Global Cultural Flows and the Post-9/11 Secularization of Sufi Music of Pakistan

By

Muhammad Usman Malik

Faculty Advisor: Dr. Eric Charry

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Abstract

*Global Cultural Flows and the Post-9/11 Secularization of Sufi Music of Pakistan* explores the development of Sufi music of Pakistan since the events of September 11, 2001. It involves the association of Sufi music with contemporary social concepts and issues, the rise of non-ritual Sufi compositions and non-hereditary Sufi musicians to popularity, and the increasing presence of Sufi music on social media and regional film and TV. I call these transformations the secularization of Sufi music of Pakistan. I demonstrate that the secularization is happening due to disjunctive global flows of ideas, money, and media.

I present four case studies to substantiate this claim. The first concerns Punjabi Sufi musician Sain Zahoor’s unusual movement from obscurity to stardom. This change is driven in part by certain US policy initiatives to modernize the Islamic world to address Muslim violence against the West. The second, Zahoor’s composition “Allah hoo” (God is) from the Pakistani film *Khuda Ke Liye*, concerns how this new transformation of Sufi music is constructing a liberal Islamic perspective in the context of global Muslim feminism. The third examines the transformation of *jugni*, a popular Punjabi genre, into a Sufi genre, attributing it to the multinational Coca Cola corporation’s attempts to construct a multicultural Pakistani identity. The
fourth, jugni’s appropriation in the Bollywood film *Cocktail*, examines the transformation and use of Sufi music in order to segment and attract Punjabi audiences.
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Introduction

The dawn of this century witnessed a new phase in the history of Sufi music in Pakistan. Previously, scholars both inside and outside of Pakistan have represented it as a spiritual expression associated with Sufi shrines and rituals, and primarily performed by hereditary musicians. More recent writing has examined Pakistani Sufi musicians moving onto the world music circuit.¹

The present era is marked by a significant transformation of the meaning of Sufi music. In Pakistan, the media, academics, and musicians unanimously associate it with social concepts and issues such as “peace,” “counter-extremism,” and “multiculturalism.” Along with the groups and organizations dedicated to organizing concerts and performances of Sufi music, its visibility has considerably increased in regional media such as TV, film, and social media. Sufi stars from non-hereditary Sufi musician background are outshining the popularity of the hereditary Sufi musicians with their new compositions. This dissertation uses “secularization” as a catchall term of these changes. Entrenched in this study is the question: how and why is this secularization of Sufi music occurring in Pakistan? To explore answers, I

present four case studies in four successive chapters concerning the aforementioned transformations.

The first case study concerns Punjabi Sufi musician Sain Zahoor, who hails from a marginalized traditional Sufi shrine singing background and in the past decade has made the unusual move to become a successful popular artist. This move from obscurity towards stardom is driven in part by certain US policy initiatives to modernize the Islamic world to address Muslim violence against the West. The second case study, Zahoor’s composition “Allah hoo” (God is) from the Pakistani film Khuda Ke Liye (2007, dir. Shoaib Mansur), concerns how this new transformation of Sufi music is constructing a liberal Islamic perspective in the context of global Muslim feminism. The third case study examines the transformation of jugni, a popular Punjabi genre, into a Sufi genre, attributing it to Coca Cola’s attempts to construct a multicultural Pakistani identity. The fourth case study, jugni’s appropriation in the Bollywood film Cocktail (2012, dir. Homi Adajania), examines the transformation of Sufi music in order to engage and evaluate the trends of the Punjabi audiences.

Each case reveals a different story in terms of the nature and forms of actors, the power relations between them, their strategies and histories they engage with, and the shifting meaning of the musical categories. The secularization of Sufi music of Pakistan is not a systematic and linear process
or set of processes. It involves the complexity and disjuncture of the global cultural flows of ideas (chapter 1,2), finance (chapter 3), and media (chapter 4).

Pakistani milieu. Lybarger explores the “sonic and social” peculiarities of the solo tabla (South Asian percussion instrument) repertoire of Punjabi musicians from Pakistan. In the absence of a detailed study on the recent global influences, I attempt to fill in some of the lacunae in the ethnomusicological literature on Pakistan through representing a few of the prominent ways (media, finance, and ideas) globalization is advancing there and reshaping traditions such as Sufi music.

Scholarly inclination towards Sufi and sacred music of Pakistan is clearly evident from the above sources. Although this dissertation takes an inspiration from this body of knowledge, it does not represent Sufi music of Pakistan as a sacred, spiritual, or divine expression, the common scholarly representations that seem to be an influence of qawwali, the ritual music genre that first captured the attention of the listeners and academics in the West. Sufism in general in this body of scholarship is seen as the mystic dimension of Islam, which designates Sufi music the stature of (a quasi-legitimate) sacred music of Islam (Frishkopf 2014). The ritual and sacredness perspectives can disengage Sufi music from its broader social significance, despite the fact that a substantial amount of Sufi poetry and music repertoire of Pakistan, which Sufis composed at various historical periods, is non-ritual and relates to society. This study demonstrates that global and local factors have begun to reinstate the forgotten social relevance of Sufi music in multiple
perspectives and through eclectic processes.

Music holds an important place in the contemporary era that is characterized by new forms of ideological and armed conflicts, and the rise of digital technology and virtual media. In the battles of ideologies, music can be a means to represent social figures, groups, and narratives and moments to construct an eclectic worldview or to delicately stimulate a social transformation that otherwise seems to be a massive task. Commercial enterprises pay attention to music to find solutions to the problems they are facing having lost control on their consumers after the emergence of the new technologies and media in the last two decades. Owing to its multifaceted presence in societies, commercial enterprises use music to construct an entrepreneurial sonic identity, to measure popular trends, and to estimate the success of their product amidst unpredictability. As Mark Slobin (1992: 6) has pointed out, “by tuning into music,” our window to the intricacies of the present era can be broadened.

A very brief overview of three major cultural forces in Pakistan will help the reader appreciate the case studies: the war on terror², multinational

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² The war on terror remains an ambiguous term depending on the historical and social context of the agency describing it. In his first address after the September 11, 2001 attacks, US President George Bush commenced this war to counterstrike the non-state actors who carried out these attacks, their hideouts and supporters anywhere (Abbas 2005: 217). Pakistan did not have a clear standpoint on this war, as it did not feel its security being threatened by the militant groups. It willy-nilly became a part of the US led military coalition to prevent US sanctions and therefore targeted the transnational militant organizations present
corporations, and the media. As a neighboring country of Afghanistan and a front-ally of the US, Pakistan has been closely associated with the war on terror since immediately after the 9/11 events. Multinational corporations have a longer history in Pakistan, part of a global economy. Pakistan formally began to embrace a market economy in 1988 with the promulgation of a privatization policy (Fatima and Rehman 2012: 1019). During the same period, the government gradually began to withdraw from its monopoly over broadcasting. In 1989, it authorized the launch of Pakistan’s first public-private entertainment television channel, People’s Television Network (PTN), which also broadcasted BBC and CNN. Satellite dishes were also a popular source to access international—particularly Indian—channels. Private sector FM radio broadcasting and the Internet were launched in 1995 (Ali and Gunaratne 2000: 162-3, 171-2, 175). The electronic media reform policy introduced by the government in 2002 paved the way for the mushrooming of a number of private and international television channels and FM radio stations (PEMRA 2007; Yusuf 2013: 23-4). This study is situated within the cultural impacts of these developments.

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3 In this study, I use multinational corporations (MNCs) as a general term to refer to commercial enterprises operating in more than one country.
As a Punjabi born and raised in Lahore, the provincial capital of Pakistani Punjab, I witnessed the secularization of Sufi music. During my days at the Musicology Department of the National College of Arts (Lahore) as a bachelor’s degree student (2002-2005), sometimes our vocal teachers Ustad Nazir Butt of the Kirana gharana (lineage) and Ustad Habib-ur-Rehman of the Patiala gharana would end the class with a rendition of a Sufi kalam (poetry set to music). The emphasis was, of course, on its musical and linguistic nuances.

Later I became a teacher and music archivist at the same department. The classroom instructions were occasionally replaced by everyday frank discussions. Likewise, my friends and students whom I taught became music researchers, producers, performers, and media professionals. Our gossips were enriched by the exchange of professional experiences. While working on the Musical Survey of Pakistan (Lahore) in 2006-2007, a departmental project dedicated to the cataloging of musicians in Lahore, I conducted field interviews of a number of musicians trained in different styles and genres. Whereas communication with my friends and colleagues continued during my stay in the US (2009-present), social media and the Internet emerged as the handy means to connect me to Pakistan on a daily basis for updates. I persistently charted the developing trends in my interest areas. In addition to
my recent concentrated research, my long-term knowledge of Pakistani music and society also underscores this dissertation.

The Premise

One of the discourses of globalization originated to grasp the spatial outreach and transformative ability of international economic systems. The central actors in this perspective are non-human entities: multinational corporations, financial institutions, and media and technology. Accounts of globalization from the field of ethnomusicology are interpretations of asymmetric power relations, in some fashion, between the non-human entities and human agency. Integrating various streams of the discourse on music and globalization, Martin Stokes summarizes the core premise of ethnomusicology in an article:

I do find significant areas of consensus. In all of these accounts, globalization is usually presented in terms of radical underlying political-economic transformation, effected primarily through technological change. Systems, in other words, that lie largely beyond human agencies, desires and plans, that force us, human subjects, to reckon with and respond to the enormous changes going on round about us, putting a strain on our cognitive and perceptual apparatus. ‘Culture’ (including music, naturally) is the means by which we do this reckoning, either encouraging us to retrench into fantasies of locality, boundedness and authenticity, or aiding us in our struggle to grasp what these systems—created by us but now, Frankenstein-like, out of control—are doing to us (2007: 5).
Music and globalization accounts are perspectives on this *culture* versus *systems* premise, which can be divided into four broad types based on Diana Crane’s classification of cultural globalization models (2002): if systems dominate, it is a homogenization thesis (Erlmann 1996); if culture has gatekeepers, it is a resistance (Feld 2000; Schade-Poulsen 1999) or negotiation thesis (Baker 2005); if systems and culture influence each other, it is a hybridization thesis (Frith 2000; Gross et al. 1994; Steele 2013); and if culture and systems are juxtaposed at a place, it is a competition or negotiation thesis (Cohen 2005; Miller 2005; Solomon 2005). Within these broad types, finer differences do exist. The point is that none of the perspectives explores the complete phenomenon, but an aspect of it.

The culture versus systems premise began to take shape in the particular environment of the late-1980s. During that period, “world music” emerged as a global genre rising to popularity in the West, and the key agency behind its circulation was the western multinational recording industry, functioning within a capitalist ideology (Stokes 2004, 2007). The academic environment was dominated by ideas from the world-systems theory of Immanuel Wallerstein that foresaw the emergence of “one singular global capitalist system” (Jones 2010: 19) dominated by the capitalist economies, particularly the US. In cultural parlance, it equates to the pervasiveness of American values across the globe (Crane 2002: 2-3). Drawing from these
influences, the foundational globalization thinking in ethnomusicology (Erlmann 1996) established the undeniable totalizing capacity of the systems, that is to say, the organized capitalist recording industry supported by media and technology. Although the homogenizing capacity of the systems has been challenged, culture versus systems or big versus small has been established as the dominant way of thinking about music and globalization. In mainstream ethnomusicology, we find very few examples of replacing this way of thinking.

Thomas Turino presents “cosmopolitanism” as an alternative premise to study “how ‘cultural globalization’ happens” (2000: 4, 7). The concept involves “objects, ideas, and cultural positions that are widely diffused throughout the world and yet are specific only to certain portions of the populations within given countries” (ibid.: 7). I would call it the culture minus systems premise in the perspective of Stokes’s opinion that cosmopolitanism as an alternative epistemology “restores human agencies and creativities…rather than a passive reaction to global ‘systems’” (2007: 6). Cosmopolitanism too has visibility in ethnomusicology (Beaster-Jones 2015), yet it seems to be a politicized stance deemed to overlook the transformative power of the systems, though Turino situates his argument in the deconstruction of global rhetoric (2000: 6-7).

Mark Slobin (1992) advances another premise, borrowing Arjun Appadurai’s (1990) famous “global cultural economy” theory. Slobin
rationalizes that we are experiencing a completely new global environment in which “[t]hings are highly kinetic and extremely volatile” due to the rapid flows of money, ideas, technology, people, and media (1992: 5). In this new environment, our existing thinking patterns have fallen short and we should invent new analytical tools to capture the new logics that are both complex and unpredictable. He argues that no single “parameter is paramount” in a planet in flux (ibid.: 5), neither big nor small. Slobin directs music and globalization discourse towards the central paradox of globalization, “complexity” that is beyond oversimplified answers or big versus small logic. Notwithstanding disciplinary orientation, scholars have a consensus about complexity as the empirical basis of globalization. “Lose the complexity and you have lost the phenomenon,” argues cultural globalization thinker John Tomlinson (1999: 14).

I affirm Slobin’s argument, asserting that the post-9/11 epoch offers enhanced complexity as compared to the early-1990s. At a glance we find at least two gigantic cultural forces unleashed in the global cultural economy during the last decade: digital and social media; and the war on terror. We are yet to understand the transformative potential of these two forces. New thinking tools are required to tap into the uncharted territories of the post-9/11 music globalization processes. Appadurai’s theory answers this by calling for a case-by-case research approach.
The Theoretical Framework and Research Design

Arjun Appadurai suggests that “[t]he new global cultural economy” is “a complex, overlapping, and disjunctive order” (1990: 296). The disjunctures can be explored by looking at the relationships between five dimensions of global cultural flow, which he terms as ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, finanscapes, and ideoscapes. He explains that these scapes are not fixed landscapes, but “perspectival constructs, inflected very much by the historical, linguistic, and political situatedness of different sorts of actors” (ibid.: 296). Revealing the core of his theory, he suggests that global flows “occur in and through the growing disjunctures between” the five scapes. The basic rationale for this postulation is that the movements of people, machinery, money, images, and ideas “now follow increasingly non-isomorphic paths” (ibid.: 301). Elsewhere, he calls these scapes “streams or flows along which cultural material may be seen to be moving across national boundaries” (1996: 45-6).

Rejecting any notion of an order, his theory construes globalization as a complex phenomenon subject to completely unpredictable outcomes. This can be fleshed out in relationship to the notion of “connectivity,” a key term within contemporary accounts of globalization. For instance, Tomlinson defines globalization as “the rapidly developing and ever-densening network of interconnections and interdependences that characterize modern social
life” (1999: 2). Wallerstein is among the pioneering globalization theorists who developed this connectivity thesis (Jones 2010: 19) that has become commonplace. In this sense, the globalization phenomenon is a predictable order, as the network can bear only one meta-theme, Americanization, for instance. What makes Appadurai diametrically opposed to all the major globalization theorists is his repudiation of this connectivity thesis. Rather, he theorizes globalization premised upon the antonym pair of connection and disjuncture (Appadurai 1996: 46). The disjunctures between his suggested five cultural dimensions cause movement of cultural material.

As there is no connectivity, each movement in the disjunctive order has a distinct perspective of its own and no notion of a meta-theme may exist in Appadurai’s model. It further implies that the new global cultural economy is an aggregate of countless distinct perspectives or individual themes given by the countless movements. Appadurai concludes that the image of the “world of disjunctive global flows” is “chaos, rather than older images of order, stability, and systematicness” (1996: 47). In place of meta-theories and pre-given answers, he invites us to adopt a case by case investigation approach in this chaos (ibid.: 47). It offers the propensity of micro scale analysis in music and globalization studies. By micro scale, I do not mean an individual, but rather a single movement of a musical category. Yet, Appadurai’s theory has its own limitations.
Along with its celebration, the application of Appadurai’s theory for a systematic cultural analysis was also evaluated critically. Turino finds the ideas of flows and scapes too abstract when dealing with geographically diffused “ideas, products, practices, and processes” (2003: 52). Social scientist Paul Hopper gives a substantial critique, noting that metaphors of flow and scape are not analytical categories, though they provide us a vocabulary to describe movement. In case we deploy them for analysis of cultural globalization, our discussions and investigations remain general and abstract (2007: 47-8). Citing David Held et al. (1999) on the idea of mapping globalization, Hopper acknowledges that the mapping of flows is possible, yet it is monumental task, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The quantity of ideas, people, commodities, images, and sounds moving across “regions and intercontinental space” would be huge, and beyond any meaningful evaluation (2007: 45).

Control on the object of the study–flows that are in uncounted numbers and go to and come in from any direction–seems impossible in Appadurai’s chaos imagery of the now global economy. The research issue is: what to study? While his theory has been lauded in the social sciences and its allied disciplines, such as ethnomusicology, this issue has not been addressed. His theory predominantly serves as a ground for the counter-argument of “homogeneity,” for instance, “heterogeneity” (Turino 2000: 4), “negotiation”
(Tsioulakis 2011), and “local-global dialectic” (Kvetko 2005). In other instances, the idea of scapes or flows is popularly borrowed to represent a local presence of global cultural influences or a dimension of a local cultural landscape, such as media.

These are reductionist approaches, as compared to Slobin (1992) who introduced Appadurai’s theory in ethnomusicology. Slobin deployed “disjuncture” as an analytical category for cultural comparison at multiple scales and localities. I deploy disjuncture in its full-scale complexity as seen in Appadurai’s imagery of chaos. I intend to study how a musical transformation happens in an epoch in which all established rules of the game have been replaced with infinite logics of transformation, the now global chaos as argued by Appadurai. I assume that such an approach may produce nascent knowledge of the globalization processes. However, no research with this goal can proceed without a systematic control on the uncounted and haphazard flows that cause the global chaos. Below I outline how I did it, which explains why I have presented four case studies for this study and their disjunctive relationship in chaos.

I begin with the proposition of mapping flows in the dimension of time. The movement is relative to both time and space, and if space has become deterritorialized, as argued by Appadurai (1990), time can still serve as a
constant to allocate the flows in chaos. By time I do not mean the experiential time that has been philosophized tremendously in the globalization debate, but the objective time that flows through a straight path and is incremental. In the dimension of time, all the chaotic flows pass through a straight isomorphic path.

The analytical studies of globalization use time to measure change between civilizational or societal epochs (Held et al. 1999). I do not argue to use time for a comparison between cultural epochs nor to trace the evolution of a phenomenon. Rather, it is a straight isomorphic path of all the flows of a single era, the era in which change is taking place. For this study of the secularization of Sufi music of Pakistan, I select the era from 2001 to 2013; from the beginning of the war on terror to the year I started writing this manuscript. Theoretically, all the chaotic flows of this era have a straight isomorphic path in the dimension of time.

The next analytical problem is identifying the number of flows in Pakistan during this period. Such an inventory is beyond human faculties. To overcome it, the strategy I deploy is to shred the unknown flows. I do it through stratification. I focus on the domain of mediated popular culture to

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4 For instance, in the study of the forms of globalization, Held et al. stratify the domains of globalization according to the power hierarchy given their Political Science disciplinary background. They explore “the central sites of power” such as “political, military, economic,
explore the secularization of Sufi music of Pakistan. The rationale for this particular domain is that it contains rational indexes such as rankings, awards, and viewer counts that can be helpful to further categorize the pile of musical objects in this domain. In this study, I focus on two Punjabi Sufi compositions: “Allah hoo” and “Jugni”⁵, sung by Arif Lohar and Sain Zahoor respectively. The former won a BBC World Music Award in 2006 (Chrysler) and the latter has the stature of the most viewed online content ever posted by Coca Cola (Moye 2013), the company that produced it with almost 14 million YouTube views by 2013. Notwithstanding the numbers and rankings, the entry of the two musicians and their two Sufi songs in popular Sufi culture is subject to movement and transformation. An exponent of the Sain (non-hereditary musicians who perform on Sufi shrines) tradition, Zahoor entered popular culture soon after the beginning of the war on terror and rose to popularity. A second-generation Punjabi folk and popular singer, Arif Lohar emerged as an exceptional Sufi musician with his rendition of jugni, which is originally a non-Sufi popular Punjabi genre. He transformed it into a Sufi genre by fusing it with traditional Punjabi genres of Sufi music and poetry for Coke Studio (Pakistan), which was a fusion music project of Coca Cola produced by a Pakistani musician, Ruhail Hayat.

and cultural domains and those of labor and migratory movements and of the environment” (1999: 24).
⁵ “Jugni” is also the composition title of the Coke Studio’s version of jugni, the genre.
While I have pinned down the objects and people for this study, ambiguity still prevails, as I cannot have a record of all the movements of the compositions and the musicians during the selected time period. The kinds and numbers of flows causing these movements remain unknown. To deal with it, I see how many movements of the two compositions and the people related to them are temporally linear between years 2001 and 2013. It yields four movements: Zahoor’s entry into popular culture from a non-hereditary shrine singer background soon after the beginning of war on terror; the appropriation of his composition “Allah hoo” for the Pakistani film, *Khuda Ke Liye* in 2007; transformation of jugni to a Sufi genre on Coke Studio (Pakistan) in 2010; and the appropriation of this version of jugni for the Bollywood film, *Cocktail*, in 2012.

Here is the synopsis of how they are connected: Zahoor enters into popular culture from a traditional background; his composition travels to *Khuda Ke Liye*; the background music composer of this film, Ruhail Hayat, becomes the producer of Coke Studio (Pakistan) and produces “Jugni” with Arif Lohar; and “Jugni” moves to *Cocktail*. My argument revolves around this core synopsis that I obtained after systematically chiseling the chaos.

This synopsis is entangled in the perpetual tension between Appadurai’s theory and the globalization theories premised upon connectivity.
This research reveals that these temporally linear movements indeed defy connectivity and are disjunctive, as these movements respectively take place along with the flows of ideas, finance, and media that have their own unique perspectives on the secularization of Sufi music of Pakistan. Time does not emerge as the dimension that connects the movements, but, I argue, the dimension in which disjuncture can be studied. The strength of this synopsis is that it contains within itself the argument to look beyond the connectivity oriented thinking to understand the complexity of musical transformation in the new global cultural economy.

**Micro Research Parameters**

I study the above movements of musical categories within two parameters. The first is Appadurai’s (2000: 5) explanation that cultural flows “have different speeds, axes, points of origin and termination.” The second is Slobin’s (1992: 5) assessment that there exists “no hidden agency which controls the flow of culture.” Taken together as a research strategy, I map the cultural flows that caused these movements, and I demonstrate the flows in their respective tangible forms in terms of origin, trajectory, reception, and impact. Through a blend of ethnographic information and history, I unearth agencies, strategies, histories, narratives, and meanings that are involved from the origin to the
reception and impact of a flow. The chapters are structured on similar formats. I begin with tracing the origins of a flow, followed by its transmission to Pakistan, and I conclude with its transformative impact on a musical category such as a Sufi song or a musician’s career. Each chapter, in its own way, should have something original to contribute both to music and globalization literature.

Chapter Outline

Chapter 1, “Sain Zahoor’s Transformation: Sufi Heritage and the Case for a post-9/11 Islamic Modernity,” explores the paradox of Zahoor’s movement from the shrine to popular culture in the context of a US strategy to revive Sufi heritage to modernize Islamic societies. This chapter analyzes the role of cultural NGOs as the global carriers of the Sufi heritage revival narrative. This chapter demonstrates that the new dimensions of cultural imperialism involve the public sector and the third sector (institutions that exist outside of both the public and the private sectors [Salamon and Anheier 1997: 1]).

Chapter 2, “Sufism, an Argument for Liberal Sociology: Shoaib Mansur and Khuda Ke Liye” performs a musical reading of Khuda Ke Liye. This film resonates with the post-9/11 global feminist outcry for the emancipation of women in Islamic societies, a narrative that was transmitted to the local milieu
through the Pakistani state. *Khuda Ke Liye* also pioneers “realism” in Pakistan’s new national cinema. I analyze how its producer, Shoaib Mansur, precisely replicates pressing cultural issues on the screen, and represents Sufi *ishq* (lit. love) as a liberal Islamic argument to counter the orthodox religious argument to snub female agency to create a morally upright Islamic society. “Allah hoo” stands as the musical representation of Shoaib Mansur’s liberal argument. This chapter establishes the entrenchment of Sufi music in Islamic modernity discourse.

Chapter 3, “A Corporate Cultural Map for the Genesis of a Sufi Genre: Coca Cola and Jugni,” studies the genesis of the Sufi version of jugni in Coke Studio (Pakistan). Borrowing from John Amis and Michael Silk (2010) on marketplace boundaries in global corporatism, I represent the international fusion music project, Coke Studio, as Coca Cola’s cartographic tool to demarcate consumer diversity into bounded regions and nation-states. The origins of Coke Studio lies in the brand’s quest to invent culturally grounded “new music” as a marketing strategy to counter the existential threat particularly imposed by the new media towards the end of the 20th century. Coke Studio (Pakistan) is one example of how the new music strategy is transmitted to local communities. I demonstrate that Coca Cola identifies Pakistan as a multicultural nation-state, and “Jugni” stands for this national
identity. This chapter demonstrates how multinational corporations, such as Coca Cola, visualize the globe in terms of unique cultures.

Chapter 4, “Media Flow and Its Rationale: Jugni from Pakistan to Bollywood,” studies the movement of Coke Studio’s “Jugni”—having gone viral on YouTube—to the film *Cocktail*. I represent Bollywood as a popular industry, a marketplace obsessed with large figures and rankings, and governed by what N. Anand and Richard Peterson (2000) call the “market information regimes” for entrepreneurial decision-making. YouTube is one such market information regime for Bollywood to gauge the popularity of independent Pakistani music and to—pre-release—assess the success of a film. I argue that “Jugni” was included in *Cocktail* to segment Punjabi audiences, while segmentation refers to the division of a diversified large audience base into targeted subgroups on a demographic basis (Ganti 2012: chapter 8, 9). I trace the origins of a non-film media serving as a market information regime for Bollywood to the arrival of the multinational music televisions, MTV and Channel V, which generated the movement of Pakistani independent music to Bollywood in the early-2000s. Then I demonstrate how social media emerges as a new market information regime for Bollywood in a marketing environment that mandates application of rational methods to know the targeted audience and then customize the content. This chapter shows
how a global industry such as Bollywood is transforming according to social media.
Chapter 1: Sain Zahoor’s Transformation: Sufi Heritage and the Case for a post-9/11 Islamic Modernity

In this chapter, I intend to demystify the phenomenon of Sain Zahoor’s entry into popular culture from a non-hereditary Punjabi shrine singer background. The backdrop of his entry took place in a post-9/11 local representation of Sufism as a moderate face of Islam that has now become a global phenomenon. In particular, I look at the origins of this new representation, the media through which it is transmitted to Pakistan, and its implication on Pakistani Sufi music traditions.

Building on Hisham Aidi’s (2014: chapter 4) seminal work on the role of Sufism in US policy regarding the Muslim world, I will analyze the narratives of US policy think tanks on Sufism in the backdrop of modernizing Islam to resolve the issue of Muslim rage against the West, precisely the US. I will argue that these narratives identify Sufism as the modernist stream of Islam, exhibiting a freedom of conscience, a non-existent trait of Islamic societies, but a fundamental aspect of western modernity. The policy recommendations formulated the idea of reviving Sufi heritage in the Islamic world. I demonstrate how NGOs helped to revive Sufi musical heritage and spread it

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6 Aidi represents Sufism in US policy as a form of mobilization against the extremist Wahabi version of Islam. Based on textual analysis of the primary sources, my argument differs from Aidi and corresponds to Saba Mahmood’s (2006) reading of Islam and secularism in US policy.
across the globe, including Pakistan, acting as an alternative media. I conclude by explaining the revival of the modernist narrative of Bulleh Shah (1680-1758), a Punjabi Sufi and poet of Qadria Order, in the embodiment of Zahoor.

The Liberation of the “I”

Islam and modernity has been a popular discussion topic in the West. Originating from a global security perspective, a segment of the post-9/11 epoch of the debate headed by the American policy think tanks and policy-making circles replaced modernity with modernization to address the issue of Islamic violence against the US. According to them, Muslim rage stems from “backwardness” manifested in the form of extremist and orthodox interpretations of Islamic doctrine. To this end, their analysts prepared reports and policy memos, unanimously recognizing Sufism as a positive modernist stream of Islamic thought and practice. Below I collect and analyze this argument, scattered across different policy recommendation documents, which can be described as interdisciplinary because of the diversified areas of the specialization of the analysts, and the methodologies and data they used to produce them.

The conservative policy think tank RAND Corporation’s report *Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies*, prepared by the
sociologist Cheryl Benard (2003), summarizes their understanding of the dilemma of Islam: that “[its] current crisis has two main components. The Islamic world has been marked by a long period of backwardness and comparative powerlessness…At the same time, the Islamic world has fallen out of step with contemporary global culture” (ibid.: 3). Hence, Benard argues for modernizing Islam led by the US—modernity as it is conceptualized in the West. In the title of the report, the descriptors civil and democratic demonstrate that she reconstructs Islam not as an independent category, but as quintessentially combined with the western values. To generate the modernization process from within Islam, she emphasizes providing ideological and material support to the grass roots strata of Islamic societies that are already struggling in the same dimension or have a propensity to absorb western values.

Benard (2003: ix-x, 3-5, 25) categorizes Muslim populations into different groups on the basis of their social views, and loosely positions Sufis in the modernist group. Fundamentalists outrightly reject western culture and seek political control to implement their strict version of Islam. Traditionalists are non-violent yet idealize the past and are resistant to change. Modernists pursue change in religious understanding and practice. And secularists consider religion a private matter. The natural allies of the West seem to be the secularists in this configuration. Yet, the report does not rely on them
because of their unfriendly and anti-American stance. Moreover, these groups represent segments on a continuum from fundamentalists to secularists, and also have subdivisions as well.

Sufis are not a ready match for any of the categories, but we will here include them in modernism. Sufism represents an open, intellectual interpretation of Islam. Sufi influence over school curricula, norms, and cultural life should be strongly encouraged in countries that have a Sufi tradition, such as Afghanistan or Iraq. Through its poetry, music, and philosophy, Sufism has a strong bridge role outside of religious affiliations (ibid.: 46).

This succinct statement is the pioneering post-9/11 policy recommendation for considering Sufism as an internal resource to reform Islam. Other conservative think tanks, such as the Nixon Center and the Heritage Foundation, and progressive think tanks, such as Libforall, also corresponded to the recommendation given by RAND (Baran 2004; Cohen 2006; Howell). Thus, Sufism was represented as the “moderate,” “progressive,” “modern,” or “enlightened” face of Islam. Although the semantic meanings of these terms are different, Sufism is clearly signified in the language of political sociology, not spirituality. Sufism in its traditional sense does not have a concrete social ideology of its own, as does Islam and the West. Triangulated with both Islam and the West, the analysts build on

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7 The analysts basically refer to Islam as a social system. However, the sociology of Islam is not a unified field that they study. In this regard, they primarily examine social views of three Muslim groups: the schools of jurisprudence (clergy), the fundamentalists, and the Islamic revival movements that originated in different Islamic countries during the colonial period and continued up until now. To control the society to implement their own version of Islam is the common thread among these divergent segments.
Sufism’s modernization potential estimated in terms of its value difference from other strands of Islam and its proximity to West. Benard explains the core values of the modernists:

The things that modernists value and admire most about Islam tend to be quite different and more abstract than the things the fundamentalists and the traditionalists value. The core values—the primacy of the individual conscience and a community based on social responsibility, equality, and freedom—are easily compatible with modern democratic norms (Benard 2003: 5).

The primacy of conscience denotes the central premise of Islamic modernization: separation between religion and society, leading to secularism, individualism, multiculturalism, and liberty to name a few key features of Western modernity.

Major Stephen Lambert’s (2005) analytical report The Sources of Islamic Revolutionary Conduct produced for the Joint Military Intelligence College performs a psychological analysis of the Muslim mind to generate new strategies for the war on terror that it construes as a conflict between two religions: Islam and Christianity. Lambert also delves into the issue of the primacy of conscience and concludes that it simply does not exist in Islam. Religious doctrine serves as the sole backdrop to judgment, generating conformist Islamic societies one after the other. In a lengthy comparison of the evolution of political thought in the West—Christendom—and Islam, he

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8 This is a public document now.
asserts that the former emancipated thought from religion through the persistent self-critique over the course of centuries, a process initiated by Martin Luther at the dawn of the 16th century in the form of the Reformation, and later on followed by the other individuals such as John Calvin and so on. Islamic thought has been frozen and enclosed, since it never encouraged critique (ibid.: 9-11, 84-97). In this context, I suggest that Lambert points to Sufi oddity to do insider critique of Islam when he expresses his infamous stratagem recommendation that Sufism “may represent an exploitable fissure in the bulwark of Islam. It may provide the means to penetrate a religious ideology that otherwise seems impenetrable” (ibid.: 168). He contextualizes the statement in the long history of Sufi persecution as apostates and heretics in Islamic societies for pursuing an Islam that challenged theocratic ideals, and was indeed “personal” and “experiential” (ibid.: 168, 166).

The notions of “experiential” and “personal” are keys to understand what is meant by Sufi modernism in the viewpoint of the analysts. The Sufi endurance to assert judgment based on individual experience is regarded as the Sufi modernist impulse of Islam. The Sufi conscience has been consistently generating the insider critique throughout the history of Islam, a nod of liberation from the claws of the immensely powerful doctrine upheld by the clergy and other likeminded groups. The experiential judgment differentiates Sufi modern from the modern as it is paradigmatically conceived.
in the West in which it is supposed to be based on reason. This is the probable cause why Benard considers Sufis not completely fitting into the modernist group in the strict sense of the concept.

In a 2004 Nixon Center conference report, *Understanding Sufism and its Potential Role in US Policy*, Dr. Timothy Gianotti, a scholar of religion, maintains that there exist two forms of Islam. First, the theocratic Islam that lays flat emphasis on orthodoxy (*al-iman*) and orthopraxy (*al-islam*). Second, Sufi Islam that celebrates *al-ihsan* (righteousness), a concept that stems from the Islamic view of worshiping “God as if you see Him, and, if you do not see Him, then He surely sees you” (in Baran 2004: 1). The onus of judgment also shifts from one form to the other. While the first form looks towards Islamic doctrine, Sufis exercise their judgment and authority in the “unseen world of the heart, a subtle domain beyond the perception of physical eyes yet perceivable through experience and the spiritual eye of intuitive understanding” (ibid.: 2).⁹

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⁹ Gianotti’s ideas at the Nixon Center are chunks from his earlier study (2001) of *Ihya Ulum Al-Din* (Reviving Religious Knowledge) penned by Islamic mystic and scholar, Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali (d.1111). Calling in Ghazali in the Islamic modernization debate is telling. As history reveals, he suddenly left his illustrious professorship in Baghdad in search of mystic knowledge, and authored his magnum opus *Ihya Ulum Al-Din* nearly after a decade of solitude. The revival, according to Ghazali, was a response to his contemporary religious scholars, who exclusively focused on the organization and control of the geographically expanding Islamic civilization according to their strictly codified interpretations. Ghazali declared this materialist approach dangerous for Islam, and came up with an original understanding of Islam influenced by his own grounding in his contemporary epistemologies such as Asharite school of Islamic philosophy, Neo-Platonism, and mysticism. Rejecting the
In this backdrop, the paradigmatic understanding of “Sufi” as the seeker of God transmogrified to the enlightened individuals. The Nixon Center report provides plentiful historical and present day evidences of Sufi eclectic worldview, benevolence and respect for non-Islamic cultures, cross-religion fertilization of their ideas, and dismissal of the clergy, indicating the freedom with which they exercised their judgment, despite condemnation from the other groups. Sufi discursive expressions, in particular music and poetry, are powerful manifestation of this judgment, literally ratifying first person singular, the “I”. A famous poem of Rumi presented by Shaykh Hisham Kabbani, a leader of the US based international Naqshbandi Haqqani Order of Sufism, in his keynote address at the Nixon Center reads:

“I am a Muslim, but I don’t know if I am; I don’t know if I am a Christian or a Jew or an Austrian or an Eastern or a Western or an upper or lower. I don’t know if I am from the four elements of the world. I don’t know if I am from heaven or from earth. I don’t know if I am an Indian or a Chinese or a Bulgarian. I don’t know if I am Iraqi or Syrian. I don’t know if I am from Roroshan or Aswohan. I don’t know if I am from this world or that – but I am a body and a soul. My ego is my soul. When I mention two it means me and God....” (in Baran 2004: 19).

Kabbani explains the meaning of the poem in its literal sense as the Sufi penchant to “blend together with the people” (ibid.:19).

religious legalization of life matters, he established the first hand experience of God in the afterlife as the perspective of his doctrine of Islam that was also rooted in the Islamic traditions (ibid.: 2-7). In another context, Ebrahim Moosa (2005: 25-29), a scholar of Ghazali, recognizes the post-9/11 relevance of Ghazali in the issues of contemporary Muslim subjectivity. The foremost among them is the compelling question of creativity and changes in the quarantined Islamic religious discourse on the onslaught of the modernity.
Yet, ironically, extremist ideologies lead the contemporary Islamic socio-political narrative that is premised upon the revival of the medieval political glory of Islam. It has sidelined Sufism in Islamic societies, a view shared by those speaking at the Nixon Center. As a US foreign policy matter, the burden of the Sufi revival was put on the US. Dr. Hedieh Mirahmadi, executive director of the Islamic Supreme Council of America, a US based Islamic NGO,\(^{10}\) suggests in the conference that the US may help the various Islamic countries “regain their lost heritage” through the preservation and reconstruction of Sufi shrines and architecture, preservation and translation of ancient manuscripts, and funding of the educational centers that focus on the ancient civilization and culture of a region (ibid.: 6-7). Mirahmadi notes that US policymakers would not endorse Sufism openly working under a secular political system. They should entrench it in a holistic approach aimed at designing assistance programs particularly directed towards history and culture of Islamic nations (ibid.: 6). The RAND report, of course, already identified the bridging role of Sufi music, poetry, and philosophy.

**Transmission of Ideas**

In 2003, the design of the “Muslim World Outreach” program by the National Security Council demonstrated that a holistic US approach towards Islamic

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\(^{10}\) See its mission statement at http://islamicsupremecouncil.org/home/about-us.html.
nations was already in play in the policymaking circles. The program was an exemplar of US post-9/11 cultural and historical engagement with Muslim countries. Developed from warfare lessons learned from the Cold War and intended to reform Islam from within as a US national security interest, the program, administered by USAID (United States Agency for International Development), chiefly called for reforms in education and curricula, training of clerics, restoration of Islamic monuments, and strengthening of moderate narratives on local media (Kaplan et al. 2005). Restoration of Sufi shrines, and backdoor support to Sufism were components as well (ibid.). Whereas Kaplan et al. maintains that an overt theological agenda differentiates the “Islamic reformation” from the Cold War (ibid.), I suggest that the revival of Islamic heritage is another factor vividly differentiating the two. The Cold War campaign was about strengthening opposition groups and American propaganda in the socialist bloc, and the Islamic reformation additionally endeavors to revive a dormant argument from within Islam such as Sufism. The revival is to make it prominent in Islamic societies as a social view, not mere spirituality.

The appropriation of Sufism in US national security strategy inspired other nations to adopt it as a policy tool reminiscent of the American think tank reports (see Sharma 2010; Woodward et al. 2013). The various approaches differ, though, in that the non-US nations mainly construe Sufism
on a Sufism-extremism binary to deal with homegrown Islamic extremism. In the US perspective it is an instrument of a deeper Islamic socio-religious transformation. The multiple perspectives have provided a working basis for the celebration of Sufism and its heritage world over.\(^\text{11}\)

For instance, the enlightened moderation ideology of President General Pervez Musharraf (2001-2008) was a precursor to the institutionalized revival of Sufism in Pakistan. The two-pronged ideology maintained that Muslims should shun militancy and focus on socioeconomic development to dispel the extremist Muslim stereotypes. It also addressed the West, markedly the US, to end the political disputes in the Muslim world in a just manner (Musharraf 2004). The international promotion of a national soft image was a key component of the ideology to counter Pakistan’s international image of an extremist nation. Musharraf recognized Sufism as a convincing soft face of Pakistan (2006: 322). Thus, Sufi wisdom was institutionalized with the help of few progressive thinkers in the organizational structure of the National Sufi Council (Eteraz 2009). However the council remained dysfunctional except for holding a Sufi music gala in Lahore (ibid.).

After Musharraf’s fall from power, the council was succeeded by the Sufi

\(^{11}\) In few instances, the global flourishing of Sufism directly links to the US. For instance, Kabbani played a key-role for establishing a vigorous Sufi narrative in Singapore, operating from the US (Sani 2010: 16). According to Kabbani’s official website, in recent years, he has travelled extensively and engaged state-heads and other key-figures, and commoners in various countries to spread a “message of love, peace and acceptance” (http://hishamkabbani.com/#).
Advisory Council (in 2009), which silently disappeared later. The formulation of the councils demonstrates the resonance of the Islamic reformation with the Pakistani political elite.

To connect to the commoners, who were the target audience of the US led Islamic reformation, the Muslim World Outreach program opted to operate through independent Muslim reform groups, and foundations in Islamic countries besides diplomatic cooperation at the state-level (Kaplan et al. 2005). The option of supporting independent Muslim reform groups and foundations is another significant difference from the Cold War in which the political bodies and institutions were in focus. In contrast, Islamic reformation is about grass roots transformation, not political mobilization. As for the Sufi revival, the think tanks hinted at the organizational and intellectual shortcomings of the traditional Sufi orders. They lauded the civic movement of the Turkish Sufi and reformer Fathullah Gulen, for its moderate ideology, flexible organizational structure, vast education network (in the Central Asia), media ownership, and quantifiable social impact (Dr. Saritoprak in Baran 2004: 5; Rabasa et al. 2007: 74).

In general, the third sector, consisting of NGOs, represents a crucial independent structure to reach the masses in the USAID global framework. A USAID report on NGO networking, prepared by Adam Abelson, recognizes NGOs as “an undeniably powerful ‘third sector’” entity for performing multiple
developmental and social tasks (2003: 2). The post-9/11 global grassroots revival of Sufi musical heritage primarily took place in the third sector.

*Global grass roots transmission*

A universally agreed-upon definition of the third sector is a disputed terrain. Generally, these are conceived to be the multiple institutions of different sizes and structures “occupying a distinctive social space outside of both the market and the state” (Salamon and Anheier 1997: 1). From the summary of the key functions and benefits of the third sector on the official website of the National Audit Office of the UK, I find three themes relevant to this study: to develop innovative solutions to social and economic problems; to work for creating (social) value of the project instead earning profit; and to connect to people (“What are Third Sector Organizations and Their Benefits for Commissioners”). In this context, the revival of Sufi musical heritage by the third sector implies: its relevance to the social issues; an innovative form to reach grass roots level; and creation of a value. Moreover, keeping in view the innate ability of NGOs to transmit knowledge, which is an outcome of their operational and strategic necessity of networking and sharing knowledge, I suggest that a successful Sufi musical heritage revival project can generate its replications across the regions. NGOs do networking for a number of reasons, such as fulfilling the donor requirements, seeking partnership with
other NGOs, capacity and contacts development, and sharing knowledge (Østergaard and Nielsen). Global donors like USAID encourage networking of NGOs affiliated with it to better perform the developmental agenda. The USAID report on NGO networking even recommends donor-led networking efforts (Abelson 2003), enabling the sharing of knowledge. I consider NGOs as the alternative grass roots media of globalization.

Interestingly, USAID primarily focuses on the preservation of Sufi tangible heritage; its network has not produced a noteworthy Sufi intangible heritage revival project such as music. While the US national security perspective builds a case for Sufi heritage’s global revival, the network of UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization), another global NGO donor, set the precedent of a musical revival in the shape of the Fes Festival of World Sacred Music, a project embedded in UNESCO’s heritage preservation plans. It was developed in 1994 in the wake of the Gulf War (in 1991) by Morocco’s largest NGO, FES-ASSIS, partnered with the Moroccan monarchy (Curtis 2007: 9-11, 37). The United Nations first recognized religion’s role to create and resolve contemporary global conflicts soon after the Gulf war along with the third sector potential to foster the culture of peace through intercultural communication (Beversluis et al. 2000: 262-81). Morocco has been at the forefront of these efforts having launched the UNESCO program for interfaith dialogue in 1995 (Guerreiro 2005: 147)
after the benchmark 1994 UNESCO declaration on the role of religion to promote a culture of peace. The United Nations declared the Fes festival as one of the twelve successful world events contributing effectively to the “intercivilizational dialogue” in 2000 (Curtis 2007: 19).

The Fes festival was initially produced to counter negative Muslim stereotypes, and interfaith dialogue was the value it intended to create. Following the 9/11 events and the terrorism tide in Morocco, the festival organizers revisited their course. Now it stands for building peace, focused on resolving Islamic terrorism (ibid.). Given the spread of the terrorism issue, its organizers have foreseen their innovative solution’s global spread:

Fes Festival organizers hope the festival’s message of teaching tolerance through music will be contagious and that it will be adapted to suit local needs. In the same way that UNESCO world heritage sites are constituted around the globe, the Fes Festival actively maintains ties to a variety of performances and festivals. The festival’s mission has taken on the status of an emulative philosophy that can be transported to any given context where groups of people seek to engage in peace building. While the festival’s mission is not a religion in itself per se, its implicit belief in the power of sound resonates so deeply with those who attend the performances that it seems patterned on a fundamental human need to revere the divine in congregation through music and sound (Curtis 2007: 20).

Focus on a fundamental human spiritual need instead of venerating a particular religion resonates with UNESCO’s framework of promoting a culture
of peace. Besides its peaceful aspects, the 1994 declaration recognizes religion as a motivational force that is also politicized, bound to a strong sense of others, which can be used for group mobilization and violence. On the other hand, spirituality, a term that it does not define, represents the fundamental value for establishing the culture of peace. As the very first step towards the culture of peace, the declaration calls for a commitment “to cultivate a spirituality which manifests itself in action” (UNESCO). The peace process starts at the individual level and then radiates outward to the global level having transmitted through the levels of homes and families, communities, and nations (ibid.). Obviously, UNESCO infers spirituality as a shared human value, separate from religion, which can permeate group boundaries. UNESCO’s understanding of the substance, spirituality, informs the basic form of the Fes festival whose organizers avow to create “a new culture of living spirituality” through deliberate dissolution of boundaries by presenting and mixing various spiritual music traditions at a single platform instead of focusing on a particular tradition (see Curtis 2007: 19).

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12 The opening lines of clause 6 of the declaration read that “[r]eligious have contributed to the peace of the world, but they have also led to division, hatred, and war. Religious people have too often betrayed the high ideals they themselves have preached” (UNESCO). Likewise, clause 20 says that “[w]e will remain mindful that our religions must not identify themselves with political, economic, or social powers, so as to remain free to work for justice and peace. We will not forget that confessional political regimes may do serious harm to religious values as well as to society. We should distinguish fanaticism from religious zeal” (ibid.).
In line with the expectation of the organizers, the idea that they established in the form of the Fes festival spread enormously in the post-9/11 world. Yet, Sufism replaced spirituality as the substance in various local perspectives. Whereas UNESCO addressed the issue of religion in generality, the post-9/11 debate on religion and global peace revolves around Islam, and Sufism is the form of spirituality that is the solution. Sufi music festivals have become commonplace in the last decade, including Jashne Khusrau Festival (in Delhi, India), Samaa International Festival for Sufi Music and Chanting (in Cairo, Egypt), and Konya International Mystic Music Festival (in Konya, Turkey), to name a few.

The burgeoning of Sufi festivals increased collaboration among the cultural NGOs in the form of technical support and the exchange of artists. Following the Fes festival, these festivals present Sufi and spiritual music of various traditions and regions. A Pakistani cultural NGO, Rafi Peer Theater Workshop (RPTW) collaborates in this network of Sufi music festivals. Modeled on the Fes festival, the International Mystic Music Sufi Festival (commonly known as the Sufi festival), held in Lahore since 2004, is a flagship festival of RPTW. It has been a solo project of RPTW since its inception except for a brief period of state support during the Musharraf presidency.
Sufi Heritage Revival at the Edge

RPTW connects to the global donor networks, specializing in a variety of capacities including early literacy, film and TV production, developing awareness at the grass-root level through performing arts, promoting local artists and craftsmen, and doing event marketing since 1974. It designs cross-cultural and training programs with its international partners, and develops international festivals (Rafi Peer Theater Workshop). It has partnered with UNESCO for the learning and awareness projects in Pakistan (ibid.). USAID too partnered with RPTW to launch Pakistan Children’s Television, known as Sim Sim Hamara (Our Sim Sim), a local adaptation of Sesame Street (“Fact Sheet on U.S. Relationship with Rafi Peer Theater Workshop” 2012).13 Earlier, USAID successfully launched the Arabic version of Sesame Street in Egypt to impart education of religious tolerance to Egyptian toddlers (Kaplan et al. 2005). Along with the other components, the Pakistani version too educates about diversity. Apart from these two global donors, RPTW does international networking with the NGOs working in the same areas of expertise (Rafi Peer Theater Workshop).

RPTW reinvigorated the performing arts of Pakistan in the last two decades. The puppetry festival in 1992 was its first festival to preserve and promote the dying art of puppetry in Pakistan. RPTW launched the World

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13 USAID backed off in 2012 after allegations of financial mismanagement on RPTW.
Performing Arts Festival in the late-1990s that was succeeded by the inauguration of the Sufi festival in 2004. This happens to be the only live Sufi music event of Pakistan that hosts both local and international artists in collaboration with local and international partner groups and NGOs. The Youth Performing Arts Festival is a recent addition to the list. Jointly, these festivals, as I know as a festival goer by 2008, are meant to “celebrate peace” and the issue they counter is the deteriorating soft image of Pakistan since the beginning of the war on terror.

The Sufi festival follows the basic form of the Fes festival. RPTW conceives Sufi music as an expression that “has the ability to cross all geographical, national, religious, and language barriers, and should thus be used as an instrument of spiritual renewal and unity,” expresses Faizaan Peerzada (d.2012), director RPTW, to the Daily Times (in “Sufi Music Festival to Hit the City on 25th”). It presents a plethora of local and international Sufi and sacred music genres and voices under the overarching theme of celebrating peace. Though the Sufi festival stands as a separate project, it is integrated into the constellation of RPTW festivals that are predominantly formed around folklore as the basic substance. In fact, RPTW began its journey to preserve the dying folk arts of Pakistan. The metamorphosis of the value from preservation to celebrating peace happened in the early-2000s. RPTW’s narrative on folklore refines the form of the Sufi festival by way of
establishing it as a platform for primarily staging the regional Sufi music of Pakistan, hence bestowing it a persona of its own.

RPTW's folklore narrative originates from the backdrop of the post-colonial dilemma of national identity. Succinctly, the fundamental question with which Pakistan has been struggling is: what forms the basis of Pakistani culture? Religion or land? RPTW opts for land. CEO of RPTW Usman Peerzada, in a TV interview posted on Dailymotion\textsuperscript{14}, provides his definition of culture:

\begin{quote}
[author's translation from Urdu] The simple definition of culture is that it relates to the land. For instance, it relates to the weather, because the weather determines the kind of vegetation there….These things become a part of the folklore. In my understanding, there does not exist any other definition of culture.
\end{quote}

The orthodox clergy, and the Islamic revivalists and nationalists (who are active for reviving the political glory of Islam) overtly intimidate the indigenous arts out of their general contempt for performing arts as un-Islamic practices. In their view, the sources of Pakistani culture are in the Arabian Peninsula, the birthplace of Islam. The state attempts to maintain a middle ground by referring to both the sources, yet inconsistently and a matter choice as well. For example, the era in which RPTW came into being ushered a

colossal current of absorbing Arab values. During the 1970s, the state strengthened diplomatic ties with the newly established oil economies of the Gulf and let in Arab influence in the form of money and values. Later in the decade, the Soviet war in Afghanistan massively increased the public presence of the Islamists who fought against the Soviets and waged a holy war on behalf of the Muslims, winning laurels. RPTW remained silent during this period.

It entered popular culture with the first puppet festival, envisaging its objective of preserving the indigenous arts. For RPTW, this is to preserve the essence of our heritage, the diversity that we inherited as the indigenous people of the Indus Valley Civilization, but endangering it by blind Arabization. RPTW head Usman Peerzada explains:

[author’s translation from Urdu] Pakistan has its own diversity: diversity of variations in which you get Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan, and Sindh [provinces of Pakistan]. In which you get a big landmass of Punjab [province] that has three or four variations of its own in its language and folklore. Then all these combine to form a beautiful diversity for you. Unfortunately, I personally feel that we were dragged in the dimension that we did not belong to. We, the people of the Sub-continent, we do not belong to Hijaz. We did not come from Arabia. We did not come armed on horses back to spread Islam...So, with the passage of time, we were taken to the Arabic formation that we were Arabic...We were the people with so many inherited colors, languages, traditions, and faces. Instead of enjoying our own diversity, we detoured to adopt Arab identity. We are not Arabs. We are natives of this region. We belong to the Indus Valley Civilization. This is our culture and this is our heritage (ibid.).
RPTW has resurrected the diversified regional Sufi music traditions of Pakistan that are primarily oral. Earlier, the state institutions have been doing so, such as Lok Virsa (National Institute of Traditional and Folk Heritage), and the state-run national television and radio. However, the revival under the banner of RPTW differs by way of: consistency (persistent promotion); scale (national and international presentation); and inclusion (indiscriminate advancement of the marginalized traditions). All the traditions represent different shades of Sufi wisdom.

From the artist repository of RPTW, I represent the sain (non-hereditary musician who performs at Sufi shrines) as a mouthpiece of the Punjabi Sufi modernist narrative. The personification of Sufi wisdom distinguishes these musicians from the other categories such as qawwals (qawwali musicians) who have been designated as the prime carriers of the Sufi wisdom by far in the media and scholarship alike. The sain not only preserve and transmit Sufi heritage from one generation to the other, but also mediate it to the commoners through their verbal and musical discourse and embodied performance. Yet, they are marginalized for their unworldly appearance and non-hereditary musical background.
The riddle of Sain

In Punjabi musical parlance, sain denotes a male who breaks away from worldly affairs due to spiritual yearning, who thereafter spends his life singing kalam (Sufi poetry) at Sufi shrines (dargah) (Nayyar 1999: 769-70).\(^{15}\) He sings kalam in an eclectic style, but based on ragas (Indian melodic modes) with the rhythmic accompaniment of the iktara (one stringed plucked instrument, also called king), which he also masters.\(^{16}\) Sain, who are mostly illiterate, memorize kalam with utmost perfection from a teacher, and exhibit remarkable ability to interpret mundane issues in Sufi wisdom, such as poetry, music, proverbs, anecdotes, and parables. Though a sain pays homage to all, he associates himself to a particular Sufi saint, his savior or patron saint, and specializes in his poetry and wisdom. He finds spiritual solace at the shrine of his patron saint and spends most of his lifetime singing there to offer gratitude for spiritual fulfillment. He marks himself usually with green, red or black-colored simple dress and heavy jewelry made of metal, stones, and beads, which signify detachment from the mundane life. It does not mean that he lives in isolation. Sain also have households and perform the other social obligations, though they live the life of a pauper. The offerings from the shrine-goers form their only concrete income.

\(^{15}\) Nayyar mentions that sain and faqir (devotee) are interchangeable terms. However, this particular sense of faqir is different from its general connotation of a beggar.

\(^{16}\) I am describing sain singers based on my encounters with sain at different locations in Lahore during 2006 and 2007. I would particularly mention Sain Laal whom I met outside Texali Gate in 2006.
The scant literature on sain musicians is devoid of any significant detail. In the context of dhol (Punjabi barrel drum) players, Schreffler (2010: 181-6) notes that these are escapist non-hereditary musicians who perform at Sufi shrines having abandoned their expected social role. They use their devotion for the saint as an excuse and carry the title of sain that indicates their nonconventional status among the Punjabi dhol playing traditions that are constructed around professional musician castes. Jurgen Frembgen notes that these are the religious mendicants of Pakistan who also sing devotional poetry. If a mendicant achieves virtuosity, he is given the honorific title of Sain that indexes his difference from the other of his category, as denoted by the semantic meaning of term, including lord, god, husband, or master (2004: 248-250). Though I agree that Sain stands as a title, I emphasize the savior-saved relationship encoded in this title to explain the genesis of this practice that is a misfit with Punjabi traditions that are organized around musician castes, lineages, and their patron groups (see Lybarger 2003; Nayyar 1999; Schreffler 2010).

Sain, the term, as I understand, bears multiple connotations in Punjab. It commonly refers to a patron or a savior who not only fulfills one’s needs, but also protects one from sufferings. The other common meaning of the term is of a person, particularly male, who has become indifferent to his environment
by birth or later at any age. In some cases, such an individual is considered to be spiritual and people seek his blessing. Combining the two connotations, Sain is also a term widely used as a colloquial referent to a Sufi who is intellectually isolated from the environment to the extent that he becomes incomprehensible to the commoners. The word Sain frequently appears on Sufi tombstones as a prefix indexing their spiritual stature. The masses look at the saints as their saviors on the grounds of the spiritual powers they are believed to possess. Generally, they communicate to them the problems they themselves have no capacity to resolve. Though they revere all of them, a person establishes an intimate relationship to a particular saint as the savior. It is common for these individuals to regularly make a pilgrimage to their respective patron saint’s shrines as a matter of duty to pay their respect and gratitude. The sain singers represent one form of the interpersonal communication with saints, a Punjabi norm. I maintain that the contextualization of this practice into economic relations, such as caste-patron, would complicate it as offbeat. In case of a sain, the patron is the saint, leading to a unique sense of work seldom conforming to the economic standards, yet it forms the nucleus of his performance practice and ultimately a unique modernist tradition.

Frembgen also notes this (2004: 249).
The sain who I met individually took pride in their “paki duty” (permanent duty) at the shrines of their respective patron saint. Generally, they perform on Thursdays, the weekday sanctified as the day of saints. They do not select themselves, but are chosen by the shrine for the duty. They claim to have spiritual insight about the call from the shrine, and afterwards they are bound to comply for the rest of their lives. They acknowledge their own musical skills as the blessing (dain) of the saint they receive at his shrine. The duty signifies a formidable spiritual practice validating their bonding to the saint. In practical terms, they deliver Sufi messages to the shrine-goers.

The history of this oral tradition remains obscure for the very reason that it has a non-caste background. The first systematic attempt to document the oral traditions of Punjab was done during British rule. The colonial management constructed Punjab in the framework of caste that contextualized the later musician ethnographies up until the present, leaving the non-caste musicians somehow at the margins. On the other hand, the sain themselves do not exhibit the enthusiasm to memorize their stylistic pedigrees as compared to the hereditary musicians who usually do it as a matter of familial pride and for claiming authenticity. State institutions

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18 Also see Frembgen (2004: 246).
19 Recently, Schreffler opines that sain dholi (Punjabi barrel drum player), the instrumental facet of the sain tradition, is purely a postcolonial Pakistani phenomenon (2010: 181).
sporadically introduced a few of them either in the category of Punjabi folk or Sufi music during the 1950s and onwards. RPTW has been consistent in promoting them. Due to its efforts, the sain musicians are now becoming household names in Pakistan besides capturing the attention of international audiences.

_sain Zahoor_

The 2006 BBC World Music award winner and now one of the leading Sufi singers of Pakistan, Sain Zahoor is the foremost discovery of RPTW. He briefly performed for state television and the Lok Virsa before RPTW systematically launched him. Peer Artist Management (PAM), an organ of RPTW, developed his profile and marketed him in the international networks of Sufi festivals and South Asian cultural organizations. PAM arranged his weekly performance at the Peeru’s Café—RPTW’s lounge—Besides launching his first international album (Rehman 2008a, 2008b). He frequently travels internationally, including North America and Europe, earning recognition as the voice of peace. Notably, the BBC award established his popular credentials, following the footsteps of the internationally acclaimed
Sufi musician, Ustad Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan (d.1997).\textsuperscript{20} Zahoor’s rise to stardom in his mid-60s, however, is an exception.

In TV interviews posted on YouTube\textsuperscript{21}, Zahoor proclaims that in his childhood, he used to see a perplexing, nightly dream of a hand appearing from a shrine and calling him. Not able to sleep, he would go out and join Sain Ronaq Ali, a sain living in a nearby graveyard that used to recite devotional poetry in the accompaniment of his iktara at night. At the age of seven, Zahoor became a formal disciple of Ali with the permission of his parents who had rebuked him initially. However, the riddle of the dream was unsolved for the next three years during which he saw it persistently. Ali suggested that he search for the shrine across the country. By that time, the partition of British India took place into two independent states, India and Pakistan (in 1947). When the dust of the political turmoil settled, he started his quest without the idea of destiny. Finally, he arrived in Uch Sharif (also known as Uch Gillaniyan), a town in South Punjab known for the Sufi shrines and the birthplace of Bulleh Shah (1680-1758), who would become his patron saint. A stranger in the town, he roamed the streets clueless when a boy called him by his name and asked him to go into a dargah where its \textit{gadi nasheen} (successor of a saint) was waiting for him. Upon entering, he immediately

\textsuperscript{20} Zahoor does not have a presence in the western recording industry, which Ustad Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan had (see Bohlman 2002: 17-22; Qureshi 2013: 599-601; Sakata 1994). Secondly, Zahoor primarily moves between non-commercial Sufi music and cultural festivals.

\textsuperscript{21} Available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7hRflW1guYNM, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mbv5OtduftA.
recognized the shrine as the one that used to call him. It was the shrine of an ancestor of Shah. He became the *mureed* (spiritual follower) of the gadi nasheen and played music for him for the next three months. For some reason, his mentor released him from his duty there and assigned his duty at the Shah’s shrine in Qasur, Central Punjab. The riddle was solved at last.

Now in his late-70s, Zahoor has been doing duty at the Shah’s shrine well over 60 years. His repertoire primarily consists of Shah’s poetry and whatever he has subsequently achieved. Later, he also learned kalam from Sain Taj Nasem Asti, who also worked in the film industry, and Sain Marna (1910-1961). Now he has many disciples of his own.

Bulleh Shah, the patron saint of Zahoor, stands among the leading Punjabi Sufi modernists for the stubborn manifestation of his intuitive judgment against the conformist religious tide of his time through his poetry. Neither Shah himself nor any secondary source ever documented his poetry and biography until an individual, Malik Hira collected them in 1882 from oral sources (Ahmad 1982: 28; Duggal 1996: 5). According to a common belief, the qawwals played an important role in transmitting Shah’s poetry to the modern era (Abbas 2007; Ahmad 1982: 29; Duggal 1996: 5). I assert that the teacher-disciple relationship between Zahoor and his mentors establishes that the Sain was a parallel tradition transmitting oral Sufi heritage. In

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22 For some of the reputed publications of Shah’s poetry, see Ahmed (1976) and Ubirai (1939).
documented form, the history of this tradition nearly goes back to a century in the form of Sain Marna who was a popular musician and was briefly documented as well (see Malik 1998: 65-7). The formal teacher-disciple relationship, the principle mechanism to impart oral musical knowledge in North India, between Zahoor and the others reveals the presence of a structure in this tradition as well. However, the musical tradition of sains remained marginalized until coming to the RPTW platform. Qawwals such as Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan sing the poetry of Shah to audiences at home and abroad. Zahoor represents Shah’s modernist argument in perhaps its most compelling form.

Zahoor’s stage performance is a blend of singing verses with iktara accompaniment and footwork synchronized to the rhythm accentuated by ghunghroo (ankle bells). He therefore represents the embodied revival of Shah, a trait devoid in the musical performances of qawwals. In place of ecstatic dancing which is common in Sufism (see Wolf 2006, 2014), Shah referred to dance as it is done by kanjari (a dancing girl of courtesan background). The rattling of ghunghroo relate to Shah’s modernist worldview that vociferously defied taboos. Answering a question about his attire and ghunghroo in an interview to BBC (Urdu) posted on YouTube23, Zahoor explains that he follows his murshid (spiritual guide) who danced to find God

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and why he should be shy of this. He embodies a tradition that extends back to Bulleh Shah.

**Embodying the argument**

By the time of Shah in the 17th century, religion in India had been enormously politicized. Just before him, the grass roots movement of reviving the orthodox Sunni Islam in India had begun. It was partly a response to *Din-e-Illahi*, a syncretic faith promulgated by the Mughal Emperor Akbar (1542-1606) that officially sought to merge the Indian mystic and religious traditions to unify the empire (Spear 1972: 134-5). The revival movement led by Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564-1624), an Islamic theologian from Punjab and a follower of the Naqshbandi Order as well, condemned it and argued for a puritanical Islamic zeal. His voice remained ineffective in the power corridors (Friedmann 2000). The political ideology took an orthodox turn when Akbar’s great grandson, Aurangzeb (also know as Alamgir) (1618-1707) came to power and began to Islamicize India. He imposed a religious tax on the non-Muslims as subordinates, *jizya*, which had been abolished by Akbar. It was followed by the non-Muslim revolts ushering the disintegration of the empire soon after Aurangzeb’s demise (Spear 1972: 132-3, chapter 15). The social fabric of Punjab was immensely affected when Aurangzeb had executed the Sikh religious leadership for political reasons, leading this region into unrest.
The Sikh separatist sentiments strengthened as a militant revolt against the Mughals (Ikram 1964: 193-5), which then led to communal tension. The successive Afghan raids into India after Alamgir merely increased the existing crisis.

Shah presented his intuitive view in his kalam (Sufi poetry) by having simply rejected the religious judgment. He had to face intense resistance for this, yet he was resilient. Example 1.1 contains a stanza from his famous kafi (a specific genre of kalam), “Bullehya! Ki janaan main kon” (Bullah! Can I know who I am). He refers to himself, Bullehya, to solve the riddle of the identity (Syed 1968: chapter 6), not the doctrine.

**Example 1.1:** First Stanza of Bulleh Shah’s Kafi, “Bullehya! Ki Janaan Main Kon”

*Bullehya! Ki janaan main kon*  
Bullah! Can I know who I am

*Na main momin vich masitan*  
I neither join the faithful in their devout affirmation in the mosque

*Na main vich kufer dian ritan*  
Nor I find myself scaling the subtleties of denial

*Na main pakan vich palitan*  
I do not raise my finger with the righteous nor do I bare my breast with the condemned

*Na main Musa na main Firon*  
I am not Moses nor the Pharoah [sic] either

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24 This is one of the most popular kalam's of Shah. It has been composed to different musical styles including qawwali, kafi, rock, and pop. I came to know this kalam through these compositions.

25 Translation Syed’s.
The anecdotal life history of Shah involves ample evidence of his defiance. He was known to take on the personification of a kanjari, which remains one of his enduring transgressive acts (see Abbas 2007: 634-5; Duggal 1996: 6). A kanjari belongs to the endogamous kanjar (a caste known for prostitution in Punjab) community, hence stigmatized for committing a cardinal sin: extramarital sex. Though the society derives pleasure from the crafts of singing and dancing of this literally quarantined group, these are taboos for the larger society. So is wearing ghunghroo, one of the foremost taboos associated with kanjar culture (Saeed 2001). Ghunghroo is a common North Indian dance instrument used to accentuate rhythm, typically upheld through the footwork. It is used in a variety of dance traditions, yet its connection to the kanjars defames it as an abject symbol of illicit female sexuality and thus, forbidden in the society.

As a Syed (descendant from the direct bloodline of the Prophet), a prestigious South Asian Muslim caste, Shah’s coming into contact with the kanjars was even more perilous for the religious and social boundaries. He did so to please his spiritual leader, Shah Inayat Qadri who belonged to an Arain (farmer caste of Punjab) family of Lahore. The allegiance to a low caste had raised eyebrows in the community earlier. When his master was annoyed for some reason and asked him to leave permanently, the alienated Shah went to a kanjari to learn dancing. Having accomplished the craft, he
embodied a dancing girl and danced for his master who ultimately recognized and pardoned him (Duggal 1996: 5-6; Wolf 2006: 253). Nachnaa (dancing) and kanjari became common subjects in his poetry questioning the socio-religious taboos. He frequently expressed his judgment in the forbidden female voice having represented himself as a kanjari in his verses. His kafi, “Tere ishq nachaya kerke thaya thaya” (Your love made me dance with thaya thaya), explains it (Ex. 1.2).

Example 1.2: First Stanza of Bulleh Shah’s kafi, “Tere Ishq Nachaya Kerke Thaya Thaya” (Duggal 1996: 44)\(^\text{26}\)

\[
\begin{align*}
Tere ishq nachaya kerke thaya thaya & \quad \text{Your love made me dance with thaya thaya} \\
Tere ishq ne dera mere ander kita & \quad \text{Your love abodes inside me} \\
Bher ke zher pyala main tan aaape pita & \quad \text{I myself took this cup full of poison} \\
Jhab de bohrhin ve tabiba nain te main mar gai aan & \quad \text{Come O healer, otherwise I am going to die}
\end{align*}
\]

I propose that Shah embedded in this kafi what he meant by dancing and thus, its precise nature can be read. In the colloquial sense, the term thaya represents a dance bol (rhythmic syllable) that the dancers use as a

\(^{26}\) Translation mine.
mnemonic device to memorize the rhythm, which is also recited during the performance to show their rhythmic virtuosity by synchronizing it with the footwork. Thaya is also used as a derogatory term to represent one who dances, in particular the eunuchs who also earn their livelihood by singing and dancing, hence another outlawed group. Shah’s sense of dancing seems to be focused on the footwork precisely synchronized with rhythm, which is the characteristic feature of Zahoor’s performance.

**Summary**

I have outlined the processes of Zahoor’s movement from the shrine to mass popularity, focusing on the post-9/11 Islamic modernization idea of the US. Analyzing a composition of Zahoor, “Allah hoo,” in a Pakistani film _Khuda Ke Liye_ (In the Name of God), I will demonstrate in the next chapter how Shoaib Mansoor, the film director, represents the outcaste female voice as a voice of modernity.
The Pakistani film *Khuda Ke Liye* is a youth film set between the years 2000 and 2002 in the locales of Pakistan, the UK, and the US. It addresses three issues: post-9/11 Muslim profiling in the US; legitimacy of music in orthodox Islam; and female free will in Islam. *Khuda Ke Liye* is a salient example of the popular religious understanding of female free will in Islamic society.

Specifically, the film’s presentation of Sain Zahoor’s composition “Allah hoo,” can be seen as a modernist Islamic expression for endorsing female free will. Against a broad context of a vast quantity of literature produced in Western academia and media about the plight of women in Muslim societies, which argues for female emancipation as a test case for embracing modernity (see Mahmood 2008), this film was created within the particular context and perspective of Pakistani modernization as found in the democracy and enlightened moderation doctrines of President Pervez Musharraf.

The peculiarity of *Khuda Ke Liye* is the objective representation of Pakistani society, a characteristic that makes it laudable for its admirers and distasteful for its antagonists. It represents the bickering liberal and orthodox voices, and Sufism’s contribution towards their arguments. I will begin with contextualizing *Khuda Ke Liye* in the media, historical and cultural narratives,
and symbols that form its musical, discursive, and storyline tools to objectively represent society. My particular emphasis will be on the religious politics of youth culture that began in Pakistan during the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and continued to the present, which informs the choices of its producer, Shoaib Mansur. I will conclude by explaining how “Allah hoo” represents a Pakistani liberal argument, bestowing a societal relevance to the Sufi idea of *ishq* (love) in this film.

**The Perspective**

*Khuda Ke Liye* questioned religious dogma, triggering controversy in Pakistan, including a nod of approval from the masses evinced by huge domestic box-office success. A petition with allegations of projecting un-Islamic values was filed in the court before its release. The petitioner argued that the film attempted to disturb law and order in the country by means of the objectionable representations of: marriage between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man as lawful; the Taliban as a misguided group; biblical King David as a good singer; and music as permitted in Islam (“Fresh Petition against Khuda Ke Liye”). However, the appeal could not prevent its screening. The man in power, Musharraf, took personal interest in its release, testifies Shoaib Mansur in an interview to Hindustan Times:

My kismet (luck) was with me. If in Pakistan we didn't have President Musharraf in charge of the regime, my film would've
been in serious trouble. Yes, he openly supported the film. He saw *Khuda Ke Liye* and made his appreciation and approval so apparent that the work of the censors became quite easy. Otherwise, I don't think my film would have made it to the theatres (in IANS 2008).

Musharraf's autobiography mentions how he was supportive of bestowing to the national media the role of projecting a national soft image to the community of nations and of defeating terrorism and extremism at home (2006: 323). Like the preceding military rulers of the country who came to implement their respective social plans, he also happened to implement his own plan of true democracy. He called the era of the previous elected government a “sham democracy,” leveling charges of nepotism, abuse of power, and corruption. In another instance, he coupled “freedom of speech and expression through unfettered media” with the other universal fundamentals of democracy, such as women and minority empowerment, the right to vote, and social development (ibid.: 335). The media had to play the dual role as an emblem of democracy and a purveyor of a counter-extremist narrative. This duality was one example of the complex nature of his social plan that had two themes: enlightened moderation and democracy. The former came to the front in the wake of the 9/11 events in 2004 (ibid.: 298). The later was given to the nation immediately after the military coup in 1999, and evolved later on, absorbing humanist values.
At the grassroots level, his plans were read as “liberalism,” though he has been cautious in using this term in his autobiography. The reason for this perception was the persistent reference to the West for defining post-9/11 Pakistan in the national narrative. He was not an exception to what I call “the neo-Muslim identity paradigm” predicated upon the Muslim taxonomies generated in post-9/11 US. He opted to represent Pakistan as a nation of “good” Muslims, hence he opened up the national discourse for the conceptions of universal humanism such as free speech and women as individual citizens.

The restructuring of Pakistani media—previously dominated by the state-owned media as the sole negotiator of the national imagination—was one of the significant outcomes of his approach. The media reforms introduced by him encouraged the flourishing of the national private media as an independent voice of the nation. Geo, Pakistan’s first independent television news channel and the marketing and production partner of Khuda Ke Liye, was a flagrant example of Musharraf’s media sociology. Geo pledged to be “the voice of freedom from the Asian Subcontinent.”27 A liberal media of Pakistan, Geo provided a platform for moderate religious scholars to present a liberal interpretation of Islam since its launch in 2002. Persistently questioning religious dogma, Geo was in line with Musharraf’s quest for

27 See Geo’s vision on its official website (http://www.harpalgeo.tv/about.asp).

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enlightened moderation and democracy despite its general antagonism for the military rule in the country. Among other issues, Geo and the government were in particular unison regarding women empowerment in Pakistan (Zaidi 2006).

Global feminist narratives after 9/11 took women's rights as a standard to measure modernity in Islamic societies. Saba Mahmood sums up the popular conclusions of the Muslim feminism debate in the media and political circles of the West:

Muslim societies are besotted with an ideology of fundamentalism whose worst victims are its female inhabitants. This judgment further entails the prescriptive vision that the solution lies in promoting ‘democracy’ in the Muslim world and Western values of ‘freedom and liberty’ through religious and cultural reforms so that Muslims might be taught to discard their fundamentalist propensities and adopt more enlightened versions of Islam (2008: 82).

Musharraf and his government responded to the international uproar over women's suppression in Pakistan by putting “the emancipation of woman” at the heart of the democratization process through various policy initiatives (see Musharraf 2006: 317-9).²⁸ Compared to the West’s imagination of a natural oppression of women in an Islamic society, the actual situation of women's rights in Pakistan was different. Women were commodified in the name of local customs, not Islam, and the government fully abolished these customary

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²⁸ Musharraf (2006: chapter 30) contextualizes these efforts in the consequences of the Mukhtaran Mai rape case. Mai was raped on the decree of a local village council to settle a dispute. Along with the national media, she and her case got huge coverage in the West.
laws. However, it could not show courage to even alter gender discrimination in religious laws for the fear of aggravating the popular religious mindset.

At this juncture, the media undertook the burden of modernization by generating nationwide debate on these issues. Geo, for instance, launched a debate questioning the divinity of the *Hudood* (limits) law that pertains to rape and adultery (Zaidi 2006). Musharraf called it “the most sensitive” and “the trickiest” issue related to female emancipation that has “tarnished our national image immeasurably,” and plead the nation to be bold enough to correct it (2006: 319). The martial law administrator, General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988), included this law in the legal code of the country as a part of his Islamization policy. By holding the testimony of a woman in a rape case as half as worthy of a man, the law sanctioned a divine commandment that a woman cannot be equal to a man (Zaidi 2006). Musharraf’s anxiety was symptomatic of the Islamic modernization narrative of the West that compared Muslim women with the liberal conception of an individual citizen.

The Islamic scholar on Geo’s panel, Javed Ahmad Ghamdi, who demanded the immediate repeal of the law, calling it against the spirit of Islam for the inequality of the genders (Zaidi 2006), also served as the religious consultant scholar for *Khuda Ke Liye*. The screening of the film (in 2007) immediately followed a debate on Hudood in the media and the government institutions that ended inconclusively in practical terms. The film manipulated
yet another feature concerned with liberalism and female free will in Islam, which I discuss in the last section below. The crucial point was that the film generated the liberal argument from within Islam, though the feminine narrative was shaped in the post-9/11 global comparative cultural perspective.

The genre

Geo situated *Khuda Ke Liye* within the revival of Pakistani cinema. In print media and cinematic circles since the 1990s, the narrative of the revival meant the resurrection of the national language in filmmaking: the Urdu cinema of Pakistan. Beginning in the 1970s, ethnic politics, Bollywood hegemony, and the proliferation of new forms of mass and micro media jointly caused the Urdu cinema to gradually recede in popularity and eventually be replaced by Punjabi and Pashto language cinemas of Pakistan. While the affluent population strata tuned to PTV’s (Pakistan Television) Urdu language dramas and pirated Bollywood films available in VCR format, the Punjabi and Pashto cinemas catered to the underclasses. The Punjabi and Pashto cinemas developed their respective cinematic formulae. Poignantly, the supra-ethnolinguistic Urdu linguistic nationalism shunned the national bearing of the two local cinematic conventions, and the national cinema was supposed to have collapsed with the disappearance of the Urdu cinema from the national ethos (see Gazdar 1997; Paracha 2013).
The revivalist narrative was formally entrenched in the national lexicon during the 2000s with the joint interest of the emerging electronic media conglomerates and the government in the cinema. The Musharraf administration took drastic steps to support the film industry, such as implementing tax rebates on the import of digital filmmaking technology, and legislation for the import of foreign (Bollywood) films for screening purpose to increase the competition in the domestic market. It set up degree programs focused on film and TV production in institutions of higher education to produce qualified filmmakers.

The electronic media developed an economic stake in film business. Geo, an enterprise of the Jang Group which is one of the largest print media groups of Pakistan, emerged as the leading television company with the launch of channels dedicated to news, entertainment, music, and sports. In line with the Western media corporate model, the next territory of the group was the film business with the release of *Khuda Ke Liye*. A new identity of the cinema was inevitable with the arrival of a corporate media embodying a societal view in this domain, Geo Films. In the backdrop of the media sociology espoused by Musharraf, the revival of the Pakistani cinema debate went through a metamorphosis. It emphasized inventing a new film convention focused on social issues, not mere Urdu language productions. The new cinema would be distinct from the entertainment oriented Bollywood,
Pashto, and Punjabi cinemas. *Khuda Ke Liye* stood as the pioneering production of its kind followed by a series of other films revolving around societal issues.

Dismissing the clichés of Bollywood, Pashto, and Punjabi cinemas, *Khuda Ke Liye* also introduced new production standards for the emerging cinema. Cardinal among them was the objective representation of society, a trait that differs invariably within the new cinema. The principal agent behind *Khuda Ke Liye* was Shoaib Mansur as a writer, director, producer, lyricist, and composer. So far, he contributed two films to the new cinema in collaboration with the Geo Films. *Bol* (2011), commonly labeled as *Khuda Ke Liye*’s sequel for the similarity of the cultural issues it addresses, too revolves around female issues. In an interview with BBC News (Pakistan), Shoaib Mansur’s statement explains the thematic recurrence:

Nothing in the world scares me more than the thought of being born a woman or [becoming] a eunuch in a country like Pakistan, where obscurantism has deep roots…Tragically, our interpretation and application of religion seem to begin and end with women…women seem to be the battleground where we practise [sic] a medieval form of religion (in Rashid 2011).

To explain the cultural, discursive, and storyline resources that objectively represent female plight in his films, I situate Shaoib Mansur’s TV, music, and film careers in the youth culture politics of Pakistan, since the storylines of these films quintessentially revolves around youth. For instance,
the male protagonist in his films is always a rock musician. I claim that Pakistan’s current youth culture politics that has its origins in the Cold War era has informed Shoaib Mansur’s representational choices and strategies. The basis of my claim is the repetition of three intertwined issues in his films: female liberation; religious legitimacy of music; and western culture.

Below, I elucidate symbiotic relationships between music, women, and modernity in youth politics to demonstrate why he considers woman as a site of religious contestation, and why female agency is integrated into music and modernity in his films. As a musician, the religious question that persistently followed him was the legitimacy of music, yet the language for this question was gendered. Different shades of religious opinion exist on the issue of the legitimacy of music in Islam, which is commonly considered *haram* (forbidden). I rationalize how this judgment has been played out as a social argument.

*The agency*

The Pakistan Peoples Party (1970-1977) was the majority-rule, socialist-leaning political party that constitutionalized Pakistan as an Islamic Republic in 1973. With a citizenry conditioned to religion, non-Muslims\(^2\) began to

\(^2\) Approximately 2 millions were non-Muslims out of a total Pakistani population of 62.4 millions in 1972. The Christians were the largest religious minority with a population count of 0.9 million (Khan 1982: 20).
disappear from a public sphere that was also being nationalized for the sake of socialist ideology. Islamization prohibited all forms of public life supposed to be morally harmful, such as public consumption of alcohol and nightlife. Christians’ bands, a colonial legacy and the lifeline of jazz and pop music in Pakistan, gradually disappeared with the shutdown of nightclubs in cities like Lahore and Karachi in the late-1970s. A few of them formed an underground scene, but could not survive the onslaught of economic constraints (see Paracha). The traces of pop survived at college campuses.

The succeeding martial law government of General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) engineered youth culture in the geopolitical context. His ascendancy to the office coincided with the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. It provided him an opportunity to form a strategic alliance with the West, particularly the USA, and with the ultra-conservative monarchies of the Middle East to counter the Russian advancement under the rubric of Jihad (Islamic holy war) destined to liberate Afghanistan. Pakistani youth immediately attained utmost importance in the jihadist narrative. With state encouragement, the Islamic political parties and groups established a chain of madrasas (religious schools) to provide foot soldiers for the war in Afghanistan. In the urban areas, the student wing of Jamat-e-Islami (Islamic Party), a political supporter of Zia, was empowered by the regime to take over higher education campuses and curb resistance (Abbas 2005: 100-1, 107-13). The campuses became a site of contestation
between the jihadist youth and the progressive youth that resisted Zia’s jihadist and Islamization policies (see Paracha). The former declared pop, an expression of the progressives, a vulgarity (*fahashi*). The “moral brigade” of the Jamat-e-Islami frequently attacked underground campus performance events, destroyed instruments, and tortured student-musicians and their mix-gendered audience for polluting the Islamic environment (Ahmad 2010: 11-3). Shoaib Mansur draws upon this ideological conflict, showing the young Islamic enthusiasts plundering a concert rehearsal in the second scene of *Khuda Ke Liye*. Thus he brings in the religious argument against music in Pakistan in this film.

The general argument against music by orthodox schools of Islam in South Asia such as the Deoband principally revolves around female agency. This point of view represents music and dance primarily as female professions, drawing upon the authority of various historical and religious sources and their interpretations. Music is obscene and sinful not because of the content, but simply because of the performer, which is the object of male desire. The grounding of professional female musicians and dancers in the courtesan background throughout the history of Islamic societies, in general, and of India in particular, corroborated their argument. Among other social ills, music (*ghana*) signifies female sexuality, and provokes adultery (Muiz 1999: 52-83). While there is no room for any form of music in an Islamic society, this
argument approves David’s hymnody. However, his hymnody can never be understood as music, but is instead described as *khush-alhani* (melodiousness), which means the melodious recital of the sacred text, devoid of music grammar and instrumental accompaniment. David can never be represented as a singer. He was a prophet who possessed a miracle, *lehn* (melody) (Muiz 1999: 408-13). The legitimacy of the music debate has acquired a gendered overtone since music performance (non-sacred music making) is predominantly attributed to women. Other pejorative terms referring to music practice such as *uryani* (obscenity) and *behayai* (transgression) literally denote its immorality. However, the debate is not merely about defining what is sinful and what is not, but constructs a social argument that explains why Shoaib Mansur represents music, woman, and the West as intertwined issues in his films.

The Muslim decline from power is the central theme of the social argument emerging from the debate on the legitimacy of music. A key to understand this is an outline of cosmic time in the view of the Islamic revivalist movements that are active with an ideology of reviving the political glory of Islam such as Jamat-e-Islami, who perhaps has been the most vocal against music in Pakistan. In their view, cosmic time constitutes three consecutive phases: the pre-Islamic age of ignorance; the age of enlightenment (from the

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30 *Khuda Ke Liye* ignited controversy for calling David a good singer to make an argument for the legitimacy of music in Islam.
dawn of Islam in the early-7th century to the establishment of European colonial rules in Muslim countries by the mid-19th century); and the age of ignorance again. While the first age of ignorance is less relevant, they gauge the later two phases with Muslim political dominance and military prowess.\textsuperscript{31} In view of the orthodox and revivalist mindsets, the Muslim decline from power that was caused by immorality implies ignorance and vice versa. Music is one of the chief causes of the decline for being a sensual activity that distracted them from their socio-religious obligations and military prowess (Muiz 1999: 62-4).\textsuperscript{32}

The Muslim decline coincided with the rise of Western civilization. The revivalists recognize Western civilization as the embodiment of ignorance. It serves as the pivotal backdrop for the rhetoric of contemporary Islamic culture as the negation of modernity in all its details, except modern warfare and some selected aspects of technology. The founding of the South Asian

\textsuperscript{31} The founder of Jamat-e-Islami Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi (or Mawdudi) (2008: chapter 2) recognizes all major pre-Islamic civilizations and the modern western civilization as the “miserable failure of human intellect” to form a balance and just society. He regards Islam as the sole emancipator of the human being. However, Muslims have been disillusioned by modern ideas. Elsewhere, Mawdudi (1986: 37-9) regards the earliest phase of Islam bearing “the truth of Islam.” The divine evidence of the truthfulness of this society was the rapid territorial expansion of Muslims outside the Arabian Peninsula and the conversion of their subjects to Islam. Western colonial rule in Muslim countries was a form of divine punishment of deviation from the tenets of Islam. My understanding of cosmic time in the view of the Islamic revivalists is based on this broader periodization of history in Maududi’s arguments.

\textsuperscript{32} The revivalists and the orthodox recognize the actual age of enlightenment from the dawn of Islam to the end of the Rightly Guided Caliphate (610-661 AD). They have an ambivalent attitude towards the succeeding Muslim dynasties that lasted until European colonialism. The revivalists and the orthodox celebrate the political dominance of the medieval Muslim dynasties, but lament the flourishing of arts and music in them as a deviation from Islam. They disown medieval Muslim patronage of arts and music (see Maududi 2008: 37-8; Mawdudi 1986: 37-43; Muiz 1999: 62-4).
Islamic revivalist movements and orthodox schools such as Jamat-e-Islami and Deoband in British India additionally helps understand their stance on modernity. As the harbinger of ignorance, both music and female sexuality are the embodied cultural traits of a morally corrupt culture: the West (Maududi 2008: 37-8). The gendered interpretation of the political history of Islam by the orthodox and the revivalists recognizes female agency in the public sphere in only one form—the performer of music and dance—that contributes to downfall only. Her presence in the public sphere means endangering the political survival of an Islamic society, and she is thus destined to the domestic sphere as a social obligation. This leads to the conclusion of banishing dance and music, the crafts that bring her to the public sphere as an object of male desire, challenging the moral standards.

Ironically, in the 1980s the West was simultaneously an ally against the Russians in Afghanistan and a perpetual cultural rival, owing to the Islamic history and the colonial memory of the nation. Apart from the profound ignorance of the West, pop music stood as a particular tool to morally corrupt Pakistani youth, which was the social segment designated for reviving the glory of Islam in the form of defeating the Russian infidels. Upon attacking a student musical gathering, the moral brigade threw chadars (pieces of cloth to cover head and body) towards the females present there. Music corrupted, and the female body was the site to practice the argument. The moral brigade
was anxious of women sitting next to men in the audience (Ahmad 2010: 12). The revivalists considered it a divine duty to abstain from Western culture and letting women into the public sphere. The government of Zia-ul-Haq, too, removed women from the public sphere through various steps to design a morally upright society. The national media was no exception under the auspices of the Information Ministry led by Jamat-e-Islami. It barred pop songs going on air (Paracha). Enigmatically, a few young program producers at PTV Karachi station provided fresh air by producing youth programs, also representing women as the positive protagonists. One of them, Shoaib Mansur, emerged as the architect of the rock music revolution in Pakistan in the late-1980s.\(^\text{33}\)

The Karachi-based young program producer and musician won laurels for producing youth oriented lively TV dramas and programs since his career debut. His comedy production \textit{Fifty-Fifty} was a rarity for playing the song “Billie Jean” in the background of the skits mocking break dance, mediating Michael Jackson to the masses that otherwise had a faint idea about international pop. In 1987, the year of the 40\(^{\text{th}}\) Independence Day, he commissioned Vital Signs, a local rock and pop band whose members were from the campuses of Lahore and Islamabad, to sing his original rock

\(^{33}\) By this time, the Afghan war headed towards the conclusion, Zia’s political significance in the region declined, and the democracy movement in Pakistan signaled the upcoming political change in the country.
composition “Dil Dil Pakistan” (Heart Heart Pakistan) that he broadcast on national TV. The government had no reason to banish a nationalist theme. The song became an overnight national sensation for its originality and embodied nationalism. Before it, the rock bands of Pakistan used to perform cover songs of Bollywood, Pakistani film and folk, and Western artists like Led Zeppelin and, of course, John Lennon. “Dil Dil Pakistan” contested the otherness of rock and presented this form of music as the original expression of Pakistani youth, and the rock revolution made its way into the nation. The composition was followed by a number of pop and rock bands with original compositions emerging from the campuses. With the opening up of the national media for pop and rock, Shoaib Mansur sequentially produced youth music programs and dramas that represented the main characters as rock musicians as well. Later, he left state television for his independent career as a producer of rock and pop music and youth TV programing. The politics of youth culture also evolved alongside.

The thriving of rock has brought it into the radar of Islamic reformists in recent years. The Islamic reformists of Pakistan represent different religious and social ideologies. I am representing here the Tablighees (preachers) who emphasize self-purification and missionary life for the betterment of individual and society. According to them, the music practitioners commit sin, hence
cause collective Muslim downfall from the grace of God. The doers should abandon it and revert to the teachings of Islam.\textsuperscript{34}

Islamic reform movements target pop and rock musicians individually, since their transition can inspire their numerous fans that are also found guilty of listening music (see Ahmad 2010: 171-6). Convincingly, their most surprising achievement is the transition of Junaid Jamshed, a close friend of Shoaib Mansur and the vocalist of the Vital Signs, who abruptly abandoned music, denouncing it a sinful practice. He became an Islamic preacher with particular leaning towards addressing the youth to come back to Islam. The iconic face of Pakistani rock that emerged amidst the ideological battlefield, Vital Signs has consequently decayed. Through the 1990s, Shoaib Mansur dedicated himself to reestablish the popular credentials of Vital Signs as lyricist, composer, and producer. In fact, he exclusively wrote music for this band, while his popular TV series \textit{Dhundle Raste} featured Jamshed as the musician protagonist. Whereas religious-leaning circles declared Jamshed's transition a victory of Islam\textsuperscript{35}, others simply regret it. His transition reinvigorated the nation-wide debate on morality and the legitimacy of music among youth.

\textsuperscript{34} For details, see Maulana Tariq Jameel’s, a tablighee leader, speech on harms of music posted on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LUy7ftiqRx0.
\textsuperscript{35} Maulana tariq Jameel gives a detailed account of Jamshed’s transition. Available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-pdu3hXj--c.
Shoaib Mansur’s music and production career went through a different kind of transition during the decay of the Vital Signs. He adopted the female singer-dancer, the emblem of Muslim decline, as the central character of his musical and visual narratives to construct an alternative worldview. This phase also accumulated a set of cultural and historical symbols he later transmitted to Khud Ke Liye.

The imagery

The origin of Khuda Ke Liye is traceable to Ishq, a series of two musical videos he produced for Supreme, a brand of tea of Unilever (Pakistan). The first of the videos represents Anarkali, courtesan of the Mughal Emperor Akbar, who had her buried alive in Lahore for loving the crown prince, Jahangir (1569-1627). Shoaib Mansur intended to narrate the oral history in a music video. To get it financed, he took his idea to a multinational corporation, Unilever (Pakistan), who agreed for it to be its publicity campaign for Supreme (personal communication 2006). The geet (genre of South Asian popular music), “Bas ishq muhabat apna pan” (Only love, affection, intimacy),

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36 This is the popular version of Anarkali, which is a legend that has travelled orally. Historians have different opinions about its accuracy (see Chaudhry 2002; Nagi 1991). Nevertheless, she has been a known figure in the South Asian narrative traditions and popular culture.
a lyrical and musical composition of Shoaib Mansur, is a musical discourse of the defiant Anarkali with the emperor.\textsuperscript{37}

As the visual shows, instead of begging his pardon she confesses her love when presented in front of him chained. Her confessional singing and dancing assert her own will in front of one of the most powerful patriarchs of South Asian history. This moment has been the climax of the South Asian cinematic productions focused on her, since the infuriated emperor instantly decides her fate at this moment. Whereas the other narrators conclude their respective versions on her death or disappearance in awe for a stigmatized woman, Shoaib Mansur immortalizes her with an epilogue that after the centuries and the contingent social changes, her mausoleum bathes in the light of ishq every night. The camera shows her soul coming out of the tomb reunited with Jahangir’s soul. Shoaib Mansur begins to develop ishq as the symbol of enduring feminine success against patriarchy in his musical and visual narratives.

The geet composition for the first ishq series video suggests a transformation in Shoaib Mansur’s musical choices from rock to the indigenous genres. The popular genre of geet came into being with the beginning of commercial media in India, particularly sound film in the early-1930s. As an independent genre, its popularity in Pakistan owes to the

\textsuperscript{37} Available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NrPB6jBYObQ.
television and cassette media (Malik 1983: 90-4). Geet expresses any theme in one *asthai* (part of composition in lower pitch range) and two (or more) *antara* (part of composition in upper pitch range), which makes it a preferred choice of the popular singers and composers. Shoaib Mansur draws upon the indigenous popular culture. Later on, he appropriates traditional genres such as kafi that has a deep historical relevance, as shows the case of Bulleh Shah who used this genre to address social issues.

In a different environment, he recontextualizes the cultural feminine dilemma in *Khuda Ke Liye*. The embodiments of Akbar and Anarkali in the *Ishq* series video, Rasheed Naz and Iman Ali respectively play the roles of Maulana Tahiri and Mary in *Khuda Ke Liye*, and represent female plight in post-9/11 Pakistani society. While Akbar was overwhelmed with his political power, Tahiri draws authority from his interpretation of religious doctrine, and it is a woman—either Anarkali or Mary—who defeats them symbolically or discursively.

In the second *Ishq* series video, Shaoib Mansur opts for a collage of Sufi kalam (poetry) including Bulleh Shah’s kafi, “Tere ishq nachaya ker thaya thaya”38 (Your love made me dance with thaya thaya), sung by Riaz Qadri, who is a traditional male Sufi singer, in kafi singing style.39 According to the

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38 Available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9x5JhHxDfO4.
39 In kafi singing, the theme line or couplet is repeated at the end of each verse, and the verses are separated through instrumental interludes. This composition also uses small
oral history, Shah sang this kafi to appease his spiritual mentor, Shah Inayat Qadri, embodying a dancing female, the kanjari, for the first time (Duggal 1996: 5-6). In a female voice, dancing for love is the theme of this kafi, which make it an obvious choice of Shoaib Mansur. The surrealist video of this composition involves the longing of a separated couple. The male adopts the way of Sufism, whereas the female dances and wins him back. The dance liberates her from the constraints imposed upon her.

The video begins with a male thinking of his beloved, a veiled female in black clothing in a rush to leave him after an intimate moment with him. He follows her passionately, but she is reluctant to express her will to respond to his sentiments, and willy-nilly continues through different terrains and heritage sites and ruins. White plaster statues of a veiled woman sitting on the ground with her head bent downwards are scattered on and alongside the terrains. A number of logs are also dispersed indiscriminately, creating hurdles and blurring the sense of a proper path. Having lost her, the male finds solace in the dance of whirling dervishes, yet the image of the statue remains with him through the ecstatic moments. The narrative turn occurs with the rendition of the kafi. She enlivens and emerges from a plaster female impression accompanied with other women that also emerge from the other statues respectively. The characters dance with pleading hand and facial gestures.

phrases such as “Mas t qalander thaya thaya” (intoxicated mystic thaya thaya) in the interludes.
The main female character is unveiled in this segment. With the intense vocal repetition of the line, *tere ishq nachaya ker thaya thaya*, her ordeal concludes. The characters and statues around her disappear. The logs also vanish except those few marking her straight path leading to the beloved. The color of her clothing turns pink while she moves towards him. Shoaib Mansur continues with this imagery of path, hurdles, restraint woman, and ishq in *Khuda Ke Liye*.

**Music and Narrative Structure**

*Khuda Ke Liye* represents three issues between the years 2000 and 2002: post-9/11 Muslim profiling in the US; legitimacy of music in orthodox Islam; and female free will in Islam. This is depicted in the opening scenes of the film: a male being deported (to Pakistan) from a mental rehabilitation facility in Chicago; a New Year's eve concert rehearsal in Lahore (Pakistan) being rampaged by young Islamic zealots; and a Pakistani-British girl Maryam (alias Mary) in love with a non-Muslim British male against the consent of her father and the anxiety of the diaspora Pakistani Muslim community. The geographically dispersed issues conflate and conclude in Pakistan in the backdrop of the debate on Islam and women's rights catalyzed by the female protagonist, Mary who would commit apostasy if she married a non-Muslim. Her father is religiously empowered to stop her from this act and decide her
fate. On the other hand, given her liberal British upbringing, she is determined to choose her life companion by herself regardless of religious judgment. The West and Islamic cultures compete, which is a theme that the narrative also reiterates at many instances. The verdict is in favor of free will: her narrative wins. However, the storyline does not arrive to this conclusion through the comparative evaluation of Islamic and Western values. It triangulates both with another interpretation of Islam that validates female free will in Islam by presenting evidence and interpretations from Islamic sources. Sufi ideology is one of the sources. Conspicuously, *Khuda Ke Liye* presents a “liberal” argument from within Islam.

The Sufi concept of ishq holds the center stage in *Khuda Ke Liye*. In common parlance, Sufi ishq is understood to be man’s unconditional love for God. The word “ishq” has been widely used in Pakistani and Indian film songs, generally depicting love between a man and a woman. However, as a woman enmeshed between two different social ideologies, ishq in the case of Mary becomes a metaphor of struggle for free will in Islam. Its musical representation is the kalam “Allah hoo”, an independent composition of Zahoor.

The inclusion of songs—a characteristic South Asian cinematic tradition—in a film destined to be different from existing Pakistani and Bollywood genres complicates its claim. What makes it different is the precise
integration of the songs in the narrative. The film songs work with the storyline in a way that Mark Slobin (n.d.) metaphorically calls “film music as architecture,” the musical disposition of film narrative. The particular architectural analogy I am pursuing here is of the “room divider” that is “a low-lying partition between sections of a house, not a floor-to-ceiling wall” (ibid.: 2). The songs of Khuda Ke Liye precisely divide the temporally and spatially dispersed storyline, unfolding multiple issues into recognizable segments through selected musical genres. Shoaib Mansur uses music as a medium to transmit the cultural issues of Pakistan to the screen. As a central figure of popular culture, he exhibits a clear sense of the issues and discourses relevant to the particular genres respectively used at various point in the film.

“Allah hoo,” the last song of the film, positioned nearly halfway through, highlights the section that I would call the argument of ishq in which Mary does practical struggle. Her quest generates a societal debate on a woman’s right to decide her fate opens up and concludes with a modernist interpretation of Islam in this section. The reappearance of “Allah hoo” as the background track of the end credits clads this section into a singular musical marker, signifying the coherent and conclusive nature of the section. I would suggest that this section represents the crux of the cinematic revivalism since it exceeds the expressive limits in Pakistani popular culture not only by challenging a commonly held religious understanding, but by also giving a
modernist religious view. Below I detail the musical architecture of the film, beginning with a plot summary.

Plot summary

Mary, who is raised by her British mother in the British milieu, loves Dave (a non-Muslim) and wants to marry him. Mary’s father Hussain considers her relationship with a non-Muslim as endangering his Islamic faith, despite her birth by his extramarital relationship with a non-Muslim British woman. He takes his own case for granted, but not of his daughter whom he wants to either assassinate or get married in Pakistan with a Muslim male. He returns to Lahore, keeping his plans secret from Mary who also accompanies him.

His two nephews in Lahore have a dream to be rock stars and achieve success in the music community. The younger one, Sarmad, comes in contact with a religious leader, Maulana Tahiri, who presents a puritanical interpretation of Islam and has fought against the Russians in Afghanistan with covert CIA support earlier, but is now an advocate of the Taliban. He declares music haram on the grounds of selective religious interpretations besides condemning it as an immoral tool of Western culture. Confused, Sarmad debates the legitimacy of music with his elder brother, Mansur, who presents a rational argument to dispel Tahiri’s opinion. However, Sarmad is
influenced by the religious interpretation of Tahiri and quits his music career abruptly.

Samrad also argues with his family members to adopt Islamic values, in particular that the women should observe the veil which they do not, out of their understanding of religion as a personal matter. Nor do they interfere in his personal affairs, and he begins to be isolated from them. He joins Tahiri’s youth followers working for scotching female symbols from the public sphere such as throwing black paint on billboards displaying female models. Mansur continues his music practice and moves to Chicago to study music. There he marries Janie, a white American girl who is also impressed by his eastern values and music.

On the matter of Mary, her father Hussain seeks his nephew Sarmad’s help who consults Tahiri on the issue of marrying without her consent. Tahiri advises Sarmad that this is the best way to do his religious duty by preventing her from apostasy, but he might not able to control her without isolating. Tahiri asks Sarmad to take Mary to the tribal areas of Pakistan along the Afghan border where a system of segregating women is already in place. Sarmad acts upon and deceitfully marries his cousin Mary, with the help of his uncle Hussain and Tahiri, in his friend’s house in a remote village of Waziristan located at Pakistan-Afghanistan border. After an initial phase of shock, Mary struggles for freedom. Later, Pakistani officials on the intervention of British
authorities rescue Mary nearly after one year of her forced marriage. She files a divorce case in a Pakistani civil court that summons Maulana Wali, a moderate religious scholar, to give his opinion on women’s rights to decide their will in Islam. Moved by the religious scholar's enlightened interpretation of Islam in the courtroom, Sarmad abandons Tahiri’s school of thought and divorces Mary without a court order.

In the international dimension of the plot, US secret agents kidnap Samrad’s elder brother Mansur in Chicago on the false accusation of being a terrorist in the backdrop of the post-9/11 racial profiling of Muslims. Their torture in an underground cell psychologically disables him. He is deported to Pakistan where his younger brother has resumed his social life as a moderate Muslim and singer. Mary leaves her plans of going back to England, and sets up a school for girls in the village she was kept hostage after marriage.

*The musical room dividers*

The two rock songs at the very outset, “Dunya ho aankhen na hon” (If there is world, but no eyes) and “Humaray hain” (Belong to us), depict the optimism of the two brothers at the pre-conflict stage. Mansur and Sarmad jointly perform the songs in the 2000 New Year eve rehearsal that was plundered by Islamic fanatics and in a TV interview. Sarmad leaves music after this section and
marries Mary before the next song appears. The conflict section is without songs.

The next two songs situate the short-lived fanciful US experience of Mansur. The traditional genres *thumri* (a North Indian semi-classical genre) and *kalam* become his identity markers and replace rock in the foreign environment. His music teacher in Chicago introduces him as a student presenting a unique form of Pakistani music for a class performance: a rendition of the *thumri* composition “Neer bharan kaise jaoon” (How I go out for water) fused with world instruments such as the *axatse*, violin, guitar, cello and djembe. Using non-traditional instruments such as guitar and keyboard, his succeeding fusion performance with Janie, a cellist and his class fellow and wife to be, is Bulleh Shah’s famous kalam “Bulleh nu samjhavan aiyan bhenan te bharjaiyan” (Sisters and sisters-in-law came to convince Bulleh)\(^40\), a kalam in which Shah negates caste boundaries. Mansur works on Sufi music’s implied potential to permeate boundaries. Janie’s voice joins him. Earlier, she pretends to be unacquainted with Pakistan on their first encounter. Mansur intends to impress her by introducing it as a country of Muslim people who belong to a faith that once dominated the important regions of the world such as Spain and India, and thus gave other people

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\(^{40}\) In the film, the title of this kalam is “Bandya ho” (O human), the phrase that also serves as a refrain.
culture and civilization. Indifferent, Janie teases him by giving him a CD of Ustad Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan in response to his introduction.

The song “Allah hoo” brings a decisive development in the narrative. While the previous half of the film revolves around the dominance of religious doctrine, the next half questions it. “Allah hoo” opens this section depicting Mary’s first active revolt against the oppression that concludes with religious scholar Wali’s argument in the court. So far a captive in Sarmad’s friend’s house, she escapes from there with the help of the other women at home while the two men are out of town. The song appears as a background score bridging her arduous journey from the village to civilization. Unfortunately, Sarmad and his friend come back home earlier than expected and hold her just before she is about to make it. On the behest of Tahiri, Sarmad consummates their marriage forcefully to make her compliant to the tradition by way of motherhood. However, she does not give up her dream of freedom even after giving birth to a baby girl, and somehow manages to send a letter to her boyfriend in London who informs the British authorities.

“Allah hoo” had an independent background outside of the film like the other traditional compositions of the film. This is the kalam that won the BBC award for Zahoor in 2006, and is now a signature composition of his as well. In a TV interview posted on YouTube\(^1\), he calls it *Vird of Allah hoo*, which

\(^1\) Available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RBcwEmIhTAQ.
means chanting *Allah hoo* (God is). Vird is done as a prayer or a formulaic spiritual practice that is built around some specific sacred words. *Allah hoo* is one such common formula in Punjabi Muslim traditions that has also been applied musically. For instance, Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan’s famous qawwali “Allah hoo,” composed to this formula, is thematically a *hamd* (praise to God), suggesting the confinement of its meaning even in a hybrid musical form. This holds true for the other “Allah hoo” compositions, revealing its grandeur and sacredness. In the perspective of the offbeat nature of the Sain tradition, “Allah hoo” attains an altogether different meaning when Zahoor fuses it with kafi ““Aukhay penday lambiyan rawan ishq diyan” (Difficult journeys long are paths of ishq).

“Allah hoo” in its kafi form represents a feminine style of discourse, discernable in Zahoor’s independent performance of the song: a blend of playing, singing, and dancing, focused on footwork accentuated with ghungroo. For instance, the footwork in his performance for the BBC world music award ceremony illustrates this point. The rattle-like sound of ghungroo is recognizable through the performance, getting louder during *Allah hoo* vird sections, reenacting Shah’s embodiment of an outlawed female (the kanjari).

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Example 2.1: Lyrics of the BBC World Music Award Ceremony’s Version of “Allah hoo”\(^{43}\)

**Refrain:**  
*Allah hoo*  
God is

**Verse 1:**  
*Sajnan bajon zaat safatan ishq diyan*  
Without beloved what is the role of ishq

*Vakhri kuli din te ratan ishq diyan*  
Distinct identity, days and night of ishq

*Chodan tabqan ander thavan ishq diyan*  
In fourteen brain chambers resides ishq

*Aukhay penday lambiyan rawan ishq diyan*  
Difficult journeys long are paths of ishq

**Verse 2:**  
*Ishq di hasti masti yar mita deve*  
Reality and ecstasy of ishq erases self

*Ag aey ishq di dil ti duhi jala deve*  
Fire of ishq burns duality of heart

*Bulleh vaang nachvan taran ishq diyan*  
Like Bulleh strings of ishq make me dance

*Aukhay penday lambiyan rawan ishq diyan*  
Difficult journeys long are paths of ishq

**Verse 3:**  
*Har har dil har thaan vich ishq samya ve*  
Ishq penetrates every heart and everywhere

*Arash farash te ishq ne qadam tikaya aey*  
Ishq has a foothold in the sky and the earth

*Ain batan ain-al-haq sadavan ishq diyan*  
Ishq chants *ain batin, ain-al-haq*

*Aukhay penday lambiyan rawan ishq diyan*  
Difficult journeys long are paths of ishq

The authorship of “Aukhay penday” is obscure. This kalam first surfaced in the Sufi ethos with Zahoor’s entry in popular culture. It is

\(^{43}\) Translation mine.
commonly understood to be a kalam of Shah; however, it is not included in his documented works. The end credits of *Khuda ke Liye* also mention its authorship as anonymous. Nevertheless, Shah’s persona and worldview mark it formidably. The composition makes a direct reference to him as the one who set an example of dancing in ishq (Example 2.1, verse 2, line 3).

The composition “Allah hoo” has a malleable structure in the oral performance practice tradition presented by Zahoor. The different versions reveal that there are four principal verses (or stanzas of four lines each). Zahoor sings all or the selected ones in the order of his choice, treating *Allah hoo* phrase as the refrain. This is a deviation from the common musical structure of kafi in which the theme line serves as the refrain and is emphasized through apt repetition at the end of each verse. In this particular instance, it should be the line *aukhay penday lambiyan rawan ishq diyan*, which is not the case. The independent version downplays the kafi theme by emphasizing the vird. Shoaib Mansur revitalizes the theme by aligning its literal meaning with the situation and visuals, though the film version also deploys *Allah hoo* phrase as the refrain (example 2.2). The film version does not use the traditional instruments, and Zahoor’s voice is accompanied with drum, techno beats, and heavy reverb.
Example 2.2: Lyrics of *Khuda Ke Liye*’s Version of “Allah hoo”

Refrain:  
*Allah hoo*  
God is

Verse 1:  
*Ishq di hasti masti yar mita deve*  
Existence and ecstasy of ishq  
*Ag aey ishq di dil ti duhi jala deve*  
Fire of ishq burns duality of heart  
*Aukhay penday lambiyan rawan ishq diyan*  
Difficult journeys long are paths of ishq

Verse 2:  
*Sajnan bajon zaat safatan ishq diyan*  
Without beloved what is the role of ishq  
*Vakhri kuli din te ratan ishq diyan*  
Distinct identity, days and night of ishq  
*Chodan tabqan ander thavan ishq diyan*  
In fourteen brain chambers resides ishq  
*Aukhay penday lambiyan rawan ishq diyan*  
Difficult journeys long are paths of ishq

Mary’s escape begins from a shrine located somewhere in the village.

A brief *bol alap* (melodic exposition using words) with the words “Allah hoo” sung by a female represents this initial phase. Over the bol alap soundtrack, Mary fearfully walks through the deserted streets wearing the *burqa* (female outer garment to cover face and body), occasionally passing by armed men who take notice of the alone woman, but do not interfere. During the brief pause between the alap and the composition, Sarmad and his friend arrive back. Finding her gone, they rush to chase, and the composition in Zahoor’s voice begins. However, she is out of the village in a valley leading to an

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44 Translation mine.
uneven mountain terrain that ends at the bank of a turbulent mountain river. They are about to approach her and come close enough for Sarmad to shout asking her to stop. She does not, but they recapture her finally. Her difficult journey actually ends with the courtroom argument of Wali, which also adheres to a societal meaning to Sufi ishq.

Tahiri first presents his argument, however, in the courtroom defending Sarmad’s act in the backdrop of his understanding of the practical Islam that identifies modernity as the mother of all social ills. He declares the civil court un-Islamic at the very outset of his discourse, but attends the proceeding as a matter of his personal respect for the judges. He laments the defiant Pakistani civil society, idealizing a political system based on Islamic religious laws to reorganize it. He does not accept female free will.

Wali’s argument develops in response to the questions of the defense lawyer. Music, women, and Western culture merge during the questioning. Answering the questions regarding a woman’s right to marry with her own will and the legitimacy of music in Islam, he gives his opinion based on religious sources combined with reason. In a later phase when the debate enters into the domain of practical implication of the Islamic doctrine, Wali dismisses combining religion and sociology. He provides various interpretations supporting his argument. Having been interrupted by a companion of Tahiri on the matter of Muslim appearance, he calls in the idea of ishq to dispel the
understanding that Islam dictates a certain Muslim appearance. Wali interprets ishq as self-enlightenment stemming from one’s free will. It has nothing to do with creating binaries such as Islam or music, and Islam or jeans (Western youth culture). Islam does not impose unnecessary codes, but rather it is the human being who has to choose. Wali recalls Shah’s famous line, *Sayoni menu Ranjha akho Heer na akho koi* (Soul mate call me Ranjha, not Heer). Wali represents this Sufi passion to eliminate one’s identity for the passion with one’s free will as the ultimate stage of practicing Islam. Directing his argument towards Tahiri’s follower, he denies the forced implication of Islam on others.

Sarmad declares Tahiri’s interpretation of Islam irrelevant in the court and accepts Mary’s claim. The camera closes with Sarmad calling to Prayer in his westernized attire, jeans, signifying the resolution of conflict between religion and sociology in his worldview. However, a young follower of Tahiri competes his call, suggesting the continuation of the two competing perspectives.

**Summary**

*Khuda Ke Liye* demonstrates how Sufi music has transformed from representing a traditional sacred space to providing a social narrative and

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45 In this kalam, Shah uses the voice of Heer, the female protagonist of the traditional Punjabi love tale named after her, Heer. Here she insists to personify her beloved, Ranjha.
voice of modernity. The argument for female free will in Islamic society in the context of the idea of ishq is a case of this new stature of Sufi music. Ruhail Hayat, the keyboardist of Vital Signs, also made his debut as a background music composer and film sound-mixer through this box-office hit film. Based on his credentials, Coca Cola invited Hayat to launch their fusion music platform, Coke Studio (Pakistan) that now stands as one of the largest platforms for the production and dissemination of Sufi music in a different perspective.
Chapter 3: A Corporate Cultural Map for the Genesis of a Sufi Genre: Coca Cola and Jugni

In this chapter, I study the production of the popular Punjabi genre jugni in the backdrop of Coca Cola’s international campaign Coke Studio, a television series that features live studio-recorded musical fusions of cultures, styles, and genres. Coca Cola commissioned Ruhail Hayat (2008-2013), keyboardist with the Pakistani rock group Vital Signs, to launch Coke Studio (Pakistan), a project that features music performances of traditional (classical, semi-classical, and folk), Sufi and pop artists in collaboration with an in-house band. Beginning in Brazil (2007), Coke Studio was a one-time venture to launch Coke Zero there with the collaboration of Nokia. Later it was introduced in other regions, including Pakistan (2008), India (2011), Middle East46 (2012), and Africa47 (2013) (“Coke Studio”).

In this way, Coke Studio replicates how the brand demarcates consumer diversity in its global cultural cartography.48 Elaborating why and how multinational companies execute cultural mapping, John Amis and Michael Silk suggest that multinational corporations do not dissolve national or community boundaries, but rather reconstitute them in order to keep intact

46 It has featured artists from Egypt, Morocco, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia.
47 It includes: Tanzania, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, and Mozambique.
48 For the history and politics of cartography in international business, see Buckley (2004).
the continuous flow of global production and local consumption, because local conditions define consumption patterns. The mapping is done in collaboration with culture industries, such as film, popular music, media, advertising, and design. To construct the places, a brand creates a polysemetric and multi-vocal marketing text to deploy a consistent text in different locales to reduce the risk of the inconsistency of the brand’s global image or its fragmentation (2010: 160-2, 168-9). Drawing upon the spatial outreach of partner media, Coke Studio draws cultural boundaries at two levels: national (India, Pakistan, and Brazil); and regional (the Middle East and Africa). The malleable identity of fusion music enables Coke Studio to have a different meaning in each culture. This meaning is shaped by Coca Cola and its partner’s discourse on culture. The central question with which I deal is how jugni reconfigures national identity in the context of how Coca Cola and Ruhail Hayat conceptualize Pakistan as a bounded community.

To this end, I begin with detailing Coca Cola’s new music campaign that serves as a context to Coke Studio (Pakistan). I describe the marketing model of Steve Heyer (2002-2004), Coca Cola’s president and chief operating officer who first proposed the idea of new music, and its impact on the positioning of music in the corporation’s marketing approach. Then I situate Coke Studio (Pakistan) in the social conditions of Pakistan. I demonstrate that Coke Studio (Pakistan) operates within a post-9/11 cultural vacuum created
by a scarcity of material and symbolic resources to counter religious extremism. It becomes a platform to celebrate diversity and to reconstruct the multicultural past of the nation. Finally, I address the transformation of jugni from a popular Punjabi genre to a fusion Sufi genre in Coke Studio (Pakistan). This version of jugni is a polysemic text that concurrently recalls the shared Indian history personified by Sufis of Punjab, and transcends social barriers as well.

**Genealogy of Coke Studio**

Coca Cola’s well-established relationship with rock shaped an anti-traditional and youthful identity of this brand, which has been the central theme of its globalized marketing campaigns, built on music, in the USA and elsewhere (Klein 2008: 2) in the late twentieth century. These campaigns epitomized a world without boundaries leading to the Americanization of the globe, a notion that has decayed in the modern marketing strategies initiated by the brand to embed itself in non-western societies.

Coca Cola’s bid for international markets—intensified in the 1980s—required this brand to respond to cultural conditions outside the United States. The company adopted the slogan, “think globally but act locally” (Rothacher 2004: 80). The localization was limited to the production and distribution outside the USA. The international franchised bottlers in some regions were granted autonomy to adjust their business strategies, as they deemed
suitable to local conditions. The global marketing and branding stayed under the strict control of its Atlanta-based American bureaucracy (ibid.: 80-1).

The uniformity of the marketing campaigns was maintained religiously. A single television advertisement carried the Atlanta-approved message across the globe that was commonly read as a foreign culture in local societies such as Pakistan (Naovi 2005: 4316). Despite the challenges, the greater portion of Coca Cola’s total consumption was established outside the USA by the turn of the century, yet the overall sales decreased. In the meantime, Coca Cola International, the division that controlled the corporation’s global operations (excluding North America), was divided into four operational units (Rothacher 2004: 79-80) under regional leadership: Latin America, Asia Pacific, Europe, and Eurasia and Africa ("Coca-Cola Leaders"). The struggle for international markets spurred restructuring of marketing strategies along with brand reinvention to attenuate mutually exclusive categories, such as native and foreign (The Economist 2001).

The battle for non-western markets did not alone transform Coca Cola’s marketing ideology. Marketplace fragmentation created by technological and media developments played a critical role as well. At the turn of the century, the general explosion of the media in various parts of the
world posed a challenge to global brands. The media fragmentation increased the possibilities of brand fragmentation. The ubiquitous Internet added to this “anarchy” (Bruce and Solomon 2013) by empowering the consumer to shape the symbolic meaning of a brand individually, and through giving up the choice of consuming an advertisement to the consumer’s control. As a result, the marketers could no longer invade the consumer’s personal space arbitrarily, deliver their message, and construct the meaning of a brand.

Steve Heyer (2002-2004), Coca Cola’s president and chief operating officer, stood among the pioneering multinational marketers who embraced these challenges and transformed the modern era of marketing by introducing the experiential marketing model (McCole 2004: 536). He also suggested partnerships among the brands, content developers, and media as the objective of this model to pull the marketing economy out of the crisis. In terms of this model’s impact on the Coke-music relationship, the merger of business categories professed the company’s move away from a client to a partner-label in the popular music industry. Heyer asked for the creation of a unique brand music, “new music,” with cultural relevance as its basic characteristic to make it experiential for the consumer.

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49 Peter Ludes explains that media fragmentation manifests itself in audience disintegration and difference in the evolution of information cultures. Different societies or different layers of a society differ in their use of media. Similarly, different media cultures simultaneously evolve with diverging institutional structure, regulations, and use of technology (2008: 10).
Steve Heyer’s marketing model

Heyer envisioned “experience-based, access-driven marketing” as the new era of marketing for multinational brands to remain relevant to the customer in the socially and economically “hyper-fragmented world” (“Steve Heyer’s Manifesto for a New Age of Marketing” 2003). The model argued to establish an emotional relationship with the consumer. Heyer identified the use of the popular cultural industry and cultural references as the modern-day means of achieving this goal. To represent “Coke” as an experience, he suggested creating brand significance “for people…that live[d] beyond and extend[ed] the immediate moment of consumption” (ibid.). The experientially evanescent slogans of Coke compelled him to propose its amalgamation with symbols that had long lasting emotional impact over the consumer. He suggested the merger of Coke with the entertainment oriented popular cultural industry, because the capital of this industry was emotional. “The effective use of relevant and powerful cultural references” by the marketing content developers was another way to establish a connection between people’s passion and the brand (ibid.). With these parameters in hand, the popular industry would develop content, such as music, that would relate the consumer’s “passion in a way only The Coca-Cola Company can” do (ibid.). He called this music the “new music” (ibid.).
The fundamental premise of this model was that a brand possessed two interconnected yet exchangeable characteristics: value, the symbol a brand stands for; and network, the distribution network of a brand. The exchangeability of the brand properties led Heyer to the paradigm shift that he aimed to bring in the marketing economy. The model also proposed collaboration among different marketing-business stakeholders, such as brands, media, and content developers, to increase their market outreach through the mutual exchange of their networks. Since network and value were interconnected, the network exchange was simultaneously an exchange of values too, which Heyer called the “added value” (ibid.). As one of the largest networks across the globe, Coca Cola did not expect gaining other networks, but the added value. However, any partners would benefit from the corporation’s global outreach. Arguing the necessity of an enhanced relationship with each other, Heyer warned the brands, filmmakers, music labels, video games creators, and media:

Those clear-cut definitions fit neatly into a box... a box defined by uniformity and predictability, which is no longer sustainable in a hyper-fragmenting world. If we continue to confine ourselves to those roles that box is going to become a coffin... We don't intend to get buried. I don't think you do either. So each of us needs to think outside that box. We need to broaden the definition of our roles. We need to leverage a powerful network held together by an unseen fabric of connections (ibid.).
The music industry got Heyer’s particular attention for the realization of the future partnership model, assessing the limitations of the prevalent music business models. He offered a new music business model based on partnerships between music makers and the brand. The model could supersede music business pitfalls by opening up one of the earth’s largest distribution networks with certainty. In this regard, Heyer mentioned Coke’s ongoing partnership with the Universal Music Group as the future prototype. The two businesses not only added to each other’s value, but the music label was also benefited by the cola giant’s financial muscle to create a hit and to break a new act. Nevertheless, Heyer did not undermine the power of the new media and proposed the use of new and all media for marketing, which he identified as access, the second cornerstone of his model (ibid.).

New music

Coca Cola’s “new music” follows the parameters given by Heyer. From the brand value perspective, it appropriates cultural meaning and relates to human emotion. From the business viewpoint, the company produces it under its own label, and uses new and all media for its distribution.

New music is a means to invoke emotions in the consumers from different cultural orientations. The first post-Heyer brand campaign, the “Coke
Side of Life” (2005-2008), has yielded to the current “Open Happiness,” which came to the forefront in 2009 (Garfield 2009; “Mary Minnick to Leave Coke in March” 2007). The company celebrates the diversity of its consumers, and on its webpage it represents happiness philosophies of thinkers who hailed from different cultures in diverse historical periods such as Aristotle, Gandhi, and Buddha, to name a few. It contributes to the legacy of the philosophers by defining happiness as simple as “anything that can bring a smile on someone’s face” (“What is Happiness”). In Coca Cola’s ideology “the quest for true happiness is not really a quest at all, but a decision and a choice… Open an ice cold Coca-Cola and choose happiness” (ibid.). Apart from consumption, Coca Cola suggests that happy music making and listening are other ways to attain happiness (“Happy Music”). The happy music production is done at two levels: the interactive composition pointed towards individual experience; and the brand music for large-scale marketing campaigns.

Interactive music making engages the individual consumers. For this purpose, the company’s websites are designed as gateways that knit together all official social media pages such as Facebook and YouTube with the virtual music making pages created by the company. Coca Cola acknowledges that music is a unique shared experience among global cultures, yet there cannot be a uniform definition of happy music and people have their own choices (“Happy Music”). The interactive options given at the website persuade the
visitor to make live happy music through DJing, engineering, and composing. The gateways also transfer the visitor to the other domains including social media so that the individual could reflect on his/her experience and communicate with others.

In many cases, the material posted by the company itself provides context to personal views posted on these sites. The websites and social media pages of the corporation are saturated with material on its environmental and philanthropic projects, its optimistic stance towards society, and human empowerment. Coca Cola represents itself as a social phenomenon rather than a commercial enterprise. However, interactive musical activity seldom possesses any significance from a branding viewpoint. New music, the contemporary brand music, is the sole discretion of the corporate office. This is the music, to which the company makes consumers listen through a variety of media including a traditional medium like TV.

New music is the product of Coca Cola’s partnership ventures with the music industry. This innovation depends upon the rise of the Internet as the dominant media in the music business that has notably paved way for two major transformations: the rise of non-music corporations to prominence in the music industry; and the abundance of free music. In the wake of the
weakening of physical media, the fundamental question that industry patrons face today is how to “move the industry forward from a product based business to a service oriented one” (Bringman 2009). The joint 11th ranking of Eddy Cue and Robert Kondrk, Apple’s senior VP of Internet software and services, and senior director, respectively, in the 2012 Billboard Power 100 Index demonstrates the rise of the services sector in the Internet-oriented music economy. In the same list, music moguls of Coke and Pepsi, Emmanuel Seuge and Frank Cooper, hold the 16th and 17th positions for their financial muscles (Billboard Staff 2012).

Moreover, the Internet has tremendously affected the product-oriented business model by offering a bulk of “free music” available through peer-to-peer file sharing, legal or illegal free downloading, pirate websites, free live streaming, and social media websites, to name a few online options (see Anderson 2014: 81-2). Coca Cola established its autonomous global music marketing organ in 2008 and immediately stepped into the popular music industry by introducing the “brand-band partnership” as an alternative business model dedicated to the production of free music as the brand’s new music (Bringman 2009; Hampp 2012b). The model was based on the power of the company’s distribution network in 206 countries. The brand avowed utilizing its network to give a huge break to the partner band that no other enterprise could do. Coca Cola soon penetrated deep into the industry, and
the euphemistically-called brand-band partnership has now evolved into a complex model in which the company partners with all shareholders: the artists, the dealers, the record labels, the conventional media, and the virtual media developers. Umut Ozaydinli (2008-2010), global music marketing manager of Coca Cola, proclaims that the company has no serious economic interest in the music business except creating value for the brand. Any music revenue is directed to the corporation’s cause-related projects (quoted in Blecken 2009).

The official song for the global “open happiness” marketing campaign, “C’mon lift me up it’s a brand new day,” performed by a cross-section of American pop celebrities, including Cee Lo Green,\(^50\) demonstrates four important cultural and musical values represented by Coca Cola’s new music. First, the song stands as a complete departure from traditional advertising by way of never mentioning the brand. The association between the brand and the music is created through the integrated marketing structure built around the song.\(^51\) The composition was simultaneously launched and promoted in international markets through social media, digital media, TV, radio, press, point of sales, and outdoor print marketing under the auspices of the company. As independent music, open happiness competed with other songs

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\(^{50}\) Available: http://www.mtv.com/videos/cee-lo-green/399202/open-happiness.jhtml.

\(^{51}\) Integrated marketing refers to the approach in which different marketing channels enforce each other (Levinson 2001).
on music charts in different parts of the world.

Second, the song transcends demographic boundaries by fusing together musical styles identified with different groups such as rock, pop, and hip-hop. Ozaydinli regards the “unique” fusion as a way for people to “connect” and share happiness (quoted in “Coca-Cola Super-Group Set to Release ‘Open Happiness’ Single”).

Third, the song signifies cultural issues in an optimistic manner. Ozaydinli contextualizes open happiness composition in the musical-cultural legacy of the corporation by suggesting the 1971 hit for peace “I’d like to buy the world a Coke” as an inspiration. Drawing a parallel between the war and economic difficulties then and now, he hopes that open happiness “can strike a similar [inspirational] chord with people today” as did the “I’d like to buy the world a Coke” during the Vietnam war (quoted in Collier 2009).

Fourth, the song was translated into different national languages when it was released in different countries. This reflects that Coca Cola’s cultural goods are grounded in local cultures over the course of their movement across international borders. A bird’s-eye-view of the company’s marketing structure and strategy further explains the local adaptation.

Coca Cola separated marketing from operations in 2005 by creating the position of vice-president of marketing, strategy, and innovation in Atlanta
to gear up innovations as per a new marketing strategy ("Mary Minnick to Leave Coke in March” 2007). Now this position has evolved into a chief marketing and commercial officer, and falls into the category of functional leadership ("Senior Functional Leadership"). While the operational leaders perform multiple jobs related to the region under their respective control, the functional leadership accomplishes a designated job globally, and is directly answerable to the CEO. The five operation units are subdivided into the business units, which are Coca Cola’s micro business entities globally and in many cases represent nation-states. The business units execute strategies as per their particular operational leadership’s vision; however, the marketing section of a business unit directly connects to the office of the chief marketing and commercial officer in Atlanta. Jointly, they are designated to form “cohesive marketing strategies” to maintain the consistency of the brand ("Career Areas").

The notion of cohesiveness also implies democratization of marketing knowledge production and communication. The company encourages production of cultural goods for advertising at local business units as long as they remain consistent with the brand value. The local offices are staffed with insiders who also act as cultural brokers. The local creation becomes the intellectual property of the Coca Cola Company and can be deployed elsewhere with appropriate modifications. To stay relevant to the international
markets, Joe Tripodi, Coke’s incumbent chief marketing and commercial officer, explains the strategies:

It’s an 80/20 model. About 80% of the tool kit is created at the center, and the rest gets adapted or adjusted locally. We also have something we call a global charter process. We really didn’t need 30 Christmas commercials, as an example. So we did away with the duplication. Instead we’ll say, “Germany, you come up with the Christmas commercial”, and other countries can then use it or adapt it slightly. I don't believe that an idea has to come from the U.S. or London. We encourage our agencies to let the best idea win, no matter the geography (interview in Dan 2012).

The Coca Cola Company introduced the fusion music project, Coke Studio, as a part of its intensifying integrated marketing campaigns for the African and Eurasian emerging economies. The project follows these parameters for new music: free brand music created in partnership with media conglomerates or local intermediaries; no mentioning of the brand in a composition--the association is made through the integrated marketing campaigns; and fusion to surpass cultural barriers. However, the discourse to establish the cultural relevance of Coke Studio varies across the various societies. Given the greater role of corporations in a neo-liberal economy, the post 9/11 sociopolitical situation of Pakistan provides an impetus for Coca Cola to take cultural leadership and reinvent the national myth.
Coke Studio and the Nation

A cursory look at the history of Coca Cola’s engagement with Pakistani pop music highlights the commercial agenda underscoring Coke Studio (Pakistan). International influence in the form of capital played a decisive role in shaping the pop scene of Pakistan during and after the 1990s. To engage the locale, multinational corporations shaped indigenous sonic emblems for themselves. The trend also brought with it its own system of categorizing music and musicians according to the class, gender, ethnicity, income and age group of their respective consumers.

Pepsi was the first to establish a link between brand and music by nominating Vital Signs as its brand ambassador. Vital Signs symbolized elite Pakistan due to the affluent backgrounds of its members, and their urban middle class and elite fan base. In response, Coca Cola initiated an altogether different strategy by signing the fusion oriented Sufi rock band Junoon (in 1996) as its brand ambassador (Ahmad 2010: 136-7) to penetrate urban and semi-urban strata. The persistent contestation \(^{52}\) between the band and the brand over the value of music (Paracha) led to the dissolution of the agreement soon after.

Coca Cola (Pakistan) moved away from being a local franchise to an active organ of Coca Cola International in 2000, and its investment in the local

\(^{52}\) For instance, Coca Cola wanted to represent Junoon’s music as a flat corporation symbol by putting its logo on the CD jacket, while the band had an anti-establishment identity.
economy increased manifold with an equal increase in its involvement in the cultural industry (Naovi 2005: 4317). The company now controls 30% of the local beverage market, less than half of Pepsi’s share, yet aims to oust Pepsi from Pakistan by spreading its message to all strata of society through projects like Coke Studio (Zmuda 2011), a melting pot for demographic diversity. The brand-music bond has been an unhappy relationship, a situation that has changed given the societal role the brand music has involuntarily assumed in the current scenario.

**Corporate leadership**

Coke Studio entered Pakistani popular culture at a time of both despair and hope. By 2008, the urban pop industry started to eclipse due to virtual media, lack of finance and the rising extremist threat to music in the public sphere. The abundance of free music merely enhanced the already existing economic degeneration caused by piracy in the informal music economy of Pakistan. Added to this catastrophe was the militancy threat to music in the public sphere, which they regarded as an un-Islamic practice. The concert culture that used be the lifeline for the bread and butter of the musicians ceased for security reasons (Usman Rana\(^{53}\), personal communication 2009). The televisual media rose to prominence as musicians chose to work for films and

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\(^{53}\) A Lahore-based pop musician.
TV dramas, or to launch their single numbers for music channels in search of a hit that not only sustained their popularity, but opened future playback singing opportunities.

The paradigm shift in the career of Ruhail Hayat reflected the industry situation and the subsequent attempts by musicians to push the boundaries before Coke Studio was launched in Pakistan. Having enjoyed immense popularity first as the keyboardist of Vital Signs and later as an independent rock music producer, Hayat gradually aligned himself with the emerging paradigm, the media economy, by producing music for Bollywood and Pakistani films. His successful fusion experiments in South Asian traditional music soon established his credentials and he fully left the rock scene. Media corporations approached him to serve for their television channels, which he declined. Now as a partner-producer and Coke Studio’s impresario for Pakistan, he acts as a cultural broker for Coca Cola.

The awakening of the civil society for democracy and civilian rights during the same period, however, gave hope to the nation. The Lawyers’ Movement (in 2007) was a non-political protest movement, led by the lawyers, against thedictatorial act of President Pervez Musharraf for unconstitutionally sacking the chief justice of Pakistan. The media graciously supported the movement and the massive participation of the urban middle class was also an exceptional phenomenon. A number of musicians supported the cause
publically on national media. Though the music-media-civil society nexus withered in the post-Musharraf period, many topnotch pop musicians\textsuperscript{54} renegotiated their role and became activists and politicians to bring sociopolitical change through the empowerment of the underprivileged. While the future of the music industry remained questionable, the discursive relationship between music and society strengthened anyway.

The conditions were ripe for Coca Cola to take cultural leadership in Pakistan. The notion of “optimism” holds a key position in the corporation’s engagement with various societies, especially those going through a social crisis. Optimism refers to endeavor for a “bright future” under Coca Cola’s leadership, asserts Ahmet Bozer, president of the Coca Cola Company’s Eurasia and Africa Group (in Holstein 2011). The company empowers the local communities by introducing initiatives to come out of the crisis, as it did in Egypt in the wake of the chaos after the Arab Spring (Wagner 2013). Coca Cola’s local leadership represented Coke Studio (Pakistan) as a hope for the nation. Rizwan Khan, Coca Cola’s head of the Afghanistan-Pakistan business unit, attempted to restore national pride by proclaiming, “Coke Studio prides itself on providing a musical platform that bridges barriers, celebrates diversity, encourages unity and instills a sense of Pakistani pride” (quoted in

\textsuperscript{54} To mention a few, Salman Ahmad, Abrarul Haq, Shahzad Roy, and Jawwad Ahmad are the leading musicians involved in philanthropy and politics for change.
In the wake of shrinking economic and symbolic resources to combat religious extremism, the intelligentsia also acknowledges the hope given by Coca Cola as a cultural leader now. Nadeem Paracha, a pop music journalist and the former foremost critic of the brand-music bond, now admits the symbolic significance of brand music. Coke Studio (Pakistan) is the need of the time as youngsters are “bound to relate more to a young pop star singing a Sufi kalam or a quawalli [qawwali]” instead of a religious fanatic, opines Paracha (Interview in Arqam 2010).

Khan’s representation of Coke Studio (Pakistan) as a platform to celebrate diversity is in accordance with what global marketing manager Ozaydinli has said about fusion. Arguably, the company diminishes differences among various groups, as nurturing difference may affect its sales among some segments. This imagination of the nation negates taxonomies, such as religion, to define the national self. Coke Studio (Pakistan) contests the state’s narrative in which traditions are constructed on two paradigms: the affirmation of Islamic identity and the negation of anything identified with the Indian others (Qureshi 1999b: 744). In this way, Coke Studio (Pakistan) has also become a platform to bring underrepresented ethnic and religious

55 Also see Mukhtar (2014: 151-3).
minorities to the mainstream. Musicians from these groups have performed in Coke Studio (Pakistan).

Hayat represents Coke Studio (Pakistan) as a platform for music with a serious concept. The English term “heavy” has a slang meaning in his following statement on the relationship between Sufi music and commercialism. The mundane meaning of heavy in the Pakistani lexicon is of something that comes out unconventionally and needs contemplation to be comprehended.

This is not very easy music to digest…This is seriously heavy stuff…People would say, ‘11 minute ka kalam aap ne commercial platform pe chala diya [you have broadcast 11 minutes of Sufi poetry on a commercial platform]? And I say it’s not a commercial platform, it’s become commercial because people have liked it, but it was never meant to be (Interview in Aziz 2011).

The war on terror shapes the unconventional meaning of music in Coke Studio (Pakistan). The fusion of traditional (classical, semi-classical, and folk), Sufi, and pop genres seeks to reinvent the buried Indo-Persian cultural past that serves as a model of tolerance for the nation and its projection globally (ibid.).

Hayat counters the hegemonic narrative of newness by identifying the Indo-Persian past as the cultural roots of the nation (ibid.). The national history of Pakistan dates back to the maturing of the Indus Valley Civilization
(3\textsuperscript{rd} millennium BC) and then the absorption of later cultural influences that came to India, most notably Persian Sufi traditions. In contrast, the standard narrative of newness declares the birth of the nation-state in 1947 as the beginning of national culture. Primarily propagated by the state’s education system, the argument dismisses the Indo-Persian past that ultimately connects to Indus Valley paganism, and also converges with the cultural orientation of India and Pakistan.

For Hayat, 9/11 reposes the question of roots, the answer to which is in our scotched past. Emblematic of syncretism, the traditional classical, semi-classical, folk, and Sufi genres represent a cultural model that is profoundly tolerant, religiously inclusive, and also grounded in the land. The Sufi saints, who came to India and settled here, embodied the evolutionary discourse of the history by merging with local customs and norms, including their music and poetry. Coke Studio (Pakistan) stands as a means to experience the muted narrative of our ancestry (Hayat interview in Aziz 2011).

Added value

TV and radio broadcast of fusion sessions, social media campaigns such as Facebook pages, websites, blogs, and YouTube channels, conventional advertisement methods such as billboards, print magazine and newspaper ads, session launching ceremonies, press conferences, and news media
reviews, all form the building-blocks of the integrated marketing structure constructed around Coke Studio (Pakistan). Though an average of four or five episodes\textsuperscript{56} are aired in a season, the integrated web of marketing methods sustains the popularity of the series throughout the year. The series has successfully completed seven seasons so far.

The featured artists are from diverse musical, ethnic, social, economic, and linguistic backgrounds. A season is anticipated with the corporation mobilizing its advertisement from billboards at prominent sites in urban and semi-urban areas to websites dedicated to this project. Once recorded, an hour-long episode is then broadcast through eleven radio stations and 50 TV channels thrice a week normally. The episode is also instantaneously made available at Coke Studio’s webpage, its YouTube channel, and its Facebook page for repeated viewing and for posting comments. Journalists follow with reviews of each episode of this campaign, which can rightly claim the largest ever advertisement campaign designed around music in Pakistan (“Coke Studio”; Tanweer 2012; Zmuda 2011). The populist national connotation of Coke Studio (Pakistan) predominantly branches out of the brand-media collaboration model introduced by Coca Cola in Pakistani music industry.

A comparative look at Coke Studio in different regions reveals that the strategic selection and use of TV channels adds a nationalist value to its

\textsuperscript{56} An episode of Coke Studio (Pakistan) consists of four or five fusion performances, featuring different artist in each performance.
Pakistani version. The hired media\textsuperscript{57} for its Pakistan version is the national media, while the other versions partner with multinational media corporations that add their respective supranational values to this project. In India, while Sony Music owned the music publishing rights for the first three seasons\textsuperscript{58}, Coca Cola partnered with MTV India to produce Coke Studio (India) to create a counter-Bollywood popular culture (Moye 2013). In the popular Indian perception, MTV at its entry represented the undesirable side of globalization for challenging the local norms with its content, such as hyper-sexualized visuals (Rao 2007: 71). Although it has gone through a radical transformation by appropriating Bollywood music as its basic broadcast material, MTV India is still conceived as a symbol of foreign cultural invasion. Representing the urban middle classes (Mankekar 2004: 417), MTV India also signifies social fragmentation that is another dilemma for Coke Studio (India) to reach all social strata. After a delay of one year, Coca Cola and MTV India plan to launch the fourth season in 2015 with more aggressive marketing strategies such as reaching college campuses and organizing more than 50 concerts over the year (PTI 2015).

For Coke Studio (Middle East), collaboration with the first pan-Arab independent media group, the MBC Group, reflects Coca Cola’s deliberate

\textsuperscript{57} The hired media only telecasts the content provided by the corporation, whereas partner media has privilege to shape the content.

\textsuperscript{58} Coke Studio (India) offers some portion of its music for free, and the rest is sold through the commercial albums and paid downloads. The revenues go to Coca Cola and MTV India (Moye 2013).
effort to transcend national boundaries in this region for political-cum-market reasons. The love-hate relationship with Arab countries delayed the corporation’s expansion in the region that spans from the Persian Gulf to North-West Africa. The Arab League boycotted Coca Cola from 1968 to 1991 on the account of its business in Israel (Wagner 2013).\textsuperscript{59} The boycott was potentially read as a religious matter. In the company’s narrative, Islam is the sole common factor among the politically and economically diversified Arab societies. Coca Cola generally reads the Arab religiosity as a mismatch with modernity, and it imagines the solution in the compatibility of the two worldviews (Levitt 1983: 97).

More recently, the Arab Spring and its anti-tradition stance provided a backdrop to the corporation to assume cultural leadership and unfold its eclectic vision of Arab modernity. Coke Studio (Middle East) fuses Arab music with western styles. Tolga Cebe, the marketing manager for Coca-Cola Middle East, describes the ideology of fusion,

Arab youth are in between two worlds, a world of tradition, heritage, belonging and pride contrasted with another world of modernity, progression, and connection to the rest of the world. Through Coke Studio, Coca-Cola aims to demonstrate the positive results that come from people connecting, sharing opinions, values, and opening their minds (quoted in “Coke Studio Set for Middle East Debut” 2012).

\textsuperscript{59} Only Egypt remained welcoming to the brand. Now it serves as the headquarters of the North and West Africa Business Unit and is also the largest market of Coca Cola among the Arab nations.
The Arab-owned yet London-based MBC Group also seeks the merger of the two civilizations (ibid.).

By contrast, Pakistani ultranationalist media efficaciously adds nationalist value to Coke Studio (Pakistan). The media power to shape national consciousness immediately came to full swing during the Lawyers’ Movement in which media support was a pivotal element to oust Musharraf from power. For economic reasons, the national media has on its own undertaken the task of safeguarding the cultural and geographical boundaries by opposing the foreign content shown by the multinational TV channels that also came to Pakistani territory trailing the media reforms (see Khan 2011).

The supranational dimension of Coke Studio, which is upfront in the case of India and Middle East due to the partner multinational broadcasting corporations, dissipates in Pakistan as the content is conceived to conform to national traditions. The collaborations between local artists and East European and Turkish musicians for the sixth season of Coke Studio (Pakistan) are stimulating in this regard. The collaborations take place to enrich the heritage while the Urdu versions of Turkish dramas shown by a Dubai based TV channel, Urdu1, receive popular criticism for invading the national culture with westernized values.

The meticulous selection of the TV channels enables Coke Studio (Pakistan) to circumvent the fragmented media environment of Pakistan, a
necessary condition to take cultural leadership among different strata of society. Despite their assumed national role, no television channel can claim viewership in all segments of the society. National media is a fragmented space in Pakistan on the basis of class, ethnicity, sectarian orientation, political affiliation, gender, and age group, to name a few categories. Coca Cola surpasses the fragmentation by hiring airtime on TV channels representing the voice of various groups. Coke Studio (Pakistan) season seven was telecasted through 50 channels, including cooking and news channels, to allow the corporation greatest penetration into the multifarious society. While pushing the media boundaries by introducing music into unconventional spaces such as cooking channels, the project altogether sidesteps the established music channels of Pakistan for their resemblance with multinational music television, for example with MTV. The core ideology of Coke Studio (Pakistan) is based on fostering “Eastern values” (Interview Ruhail Hayat in Dasgupta 2012a) compared to the westernized identity of the local music channels.

**Sufi Music in Coke Studio**

Three groups of musician collaborate in Coke Studio (Pakistan): the house band, guest musicians, and the featured artists. The guitarist, keyboardist, drummer, and chorus form the house band, and jointly they represent the
western pop section. The guest musicians are the visiting traditional instrumentalists—for example tabla, dholak (small barrel drum), matka (earthen pot), and iktara, to name a few—who provide timbre contrast or traditional rhythms for specific compositions. Following the dominance of vocal music in South Asia, the featured artists are mostly singers and have different stylistic backgrounds, but can broadly be categorized into Sufi, folk, classical, and pop musicians. They perform solo or are paired with another artist from another different category to create a contrast. The compositions are thoroughly planned and rehearsed before recording.

Sufi music flows out of this process in three structured ways. First, the featured artists have backgrounds in Sufi traditions and perform solos, while the instrumentalists (house band and guest artists) provide accompaniment. Second, Hayat pairs the Sufi musicians with a pop singer, and an exchange of ideas takes place. Third, a pop singer performs a well-known Sufi composition as a tribute to a musician. The three types of Sufi collaborations dominate the overall Coke Studio (Pakistan) compositions both in number and popularity. The nurturing of eastern values determines the course of new music created in Coke Studio (Pakistan). Sufi music is one of the two categories that carry eastern values. The other is what Hayat calls traditional music (Interview in Dasgupta 2012a), which comprises folk, semi-classical and classical.
Coke Studio (Pakistan) has become the largest platform for the production of mediated Sufi music in the country. The song “Jugni” stands as the foremost example of the dominance of Sufi discourse in Coke Studio (Pakistan). Initially a sarcastic popular Punjabi genre originating in British India, jugni has now evolved into a Sufi genre. With over 18 million views on Coke Studio’s YouTube channel by 2015, the song “Jugni” has the greatest role in establishing the populist credentials of the brand music as the most popular composition so far.

The transformation of the jugni genre epitomizes a changing identity paradigm of Pakistan. The following section analyzes the transformation of meaning reflected through the lyric composition in mediated versions of jugni songs. I focus on recitals of two kin-related Pakistani Punjabi folk musicians, Alam Lohar (the father) and Arif Lohar (the son). While Arif Lohar (b. 1966) has popularized jugni on an international scale through Coke Studio (Pakistan), Alam Lohar (1928-1979) did it through state-owned media, the PTV (Pakistan Television). Alam Lohar represented jugni as an invocation, sideling the memory of the shared Indian past. Under corporate cultural leadership, Arif Lohar interprets jugni in the context of the current identity discourse by reviving the forgotten past, but with Sufi symbolism.
Jugni evolved in the early 20th century and was thematically a sarcastic oral genre. Karamjit Singh Aujla (2005) from India notes that this genre came to the forefront in 1906, the year a Jubilee flame was taken across the country to celebrate the 50th anniversary of British Rule over India. The flame was carried in a large gold container and taken to each district headquarters. As the flame arrived, the district government was supposed to greet it with splendor and ceremony. When the flame reached Punjab, there was anger against British rule. Two musicians, Bishna and Manda followed the flame from district to district, performing their own poetry and music parallel to the pomp of the colonial administration. The two musicians pronounced the word jubilee as jugni and started singing verses of agitation against the British as symbolised by the jubilee flame. Both of them were sentenced to death soon after (ibid.).

Uxi Mufti, a Pakistani folklorist, opines that jugni as a rebellious genre came out of a mystic origin in 1889, the year of jubilee celebrations (quoted in Ahmed 2011). While Aujla’s narrative is based on the testimony of an elderly freedom fighter, Baba Makhan Singh, Mufti does not cite any source.

In the opinion of Afzal Parvez, a Punjabi folk singer and researcher of

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60 Jugni has not been studied by academics so far. I am recollecting its history from newspaper articles from India and Pakistan.

61 This date is incorrect. 1889 cannot be the year of jubilee celebrations, as British Rule over India began in 1858 (see Spear 1972: 277).
Pakistan, satirical jugni was “perhaps” a variation of ballad “Jugni-Rawal,” from northwestern Punjab\textsuperscript{62} and had no connection to any Islamic or nationalist symbol (quoted in “Jugni: Whose Creation?” 2010). Despite divergence on how it came into being, the accounts establish that jugni at the time of its origin was sarcastic.

The construction of place was another important attribute of this genre. Jugni quintessentially symbolized a wandering character that visited various places in Punjab. A typical jugni stanza starts with proclamation of this character entering a place, followed by a narrative. Then another stanza would start mentioning another place and so on. The following verses, which Aujla (2005) claims to be an original creation of Manda and Bishna, exemplify the traits of jugni.

**Example 3.1: An Old Jugni Stanza**\textsuperscript{63}

\begin{align*}
\text{Jugni jaa varhi Majithe} & \quad \text{Jugni entered Majithe} \\
\text{Koi Rann na Chakki peethe} & \quad \text{No woman grinds wheat} \\
\text{Putt Gabhru mulak vich mare} & \quad \text{Young man dies in the country} \\
\text{Rovan Akhiyan par Bulh si seete} & \quad \text{Eyes crying, but lips were shut} \\
\text{Peer mereya oye Jugni ayi aa} & \quad \text{O my spiritual mentor, Jugni is coming} \\
\text{Ehnau kehrhi jot jagaee aa} & \quad \text{What kind of light have they brought?}
\end{align*}

\textsuperscript{62} Parvez’s opinion stems for his fieldwork in Pakistani Punjab in the early 1950s, immediately after the partition.

\textsuperscript{63} Taken from Aujla (2005). Translation mine.
Jugni is sung in raga Bhairvi and each line is composed to the four beat Kehrva tala (rhythmic cycle) in fast tempo. Traditionally, the rhythm is played on the tabla, dholak, matka, or chimta (fire tong), or some combination of them. The vocalist is accompanied by the jori (double flute) or the iktara. In studio sessions sometimes sarangi (Indian fiddle) and harmonium are also added to the ensemble.

A recital contains a few independent stanzas separated by instrumental interludes. Jugni does not contain narrative flow and each stanza of this genre stands alone in terms of theme, number of lines, and rhyming scheme. The soloist structures the recital with any number of stanzas sung in any order of personal choice deemed suitable to the context. The most important component is the mentioning of jugni in all of the stanzas to establish the identity of the genre, which does not have a shared storehouse of verses like the narrative genres of Punjabi folk music such as qissa (folktale). In performance practice, the artist eclectically composes lyrics to construct the sociological meaning of jugni, a word that connotes femininity with its last syllable “ni.” Jugni can be represented as a female or an object with feminine attributes.

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64 However, a stylistic genealogy has emerged in Pakistan. Alam Lohar’s recorded jugni compositions set the precedent for his son, Arif Lohar, who draws upon the verses composed by his father.

65 In the Punjabi language, the addition of syllable “ni” to a common noun signifies the feminine version of the common noun.
Jugni has been the forte of musicians located in the urban areas of Punjab. The organization of music in the rural and urban areas provides two different environments for nurturing experimentation. In rural Punjab, folk music is dominantly organized in musicians’ caste categories that predicate their repertoire and ultimately their entire course of performance practice (Nayyar 1999). The urban-oriented democratization forces, such as the music industry, are a catalyst for transcending the boundaries and the subsequent expansion of repertory and creation of new compositions for mass consumption. Jugni does not belong to a caste category and the musicians who have contributed to its popularity had a unique aptitude to increase the corpus of Punjabi music by composing for the popular industry.

The two contemporary icons of Punjabi music, Alam Lohar and Hazara Singh Ramta (b.1926), hailed from cities and had a non-hereditary musical background. They performed jugni in two divergent postcolonial milieus that had emerged after the partition of British India. Alam Lohar was born in Gujrat (Rehman 2011) in central Punjab (now in Pakistan), a prosperous industrial zone, and he exclusively represented Punjab on the state-owned media, PTV. Ramta was born in a Sikh family of Montgomery (now Sahiwal, Pakistan) and later migrated to India (Schreffler 2010: 940). While nation building on Islamic traditions contextualized Alam Lohar’s PTV performances, Ramta’s music was evocative of Punjabi displacement and the subsequent cultural
challenges faced by the Punjabi diaspora in their host societies. Juxtaposition of East and West was a common theme of Ramta’s compositions (Schreffler 2010: 940-2), which he enacted through reconstructing the colonial past in his jugni recital as well. In addition to composing the music, the two musicians wrote lyrics of their numerous popular compositions.

Ramta constructed Jugni as a person in his “Jugni” composition. Mimicking the colonial era defiance of jugni (the genre), he represented Jugni as a transgressive female who overtly challenged cultural norms and embodied the ills of modernity. As depicted in example 3.2 (Stanza E), Jugni confronted gender boundaries and familial values in her pursuit of a western lifestyle. Ramta referred to the symbols, such as a Fiat car, which were synonymous with the westernized Indian colonial elite.

Example 3.2: Lyrics of Ramta’s “Jugni” (CDNF 140073 vol. 3)\(^{66}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A:</th>
<th>B:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jugni fashion di matvali</td>
<td>Jugni performs European dance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thape poder lave lali</td>
<td>Everyday begins a new romance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tidon pukhi jebon khali</td>
<td>Milda Mayaram nu chance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veer merya o Jugni</td>
<td>Mayaram also gets a chance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pai merya o Jugni</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veer merya o Jugni bendi nai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O gal kise di sendi nai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Veer merya o Jugni
Pai merya o Jugni
Veer merya o Jugni chandi di
Mein tor puchhana jandi di
O my brother, Jugni
O my brother, Jugni
My brother, fashionable Jugni
I recognize her persona

C: Jugni ja varhi Karnal
Akhin aina ak hath rumal
Tenas kedhe mundyan nal
Oye veer merya Jugni
Pai merya o Jugni
Veer merya o Jugni tan gai ye
Nabe di total ban gai ye
Jugni entered Karnal
In trendy attire
Plays tennis with boys
Oh my brother, Jugni
O my brother, Jugni
O my brother, Jugni has straightened
She has become a bottle of ninety

D: Jugni ja varhi Jalandher
Meman mar gaiyan thande ander
Gore ban gaeye mast qalander
Jine chherhya ho gya ander
Hoye veer merya o Jugni
Pai merya o Jugni
Veer merya o Jugni pital di
Mein dekhi sheron nikal di
Jugni arrived in Jalandher
English women downtrodden in cold
White men went mad
Whoever teased, went to jail
Oh my brother, Jugni
O my brother, Jugni
O my brother, the shining Jugni
I saw her leaving city

E: Meri Jugni skooley parhdi ae
Te do do guttan kerdi ae
Nat ja cinmey vich varhdi ae
Raati daddy mummy nal larhdi ae
Dine Fiat car te charhdi ae
Veer merya o Jugni
Pai merya o Jugni chandi di
Mein tor puchhana jandi di
My Jugni studies at school
And makes two ponytails
Desperate to enter the cinema-hall
At night, argues with daddy mummy
During the day, rides in a Fiat car
O my brother, Jugni
O my brother, fashionable Jugni
I recognize her active persona

F: Jugni ja varhi Sadar Bazaar
Agey tangaa pichhey car
Jugni phas gai adh vich kaar
Agon puchh na merey yaar
Veer merya o Jugni
Pai merya o Jugni
Veer merya o Jugni re gai ye
Dil sav da khich ke le gai ye
Jugni entered Sadar Bazar
Tonga in front, car in back
Jugni stuck in between
Do not ask what happened next
O my brother, Jugni
O my brother, Jugni
O my brother, Jugni has stayed
She has stolen everyone’s heart
In contrast, Alam Lohar constructed Jugni as an invocation (discussed below), not a female. To establish this, a look at the structure of Ramta’s above-mentioned recital is necessary. His performance consisted of a total of six stanzas (A, B, C, D, E, and F), separated by instrumental interludes and a brief *alap* (melodic elaboration) at the outset (example 3.3). Each stanza had a unique theme and was sung once with no repetition of it or a part of it. As the lyrics of stanza E demonstrate (example 3.2), Ramta repeatedly acknowledged Jugni’s agency and the brief narrative in this section centralized her. The first five lines give the narration while the remaining three lines provide the singer’s reflection on the main character’s attributes. This standard composition formula was maintained in other stanzas as well.

Example 3.3: Structure of Ramta’s “Jugni” (CDNF 140073 volume 3)

Alap…A…B….C…D….E….F

Alam Lohar began his recital with an invocation to God composed in two equal parts of three lines each. The first half (I) invoked the authority of the God and the Prophet, and then emphasized piety. The second half (J) described invocation to the authority of Ali, an Islamic spiritual leader and the fourth Muslim Caliph (656-661 AD) (examples 3.4, 3.5). This half established the identity of the genre by mentioning Jugni (the invocation), and Alam Lohar
used this half as a refrain for the performance. He composed each stanza in two parts, and the second part was necessarily J (see examples 3.4, 3.5). Unlike Ramta’s reflection on Jugni’s transgressive persona in the second half, Alam Lohar ended his stanzas at the invocation, a religious theme he introduced at the very beginning.

Alam Lohar composed his stanzas with themes of nationalism, piety, and morality. For example, Stanza A (example 3.5) argued for passion to the motherland as an eternal bliss instead of pursuing one’s own pleasures. The lyrics did not directly index particular human subjects or objects, and were composed in a proverbial fashion to claim the universality of truth they were supposed to contain. Alam Lohar represented Jugni as a subject in stanza C only, which was sung twice. However, its agency was conditioned to its relationship to the nation-state, Pakistan, and its action was confined to the boundaries defined by the Holy Quran. It conformed to the state’s attempts to form a postcolonial Muslim national identity. The state-owned national television reflected this identity paradigm (Rajput 2005). Jugni in Pakistan shared the burden of nation-building and lost its feminine defiance, which was restored in the Indian Punjab. A transgressive female contradicted a

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67 The room for variation was always there in case of Alam Lohar’s music. However, the basic text for J remained intact throughout the performance. I gave the basic text in the examples given here.
postcolonial sexist Pakistani society. Alam Lohar sang jugni as an invocation and composed it with themes of nationalism and piety for popular appeal.

**Example 3.4:** Structure of Alam Lohar’s “Jugni” for PTV⁶⁸

Invocation (I+J)….A+J….B+J….2x (C+J)

**Example 3.5:** Lyrics of Alam Lohar’s “Jugni” for PTV⁶⁹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>J (refrain):</th>
<th>O Pir merya Jugni</th>
<th>O my spiritual mentor, Jugni</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sain merya Jugni kirendi aa</td>
<td>My Lord Jugni is doing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oye naam Ali da lendi aa</td>
<td>See! It chants Ali’s name</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| I: | Awal naam Allah da laeye | First, lets chant God’s name |
|    | Pher darud nabi nu kaeye | Then, pay homage to the Prophet |
|    | Har dam ajzi vich raeye | Always observe humility |

| A: | Ae wawa moj jwani wali | This tremendous joy of youth |
|    | Shed gurhe ton mithi | Sweeter than honey and sugar |
|    | Aai jwani har koi venda ye | Everyone notices adolescence |
|    | Jandi kise na dithi | Nobody notices its end |
|    | O ki bunyad ae bandya teri | O human! What is your root |
|    | Bunyad hai teri miti | Root is your land |
|    | Ishq lohara taza renda ye | Lohar, passion remains afresh |
|    | Darhi ho jae chiti | Even in old age |

| B: | Ae jwani char diharhe | This temporary youth |
|    | Khushian nal langaeeye | Let’s spend happily |
|    | Zindgi da koi man nai | No confidence in life |
|    | Mer pal ke hi mar jaeye | No wonder we die this moment |
|    | Spaan de puter yar nai bande | An enemy can never be a friend |

⁶⁸ Available: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QCCRONPgGRU.
⁶⁹ Translation mine.
Chulian dudh piyaeye  Despite the best offering
Murh gai jwani pher nai andi  Once gone youth will not be back again
Lakh khurakan khaeye  Despite huge efforts
Chhad lohara gaon da kherha  O lohar, leave singing
Te sani thorha waeye  And return to blacksmith life

C:
Ae Jugni Pakistan di ye  It is Pakistan’s Jugni
Ae raj ke mojan man di ye  It is so joyful
Ae hami pak Quran di ye  It supports Holy Quran

Scotching ethnic history was another significant aspect of Alam Lohar’s nationalist jugni. Ramta reconstructed colonial Punjab and imagined places, such as Karnal and Jalandher, where Punjabis struggled to concord with modernity. Alam Lohar neither recalled history nor imagined Punjabi places that were once inhabited by the others as well. The only place that he constructed, then, was the supraethnic Islamic nation-state of Pakistan (example 3.5 stanza C), the new syllogism to define ethnic roots.

Resurrection of history

For Coke Studio’s rock version, Arif Lohar represents Jugni as transmittable spirituality and fuses the genre with Sufi compositions. He begins his recital (example 3.6) with a seharfi (a genre of Punjabi Sufi poetry and music) penned by Punjabi Sufi poet, Sultan Bahu (1628-1691). As a genre of music, a seharfi is traditionally composed to free rhythm for contemplative spirituality, and here it establishes a convincing Sufi theme at the very outset. Emulating
his father's compositional strategy, Arif Lohar mentions Jugni in the second part of a stanza that he also uses as a refrain. He concludes the seharfi with a refrain and affirms the Sufi theme by representing Jugni as the “Spirit-Being” of “the Godly ones,” in particular his own mystic pedigree (section J of seharfi in example 3.7). He establishes his spiritual lineage in section J by connecting to the Prophet through his Pir (spiritual mentor) while Ali acts as the intermediary between the two. In stanza D, he introduces another Sufi composition, “Wangaan charhaa lo kurhyo” (Put on bangles, girls), which is a praise song dedicated to Sayed Ali Hijweri alias Datta Ganj Bakhsh, the 11th century mystic whose shrine is located in Lahore.

The fusion version of jugni is a polysemic text. It resurrects the syncretic history of the region by invoking Bahu and Hijweri, two Sufis who personified the diversified local and cross-regional influences that have contributed to Indian culture. Hailing from Ghazni (Afghanistan), Hijweri migrated to Lahore and spent his life there spreading Sufi teachings to the commoners. He was a bearer of Persian traditions and he contributed to Sufi prose composed in the Persian language and syntax. He was absorbed in the

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70 The English translation has been adopted from the subtitles given in the official Coke Studio video posted on YouTube. Available: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gjaH2iuoYWE.

71 Establishing a spiritual lineage is a common practice of Punjabi qissa singing. The singer begins the composition by recalling it; however, these opening lines are not a part of the narrative. Arif Lohar assigns a functional role to this practice in “Jugni” composition by keeping it intact as a refrain.
local mores and has been venerated as “the Benefactor” for nearly a millennium by the multi religious Indian community, even after the Partition (Fauq 2007). Now his shrine is magnet for devotees, in particular Punjabi musicians from India who religiously pilgrim to grave whenever they visit Pakistan to seek his blessings.

On the other hand, Bahu was born in Punjab and expressed himself both in the elite Persian and the vernacular Punjabi (Hamdani 2001). He is popular for his Punjabi poetry that is a part of the traditional Sufi repertory of Punjabi musicians from the two countries.

The fusion of rock and traditional Punjabi style in “Jugni” transcends societal barriers. Female rock singer Meesha Shafi sings as the second vocalist and provides timbral contrast to Arif Lohar for the recital. Whereas Arif Lohar has been synonymous with the rural and semi-urban Punjab for his numerous albums done for the subcultural recording industry, Shafi, a Punjabi rock vocalist, represents urban middle class Pakistan. The collage of the two voices accomplishes the determination of Coke Studio (Pakistan) to socially mobilize traditional genres onto the national canvas.

**Example 3.6: Structure of Coke Studio’s “Jugni”**

Seharfi+J….A+J….B+J……C+J….A….D….A+J

72 Available: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gjaH2iueYWE.
Example 3.7: Lyrics of Coke Studio’s “Jugni”

J:  Peer meriya - Jugni ji  O Pir of Mine – Spirit-Being  
    Ae we Allah waaliyaan di  Indeed, this is the Godly One’s  
    Jugni ji  Spirit-Being  
    Ae we Nabi Paak di Jugni ji  Indeed, this is the Holy  
    Jugni ji  Prophet’s Spirit-Being  
    Ae we maula Ali wali Jugni ji  Indeed, this is the Spirit-Being  
                                 devoted to Ali, the friend of  
                                 God!  
    Ae we merey peer di Jugni ji  Indeed, this is my Pir’s Spirit-  
                                 Being  
    Ae we sar-sabaz di Jugni ji  Indeed, this is the long-living  
                                 Pir’s Spirit-Being

Seharfi:  Alif Allah Chambey di booti  The letter alif of God’s name is  
         a Jasmine flower  
         Te mere murshad man wich  And my Guide has planted it in  
            lai Hu  my heart – He  
         Ho nafi asbat da pani de ke  Watering with the negation and  
                                       affirmation (no God, but God)  
         Har rage harjai Hu  (Watering) each vein and each  
                                      pore – He  
         Ho jug jug jive mera  May my beautiful Guide live  
            murshad sohna  forever  
            Hathe jis ae booti lai Hu  Whose hands planted this  
                                      flower – He

A:  Dam gutkoon dam gutkoon  With every breath, my heart  
    echoes God’s name like a  
    dove’s call  
    Dam gutkoon gutkoon kare  With every breath, remembers  
              Sain  the Lord  
    Te kalma Nabi da parhey  And says the kalma\textsuperscript{73} of the  
                      Sain  Prophet  

B:  Jugni tar khaain vich thaal  O Spirit-Being, share what you  
    have with others (place your  
    food in a communal dish and  

\textsuperscript{73} Kalma literally means creed. Here it is used in the sense of faith in the Prophet.
Chad duniya de janjaal  
Become free of the troubles of the world

Kuj nai nibhna bandyan nal  
It's not possible to keep faith with humans

Rakhin sabat sidq amaal  
Keep your deeds true and sincere

C:  
Jugni dig pai vich roi  
The Spirit-Being stumbled in the wilderness

Othe ro ro kamli hoi  
There, she went mad shedding tears

Odi wat na lenda koi  
No one asks how she is

Te kalme bina nai mildi toi  
And without the kalma, one can't gain release

D:  
Wangan charha lo kurhyo  
Put on bangles, girls

Mere Data de darbar diyan  
From the court of my Benefactor (Data Ganj Bakhsh)

Na ker tiyan khed pyari  
O daughter, don't revel in love of fun and play

Maan dendi aa galrhian  
Mother gives advice

Din din tali jwani jandi  
With each day, the bloom of youth waning

Jyoon sona kuthyalrhian  
As gold in a goldsmith's crucible

Aurt mard shezade sone  
Women and men are beautiful and precious

O moti o lalrhian  
They are pearls, they are rubies

Sir da sarfa karan na jehrhe  
Those who don't care to save their own head

Peen prem pyalrhian  
Drink from the cup of love

Ho Data de darbar vich akho  
In the court of the Benefactor, come and say your desire

Pawan khair swalrhian  
(He) will grant prosperity to the petitioners
Summary

The song “Jugni” simultaneously corresponds to its producers’ strategic negation of social barriers for consumption, and to the identity dilemma of the nation. Having gone viral on the Internet, it reverberates with the South Asian traditions beyond its national borders. “Jugni” was appropriated for the Bollywood film *Cocktail*. In the next chapter, I will venture into how media flow has engendered this movement.
Chapter 4: Media Flow and Its Rationale: Jugni from Pakistan to Bollywood

Generally, collaborations between Bollywood and the Pakistani music industry take place in two forms: Pakistani musicians doing playback singing, and Pakistani independent songs appearing in Bollywood films. Jugni falls in the second category, bringing in a Punjabi audience. In the case of the Bollywood film Cocktail, a previously released independent song (called “Jugni”) that had gone viral on YouTube created and engaged its audience first; the film then took advantage of this segmentation by appropriating the song. In this chapter, I examine this example of “Jugni” in Cocktail and then broaden out my perspective to discuss Bollywood’s new marketing environment and new media, Punjabi dominance in the industry, and the influence of western filmmaking.

Segmentation, a technique used by media organizations, refers to dividing a large audience base into targeted subgroups on demographic bases such as class, ethnicity, region, language, gender, and age group (Ganti 2012: chapter 8, 9). The choice of music and language and the casting of a regional star are common Bollywood strategies to segment an ethnic group (ibid.: 290). In the case of jugni’s movement to Bollywood, social media such as YouTube acts as what N. Anand and Richard Peterson (2000) would
call the “market information regime.” This regime includes information mechanisms, such as Billboard charts, by which marketplace players rationalize their actions and those of consumers, rivals, and suppliers. In the case of Cocktail, Illuminati Films, the company that produced the film, subscribed to social media to identify trendy Punjabi music for use in it.

This cross-media approach (e.g. using social media to develop film content) is an outcome of the digitization of Bollywood. By 2013, 77 percent of Bollywood screens have been digitized and total digitization is expected in the next two years (FICCI-KPMG 2013: 10). Bollywood films are now produced, financed, marketed, distributed, and consumed in collaboration with local and multinational film production companies, independent distributors, financial institutions, media conglomerates, telecommunication companies, and dotcom and e-commerce companies, to name the key players (Lorenzen and Taeube; Punathambekar 2013).

FICCI-KPMG reconfigures the challenges of the Indian media industry in the digital age that has also brought with it media fragmentation, since people now consume content through a variety of digital sources. The

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74 KPMG annually prepares the Indian Entertainment Industry Report under the auspices of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry’s (abbreviated as FICCI) entertainment division. FICCI claims that it “covers all segments and verticals of the Indian Entertainment Industry, is the only one of its kind available in India and the most authentic referral document on the industry” (“FICCI: Studies”). KPMG collects data from the leading media firms to evaluate the ongoing progress and the future prospects of growth under the broader regulatory and developmental steps taken by the government and international media economy trends. As the blueprint of the industry, the report has attained great significance and Bollywood filmmakers aptly rationalize their actions based on the figures provided in it (see Bhat 2011; Tips Industries Limited 2013).
Bollywood industry is integrating into the social media to find answers to various questions this industry is facing now. Drawing upon FICCI- FRAMES\textsuperscript{75}, “engaging a billion consumers” is the theme of the year 2013 FICCI-KPMG report. To achieve the goal, one of the core questions that the report raises is how to “create true connect” (FICCI-KPMG 2013: 7) to the audience. In addition to shattering the myth of a monolithic audience, FICCI-KPMG emphasizes the development of content as a two-way process, necessarily taking into account audience trends measured through effective methods. The report explains the question:

How can we effectively segment a diverse audience base and then research and customize content for each segment, to ensure relevance? For example, how do we balance dubbed vs localized content in newly penetrated regional and rural markets? Or international vs locally produced content targeting key cities? Is there a business case for further zoning/ going hyperlocal within penetrated markets for greater localization of offerings? How do we engage the multitasking youth of today? How do we then inculcate processes to measure and monitor audience and reader responses, and then to ensure responsiveness and flexibility? (ibid.: 7).

Social media provides an empirical means to answer a few of these questions. For instance, FICCI-KPMG mentions the film \textit{Barfi} as a Bollywood success story for its innovative marketing methods targeting youth. Before the

\textsuperscript{75} Another FICCI entertainment division project to leverage media and entertainment industry.
release of the film, the marketing team launched an instructional video on
YouTube, devising methods to flirt with girls, which engaged 250,000 users in
two weeks and thus contributed significantly to the pre-release hype of the
film (2013: 8, 84). This example also exhibits the emerging Bollywood trend of
estimating the success of a film pre-release through counting the actual
number of consumers that their marketing devices have individually engaged
in a fragmented media environment. The larger the number, the greater the
expected market success as shows Barfi. With over 10 million YouTube views
by 2012, the song and video “Jugni” acted as a formidable pre-established
mechanism to engage audiences for Cocktail.

By establishing a relationship between Bollywood musical decision-
making and independent music market information regimes, such as chart
rankings, awards, and social media counts, I will represent Bollywood songs
as musical entities (what Mark Slobin 2008 calls the ethnomusicologists)
performing a dual function of film-marketing (Morcom 2007: 195) and
representing characters and locales. I will discuss films whose characters
have become identical with their respective target audiences—an emerging
Bollywood trend—and the musical genres with which these audiences identify
themselves. Particularly focusing on films targeting Punjabi diaspora audience
segments, I shy away from making any claim to examining the entire
Bollywood industry, which is too diversified as argues FICCI-KPMG (2013).
Identifying songs as an entrepreneurial decision-making site, I will discuss films from the producer’s point of view. I will take into account economic and cultural factors, such as the size and market position of the production company, and the ethnic background of the producer, which play a significant role in defining the brand image of a company and its target audience as well.

In Bollywood, “producer” is not an exclusive category as many producers perform multiple jobs, such as director-producer, writer-producer, and actor-producer, which bestow upon them more power to decide the content.

I will demonstrate that the multinational music channels MTV and Channel V have served as music market information regimes for Bollywood and mediated Pakistani rock musicians in Bollywood starting in the mid-1990s. I will then explain how the Internet and YouTube now perform this task. Finally, I will situate “Jugni” in Bollywood’s ongoing Punjabi ethos that has integrated with the international Punjabi music industry in an order to follow the western filmmaking conventions.

**The Media Cartography**

Cross-border collaborations of Pakistani musicians drastically increased with the arrival of multinational media in the region in the early-1990s. Music television channels like MTV and Channel V began marketing Pakistani rock musicians in India according to their regional policies. Bollywood companies
targeting the Indian urban middle class youth segment predominantly acquired these musicians’ independent songs.

The regionalism

The multinational music media reconstituted the Hindi speakers of South Asia into a single audience. MTV Asia, the regional version of MTV and a joint project of Viacom and STAR TV (a Hong Kong based regional media conglomerate), withdrew its broadcast three years after its launch in 1991. Apart from the profit sharing issues, STAR TV disputed MTV’s English language programming in multilingual Asia (Chang 2003: 14). Also, Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp had purchased STAR TV in 1993, and was eager to localize it according to the dominant languages of the continent. Chang calls this phenomenon “the Language-block-by-language-block approach” towards the localization of global media (ibid.: 5-6, 14).

News Corp divided STAR TV’s programs into two beams: northern and southern. The former, reserved for the Mandarin speaking audience, concentrated in China, Taiwan and Hong Kong, while the latter marked the Hindi speaking spectators principally concentrated in India (ibid.: 5). Channel V, the music channel launched by STAR TV, filled in the gap created by the departure of MTV, hence separate broadcast programming for the two language blocks. Its southern Hindi beam covered the youth audience from
Pakistan to North Korea. MTV’s reentry into Asia in 1995 was in line with the linguistic geography drawn by its rival Channel V. MTV Mandarin covered Mandarin audiences, and MTV Southeast Asia, primarily an English service, covered non-Mandarin audiences from Pakistan to Korea. These were two separate feeds of MTV Asia (ibid.: 14). By 2002, MTV Asia had grown from two to seven feeds: MTV Southeast Asia; MTV Mandarin; MTV India; MTV Australia; MTV Philippines; MTV Japan; and MTV Korea. This MTV Asia constellation caters to local audiences with primarily local programming (ibid.: 15).

In the form of this multinational television media, the single largest wave of internationalization hit the Pakistani rock scene. While covering the Hindi speaking audience, MTV and Channel V identified Indian urban middle class youth as its prime audience. The main genre that these channels marketed was “Indipop,” a non-film genre of popular music created by Indian middle class individuals, relying “heavily on western pop and rock styles” (Kvetko 2005: 129).

Located at the periphery, the Pakistani rock industry turned out to be the foremost beneficiary of media regionalism as it is the second largest nation speaking Hindi (or Urdu). This bustling industry was propelled by the mutual collaboration of the local media, multinational companies, and local music labels, yet it had no access to the international market. The regional
presence of MTV and Channel V was the only window for Pakistani rock to go international. It provided an entry into Indian youth culture where these networks were concentrated. The privilege was confined to the pre-established voices since both channels closely watched the bands’ rankings in the local industry and opened their airwaves for the outstanding ones, such as Strings and Junoon, to name the pioneers of the international face of Pakistani rock. By the mid 1990s, both bands had established a distinctive stature in the local market in terms of record sales, chart rankings, and cult fan following.

The music media and multinational record labels soon developed their business interests in promoting Pakistani rock bands in India. Labels such as Sony BMG and EMI invested in Pakistani voices for monetization from the financial muscles of the Indian urban middle class youth. In his autobiography, Junoon’s guitarist, Salman Ahmad describes the beginning of the band’s story in India that demonstrates this:

More than fifty years after the subcontinent gained its independence from Britain, Junoon actually had an Englishman to thank for getting us known in India in the first place. Adrian Cheesely, EMI Music Arabia’s marketing man…was intrigued by Junnon’s sound and impressed enough to sign us to a three-album contract. He immediately began promoting our album Azadi in India and got MTV to play our “Sayonee” video in heavy rotation. We were battling bans at home, but the international airwaves were ours. “Sayonee” made waves in India, and….Indian media…wanted to tell our story to Indian kids.
Junoon had begun to cross a virtual line of control (Ahmad 2010: 159).

Likewise, Strings worked with Sony BMG to launch its albums in India. The integration of Pakistani rock and Indipop industries developed a large market for Pakistani rock in India. Strings won the 2005 MTV Asia awards for the Most Favorite Band (Amati and Silva 2012), a viewers choice award category that demonstrates Pakistani rock’s inroads into Indian youth culture (see Ganguly 2012). In 1998, Junoon won Channel V’s Best International Band award after competing with stalwarts such as Aqua (of Denmark), Sting and Back Street Boys. During the same period the home government imposed a ban on Junoon for criticizing the state’s hostility towards India (Ahmad 2010: 168); however, the multinational media empowered the band to sideline the state’s narrative.

*Targeting a common audience*

Pakistani rocks’ audience in India in the 1990s overlapped with the audience of the film production companies targeting the Indian urban middle class youth audience segment. The prominent presence of Strings among Indian urban youth made them a preferred choice for film companies looking to market their content to the same audience segment. This happened when

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76 See the band’s bio on its Facebook page at https://www.facebook.com/stringspage/info.
Columbia Tristar Films of India signed Strings to sing the cover song for the Hindi version of Spider-Man 2 (2004, dir. Sam Raimi). The cover song “Najane kyun” (Don’t know why) was taken from the band’s fifth album Dhaani. Afterwards, Bollywood films Zinda (2006, dir. Sanjay Gupta), a revenge movie, and Shootout at Lokhandwala (2007, dir. Apoorva Lakhia), the story of the urban gangsters, respectively acquired the songs “Ye hai meri kahani” (This is my story) and “Akhri alvida” (Last goodbye) from Strings’ later album Koi Aanay Wala Hai. Similarly, Ali Azmat, the vocalist of Junoon, debuted his Bollywood career after disbanding the band. “Garaj baras savan” (Thundering raining monsoon) was his own production as a singer-composer that was featured in Paap (2003, dir. Pooja Bhatt), the story of a young couple saving the life of a Buddhist spiritual child leader.

The youth-oriented films of Vishesh Films significantly increased the presence of Pakistani rock compositions in Bollywood. In the early-2000s, the company, owned by brothers Mahesh Bhatt and Mukesh Bhatt, emerged as the single largest consumer of Pakistani music across the border. The inclination of the Bhatt’s towards Pakistani rock was grounded in the musical preferences of the urban youth audience for which they customized the content. Mukesh Bhatt explained how they gauged the taste of this group, “I see them watching television. I see what sorts of film they [enjoy]…what sorts of books they are reading…That’s an indication, that’s a pointer” (quoted in
Ganti 2012: 325). According to his company, its films show “an unusual engagement with the psychological damage arising from infringement of social norms” (“Vishesh Films”). These films are saturated with themes of individualism, global citizenry, consumerism, and extramarital sex and thus represent emerging globalized Indian values that were also in conflict with the traditional norms at times. Rock represents the youth characters embodying these values.

The cinematic modalities (narratives and characterizations) and professionals of Vishesh Films invariably strengthened the advancement of Pakistani rock in Bollywood. Bhatt introduced a new team of professionals in the 2000s consisting of a younger generation of Bollywood debutants including: Mohit Suri, as writer and director; Imran Hashmi (or Emraan Hashmi), as male protagonist; and Pritam, as music composer, who later rearranged Coke Studio’s “Jugni” for Cocktail. Suri and Hashmi debuted their careers from the platform of Vishesh Films (“Mohit Suri: Biography”; “Emraan Hashmi: Biography”).

Former rock musician cum sound designer Pritam had a different route. He initially won notoriety in the formative years of his Bollywood career for plagiarizing popular tunes from a variety of genres and cultures. Nevertheless, he was able to produce frequent big hits in his eclectic rock
style (Aspi 2010). Some of them, such as “Woh lamhe”77 (Those moments) from Zeher (2006, dir. Mohit Suri), were rearranged versions of Pakistani songs that he did for Vishesh Films. Now the most sought after music composer after A. R. Rahman (Aspi 2010), he frequently commissions Pakistani rock singers to do playback singing for the big production houses as well.

On Vishesh Films’s modalities, I would particularly mention the various film roles of Hashmi as a metaphor of globalized Indian values. He is frequently characterized as a shrewd womanizer living a lavish middle class life with Western standards in an Indian cosmopolitan city or abroad, looking for easy money, giving his career a preference over human relations. He is an anti-traditionalist as well. These features eventually cause him psychological distress and he struggles to bring back emotional equilibrium through righteous actions.

In Awarapan (2007, dir. Mohit Suri), he plays the role of Shivam, an atheist living in Hong Kong and working slavishly for his boss, Malik, a successful businessman also involved in human trafficking. In the past, Shivam loved a girl Aliyah, living somewhere in India. Her enraged father who did not like their relationship shot at Shivam who dodged him. The bullet hit Aliyah and she died. Thereafter, Shivam lived in agony, eventually redeeming

77 Sung by Atif Aslam.
the pain by rescuing Reema, Malik’s purchase from Bangkok’s female sex market; Shivam died in a mortal combat while doing so. Earlier, a series of incidents made him believe in spirituality and emancipation. Set in the shifting scenes of his past and present, Awarapan’s songs depict Shivam’s melancholy in the glittering cityscape of Hong Kong and his nostalgic memories of his beloved, despite having an extravagant lifestyle that a youth can dream of in a world-class city. A musical venture of Pritam, Awarapan provided the Bollywood debut of two Pakistani rock singers: Mustafa Zahid and Annie Khalid. Also in the film, their Pakistani peer Rafaqat Ali Khan of the Shamchaurasi gharana sang “Maula Maula” (Master Master), which is a rock version of the kafi “Medha ishq vi tu” (Thou my love too). Moreover, Vishesh Films is among the earliest film companies that began to use songs as background tracks, leaving the conventional Bollywood practice of lip-synching. I will turn to this point later.

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78 Such as “To phir aao” (So come back) and “Tera mera rishta purana” (Your and mine old relation).
79 Pakistani traditional gharana and Sufi musicians have a niche market in Bollywood. They sing compositions that usually contain Indian classical singing elements such as alap, sargam (Indian solfege), and tarana (classical genre based on different syllables) techniques. These elements give their voices a unique stylistic identity.
80 Using independent songs as background tracks is now becoming common in Bollywood. Jayson Beaster-Jones notes that this trend may prevail in Bollywood in the future for economic reasons. However, he does not consider that the independent songs may directly promote a film (2015: 170), overlooking the new Bollywood marketing paradigm of customizing content according to the target audience (see FICCI-KPMG 2013: 7).
The New Independent Music Index

The Internet emerged as a new media showcasing Pakistani rock in India by the time Awarapan was produced. In an interview clip posted on YouTube\(^1\), Zahid reveals that most likely Mahesh Bhatt listened to his song “To phir aao” through the Internet and then contacted him in Pakistan to sing the same song for his film. The important point here is that neither his song nor Zahid had a big name before singing for Mahesh Bhatt. He was vocalist of a struggling rock band, Roxen. The Internet democratized the access to Bollywood and social media such as YouTube became new platforms for mediocre bands and singers to market themselves.

Self Marketing

In my conversations with industry professionals in Pakistan on how independent songs such as “Jugni” travel to Bollywood, they have expressed the opinion that the Internet is the largest medium that creates buzz across the border. Social media metrics such as the number of YouTube views and Facebook fans are very important for marketing music, as Bollywood is eager to purchase the pre-established popularity of a song or a band, says Ali Ayub a rock musician and owner of the newly established Lahore-based production house, Paradigm Studio (Skype interview, December 23, 2013). Ayub

\(^1\) Available: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6PGHNZx0twM.
identifies India as the most viable market for Pakistani music amidst the crisis of the local industry. Pakistani musicians have dual career opportunities in India: either they do concerts and release albums or sing for film producers. Bollywood is what makes the Indian music market unique in the region, as it patronizes music of all sorts. It is the ultimate destination to have an economically sustainable career (ibid.). Ayub shows keen interest in collaborating with his Indian counterparts and his presence on social media stands as the key self-marketing strategy to introduce his brand across the border.

The regional success of the rock band Jal is a glaring example of self-marketing. The band’s market presence is owed to its first song “Aadat” (Habit) that became an immediate sensation in the region. In an interview with the online The Times of India, Goher Mumtaz, now the vocalist of Jal, testifies that their band became unexpectedly popular through the Internet. He says, “(Our) journey started with jamming with friends in college. I never thought one day Jal would be among the best rock bands in South Asia. We got so popular on the Internet that we became a star overnight” (in Singh 2012). In an interview for MTV posted on YouTube82, the former vocalist of Jal, Atif Aslam mentions that he financed the video of “Aadat” out of his own pocket-

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money, and posted the video on YouTube. Within a short period of three years, “Aadat” became an anthem in the region.

As a music producer, Ali Ayub has another version of the story to tell about “Aadat.” According to him, as teenagers, the band members used to mimic rock bands at their college campus in Lahore. “Aadat” was their original, yet raw idea. They took it to local music producers, but nobody showed an interest in investing in these unknown kids. Finally, Meekal Hassan, a producer cum composer, refined their basic idea into a catchy composition, and generously recorded their song in his own studio for a nominal fee. Then they produced the video on their own (Ayub, personal communication 2007). Subsequently, “Aadat” was an instant hit. The Bhatt acquired a version of “Adat” (“Juda hoke bhi” [Even after separation]) for Kalyug (2005, dir. Mohit Suri). “Who lamhe,” the second song of Jal and another big hit, also ended up becoming the signature song of Zeher. By that time, the dispute between Aslam and Goher, the members of Jal band, over the rights of the songs had begun. They split and Aslam started his Bollywood career as a playback singer that is primarily indebted to Vishesh Films and Pritam.
The corporation and the Internet

As the premier music platform of Pakistan, Coke Studio (Pakistan) has become an information mechanism to measure music or artist popularity in India through different methods. Coke Studio @ MTV, the Indian version of Coke Studio, is the foremost case endorsing my assessment. Before launching it, Coca Cola India conducted research via Google in 2010 to measure audience response to Coke Studio (Pakistan) in India. Wasim Basir, Coca Cola India’s director of integrated marketing and communications, in a statement given to the online Express Tribune, mentions that 25 percent of “all Google searches in India were for Coke Studio Pakistan” (quoted in Mahmood 2013). The amazingly high figure inspired them to launch Coke Studio in India the next year (ibid.). In India, Coke Studio (Pakistan) is only accessible through the Internet due to a general ban on Pakistani television channels in India.

In contrast to the earlier waves of rock, the official YouTube channel of Coke Studio (Pakistan) additionally offered a variety of traditional genres to Indian popular culture. Aditya Swamy, the executive vice president and marketing head of MTV India, compares this difference through the allegories of Britney Spears and Sufis. He says:

As a local radio jingle goes these days ‘Britney chali gayi or sufis gaye’ [Britney has gone and the Sufis have arrived]– this is how Coke Studio and Pakistani musicians have changed the game!...There was a time when we [in India] used to just have a
particular DJ night at clubs, but now we have Sufi nights. I am really happy that this influence is coming from our neighbouring [sic] country (ibid.).

The propensity to acquire Pakistani music for films targeting audience segments other than the youth has also been established. The inclusion of Coke Studio’s version of “Jugni” in Cocktail is one example. In Cocktail, the genre’s Punjabi identity is more vocal than its Sufi character (representing the Punjabi characters of the film), conforming to global Bollywood’s trait of using Punjabiness as a means to segment the overseas diaspora audience.

**The Bollywood Punjabi and NRI’s**

Cocktail is a love story revolving around three Indians in London. Meera travels to London to live with her husband who is already there, and he does not accept her when she arrives. Stranded and disappointed, she becomes friends with another Indian girl, Veronica, who loves Gautam, a young Indian man. The three characters become friends and start to live together at Veronica’s apartment. Eventually, Meera and Gautam feel that they are in love and Veronica sacrifices her love for them. Gautam marries with divorced Meera in Delhi, India.

The song “Jugni” is presented when the three characters realize the dilemma of love and try to evade it. At one side, Gautam keeps pretending to
Veronica, who is injured in a car accident and in a need of emotional and physical care. On the other hand, Meera moves into her husband’s flat giving them space to come close to each other again. In the meanwhile, Meera finalizes the divorce process with her husband before leaving for India permanently. “Jugni” portrays the emotional crisis they all go through. Arif Lohar brings in a lyrical modification in Coke Studio’s version to make it depict the situation in Cocktail. In its rearrangement, Pritam does not use the traditional sounds (dholak, chimta, and iktara), and brings in drum and techno beats. Though “Jugni” retains its Sufi mantle in Cocktail by referring to the Prophet, Ali, and the spiritual mentor, the slippage in the meaning of word ishq enables it to carve its place in the film. Ishq in Sufism refers to a one’s unconditional passion for God, while in Cocktail it depicts love between humans (Example 4.1).

**Example 4.1: Lyrics of Cocktail’s Version of “Jugni”**

Prelude: The first letter (Alive) of God’s name is the seed of ishq. You have sown in my heart. This flower in not bound to a season. It blossoms out of season. May Jugni live long. The one who sowed the seed of love in my heart. I have the spirit of my beloved.

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84 In the subtitles ishq is translated as love, while I am giving here the original Punjabi word to emphasize the slippage of meaning.
Refrain: Jugni belongs to the People of God.
Jugni belongs to The Almighty.\textsuperscript{85}
Jugni belongs to his followers.\textsuperscript{86}
Jugni belongs to the saint.
Jugni belongs to all His words.

Verse 1: Like a dove’s call with every breath.
My heart echoes your name.
And reads the lesson of love.
O sage of mine.

Verse 2: Jugni tread along the path of \textit{ishq}.
She fears betrayal.
She does not know.
Is she should risk losing her heart.
Yet her love is pure.
O sage of mine.

Verse 3: Jugni is lost in thoughts.
She searches for someone in someone else.
She’s madly in \textit{ishq}.
She laughs while she cries within.
Yet her love is pure.
O sage of mine.

\textit{Cocktail} represents two complementary identities of the three Indians living in the UK. They are simultaneously Indian and Punjabi. The film begins with Gautam moving from Delhi to London in search of a job. His ethno-linguistic Punjabi identity is concealed until the appearance of his mother, Kavita Kapoor, who frequently switches code from Hindi to Punjabi. The film’s grounding in a Punjabi musical milieu is another feature reflecting its Punjabi identity. Along with “Jugni,” the film has the following: three other Punjabi

\textsuperscript{85} Incorrect translation, it should be “Jugni belongs to the Holy Prophet.”
\textsuperscript{86} Incorrect translation, it should be “Jugni belongs to Lord Ali.”
songs, “Tera naam japdi phiran” (I keep murmuring your name), “Lutna” (Betrayal), and “Angreji beat te” (On English beat); three Hindi-Punjabi songs, “Yaarian” (Friendships), “Second hand jawani” (Second hand youth), and “Main sharabi” (I am alcoholic); and two Hindi songs, “Tum hi Bandhusra” (Only you are Bandhusra), and “Daaru desi” (Native liquor).

*Cocktail* is a Punjabi-Hindi narrative that reconfigures the representation of national in Indian cinema because pan-Indian identity in the Bombay-based popular film industry has been constructed on the national language, Hindi. The discourse has been split and the Punjabi ethno-linguistic narrative now shares the national space (Roy 2010). The spatial centrality of Bombay as a site of national culture has also been divided with the representation of Delhi, a stronghold of Punjabi culture, as home to the returning diaspora in Bollywood films.

The transformations concord with what Ramindar Singh (2012), in an online article of The Times of India, calls the “creeping Punjabi renaissance” in Bollywood, referring to the commonplace celebration of all things related to Punjab. In recent films, the geography of Punjab has been frequently reconstructed, and places like Patiala, Bhatinda, Amritsar, and Haryana, which were previously under the radar, became frequent sites of reference.

Delhi, the national capital bordering Punjab, has also attained significant attention in terms of Punjabi-oriented films produced in Bombay.
The number of films revolving around Punjabi characters has drastically increased. Previously, Punjabis, particularly Sikhs, were represented as buffoons as compared to the Hindi-speaking central characters. Now Sikh men wearing a turban and women in *shalwar-qameez* (common Punjabi dress) are frequently represented as central characters. Similarly, Punjabi music imagery and genres such as *qissa* (folktale), *bhangra* (traditional Punjabi joyous dance), jugni, and kafi are also current in Bollywood. Featuring a Punjabi or Hindi-Punjabi song in a Hindi film is no more a matter of astonishment.

In addition to Punjabiness, *Cocktail* also exhibits a creeping western influence in Bollywood, separating background music composition from the songs. The duo Salim-Sulaiman composed its background music. For the songs, *Cocktail*'s producers commissioned four individual composers: Sahir Ali Baga (a popular Punjabi film composer from Pakistan), Arif Lohar, Yo Yo Honey Singh (or Honey Singh, a Punjabi rapper), and Pritam. This is similar to western film traditions in which multiple independent artists or bands produce songs for a single film. In this way, *Cocktail* deconstructs the dominant single-music-director-centered model of Bollywood that has been pivotal in shaping the peculiar musical identity of this industry (Booth 2008). In

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87 The Sikhs are one of the prominent Punjabi ethno-linguistic subgroups. While their majority now lives in India, Sikh population count in Pakistan is nearly negligible (see Khan 1982: 20). The Hindus and the Muslims represent the other major Punjabi ethno-linguistic subgroups in India and Pakistan.
this model, a single composer (and his teammates) controls the production of
the entire music including background score and songs. The idiosyncrasies of
the music director bestow upon the film a musically consistent identity, a
convention that has been rigorously observed. In many instances, these
music directors are stars on their own right and their association with a film
plays a vital role in the market success of the film.

I argue that the appropriation of independent songs such as “Jugni” is
an outcome of Cocktail challenging the prevalent power structure of
Bollywood music production. Moreover, the use of the songs in the film also
conforms to western standards. The songs are generally used as background
tracks, eschewing another distinct marker of Bollywood: lip-synching.

To dovetail the above two influences, I situate Cocktail within
Bollywood’s two production streams. First there are the top-ranking firms like
Yash Raj Films, which pioneered cinematic representation of Punjabis living
in London as a formula to segment the UK audience and unleashed the
Punjabi renaissance (see Dwyer 2002). These firms are holding together the
traditional Bollywood music production values along with acquiring new
trends. Then there are small-scale and newly formed firms that are
collaborating with western film production companies. These firms translate
the formula of Yash Raj Films according to Hollywood-style production values,
appropriating independent Punjabi songs such as “Jugni.” The following sections illuminate the points outlined here.

*The Punjabi revival*

The Punjabi renaissance was enshrined in Bollywood’s bid for going global in the mid-1990s (Roy 2010). Global Bollywood, an emerging term, refers to the liberalized Bombay-based Hindi film industry that began to produce films targeting foreign audiences, in particular the Indian diaspora, the NRI’s (non-resident Indians) in the western countries (see Kavoori and Punathambekar 2008; Punathambekar 2013). Liberalization was not confined to the inclusion of the diaspora in the national consciousness. It also changed fundamental elements of the film industry when the Indian government introduced reforms to restructure Bollywood to international industry standards by encouraging transparency, documentation, and corporatization (Punathambekar 2013). The story of Bollywood going global is dominantly Punjabi.

The international presence of Indian cinema is measured in terms of exported films’ business and the ascendancy of these films to the mainstream western film market information regimes, such as chart rankings and awards. Despite the increasing export, only a tiny fraction of Indian films have been
able to do good business in the foreign markets and make an entry in the western film charts. This provides a limited number of titles produced by a few production houses. These titles and production companies have become symbols of global Bollywood, as scholars redundantly refer to them in one way or other. Some of the prominent symbols are: producers, Yash Chopra, Karan Johar, and Subhash Ghai; production houses, Yash Raj Films, and Dharma Productions; and films, *Kabhi Khushi Kabhi Gham* (2001, dir. Karan Johar), *Dilwale Dulhania LeJayen Ge* (1995, dir. Aditya Chopra), *Taal* (1999, dir. Subhash Ghai), and *Kal Ho Na Ho* (2003, dir. Nikhil Advani) (see Dwyer 2000, 2008; Kavoori and Punathambekar 2008; Lorenzen 2009; Lorenzen and Taeube; Punathambekar 2013).

In the making of global Bollywood, Roy (2010) deconstructs *Punjabiyyat* (Punjabiness) in the few films I have enlisted here, without paying any attention to the Punjabi background of their producers. A robust Punjabi presence always existed in the Bombay-based Indian national cinema since its formative years.

The film industry in India was predominantly built on an ethno-linguistic basis. By the 1930s, regional filmmaking centers came into being, representing socio-economically affluent ethno-linguistic groups comprising prominently: Bengalis in Calcutta; Marathis in Pune; Punjabis in Lahore (Dwyer 2008: 363); and Tamils in Madras (now Chennai) (Getter and
Bombay emerged as home to the Hindi language cinema and later it symbolized the pan-Indian Hindi national culture in an independent India. While other ethnicities retained their filmmaking hubs in the wake of the partition of India, the situation became upside-down for the Punjabis. Punjab was divided between India and Pakistan with Lahore becoming a part of Pakistan, ensuing the exodus of Punjabis of Sikh and Hindu origin. The frequent transaction of labor and capital between Lahore and Bombay had been established in the pre-partition period, hence the latter became the ultimate destination of Punjabis in India or migrating to India after partition (Dwyer 2002: 21; Khan and Ahmad 2010: 149). They were absorbed into the pan-Indian Hindi milieu of Bombay.

Nevertheless, a mismatch has been there in what Bombay represented and what it was at its structural core.

With Independence and the division of India and Pakistan in 1947, a vast stream of refugees poured into North Indian cities, and an amount of film producers and entrepreneurs from the North (mainly the film industry in Lahore) arrived to Mumbai and introduced an alternative filmmaking strategy here. Newcomers challenged the integrated production companies by staying small, outsourcing creative activities and facilities, and employing shifting freelancing directors and star actors (lured away from studios by high salaries) for each new production (Lorenzen and Taeube 19-20).

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The stereotype of a migrant Punjabi producer intermittently comes to the forefront in Bollywood reflexive movies (see Rangeela [1995, dir. Ram Gopal Verma]). In the liberal era, Punjabis retained their leading positions by successfully transforming their family-owned production companies into corporate powerhouses.

Yash Chopra (1932-2012), who was born in Lahore (Dwyer 2002: 12)\textsuperscript{89}, has been the most powerful immigrant Punjabi director-producer of Bollywood. His company, Yash Raj Films, is the leading example of professional success for its largest annual turnovers in Bollywood, especially from exports, and for its leading role in embracing and reflecting the liberalized business environment of Bollywood (Lorenzen and Taeube 15). Yash Raj Films now has evolved to a family-owned multinational entertainment conglomerate, producing and distributing films, music, television programs, and venturing into home entertainment as well (“Yash Raj Films: Company Info”). The other firms in the field occasionally show their concerns over the monopolizing influence of Yash Raj Films (see Bhat 2011). However, the Indian government has officially venerated him as the leader of

\textsuperscript{89} Ganti (2004: 101) mentions Jullunder (Indian Punjab) as Yash Chopra’s birthplace without citing a source. Dwyer’s information is based on interviews with Chopra himself (2002: xii).
the Indian media industry. He co-chaired FICCI and on its official website it
tributes:\footnote{This excerpt was most likely posted before Chopra’s death (see \url{http://www.ficci-frames.com/profile/yash_chopra.htm})}

Yash Chopra, today, is more than a director and producer alone. In fact, the corporatization of ‘Bollywood’ had its very genesis in the pioneering efforts of Yash Chopra. With his vast years of experience in the entertainment business, Yash Chopra is indisputably the leader of the Media and Entertainment firmament in India and the voice that governments and organizations listen to on matters pertaining to the rapidly booming Hindi film industry. YRF [Yash Raj Films] film continues to remain the most anticipated event in the film calendar of India.

Chopra singlehandedly led the globalization of Bollywood. The globalization of Indian cinema was carried out on the financial muscles of its primary consumer, the NRI segment, and Chopra’s pioneering NRI films of the 1990s opened the overseas market to Bollywood (Dwyer 2000). In addition to the other factors, it reconfigured the relationship of Indianness with Punjabiness, and Punjabi emerged as the normative diaspora Indian identity. The transformation took place due to the dominance of the Punjabi diaspora in the overseas audience Chopra targeted and represented in the formative phase of global Bollywood.

The construction of the diaspora as a monolithic entity in the analysis of Bollywood is misleading. Neither the diaspora’s global distribution nor its ethno-linguistic composition in a host society is uniform (Chitrapu 2012: 93-
100), and these patterns inform Bollywood’s overseas reception. In addition to these factors, the internal cultural and economic dynamics of a host society also determine reception. Under the overarching term global, Bollywood’s entry, development, and success in various overseas market happened at different points of times and at different paces (see Kavoori and Punathambekar 2008).

In an earlier phase of developing a Bollywood stronghold in the West, Chopra focused on the UK, and this is the place where features of Bollywood as a global cultural force began to emerge, drawing upon the financial strength of more than two million people of the South Asian diaspora (Thussu 2008: 102-3). Indian films were consumed in the racially pre-segmented Brasian (British Asian) film market (Dwyer 2008). Brasian films refer to the filmmaking ethos that has its roots in the resistance movement of Black politics in the 1960s and 1970s in which two distinct communities, Asians and Afro-Caribbeans, were blended through their common experience as racial minorities within the UK (Sawhney).

Eventually, Bollywood developed its highest international profile in the UK, among other western countries (Thussu 2008: 103). Dwyer (2008: 366) breaks down the ethno-linguistic composition of the South Asian diaspora in the Brasian film market and suggests that this segment primarily consists of native Punjabi or Gujarati speakers with a relatively significant number of
Sylheti (Bangladeshi) speakers and a small number of native Hindi-speakers. Under the influence of the predominant Punjabi audience, the gap between the displaced Punjabi subjectivity of Chopra and what he represented was eliminated.

Reducing the market and its ethno-linguistic composition to a representational strategy, film narratives revolving around the London-based Punjabi characters emerged as the key trend of the Bollywood. Directed and written by his son Aditya Chopra, the groundbreaking NRI film *Dilwale Dulhania Lejayen Ge* sets the love story of a Londoner Punjabi girl, Simran, in the backdrop of London and the Indian Punjab. In contrast to the elder Chopra’s earlier flop, the non-Punjabi NRI film *Lamhe* (1991, dir. Yash Chopra) (Ganti 2012: 300), the phenomenal overseas box-office success of his son’s *Dilwale Dulhania Lejayen Ge* established the approval of the UK audience. Eventually, the UK became the largest revenue generating overseas market, comparable to the domestic market, for Yash Raj Films and Bollywood as well (Dwyer 2008: 367). Given his stature, Yash Chopra’s representational strategy was to influence the rest of the industry enormously. Eager to tap into the newly opened overseas market, Bollywood producers adopted his strategy as a success formula. *Cocktail* is one of the recent examples.
Standing next to Yash Raj Films is Dharma Productions, another powerful Punjabi production house now headed by Karan Johar. Since 2001, the company has been producing some of the highest grossers of Indian cinema, such as Kabhi Khushi Kabhi Gham (“The Dharma Production Group”). Dharma Productions followed Yash Chopra’s formula and played a significant role in strengthening the international profile of Bollywood in the UK. Kabhi Khushi Kabhi Gham, another displaced Punjabi story situated between India and the UK, stood at 3rd position on the UK Top 10 film chart behind Harry Potter and Lord of the Rings. As one of the biggest Bollywood box-office successes overseas by that time, the film holds a key place in the profile of the company and Indian cinema (ibid.) by virtue of standing next to the British and Hollywood film industries in the West. Johar was lauded as one of the leading Indian producers who knew their audiences very well (Tarun Tripathi quoted in Punathambekar 2013: 80), and Kabhi Khushi Kabhi Gham became a permanent reference for scholarly studies on global Bollywood. With its strengthening market position, Bollywood also moved from the subculture to the UK mainstream cinema. For instance, Yash Chopra was the first Indian who was recognized with honorary membership in the British Academy of Film and Television Arts in 2006 (“Yash Chopra”).
Yash Chopra’s films established a new musical template to represent the NRI’s. These emphasized bhangra\textsuperscript{91} as a marker of Indian-Punjabi diasporic identity. Secondly, his films introduced the dual-code song model as the voice of the NRI’s, deploying Punjabi words and imagery in Hindi songs. *Dilwale Dulhania Lejayen Ge* exemplifies these innovations. The film is in two registers. The first introduces the tension between Indian family values and western individualism in the UK, while the second resolves the issues in the homeland, the Indian Punjab. The Punjabi musical self of the NRI’s becomes manifest at the very outset. The call of homeland, the song, “Ghar aaja pardeis tera des bulaey re” (Come home o’ wonderer, your homeland beckons you) at the opening credits features Simran’s father Baldev’s memories of the nostalgic mustard fields of Punjab. The snippets of the Punjabi language such as *matyar* (damsel) affirm the identity of the characters when this song reappears in the second half. At one point in the song, Simran secretly meets her lover Raj\textsuperscript{92} on a rooftop and the song transforms from a Hindi to a Punjabi voice with the Punjabi couplet, *o man meeta, tenu rab de khawaley kita* (dear beloved of heart, I give you in protection of God), composed to the tune of a popular romantic Punjabi folktale genre, *Heer*. The dual-code song model reiterates in another Hindi-

\textsuperscript{91} Roy (2010) uses bhangra as a generic term to refer to traditional Punjabi musical and dance genres being appropriated in Bollywood. I use this term to refer to traditional Punjabi dance genre (Dudrah 2007) that is fused with other styles in Bollywood.

\textsuperscript{92} Who follows her from London to Punjab.
Punjabi bhangra song “Mehndi laga ke rakhna” (Be ready wearing henna) featuring Simran’s wedding rituals. Johar modified Chopra’s model by introducing English words and stylized choreography in the song sequences. The trilingual song “Shava shava” (Bravo bravo) in the film *Kabhi Khushi Kabhi Gham* is an example of this.

Punjabi songs soon became a tested formula to market Bollywood films in the West and to represent the normative voice of the NRIs regardless of their ethno-linguistic orientation. The star-studded mega budget film of Bengali producer Pritish Nandy93, *Kaante* (2002, dir. Sanjay Gupta), exhibits the penetration of the Punjabi musical influence in Bollywood. In his study of Bollywood turning into a global film industry, Punathambekar (2013: 83) suggests that *Kaante* resembles Hollywood in terms of production values, processes, and marketing methods. Actually set in the locale of Los Angeles, this is the story of six Indian males in the USA who rob a bank and face the tragic consequences. In contrast to the Hindi and English speaking characters that have no link to the Punjab, the film features one Punjabi song, “Yar mangya si” (I only begged my beloved), a fusion version of a popular Punjabi song, and two Hindi-Punjabi songs, “Mahi ve” (O beloved) and “Ishq sumundar” (Love ocean).

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93 In collaboration with Sanjay Sippy, Film Club Limited, and Larry Mortoff.
Kaante also shatters the formulaic use of Punjabi songs in earlier films in terms of characters, spaces, and musical genres. The foremost transformation is the use of Punjabi songs in a form other than joyous bhangra songs that has been common in Chopra and Johar’s films. The Punjabi and Hindi-Punjabi compositions of Kaante portray themes of sorrow, longing, and loss. While Chopra and Johar represented Punjabi music as the voice of the family-oriented modest NRI’s, Kaante signifies it as the voice of the outlaws such as robbers and bar-dancers. For instance, the composition “Mahi ve” is the voice of a bar-dancer, Lisa, who loves one of the robbers and sings this song in the bar. However, Kaante does not hold any significant position in the story of global Bollywood since it was not a box-office hit.

In contrast to Kaante, Taal is a formidable symbol of global Bollywood for its phenomenal success in the West (Thussu 2008: 101). Produced and directed by another successful Punjabi producer, Subhash Ghai (“Subhash Ghai: Biography”), Taal revolves around class issues in Indian society. The film was a flop in the domestic market, yet a big hit overseas and was the first Indian film to break into the US Top 20 (Bist 2002). Taal, a film about Indians living in India, demonstrates Bollywood’s hastiness to acquire Punjabiiness to represent local Indians as well. The Hindi-Punjabi songs, “Kariye na” (Should not do), “Dil bechain ve” (Heart is restless), and “Ni main samjh gai” (Yes I understood), are the voice of the female protagonist Mansi, who otherwise
has not been represented as Punjabi, though she hails from Chamba, a former border town of the British Punjab. The film also has an important place in the discourse on Bollywood’s musical globalization since A. R. Rahman, another important symbol of global Bollywood, composed its music (Booth 2008: 108-9). In his analysis of the international economic, musical, and technological influences, Booth (2008: 108-9) neglects the Punjabi influence on Taal’s music. In years since its release, this influence implicated new social and economic relations in Bollywood, the industrial structure of which was also going through a transformation.

*The western influence*

Following industrial reforms, the multinational western film production companies now operating in India have posed a challenge to the single-music-director-centered model of Bollywood by making Indian films receptive to independent music. Under the influence of these companies, Bollywood outsourced musicians from the international Punjabi industry, which is a geographically dispersed phenomenon yet connected through the media (Schreffler 2010: 966). The western filmmaking influence in Bollywood is manifest through two streams: Punjabi diaspora filmmakers and western film production companies.
Mira Nair, Deepa Mehta, and Gurinder Chadha are renowned Punjabi diaspora director-producers\(^94\) based in the USA, Canada, and the UK, respectively (“Deepa Mehta”; “Gurinder Chadha”; “Mira Nair Biography”). Though not a direct part of the Bombay-based film world, these individuals relate to it through occasionally venturing into the Bollywood genre, a plot intertwined with songs and dance sequences. Outsourcing actors and other professionals from Bollywood is another feature that bestows upon their bilingual (Punjabi-English or Hindi-English) and trilingual (Punjabi-Hindi-English) films a Bollywood outlook. Moreover, their films (Nair and Mehta in particular) are also communicative to the homeland, reflecting on Indian cultural issues.

These films are identified in multiple ways. In a UK perspective, Dwyer (2008: 369-70) calls these films “Brasian films,” suggesting a common targeted audience of these films and the mainstream Bollywood. The Bollywood scholarship also recognizes the bridging role of these films between the West and India. The three producers and their films, such as Chadha’s *Bend It Like Beckham* (2002) and Nair’s *Monsoon Wedding* (2001), are occasionally considered a part of the global Bollywood (for instance, see Kavoori and Punathambekar 2008; Lorenzen 2009: 24). I suggest that the Punjabi identity of these producers speaks in their films as well. Mehta’s

\(^94\) Generally they coproduce their own directed films.
acclaimed trilogy, *Fire* (1996), *Earth* (1998), and *Water*\(^55\) (2005), represents female plight—symbolized by three elements—in the backdrop of Indian modernity. In a female voice, *Earth* reconstructs the tragic partition of the Punjab between India and Pakistan on communal basis. Similarly, Chadha’s *Bend It Like Beckham* and Nair’s *Monsoon Wedding* depict family dramas of Punjabis in Britain and India, respectively.

These producers, in particular Chadha and Nair, followed Chopra’s model of musically representing the NRIs, yet drawing on western filmmaking conventions. None of the characters do lip-synching, nor does a single composer write all the songs of a film. They commission multiple independent artists for a film. *Bend It Like Beckham* features compositions of the UK bhangra musicians Malkit Singh and Bally Sagoo. Likewise, *Monsoon Wedding* calls in Sagoo for a composition “Aja nachle” (C’mon dance). These filmmakers, particularly Nair, are becoming visible in Indian film culture, though they are not as influential as the mainstream Bollywood producers, such as the Chopras and Johar. In 2012, Nair was awarded with the highest Indian civil award, Padma Bhushan, in the category of Art Cinema (Ministry of Home Affairs 2012).

The influence of western film production companies such as Fox Star Studios and Viacom 18 Motion Pictures on Bollywood is also coming to the

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\(^{55}\) *Water*, a direction of Mehta, was produced by the Canadian producer David Hamilton.
forefront. As a matter of their multinational brand image, these firms are keen to shape a counter-Bollywood filmmaking culture in India by promoting unusual themes and new talent. For instance, Viacom 18 Motion Pictures, a sister organization of MTV India, introduces itself on its corporate website as a purveyor of the “clutter breaking’ projects” keen to introduce new genres, ideas, and talent (“Viacom 18”). Despite their financial resources, companies like Viacom 18 Motion Pictures have limited impact on Bollywood culture. This industry operates on social relations and the new entrants have not acquired enough social capital to operate independently, hence they coproduce with the local companies (Lorenzen and Taeube).

In terms of financial resources and turnover, two broader categories of Bollywood production companies exist. The first category includes large-scale corporates such as Yash Raj Films that collect huge annual turnover and rely on their own financial resources to produce and distribute a big budget film. In the second category are small-scale firms that produce low-budget films occasionally in collaboration with other companies (Lorenzen and Taeube: 15-18, 28). The small-scale firms are inclined to collaborate with the western firms and a transformation in Bollywood production values is first emerging at this tier. Vishesh Films, now a coproduction company with Fox Star Studios (IANS 2013), is one example. As I have shown above, the company is
producing youth oriented films with consistency and also facilitating the
crossover of independent musicians and their songs.

Founded in 1947, Bohra Bros is another small-scale production
company collaborating with local and western firms, such as Viacom 18
Motion Pictures. Endeavoring to develop its brand image, Bohra Bros exhibits
how small-scale firms are lining themselves up with the new industrial
structure leaving behind their traditional legacy. The company’s official
website represents Sunil Bohra, the third-generation incumbent head of the
company, as the one who stepped out “of what was provided to him as
inheritance through Bohra Bros as a company, in order to reconstruct and
build from scratch a brand that today is viewed as a legacy of Bohra Bros”
(“Founder’s Profile”). The list of films posted on the company’s official website
contains some of the well-known titles of the recent years known for their
production quality, unique storyline, and innovative music.\footnote{Such as \textit{Gangs of Wasseypur 1-2} (2012, dir. Anurag Kayshap) and \textit{Shaitan} (2011, dir.
Bejoy Nambiar), to name a few.} In terms of the
change in its musical legacy, the company has become an unparalleled
platform for the Bollywood-independent music crossover. Since 2011, the
company has been coproducing an average of 3 to 4 films per year with
music composers commissioned from the independent music scene (see Film
list on www.bohrabros.com).
Despite their conceptual underpinning, the western and small-scale film companies also respond to economic pragmatism by appropriating mainstream Bollywood formulas such as Punjabiness. Viacom 18 Motion Pictures takes prides of its association with some of the overtly Punjabi-Hindi entertainment films such as *Jab We Met* (2007, dir. Imtiaz Ali) and *Singh Is King* (2008, dir. Anees Bazmee) (“Viacom 18”). Similarly, Bohra Bros also adopts Punjabiness. However, to purchase an independent popular Punjabi song is an innovative marketing strategy of these small-scale and multinational film companies. As a result, Bollywood has begun to integrate with the international Punjabi industry. Punjabi voices are emerging as hot commodities. The crossover of Mukhtar Sahota and Arif Lohar from the British Punjabi rock culture to Bollywood is a blatant example of this trend.

Sahota, now a British Punjabi rock composer and producer, is an important name for the contemporary revival of jugni. The revival of Alam Lohar’s classics was the first project that Sahota envisaged after the launch of his own music label, Internalmusic, in 2006 (“Mukhtar Sahota: Biography”). The project also aimed at introducing Arif Lohar to the international popular Punjabi industry, though he was a well-established folk singer in diaspora audiences. Sahota and Arif Lohar’s 2006 debut album, *21st Century Jugni*,
presented “Jugni” as the title song\textsuperscript{97}. The composition was an earlier rendition of Alam Lohar, which Arif Lohar reinterpreted on a rock track composed by Sahota who wanted to dispel the Punjabi stereotype identified with bhangra. Rock was one way to give Punjabi music a mainstream identity in Britain (interview Mukhtar Sahota in Lakha\textsuperscript{98}).

The album paved the way for the explosion of the jugni genre in Bollywood. In Pakistan, this version of jugni could not leverage the popularity of Arif Lohar as a folk-rock singer since Pakistani media had no noteworthy connection to the international Punjabi music industry, the primary marketer of the album. In contrast, the India-based Punjabi multinational media had integrated into and celebrated UK Punjabi musical expressions to cater to its geographically diffused Punjabi audiences. For instance, ETC Channel Punjabi allocated separate categories for non-residential music and musicians for its prestigious annual Punjabi music awards (“4\textsuperscript{th} Annual ETC Channel Punjabi Results”). The album 21\textsuperscript{st} Century Jugni won three different categories, including Best Folk Pop Album for 2007 (“Mukhtar Sahota: Biography”).

After this remarkable success, the explosion of jugni happened in

\textsuperscript{97} The original video available on YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RL61YnpDmFk. From: Mukhtar Sahota. 2006. 21\textsuperscript{st} Century Jugni. Wolverhampton, UK: Internalmusic, UK.
\textsuperscript{98} This interview was done after the release of 21\textsuperscript{st} Century Jugni in 2006.

Popular approval also mediated Sahota and Arif Lohar’s crossover to Bollywood. *Sahib Biwi Aur Gangster*, a coproduction of Bohra Bros and Brandsmith Motion Pictures, was their Bollywood debut project in 2011. The film completely deconstructs the single-music-director-centered phenomenon of Bollywood by commissioning seven different composers, including Sahota, for its seven songs. The song “Akhiyan” (Eyes) from the album *21st Century Jugni* was a part of the film. Later, Sahota composed another version of jugni for its sequel, *Sahib Biwi Aur Gangster Returns*, a coproduction of Brandsmith Motion Pictures with Viacom 18 Motion Pictures. Sahota also licensed “Jugni” from the *21st Century Jugni* for *Diary Of A Butterfly*.

Illuminati Films exemplifies another widely emerging type of film company: the actor-producer category, a product of industrial reforms introduced by the Indian Government. Founded in 2009 by actor Saif Ali Khan, Illuminati Films works in collaboration with other big production and
distribution companies such as Eros International (ET Bureau 2009). Actor-producers also pose a challenge to the single-music-director-centered system by occasionally adopting the western model of including independent songs in a film. Sometimes they race against each other to acquire an independent song. Zeenews Bureau (2011) reports that Bollywood actor-producers Akshay Kumar and Shahrukh Khan competed and lobbied against each other to acquire the rights of another viral independent song “Why this kolaveri di,” sung by Tamil singer Dhanush in Thanglish, the Tamil accent of English. The song ended up becoming a part of the Tamil film, 3, creating enormous hype for the movie.

Similarly, Saif Ali Khan personally approached Arif Lohar to compose a version of jugni for Cocktail (Arif Lohar in Dasgupta 2012b). The “Jugni” promo crossed one million views on YouTube a few days after its release (Malik 2012b). Drawing upon its success, the production team was keen to have Arif Lohar perform at the film music launch ceremony to boost the film promotion by attracting his Indian fans. However, they had to cancel it due to visa issues and later they planned to organize it in London (TNN 2012), which did not materialize either.

For Cocktail, Illuminati Films also included Punjabi rapper Honey Singh’s song “Angreji beat te” (On English beat) from his chartbuster album, International Villager (2011). Born in the Indian Punjab, Honey Singh studied
music in London for some time and debuted his career with his first rap song “Glassy” (Small glass). Now with over 11 million followers on both Facebook and Twitter (“Yo Yo Honey Singh: Biography”), he has gained major currency in India and in international Punjabi rap. The compositions in *International Villager* have blown international music charts such as world iTunes and BBC Asian charts. Honey Singh has now become the highest paid singer in Bollywood history. Recently, Sunil Bohra of Bohra Bros signed a deal with him for a song, which has not been disclosed yet, from *International Villager* in return for seven million Rupees (one hundred and twelve thousand US Dollars approximately) for the upcoming film *Mastaan*. This is the highest amount a singer has ever received for a song in Bollywood (Saini 2012; “Yo Yo Honey Singh: Biography”). Bohra’s comments on his deal reflect the value Bollywood producers now assign to Punjabi hit songs:

Honey has become a household name after *International Villager*…Though he wanted to launch that song as one of his own big hits, now, it will prove a game changer for my movie. I feel Rs. 70 lakh [Rupees 7 million] is less for it …I would have signed him for more if it was required. (in Saini 2012).

Saif Ali Khan rightfully claimed that *Cocktail* had captured the audience imagination when each of its pre-release song promos crossed one million YouTube views within a few days, a rarity in Bollywood.

Yes, it does not happen with every film. I was happy that it was our turn to be one of those films because it has happened with other films. I guess what you learn from that is that certain films
capture the imagination of the audience. You don’t really know why. So, you keep trying and making different kind of movies. Some will work and some won’t but I don’t think you should take either result too seriously. The idea is to just keep trying different stuff (interview in Malik 2012b).

Summary

The inclusion of jugni in Cocktail is one example of how social media such as YouTube acting as an independent music market information regime informs the musical decision making in Bollywood. Film companies purchase a viral content to find solution to the challenges of evaluating and segmenting their targeted audiences in a business environment that mandates rational marketing approaches. Social media precisely represents the audience trends. “Jugni” segments Punjabi audiences, the ethno-linguistic group, now play a formidable role in Bollywood both as consumer and producer.
Conclusion

This study has explored the post-9/11 secularization of Sufi music of Pakistan. No single logic explains the secularization when examining the disjunctive flows of ideas, finance, and media related to four movements of musical categories. The transformation in Sain Zahoor’s career from a traditional shrine singer to a popular Sufi singer has happened, in part, due to some specific US led Islamic modernization policies. His signature independent composition “Allah hoo” in the Pakistani film Khuda Ke Liye is a musical representation of a local liberal Islamic worldview, corresponding to global Muslim feminism. Jugni’s transformation from a popular to Sufi genre suggests Coca Cola’s strategy to represent Pakistan as a multicultural, bounded community. The Bollywood film Cocktail appropriates Coke Studio’s (Pakistan) version of “Jugni” to segment the Punjabi audience. These findings imply the diversified nature of the present social relevance of Sufi music of Pakistan.

This study has explored some of the aspects of what is new about music in “the new global cultural economy.” Either as a US security concern or global Muslim feminism, Islamic modernization rhetoric is a formidable new ideology influencing the music of Islamic communities such as the Sufi music of Pakistan. The other dimension of this rhetoric is the emergence of new
actors such as the US state and the NGOs, providing ideological and material
grounds for the production and dissemination of music. Social media is
another new entrant in the field. This research has charted social media’s
influence on multinational corporations and media industry, such as Coca
Cola and Bollywood, which are reaching the individual consumers by
evaluating consumer trends and market success of their content through the
music posted on various social media such as YouTube.

The other form of newness concerns the transformed strategies of the
global actors to appropriate music for claiming a global presence. The
multinational corporations like Coca Cola and the emerging global media
industry of Bollywood do not construe their consumers as monolithic entities.
They display an eclectic understanding of diversity by appropriating and
producing a variety of music genres in conformity with their geographically
bounded or unbounded targeted consumer group’s traditions and choices. No
universal genre represents these global actors now. These transformations
provide ample opportunity for Pakistani music to become a part of the global
economy, and for local actors to inscribe their histories on global trends.

While borrowing Appadurai’s theory of disjunction, I have attempted to
creatively functionalize this theory for analysis of music. The kind of analysis I
have performed is to study a musical transformation in global chaos—the
imagery of acute complexity—as argued by Appadurai, in which countless
haphazard and partially overlapping logics of transformation may exist in place of one. In the boggling complexity of posing a research challenge of control on the object of study, I have suggested that one can at least control a specific time period, a given genre or song, and the active agents in today’s cultural flow, such as media, corporations, governments, third sector organizations, and individual artists and lineages. A certain indeterminacy will remain for various reasons: the unpredictability of agents’ actions, the opening of new media and social spaces, the synergy that arises anyway from differing or conflicting initiatives, the uneven pace of investment, and wavering or segmented audience reception. The findings of this study do not represent the complete picture of the secularization of Sufi music of Pakistan, since they sifted through the four movements of the musical categories. The picture might be different or partially overlapping if the focus is shifted to a different Sufi musician or song.
Appendix A: Sufi Musicians and Producers

Sain Zahoor\textsuperscript{99}

\textsuperscript{99} Source: ayeshazeekhan.blogspot.com.
Arif Lohar\textsuperscript{100}

\textsuperscript{100} Source: www.pakium.com.
Shoaib Mansur\textsuperscript{101}

\textsuperscript{101} Source: www.masala.com.
Ruhail Hayat¹⁰²

¹⁰² Source: tribune.com.pk.
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