measure, destined to reestablish the equality of charges and of profits among all the people that live in France. It is moreover the best and the only way we can resort to in order to remedy the regrettable slowing of our population, as we do not have as many children as the others.”
Even though some advocated welcoming foreigners and assisting in their integration, others emphasized the threat of the “foreign invasion” and favored protecting national identity. Author Henri Bloch (1932) claimed that there was an urgency for legislation to take immediate action and stop foreign populations because their presence on the French soil was threatening the French national unity. Sooner or later, the foreign population would challenge France’s identity.

This conflict resulted in a new era of immigration regulation. Starting in the early 1890s when the number of immigrants went over a million, immigration management started to become better organized. The state labor department first set up a fixed proportion of the number of foreign workers over the total labor force. The state then relaxed the naturalization policy for these workers and as a result, the percentage of naturalized population increased by almost three times within the following twenty years (Wihtol de Wenden 1999). These policies acknowledged the importance of immigration in France. However, the foreign competition debate intensified and native workers continued to protect the rights of the local labor force. Xenophobic demonstrations against Italian workers, in particular, were heavily prevalent. Worries about national security triggered many labor union parties to vote against admitting more immigrants in 1899; thus the number of immigrants stayed constant.

In 1901, Algerian workers first appeared in the census data, as a group of non-European immigrants: “Ils se concentrent dans le département de la Seine et dans les zones frontalières.” 24 (Bloch 1932: pp. 34) Since the immigration rate increased slightly in the following five years, the government decided to institutionalize

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24 “They are concentrated in the Department de la Seine and the frontier zones.”
immigration between 1906 and 1913. Federations of specific industries started recruiting labor collectively. In 1911, immigration constituted 3.0% of the French total population (INSEE 1911). The French public realized that the process of naturalizing did not achieve the goal of assimilating European immigrants. Most immigrants maintained their native languages and lived exclusively among their compatriots; integration into French society was simply impossible, even for those immigrants from neighboring countries. Therefore, while immigration helped bolster France’s declining population, it also caused the French public to worry about its national identity.

Stage II: Pre 1945-immigration driven by labor demand

The devastation from the two world wars resulted in huge population loss, and the loss created a need for labor. In order to carry out economic revival plans, the French government had to prioritize labor recruitment over the protection of native workers. The Republic thus ignored the complaints about immigrants who contributed to declining wages, and concentrated on fulfilling the industrial labor shortage. Starting in World War I, France took control over immigration by establishing national identity cards on April 2, 1917. Due to the lack of labor, many immigrants immediately became permanent workers. As the government had to deal with more and more immigrants, more organizations were designed to manage immigration. The minister of agriculture from Office de la Main-d’oeuvre Agricole was in charge of receiving the employers’ requests and placing qualified immigrants.
The minister of work announced a centralized escort system as well as regional offices to provide quicker and better services for the war.

The war also induced a diversity of immigration inflow. In 1918, active recruitment took place in the colonized countries, in particular the North African and Indochinese regions. The North African and Southeast Asian immigrants came along with the traditional European labor force. Many Algerian workers, who were attracted to France because of higher salary opportunities, took the place of the Polish in the mining industry. Besides, the need for constant labor during the war persuaded the French parliament to pass the law that took away the right from the North African workers to travel. This requirement was meant to stabilize the labor supply in France. Meanwhile, there was a conflict of interest between the French government and the labor unions. The labor unions rejected the idea of immigration, defended the preservation of nationalism, and advocated the protection of French workers’ wages.

Castles and Miller (2003) wrote that France experienced an increase in immigration during the inter-war period due to its demographic deficit. Shortly after World War I ended, another round of open immigration politics started in 1920. With the goal of modernizing the economy, the Republic was oriented towards big businesses and felt it imperative to exploit all possible resources. Therefore, Charles de Gaulle’s administration called for continuous use of immigrant labor after the war and gave SGI (Société Générale d'Immigration) the right to take charge of labor recruitment. The system used identity cards and work contracts, and was later modified to meet different industries’ needs. The immigrants’ contribution was recognized and the Republic achieved a consensus for establishing a new immigration
policy that would respect the human rights of the foreigners. The benefits for immigrants improved; for the first time, welfare was available for all immigrant workers. All immigrant families would benefit from social rights, as long as they paid taxes to construct the French welfare (Withol de Wenden 1999).

These liberal policies resulted in an increase of more than two million foreign workers immigrating to France. Following the Great Depression, xenophobic sentiments intensified due to high unemployment among French natives. Therefore, restrictive policies prevailed in the 1930s. The government introduced a hierarchy of residency permits in order to differentiate the native and foreign population. However, although the depression resulted in a reduction of immigrants, this deduction only lasted a short time. World War II resulted in less restrictive immigration policies, similar to those that prevailed following World War I. More labor was introduced to either join the national army or rebuild the country’s devastated infrastructure. Therefore, at the end of World War II, France once again opened its doors to immigrants.

**Stage III: 1945 to 1974 - An open immigration regime**

1945-1974 is commonly referred to as the glorious thirty years (“Les Trente Glorieuse”). The government’s initiatives following World War II were again driven by France’s economic development and a desire for demographic balance. The Republic experienced tremendous economic growth in these thirty years and its economic plans required a lot of labor to provide goods and services. Thus the Republic took precedence over immigration. To fulfill its labor needs, France turned
to its former colonies, particularly in North Africa. The political separation between France and Algeria was far from complete. The bilateral treaty right after the Algerian independence still considered Algerians as quasi-French citizens. This ambiguous postcolonial relationship between the Republic and Algeria later led to a spiking increase in immigration and contributed to the failure of border control.

Economic planners and national demographers took charge of immigration policy, coordinating settlement of refugees and ensuring welfare coverage of immigrants. Jean Monnet was in charge of overseeing economic policies as the head of CGP (Commissariat general du plan), while Alfred Sauvy mainly advised the government on the population and economic conflicts. In 1946, the government established two agencies: ONI (the Office National de l’Immigration) and OFPRA (L’Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides). ONI was responsible for recruiting fit foreign workers from principal immigrant-supply countries, and placed them into different sectors of the French economy wherever needed. OFPRA’s mission was to help settle the political refugees. (Russel 1993)

With the goal of bringing in more labor force, L’Ordonnance de 1945 outlined lenient immigration and naturalization policies. This ordinance rejected the former quota system based on ethnicity or nationality, and instead advocated for recruiting more labor to make up for the demographic decline and labor shortage due to World War II. The government adopted a policy that provided temporary resident cards for seasonal workers (referred to as an ordinary residents permit), a three-year valid and renewable pass for ordinary workers, and a privileged residents’ permit, a ten-year renewable card for workers with special skills. The idea was to gradually ensure the
security of settlement for new immigrants (Marie 1992). In the same year, the ordinance granted liberal access to French citizenship. These policies contributed to a significant increase in immigration. The incoming number of immigrants more than doubled within the five years between 1946 and 1950. The guest worker regime, launched as a means of recruiting temporary workers from the late 1950s, allowed North African immigrants to come into France in massive numbers.

Immigration also increased due to the bilateral agreements between Algerian and French governments. According to the treaty, Algerians could move freely between Algeria and France. The quasi-citizenship status gave Algerians a privileged status following the decolonization (Institut National d’Etudes Demographiques 1977). Algerians were considered French citizens until 1968, six years after Algeria’s independence. Hence, their migration was legal. Tunisians and Moroccans, as former colonized population, became another major group of labor supply. The uninterrupted economic growth constantly demanded immigration from these sending countries and the open immigration mechanism made any immigration control extremely difficult.

The increasing volume of immigrants, with an annual increase of 250,000 in the foreign population, was unexpected. The high number of immigrants led the French government to step back and reconsider its control policies. Thus, a series of stringent requirements for both foreign workers and employers emerged. For example, employers had to provide the foreign workers with a sufficient wage and a housing subsidy. These policies angered many employers, especially those who worked in labor-intensive industries like construction and mining. The infrastructure sectors relied heavily on immigrant labor and the related economic growth persuaded the
government to loosen its restrictions. Hence in the 1970s, with the resistance from the employers and the ambiguous post-colonial relationship with Algeria, “the French government’s first real attempt to assert control over immigration (permanent workers, family members, seasonal workers and the like) ended in failure,” (Hollifield 2007: pp.190) and inflows persisted.

Stage IV: 1973 to 1990- Rising hostility toward immigration

The economic decline beginning in the 1970s increased the rate of unemployment, which ended the need for immigrant labor. In addition, French people realized that immigrants were challenging the national unity due to their disparate cultural backgrounds. French sociologist Wieworka (1991) pointed out that North African immigration started to be viewed as a threat to France. Therefore, the French government halted the entry of immigrants and caused Valeri Giscard d’Estaing’s presidency to end the open immigration policies.

The French government justified the constraints that their policies placed on as a means of protecting their native population. The economic downturn had increased unemployment among French natives. In addition, the huge influx in the third stage was sufficient to meet France’s demographic needs. Thus France no longer needed immigrants to bolster its labor force. Employers could give priority to native labor and eliminate foreign labor. The French government began expelling immigrants and deterring their entry, and as a result, French natives could receive immigrants’ jobs and the unemployment rate could decrease. Betz (1994) and Thranhardt (1997) argued that these control polices would provide the French
workers with higher wages and help arrange xenophobic political movements. In the beginning of 1973, the abundant immigrant labor quickly met resistance from the government. Another wave of control was about to start. However, the failed initial attempt to control immigration dampened prospect for success in future immigration restriction policies.

The government believed that, in order to decrease the total number of immigrants in France, the Republic had to limit working immigrants, control seasonal workers, and impede family reunification. Therefore, France at first denied work visas from abroad as well as diminished the number of work permits within France in order to control foreign labor. In addition, the government tried visa restrictions, family deportation, and even paying foreigners to leave (Weil 1991). However, these large-scale restrictive policies produced adverse effects on the immigration flow. Immigration rate went up consistently in the early 1980s. These undesired consequences were attributed to the permanent settlement of families and individuals. By making it more difficult for immigrants, the French government achieved the opposite of what they wanted. More immigrants stayed than would have had the policies not been implemented. Hollifield argued, “by decreeing an immigration stop, France inadvertently accelerated the processes of settlement and family reunification.” (Hollifield 2007: pp.192) Total immigration still steadily increased in small margins due to reunifications of families. This increase in family reunification was also motivated by international law and rules. According to Charles P. Gomes (2007), “Article 8 of the European convention of Human Rights served as the legal basis for French constitutional and administrative courts to rule in favor of the
“family reunification” for immigrants in the late 1970” (Gomes 2007: pp.212). As a consequence, the plan to reduce immigration size failed; the number of immigrants remained consistent, again disappointing the Republic before the socialist Mitterand took office. The government’s second attempt to stop the immigration flow in 1986 failed dramatically.

The following ten years under a politically liberal government administration could be characterized as a continuation of the former administration. Although the socialists tried to fight immigration by integrating the existing immigration communities, they did not erode the former republican ideals and were committed to following the same strict immigration controls. They intensified policies of inspecting undocumented employees and cracked down on black markets to keep immigrants from coming (Marie 1992). Meanwhile, they fought against immigration through enforcing more stringent border rules. However, the new administration differed in its approach to integration. It stressed the importance of social integration, taking measures to help facilitate the integration process for those immigrants who were already in France. They extended the rights of foreigners, granted amnesty for undocumented immigrants, and suspended the expulsion law. In addition, Mitterand advocated for the authorization of voting rights to immigrants, saying that because immigrants “live and work in my country… it’s only natural that you should have a say in choosing those who make the decisions in your town.” (Schaine 1988: pp. 37)

Other efforts of integrating immigrants included exhibiting works of minority artists. In January 1984, a record breaking three-month exhibition, Les Enfants de l’Immigration, opened to the public at the Centre Nationale d’Art et de Culture
Georges Pompidou. The art show exhibited many lively aspects of the North African immigrant community, symbolizing the republic’s commitment and sincerity to integrate the ethnic groups (Hargreaves 2005).

Meanwhile, the extreme-right party, FN (Front National), which heavily relied on nationalism and completely rejected the idea of immigration, surprisingly won the municipal elections in Dreux in 1983. Their winning signaled upcoming debates on the importance of immigration policy, “making immigration a rallying-cry and exploiting the subject with rabble-rousing and provocative methods.” (Jelloun 1999: pp.25) Socialists wanted to ally themselves with the FN party for the political benefits of gaining working class votes, and weakening their rival, the Communist Party. This led the socialists to change the electoral system from single member district system to one based on proportional representation for the legislative elections of 1986 (Withol De Wenden 1999). The electoral victory allowed FN to gain representation in the parliament. Despite the fact that the government was open to legal immigration, with no quotas or ethnic preferences, under the cohabitation of the left and right government, the FN led the government to take a tougher stand against immigrants and further polarized immigration issues.

Stage V: the era of zero immigration politics in the 1990s

As stated in Chapter Two, there is a correlation between the state of the French economy and annual immigration inflows. The poor state of the French economy in the beginning of the 1990s intensified French people’s hostility toward immigrants. Thus, xenophobia reached a culmination under the influence of the far-
right FN. The minister of the interior, Charles Pasqua, officially confirmed the government’s willingness to endorse a “zero immigration” policy (Le Monde, 2 June 1993) and it was a symbol of acute sensitivity to immigration in France. As a consequence, a third wave of attempted government control started. First the government introduced a series of reforms of immigration laws. For example, the Second Pasqua Law impeded worker and family immigration by requiring workers to wait two years before having any family member immigrate. In addition, no undocumented individuals could attain adjustments of status by marrying French citizens and mayors had the authority to suspend any suspected marriage of convenience (Hollifield 1999).

Learning from the previous two experiences in immigration control, the new right wing government, led by Chirac in 1995, found it necessary to take a different approach. The Fifth Republic realized that merely reducing the number of work visas and enforcing a strict border were limited in their effectiveness. The French government needed to find a long-term solution to stop future incoming immigrants or pushing current settlers to leave. In order to achieve sustainable immigration it would be necessary to diminish people’s incentives to come to or stay in France. Hence, the government decided to discourage immigration by giving less respect to foreigners. Professor Hollifield(2007) defined these new policies as a shift from external focus and internal policies. According to Hollifield, external policies included border control, police checking IDs, and stopping the black markets for immigrant labor whereas internal control focused on diminishing the rights given to immigrants, especially illegal immigrants. He explained that when external measures
such as territorial closure did not work, internal policies became appealing alternatives. He argued: “instead of relying exclusively on external border controls or on internal regulation of labor markets, the first right-wing government of the 1990s, led by Edouard Balladur, began to roll back and limit immigrants’ rights by undercutting civil rights and liberties and going after certain social rights, specifically health care.” (Hollifield 2007: pp.2) In order to make immigration less attractive to incoming and existing immigrant populations, the Republic reduced the benefits previously guaranteed to the immigrants and made eligibility more difficult to achieve. This way of discouraging immigration seemed much more efficient than external measures; however, it had its limitations. The unfair treatment of immigrants caused a great deal of hatred towards the French natives and immigrant disobedience transformed into riots and turbulence. The deprivation of rights from the French government also met with resistance from the supervision of the courts, which monitored infringements upon the individual rights.

Nevertheless, the policy shift to stricter labor regulation through deprivation of civil rights, in addition to intense external measures, had little effect on the actual number of immigrants. Although the inflow of immigrants decreased by almost one-fifth due to the economic turmoil, the annual immigration wave fluctuated between 60,000 and 70,000 (INSEE 1990-2000) throughout the 1990s. Professor Hollifield (2007) added: “with respect to internal control, liberal and republican states like France are constrained institutionally, ideologically, culturally, and ultimately by their civil societies. Strategies for internal control bend to these constraints.” (Hollifield 2007: pp.211) Ultimately, immigration control politics are a complex issue comprised
of more than just economic interests and national identity, and are “dependent on the interplay of ideas, institutions, and civil society.” (Hollifield 1992) Thus for the third time, French immigration policies failed to restrict immigration inflow.

The politics of immigration control continued with a combination of internal and external control under Jacques Chirac’s presidency. In 2002, Jacques Chirac won the second round of the French election against the candidate of the extreme right, Jean Le Pen, who surprisingly made it into the second round with substantial working class support. As an anti-immigrants party, FN was considered ignorant and racist by many liberals. It scolded immigrants, insulted them and humiliated them with clichés and slogans. Ironically, they “should have paid tribute to the millions of immigrants, whose presence allowed it to attract so many supporters and win an astounding 15 percent of the votes cast in the general election of 1997” (Jelloun 1999: pp.26) Many voters in the second round of the election in France strongly opposed FN; slogans like “Vote for a crook and not a fascist” were everywhere. In the end, FN lost to UMP by more than sixty percent (UMP: 82.21% vs. FN: 17.79%).

The surprising popularity gained by FN indicated that the immigration policy of centre left and centre right was perceived to be too relaxed. Hence, addressing immigration issue became the major task for Chirac’s second presidency. When Nicholas Sarkozy was appointed Minister of the Interior, he took a tough stance on immigration. The first new law called Loi Sarkozy in 2003 included two tough measures in hopes of cutting the number of immigrants. Firstly, he fixed a target of 25,000 deportations in 2006, which more than doubled the number in 2002. Secondly, he substantially reduced the number of asylum-seekers. He argued that this restrictive
immigration control would facilitate the integration of existing immigrants in France (Marthaler 2008). In 2006, after the 2005 riots and before 2007 presidential elections, Sarkozy pointed out “in France, immigration retains negative connotations because it is not adequately accompanied by an ambitious integration policy.” (Sarkozy’s new year wishes to the press. 12 January 2006) Subsequently, Sarkozy stated his intention to switch from the family immigration policy to a labor immigration system. On July 24th, he proposed the second Loi Sarkozy where he emphasized the benefits of Immigration Choisie and wished to abandon “imposed immigration” (“Immigration Subie”). Rather than accepting immigration that is focuses on family reunification and asylum-seekers, Sarkozy defended the idea of selective immigration, which aims to tailor France’s economic needs by welcoming highly qualified non-European workers. Such an approach would allow France to attract skilled immigrants that France desires in industries where native labor is lacking (Odmalm 2005).

In the 2007 presidential elections, Sarkozy competed against the Socialist candidate: Ségolène Royal, who proposed ‘shared’ immigration (“Immigration Partagée”). She had disagreed with Sarkozy’s implication that immigrants caused a threat to the national identity. She also stressed that immigrants should be treated more humanely. During the two rounds of televised debates between the two candidates, Sarkozy took a tougher stance on immigration and emphasized that “If there are people who are not comfortable in France, they should feel free to leave a country which they do not love”, which was viewed as an echoing of Le Pen’s “La France, aimez-la ou quittez-la.” The Opinion Way poll on October 11th, 2007 showed that 56% of the voters were feeling closer to Sarkozy on immigration and only 32%
to Royal.” Sarkozy won the second round election by 6.2%. (Nicolas Sarkozy 53.1% and Ségolène Royal 46.9%)

The French government implemented policies which they hoped would restrict number of immigrants. In reality, these policies were not effective; immigration rates persisted despite the government’s efforts. The continued discrepancy between the goal of limiting new immigrants and the outcome of a persistent immigration rate throughout the three trials illustrated the incapacity of the French government to effectively control immigration flow. At the same time, France witnessed the rise of North Africans as a predominant immigrant group. As more and more North African immigrants entered the country, constituting 38.4% Maghrebs of total foreigner immigration in 1982, they become highly visible in French society, which increased French people’s worries about national identity. In order to avoid possible degeneration of French culture, the government became intolerant of any other ethnic culture, especially the North African culture, which was perceived to be based on Islamic values. Hence, the French government launched policies that were exclusively applicable to the North Africans.

- **Legitimized Discrimination Towards North African Immigrants**

*Le Transfert d’une Memoire* by historian Benjamin Stora (1999), argues that France inherited the collective fears of their culture being eroded by other ethnic cultures, particularly by Islam. The French government and the public have yet to accept cultural diversity. As multiculturalism was denied in France, the evolution of
French immigration politics could also be characterized by its discrimination against non-European citizens, which author Hargreaves(2005) called “the ethnicization of politics” (Hargreaves 2005: pp.180). This section explores a series of laws that were exclusively applicable to ethnic groups, mainly North Africans, and presents the ways in which prejudice is embedded in policy.

In *French Hospitality*, writer Tahar Ben Jelloun(1999) argued that immigration problems could be attributed to the Algerians. He wrote: “France does not have a problem with immigration as a whole. It does have a problem with its own colonial past in general, and with the Algerian past in particular.” (Jelloun 1999: pp.10) There was a fear of ethnic immigrants, particularly North Africans, because they were thought to have different values and beliefs. In contrast to maintaining the liberal immigration framework of half a century ago, today’s France has become intolerant toward immigration, with the strongest hostility directed at North African immigrants. Therefore, in France, “immigration policy makers were also active in the process of demarcating and distancing North Africans from European immigrants.” (Domini 2005: pp.37) Racialized policy practices emerged in order to maintain French culture dominance. FN’s constant persistence to keep France’s values and beliefs untouched pushed France to pay more attention to the Maghrebi population. Hence, the Republic had to change immigration policies to restrict any potential threat to the national identity.

Unlike the Portuguese and Italians, non-European immigrants have to encounter religious and racial differences in order to integrate into French society because many specific restrictions were imposed on non-European citizens. In 1986,
the Pasqua Law (*La loi Pasqua*) made additional requirements for the entry of non-European immigrants, which made entry more difficult and expulsion much easier. A new enforcement called the Debré law (*La loi Debré-Pasqua*) was passed in 1996 to reinforce the ethnic immigration control. In order to renew a residence permit, one had to prove that he/she would not be a threat to the French public order. All French private citizens who hosted non-European union foreigners were required to notify the local authorities by law and “mayors were to be given authority to verify that a foreign visitor had left the private citizen’s home once the visitor’s visa had expired.” (Hollifield 2007 pp.213) The complex administrative inspection was trying to weaken the status of aliens in France and ultimately decrease the non-European migrants. Other provisions were geared towards keeping an eye on ethnic immigrants and ensuring that only those with resources, papers, and jobs could stay in the country. These rules showed substantial discrimination towards non-European citizens, essentially suggesting a “zero immigration” policy, and illustrating the French government’s intention to expel non-Europeans and keep the French identity intact.

North Africans have been the biggest ethnic group in France, the majority of them being Muslim. Their explicit expressions of Islamic beliefs formed the most hostile counterpoint to French unity (Laurence 2006). When negative behavior occurred among North Africans, the French press would immediately alert the public. As a result, many policies were generated, simply because France rejected any forms of negotiation for a mingling of national identity with Islam. After the second Pasqua law came out for instance, some North African immigrants without proper documentation (“sans papier”) failed to obtain residency after years of living in
France. In order to demand an adjustment of status, they occupied churches or launched hunger strikes. (Odmalm 2005)

Author Laurence Vaisse argued that the civil war in Algeria in the early 1990s was the major drive of the fear of Islam in France and thus intensified French people’s hostility toward Algerians. To certain extent, the Algerian war created “ethnic and racial fault lines in French society that persist to this day”. (Safran 1992 pp.186) The civil war was between the Islamic radicals and the ruling government, the Algerian National Liberation (FLN). In 1991, when the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) party gained popularity amongst the Algerian people, FLN, which was supported by the French government, suspended the elections to prevent Islam fundamentalists from winning. The French government’s assistance to the FLN party angered many Islamic radicals, who retaliated against the French government with terrorism. The terrorists’ activities organized by Islam fundamentalists contributed to the French fear of Islam. All of a sudden, the North Africans again drew the French public’s attention. Another round of fear of Islam swept the country: “In October 1995 the police shot and killed one of the bombers, a young second-generation. The press covered his life story in detail and held it up as an example of French society’s failure to integrate the second-generation Maghrebi population.” (Hollifield 1992: pp.213) The rise of terrorism forced the government of Alain Juppe to increase national security. The government implemented the expulsion and deportation of imams at the neighborhood level. Le Monde, the best-known French national newspaper, commented on July 16, 2005 “M. Sarkozy veut expulser les imams
‘radiaux’. To overcome terrorism, strict deportation rules applied to those mosque leaders who in any way endorsed terrorism. In fact, the French public’s psychological fear was more intense than the actual deporting policies because an initial fear of Islam was confirmed by terrorist acts. The North Africans were widely considered an undesirable group, and “public opinion polls regularly single out North Africans as a culturally alien, threatening, and inassimilable community.” (Vaisse 1992: pp.253)

Therefore, in many ways, the major conflict between North Africans and French people originated in the French battle against Islam. The French viewed Islam as a threat to national security. To many French people, Islam became the defining characteristic of North Africans, and “Muslims were deemed as inassimilable and hostile to the republican values” (Hollifield 2007 pp.193)

Despite a continued fear of Islamic terrorism in the French public’s memory after the civil war in Algeria, the French government felt it imperative to accept the Algerian political and intellectual elites as refugees after the Algerian civil war in order to maintain a positive image in the realm of human rights. However, they continued using policies to resist immigrants as a whole. The Debré proposal required all visitors to have legitimate accommodations and sufficient funds to stay in France and return home afterward. In order to avoid the charge of overt discrimination towards the North Africans, the French government did not use a quota system based on ethnicity or nationality in the visa issuance. Instead it adopted an egalitarian system, the design of which could control entry from North Africans as well as other ethnic immigration from developing countries.

25 “Mr. Sarkozy wants to expel all radical imams”
The concerns with Islam were far from over. The foulards (veil) affair had existed since 1989. The issue indicated the growing fear of Islam and heightened the sense of an identity crisis. Socialist Bourdieu explained that the symbol of whether one could wear a religious affiliated headscarf “masks the latent question of whether immigrants of North African origin should be accepted in France.” (Bowman, 2008 pp.64) In 2004, a bill was approved to prohibit any wearing of conspicuous religious symbols in any public primary and secondary schools because it violated France’s policy of separation of church and state. Public schools, as public space, would reassert the neutrality of religion rather than serving as a religious battleground. The widespread fear was associated with the worry that immigrants try to use religion to raise multiculturalism as a threat. The religious symbols that represented ethnic differences were viewed as disruptive signs: “When headscarves are introduced into the classroom students take the initiatives to demonstrate how chaotic schools would become if everyone chose to put their faith on display.”(Vaisse 1992: pp.138) Although the state’s secularism seemed to defend the idea of religious pluralism, the Republic manipulated the law and treated Islam as a threat. The government insisted that religion be practiced in private spheres. The ban was manipulated to be legitimate because it protected the French national identity from being eroded: “This ban can thus be seen as part of a larger effort to reduce the further development of certain religious inclinations and to prevent the potential development of dual loyalties among France’s Muslim population.” (Vaisse 1992: pp.167)

North African immigrants have had a hard time integrating into French society particularly because so many policies discriminated against them. It is not the
case that Maghrebi immigrants are incapable of assimilating into French society, rather, France has created obstacles to their integration. As French policymakers adopted a racial policy towards the postcolonial population, specifying North Africans as especially problematic due to their religion, there was much less to discuss about Southeast Asian immigrants. Although they have significantly increased in the past, they are still much more invisible than North African immigrants in the eyes of the French public. Southeast Asian immigrants attract little attention from the French government (Le Khoa 1995b). There were no laws created on the national level to exclusively target Southeast Asian immigrants like the North Africans. Hence, French immigration policies do not prevent Southeast Asians from integrating. In addition, some immigration laws have especially benefited Southeast Asian immigrants. Selective immigration policies by Sarkozy have attracted a large group of Southeast Asian students and intellectuals to move to France, and Southeast Asian immigrants have shown a higher percentage of technical migration rate compared to North African immigrants. Hence, Southeast Asians have an advantage over Maghrebi immigrants with respect to French immigration laws.

- **New Direction for Immigration Policy to Improve Integration**

A mixture of national security worries and secularist ideology influenced France to implement policies against North African immigrants. However, those policies are far from being the perfect solution to all of France’s immigration problems. In the new century, immigration has become one of the most prioritized
concerns in France. In order to achieve a sustainable control and healthy development of immigration, it is important for France to move in a new direction of managing integration. This would require France to examine its immigration policies and forge of a new relationship with North African immigrants.

In the past half century, France has tried many ways to control immigration and the results were far from satisfactory. External control, including giving the police more authority to deport the immigrants, resulted in a larger number of family reunifications, while internal control, such as limiting immigrants’ rights, initiated domestic violence from the North Africans as well as native criticism. Both measures increased difficulties for immigrants in the short term. However they also created hostility among the immigrants towards France, which, in the long run, made immigrant integration more problematic. As France modifies immigration plans, costs and benefits of policy effects should take priority; long-term outcomes should outweigh the short-term profits. Abandoning the internal measures and maintaining human rights for immigrants in France is important because it significantly increases the chance of integration success. As for the eternal solution, according to Borjas (1994), it is important for France to reflect on what immigration is needed in the country and how many immigrants there should be, rather than simply tightening up border controls and becoming a country hostile to immigration.

In addition to overall policy supervision, France should pay more attention to its relationship with North African immigrants. The French open immigration policies that welcomed North African immigrants after the World Wars conflicted with the fear of a changing national identity in the 1990s. In particular, the rise of North
African visibility in France was severely criticized because it resulted in the crisis of French identity in the last century. France is now still struggling to handle the Maghrebi force that tends to pull France away from its traditional beliefs. *L’Homme Dépaysé* by author Tzvetan Todorov (1996) discussed the impact of colonialism and decolonization and argued that it had left a deep and negative mark on the people of former colonies; “Colonialism, decolonization, and their consequences may be the subject of special research, but they have been repressed by the collective consciousness.” (Wilmsen and Mcallister 1996: pp.29) The existing Maghreb’s attitudes toward France are important because these Maghrebi immigrants are currently part of France. Therefore, creating a sustainable immigration policy cannot be mentioned without referring to possible ways to manage the existing North African communities in France.

First of all, France has to reconsider its injustice to the North Africans. A smooth integration requires a non-biased understanding of the immigrants (Wilmsen 1996). North Africans have been subject to unfair and prejudicial treatment. For example, the French public falsely perceived that North Africans constituted the majority of immigrants just because they are the biggest non-European immigrant group. In fact, “North Africans have never comprised a majority, and until the end of 1980s they were outnumbered by Portuguese.” (Martin 1994: pp.7) Their affiliation to Islamic cultures has made the French public exaggerate their prevalence and assume certain prejudicial attitudes. Therefore, justice should be provided to the North African communities.
Secondly, recognition of different beliefs and respect for plurality of values will be vital to French immigration reform. Immigration has changed the French demographic composition. To successfully integrate immigrants, author Laurence Vaisse argues that France needs time to realize the outcomes of immigration and “to wake up to the fact that it is changing and its population is diversifying. In the thirties France tried to hold off inroads from Italy and Poland, but in the end it stopped resisting and let things take their course—and now it has no regrets. What has slowed down the natural pace of further integration is of course the Algerian disaster, and Islam.” (Martin 1994: pp.9) Fostering a coherent society will require France to be open-minded. Since immigrants have served the country, the trade off is clear: France needs to deal with culture differences between natives and immigrants. The French government should take initiatives to present North Africans fairly to the French public and cease to treat the integration of the Islam as undesirable. Professor Richard L. Derderian(2004) in *North African in Contemporary France* argues that racism has strongly resisted the recognition process. According to Derderian, “disrespect, particularly in the form of racism and discrimination, can function as a powerful incentive for recognition struggles, it can also have a debilitating impact making it difficult for those struggles to succeed.” (Derderian 2004: pp.173) The problem with racism is its overt legitimacy; the law has not effectively restricted the spread of discrimination. As Derderian points out, “racists and their insults are no longer clandestine and shamefaced. They flaunt themselves openly despite the law forbidding incitement to racial hatred.” (Jelloun 1999: pp.19) It is time to address racism’s harm to the society as a whole.
Since the key aspect of integration is to develop tolerance of different values, it is important to increase public awareness of Islamic culture so that French people do not view it as a threat. It is France’s choice either to accept Islam or to reject Islam in order to preserve national homogeneity. North Africans who practice Islam make up more than two million people. Today, it should be a matter of how to create a French identity that includes Islam rather than treating Islam as separate from French culture; “We need to treat Islam in France as a French question instead of continuing to see it as a foreign question or as an extension into France of foreign problem….There has to be a French Islam.” (Le Monde, 1 October 1994). Since North Africans are part of French society, they should constitute a share of the French identity. Sociologist Michel Wieviorka (2003) affirmed the possibility of creating a French Islam, although it would require a long-term process to help the general public modify their prejudiced views. Jelloun agreed with Wieviorka by arguing, “Islam could exist in France in peace and mutual respect on condition that people stop identifying it with evils that have nothing essentially to do with it. I don’t forget that France is a secular state that welcomes other religions. But it may take time, patience, and education for Islam to blend into the human and social fabric here. For the present it is seen as a threatening and recalcitrant difference because of the way it is exploited ideologically and politically by small groups of fanatics who have no real roots among immigration population.” (Jelloun 1999: pp.22-23) As France moves on and recruits newcomers, it is important that it improves relations with the existing North Africans. French ideals contend that people are always ready to defend citizens’ rights. Why exclude Muslims?
Conclusion:

Immigration politics has evolved in varying degrees throughout the past century. As immigrants started to compete with the natives and showed potential to reshape the French national identity, French people felt threatened and hence, the French government has since experimented with both external and internal measures in hopes of resisting the immigration push. Failure in all three attempts has indicated to the French government a need for more effective laws to cope with immigration issues. The most urgent issues are figuring out ways to target and attract desired immigrants for the country, as well as to integrate the North Africans.
Conclusion

The historical analysis in this thesis presented images of the French economy and of North African, and Southeast Asian immigrants to France. The economic labor market theory, the sociological perspective of the two ethnic community formations, and the political view of discriminative enforcements on the Maghrebi immigrants, were all consistent with the statistical results that indicated the Maghrebi population’s more vulnerable economic integration compared to the Southeast Asians. This comparative study of North African and Southeast Asian immigrants allows us to understand better the aspect of non-European citizens’ social and economic integration in the twentieth century, as well as illustrating sources of immigration problems caused by French governance. Because of French racism, immigrant memory is marked with cracks, pain, and despair (Wieviorka 1995). The difficult integration process for North African immigrants calls for some changes from the French governance. It is time to confront the question of how to achieve compatibility of ethno-cultural minorities with French nationalism.

In addition, the difficulty in coping with immigration problems in the twentieth century has taught France the lesson that immigration is certainly not for transitional uses when the French economy experiences booming periods, but is actually irreversible. History has revealed that immigration cannot suddenly disappear as the French economy suffers and as French people start to worry about national unity. Forcing immigrants to leave France and reducing the rights of existing immigrants did not succeed in restricting incoming immigrants into France. Such measures were actually far from effective solutions to deal with immigration issues.
The French government has to understand that ethnic pluralism has become part of French identity. Integration of immigrants into French society will require its patience and long-term management. Therefore, it is essential to think of long-term solutions to cope with the problematic Maghrebi population and the only fundamental key to cutting immigrant flows is to reduce people’s incentives for leaving their countries of origin in the first place.

What is to be done to achieve this goal then? The linguistic tie with Francophone countries, an ongoing postcolonial connection to France, makes France the logical country to migrate to for many people. In order to restrict migration effectively of people from the Francophone world, French government needs to take the leadership role of making Francophone countries better places to live in so that migration to France does not become the salient option in life. Had this been what the French government had done rather than focusing on those costly external and internal controls of immigration discussed in the third chapter, France would probably have been in a completely different position with immigration today.

Meanwhile, because of commands over the French language and the familiarity with the French culture and education systems, the majority of Francophone citizens have favored France as a migration option over English speaking countries like the U.S and Britain. This has automatically given France an advantage in attracting these people. If by any chance France would like to have these immigrants continue to prefer them in the long run, how to maintain a strong relationship with Francophone countries is doubly important. For example, improved French hospitality to the existing Francophone immigrants should warrant the French
government’s attention. In the new century, France has made some tangible progress in promoting its diversity under Chirac’s administration. The Prime Minister Pierre Raffarin for the first time named two cabinet members who were of North African origins. Tokia Saifi, deputy minister for sustainable development, and Hamlaoui Mekachera, deputy minister for veteran affairs. This is a reflection of a contemporary effort to diversify France, where appointing minority candidates to office is just one of the many initiatives. The government in 2003 installed the “conseil Français du Culte Musulman” (CFCM) to facilitate the creation of a French Islam. Also, in January 2005 the “Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour l’Égalité” (HALDE) was launched in order to diminish racial and religious discrimination. Cumulatively, these actions are all aimed at long-term positive effects for the French society as these policies strive to increase tolerance gradually toward different ethnic groups in France in order for a fresh national identity to emerge.

Finally, all this thesis can do is to analyze the problematic nature of immigration in France, chart the dangers of some past French immigration policies, and present possibilities of launching more sustainable ideas. However, it is certain that better integration cannot be achieved without the French government’s firm determination of situating ethnicities into its broader context of national identity.
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