WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY

A PHENOMENOLOGY
OF ARTISTIC
PERCEPTION

by

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INTRODUCTION

THE IMPORTANCE OF ART

Man's predeliction for artistic activity can be traced far back into the mists of prehistory. We have evidence of artistic activity almost as old as the oldest fossil records of toolmaking, or the inferred use of language; older even than the evidence for such things as the cultivation of crops. It can even be argued that artistic activity is more of an evidence of a specific unique characteristic of man as an intelligent being than language itself; several species of animals, e.g., the bees and the cetaceans, use language; dogs can be trained to respond to spoken commands, and parrots can be taught to pronounce words, though we have no evidence to suggest that they can use them intelligently. Only man employs images; and only man sings and dances. Only man and no other species does this. Furthermore, all men, everywhere and in all cultures, do this; no culture is ever so primitive that it is without some form of artistic expression. Moreover, throughout all of recorded history, there is a great deal of evidence to indicate that men have always regarded these things as very important, and that a great deal of time and resources have always been given over to the arts. Even in times and places where life is habitually hard, desperate and marginal, men will manage to find some few spare resources to devote to play—and to art. Men indulge in the creation of art, and value the results of that creation. Some men will spend a great deal of time and effort to engage in artistic activity, in many cases at great personal cost. They will insist that these things are very important to them. But, if asked—they may not be able to give an adequate reason why. What is the good of art to man, seeing that it is, in many cases, so extremely remote from immediate practicality?
For a fuller understanding of the role of the arts in human life, we must consider and analyze not only art itself, but also its relationship to the full range of human behavior to see if we can find some underlying principle or explanation for the nature and role of the artistic activity.

I specifically wish to defend the notion that art is an important influence on man's behavior, and a necessary feature in explaining his ongoing development as a species. Moreover, I wish most emphatically to distinguish what I am claiming for art as an influence on behavior from the position that art is merely a "reflection of," or an "expression of" man's needs and values. Art is cause as well as result. So profound, I maintain, is the influence of art, that it can be shown to influence not only individual behavior, but it can also be shown to contribute to both the stability and also to the reshaping of society at large. Far from being a mere pleasant incidental pastime, and far from being a mere symbolic expression of antecedent feelings and ideas, artistic experience is in fact a determinant of, and influence on, behavior; not, to be sure always a sufficient determinant, but a determinant nevertheless. Art can be an influence for good or for ill; for action, change and growth as well as for resignation, reconciliation or fear. It can, on occasion, lead men to an image of themselves that they might have the courage to find in no other way; it can also degrade men and frustrate their developing sense of identity.

The problem that I am addressing is not merely that of attempting to explain great art, or even to provide criteria for evaluating works of art; still less am I proposing to defend the social significance of works of art. What I am proposing to do is: to explicate a general theory of art in a context of total human activity; and to show the interrelationship and more especially the reciprocal correlations and coherent influences obtaining between the arts and other aspects of culture, such that both "good" or "great" art and all other levels of art are located on a continuum, a geography, as it were, the broad outlines of which allow for any desired level of
determination. This continuum is not to be thought of as being bounded by artistic activity proper, but is rather to be thought of as extending through a scope so vast as to embrace all human culture.

In order to show the relation of art to culture generally, the first task to be undertaken is to develop a suitable and adequate general theory of art.

What we require of this theory is that it be comprehensive, broadly applicable, and adequate to satisfy the purpose of demonstrating the interconnection of art to observed and projected cultural and social effects. By progressively coming to a greater understanding of these effects, the importance of art as a human activity can be better appreciated, and a direction and a range of options can be given to artistic activity itself which would otherwise remain implicit. As a test of its validity and comprehensiveness this theory should be capable of being tested against a wide range of observed, lived and practiced art, and should, ideally, be valid for all possible art, not just for selected examples of particular cultures.

In developing such a theory, the first question which must be asked is: how is art possible? How are we to determine the most elemental aspects of art so as to produce a theory valid not only for analytical consistency in dealing with given, selected examples but also for dealing with the case of art in general? What must we necessarily infer of man's nature in order to explain both man's indulgence in artistic activity as well as the full range of observed effects and consequences of that activity?

This theory is not to take as its starting point, the artistic product as thing, but rather, starting from the standpoint of observing lived human experience, is to consider, both as starting point and as goal, the total of human experience, with special emphasis on the focusing of that experience on artistic activity.

Such a theory of art, I submit, would be analogous to the transcendental grounding of the forms of space and time as developed
in the philosophy of critical idealism as exemplified by Immanuel Kant, and those thinkers who derive to a greater or less extent from the critical analysis of the processes of human cognition developed by him. I will discuss the essential qualities of the mind necessary for the perception of art as being analogous to the forms of intuition as developed by Kant in the first part of the "Critique of Pure Reason," namely the transcendental aesthetic, the forms in question being those of space, time and causality. The capacity of the mind to form an experience of space is related to the possibility of understanding the artistic image, while the form of the mind which knows time gives rise to music. Causality is related to those arts which presuppose language. Not all experience of space is essentially art, just as not all experience of time is musical, although both are potentially so.

Artistic activity is a type of mental activity which has similarities and differences with other types of mental activity. It is concerned with the cognition of sensuous things, yet it is not the same thing as cognition. It goes beyond cognition in some ways, and is in other ways more refined than cognition in the usual sense of that word. It is concerned with things, but it is not determined and bound to things, as sometimes cognition may tend to be. There is an element of freedom in artistic activity, yet it is not formless or random or arbitrary. By showing what is necessary for the artistic image and for musical rhythm, to be possible, one can specify the artistic dimension in experience. Passing from the one essential feature of the artistic experience to the total field in which the artistic feature (or features) is imbedded, we may analyze the total artistic experience, both in its essential, necessary components (its unmediated aspect) and its mediated aspects. We may then proceed to investigate the relationship of this (artistic) experience to the total cultural situation of which it is a part.

Once we have determined the necessary and essential criterion for locating the presence and character of an artistic activity (which we shall call the artistic mode of perception), that is,
once we have developed a theory of the essential nature of art, we must then proceed to show its applicability and relationship to individual cases of the artistic experience. The reciprocal (but not reflexive) determination of the essential (unmediated) dimension of art and the mediated aspect will prove of key importance in understanding the connection between artistic activity and cultural forms. Any human activity includes to some extent all aspects of human potential. Therefore any human experience can be regarded in any of several ways, and we must not expect to find any example of an experience which is totally and exclusively of an artistic nature. We must conversely allow, as well, that any experience can have an artistic dimension, however remote. We will do well, therefore, to make an in-depth case study of a range of examples of experiences which are deliberately meant to concentrate on artistic activity, and then extend our findings and refine our methods of inquiry to more remote and obscure examples. By tracing the essential features of the artistic mode of perception, as the unmediated artistic element in experience, through a number of situations in which it appears along with various mediated elements, we may demonstrate the modes of connection and the integration of the artistic posture with the remainder of the totality of human life.
CHAPTER I

THE EPISODEY OF ARTISTIC PERCEPTION

Locating the Artistic Mode of Perception in the
Totality of Human Experience

Consider the totality of human experience. If we wish to focus on the artistic dimension of that experience, we shall find it necessary to locate the distinguishing features of that class of activities we call "artistic."¹ We may begin by noting that experience in general is analyzable into experiences, i.e., specific occasions of experience, the contents of which are changing. Knowledge, as an ordered consciousness of experience, is an activity which invariably involves a relationship between two things, a knower and that which is known. The knower, as subject of the activity of knowledge, is regarded as substantially enduring through the temporal flux of the changing content of consciousness, and is identified as the "ego." The world, as object for the knowing subject, is what is meant as that which is to be known, and the succession of experiences of objects is understood as progressively revealing that world. A countervailing argument to the assumption of posit-

¹One of the problems continually recurring in the present discussion stems from the fact that there is, in the English language, no compact, succinct verb-form available to refer to the process of engaging in the activity of artistic perception. The process must therefore continually be referred to by a cumbersome circumlocution. There was a time in English usage when the word "music" could be used as a verb; to bypass the circumlocutory phrases, thus, men playing music could be said to be "musicing"; e.g., "we musicked." Could we, by analogy, possibly construct a neologism such as "art-ing"? ("I art!"; "we art-ed"; etc.) The word "art" always seems to refer to a product, or to a process as inseparable from a product as end-result. Any discussion which wishes to emphasize the process does not have convenient language readily available.
ing a substrate of enduring personal identity in the knowing sub-
jects is developed by Sartre in "The Transcendence of the Ego"; 2
we may for methodological purposes merely regard those cases
where his objections do not apply.

In the changing flow of the content of consciousness of a sub-
ject different qualities may be present in the various experiences.
Because we are to operate on the assumption of the consistency of
personal identity of the subject throughout all the changes of ex-
perience, we will say that whatever changes of attitude or interest
may be predicated of the subject confronting this or that aspect of
the world, or whatever change of experienced quality may be found
in that world, we shall, until proven otherwise, regard those var-
iations as differences of emphasis, rather than utterly different
kinds of experiences without any connection to one another. We
assume this essentially holistic unity of experience antecedent to
the explicit establishment of connections among experiences, on
the basis of the enduring identity of the experiencing subject.

We now offer a first working definition of the artistic ex-
perience: an artistic experience is a specific experience in which
the artistic mode of perception is emphasized. To further elab-
orate on this definition we may go on to say that, in reference to a
given sensuous, or imagined or remembered sensuous experience,
that it is regarded by the subject as having a special quality which
is other than mere object-perception, and this other quality, i.e.,
the artistic quality is to be differentiated according to criteria to
be developed.

We shall discuss the artistic mode of perception in detail in
three broad areas of artistic activity, namely, the visual mode as
a case of art in relation to the form of spatial perception; which is
exemplified by the visual arts; second, the aural mode, as related

2 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego. An exis-
tentialist theory of human consciousness, (New York: Noonday
to the perception of time, as exemplified by music (though we shall have occasion to examine the relationship of music to hearing in some detail and to broaden our specification); and thirdly, the linguistic and semiotic mode of art, as exemplified by literature and poetry, as a case of an art which derives from the demands of the notion of causality. The three areas specified are taken directly from the terminology and thought of Immanuel Kant, as set forth in the transcendental analytic and the transcendental aesthetic of his work "The Critique of Pure Reason."

We will see, after analyzing these areas in detail that the artistic mode operative in each case can be understood as instances of a more general phenomenon, which can be understood as unifying the three cases. This unifying phenomenon will be discussed in detail after each of the three cases has been considered.

We may at this point outline the main features of the doctrine of Kant's discussion of the transcendental aesthetic. We cannot, of course, attempt a complete description of Kant's complete doctrine in detail, still less can we attempt a defense of it. If the outline set forth here is necessarily incomplete, those who are familiar with the full teaching will, I hope, agree that it is in the essential spirit of it, and not in any essential disagreement with it.

The knowing subject, the "transcendental ego" is presented with a kaleidoscope of raw sense-data, the "manifold of intuition." For the transcendental ego to understand this manifold of intuition as being in space and time, the mind must necessarily supply the forms a priori of space and time, that is, must provide them as logically prior to and necessary for all experience. The forms of space and time are "contributions" of the mind in its attempt to organize the raw data of intuition into a coherent world.

Broadly following the methodology of Immanuel Kant, in the "Critique of Pure Reason," in his chapter of the "transcendental aesthetic," we state that space and time are the forms of our sensuous intuition:
Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from external experience. For in order that certain sensations should be referred to something outside myself, i.e., to something in a different part of space from that where I am, again, in order that I may be able to represent them (vorstellen) as side by side, that is, not only as different, but as in different, but as in different places, the representation (vorstellung) of space must already be there. Therefore the representation of space cannot be borrowed through experience from relations of external phenomena, but on the contrary, this external experience becomes possible only by means of the representation of space. . . .

Time is not an empirical concept deduced from any experience, for neither coexistence nor succession would enter into our perception, if the representation of time were not given a priori. Only when this representation a priori is given, can we imagine that certain things happen at the same time (simultaneously) or at different times (successively). . . .

Against this theory which claims empirical, but denies absolute and transcendental reality to time, even intelligent men have protested so unanimously, that I suppose that every reader who is unaccustomed to these considerations may naturally be of the same opinion. What they say is this: Changes, they say, are real (this is proved by the change in our own representations, even if all external phenomena and their changes be denied). Changes, however are possible in time only, and therefore time must be something real. The answer is easy enough. I grant the whole argument. Time certainly is something real, namely, the real form of our internal intuition. Time therefore has subjective reality with regard to internal experience; that is, I really have the representation of time and of my determinations in it. Time therefore is to be considered as real, not so far as it is an object, but so far as it is the representation of myself as an object.3

Since situation in space or in space and time are invariant features of perception Kant speaks of them as the forms of perception. The matter he takes to be the result of sensation, i.e., the result of our being affected by objects. To use a very crude analogy, space and time are the spectacles through which our eyes are affected by objects. The spectacles are irremovable. Objects can only be seen through them. Objects, therefore, can never be seen as they are in themselves.

From the thesis that situation in space and time is not anything abstracted from perception, but something given a priori, Kant infers that space and time are contributed by the perceiving subject. It has often been pointed out that the argument from

the a priori character of space and time to their subjectivity is not conclusive. It is always logically possible that what we perceive under the form of space and time is so ordered independently of our perception. It is quite possible that what a person sees through his irremovable spectacles as, let us say, pink, is also pink in fact, and would be seen so even if, per impossible the spectacles were removed.

One can agree with Kant's view that the matter and form of perception are distinct, without sharing his view that the form is subjective. . . .

Allowing, for the sake of methodology, that the forms of space and time are contributed by mind to organize and structure the manifold of intuition, as a source of "experience," in order to derive knowledge, I wish to maintain, going now beyond Kant, that not only does the mind apply these forms to the manifold to literally interpret the manifold, but that the activity of the mind in generating these forms is active not only when operating on a given manifold, but also goes beyond, in a certain important sense, its function in merely constituting the given, and actually extends the given and freely creates features beyond the given, which features then become part of our "experience" (now in a second sense of the term). This activity may be specifically recognized in what we are to denote as artistic perception. Utilizing the a priori form of space the mind goes beyond the merely sensuously give to form the artistic image. The mind goes beyond the a priori form of time, as understood as moments of succession and simultaneity and proceeds to the understanding of time as change and movement in itself, that is, to the change-quality of the experience of time, which is the fundamental aspect of musical perception.

The Form of Space as Ground for Visual Art

By way of illustration, of the operation of the mind with the form of space to create the possibility of visual art, let us consider a drawing. The object represented is recognized but the

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drawing is not mistaken for the object. It is less than the object, less than a literal picture, and yet more stimulates the imagina-
tion by selectively suppressing and emphasizing different features
of the subject. The subject is not the image, but the representa-
tion of the subject is the image. The apprehension and under-
standing of the drawing, as conveyer of the image, as both less (in
reality) and more (in the "imaging-faculty") than the object is pos-
sible only by using a perceptual faculty beyond the merely sensual.
The imaging-faculty is described at length by Hans Jonas in his
essay "Image-making and the Freedom of Man," in which he
wishes to discuss the contention that, as man, and only man,
produces images, they are evidence for a specific difference
between man and the rest of the animal kingdom. While we reject
his opinion that the "biological uselessness" of the image is a
testimony to man's "higher nature" (as we shall see, image-
making is an important psychobiological resource for man), we
may fruitfully summarize his description of the properties of the
image. "The most obvious property is that of likeness." Men
can see a resemblance between the image and the object intended;
the image is meant to bring to mind that object. But, the image is
not a mere duplication of the object; if it were a mere literal dup-
lication, then the result would be a second object identical to the
first, and not an image. There is something "left out." But,
"beyond this basic condition, the 'incompleteness' assumes degrees
of freedom." While there is a selection of representative features
to be portrayed, the selection of what is to be considered "repre-
sentative" is left to a matter of judgment, subject only to the con-
dition that the imaged thing remain recognizable. These standards
of judgment may be, e.g., economy, expressiveness, or idealiza-
tion, among others. But:

5 Hans Jonas, "Image-making and the Freedom of Man,"
6 Ibid.
With these last remarks we have passed beyond the dimension of "incompleteness" to that of positive difference. Added to dissimilarity as a result of omitting and selecting, there is alteration of the selected features themselves, as a means of heightening the symbolic similitude, or in order to satisfy visual interests other than representation, or just as the result of inadequate ability. The dissimilarity may range all the way from slight displacements by way of emphasis to the most exaggerated caricature, and from unobtrusive harmonising to complete assimilation of the "given" to a canon of style. Some such departure from the given is inseparable from the process of its "translation," in view of the human agency involved; and the tolerance allowed in this respect by the image category as such is indefinite. Choice or compulsion, mastery or the lack of it, each and all may have play within this tolerance. The involuntary oversimplifications and distortions of children's drawings, no less than the sovereign exercise of artistic intention, may leave only faint traces of likeness to the depicted object. Yet to artist and spectator alike, even such strained and imperfect likenesses are representations of the object in question. There is almost no limit to the stretch of imagination that the capacity for symbolic understanding may command.

Carried by this capacity beyond the initial terms of image, the representational function may rest progressively less in real similitude than in the mere recognizability of the intention. At first an obvious degree of likeness is necessary to make the intention recognizable, and this is the province of image proper; but with the rise of a symbolic convention an increasing range of substitutions and graphical abbreviations becomes available, with increasing emancipation from "literality." (One possible fruit of this development is ideographic script.) From the beginning, however, abstraction and stylization are present in the pictorial process as such, as the demands of economy are met by the freedom of transcription. And it is in the exercise of this freedom that the norm of the given object can be abandoned entirely for the creation of shapes never seen: the pictorial faculty opens the road to invention.

The object of representation is visual shape. Vision grants the greatest freedom to the mediacy of representation, not only by the wealth of data from which the latter can choose but also by the number of variables of which visual identities admit.

There are, of course, many instances of visual art which are not describable as image-representations of objects. The imaging faculty does not need a referent object in order to be

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7Ibid.
evoked; discussion of the evocation of the imaging faculty as one aspect of perception of a representational work of art serves a pedagogical purpose, in that, in such a case, the distinction between the perception of the sense-datum itself and the imaging-faculty is clear, and particularly easy to understand. Although large numbers of examples of visual art products are representational and referential in a general sense, representation or semiotic reference is by no means the essential and minimum necessary feature of a product of visual art. A point of view, such as developed by Jonas confuses the artistic proper with a notion of art which seeks the essence of art in the correspondence (to a greater or less degree) of an object with some ideal (or idealized) "form." That there are such products as may be characterized as evoking a sense of ideal form we do not deny: what we wish to specify and indeed to insist on is that such objects or experiences may overlap into the area of art, and may perhaps constitute a source of affect. However, this property is common to many objects of experience not properly artistic, whereas many artistic products are examples of evocation of specific, objective form only in a negligible sense.

We must now entertain something of a parenthetical digression in order to clear up a matter of terminology about which ordinary language is unfortunately vague and inadequate.

The image-quality of an artistic visual experience may sometimes be spoken of as an example of "imagination." The term "imagination" is commonly used to refer to several quite separate things which must be distinguished, not all of which belong to the artistic imagination proper. One may, for example, "imagine" a sense-perception which is not actually present. This imagined perception may be freely taken from the memory of a once-perceived experience, or may be freely fantasized, or may even be hallucinated. None of these are necessarily related to the artistic mode of perception. "Imagination" in the first sense can be seen as meaning the presentation to consciousness of a mental "picture"
which is understood to be "like" a sense-perception, except that it refers not to a sense-perception actually present, but conjured up in the imagination. Artistic imagination, in a second sense, may accompany an imagined (first sense) presentation. In addition to an imagined sense-datum, there may be all sorts of imagined feelings or emotions, which are in some vague sense understood as "not real" or in some sense different from those regarded as "real" which may or may not accompany the imagined (first sense) experience. This is now a third sense of the term. This third sense is also to be distinguished from the specific artistic image, that is, from the evocation of the imaging-faculty as it refers to art proper.

Music as a Perception of Time

In spatial perception, the image may be said to go beyond the given. In temporal perception, the memory of a sequence, or, of a moment of time as a having-been-given, and the teleological moment as a case of the future perfect, i.e., as a that which will have been accomplished, are manifestations of time given in less than its immediate plenitude. Only in music, and in the musical posture before time, is time apprehended in its immediate character as becoming. To speak of the musical posture as including expectation, with its concomitant fulfillment or surprise is already to introduce the most elemental mediate element.

When we discuss the development of the artistic affect in terms of the relationship of the mediated and non-mediated elements we shall at length arrive at a discussion of the means by which art appeals to the perceiver's own sense of emergent future, and will discuss the special appropriateness of music as having the capacity to be understood as referring to this sense in a special way. Music does this very powerfully and compellingly; accordingly, many writers on music have suggested that the essence of music lies in appealing to a sense in which music is perceived as in some
way creating expectations and then fulfilling them (or, if not fulfilling those expectations, dealing with them in some way). This is not, however, what I wish to specify as the essential feature in the musical mode of perception.

As the image element goes beyond the immediately given (in spatial perception), the musical attitude approaches the "given" (in the temporal mode of perception), that is, the direct experience of time (as the form of the inner sense) as primal movement. The distinction between musical time and "scientific time" is usually not made in a clear manner; the confusion results from the fact that the reflective memory prefers to deal with sequence as remembered (or, more properly, "reflected"). Even Husserl makes this mistake:

Truly, it pertains to the essence of the intuition of time that in every point of its duration (which reflectively we are able to make into an object) that it is consciousness of what has just been and not mere consciousness of the now-point of the objective thing appearing as having duration. . . .

It usually appears to be more convenient to deal with a reflective or remembered sequence of moments as given (an attempt, as it were, to "map time onto space"), than to deal with the immediacy of time as pure flow. The reflective awareness of the having-just-been is, to be sure, necessary for musical intelligibility, just as for speech or for experience generally. Those who maintain that time is rhythm, or arsis and thesis, are on the right track, for the now-point can only be experienced in its quality as changing, i.e., becoming or tending. However, to take as example of musical time the simplest case of arsis and thesis

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still retains a fundamental confusion about the true nature of musical time, as it does not distinguish the essential aspect of the musical experience of time, which is, namely, the immediacy of the now-point as flow, from the simplest case of the experience of moments given to reflective awareness, i.e., the awareness of the "having-just'been." An experience which does not change with time is an experience about which time cannot be predicated, i.e., is no experience of a sensuous object. The source of confusion is easy to see, since arsis and thesis is the simplest way of representing change while still retaining reference to "moments" as now-points for reflection. Furthermore, most descriptions of temporal events refer to these events as they exist for reflective consciousness; indeed, there is not even a word in the language which refers to the now-point abstracted from a reflected or remembered sequence.

Experiencing music is always a 'now' in a mythopoetic sense, and it is precisely this musical faculty that gives the mythopoetic its peculiar character. The musical and the mythopoetic, when both are at their highest and most pure, begin to merge. An experience which calls on the heightened or emphasized awareness of the musical "now" is what we call music. This posture is not necessary to language considered purely in its aspect of conveying information in typical communication. However, it is necessary to language use in art-form (though to be sure in a way somewhat less prominent than that in music proper) such as poetry.

The outstanding feature of bad poetry, or "doggerel" is its overly developed preoccupation with the sing-song, the speech rhythm, the tripping alliterative assonance, the obvious and trite rhyme-schemes. These very features may be less objectionable or even desirable in a lyric or song-text. But the over-emphasis of the musical element in a literary or linguistic work of art is regarded by the perceiver of some taste as distracting from, rather than enhancing, the total affect. Such is a good example of one art trying to constitute its appeal in terms of another art, with
a resultant inappropriateness of coding for evoking a particular role on the part of the perceiver, in other words, the perceiver is not clear as to what he is to understand. On the other hand, he may regard its appeal on the level of musical affect, in which case he will derive such pleasure as may be afforded.

Music is commonly regarded as being intimately associated with sounds as perceived by the ear. However my specification of music as an emphasis on "time as the process of becoming" says nothing about sound. Why for example could not the eye or the sensation of touch serve equally well for musical perception? The ear seems to have a peculiarly good ability to process sound-events in time, while the perceptions afforded by the eye, as organ of spatial perception seem to tend to wish to fix objects, and to reduce, e.g. the multiplicity of different perceptions of an object to a fixed idea of that object. I see no adequate reason to limit musical time to perception of sound-events (via the ear or any other organ) and in the absence of conclusive argument I must allow for thoroughness' sake that music may not be so limited. Perhaps dance, as kinaesthetic perception of time must also be allowed as essentially music. But then where is the dividing line between ballet and gymnastics (or any other sport? or play? or game?).

Language as Deriving from the Need to Impute Causality

One may well ask: having now specified the essential element in both visual arts and music, what is the nature of those arts which depend on language, such as poetry, theatre and novels, etc.? They are in fact classed among the arts yet are not at all reducible in any useful sense to either of the other two cases. We must accordingly make some observations about the difference of language use in artistic products from its use in usual communication. Let us start from some considerations of the nature of language in general. While we will not need a general theory of language some
selected observations will be offered which seem particularly a propos of the points to be made.

In the mind, in the process of consulting the undifferentiated flux of primordial, originary experience, one area is marked off, bounded, "de-termined," and given a name or referred to with a word. The name of the experience refers not only to the single experience as unique, but also may refer to a generalization made emphasizing the similarities among many originary, unique experiences; this procedure may be referred to as the process of "abstraction." Abstraction enables us to predicate the "same" or "similar" attributes to a number of different experiences. The word, as it were, stands on the borderline between two kinds of human experiences—First, the originary modifications of consciousness which form the raw subject-matter for linguistic determination, and, secondly, once the experience has been demarcated, by a word which now refers, not to an experience but to a concept of an experience, the word becomes the subject-matter for reason. The position of the word, as concept, mediating between feelings and reason is discussed by Schopenhauer: Schopenhauer speaks of the broad area of mental life known as "feelings"; he contrasts those "feelings" which have been determined by concepts (as expressed in "words") with those feelings which remain without being so specified. Although he does not discuss the process whereby those feelings are brought under concepts and thus progressively claimed for the province of rational life (which process is our concern here) his characterization of "feeling" as including potentially contradictory elements, without necessarily any sense of their contradiction, is the point which we wish here to emphasize.

Now in this respect, the true opposite of rational knowledge (Wissen) is feeling (Gefühl), which we must therefore discuss at this point. The concept denoted by the word feeling has only a negative content, namely that something present in consciousness is not a concept, not abstract knowledge of reason. However, be it what it may, it comes under the concept of feeling. Thus the immeasurable wide sphere of this concept includes the most heterogeneous things, and we do not see how they
come together so long as we have not recognized that they all agree in this negative respect of not being abstract concepts. For the most varied, indeed the most hostile, elements lie quietly side by side in this concept: e.g., religious feeling, feeling of sensual pleasure, moral feeling, bodily feeling such as touch, pain, feeling for colours, for sounds and their harmonies and discords, feeling of hatred, disgust, self-satisfaction, honour, disgrace, right and wrong, feeling of truth, aesthetic feeling, feeling of power, weakness, health, friendship, and so on. Between them there is absolutely nothing in common except the negative quality that they are not abstract knowledge of reason. But this becomes most striking when even a priori knowledge of perception of spatial relations, and moreover knowledge of the pure understanding, are brought under this concept, and generally when it is said of all knowledge, of all truth, of which we are at first conscious only intuitively, but which we have not yet formulated into abstract concepts, that we feel it. To make this clear, I will quote some examples from recent books, because they are striking proofs of my explanation. I remember having read in the introduction to a German translation of Euclid that we ought to make all beginners in geometry draw the figures first before proceeding to demonstrate, since they would then feel geometrical truth, before the demonstration brought them complete knowledge. In the same way F. Schleiermacher speaks in his Kritik der Sittenlehre of logical and mathematical feeling (p. 339), and also of the feeling of the sameness or difference of two formulas (p. 342). Further, in Tannenmatt's Geschichte der Philosophie (Vol. I, p. 361), it says: 'It was felt that the false conclusions were not right, but yet the mistake could not be discovered.' Now so long as we do not consider this concept of feeling from the right point of view, and do not recognize this one negative characteristic that alone is essential to it, that concept is always bound to give rise to misunderstandings and disputes on account of the excessive width of its sphere, and of its merely negative and very limited content, determined in an entirely one-sided way. As we have in German the almost synonymous word Empfindung (sensation), it would be useful to take over this for bodily feelings as a sub-species. Undoubtedly the origin of this concept of feeling, out of all proportion to the others, is the following. All concepts, and concepts only, are denoted by words; they exist only for the faculty of reason and proceed therefrom; hence with them we are already at a one-sided point of view. But from such a point of view, what is near appears distinct and is set down as positive; what is more distant coalesces, and is soon regarded only as negative. Thus each nation calls all others foreign; the Greeks called all other men barbarians. The Englishman calls everything that is not England or English continent and continental; the believer regards all others as heretics or
heathens; the nobleman considers all others as roturiers; to the student all others are Philistines, and so on. Reason itself, strange as it may sound, renders itself guilty of the same one-sidedness, indeed, one may say of the same crude ignorance from pride, since it classifies under the one concept of feeling every modification of consciousness which does not belong directly to its own method of representation, in other words, which is not abstract concept. Hitherto it has had to atone for this by misunderstandings and confusions in its own province, because its own method of procedure had not become clear to it through thorough self-knowledge, for even a special faculty of feeling was put forward, and theories of it were constructed.9

The originary, primary flux of experience goes by many names in various contexts: Ylem, Tohu Wobahu, the Mind of God (as ground of all possible potentialities), the Unconscious, feeling, the "irrational," etc. This is skewed, sliced up, gridded with sets of distinctions and linguistic determinations and more or less specified - metaphorically, in the case of casual distinctions, and scientifically in the case of more carefully thought-out determinations.

Children, when they are learning to speak, do this. Although they are taught much of language by example, there is much that any child can be observed to know about language that he seems never to have been taught.

Once it occurs to a child that he can demarcate certain experiences, and, more importantly, certain kinds of experiences by means of words, he might well go on merrily naming and denoting objects with words in all kinds of ways, sometimes amusing, sometimes bizarre or inappropriate. Names, and those kinds of terms called "nouns" are important in the sense that they are understood to refer to fixed objects, i.e., objects which are in some sense "given," that is, objects which are understood to retain their identity through a multiplicity of distinct and individual impressions of them. Left to his own devices, he might not neces-

sarily generalize about his experiences in a manner similar to that of a "normal" adult. Indeed, the adults of various cultures are observed to generalize differently, each according to his own culture; therefore we must allow for the possibilities of alternate kinds of generalizations. We must, therefore seek some mechanism which occasions the realization of one possibility out of the range of potentialities.

As the child is in the process of learning to refer to things by means of words, his tentative experiments will be reviewed against a criterion of usefulness and effectiveness in communication. His verbalizations will be subjected to processes of selective suppression and reinforcement in the name of "socialization" (not to be confused with learning proper). He will gradually absorb the sorts of distinctions most pragmatically useful and socially acceptable to those with whom he has to deal, and at length he comes to accept the distinctions as "given." He will come to understand that these distinctions and these words will be accepted by those in his society and will be useful for day-to-day communication. Socialization is only one influence on the process of learning to verbalize. The results of the process may be subjected to revision at any time if the need or desire to do so should arise.

The set of distinctions regarding experience implicit in language cannot be made in a completely arbitrary or random manner without penalty even by a whole society. Different names or words are developed for different kinds of experiences when those differences are understood to be important, and general names are developed for classes of experiences in which the similarities among them one might wish to emphasize. Just as visual art was described as an analogue of the form of space as discussed by Kant, and music the analogue, or "artistic manifestation of the form" of time, so too, the Kantian discussion, in the transcendental aesthetic of the Critique of Pure Reason, of the mental form of the a priori category of causality bears the intimation of the capacity for the use of language in artistic production.
The distinction between the use of language in usual communication and in artistic forms might, at this point as a first approximation, be said to be that in usual communication the "givenness" of the referent of the word is taken for granted, while in artistic use of language there is an emphasis of appeal to the potential artistic perceiver to the relationship of the word with the primary experience from which it came. This does not at all mean that the appropriateness of the word (and the context of the word, the distinction from which gives the word its meaning) is being challenged. Not at all; simply that the process of formation is to be called to mind.

Summary of the Unifying Principles of the Cases

Herebefore Considered

At this point we are now in a position to give a synoptic and very brief summary description of the foregoing. We may say that the originary state, or pristine aspect, of consciousness is that of flux, of a "manifold of intuition"; (following Kant) there is a movement, a self-generating activity of mind, to fix points in that flux. This process results in what we call the ordinary objects of cognition (e.g., moments of time, objects, and especially words--words as names of objects or as having referents, or words as names of classes of objects, etc.), and the process of fixing those points is (howsoever those points may be fixed) to be understood as the process of ordinary cognition. This process may be refined to any desired level of specificity, which beyond a certain degree of refinement, shades off into scientific epistemology, e.g., knowledge of things, or, to say the same thing in another way, of the world. It is especially characteristic of modern scientific epistemology that it is concerned with the process of knowledge as such of objects.

It would seem to be in the nature of human mental faculties that it is more convenient to refer to, to think about, and to operate with, points fixed in the flux, rather than with the flux itself.
By fixing points appropriately, we may manipulate them, move them around mentally, and recombine them in our imagination, and at length, in reality, according to the rules of logic and under the assumptions of the regulative notions of the principle of sufficient reason and causality. Whenever a conflict is disclosed in so doing, it is not logic or the principle of sufficient reason that is called into question; what is questioned is rather the process by which the points were originally determined out of the flux. We do not readily abandon these principles. However, these processes, however elaborated they may become, are characteristic of the processes of ordinary, or perhaps, on occasion, scientific cognition, i.e., the determination of objects as such, and the determination of their nature. The artistic mode of perception does not require total obliteration of these processes; however, artistic perception follows a different path.

Artistic perception does not concern itself necessarily with disregarding or attempting to obliterate those points such as they may have been fixed, or in interfering with the process; still less is it concerned with re-fixing or redefining those points. That is the task of scientific and epistemological revolution. Nor does it presume to challenge the validity or the application of the regulative notions; rather, for the most part, it ignores them.

Artistic consciousness is, however, particularly concerned with focusing on the flux-aspect of the experiences from which those points were fixed. Artistic consciousness, i.e., that mode of consciousness proper to the perception of artistic experience, can retain awareness of both the points and the flux, juxtaposed simultaneously, so to speak. Ordinary cognition, which is concerned with the points as fixed, need not be taken leave of during artistic perception. However, if, on the other hand, the cognizance of those points (which, having been fixed, and habitually referred to, have therefore become those things commonly understood to be "objects") is disregarded or obscured, and the focus of attention is given to the flux as such, not essentially related to objects, then
what we have is a very private art, one which begins to look like
the sort of thing which might possibly be a type of psychosis, or,
perhaps, in a more controlled situation, trance or mystical ex-
perience. Such an experience is less properly categorized as
"artistic." It is not, therefore, every preoccupation with flux that
is characteristic of the artistic mode of perception, but a special
kind: the artistic mode of perception is one which emphasizes the
flux-aspect of consciousness, the process-character of experience--
without, however a loss of awareness of objects, and of self as,
in some sense, in a world of objects.

We have said that artistic perception does not necessarily
or essentially concern itself with the process of fixing points;
this does not mean that it merely assumes the process as given, or
the end-result of the process as given. Indeed, we may note that
it is the very preoccupation with the flux, as the essential feature
of artistic perception, that it facilitates a critical attitude toward
the fixed points which have been previously set and which are
habitually assumed. The process of re-fixing those points and the
subsequent re-commitment to the newly fixed points implies a
re-situating of the locus of personal identity, and a re-structur-
ing of the constellation of personal attitudes, beliefs, and regulative
norms. In this sense the process of the artistic experience facil-
itates discovery, creativity, and a progressively higher sense of
self--higher, that is, because when invited to reconsider its
epistemology, the self becomes aware of a wider range of options,
possesses a sense of increased power and self-sufficiency.

In the case of a work of art which depends for its effect
very little on the affect of mediated elements, demands may be
made on the processes of artistic perception that are so great that
a sense of "pure" creativity is engendered, so that it almost seems
that the perception of such a work of art speaks of a seemingly
infinite potential, seems to reinforce a virtually boundless reaffir-
mation of faith in the power of pure creativity itself, and gives a
sense of both boundless hope and invincible resolution. Indeed, it
almost seems to be an intimation of "pure spirit" such as is rarely given to man to experience.

However, it is a mistake to think that art invariably speaks only of the necessarily new or of the progressive or of the revolutionary. As often as it may speak of the new, it may also speak of the reinforcement of the familiar, the established, the uncritically assumed. Its very power is that it can do either; its suspect nature (suspect, that is, to those who are committed to one function against the other) stems from the fact that it could do both. Which of these it does, and to what extent, is not a function of the essential artistic posture only, but also of the total of the circumstances of the artistic experience. An artistic product, besides facilitating revision of one's own cognitions into a new system of possibly greater adequacy, can also tend to reconfirm a given existing determinative world-view. A given artistic product may be so powerfully emotionally related to a given mode of setting fixed points that the product, by its very appeal to those points as necessary substrate for its own basis of appeal, discourages, and tends to preclude critical thought about those points and the mode whereby they were fixed. Thus, the artistic product, by its appeal facilitates acceptance of that set of points, i.e., that "ideology," as the basis of a world-outlook; or, at least, renders criticism of that ideology more difficult by placing an emotional obstacle in the path of criticism. The appeal of the artistic product lends an aura of appeal and a sense of adequacy to the epistemology of an ideology. The art tends to seduce one to acceptance of the mythology behind it, even, possibly, on occasion, against one's better judgment and critical non-acceptance, or even resistance. Aquiescence, prompted by emotional appeal, becomes a surrogate for cognitive assent.

We may now return to a discussion of the flux itself. The manner in which it was spoken of might have lead one to believe that there was implied some sort of stream of raw impressions which were somehow mysteriously forged into forms by the mind
which then presented the results to consciousness. Such is, of course, not at all what I am describing. There is, in fact, no flux as such. The flux-aspect of experience is inseparable from the determined aspect. The determinitive nature of the activity of the mind, however, is not reducible to a mere transformation of elements given in the impression; the nature of these determinations, those fixings of points, is "free"; that is, not strictly determined by or reducible to features of the impression—however, though there is this freedom, there is also a criterion of appropriateness for the totality of life, which to a large extent conditions that activity. Of central importance however is the contention that the determination of points is the result of the activity of the mind; that the mind is not determined by the impression. Nor is this impression, on which the mind operates to be arbitrarily limited to that which is usually called "sense-data." I have had occasion elsewhere to refer to the sense of "oceanic totality" of the consciousness of the neonate; the distinction within that totality of a demarcated area henceforth to be known as sense-data is already based on the presupposition that there is something that it can be distinguished from. What is to be understood is that there can be a movement toward a greater sense of flux, or a movement toward a greater specification of determiniteness; "absolute" flux or "absolute" determination are poles, or limit-conditions which have something of the status of regulative notions.

We have said that there is no flux; that statement must now be qualified by saying that there is indeed no flux in ordinary consciousness. There are conditions where a true flux is indeed present or, at least approached. This condition is presumably to be found in the neonate, for example.

A condition similar to a state of flux is also frequently described as being associated with trance states, certain types of meditation, intense cases of drug-induced hallucination, and some diseases which induce delirium. One interesting type of case occurs with adults who were born blind and who acquired sight at
some point. For a period of some time they have difficulty in distinguishing objects or in relating what they see to objects familiar to touch.

In any case, when a true flux is present (as it indeed is in such cases as have been mentioned), it is characteristic of that state that objects cannot be, or, at least, are not differentiated. It follows necessarily that that state of perception which we are calling the artistic mode of perception cannot occur, because the dialectical tension is lacking of the relation between the fixed point as object and the ground of flux; out of which (and within which) the object is fixed.

The sense in which the term "flux" is meant in the present context goes beyond the Kantian "manifold of intuition." Kant's term is more or less synonymous with what we would today understand as "sensory impression." What we here mean by flux is that totally fluid, oceanic state of, chaos, of raw potential, of unformed existence which can be thought as even prior to such elemental distinctions as the subject-object distinction, to say nothing of space and time as forms of phenomena. The Kantian distinction, on the other hand, already implicitly presupposes at least a distinction of subject and object, as well as a distinction of specifying "sense-data" as "experience of the world of appearances" (as differentiated from other types of "experience"), and, finally, Kant implicitly presupposes that the important thing to do with the perception of the manifold is to derive knowledge from it. He thus refers to the knowing subject as the "transcendental ego," prescinding from all other functions, mental or otherwise, of a subject. Kant also has been understood to presuppose that there is a fixed and absolute, as well as unchanging field of operation of the understanding as operating on experience and utterly distinct from it. The understanding of Kant's philosophy hinges on what one is to understand by the term "experience." We must explicitly expand Kant's notion of experience to allow for the possibility of the expanding and evolving nature of potential experience, and for the possibility
that "experience" could be understood in this progressive way.

The Potential Implications of the Theory

We have discussed visual art, music, and language art; we have said that the artistic consciousness consists in the heightened or emphasized awareness of a particular feature, which could possibly be found in all experience in a greater or less degree. We have also said that this feature originates in the mind, and is analogous to processes which the mind employs in organizing experience. We have specified what that feature was in the cases at hand, and have made that feature the distinguishing characteristic of the artistic mode of perception. The task remains to actually examine the experience of mankind and to justify that this distinction is really both a reasonable specification and that it conforms in an important sense to men's actual experience in dealing with art.

Many writers who have approached the topic of aesthetics have sought to specify the nature of art in examining its relation to e.g. feeling or emotion of one kind or another; most frequently a work will be judged "beautiful"; and the nature of art will be sought in examining the nature of that judgment. Or art will be related to the conformity of some sensuous product with a presumed ideal model, i.e., the so-called "formalist" aesthetic; not infrequently that model will be thought of as being, or deriving from some mathematical or geometrical principle. All of these approaches offer many important insights into the nature of art and the psychology of our responses to art. However, such approaches are all, each in themselves, incomplete and inadequate to the total human experience of artistic production. In many cases the theories suffer from certain local prejudices resulting from an inadequate range of experiences from which to generalize.

Such an approach is characteristic of one whose experience of the arts is only one culture or tradition, and who is unaware of
the true range of possible modes of artistic receptivity which characterize the range of world art. That the socially learned responses to a given artistic product might be quite different from culture to culture is not allowed for, very possibly because such a condition has never been experienced.

On the other hand, by starting, as we do, with the concrete phenomenon of an artistic experience by a person or a society, which possesses a specific epistemological tradition, we can take, as our starting point, the full human experience of the artistic experience. By observing the artistic response and explaining it, we may hope to demonstrate a coherence between that response and the epistemological field of the total of experience. Perhaps it is difficult to demonstrate that a particular work of art is "great"; it is certainly problematic to ask "why" it is so. However, given that an individual in a concrete particular situation judges that a work of art is, e.g., "great," we can demonstrate the lawful coherence of this judgment with the total range of cultural features. We may not be able to demonstrate that a work of art is "great"; but once we have made such a judgment, we may proceed to examine why indeed we think so.

To do this, of course, we must also ask what it means to predicate "greatness" of art. When we have answered this question satisfactorily, we shall have pushed the dialectic of the mediated and the unmediated to its farthest limits, and begun to understand the point at which psychology and art merge; the point where the distinction between form and affect begins to merge, to melt and shimmer, the very point where linguistic adequacy by its very nature must break down altogether in an attempt to analyze the experience.

As our theory proposes to span the entire spectrum of the artistic experience, we must deal not only with high art, with art products which are quite explicit about their nature as works of art, but we must extend our investigation to include an examination of the artistic mode wherever it is found, even in objects normally
not considered to be examples of artistic appeal. A distinction may be made, more or less correctly between on the one hand, "pure" or "non-utilitarian" art and on the other hand products which have a clear ulterior utility, which bear some features of artistic design. But it is a mistake to then proceed to dismiss or denigrate the artistic features of the utilitarian product as being of no interest to the theoretician of art. Happily, this sort of approach is increasingly less common, as more experience is accumulated in the scholarly community regarding the historical and cultural breadth and depth of the scope of human life. One of the chief tasks of any theory of aesthetics, one which it cannot avoid addressing if it is to make any claim to completeness, is to examine and explain the appeal of so-called "bad" or "poor" art as well as that art which the philosopher has judged to be "great." It is all very well to seek to justify (or rationalize) one's judgment that a work of art is "great." But what of the immense observed appeal of trash, kitsch, doggerel, singing commercials, propaganda, decorated utensils, etc.? Only a theory of artistic appeal that locates all of these products on a spectrum, a continuum, a methodology of analysis which, in classical spirit, if not necessarily in literal form, can specify per genus et differentiam what the relationships are among all types of art within themselves and the relationship of art in general to the continuum of all of human experience and as theory can hope to justify its claim to adequacy and comprehensiveness.

It is clear that by noting the isolated feature which we claim is to distinguish the presence of an artistic product, we do not even begin to discuss the total affect of the artistic product, the total affect being our terminus a quo. That total artistic affect, which is to be discussed more fully subsequently, may be understood as distinguishable into several features: first, the unmediated direct artistic affect, which is precisely the unique feature such as was specified as being the "essence" of art, and secondly, the features which are or which may be understood as more or less mediated.
CHAPTER II

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE MEDIATED AND THE UNMEDIATED IN THE WORK OF ART

PART I

The Touchstone of the Presence of the Artistic Experience

We have located the essence of art at a single touchstone point. We have said that an artistic experience is one in which that point or aspect is emphasized, given a total field (or, to say it another way, given a total experience). We may now use the framework of distinctions which we have developed to analyse and reflect upon various experiences to see in fact how this point is to be identified, and, by noting it as an invariant among many experiences to see if observation and comparison of those experiences reveals insights of any importance.

The first issue to be determined in reflecting upon an experience is to determine whether or not it is in fact an instance of an artistic experience, that is, whether or not it is in fact concerned with emphasizing the artistic mode of understanding.

We may say that, within the limits of possibilities (which limits themselves must yet be determined) the invocation of the artistic mode is largely and most importantly a socially learned response to certain circumstances which are meant to be associated with the artistic mode. The occasions on which the artistic mode is meant are, for the most part, clear and unproblematic; however, there are occasions when the "triggering" of this response is unclear or ambiguous, sometimes deliberately so. These occa-
sions deserve to be noted for separate discussion. The role of social learning in occasioning the artistic mode must be noted for future discussion. Suffice it at this time that we need, in our discussion of the second point only those examples which are unproblematical as cases of artistic experience.

A specific experience can be understood in many ways. What elements in an experience are strictly "given" and what are the results of the mind's "constituting" of that experience are a matter of some controversy among psychologists and philosophers. However the presence of conflicting aspects, which, when reduced to linguistic specification, may be said to be "contradictory" seems to be without doubt. Paraphrastically, one may say that if such did not in fact occur, the law of logic known as the law of non-contradiction would never need to have been stated.

To take as our most elemental possible starting-point, we may inquire as to just what is "in our minds" at a given moment of time. We have certain feelings, a certain sensory input, which we understand to be aspects of objects, about which objects we remember certain things. We furthermore believe and expect certain qualities of those objects, and understand their presence in reference to ourselves, etc. Now if we refer to such an experience as is dominated by what we have described as the "artistic mode of perception," we see that there are all sorts of things present besides the awareness of that artistic posture, just as in any other experience. Some aspects will be seen as important to the total affect, while others are understood to be insignificant. From among those aspects regarded as significant, we may say that they can be understood to contribute, all of them, to the total affect, but each in different ways.

The Specification of the Mediated and Unmediated Aspects

On the occasion of experiencing a particularly moving artistic
product, we may understand the experience to be "unmediated," that is, needing nothing to explain it except that which is already immanent in the experience (remember that this "experience" is a two-place affair, involving the relationship of subject and object) of the total affect. Upon reflection, however (which reflection does not destroy the original experience, but conditions the total subject), one or another aspect of that total affect can be understood to be "mediated," that is, referable to an affect other than that of the artistic quality. The fact that an aspect can be explained by something extraneous to the total artistic affect, and therefore "mediated" does not necessarily mean that it encroaches upon, or changes the "unmediated," i.e., properly artistic, affect. However if it does, then it does change the total affect, from one which is understood as purely art, to one which is understandable as an experience having (1) an artistic aspect, and (2) another aspect, a "mediated" one. (The relationship, as we shall see, is not mutually exclusive.) Any aspect of a work of art which can be understood as mediated may be said to be "mediatable," whether or not it is in fact so understood on a particular occasion.

The failure to distinguish between the mediated and the unmediated aspect of an artistic experience has been the cause of the greatest confusion. This is because the para-complementary nature of the relationship is not a fixed one, but is to some extent reciprocally determined, yet not necessarily reflexively. If "A" is the mediated, and "non-A" is the unmediated, then "non-A" is not necessarily merely the negation of "A"; "non-A" does not exclude all that is not "non-A." This is illogical. It is not necessarily irrational, but it is illogical—nevertheless, this is in fact the way artistic perception functions.

A commentator, ¹ writing on the use of the distinction of the

mediated and the immediate ('non-mediated') in Hegel said: "... the mediate is always to be understood in its opposition to the immediate." What he should have said was "the immediate is always to be understood in its opposition to the mediate," because it is precisely the "immediate" that we are interested in understanding, in the case of artistic perception.

(In the science of logic, there is a class of paradoxes, that is, logically constructed arguments which involve internal contradictions because the requirements of logical consistency are not operative, whose paradoxical nature is related to their self-reflexivity. The paradox is recognized because the mind, of course, is superior to mere logic. In fact, when one has abandoned confidence in reason, and given over one's reason to a blind faith in a logical calculus, one has, in effect, stopped reasoning. To paraphrase Schopenhauer, once you start being logical, you have stopped being rational. Methods were devised for dealing with these paradoxes once they were recognized. The state of affairs related to the understanding of the relationship of the mediated and the unmediated aspects of art can be thought of as an analog (in sensuous perception) of the perception of paradoxes in logic.)

Now we have just said that a particular aspect can be seen as both mediated and unmediated at the same time. It must surely seem very strange to develop such an illogical, nay, "anti-logical" argument; but such is, in fact, what the experience of the work of art involves, especially when that experience is taken in the context of the total experience of a subject, in the world, who has a developed, differentiated consciousness, and who above all must distinguish the artistic mode of perception from alternative postures. On one level, i.e., as a first approximation, whatever is necessary for the total artistic affect but refers to something outside the artistic affect proper can be called the mediatable, because its meaning and therefore affect is occasioned by its extra-experiential reference. Whatever can be specified (i.e., specified, usually in a linguistic manner) without reference to the essential
artistic quality of the particular artistic experience in question may be thought of as mediatable. The unmediated affect of an artistic experience cannot be linguistically specified directly, though the occasions of its occurrence can be described.

The interrelationship between the mediated (or mediatable) and unmediated affect may change from time to time even in repeated experiences of the same "work." The fact is that with different background experiences, the understanding of a given experience for a subject changes and may be conditioned by ulterior knowledge.

The Power of Art as the Ability to Bypass the Critical Faculty

All of the foregoing discussion was developed to make a point which may now be stated in more or less direct form. The discussion of the interrelationship of the unmediated, mediatable and the mediated was to prepare for a discussion of this point and was, in a way, a preparation to extend that discussion into certain areas which may otherwise be less obvious. The point to be made is this: art exists in the world—it does not exist as a self-contained set of experiences without reference to that world. Art, furthermore, says something about that world, and about the nature of the human mind, especially as humans, as possessors of minds, seek to understand the world and themselves. The moral effect and power of art, the potential of art to condition a subject's understanding of the world and to reinforce his own sense of identity, is to a large extent related to the fact that: in the attempt at the apprehension of the pure, unmediated affect, which involves the suspension of the critical faculty, that which might on another occasion be regarded as the mediated is, by close association, uncritically absorbed.

To the extent that that which can be shown to be mediated is absorbed in an unexplicated manner, it may be said to partake in the character of the unmediated, and absorbed as unmediated. Need-
less to say, the dialectical determination of the mediated vis-a-vis
the unmediated will vary from particular case to particular case
(i.e., of an artistic experience). This potentially mediated affect,
if it were to be made explicit and referred to, especially in the
form of a linguistic proposition, might be resisted, ignored or
rejected by the subject exercising his critical faculty. One
reason that art is so powerful is that when everything feels so good,
it is hard to say "no" to anything.

On the other hand, one might very well subscribe to that
mediated aspect as understood by its linguistic specification.
In that case, the subject may be aware of the mediatable aspect
of the artistic experience; but, since he subscribes to it, that
is, does not invoke his critical faculty, it is absorbed in an un-
mediated fashion, just like, but not as, the absorption of the
artistic affect.

Art is very frequently the means by which certain topics
themselves subject to taboos on one level, which are nevertheless
of a certain fascination on another level, can be alluded to safely;
that is, by partially suspending or bypassing either social censor-
ship or internalizing strictures. The easy access which art
allows for expressions of this type is readily noted by the potential
revolutionary, and so provides a means of "guerilla warfare"
against established values. Art is indeed so adept at this, that,
when one considers the enormous number of cases in which this
faculty is taken advantage of, one may be tempted to conclude
that such is the essence of art. But, as we shall see, this is not
the whole story; it is important to understand how art affects the
human spirit in the whole range of its possibilities—we cannot
focus on just one aspect of its activity as if it were the whole
truth. The discussion we are engaging in is to be thought of as a
description of how art in fact does work; the reader is cautioned
against reading into it any prejudices or presuppositions of values.
Any introduction of values must be noted for what they are, and
not introduced surreptitiously. Before anyone can say what art
should do, he must, if his argument is to have any cogency, understand clearly what art, in fact, does do; he must understand the full range of how art affects the human spirit, and he must account for its ubiquity and pervasive appeal.

We have already noted that in specifying the touchstones of the artistic experience, we have singled out for emphasis one factor only; we have said nothing about the presence of those elements typically considered to be the essence of art, namely, beauty, form, feeling, or sublimity. The reader may be puzzled about how these things are now to be included in that which we call the artistic experience (or, what is the same thing from a different point of view, the experience of the artistic product). I do not feel called upon to explain their addition; as I will explain that they are always there—the onus of explanation is directed rather to discussing the conditions under which the particular qualities in question are emphasized or suppressed.

The psychologist describes the newborn as a "polymorphous perverse." The initial condition of consciousness is that of an undifferentiated, generalized, "oceanic" surge of (what is to become) feeling, volition, cognition and set of potentialities which only gradually becomes differentiated by selective reinforcement, emphasis, suppression and sophistication of distinction which is understood to be the normal, typical process of socialization. Let us suppose that in adult life the potential for this holistic, oceanic state is not completely lost but is rather more or less recoverable under suitable circumstances; not, to be sure, recoverable in an exact duplicate of the infantile state but rather in selected and specifiable areas on certain occasions. The issue then transforms into the question of when and how such a state might be occasioned; the answer may be sought in an examination of the particular circumstances on which this is observed to occur, in a greater or less degree. The difference between such a state in an infant and that in an adult is referable to the fact that in the adult, it is necessarily accompanied by the whole of accumulated experience
about how the world is, and in the conditioning, training and habit which is part of having gone through the experience.

An important point in the differentiation of consciousness is reached with the advent of the judgment; that is, the formulation of a statement about reality, or something that can be said to be right or wrong (in some meaningful sense). If we locate the products of mind with respect to this point, we may say that a mode of thinking which reserves for itself the category of judgment puts one into the area of critical thinking, while without this presupposition we may say that one is in the area of pre-critical thought.

It would seem that art wishes to operate (though it does not always do so successfully) in the area of pre-critical thought. The area of pre-critical thought is one which art must share with such other cultural and personal manifestations as religion, myth, psychosis, feeling in general, and kinesthetic behavior. Language, be it noted, straddles the critical and pre-critical. Linguistic productions are sometimes meant to be critical, sometimes pre-critical and sometimes vague or ambiguous in this respect. Art, while it shares the pre-critical (again for the most part) with many other types of manifestation, however, is not without its differences. In the undifferentiated state typical of the neonate there is not yet a developed critical faculty, while in the differentiated state, even the pre-critical state is experienced within a context of the potential to invoke the critical. In order for the total artistic affect to be effectively presented, it is necessary for the critical faculty to be suspended; the ability of the particular artistic product to do so, by engaging one's interest on other levels is an important necessary precondition for the success of the artistic product in delivering its total artistic affect.

The point of this discussion is to prepare the framework for the consideration of an important point, and one which I feel has not as yet been sufficiently addressed in the range of aesthetic theory in a systematic way, namely, the analysis of the otherwise rather recondite, observation that the same artistic product may
very well affect different people differently, may be understood differently, and, furthermore may even occasion different reactions in the same individual at different times. Ideally a progressively more general comprehensive and detailed understanding will converge asymptotically toward exactly what we have yet to determine.

To review: we have (1) the total affect of a product or object or sensuous experience which we (2) specify as artistic according to the criteria outlined in the section on the epistemology of artistic perception, which can be thought of, or analysed into (3) mediated aspects and non-mediated aspects. The point at which an aspect is thought of as mediated or non-mediated will of course vary with the total context of the field within which the experience is understood, will change with changes in that total field, and changes in the artistic understanding (and perforce, total affect) will be specifically correlative to those changes in the field. Aspects which in one context may be regarded as unmediated may in another context come to be seen as mediated. Less frequently, the converse may, on occasion, occur. A rather crude and unenlightened point of view may regard all art as essentially ultimately completely recidivistic and stavistic, and that at length all art will be exposed for what it is—namely a convenient illusion, when at length the mediated "unconscious" elements are "exposed" for "what they really are," i.e., a presumed attempt to recover the oceanic bliss of the neonate. This point will be dealt with subsequently, when an adequate framework will have been developed to discuss the role that art can, and in fact does, play in human life. By way of anticipation we may say that art may, on occasion, disregard what one or another may specify as "reality," but it is not of the essence of art that it do so. Much depends on the specification of just what one wishes to consider "reality"; this notion, just like art, is a progressive and dialectically developing one.

The necessary condition of the unmediated is that it is uncritical, not however uncritical as such, but uncritical in the
context of the potential of invoking the critical faculty. ²

² The unmediated also has a cognitive aspect as well as an emotive aspect, as they are combined before differentiation and which is called affective. Any object can have different aspects; it may be blue, heavy, cold, pretty. The words "blue," "heavy," "cold," "pretty" are the predicates, what the predicates refer to are the aspects of the object.
PART II

THE EXAMINATION OF THE RANGE OF MEDIATED ELEMENTS

The Semiotic and Referential Elements

We will examine several examples of artistic products, exhibiting a wide range of features, and will seek to determine what, in the experience of the product, is understood as mediated by something other than the artistic affect. This discussion must be understood as referring to many different types of art, and from artistic products in many different contexts. It presupposes drawing examples from a range of cultural products in which the artistic affect may be understood to be present which are not usually included in a discussion of art. That this can be done is an intimation of both the power of the artistic faculty to color a wide range of human experiences, and also of the power which it exerts on culture more broadly; not only is the topic, art, to be extended in scope, but its influence is to be seen as very wide-ranging.

The most easily understood distinction between the mediated and unmediated aspects of the total affect can be seen in the cases where an element, or elements are present which can be explained in terms of some other field of human activity. That is, where there are explicit semiotic references in the work of art itself. In music, for example, the meaning of the words of a song, or in art the subject-matter of a painting, or, in literature, the mere denotative meanings of the words can all be very well understood without referring to their presence in an artistic product. Their contribution to the total affect can be quite clearly understood; whatever affect may be attributed to them, it is separ-
able from the artistic affect proper. Although the two affects in theory can be separated, in fact it is not necessarily the case that this is done. In fact, an individual may, in his mind, reflect on the differences, discriminate between them and may, even in the single experience of the artistic product, understand it on different levels simultaneously, and this without necessarily any sense of conflict. In fact, a discussion of a sense of conflict is only possible because on reflection, one realizes that the two elements can be understood as separable. A large class of apparent, or alleged, "differences in taste" can in fact be reduced to a failure to make distinctions in the relative contributions in these two classes of affect. Most artistic products include both in substantial measure, and depend for their appeal on both. An artistic product which is meant to appeal solely, or mainly as "pure" art with very little overt mediated appeal is, empirically, a member of a small, albeit very important class of products. Even in the case of an artistic product that claims to be "pure art," the distinctions between the mediated (or mediatable) such as we have specified above, and the total affect must be made before proceeding.

Proceeding further with an analysis of mediated elements, we now begin to come to cases of a type more closely and usually related to art proper. Accordingly it becomes progressively more difficult to discriminate between their nature as mediated and the artistic affect proper. One factor, frequently mentioned in the course of philosophy in history, is the conformity of the artistic product to some idea form. This viewpoint is, of course, most closely associated with Plato, and Schopenhauer, following Plato.

**Form or Idea**

Discussions of "form" in art are likely to be the most confused farago of notions compounded by lack of clarity of dis-
tion and overlaid with confusions with all sorts of irrelevant notions. If, for example, we ask just what an artistic product is, we are faced with choosing from a wide variety of answers, not all of which are necessarily equally satisfactory. On reflection we soon see that it is not, for example, merely the canvas or the pigment particles of a painting, or the mere sounds of a musical composition, etc. The artistic product has something to do (what exactly we have yet to determine) with the relations among the sensuous elements, i.e., the "matter." But, if we ask what the "form" of a work of art is, we may soon come to realize that, once we have specified a particular thing (or experience) as "artistic," then we may see that the predication of "form" is almost, but not quite, "non-special," that is, there is almost nothing in our perception of it which cannot be said to be "form" in a meaningful albeit perhaps vague sense. Since the term "form" has been used in an extremely wide variety of senses in the description of artistic products, it might be well to distinguish some of those senses. First of all we should exclude from a discussion of form proper those elements which can ultimately be reduced with a bit of reflective effort to cases of the semiotic as the semiotic is represented in the work of art. If, let us say, a triangle (or other geometric figure or proportional relationship) is used in a work of art, is it a triangle proper, or is it the "representation of the idea of a triangle"? Well, why can it not be both? It is rare to find a work of art in which one could not, with a little diligent application, find some semiotic elements. It is also true that there are few such artistic products in which one might be interested in which the semiotic elements would account for the larger measure of artistic interest in those objects. Proceeding analogically from the procedures developed in searching for the semiotic elements, one soon begins to realize that the formal relationships that are perceived among the sensuously given features of the artistic product constitute—i.e., as "thing"—the object on which is to be exercised the artistic mode of perception. That is,
it is not the perception of the formal relationships that constitute
the understanding of the thing as work of art, but constitute the
preconditions for understanding the thing as thing, and so, in a
manner of speaking, prepare the thing for the operation of the
artistic posture. The perception of formal relationships is not
in itself the artistic mode of perception, but the artistic mode
of perception necessarily presupposes the perception of the
formal internal relations in the product.

However, suppose it be asserted that, in a given artistic
product there are formal relationships present that are not among
those perceived, and furthermore not necessarily deducible from
perception. These may be alluded to by some sort of ulterior
description, which may then indeed influence the understanding,
and even the perception, of the work of art itself. The use of
geometrical form in paintings, the "rules" of counterpoint and
sonata-form, or isorhythm, or tone-rows in music, or verse
forms in poetry are all examples of "forms" in this sense of
understanding which is not reducible to the perception of the work-
of-art-as-thing.

One very interesting class of such formal aspects is to
be found in the case where there is some sense of imputed teleology
in the work of art as representation. That there is, in many
cases of works of art that we esteem, a sense of rightness, of
good proportion, and of organic relationship among the parts, is
very commonly observed. This way of regarding works of art is
only partially derived from our experiences with organic living
forms, and is not completely explainable only by referring to the
work of art itself. It is in the nature of mind itself to impute
teleology; the problem is to explain why some works of art urge
the mind to do so more strongly than others. Of course, it is an
important insight to realize that the sense of teleology is generated
in the mind, and is not necessarily a property of the object as
such. That the teleological relationships understood in relation
to the work of art are not so understood, i.e., as being produced
by mind, but rather are understood to be features of the object, is
the consequence of the naturalistic fallacy, a mental procedure
which will be discussed more fully subsequently.

There are some observations to be made about the criteria of form, however they be applied. First of all, they do
not necessarily co-extensive with what we would wish to call
"art"; they can be applied to all sorts of utilitarian productions
as well as to natural objects like plants, sunsets, human beauty,
etc. Secondly, a particular production might be a very close
realization of a form, such as in an academic exercise, and yet
be unprepossessing as art, while in other cases artistic pro-
ductions which do manifest violence to demands of formal coher-
ence might be considered quite engrossing.

In any case, all notions of form in reference to works of
art concern themselves only with descriptions of works of art
considered as things, as objects, which are to be known in a
manner no different from the other objects of cognition. Consider-
ation of aspects of form is not an approach unique to works of
art. Even in the case of imputing certain features to the work,
such as understanding the work as manifesting relationships which
are regarded as purposive, is not the exclusive province of
artistic perception. While such knowledge (of the internal formal
relations) is indispensible to the process of artistic perception in
the individual case, this knowledge must not be confused with artis-
tic perceptions proper. That there can be levels of understanding
which condition the total affective response must be once again
insisted upon. These levels of understanding also condition the
expectations of the perceiver in this, that the individual artistic
product is understood as, at least on one level, a selection from
among the range of possibilities, ranging from the banal and the
obvious to the bizarre and incoherent.

Summarizing this extremely brief discussion of form in
art we may say that any formal relationships which could be
among those possible in a work of art can be located on a continuum
ranging from the overt and obvious semiotic elements to the arcane, esoteric and hidden symbolism, then to the more general symbolic elements which are more difficult to specify as properly semiotic. We may then proceed to the perceived formal elements in the matter, i.e., the material, of the artistic product as experienced, which experience itself can be conditioned by the acquisition of knowledge about the product which is gained by experiences other than that of the proper and delimited perception of the artistic product itself. All of these sorts of understandings of the formal aspects of an artistic product constitute knowledge of the artistic product as thing as derived from "experiences" (as instances of "experience"). In considering form in art, the mode of apprehension is that of ordinary cognition of objects, not that of the artistic mode per se. Furthermore, nothing in any discussion of form necessarily relates to any correlate in affect. Accordingly we shall now turn to a discussion considering the nature of affect proper in the total experience of an object experienced in the artistic mode of perception.

Pleasure, Feeling, or Emotion

The experience of pleasure is frequently discussed as being associated with the artistic experience, and, true enough an artistic experience is often pleasurable. Desire is also frequently mentioned, both in the aspect of conscious, deliberate willing or "willing" as well as in its aspect referring to pre- or sub-conscious urges. Both experiences, pleasure and desire, may be categorized as one or another aspect of "mediated affect" which will be discussed here as such.

There are a great number of notions commonly employed in discussing the arts which it may seem strange to omit in this discussion, in which we are attempting to pinpoint the crucial nature of the artistic experience. "The beautiful," "the sublime," "the aesthetic," "the imitation of nature," etc., all of these ideas
have their place and will be allowed for. All the things necessary for the total artistic affect are not necessarily the unique province of the artistic experience. Remember we are talking about differences in emphasis in the qualities of different experiences, not about the absolute "either-or" presence or absence of any feature. As may be easily seen on reflection, such things as beauty, pleasure, sublimity or desire are not exclusively proper to the artistic experience alone. They constitute precisely those elements which effect the re-integration of the artistic experience with the total web of lived experience, and are the clues for exploring the question of the influence of art on human culture more generally. Not only are mediated aspects necessary for total artistic affect, but conversely, the unique quality which I claim characterized artistic experiences permeates and contributes to the total affect of many types of experiences not normally thought of as "artistic" proper.

Let us specify the aesthetic object as that object which pleases us inasmuch as it is known. The features of the aesthetic object are therefore, (1) that the experience of a subject is such that it (the experience) is understood as being related to an object; (2) that in some sense the object is understood as being related to pleasantness in some sense; and (3) that this pleasantness is distinguished from the causal efficacy of the object to produce pleasure in any way other than that it is known. It is clear that there are aesthetic objects which do not fall under the specification of art as I am herein describing the artistic experience, and conversely, there are artistic objects (or experiences) which need not necessarily be aesthetic, or, if they are also aesthetic, not aesthetic because of their artistic nature proper and solely because of their artistic nature, but because of something else (which something else we will not, however, at this point specify).

The pleasant is furthermore to be distinguished from the aesthetic, as the experience of pleasantness may be caused or
related to something, some other source than the mere knowledge of the object. If we call this sort of object the merely sensuously pleasant, we may easily see that an object can be both sensuously pleasant and aesthetic at the same time, but, of course not for the same reasons.

**Beauty as a Criterion--the Objectivization of Beauty**

Predicating beauty of an artistic product has two aspects; the first, the sense of beauty which the perceiver acknowledges, and, secondly, the intention to predicate that beauty of the object (or, "as of" the object). The wish to remove the sense of beauty from the subjective realm, where it would seem it can never be more than an opinion, and to objectively validate the perception of beauty in a manner analogous to that of cognitive truth, and ultimately certainty is certainly a central problem for the theory of art. Were there never any human disagreements about which are and are not to be categorized as "objectively beautiful," there would be no problem. What evokes the sense of beauty in one individual "ought to" evoke that same sense in all others who see (or "experience") what the first did. The discussion of beauty as an objective phenomenon is one which has been carried on at great length during the course of the history of philosophy; I have nothing essential to add, for it does not serve my purposes here to come to any conclusions about the topic. It will suffice to note the differences of opinion, and to seek the correlates which will account for the differences. However we do note in passing that the predicate of beauty, like that of formal perfection, is one which may be applied not only to artistic productions but to other classes of experiences as well; furthermore, just as again in the case of formal perfection, artistic production might be quite engrossing about which it might not occur to one to predicate beauty.

Can it be that, even in the case of, for example, Kant, that he has succumbed to defending some residue of a naturalistic
position in attempting to justify the objectivization of beauty? Does he not wish to not carry through his critical position? Kant, and many other critical thinkers who formally subscribe to the humanist ideal, may still on occasion lapse into the naturalist notion.

For example, in grounding the natural sciences, the scientific laws which are used to describe reality are taken as successive approximations approaching in adequacy the object as it ultimately is, in the naturalist attitude, while for the humanist, the laws are good or valid by precisely the same criteria, but they are seen as mere points of departure for successively higher syntheses of manifolds. The Critique of Pure Reason, in its epistemological enterprise, can still be understood as serving both viewpoints; the Critique of Judgment clearly does not. The criterion of beauty in art is probably the most refined criterion to which the radical naturalist has access. For the humanist, however, there is a yet more refined aspect of the sort of things that art can say, if it were but understood.
CHAPTER III

THE RANGE OF THE HUMAN SPIRIT AS MANIFEST IN THE WORK OF ART

The Understanding of Lived Time: Art as Expression of the Understanding of the Emergent Future

In the previous chapter, we discussed the work of art as a fixed, bounded, delimited thing given in perception; or as an experience with specific borders, which was to be perceived and understood apart from a context in historic time, understood as a pure a-historical presentation of a sensuous given in which an idea, equally a-historical, was to be communicated. Our discussion was then conducted under the assumption that we were dealing with an object which might be perceived much as might any object, except that we were proceeding to draw distinctions focusing on the case where the artistic posture was observed to be present. We have noted aspects under which artistic objects may be understood.

We must now shift our focus to a consideration of the full range of the potential of human understanding. Instead of noting what this or that particular artistic experience reveals to a given individual, we must now consider the kinds of things that could be seen in an artistic experience. It is well known that the "same" artistic object can be understood in different ways under different circumstances, or differently by different people. We must now turn to a discussion of differences which are not accountable merely by differences in the accidents of perception, but by differences in basic subjective attitudes, by differences in (if one will) "value-systems."

Many writers have attempted to discuss theories of fine
arts by analysis of the inner features of the work of art itself. The analysis is conducted on the premise that the "form" of the work can be understood by noting the perceptual and cognitive affect of the work seen as the result or function of the inter- relationship of the parts seen as constituting a whole. By examining these formal relationships it is hoped that some feature can be demonstrated which will vindicate the value and quality of the work of art. While this approach is praiseworthy as far as it goes as an attempt at a theory of art, it suffers from certain inherent difficulties. One minor difficulty is the preconception that a work of art is a "thing," a sort of delimited object. Such a theory must operate under the assumption that the norm of art is the production of fixed objects such as, in visual art a drawn image, or, in the field of music, the notion of a "composition," i.e., a piece of music that can be repeated in essentially unchanged form more or less at will. Having adopted such a methodology, one must regard any artistic product which is not specifically delimited as exceptional. Any improvisation might be just such a piece of artistic work.

But there is yet a more basic difficulty. There is a type of mental set, whether in philosophy, art criticism or general world-outlook which is concerned with "things!; with the world as a given, which is progressively to be discovered, in which man is to come to understand its possibilities and limitations, and to operate within them. This posture I wish to characterize as the "naturalistic" or natural attitude. Examining the world, it seeks to learn the nature of the world and to understand the underlying principles which make the world what it is.

Alternatively, there is another mode of thought, another approach to the problems of life which operates on a very different set of assumptions. If, for example, we start to think about human life, starting, not from the point of view of regarding the world as a given, but rather starting from the standpoint of lived human experience, we may proceed, not to determine the nature of the
world, but of man's capacities to understand the world, and ultimately to intervene in the world to change it. This point of view is what I understand by the term "humanism." The history of modern philosophy in the West, most emphatically since the time of Descartes, has been concerned especially with epistemology, that is, with the science of understanding the nature of the mind to know and to act. In the natural philosophies, the mind approaches the object with the intention of coming to a successively more adequate understanding of it; the humanist approach, on the other hand, is to see the mind's successive development of understanding as a progressive unfolding of the mind's own nature. Such is the theme of the greatest modern philosophers, most notably Kant, Hegel, and Husserl. The naturalist sees the world as fixed and given, within which man must adapt himself. The humanist is concerned with the progressive unfolding of man's own nature. The "natural" attitude is to understand that there is a world, of which man is a part, and that there is a continuity between man and nature; the humanist approach wishes to emphasize, not man's continuity with nature (which he does not deny) but rather that which sets man apart from the rest of nature, that which makes man unique in the universe. That feature is, of course, man's reason, understood as the self-developing and self-determining activity of thought as effective in the world of things. The acknowledgement of the presence of reason in the life of man, and the acknowledgement of reason's powers and the adoption of an attitude of confidence in those powers is a theme that may be said to have come into prominence during the era of classical humanism. We wish here to specify and isolate that theme so that we may trace it through many currents of history, in order to take note of its manifestations occurring in complicity with other themes; we will, I believe, note a progressive unfolding and clarification of that idea. The adoption of this attitude as a conscious and habitual posture, which we wish to specify as a theme of emerging humanism, allows for the development of a type of theory
of human knowledge and a theory of human nature which is unique to it alone; progressively more confident affirmation of the commitment to the adequacy of reason as a radically fundamental regulative principle distinguishes the emerging humanist posture from any of several conflicting alternative ideologies.

The commitment to the adequacy of reason is the necessary precondition for the understanding of time as ground of the emerging infinite potential of human evolutionary development.

The naturalist, as well as the humanist, can understand form, pleasure, emotion, and even beauty in art; each can understand statements which art makes about time in a kind of pluperfect sense, i.e., of a time in the future in which the known will have been suffered to undergo a rearrangement, a permutation of elements already known and familiar. Only under the humanist assumption of radical commitment to the adequacy of reason, can the nature of time be understood in such a way as to allow for artistic statements about the truly new (or the truly new in any field, not only in art); therefore truly humanist art is bound to be misunderstood by the unreconstructed naturalist, the anti-humanist.

How art may speak of different qualities of the future is a very difficult topic to discuss. Art cannot create de novo the conditions necessary for human beings to understand it. It can only appeal to, and to reinforce, what there is already existing in human beings in terms of their potential for understanding. Any artistic statement about time and the future which requires a type of understanding which presupposes a range of possibilities beyond that which one might a priori allow will be dismissed just as reference to any other tabooed topic. Not only must the attitude toward time which is expressed be taken into account, but also the intensity of that expression. An important feature of high art is that it makes strong statements about time. As we shall discuss, visual art removed the thing represented from immediate time and immediate causal efficacy in order to deal symbolically with
the idea of the thing represented (in many cases); this is not, to be sure, the total reason or explanation for generating a work of visual art; however, consideration of some of its mediatable aspects for this reason is one possible motivation for creating an object which is a visual art image. Visual art, as it were, "freezes" time, makes time stand still, in the objective sense so that the subjective time has freer rein. On the other hand, music, which requires time for its unfolding, is itself at once an instance of time and a statement about time's nature; the particular understanding of that statement is a sample, an instance (not a mere symbolic expression) of that sense of time.

However, the nature of the understanding of time may vary, over the whole range of human possibilities, striking a responsive chord in those people who share that particular conviction, and who then understand that particular work of art as reinforcing their own frame of mind. Men may have a strongly conservative attitude toward time, or a strongly progressive sense of time; their postures may range over anything in between the two extremes. Art likewise may make statements ranging over the whole course of possibilities, and those statements will occasion responses in those prepared to receive them as corroborating their own views, while being dismissed by those not so disposed.

Men's sense of emerging future as that which is to be experienced in the progressive unfolding of times as part of the one time in which experience can occur must be sharply distinguished from all other notions about time, especially "time" as understood eschatologically. The eschatological understanding of time, as exemplified by the teachings of the major religions whose theologies or doctrines include reference to an after-life or any philosophy whose teaching about time is other than that all time is one, and always moves in one direction only, i.e., from future to present, present to past (as against "cyclical" doctrines of time) are not to be confused with that use of the word "time" as referring to the experience of the emerging future. Although the word "time" is
used for both situations, and although they may be believed by
some to be connected (that belief being the result of confusion),
and, although they do not exclude one another, they can never-
theless always be understood to be different and to be distin-
guishable from one another, to be each mutually specifically
qualified in some way. Exactly how that differentiation may be
specified would have to be discussed in reference to the individual
case. For example, even if someone proposes to argue that the
"time" referred to when speaking of lived experiences is "unreal," as
contrasted to "real" eschatological time, this argument itself
refers to two types of "reality," one held to be "real," the
other, "unreal." Such, for example, is the teaching of the
hindus, who regard the world of lived experience as "maya,"
i.e., illusion. There is, of course, always the possibility that
one may always fail to make the distinction between lived time and
eschatological time, which difficulty can always in principle be
resolved by appropriate reflection.

The understanding of the future as emerging from the
lived experience of time, i.e., of time as experienced, and the
expectation of a future which will be part of that one time, and
will have as a feature a present of time flowing is the type of
understanding of time and a sense of emergent future that we wish
to discuss.

Eschatological time and lived time must be distinguished.
One's understanding of each of them respectively may be quite
different. One whose understanding of reality allows for the
existence of eschatological time might view that time with optimism
or anxiety; his understanding of lived time might also range from
optimism to anxiety without the two sets of attitudes having any
necessary influence on one another. . . .

In the subsequent discussion, we will use the word "time"
primarily to mean lived time as distinguished from eschatological
time. We may take note, parenthetically, that art may also speak
of eschatological time, and we may note as well that one may
impute to eschatological time a wide range of features. We do not deny that a work of art may speak of such time; however, we must insist that, while perhaps it may do so, it does not neglect to make a statement about lived time as well. It will be our concern in examining all works of art, even those that are overtly or otherwise concerned with eschatological time, to disclose those features of those works which speak of lived time, in the sense in which we are here using that word.

Historically, God (or a supreme infinite spiritual being) as guarantor of man's unique nature, i.e., his reason, was understood in a certain way, because it was presented in the context of a practical order which had certain characteristics, and the notion of God as guarantor of man's reason (and hence his dignity) was contaminated by the association with that circumstance. That associated circumstance was namely the notion that the world was fixed, closed, essentially complete and given, the totality being implicitly present to God's infinite knowledge and foreknowledge. Contrast if you will the notion of God as fixed infinite with the notion of God as moving, developing, evolving infinite. The notion of the self-development of man's reason is in no essential conflict with the notion of God as infinite developing process, but it is in most definite conflict with the notion of traditional mediaeval Christian theology, which saw God as fixed infinite substance. The notion of a God to whom is attributed at least as much as is attributed to that reason as found in man; however it is in most definite conflict with a theological notion of a deity which is not believed to possess at least what may be imputed to man.

I maintain that a very important affective resource of works of art is the means whereby they present reference to one type or another sense of emergent future, from among the range of possibilities. We wish, in turning to works of art themselves, and turning to the observed lived understanding of those works by perceivers, to consider both how the sense of time is expressed, and also to consider what that posture is. Ranging over the course
of works of art both in historic times, as well as contemporary expression, considering alike the high art of cultures as well as artifacts of daily life, industrialized societies as well as ethnic groups, we shall wish to examine the artistic products of all these kinds with a hypothesis that they all, in some way, speak of a sense of time and of a viewpoint toward the emergent future. We shall, in the course of our analysis, be concerned with two things simultaneously. First, since we maintain that all art in some way contains as a disguised, mediatable feature some sense of posture before time, we shall be inquiring what that posture is. Secondly, we shall allow that that posture can be strongly expressed, or diffidently expressed; we shall be particularly interested in those cases which might corroborate the hypothesis that in general the high art of a culture makes clear and strong statements about that sense of time, and that this sense of time, as it finds expression in the art, is representative of either the collective mentality in fact, or at least of the sort of mentality which the ruling class of the society (who are thus the patrons of the high art) would wish to promulgate.

Indeed, one might almost define "great" art, the high art of any age or culture, as that art which makes strong statements about time. A good case could be made (with exceptions, to be sure) that greatness in art is almost synonymous with conviction of statement about the nature of and feeling toward time, conceived as expectation about the future. Conversely, entertainment (as categorization of an artistic product) is characterized by pusillanimity about posturing toward the future, and therefore can be accepted by people whose attitudes toward time might be widely divergent, without calling in to question their attitudes or challenging their commitment.  

Surveying the vast spectrum of human culture, one finds

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1 The German word for entertainment is "Zeitvertreib," literally "driving away time." This is stronger than the English "pastime."
the most diverse forms of activity; many cultures do not even have a separate category for artistic activity or productions, while still others can be found who use artistic materials for widely divergent and even contrary purposes. The one thing, the common denominator, through which all the divergent forms of human art can be compared, is the nature of the expression of man's attitudes toward time, and his understanding of the emergent future.

The analysis of man's attitudes toward future time is the necessary link in comparing the arts over all times and places. The social, economic, political and technological circumstances of man's existence condition (but do not determine) his attitude toward the future. His attitude toward the future, in turn, conditions (but does not determine) his attitude toward artistic and other cultural productions.

In any given instance, one's attitude toward his own future, and toward the future in general is not strictly deducible from, nor reducible to, any circumstances of personal history. At large, there may well be (as I believe there most certainly is), a broad general correlation between circumstances and attitudes. Given circumstances in which there has been little or no fruitful result from a spirit of enterprise, where attempts at creative thought have had little or no practical impact in improving life, there well may be a conservative attitude toward the future, and a lacuna of vision regarding human potentialities, considering society at large. Nevertheless, individuals may still be found, who devise improved ways of doing things, and who succeed at last in convincing their neighbors to emulate them, or to at least adopt the fruits of their own creative efforts. On the other hand, abundant success in improving life as the result of creative mentation about the world and the materials in it, may still lead to a situation where the fruits of such labors are indeed enjoyed, but the process of further improvement may not be valued, or, indeed may be looked on with suspicion.

Nevertheless, it is true that people, given similar circum-
stances, especially contemporaneous social interaction, exhibit a convergence of ideas and expectations which are self-reinforced by the very process of being stated. This is especially true if the common, i.e., social, attitude is well understood, as would be the case where a whole society has had a long tradition of a consistent, unchanging and unquestioned attitude. The art, the myth, the stories, the religion all converge to the point where the individual internalized this attitude so thoroughly that the very language and rhetoric of the society become identified with thought and reality.

To propose that art is an expression of attitudes about time and specifically about the future is to strike at once at the heart of all philosophy of art and all personal beliefs about the world. The most speculative of all human activities, namely philosophy, has surprisingly little to say about the nature of the future, at least in an explicit way. We find topics such as free will, the will, creativity, hope, evolution, eschatology, the problem of mortality, etc., all concerned with, implicitly, the nature of the personal future, but the crucial nature of the problem has not been explicitly touched. We cannot, by definition, have an experience of the future; the most we can have is the experience of an evolving present, and a belief that the future will become present. To say that we cannot experience what is not yet may seem a quaint truism; but the practical implication of such an observation is that, while all sorts of observations can be offered in explanation of a program of future expectations, it is very difficult to specify and select certain facts among a total life experience and to then say that a certain image of the future must be the result. Not only are we incapable of this from a practical point of view (given our scientific knowledge today to weight the various factors), but we can never be sure of having all the important facts. No mere analysis of historical data, no matter the degree of refinement, can determine an attitude toward the lived future.

We wish to substantiate the claim that works of art can be
understood, in a crucially important sense, as expressing an attitude toward a sense of emerging future. We shall proceed by first investigating select cases where there is strong evidence for a particular attitude, and where the art which is generated among men possessing the attitude is known; we will be prepared to observe whether there are common features in that art which will be traceable to the antecedent mental posture. We shall select, for examples to be considered, those sorts of cases which seem clearly to exemplify conditions representative of the extremes of the range of possibilities presented in known historical circumstances. We will consider first the case of extreme conservatism, and its expression in art. Then we will turn our attention to a consideration of the possibility of the expression of humanist optimism, and will note the correlations between mental outlook and its expression in art in that case. Following this, some brief observations will be offered on selected instances of various types of artistic products. Finally, some suggestions will be made for developing a methodology of analysis for general cases, with emphasis on the notion that art conditions and reinforces mental attitudes, as well as being an expression of them.

It is impossible to "predict" what sort of art or artistic style features might be generated or preferred by a person or a society simply by virtue of knowing any one specific feature or set of features about his or its attitude toward the world. Art is always the expression, albeit perhaps frequently disguised, of one or another aspect of the whole man, and the whole man is infinitely beyond any finite specification. In specifying any set of features, we can never be sure that we have not overlooked something of greater importance.

While it is impossible to predict art on the basis of any finite knowledge, it is both possible and fruitful to examine cases where men are known to have held certain attitudes and expectations as important aspects of their total world-view, and where these same men have also expressed themselves in art. We do
this for the purpose of testing the hypothesis that there is a corre-
lation between them, that there is the possibility that their
world-view might indeed find expression in art. Among the
sorts of things we might look for and expect to find in one form
or another, we wish in particular to note what that art might
express about its creator's (or patron's) attitude toward time
and how it expresses his sense of the potential of the emergent
future.

Every human being has a certain understanding of time,
in one sense or another, over the range of possibilities. (What
the extremes of possibilities of such attitudes are, we leave
to further investigation to discuss.) That attitude itself might
be more or less explicitly conscious, or might be habitual but
implicit. The sense may change; that change might be motivated
by the circumstance of experience, but is more particularly
motivated by reflection on that experience.

Once we have made the discovery (as we claim to have
done) that this attitude can be expressed in art, and, furthermore
that there is in fact always a sense of that expression on one level
or another, we may proceed to enquire how in particular this
expression is accomplished.

We call for an analytical approach toward the question of
the meaning of art as expression of posture before time. In the
examples of art which I have chosen, I have maintained that cer-
tain features of art speak of a certain attitude toward time. Under
the hypothesis that art may, and, in fact always does speak of a
sense of time, let us examine the whole range of world art, and
let us ask ourselves how that sense of time may find expression.

Several of the examples I have chosen are examples of
extreme trauma. I have chosen these examples because in such
cases one might reasonably suppose that the overwhelming in-
fluence of that trauma would cause a well-defined, clear and
comparatively straightforward mental set in those who experienced
it. As we move away from the circumstances of extreme trauma,
the relationship between external circumstances and mental set is never again so clear or so extreme.

However, whatever is expressed in the art of men under any circumstances is present because of its appeal to its patrons, an appeal which will range over the whole field of human needs and desires. In many cases, the understanding of time, expectations, and the sense of the emergent future may be only very obscurely and obliquely expressed; such cases of art may perhaps be of interest on other grounds. Those cases of art where a sense of time is strongly expressed will merit special discussion.

We are in no sense maintaining that the artistic expression of the sense of time is the central concern of art in general; but we do maintain that many important instances of art do concern themselves with expressing a sense of emergent future and expectations of time. The expression of that sense of time as found in art is of course not necessarily the result of coming to a position well thought out, achieved and decided only after much philosophic reflection. That sense of time can be found in any state of emerging awareness, from deliberate repression to well-considered avowal. In like manner, it can span the range of possibilities of understanding of, and attitude toward time from numbing apprehensiveness to improvident optimism.

The Conservative Mentality in its Artistic Expression

We wish to identify and locate examples in the panorama of human experience which are instances of a conservative outlook on the future, instances where a habit of fear and caution are prevalent. The most obvious such examples might well be found among circumstances where life is in reality insecure, where indeed the range of previous experience has been one of hardship, uncertainty, material poverty, and lack of control over the vicissitudes of natural calamities. Such circumstances are abundantly
to be found in technologically undeveloped, "primitive" ethnic cultures. To be sure, there is, even in very backward and traumatizing circumstances, occasional evidence of innovative behavior, and also some evidence of the human spirit transcending the immediate misery of circumstances, some sense of happiness, joy and elan. Nevertheless, in the broad view, we maintain that in these societies the overwhelming thrust of circumstances is to encourage a very conservative mentality in behavior. An interesting argument for the discouragement of innovative behavior generally among such societies is given by a writer concerned with the topic of the history of technology, L. Sprague de Camp. He notes that, during the course of human prehistory, examples can be sporadically found that give evidence of an inventive capacity in man's nature which can be traced back into the Pleistocene Period. Nevertheless, technological progress was slow.

The reasons for the sloth of invention in primitive societies are not hard to understand. For one thing, primitive peoples live a hand-to-mouth existence. Most of their foods cannot be stored, so that they have no economic surplus. Therefore they can less well afford to risk experiment than more advanced peoples. If an experiment fails, they die.

As a result, primitive societies are very conservative. Tribal customs prescribe exactly how everything shall be done, on pain of the gods' displeasure. An inventor is likely to be liquidated as a dangerous deviationist.

Peasant farmers are almost equally conservative. Man's inventive faculties are stimulated by the breakdown of established custom that takes place in the urban environment; hence most inventions have been made by city dwellers.²

Before the rise of cities, the opportunities for the dispersal of an innovative idea were restricted, especially during the era when human beings lived in hunting bands, which were, with good reasons, isolated from similar bands, whom they regarded as rivals for the food supply of an area, and with whom they were not disposed to cooperate. If such a hunting band consisted of, perhaps, forty-five to fifty people, then that band has at its dis-

posal the inventive talents that might be found, say, in a random
group of such a number.

Innovative behavior, by its very nature, is behavior the
outcome of which is not known in advance. Indulgence in such
behavior is conditioned by several factors: if, in a given society
with a total amount of time, energy and resources available,
a large percentage of that total must be spent on simply main-
taining the material conditions of that society, then the surplus
available for experimentation is small. The ratio of surplus to
maintenance requirements must exceed a certain point before
a significant amount of surplus is available for such speculative
behavior, which itself must compete for attention among other
leisure activities. The social conditions must be such that the
results of successful innovation can be both received positively
in society and communicated efficiently. Comparing a small
isolated society with a society in which large numbers of people
can easily and effectively interchange ideas, one can readily see
that the smaller society has less innovative talent at its disposal,
assuming that talent to be distributed more or less randomly,
and also has less opportunity to build up a record of experience
of successful innovation. Furthermore, the social and political
circumstances of a society influence innovative behavior as well.

The reason that we have discussed innovative behavior
is that there is a link between innovative behavior generally
and the activity of indulging in artistic creation. Artistic crea-
tion is a subdivision, a type, of innovative activity generally; it
has its similarities with other types of innovative, creative behav-
ior because it has in common with those other types of creative
behavior similar features in the mental faculties and attitudes of
men, which they use when they so act. The dividing line between
artistic and other types of creativity is not sharp; very similar
mental processes can be shown to be at work in the several in-
stances. Men's attitudes toward innovative behavior, toward its
desirability, toward its efficaciousness and toward its nature as
process will therefore find expression in the art that they patronize. Men's lived circumstances, their expectations about their environment, their mental set, and their art all have their influence on one another. We emphasize that the relationship is not seen as deterministic; however, the observed broad correlations urge themselves quite cogently.

If we maintain, as a reasonable generalization, that a history of straitened economic circumstances, coupled with the expectation that such circumstances are, in the course of immediate practical options, not alterable, will generally encourage a conservative cast of mind, we may now proceed to the consideration of how such a mentality expresses itself in art, and in the various forms of symbolic expression which men engage in as consequence of their mental aspect of their life.

What we wish to do is to locate several human societies with a history of extremely traumatic, straitened physical circumstances coupled with an attitude on the part of the members of those societies that such circumstances are more than just local or temporary, but overwhelmingly condition expectations. We then wish to examine the artistic products generated by such a mentality, on the hypothesis that such tensions will be reflected in some way in that art. We will also wish to examine situations where there has been a previous history of such circumstances which have been transformed, and to some degree alleviated, again noting any transformation of artistic styles with which might be understood as an expression of that transformed psychic posture which we might expect as a result of the alteration of material circumstances. We might summarize our hypothesis by saying that: (1) material circumstances condition attitudes; and (2) the attitude will be expressed in artistic products. We first turn our attention to extreme cases (in the first case to be examined, that of extreme trauma) because in the extreme cases we may find the clearest and least complicated and overlaid features which we wish to uncover, about the relationship.
We may begin by first considering the nature of tensions and their transformation onto artistic expressions. Frustrations of need and impulse give rise to tensions in the emotional life; these tensions may be transformed into symbolic (i.e., proto-artistic) expressions:

Human beings, like other biological organisms, spontaneously seek to preserve themselves and to fulfill their needs and desires. Their success depends upon the degree to which they are able to achieve a profitable relationship with their environment. On the positive side, they must win from that environment the facilities necessary for their maintenance and satisfaction, such as food, shelter, and mate. On the negative side, they must defend themselves against whatever difficulties and dangers the environment imposes, whether these result from disease, famine, wild animals, human enemies, or other causes.

Among the internal resources employed by the organism in its interplay with the environment is psychic energy—a kind of mental-emotional drive that serves as an activating and directing force in promoting fulfillment and resisting opposition. The flow of such energy appears, as Jung puts it, "in the specific, dynamic phenomena of the mind, such as instinct, wishing, willing, affect, attention, power of work, etc."

For our purpose a technical term for psychic energy hardly seems necessary, but it may be noted in passing that we are here dealing with what Jung technically calls "libido." Freud uses the latter term in an equivalent but narrower sense, restricting it to the "instinctual forces of the sexual life."

The normal discharge of psychic energy is in action of a kind appropriate to satisfy a given need or overcome a given difficulty. . . .

When, for any reason, an impulse fails to find expression in action, a certain amount of unused psychic energy accumulates in the organism and sets up what we may call tensions.

Tensions originating in this manner affect life in a variety of ways. In diffused form, they color our moods and influence our general well-being, exhilarating us if the tension is a positive one resulting from a delayed but anticipated fulfillment, depressing us if it is a negative result of difficulty or repression. And what particularly concerns us, these tensions stimulate our imagination to form images embodying their emotional essence. The mental-activity through which psychic tensions are thus translated into equivalent forms of mental imagery, we shall call the tension-imagery process. This process, we suggest, is the dynamic agency behind both individual fantasies and forms of cultural expression. In
terms of it we can establish all the correlations that we are seeking between things psychic and material, individual and collective. The basis for these correlations will appear as we proceed.  

Abell then goes on to discuss the mechanism whereby the intensity of symbolic transformation of tensions is increased to the point where it may constitute a dominating force in mental life, going so far as to ultimately be confused with reality and to constitute a basis for a regulative norm of behavior.

With a little effort all of us can detect the tension-imagery process at work in ourselves if we watch any tendencies we may have toward daydreaming. In reverie which is sometimes fully conscious, sometimes a barely perceptible substratum to other mental activities, we may find ourselves being honored for some dreamed accomplishment, meeting a wished-for lover or, if the tension is a negative one, undergoing some trial or embarrassment. If we bring our analytical faculties to bear upon these reveries, we recognize them as fantasies inspired by psychic tensions; in the first case by the desire for approval, in the second by sexual need, and in the third or negative instance, by fear or some other negative tension.

For practical purposes in normal daily living, we learn to distinguish clearly between such fantasies and objective reality, and to devote our main energies to productive action along the lines indicated by objective circumstances. To a certain extent we may indulge in daydreams of desired or anticipated pleasure, but we normally subject our fantasies to as much rational discipline as we are able to maintain. To the fantasy pleasures that are incompatible with our environment we say, "Get thee behind me Satan." The fantasy difficulties, unless they reflect problems demanding immediate attention, we banish as largely as possible from our consciousness. "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof."

The ability which we thus exercise to distinguish fact from fantasy and to separate the one from the other in our thoughts and conduct, is one of humanity's most hardly won and most easily lost accomplishments. It lapses whenever reason ceases to exercise a strict control over our mental operations. In varying degrees, fantasies then become illusions.

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4 Ibid., pp. 60-61.
In the case of extremely traumatic and threatening circumstances, the tensional transformation, in art, or in myth takes a very similar form among many peoples in world culture. Several such instances of transformation are described by Abell, from whose writings the following quotation may be taken as representative of the sort of discussion which he engages in, which deals with the transformation process:

When, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the world circle of racial migrations completed itself and civilized European man established contact with his primitive contemporaries on other continents, he discovered among them, as it were, living records of his own past. Many of these other races were still living under the conditions of the Stone Age. Among them, the Neolithic cultural patterns and mentality which had once characterized Europe, but which had faded from recollection during centuries of civilization, were still active realities. A vast store of information on these surviving prehistoric cultures has been accumulated during recent centuries; a store of information which is of great interest both in its own right and in relation to the lost myths of early Western Europe.

Material available to us from this source appears to support the theoretically projected portion of our evolutionary diagram. Examples are not lacking to substantiate all three of the theoretical suggestions advanced: First, that there is an early mythology of omnipotent monsters; second, that such monsters are not likely to be represented in art so long as a community's experience of them is traumatic; third, that the geometrical art frequently contemporaneous with transcendent monster myths may be in part a recoil from overwhelmingly negative imagery but may also, at least in some cases, refer to such imagery in a guarded indirect manner.5

Out of the number of cases that Abell discusses, we shall select three as examples of preliterate societies in a state of extreme physical trauma; and will consider something of both the myth and the art which was associated with them. In 1603, Samuel de Champlain came upon a tribe of Indians in northeast Canada who possessed among their tribal lore a myth of "Gougou," a gigantic man-eating monster; the Ojibwa Indians spoke of a

5Ibid., p. 141. Italics mine.
creature called "windigo," a giant skeleton made of ice that prowls in winter during time of famine, who represents the spirit of cannibalism; and finally the Indians of the Nass river area of British Columbia who were traumatized by the eruption of a volcano in 1780, believed in a "gnawing squirrel" which they reported to have seen in apparitions, and which they at length imaginatively represented in a totem-pole carving. "Neither Gougou or the windigo it appears were used by those who believed in them as subjects for visual representation in art." 6

The Gnawing-squirrel myth was however at length represented in art. This did not occur until the passage of time caused the memory of the trauma to fade; only then was the collective mentality ready to face even its artistic representation:

"Our Gnawing-squirrel totem provided an ethnological example of ... readjustment. The volcanic explosion that caused the original hallucination took place in 1780; the carving of the totem was not made until approximately 1860. During the eighty years that separated the original trauma from its expression in art, the terror that caused the hallucinations had subsided. Recovery from the shock permitted certain individuals to conceive the fantasy of having "killed" the guardian of the monsters. What had once been a symbol of fear now became a matter of pride. It was the latter association that led to the adoption of the squirrel as a totem and to its visual representation on the pole. 7

Abell further reports the account of Andre Gide in his account of a visit to the Massa tribes of equatorial Africa.

"Here and there," Gide writes, "sometimes in the country, sometimes at the edge of a village, or in the village itself; at the foot of a tree, anywhere in fact, one is surprised to see a small mound of earth, usually painted white, about the size and shape of a beehive. One asks for information--"It is the devil," one is told. I did not succeed in understanding whether they thought that the devil was actually inside the mound, whether it was a propitiatory altar, a devil-trap, a protection or defense against devils. What is certain is that if you see one of these little monuments, a devil is involved." The form of these mounds being abstract, visual examination of them reveals only their abstraction and provides no

6 Ibid., p. 142. 7 Ibid.
due to their symbolic meaning. Only a member of the society that produces the mounds, conversant with their motivation can reveal to us the fact that they are associated with a concept of the devil. We may presume that there are other known instances of such connections between an abstract form and a negative tension concept. Even more important, we may assume that the geometric art of cultures no longer extant may have involved such connections. Without surviving interpreters to indicate its symbolical meaning, that meaning is lost to us, though it may have been more important to the creators of the art than the formal effect which we now see. 8

The point I wish to emphasize in Abell’s discussion is his contention that a preference for geometric, abstract, repetitive, imageless art as the major art of a culture may be correlated to the existence of what he calls "negative tension imagery," and which is similar to what I wish to call "apprehensiveness" and a sense of fear in confronting one’s own lived future. The reader is urged to consult the work in full for a more extended discussion of the issues raised, and also for a more ample breadth of examples cited in support of the contentions. We may, however, quote from his writings in order to summarize his arguments, as follows:

These instances demonstrate the fact that absence of monsters in the art of a given culture can signify the exact opposite of what we might at first suppose. Instead of coinciding with a parallel absence of monsters from the related mythology, it may coincide with mythical monsters so terrible that the artist and his society shrink from the contemplation of them. Psychic repression of the traumatic image, it would seem, results in creative suppression of the image from art.

Only when psychic readjustment has so far progressed as to counteract the negative tensions with emergent positive ones—only when the fears associated with the trauma are modified by a sense of recovery—does a will arise to contemplate the monsters through representations of them in the arts. Stated in terms of tension-imagery, the fantasies become a subject for art only when the dominance of the negative monster-image is offset by the rise of the positive imagery of a hero or other champion of humanity.

The obverse of the same tensional dynamics might well

8Ibid., p. 143.
help to motivate a tendency toward geometrical abstraction in the art of cultures ridden by fears of omnipotent monsters. When negative imagery is overpowering, positive imagery is so weak as to be negligible. If the negative mythological themes are suppressed from art and positive ones are not available to it, the resulting art is left without mythological subject matter. Only two resources remain to it. It can turn to the real objects of the external world for subject matter, or it can have recourse to abstraction through some form of nonrepresentational design. Abstraction seems to be its most frequent and characteristic response. Specific art objects are not available to substantiate this assertion with regard to the traumatic monster complexes cited above. We do know, however, that the pre-Columbian art of the Indians of northeastern Canada tended in general toward geometric abstraction. The same can be said of much of the art produced elsewhere by societies that survived on or near Neolithic cultural horizons.

The possibility still remains that some or all of this abstract art retains an indirect symbolic connection with the suppressed negative imagery. It would, in this case, act as a compromise formation that avoids the full contemplation of the monsters yet permits them indirect recognition. How frequently there is such a connection between monster concepts and abstract design will have to be determined by a wider study of comparative ethnology than has yet been made.

An interesting corroboration for the hypothesis that certain types of art, namely the abstract and geometrical (or generally non-representational), correlate with conservative attitudes comes from a rather unexpected source. Luigi Barzini, in a study of the national character of the Italian nation, makes the following observations:

Fear can also be detected behind the Italians' peculiar passion for geometrical patterns, neat architectural designs, and symmetry in general, which is part of their love for show--mainly the fear of the uncontrollable and unpredictable hazards of life and nature; fear and also its shadow, a pathetic desire for reassurance. This compulsive predilection for regularity can be seen everywhere. It is only rarely utilitarian and seldom satisfies strictly functional needs, as almost always it is merely meant to please the eye and comfort the heart. Fruit and vegetable dealers spend precious minutes of the

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9 Ibid., p. 142. Italics mine.
morning building fragile pyramids of their wares which they will have to demolish in the course of the day. The new maid will stubbornly remove every piece of furniture in your room from its accustomed place, every morning, to satisfy her ideal of symmetrical decorum. She will arrange the bibelots on the mantelpiece until it will look like the parody of an altar. Old gardens leave nothing to chance and unbridled nature. Their complicated patterns of hedges, gravel walks, fountains, statues, always strictly symmetrical, often puzzle the visitor, because they can only be fully admired by people flying over them in balloons, who see them as elaborate tapestries.

Streets, piazze, avenues, public parks, corsi have been planned in rigid symmetry; almost identical churches, like Chinese potiche, flank the opening of an avenue, several streets converge on the same obelisk or monument, similar or identical fountains beckon to each other at the two ends of a long corso. The cultivated countryside is always unnecessarily neat. Saplings in newly-planted woods are always set in military rows. The same obsession with regular patterns can also be traced in invisible things, in absurd rules and regulations which balance prohibitions to this group with prohibitions to that one; in the elaborate outlines of scholarly treatises, in the organizational charts of government bureaus and military units. The greatest Italian literary masterpiece, Dante's Divina Commedia, is so well-ordered that students reading it must buy a plan showing the exact position of Hell, Purgatory and Paradise. It is composed of an introductory canto and three parts, each of thirty-three cantos, each ending with the same word, "stelle."

The word for this is sistemazione. To sistemare all things is considered to be the foremost, perhaps the unique mission of man on earth. Sistemare and sistemazione cannot be exactly translated. The latest dictionary bravely attempts a few well-meaning suggestions, as inaccurate as random artillery shots. Sistemare means, according to its authors, "to arrange, regulate, settle," and sistemazione, naturally enough, "regularization, arrangement, settlement." The English terms are not colloquial and are mainly used in official prose, editorials and scholarly dissertations. The Italian words are, on the contrary, as common as bread and cheese. They occur in everyday conversation. To begin with, sistemare means to defeat nature. Italians sistemano mountain torrents, marshy land, wild animals, spoiled children and unruly populations. "Ti sistemo io!" is a much abused threat. It means, "I will curb your rebellious instincts."

The words are also often used in the sense of "conquest of security." 10

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The difference in circumstances between the examples cited by Abell and those of Barzini are worth noting: in the one case, the art is the high art of a tribe or culture, one sponsored by the spokesmen for the collective mentality, and subscribed to by the collective; in the other case, Barzini speaks of cases which might not normally be included at all in the notion of representative instances of artistic activity, but rather speaks of examples drawn from daily life, a daily life of a people who, moreover, have easily accessible to them, because of their national history, and the accumulated cultural objects left by that history, surrounding them on all sides, such as the churches, palaces, literature, painting, musical compositions, examples of a high art of rich and varied scope. Therefore, it might be argued, that Barzini's analysis, though possibly valid, as far as it goes, is not truly representative of the basic mental posture of the people involved in it. A full discussion of just what would be representative, as well as a critique of the adequacy of such a discussion, is beyond the scope and intention of the present work; it will be sufficient for our purposes here to take note of the problem (of determining the relationship of the features of high art to the artistic features of everyday objects, as expression of basic mental set), as a project for future discussion.

Abell discusses the case of the extremely traumatized state of human experience as engendering a type of non-representational art, and goes on to discuss the emergence of symbolic representation of the image of the traumatizing forces only at the point when a partial mastery of those forces has begun to occur. This occurs primarily when improved circumstances and means have begun to prove their efficacy in dealing with these forces. However, dare we to suggest, that the process of being able to face up to and to deal with these traumatizing forces might indeed be facilitated by the very process of first having the courage to represent them in art? May we not see, in the process of representing the traumatizing forces in artistic images, a
rehearsal, a training in courage, a veritable mental mastery in imagination of the problem, in preparation for real confrontation in the world?

Such a contention should properly be a matter for empirical research; if we were to follow the model of the physical sciences, we might follow, by analogy, the usual procedures for experimentation in the physical sciences, and consider constructing a "controlled experiment" with a control group, single alteration of variables, etc. Or, perhaps, we might wish to devote ourselves to studies of field-cases to see if any cases could be found which would support our contentions, assuming, of course, that field cases could be found that were clear and unproblematic examples supporting our argument, and did not raise all sorts of other issues. We will in fact never have a good, clear example of man increasing his mastery of his world as the result of his rehearsal for that increasing mastery in art—for this reason: that, as soon as art produces the slightest change in attitude toward the feared thing, that change, if it is to be practically effective, must be tested in reality. Therefore any truly effective improvement can never be accounted for solely by art; which of course always leaves open the question of what did in fact adequately cause the effective change? It cannot ever be art alone; the increment produced solely by art is not yet a real change.

The influence of art can be thought of as being "causative by indirection"; of doing something perhaps profound, while seeming, or purporting, not to be overtly doing anything, except "being itself." If someone insists that a work of art "means" something determinate, it is (or at least should always be) possible to argue, if the alleged meaning should prove embarrassing, that the work has been "misunderstood." Its success in lulling the censorship (either political, social, or internalized) is one test of effectiveness of an art work. If a work of art is to speak in its mediated elements of that which is challenging or
confrontational, it cannot go too far, or the "message" will be
exposed and rejected (or repressed, also with rejection of the
work). How far is "too far" can, of course, vary enormously
with circumstances. One has only to consider some of the
propaganda efforts of long-past causes to find examples of ex-
pression that, to those far removed from the original events,
seem almost insultingly silly, fatuous and over-blown; yet some
of those same objects were, in their day, rallying-points for
life-and-death struggles. But even in the midst of such propa-
ganda efforts, works of enduring value may be created, which
transcend the immediate circumstances of their origin, precisely
because they appeal on more than one level of understanding.
However, in addition to forcing or facilitating confrontation, art
may on the other hand provide distraction and mental escape;
art may be a pleasant reinforcement of accepted values.

In the continuation of the essay of Hans Jonas quoted at
length in the first chapter, Jonas goes on to raise the point
of the nature of what is symbolized in the work of art (here
understood as primarily visual art):

In spite of its embodiment, the likeness is unsubstantial,
like a shadow or a mirror image. It can represent the
dangerous without endangering, the harmful without harming,
the desirable without satisfying. What is represented in the
mode of image is, in the image, removed from the causal
commerce of things and transposed to a nodynamic existence
that is the image existence proper—a mode of existence to
be confounded neither with that of the imaging thing nor
with that of the imaged reality. The last two both remain
involved in the movement of becoming. As the imaged
reality goes on in its course, the body of the image-thing,
starting on its own history, continues to be part of the
causal order in whose transactions it assumed its present
condition; but considered in its imaging function it ceases
to count in its own right. Its substantality (whose sole
requisite is to be stable, so as to preserve the image) is
submerged in its symbolic aspect, and therewith its sub-
merged its causal background—not only that of its natural
prehistory (its past as a tree, a rock) but also that of
becoming, under the artist's hands, its present self. 11

11 Jonas, Phenomenon of Life, p. 163. Italics mine.
We can thus easily see how and why images of traumatizing forces might be the subject of the preoccupations of artists and men who were in the process of confronting those traumas. The discussion quoted from Jonas certainly suggests that if symbolic representation of the feared object is engaged in, that process is benign and controlled. It is an instance of an activity unique in the scale of evolution, one in which only men engage, one which compensates them for their relative lack of physical strength, swiftness or other survival resources—-that is, namely, the ability to face problems, but more especially, to think about them, to think them through, to originate increasingly more effective modes of behavior in dealing with them, and finally to communicate those thoughts to other men, both by means of language as well as art, so as to engage their cooperation in confronting those mutual problems.

What we are here considering is a crude elementary case in which art may indeed be both communication of idea, and is also an instance of a psycho-biological resource in the evolution and the ongoing development of man, considered both from the individual as well as from the generic point of view. There is, in the examples we have discussed, a strong, broad correlation which deserves not to be ignored, and which may serve as a starting point for further empirical investigations of greater detail. No doubt, closer critical examination of cases will disclose interesting and significant variations in detail; at this point, however, we must concern ourselves with the broad picture (allowing, to be sure, for the refinement of detail), as we shall wish to cover a wide-ranging field of activity.
Humanism in Art

In order to recognize art which speaks of the infinite potential of the rational powers of the mind, as the humanist understands that potential, two things are necessary for the perceiver. First, he must have developed his own awareness of reason at work in him to the point where the humanist understanding of human nature is a possible category for him. He must be radically committed to a faith in himself as bearer of mind, and to his fellow human beings as to those implicitly who share his humanity. He cannot find in art what he cannot find in himself. His understanding of art will be otherwise limited to the scope of his understanding of reality in general. Though all men have the implicit potential to attain to the humanist understanding of themselves, it is possible (and frequent) that one may have closed off, precluded, fixed his mind at some limiting category. In such a case he will be unable to understand the plenitude of the humanist viewpoint and, what is more serious, will not understand that he does not understand.

But the second condition necessary to understand a work of art as speaking to the nature of lived future time as ground of emerging potential is that one must abandon, one must transcend the notion of the work of art as a fixed and delimited entity, as a bounded thing. Just as emerging future time is understood as emerging process, so the work of art must be understood in context—that context, and the understanding of it being an indispensable part of the total and adequate understanding of the work of art itself. The work must be understood in its total historical context as a process of movement, of development just as history itself. One must understand the work measured against the category of the process of progress toward the humanist ideal of confidence in the powers of reason, not as a fixed, final and static achievement of that ideal. Now it
may be, that, in an individual case, one's understanding of that historical context may be inadequate, vague or even factually inaccurate. Nevertheless, just as the work is itself a manifestation of a process of development, so too its understanding must be seen as an instance of progressive adumbration. It is entirely possible that a work of art, which in the circumstances of its genesis was explicitly meant and understood as progressively advancing the humanist ideal, has subsequently become, through ignorance, or even deliberate suppression of the awareness of the total of its original circumstances, a harbinger of reaction. The humanist idea is hard won and easily lost; sensitivity to that ideal requires a re-commitment by each generation, and a constant vigilance and re-dedication, among those who value the ideal.

A certain level of material resources is necessary to a society before the humanist outlook can be developed; in the condition of a marginal economy, where there is little surplus, conservatism rules, and experimentation is not encouraged. As was suggested in the previous section, the waste caused by unsuccessful experimentation could be disastrous in those conditions, while the result of success might be only a scarcely noticeable increment in the material conditions; not that material success is the only criterion, but the comparison of the projected results of success to the projected results of failure is.

(A less benign commentary on the state of human existence is the observation that one of the clearest cases of encouragement to the humanist outlook occurs under the condition of social conflict known as war.)

It may seem almost trivial or too obvious to make a serious statement that men are creative when, and because, they believe it possible and important to be so. But in fact the naturalist position does not allow for this possibility. I.e., the possibility of creativity such as the humanist understands the term.
The arts have existed in all times and places where men have lived in society. But it is only the humanist art, i.e., the art created under humanist assumptions in various states of clarity and levels of emergence, that can appeal to the humanist notion of a sense of progressive future, and which can only be fully understood by one who is himself a developed humanist.

The difference between the naturalist and the humanist is not to be found in comparing their understanding of reality as given, of what in fact exists, or of its nature. The difference between them is to be found in comparing their understanding of what does not exist (as yet), i.e., in their relative assumptions, in their relative understanding, of their own emergent potential, and the range of possibilities implicit both in their own personal futures and of mankind in general.

Let us now turn to known instances in which creative human mentation is engaged in as a deliberate, self-conscious habit of activity. Let us investigate the hypothesis that creative activity in the arts, as also in the formation of social institutions, and in scientific and technological work is to be found importantly among people operating under the humanist assumption of the regulative notion that they, as individuals, as members of society, and as members of the whole social human species, can indeed use their minds effectively to know both the world of nature as well as themselves; that they can use their mental powers to intervene effectively in the world of nature; that they can indeed create, and by their creative activity effect a real augmentation of the total fund of human knowledge; and of power over the vicissitudes of nature; and operating furthermore on the assumption that they may and should do this, that it is important that they do, and finally, that such activity is the normal, healthy mode of human life. Creativity in all fields, I maintain, will not be found only where there is an accumulation of given knowledge on which to operate, but the more general condition for its presence will be found where there is a healthy
and basic confidence in the powers of mind to know and to
creatively confront and solve problems of reality.

Let us also investigate the further notion that whenever
the fruits of such activity are to be found, not in single instances
necessarily, but as an habitual and connected enterprise, they
may be traceable to the guiding influence of just such a regula-
tive notion. 12

We wish to find an example in the world of art where ar-
tistic production is known to have been, or strongly believed to
have been, or where there is strong evidence for the contention
that the work has been undertaken consciously and deliberately
(awededly) in expression of those values which we shall broadly
characterize as humanist. Before specifying the case to be
considered, we must first undertake to clarify several points.
First of all, the humanist posture is not a fixed and static at-
titude; it is a process, a movement, a development, a developing
awareness of men of their own nature. Accordingly, we must
seek, not a fully developed statement of a humanist position,
but rather we must look for evidence of a developing sense of the
humanist point of view emerging in an historic context, perhaps,
and indeed most likely in a context of conflict with all sorts of
other themes, as well as all sorts of residual doubts, diffidence
and insecurities. We must look for a sense of the emergence
of humanist themes in a given historic context. Secondly, we
must allow for the fact that what will constitute expression of
these humanist themes will be different at different stages in the
context of historical development. An expression which at one
stage of human history might be an example of progressive devel-
opment of the humanist outlook, might, in a later time, a time
when that development in turn ought to have been transcended in

12. However, a distinction must be made between the pro-
cess of creativity under the assumption of its possibility, and the
valuing of and the receptivity toward the fruits of such endeavors,
on the other hand, as divorced from the process.
turn in order to give rise to the next stage of development and expression, might be a repressive and reactionary regression to a stage of suppression of that ideal.

Also, we cannot merely restrict ourselves to an examination of the artistic product as delimited thing in seeking for evidences of this emerging humanist ideal. In fact, we can set no prior limits at any point on the nature of the kinds of things called into evidence; each argument will have to be determined by its own rules in the case at hand. Each case will call forth its own criterion for the degree of appropriateness or validity of argument as to the extent to which it furthers or substantiates our contention or not. What this means primarily, but not exclusively, is that we must consider the social context of the work, especially understood as represented by the internalized audience of the artist, such as we may be able to determine his (or their) intentions in the matter. To do this, we must examine not only the art itself, but also the statements of the artist(s) about the nature of his (their) artistic intention, and turn our attention to biographical details of his life. We must especially consider the progress of his historical development as an artist, as evidenced in his artistic productions.

In attempting to speak of humanist expression in art, we are dealing with cases which are not by any means so clear-cut as the cases we have heretofore considered. We must therefore carefully prepare and develop the criteria for our discussion, as we are not, by any means, to find examples so accessible as those which express the ordinary, familiar sentiments of daily life. We must be content to disclose evidence of a process, content to marshall forth facts of historical circumstance which may be understood to converge toward support of our contention of the presence of a process of emerging humanism, in the sense of faith in man's powers to face his unique future.
The Career and Artistic Production of Ludwig Van Beethoven as Expression of the Humanist Viewpoint

We wish to consider the life and artistic productions of Ludwig Van Beethoven in the light of the theme of expression of emerging humanism. Biographical studies of Beethoven and his music abound, and it is not my intention to produce yet another biography; it is my intention, however, to examine the man and his work in order to trace the expressions of humanist themes through these works, looking for evidence of ever-greater progressively emerging expressions of the humanist viewpoint; to consider that theme not only as it may be found in his work, to emphasize certain aspects of his work as expressing that theme, but also in its expression as it was to be found in the society around him, and especially in the period immediately prior to and contemporary with the period of his main creative activity. Surely, Beethoven's music is sufficiently highly regarded that it does not need yet one more apologia to convince those familiar with it of its merits; nevertheless, the notion that his music can be seen as an expression of the emergent humanist posture is one that may have escaped explicit consideration in many who otherwise have a high regard for it.

Beethoven was, as a composer, one of the greatest geniuses. Many things, many expressions can be found in his music. His music may be understood to mean the whole range of human feelings, might be a consolation, or, in turn, might be an inspiration for men over the whole gamut of their emotional lives. But it is yet more--more than merely emotional, more than merely inspirational. It is an instance of the emerging integration of that which makes man uniquely human--namely, his reason--with his emotional life.

Art may frequently be understood to range from the ex-
tremes of the intellectual to the extremes of the emotional; the so-called contrast between the Apollonian and the Dionysian postures. Curt Sachs, in his work, The Commonwealth of Art, deriving his terminology from Nietzsche, attempts to trace art-styles in western art on the basis of the polarity of such features. His analysis is inadequate; such an analysis attempts to fragment, polarize and dichotomize what was originally a unity, namely the integration, under reason, of man's emotional needs with his intellectual capacities. Commenting on the inadequacy of the polar approach, specifically in reference to Beethoven's music, Sidney Finkelstein makes the following observation:

Also assisting at the mystification of Beethoven's art, and in fact of all art, is the theory, popular among the self-styled "scientific" critics of today, that "thought" must be separated from "feeling." Things are presumed to be seen clearly only when divested of emotions, or removed from human relationships. Emotions are properly felt only if divested from the things that engendered them, or as the mysterious forces of the "unconscious." The result is not scientific clarity, but only a dehumanisation of art, so that a music is created as if it consisted of little puzzles of sound patterns, and emotions are treated as if they were inexplicable apparitions of the "unconscious."14

This sense of integration, which we may call the Promethean, which we are prepared to observe in Beethoven's music, is not, to be sure, equally well exemplified by all artistic products in general. Many artistic products are overtly and avowedly committed to expressing something either less than, or other than, the plenitude of the human spirit, such as we understand the promethean to be. Other artistic products may perhaps be more properly and fruitfully understood and analysed without reference to the sort of holistic integration that the term "prometheanism"


implies, since, for those other several works, it is not a factor which can be understood to have been emphasized as important. Beethoven's music represents a particularly good case of an art which explores an extreme frontier of the range of a certain type of artistic potential.  

It is this expressly promethean character which gives Beethoven's music its claim to be an expression of not merely the emotional, but of something much more.

Before considering the artistic activity of Beethoven in detail, let us highlight those factors in the history of his era which bear upon our discussion.

Beethoven was born in 1770; his life spanned a period in European history which was characterized by turmoil and reformation in the political, social and ideological spheres. When he was six years of age, the American Revolution occurred. The Declaration of Independence spoke of the notion that "all men (were) created equal." In 1789, when he was nineteen, he witnessed the French Revolution, which overthrew the feudal order in that country, and later saw the ascendancy of Napoleon Bonaparte, a ruler whom many regarded, at least until they were disillusioned, as the champion of a new order of human political liberty. Beethoven himself was to take advantage of the new social order. He spurned employment under court or church patronage, the situation hitherto usual for aspiring composers; instead, he chose to negotiate for payment for his works on the "open market," thus acknowledging that the economic potency of the previous, feudal order had waned. Beethoven

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15 However we feel compelled to add a cautionary note: we do not understand the range of artistic potential to be located between two extreme poles. If we insist on seeing Beethoven's art as the exploration of one such extreme frontier, we do not mean to imply that there is only one polarity of frontiers. The range of the human spirit is not to be so limited; there are a potentially infinite number of such frontiers, and all of them may be addressed by art, each in the manner most suitable to the individual case.
obviously felt that he no longer needed to endure the constraints which the catering to aristocratic patronage would have meant. Although many of his commissions did in fact come from aristocratic patrons, who recognized his genius, those aristocrats were hardly in a position to dictate to him, as once they might have been.

In addition to these political and socio-economic developments, there was also in intellectual currents a new strain of attitude. Talk of personal freedom and political liberty were in the air. Long before, in 1637, Descartes had published his "Discourse on Method," beginning an attack on the ideology of the mediaeval theologians and dogmatists; thus setting, for future philosophers, the task of addressing themselves to investigating the nature of the human mind and determining the scope of its powers. In 1784 Immanuel Kant was to make his contribution to this enterprise with his publication of the "Critique of Pure Reason"; somewhat later, G. W. F. Hegel developed the notion that every man, in consequence of his dignity as bearer of reason is free. Those speculative thinkers in the period somewhat preceding and contemporaneous with Beethoven who can be broadly characterized as "humanist" were not yet spokesmen for politically potent movements; their influence proper was to be felt only somewhat later, especially with Hegel's most influential disciple, Karl Marx, and his followers.

The philosophers expressed and developed currents of thought; the actual influence such as it was of their writings was mediated by the politicians, statesmen and princes, the practicalities of whose stations and circumstances led them to mix idealism and practicality in somewhat unpredictable measure; during the same period, moreover, there was growing popular sentiment in favor of political self-determination. The influence of humanist thought on the political life of the era was not unequivocal; however, it cannot be denied that the history of Europe from the 16th century to Beethoven's day records an increasing
focus of attention by speculative thinkers on the topics related to the exploration of reason, as well as a burgeoning receptivity to the practical implications of those ideas.

Those currents of thought and of posture before the world which may properly be characterized as "humanist" were, in Beethoven's day, in a state of imperfect realization but of growing emergence. Beethoven's identification with and contribution to that current of thought can be properly seen only in its process of emergence, as his work develops and amplifies themes in a manner appropriate to his historical circumstances. As we shall discuss, several of Beethoven's compositions explicitly celebrate themes of personal freedom, political liberty, and resistance to political oppression. These notions were not exclusively the property of the humanist tradition, either previous to Beethoven's activity, during Beethoven's lifetime, or now. Various factions have always sought legitimation through espousing abstract ideals; one must always give due weight to the totality of circumstances in which abstract ideals are expressed. One must never assume that the same word expressing an abstract ideal (e.g., "freedom") has similar meanings when used in vastly different contexts. At the same time, however, one must guard against cynicism; ideals do indeed have real power; and the infectious enthusiasm which an ideal can foster may engender consequences far beyond the intentions of those who originally promulgated it only to foster limited practical goals.

In order to properly understand and appreciate the role which Beethoven and his music played in the history of the expression of ideas, we wish to consider evidence in support of the following points: first, that Beethoven personally understood himself, as a creator of music, as a humanist. He, as a composer grew ultimately to recognize the powers of his reason as ultimate source of his creations and also as ultimate judge and critic of their worth. As one consequence of that attitude, his
motivation for being concerned with the notion of freedom and political liberty was the hope for a more appropriate social situation in which that reason could be exercised, without however attaching that hope to any particulars of the factional politics of the day. Second, Beethoven's music, especially the productions of the so-called "late" period, can be fruitfully understood to be an important expression in art of a certain posture before time; namely, an expression of confidence in reason's powers to create, to embody a truly new idea presented through the sensuous, and to self-expansively exploit the implications of that idea, as an exercise in the use of that reason, in an ongoing organic development of that idea in time, and as example of the application of mental laws.

Let us turn now to consideration of specific features of Beethoven's music and his life. We shall consider the means he employed to express, in his art, his values, considered especially in relation to the topics we have been discussing.

We shall first consider an aspect of his compositional activity in which the expression of ideas is verbally, at least, clearest and least problematical as to overt meaning, namely, a discussion of the texts chosen for music including the voice. Next we shall consider some technical features of the music itself, in very broad perspective, as expressive of a viewpoint toward the use of human reason, as exemplified in the problems posed by musical perception. Finally we shall consider in evidence some ideas which the man himself expressed to those associated with him.

The relationship of music to text in the works of Beethoven is one which must now be discussed.

Composers have extremely varied attitudes toward the texts that they are working with. Music does not express ideas in the same way that language does; the expressions of each respectively must be explicated as well as the cases may allow
before it is possible to even begin to discuss the relationship. In the case of Beethoven's vocal and choral compositions, several factors must be taken into account. First is the consideration that in the case of certain commissions the text was specified, as for example the commission surrounding the composition of the "Missa Solemnis," although Beethoven was known to have begun a mass in sketch-form before receiving the commission. In other cases the text used was of the composer's own choosing. There is, however, the further consideration that the political situation in the Austrian Empire, of which Beethoven's Vienna was a part, was under great stricture in the possibilities of literary and theatrical expression, owing to the institution of rigid censorship of the forms of public expression. There were many restrictions on the activities and expressions of the people; even men's singing clubs were tightly controlled, when they were not actively forbidden. These clubs might perform music with perfectly innocuous texts; however, the potentialities of their organizational format as a base for reform-oriented political activity was too obvious to go unnoticed by the authorities. In the theatre, the insertion during performance of any word or gesture not specified in the prompt-books was subject to severe penalties.

The range of possible choice of text was, for Beethoven, constrained by the two forces that ever constrain the creative artist in society, and whose influences ever attest the importance of the artist to that society, and whose presences are a proof of society's assessment of the influence of art. Those forces are, namely, patronage and censorship. They are the forces which provide the connection of society with the artist, and furnish the clue as to the meaning of art, and are the evidence for the understanding and reception of art in a given cultural milieu.

Beethoven primarily concerned himself with composing music; he did not attempt to undertake responsibility for the
full spectrum of elements in performing arts, as did, for example, Wagner. For compositions requiring vocal parts he almost invariably chose texts composed by others, frequently from among the works of the noted poets of his own era. Beethoven did not compose his own texts, nor did he commission texts from poets. The few occasions on which he set texts which he himself wrote can be quickly enumerated: some humorous and satiric canons and trivial pieces, and the opening sentence of the baritone solo in the finale of the 9th symphony. His opera, "Fidelio," for example, used for its libretto a German translation from an existing French work.

Fidelio, which had become the classic example of the "rescue opera"—it originated as "Léonore" (1789; M., Pierre Gaveau; L., J. N. Bouilly)—is an instance in which the sentiment and the "happy ending" finale were both raised to heroic and idealistic levels, here by Beethoven's concepts of Ewigkeitliche and Brüderschaft.¹⁰

The libretto itself was a genre piece, containing many elements familiarly used in the French operas and stage works of the day. Both the place and the date of the original presentation are to be noted—perhaps France somewhat after the aristocracy had been overthrown, in the French revolution, that is to say, at a time and place where, in the first place, the political turmoil might have allowed relaxation of the enforcement of the otherwise-strict censorship, and at a time when the theme of the main action of the book might have been identified with the particulars of the historical circumstances, and whose more general implications might have been less immediately obvious.

By restricting himself to selecting from texts which had already been allowed by the censors, he could be assured of no difficulties with the authorities on that account. In those compositions where he was not constrained in his choice of texts,

we must now inquire into the possible reasons for his choices, in order to see what might have attracted him to those texts.

Vocal works do not form a large portion of Beethoven's creative output. There are a few lieder, some of exceptional interest, an oratorio "Christ on the Mount of Olives," an early mass, and so forth. However, in two of his most important compositions he chose texts which could not have been plainer in revealing his preoccupation with humanist themes. His only completed opera, "Fidelio" involves a libretto whose central theme is confrontation with political oppression. In addition to the central theme, there is also a sub-plot concerning the romance of the jailer's daughter with the disguised Leonore, whom she believes to be a man. Her sentiments and her theatrical development are inadequate, not to say perfunctory. Beethoven worked on the opera for some years after its original presentation in 1805, adding in 1814 the powerfully moving aria of Florestan, at the opening of the second act: "In des Lebens Frühlingsagen." He did not concern himself with amplifying the love theme of the sub-plot, during his irregular efforts at rewriting over the several years after the premiere. Some critics have interpreted this to have been an error of judgment on Beethoven's part. But could we not see it as Beethoven's way of contrasting it, as comparatively unimportant, with what was for him the immensely more significant theme of the main action of the libretto? A comparison of the exalted music which he created for those moments concerned with the theme of political oppression with the relatively undeveloped character of the love themes leaves no doubt as to where the composer's interests lay. The libretto must have been particularly close to his heart; he was interested in it, for many years after the original production, although the circumstances of its production, and its relation to the rest of his creative output, are a history of trials and difficulties. The libretto itself, for instance, had been set no less than twice by other composers.
(long forgotten), and were therefore presumably potential competition for public enthusiasm. The very name of the opera is a consequence of the fact that one of those works used the name "Léonore," the name which Beethoven would have wished to use. Though the first productions were dismal failures, Beethoven constantly returned to it and reworked it, adding some of the most characteristic and sublime of its music only long after its original presentation. Although the composer is known to have exhibited a long-standing ardor and interest in producing music for the stage, he never found another libretto with which he was satisfied to the point of committing himself to work with it, and left merely scattered fragments of theatre music through his works. But even these fragments support to some extent the contention that humanist themes held great fascination for him. He composed an overture for the drama "Egmont" and composed a ballet entitled "Prometheus," the book of which is unfortunately lost.

Beethoven, in his last, longest, and by general acclaim greatest symphony, the 9th symphony, op. 125, uses, for the final movement, a chorus and vocal soloists in addition to the orchestra. The text, with the exception of a few introductory lines, was excerpted from a poem composed by Friedrich Schiller some years earlier, the original title of which was "Ode to Freedom." Schiller later changed the title to that by which it is today known, "Ode to Joy," the change quite possibly owing to the fantastically rigid literary censorship of the Imperial government of the time. Beethoven was known to have planned to make a musical setting of the poem as early as 1793; and so, we know both that the poem was long familiar to him, and that it was important enough to him to have been kept in mind during that time. There were other changes too, from the earlier version which toned down the radical implications. Beethoven knew the earlier version, and so, quite possibly, did many of the people in his audience. Unfortunately, we will never know
the full extent of the impact that this symphony, with its text, had on its first audience, as the censorship of the day was so extreme as to prevent any meaningful open expression of sentiment. More the wonder that it was permitted to be presented at all.

The music which Beethoven composed and submitted for publication was, for the most part, the product of long, careful and hard work, of well-considered features and proportions, and was meant to be listened to with the same level of care as that with which it had been composed. The proper understanding of this music depends on the processes of reason to apprehend the musical features of the construction of the composition in question. A large portion of it was purely instrumental, that is, there was neither a vocal text, nor was there programmatic intention, nor was it intended to accompany, as by way of "setting a mood," some other activity, such as a ritual, or such as a festivity celebrating some event. It was intended to be listened to in itself (must we say "in-and-for itself"?) the performance of the music was to be its own ritual. It was meant to be relatively more free of obvious mediated aspects than music had commonly been hitherto. He wrote his music with the intention that it be understood as having "themes" which are presented at one point or another; the recognition of the themes and the relationships to their transformations is an exercise of reason in apprehending ideas presented through the sensuous; the themes and their transformations are to be understood not only in their internal relations, but also in a relation of "development," a sense of carrying through the implications and the drive of the themes and their transformations in a development which culminates in an emotionally satisfactory climax and sense of completion. In order for the listener to understand that this is being done, he has to remember themes, he has to keep them in mind so that he can cross-reference them with their transformations and must recognize (properly, "cognize")
their development. Occasionally, more than one theme (or transformation) is presented at one time, which involves the processes of counterpoint, and fugal imitation. Beethoven was not, of course, the first composer to construct music in this fashion. In fact, on one level of sophistication or another, it is the usual way that western music was constructed, for the most part, until the advent of the modern era, e.g., the music of Bach, Mozart, Schubert, Schumann, Brahms, et al. Those whose experience of music derives only from that of western culture may be taken aback by the idea that many other music cultures do not proceed to organize music in this way.

A theme is presented, then it undergoes transformation; but, with the advent of the transformation (which transformation may even take place within the theme itself or indeed at any time) new conditions have arisen, which create their own laws of inner dynamic and growth. This sort of development of musical ideas is an instance of reason's activity; this activity finds its analogue in other fields of operation. Man exercises reason in his attempt to satisfy his needs; but in so doing, his very needs are transformed.

One typical way of presenting musical material to a listener is as follows: first, present some simple, easy-to-remember material, then perhaps, for interest, present some material of a contrasting nature, which leads back to the original material. Such is the construction of a very large body of songs in western music, and, in the case of compositions which are not overly long, might be the form of some comparatively interesting works. Variations can be constructed on this idea; such procedural overviews on how to handle musical material are sometimes referred to as "forms." A classical, balanced, well-proportioned form gives a listener some sense of what to expect; and certain forms are well suited for the presentation of certain types of musical ideas. But certain types of musical ideas are not well-suited to balanced, classical forms; compared
to the music of his immediate predecessors, the music of Beethoven became more and more of this type; it frequently distended those forms, and the music assumed proportions which could not be easily seen as simple instances of classical forms. For example, the technical feature of his predecessors' music known as the "coda," which usually amounted to no more than a flourish of a few notes in a cadence pattern to signal the end of a composition, employed to distinguish the very end of the piece from the end of one or another section, became, in many of Beethoven's compositions, a section unto itself. The implication that I wish to draw from this observation is this: that, for Beethoven, the musical idea is an idea in the sensuous presented to reason; therefore, the idea itself conditions its own law of growth and development. The features of its developmental necessity are not to be predetermined by some over-riding form, but are rather to be understood as "open-ended."

The finale of the ninth symphony may serve as a subject for case-study in the organization of musical materials from the viewpoint of seeing how that material asserts an effect on form and modifies and alters it. After a few crashing dissonances (which shocked the first audiences, though they are now to us appropriately dramatic, rather than shocking) and some thematic fragments from material presented in earlier movements, the superbly moving scale-tune hymn is presented. It is one testament to Beethoven's skill and inspiration as a composer that he used a melody which was at one and the same time both profoundly stirring, and also so very simple and perceptually comprehensible or, to say it another way, "accessible." It would be difficult to imagine someone so unmusical that the tune would be too complicated or abstruse for him to understand as a total gestalt, and who would not on some level be moved by it. If Beethoven had written no piece of music but that hymn, his memory would deserve to be remembered. But during the course of the movement, material derived from, or, in a broad
sense related to, that tune become involved in the most abstruse, obscure and generally difficult-to-access counterpoint. The juxtaposition of the two extremes (extreme, that is, from the point of view of psychological accessibility) was not an error of judgment from the point of view of Beethoven’s sense of theatrical effect. The compression of affect that the use of counterpoint in music affords was necessary to express the total range of implications of the music; to show to the listener that the attention and the appreciation demanded of him was vastly beyond that required for merely a stirring anthem, or merely a celebration of the general sentiments expressed in the Schiller Ode.

Knud Jeppesen, in speaking of counterpoint as practiced by composers long prior to Beethoven, hints at the mechanism by which this compression of affect occurs:

... (the perceiver of polyphonic music) has a difficult—strictly speaking, impossible—task. He must assemble all the participating parts mentally and condense them into a total impression; yet he may not always be able to abandon himself freely to this total impression, but sometimes be forced, or enticed, to follow and spiritually to merge himself in single voices or parts. However, the more he is absorbed in the totality of the impression, the less distinctly will he be able to follow the course of the single lines; and the more he concentrates his attention upon the single parts, the more will his conception of the collective effect recede into the background. It is therefore possible to hear a composition of Josquin,Palestrina, or Victoria, perhaps a hundred times and each time receive a new or different impression, in proportion as this or that voice is more or less brought out or covered in the rendering...

It is rate in the history of music that within one section of a composition, the composer presents his audience with such a wide range of perceptual tasks. But for Beethoven, this was his way of illustrating to the world what he thought music is, how it ought to be perceived, and what he would demand of those

who would share his vision. Looked at another way, it was
his way of spanning the range, in the shortest and most com-
pressed possible way, of the psychological possibilities of
music, thus fulfilling the ideal set for Beethoven by his early
teacher, Neefe (as reported by Nottebohm):

His [i.e., Neefe's] theory was that the laws of the phenom-
ena of music ought to ally themselves with the psychological
life of man, and that, properly speaking, they ought to
accept it as their basis.\footnote{Edouard Herriot, The Life and Times of Beethoven

In addition to the hymn-theme and the closely-worked
counterpoint, there are also several other sections of varying
character--a "turkish march," some extreme key-changes,
etc. The overwhelmingly inspirational character of some of
the passages may have proved a distraction for the aware-
ness of the total affect, unless a perceiver is willing to apply
himself to repeated hearings and engage in a certain amount
of reflection as well; to, as it were, "get beyond the tunes."
The contrapuntal passages are invariably the last to attract
the listener's attention, as they are the furthest removed from
cognitional accessibility. But their presence is essential to
the composition; they are not there merely to fill out the form.
The compressed affect of those passages is a demonstration of
the implications of the hymn-theme, and may we say, is meant
to serve almost as a model for a methodology of how reason
is to proceed in its activity.

If we were to see in the contrapuntal transformation
of the hymn-tune an analogue for the procedure of reason trans-
forming the field of its activity from the immediacy of sense-
certainty, through various stages of increasingly greater ade-
quacy until at last the processes of reason are confidently
engaged in, we may come to a greater understanding of how it
is that this music, and any music potentially, may exemplify
the humanist commitment to the activity of reason.

Beethoven was not an intellectual; he was not overly given to relying on verbal expression to convey those thoughts most important to him. His formal schooling was limited; it is said that he never learned to do simple arithmetic, and his spelling was notoriously poor, notwithstanding his propensity for outrageous puns. He was largely self-educated; that self-education was however not exactly without exceptional positive features, as he was in contact and communication with some of the leading intellectuals of the day. He also numbered among his personal friends many well-educated and cultured persons of stations in society from whom he informally absorbed a certain amount of the tradition of western ideas. Nevertheless, his perception of cultural issues was sketchy and uneven, vacillating wildly between unconcern and great enthusiasm. However, in the area that interested him most, namely music composition, he was capable of enormous concentration and intellectual discipline.

Beethoven undoubtedly considered music his primary means of expression and, as befits a composer, can only have formed habits of thought or adopted a mental set which would not be completely intelligible except in strictly musical terms. On those occasions when he might have attempted to put some of his ideas into words and into ordinary language, his expressions could not be properly understood in the same manner as the expressions of one who was accustomed to express his thoughts in the usual verbal manner. Beethoven did not attain to his outlook on the world by rationally arguing himself into it, least of all in linguistic or conceptual terms. His verbal expressions must be seen as insights or glimpses into musical moods or viewpoints. They in no sense have the status of regulative generalizations to which he might have felt himself committed.

Beethoven seems to have had a deep concern for themes
of human dignity, freedom and of the desirability for man to exercise and value his reason; however, support for this contention is more emphatically to be found in the substance of his creative output than in remarks or writings, in toto, of which were, of different quality as considered statements. A few well-chosen anecdotes may, however, place Beethoven's frame of mind in perspective.

Beethoven could be merciless toward such conventionally pious language in others, as when Moscheles wrote "FINIS--with God's help" at the end of a score and Beethoven scrawled "Man, help thyself!" across the page. 19

But the besmirched human dignity of the oppressed is restored by the glorified message of the brotherhood of man: The same spirit that imbued Beethoven's words to the "Immortal Beloved" when he wrote, "Man's humility before men pains me." 20

In another place, Beethoven wrote, addressing the Archduke Rudolph:

...the old masters are most useful to us. But freedom and progress are, in the world of art as in the whole of creation, our object; and if we moderns are not quite so advanced as our ancestors in solidity yet the refinement of our manners has enlarged our scope in many ways. 21

Against such quotations, to be sure, could be ranged many others expressing contrasting or incompatible views, e.g., his attitude toward religion, his many antiegalitarian pronouncements, to say nothing of his ambivalence toward certain political and social issues of the day. (Witness his behavior regarding the dedication to Napoleon of the third symphony.) At first, he dedicated his work to the general, then, when he

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was disillusioned about the general's behavior, tore up the title page; later he was to offer to re-dedicate it when there was a commission in the offing.)

In summary, we may say that Beethoven's life and work provide many instances of examples of humanist values; however Beethoven's musical, intellectual and conceptual development involved many conflicting elements, which were never resolved, outside of his music, in a conceptually satisfactory way. But we are not primarily interested here in conceptual explanations or expressions of humanist thought; we are interested in its artistic expression, especially as that artistic expression is seen in the process of emerging in human history with greater clarity and resolution, and expanding on its antecedent resources. If we have succeeded in demonstrating, in Beethoven's art, the advance of the resources of humanist expression, then we have succeeded in our task.
CHAPTER IV

TOWARD A CRITICAL FIELD-THEORY OF WORLD ART:
SUGGESTIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A
METHODOLOGY

We have considered cases where a known instance of a
traumatic situation resulted in the predeliction for a certain
type of art, namely the abstract; are we then to infer that when-
ever we come across instances of this type of artistic expression
we may presume it to be motivated by similar circumstances?
Or, perhaps, by a similar mental set? This is, to be sure, the
sort of thing that we would wish to do, the sort of procedure we
would wish to be able to engage in confidently. Such a procedure
would, of course, involve an invalid inference, and, of course,
I am not claiming that we are in a position to do it at this time.
However, this strongly suggests a hypothesis to be investigated;
no doubt persistent research will disclose many other factors
which will have to be given their weight, many variations and
many exceptions to any general rules developed. What I am
suggesting, and most strongly, is that we investigate known
cases where correlations between mental set and artistic product
are known, with particular emphasis on noting the posture regarding
time, with an eye toward extending the investigation to progres-
sively more obscure and complicated cases. With other types
of cases too, where the posture toward time is not so extreme
or obvious, its artistic expression must be noted, and finally,
special attention ought to be paid in those cases of artistic expres-
sion where the humanist celebration of man's emerging spirit is
especially emphasized.

We have adduced several selected examples of cases where
the relationship between men's images of themselves and their
images of their future and the expression of that image in art were known. What remains now is the extension of the suggestions developed from these observations to ever more wide-ranging cases until a general theory can be developed, and supported with a broad range of examples. We may hope to extend the project even further: we may eventually hope to show the influence of art on the very direction and development of men's self-image, even to the point of showing the influence of art on the direction and development of culture at large, in the macrocosm; in the development of cultural forms, and in the influence on the direction of man's evolution and evolving self-expression and self-consciousness.

Any attempt to analyse the nature of art apart from its meaning within the context of the total lived experience is bound to be inadequate and self-defeating.

I am not stating that art should have moral, i.e., extra-artistic implications—I am stating that, in fact, art always does. The term "moral" is to be understood in the broadest sense of "valuational." Only it is necessary for us to tell ourselves (and others) that it does not ("art for art's sake") in order for it to have this effect, so that we can enjoy what might otherwise be forbidden, either by society, or by that internalization of mores (mostly socially derived), called conscience. This is so even though we sometimes know on another level that what the particular work of art in question is very clearly speaking about is something which, if explicitly stated, might cause problems. Occasionally the referent is something which is of such repressed nature that we truly block on clearly understanding its nature.

The bypassing of the critical faculty was identified in the chapter on the distinction between the mediated and the unmediated; it is this point which provides the connection between art as a self-contained activity and the implication of art for the totality of lived experience. It is a form of bracketing experience, in order to deal with it, possibly at leisure, and free from threat.
or pressure— one type of experience which "brackets" all other
types of experience, so that one can concentrate on the process
of experiencing, in a "free" sense; i.e., "free" from the im-
mediacy of the causal implications obtaining in the world. But
the "forbidden," the repressed, which is to be bypassed,
might not always be an explicit moral injunction (or actual
physical threat). For example, consider the terror of the
self-conscious man facing the prospect of his own mortality.
Will he not, upon such reflection, entertain a terrible fascina-
tion (and at once ambivalence and revulsion) at the quintessential
formlessness of the future? Here we have a clue to the un-
speakable (or rather, "unnameable") attraction which music
holds, especially music which is relatively free of circum-
stantial or semiotic references ("pure" music), which speaks
of the pure form of time as the emergent future. It is only
by seeking to determine the extra-artistic implications of art
that the true nature of art can be understood. (As Hegel would
say, when we have set a boundary we have already in some sense
gone beyond it.) Furthermore, it is in the very nature of the
kind of psychological involvement we humans have with art that
its meaning resists being made explicit; any assertion as to
the "true" meaning of art can, in the very nature of things, be
disclaimed, can be said to have been "misunderstood," should
the insight prove to be embarrassing or threatening. In this
sense, art is similar in its use of imagery to the processes of
symbol-formations in dreams— however, that which is under-
stood to be art is never confused with a dream, even though the
imagery used in a work of art may be avowedly derived from a
dream. That the processes of imagery formation in the two
cases may be similar is not denied; however the differences
between dreams and art must not be glossed over, especially
inasmuch as the two things are never in practice confused.
Dreams and reality might be confused with each other; but, when
an experience is regarded as reality in confusion with its artistic
nature, then the processes of artistic perception are no longer strictly applicable as a description of the perception of the object, but must be modified as for a case of such confusion. It then no longer comes under the case of being an example of art; when art and reality become confused, it is no longer, strictly speaking, art, though it may have some features in common with artistic perception. Nevertheless, the mechanisms of psychological repression operate similarly in both cases.

I have described what I believe to be the extremes of the range of artistic activity such as I know that activity. Much empirical work yet remains to be done to locate a particular artistic product or experience on the spectrum between those extremes; yet, I am still more interested in examining the extremes, the end-points, the frontiers; and I have done so because it is art that I am interested in, and, it is in the very nature of art to explore those frontiers, to test them and to push forward man’s knowledge and the life of his reason and to claim for it yet one more province. I issue a clear invitation, say rather a challenge, to those who would regard themselves as artistic creators not to flinch from the task, but to apply themselves deliberately to exploring those frontiers. This is the task specially suited to the character of art, the thing that art can do so very well.

The Appropriateness of Various Genres of Art to Express Ideas over the Range of Possibilities

When we considered the nature of the expression in art of the posture of apprehensiveness and fear, we found examples of that posture in visual arts, and in those cases it was relatively clear and easy to see the connection between the mental set and its tensional transformation into the artistic image. When we wished to find in art an expression of the humanist notion of the self-developing perfection of the mind, we turned
to an example of music. The differences between these two cases are not arbitrary or accidental. In visual arts a man may represent and confront a feared thing and may do this without summoning up the whole host of emotional preoccupations that the real object would occasion. Therefore he might contemplate it relatively freer from those distractions and will bring to bear more of the resources of reason. This is not to say that other things cannot be represented in visual art. Objects of both fear and desire, both attainable and unattainable, may be portrayed. Nevertheless it would seem that visual art is in many cases particularly apt for portraying objects associated with the negative tensions of fear and threat of trauma.

Music too can appeal to man under threat of trauma. Repetitive, rhythmically obsessive music might well distract the mind and allay fears at such times, much as would a lullaby. Might we not see in such music the analogue to the condition in visual arts involving repetitive abstract geometric (or other) figures? But visual art is eminently suited to representing the world as static, as fixed and as controllable while the mind, so to speak, moves, is active and is engaged in concocting tentative solutions to problems. Music, on the other hand speaks directly, and is indeed itself an instance of movement. More detached from laws of causal effect than visual art, music speaks of plummeting forward into the future, into that which, by definition, is not, cannot be directly known, and whose contents might be from among an infinite range of possibilities and which we, upon reflection in the light of our human reason, realize we must face. Hence, the circumstances that music is always surrounded, in its practice, by rules—codifications imposed on the ranges of permitted expectations and the posture under which the music is to be understood, even when those rules are violated. Hence music is eminently suited to expressing the free movements of reason, which activity
must be understood as only partially relating to exploratory activity concerning its practical applicability. The movement of reason must be understood as a movement for itself, no longer strictly reducible to material concerns; and it is of this movement which music is eminently suited to speak.
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