A Bellicist Theory of War-Making and State Power in the Modern Middle East

by

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War has been a feature of the human experience since time immemorial. To all but those fools who imagine glory, war is altogether terrible, destructive, costly, murderous, cruel, and inhuman. War cleaves families and nations, ruins cities and governments. War is rightfully regarded as a plague upon the human condition.

Nevertheless, for states there is a definite and much-studied utility to war. War-making can contribute powerfully to the growth of states. Charles Tilly in *Coercion, Capital, and European States: AD 990 to 1990* proposed a war-centric theory of state formation that has since become one of the most prominent and most cited in political science. His theory posits that the preparation for and conduct of wars in early modern and modern Europe fueled a natural selection of states, whereby those states that could develop the necessary infrastructures, institutions, and technologies to extract resources for wars—namely coercion and capital—from their societies swallowed up most of those states and state-like organizations that could not. The lengthy, multi-century process involved extensive bargaining between states and societies to effect a high concentration of both capital and coercion necessary for successful war. Through this process, states accumulated legitimacy, achieved relative freedom from internal threats, gained an exclusivity of legal power, acquired the capability to dictate the affairs of individuals and organizations within their
Tilly’s theory, along with many like it, is very much tied to the European experience in the early modern period. Urban growth, the gradual emergence of capitalism, norms of warfare, the Enlightenment and scientific revolution, and crucial military and technological developments were essential to the accumulation and concentration of coercion within the modern state structure. Many of these elements were absent in other parts of the world during the early modern period, and so the modern state—and Tilly’s theory—were born out of the precisely European experience.

Nevertheless, later scholars have attempted to export Tilly’s theory of state formation to other regions and time periods, attempting to determine the value of war-making in state development more generally. These works include general applications of bellicist theories to the contemporary developing world as well as specific regional and temporal studies. In comparison with other regions, such as


Latin America or sub-Saharan Africa, the modern Middle East region has received remarkably little scholarly attention. Moreover, those few who have imported Tilly’s theory to the region have almost invariably rejected its applicability, usually either characterizing the theory as dysfunctional because of the differing regional and temporal contexts or simply declaring it inadmissible altogether. These scholars generally contend that between a relative dearth of interstate warfare in the region, the total absence of state death, an abundance of external rents, and frequent outsider interference, war-making seems to have had precious little room to fashion more powerful states and therefore fails to play a role in the development of states and state power in the region.

But such analysis is wrong. War-making has fashioned more powerful states in the Middle East, only it has done so according to Middle Eastern paradigms and contexts, not the European ones described in Tilly’s exact theory. For example, the

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4 This marks a considerable difference between the broader bellicist literature on the developing world and the scholarship on the Middle East specifically. In the broader literature, the subject of successful applicability is very much under debate among scholars, with some scholars (such as Georg Sørenson) skeptical of bellicist theory applied to developing regions and others supportive (such as Mohammed Ayoob and Cameron Thies). The same can also be said of other specific regional literatures. For example, scholars such as Miguel Centeno contest the use of bellicist theory in Latin America whereas others such as Cameron Thies support its application.

5 Cameron Thies makes a similar point about bellicist scholarship in regional contexts, including the Middle East, arguing that most applications are done in “too literal” a fashion, but that “[w]hen properly specified, these models are applicable.” Lingyu Lu and Cameron Thies, "War, Rivalry, and State Building in the Middle East," *Political Research Quarterly* 66, no. 2 (2013); Thies, "War, Rivalry, and State Building in Latin America," 451. See also "The Political Economy of State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa."; "Public Violence and State Building in Central America," *Comparative Political Studies* 39, no. 10 (2006); "Conflict, Geography, and Natural Resources: The Political Economy of State Predation in Africa," *Polity* 41, no. 4 (2009).
norm of constant interstate warfare that existed in early modern Europe is almost entirely absent in the Middle East, but war and the preparation for war does still occur and does still generate state power. More importantly, however, intrastate warfare is a much more common feature of the Middle East than interstate warfare, and though largely ignored by state formation theorists it similarly produces a security predicament that requires the state to acquire resources, adapt, and grow to survive. Middle Eastern states have faced and continue to face considerable external and internal security threats, and oftentimes this security predicament has ultimately strengthened states of the Middle East rather than weakened them.

Drawing from Tilly’s and other bellicist theories of state formation in Europe and the literature on state development in the modern Middle East, this thesis adapts Tilly’s own conceptual map of state formation to propose a modified theory that is oriented toward Middle Eastern contexts. In brief, this theory posits that the security predicament faced by states and state-like organizations of the Middle East generates a need for coercion and capital, and through a process of war-making states and state-like organizations attempt to acquire these resources. When successful, this process of acquisition generates legitimacy, institutional effectiveness, and capability, which together supply increased state power (these and other terms are defined later in this chapter). Finally, greater state power heightens the security predicament for other states and state-like organizations, fueling a bellicist cycle of state development through war-making.

Once this modified theory is laid out, I apply the theory to three specific case studies of Middle Eastern conflicts, explicating their general impacts on their
participant states as according to the theoretical framework I propose. Because existing scholarship has not substantially applied bellicist theory to specific wars and conflicts, these case studies also serve to help address this lacuna.⁶ A discussion of these case studies and their selection is provided later in this chapter.

There are a number of things this thesis does not do. This work does not attempt to fully prove my theory, which I present merely as a functional possibility (of many other possibilities) for the development of states in the Middle East. There are innumerable counter-arguments I do not address. I do not discuss the precise conditions under which war-making will effect increased state power and under which conditions it will not. I also do not conduct a comprehensive analysis of all Middle Eastern conflicts and track their adherence to my theory, nor do I make substantial analysis of cross-state or cross-regional variations in state power. And finally, because my theory responds to a particular literature and is constructed to fit the particular contexts of the modern Middle East, I do not examine broader applicability of my theory to other regions or eras in any great detail or with the necessary academic rigor.⁷ The scope of this work is to lay out a functional theoretical explanation, which runs counter to much of the existing literature, for how some states of the Middle East have developed in the modern era and discuss a few

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⁷ Importantly, I also do not argue that war-making in the Middle East is particularly unique. There are elements of my theory that may well be very applicable to other regions, or not; my aim in this work is simply to present a theory that describes war-making in Middle Eastern contexts that responds to the limited existing bellicist literature on the topic.
explanatory cases in which the theory seems to make sense. The full proof—or disproof—I must leave to later works.

This contribution is nevertheless important because, as I discuss in Chapter 3, we do not presently having a functional bellicist theoretical model of state development in the modern Middle East. This work is intended to lay the groundwork for such a theoretical model of war-making and state-making in the region. Later scholarship can use this work to further develop the theory and, perhaps, employ similar methods to further develop bellicist understandings of state development in other regions and eras.

Definitions

Before diving into the literature, theory, and case studies, it is necessary to clarify precisely how I use various terms throughout this work. These definitions are discussed in detail here.

“The Middle East”

There are a hundred different ways to define “The Middle East,” a term first used by the American naval captain Alfred Thayer Mahan to describe the strategically important land masses between the Arabian Peninsula and the Indian subcontinent. While almost everyone agrees on a core region, encompassing the Arabian peninsula, Egypt, Iraq, and the Levant, scholars debate the inclusion of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, the Sudan, Somalia, much of Central Asia, the remainder of North Africa, even the

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Balkans or the Caucasus countries or far-off Mali and Mauritania of the Maghreb. The term “The Middle East” therefore requires some clarification.

I define the Middle East as the region of contiguous\(^9\) state territories bounded by Egypt, Turkey, and Iran. In addition to those three states, this includes Bahrain, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, the Palestinian Territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. This definition rests primarily on the basis of strong regional ties: all of these states have a history of extremely significant and sustained military, economic, or political interaction with several other states in the region. This definition largely ignores cultural, linguistic, or religious relationships which might warrant the inclusion of other states. There are, nevertheless, other candidates: the other North African states might qualify under this definition, but they are excluded on the basis of their relative independence from the interaction of the Middle East (again, culture, language, and religion notwithstanding), especially in comparison to Egypt, the one North African state included in the Middle East.\(^{10}\)

The Middle East therefore circumscribes a somewhat tighter area than might otherwise be defined. This is important because the region described under a tighter definition is more systemically uniform and integrated from a state development perspective. Not only do all of these states interact quite intensely and regularly, they

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\(^9\) Excepting Bahrain, which is an island in the Gulf between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

\(^{10}\) The Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Pakistan, and other parts of Africa are easier exclusions. The Balkans form a distinct sub-region of Europe, generally more concerned with themselves and—at most—Turkey. The Caucasus states are similarly separate and more typically concerned with Russia than either of its two Middle Eastern neighbors, Iran and Turkey. Central Asia is thus easily excluded also, though other definitions of the Middle East based on wholly on the influence of Islam might be destined to include it—to say nothing of China or Southeast Asia. The Maghreb, Sudan, and Somalia, though similarly under some influence of Islam, have few military, economic, or political ties to the Middle East core. Pakistan, meanwhile, is tied much more closely with India and Afghanistan, despite its important economic ties to the labor markets of the Gulf. And so these regions are not included.
generally share similar features: most states are very young, possess Western-drawn borders, contain several cross-border ethno-religious groups, experience high levels of internal tension, possess relatively weak economies with high dependence on external rents, and are generally characterized as weak states with low state power. Nevertheless, as this thesis attempts to show, these common features present challenges to the Middle Eastern states of the modern era that have engendered growth in state power over time.

“Wars, Conflicts, and War-making”

In conventional vernacular, even in academia, the terms “war” and “conflict” are often used with loose interchangeability. “War” typically has a slightly more formal connotation, calling up images of pitched battles and bunkers and implying a documented declaration of war between recognized states followed by a documented peace treaty between the same. Typically, “war” connotes a somewhat larger-scale enterprise than a “conflict”—a war without a declaration, without clear boundaries, and generally a little more muddy and unclear. Nevertheless, the terms are used to describe the same thing: prolonged armed engagement between definable political forces. I wish to separate the terms more carefully.

As a formal term, I define “conflict” as a bounded event in which the interests of two or more political entities—namely, states and state-like organizations—clash through armed physical violence over a sustained period of time.11 This definition encompasses both internal and external conflicts, to which I will refer regularly

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11 For a useful (if somewhat dated) discussion of state-ness among polities of the modern Middle East, see Lisa Anderson, "The State in the Middle East and North Africa," *Comparative Politics* 20, no. 1 (1987).
throughout. An external conflict is synonymous with a “war,” defined below. An internal conflict is a conflict—under this definition—that occurs between two political organizations that contest control over the same state, or at least a significant portion of that state’s territory, and occurs almost exclusively within the borders of that state or territory. This is more colloquially termed a “civil war,” but I avoid the use of that term due to its closer connotation to formal war. An internal conflict, in the Middle East at least, is more typically a prolonged insurgency than something akin to the primly-uniformed American Civil War.

A war, then, is a conflict that occurs between two or more internationally recognized states over a readily defined period of time and is conducted almost exclusively by the militaries of those states against each other. This is a particularly narrow definition which excludes so-called “wars” of independence, rebellions, revolts, interstate rivalries like the Cold War, et cetera, which would be defined as “conflicts” but not “wars.”

Conversely, I intend “war-making” as a broadly defined term. Most of the state-formation literature uses the term to discuss the activities and enterprises involved in the preparation for and execution of war (under the above definition); scholars thus unnecessarily exclude the similar processes involved in preparation for conflict more generally. Therefore “war-making” will here include all activities and enterprises conducted by states and state-like organizations that involve the preparation for and execution of conflict. This thus includes the development of internal security services and other measures that attempt to fortify the state from
within rather than simply without, in addition to all of the military development and other endeavors that aim to protect the state from outside aggression.

“State”

Even more so than other terms defined here, the concept of “the state” possesses a seemingly infinite array of definitions derived from an equally vast literature. Max Weber’s immortal definition, “a state is a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory,” should be mentioned, of course. But later scholars have contested, expanded, and refined the notion of the state—of particular note here, Charles Tilly, Theda Skocpol, Peter Evans, Timothy Mitchell, Hendrik Spruyt, and Margaret Levi.

I draw upon this wealth of scholarship to employ a modified definition that is oriented towards the needs of this particular study. I define the state as a political infrastructure that claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of armed force within a specified territory over which it has effective control, claims ultimate sovereignty, regularly extracts resources from the inhabitant population, and reserves—or, more typically, regularly exercises—the right to interfere in the affairs of that population. A state is therefore different from a “regime,” a political organization that occupies and controls the political infrastructure of the state. The state is an infrastructure that tends

to persist throughout regime changes and retains all of its requisite claims. All states with membership in the United Nations would currently qualify under this definition, although international recognition is not a prerequisite—for state-like organizations with effective control and autonomy over a region, whether recognized or not, such as Hamas or Syrian Kurdistan, might also qualify as states.\footnote{See the discussion of Hamas in Chapter 6.} A “state-like organization” in this work will be used to signify a political infrastructure that exhibits some properties of a state but not all of them and not enough to qualify it as a formal state. The most common type of state-like organization is an independence movement that claims or aspires to statehood but does not have effective control of a territory.

“Nation”

binding together those individuals who share a sense of large-scale political solidarity aimed at creating, legitimating, or challenging states. As such, nationalism is often perceived or justified by a sense of historical commonality which coheres a population within a territory and which demarcates those who belong and others who do not.”¹⁶ Other factors, such as common language, may also contribute to this “collective sentiment or identity.” This present work borrows from Marx’s useful definition; a nation is thus here meant to signify the political entity—real, imagined, or aspired to—that is the object of a particular nationalism under Marx’s definition. Note that the concept of nation is important to this work only insofar as it is an integral part of the theoretical framework of the modern state, and is used extensively by Tilly and other scholars to discuss the state.

“Sovereignty”

Of the four main types of sovereignty typically discussed in political science—international legal, Westphalian, domestic, and interdependence sovereignties—domestic sovereignty will be the most relevant in this study.¹⁷ Domestic sovereignty, heretofore referred to simply as “sovereignty,” is the “formal organization of political authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their own polity.”¹⁸ The legitimacy (defined below) of a state is very closely linked to the degree of sovereignty a state wields. As with the term nation, sovereignty is important here because of its

¹⁸ Ibid., 4.
definitional and theoretical connections to the modern state, but will not often otherwise appear in this work.

“State Power”

Though the world has long had a general notion of “the Great Powers” and a rough pecking order among them, the term “state power” or alternatively “state strength”—concepts on which the idea of a Great Power is effectively built—is a rather amorphous term. Attempts to measure state power have yielded mixed results. Political science has at its disposal the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC), compiled through the Correlates of War Project, but CINC data has garnered significant criticism over the years. Recent adjustments to the CINC data using improved methodologies, such as the Geometric Indicator of National Capabilities, are ill-suited for measuring the changes in a particular state’s power over time. Political economists often make use of the World Bank World Development Indicators or the data contained in the annual Human Development Reports published by the United Nations Development Programme, but at best these datasets contain measurements of indicators of state power—not measurements of state power itself. For example, a measurement of changes in the infant mortality rate or electricity consumption within a particular state could at most only correlate with changes in

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20 Kelly Kadera and Gerald Sorokin, "Measuring National Power," ibid.30, no. 3 (2004). The GINC scores are, under particular circumstances, useful for dyadic comparisons between states, but not for comparing a state with itself.
state power. Some other datasets come closer to the mark: the World Governance Indicators (also produced by the World Bank) has an estimate for “Government Effectiveness,” as does the Quality of Government dataset run by the Quality of Government Institute at the University of Gothenburg. These datasets are also problematic, however. Beyond any questions regarding dataset construction and the measurements involved in estimating “Government Effectiveness,” the data are simply incomplete. The World Governance Indicators data only extend back to 1996, and the Quality of Government data back to 1985 (with data from many years absent). Furthermore, none of these datasets attempt to measure the power of states (or state-like organizations) not widely recognized internationally, such as the Hamas government in Gaza.

With these problems in mind, I must, for the purposes of this work, keep the definition and measurement of state power qualitative and, unfortunately, somewhat ambiguous. I consider “state power” the degree to which a state can readily exercise its will, both within its territory and without. State power therefore depends on a wide variety of factors. The size and armament of a state’s military, its economic resources, its bureaucracy’s efficiency, the popular strength of its claim to sovereignty, and a host of other components have critical effects on state power from within. Regarding the state’s ability to exercise its will outside its borders, I refer primarily to its ability to project its power beyond its territory; I am less concerned with comparative judgments between two adjacent states. For example, though Saudi Arabia could easily conquer Bahrain, this fact should not have a supremely negative effect on Bahrain’s state power. Rather, Bahrain’s state power should be based on its own
ability to project power and influence in the rest of the region. I therefore do not employ relative cross-national measures of state power, opting instead for cross-temporal intrastate and structural measures.

It should be noted that “state development” will here be used to signify changes in a state’s state power over time, whereas “state-sponsored development” will be used to mean economic or infrastructural development conducted and financed by a state (which, of course, may lead to state development).21 State development is also akin to the terms “state building” or “state formation” in the literature. I use the term state development instead to distance the connotation from origination or birth of states because I exclusively discuss states’ post-inception evolution and development. Note also that references to developments in state power as “positive” or similar adjectives is meant to signify that state power merely increases, and not to imply that the precipitating developments were objectively “good” or “positive” from a moral standpoint.

“Legitimacy”

State power is enormously dependent on legitimacy, as we will examine more closely in Chapter 3. For now, let us define “legitimacy” as the degree to which a state or state-like organization is granted authority—a monopoly over affairs typically attributed to a state, including the legitimate use of force—by the relevant

population.\textsuperscript{22} Note that the term in its typical usage carries a moral and positive connotation, typically associated with popular and democratic rule based on principles of self-determination. As I define the term here and use it throughout this work, authority does not need to be granted willingly and can be achieved through a variety of means: a popularly conceived “right” to leadership can derive from democratic election, effective governance, hereditary succession, religious legitimation, or the use of force, among other possibilities.\textsuperscript{23} A state may compel legitimacy through force of arms, but nevertheless it is granted authority by a fearful populace. This definition is not meant to conflate conventional usage of legitimacy with a more dated notion of “might makes right,” but rather to emphasize the distinction between legitimacy and authority: legitimacy, as something that is granted, possesses a greater scope that includes authority through force as well as authority through democracy, \textit{et cetera}.

“I Institutional Effectiveness”

State power depends heavily on institutional effectiveness. I define “institutional effectiveness” in two parts. The first is the long-term stability and durability of a state’s bureaucratic structures. The second is the efficiency and overall ability of the state’s bureaucratic structures to conduct the business of the state. Stable and efficient bureaucracies that readily perform their assigned tasks indicate a high

\textsuperscript{22} Because legitimacy and sovereignty are closely intertwined and because I am concerned in this work with \textit{domestic} sovereignty in particular, this “relevant” population is generally but not exclusively the domestic, inhabitant population.

\textsuperscript{23} For a discussion of paths to authority and legitimacy, see Ian Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," \textit{International Organization} 53, no. 2 (1999).
level of institutional effectiveness; corruption and inter-agency warfare conversely indicate a low level of institutional effectiveness.

“Capability”

If institutional effectiveness is a state’s dexterity, “capability” is its raw strength. Capability and state power are symbols of only slightly different things, and are strongly related. Capability refers to the resources available to a state, whereas state power refers to the ease of the actual exercise of the state’s will. I define the term as the measure of a state’s raw resources—economic power, manpower, natural resources, infrastructural power, military might, et cetera—that it can bring to bear in the execution of its will or the resolution of a particular problem. A state with a strong economy is more capable of financing any number of enterprises, from infrastructural development to conducting a war. In some respects, capability also incorporates both legitimacy and institutional effectiveness. A state with high levels of legitimacy and a strong bureaucracy is, after all, more capable of exercising its will.

Case Selection

The three case studies that make up the second half of this work are each meant to explicate my theory in light of one particular variety of war-making. In each, I examine the case in terms of absolute changes in state power and its component proxies (legitimacy, institutional effectiveness, and capability) by evaluating conditions at the endpoints of the case—to the extent possible—with relatively little discussion of the ebbs and flows produced by various specific developments
throughout the middle. Because I am not, in this work, attempting to determine the precise conditions, actions, and developments that employ war-making processes to produce state power, these case studies are meant to provide a grounded theoretical perspective rather than a step-by-step historical proof.

The case study on the Iran-Iraq War of 1980 to 1988 examines interstate war, the variety of war-making most thoroughly discussed in both Tilly’s own theory and in the works of Middle East state formation theorists. There have been relatively few interstate wars in the Middle East over the last century, especially in comparison to the chaotic mess of warfare that characterized the early modern European state system. Most of the Middle East’s wars have involved the state of Israel; however, because Israel is something of an outlier state in the Middle East, possessing an altogether different ethno-religious makeup from other regional states as well as possessing a generally stronger military and economy, I have deliberately chosen a war that does not involve Israel in any substantial way. The Iran-Iraq War is also convenient because the scholarship on the war has generally characterized it as pointless, a struggle in which neither side gained despite enormous expense, but as my theory predicts and I attempt to show, this is not in fact the case.

The second case study, on Turkey’s internal struggle with its Kurdish population, brings to light the application of purely intrastate war-making to state development. There are more cases to choose from here, as intrastate warfare is the dominant form of armed conflict in the Middle East. The selection of Turkey in particular is because of the conflict’s relative length and intensity when compared with other such conflicts. The long period of conflict, which is to some extent
ongoing, with many escalations and de-escalations provides an excellent array of data to dissect. A clearer picture of how the conflict contributed to the development of the Turkish state is thus more easily formed.

Finally, the third case study explores the impact of war-making on state-like organizations. For this, there is no better example than that of Hamas, which presently finds itself in control of a defined territory, Gaza, and responsible for the full execution of a state’s functions. Hamas is no longer a simple resistance movement, a state-like organization in opposition to its host state—Hamas is now a state. No other state-like organization in the Middle East has reached the same level of state-ness as Hamas. This case study attempts to show that Hamas’s transition was made possible by its war-making enterprises, thus validating the applicability of my theory to state-like organizations as well as states.

Organization

This thesis proceeds as follows. The second chapter details traditional bellicist state formation theory in Europe and its literature, followed by a brief discussion of the Thirty Years’ War from 1618 to 1658 as a historical case study of bellicist theory applied. The third chapter provides an overview of the literature on bellicist theory in the modern Middle East and details the mechanics and rationale of my proposed theory of state development discussed briefly above. This third chapter constitutes the kernel of this work’s contribution to Middle Eastern state formation theory. The fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters each conduct case studies of my theory applied, one each on the Iran-Iraq War of 1980 to 1988, the multi-decade conflict between the
Turkish state and Kurdish nationalists, and the development of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) since its founding in 1987 to today. The seventh and final chapter concludes and discusses opportunities for further study and explication of my proposed theory.
The task of distilling traditional state formation theory into a few readable pages is Herculean. The state, as such a central concept in political science, seemingly taxes a vast bulk of the field in a search for explicability, and the restriction to the development of the modern state in Europe only narrows the bulk slightly. The libraries of scholarship on European nationalism, capitalism, technological progress, social class development, international relations, geography, comparative politics, and war each have a great deal to say about the development of the modern nation state in Europe, but it is the final aspect, war, on which this characterization of European state formation theory is centered. I focus primarily on the pivotal work of Charles Tilly and his magnum opus, *Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990 to 1990*, as well as earlier works of the same vein. Tilly features prominently here because his is the theory whose exportation to the Middle East is contested by many later scholars.

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(see the next chapter) and which I seek to validate as a functional paradigm for that region in this work.

The Mechanics

A thousand years ago, feudal structures dominated the European continent. These included thousands of kingdoms, empires, principalities, bishoprics, duchies, baronies, fiefdoms, and semi-independent towns. Over the course of long centuries, the modern nation state emerged as the dominant polity of Europe, occupying nearly every inch of the map with just a few dozen territorially exclusive and more or less clearly defined supreme sovereignties. How did this happen? At work were a variety of interactive forces—political, social, technological, economic—which drove a great “natural selection” of states through which “war made the state, and the state made war.”

The accumulation and concentration of two strategic commodities, coercion and capital, increased substantially in the transition from the late medieval to early modern periods. Means of coercion became more effective overall—accumulation of coercion—and the state gained a relative monopoly over the use of that force—concentration of coercion. Europe simultaneously accumulated greater capital through the prosperity of globalized trade, whereas growing urbanization fueled a concentration of capital in the cities. In regions where these two trends converged, the nation state (the modern state) emerged as the dominant form of political sovereign. Wielding new coercive capabilities, the state was able to extract capital and other

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25 Or, as Tilly puts it, the national state. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1990, 2.
26 Tilly and Ardant, The Formation of National States in Western Europe, 42.
resources from the growing and newly prosperous cities through the threat or act of war. This dynamic formed a positive feedback loop wherein states accumulated greater concentrations of wealth and power, as well as the ability to pursue and implement policies that accelerated the feedback loop. Those states that could not keep up in the race for ever more wealth and power also could not maintain an equal footing in war, and were therefore swallowed up by stronger states. And so the modern map of nation states began to emerge in Europe.

With this general story in mind, the following sections examine each of the core dynamics in turn: the development of coercion, the development of capital, bargaining between state and society, and the pursuit of war.

*Coercion and the State*

By 1500, feudal institutions were falling out of favor. In some regions of the continent, particularly the north and west, the highest sovereigns in the feudal chain began to acquire professionalized standing armies, altering the means of war. No longer did a king need to rely on the loyalty of his vassals in order to wage a war against his enemies, whether they were other states or simply rebellious lords. This fundamentally compromised the relationship between the sovereign and the nobility: a banding together of locally mustered peasants and knights led by local lords was insufficient to challenge the central ruler of the state. Simultaneously, the invention of the cannon eliminated the primary means of defense for truculent lesser lords, whose castle walls had often previously been able to hold off a discontented monarch for a substantial period of time. Sieges were costly to conduct, threatened by disease, and
difficult to supply. With the arrival of the cannon, however, monarchs hardly needed
to bother with a siege.\textsuperscript{27} Small wonder, then, that King Louis XIV of France had his
cannons emblazoned with the phrase “Ultima Ratio Regum,” or “the final argument
of kings.”

The state held decisive advantages in acquiring these new means of coercion.
Professional armies, cannons, and other similarly disruptive military technologies
were expensive. Few local lords, or even rich city magistrates, managed to scrape
together enough capital to pay for the wages, equipment, and training of a
professional standing army or for the construction and operation of a cannon foundry.
Many sovereigns, both states and smaller local authorities, therefore relied on
mercenary armies for their wars and protection. As we will see later in this chapter,
however, the mercenary system was eventually overrun by a system of national
armies wielded exclusively by sovereign states, and this occurred for a variety of
reasons. In comparison with even the most capable of mercenary captains, states were
better able to standardize equipment, training, and supply of armies through the
development of modern bureaucracies and administrative power, making them more
effective. Furthermore, socio-political developments such as the notions of
citizenship and national identity contributed to additional effectiveness in the field:
armies composed predominantly of national citizens (at least in the officer corps)
were more loyal to their employer and especially more willing to fight in dire

\textsuperscript{27} Defensive technology did eventually catch up with the invention of so-called ‘star forts,’ which
featured their own cannons that could cover every approach to the fort (thus making infantry assaults
very costly) as well as sloped walls to deflect or absorb enemy cannon shot. These forts were
extremely expensive, however, generally beyond the purses of non-state sovereigns. Furthermore, for a
crucial period in the middle of the millennium, defensive technologies such as castles lay in absolute
ruins before the destructive might of the cannon, and it was largely during this time that sovereigns
consolidated their power.
circumstances. States were therefore able to accumulate and concentrate their coercive power at the cost of all other polities on the continent, and those states that did it best were able to survive through centuries of iterative war.

*Capital and the State*

Though networks of trade cities developed during the medieval period, the shift in Europe’s economy from agrarian predominance to trade capitalism accelerated with urbanization and globalization in the early modern era. Urban growth was the result of several convening factors, including advances in farming technologies which permitted expanded labor pools for non-agricultural production; slow speeds of communication across distance which supported a proximity benefit for business and trade conducted in urban settings; and cheapness of labor in cities coincidental with rising concentrations of capital there.\(^{28}\)

Facilitated by significant advances in naval technology, trade empires bloomed along European shores. Port cities such as London, Amsterdam, Lisbon, Cadiz, and Venice flourished with the flow of products from Asia, Africa, and the Americas.\(^{29}\) Complex joint-stock venture-capital organizations such as the Dutch East India Company and its British equivalent were developed to take advantage of this

\(^{28}\) Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1990*, 17-18. The percentage of Europe’s population in cities climbed rapidly in the 16\(^{th}\) century and then again in the 18\(^{th}\) century, after which it never really slowed down. For most of the early modern period, this percentage was between five and ten percent. Ibid., 49-50.

\(^{29}\) Navies had traditionally clung to shorelines out of necessity; with better ship-building architectural developments and new navigation technologies such as chronometers and sextants, enterprising individuals and states alike were able to cross oceans with relative ease, establishing trading posts and colonies. The story of Venice demonstrates the impact of these new technologies, as Venice flourished for a time and then rapidly declined. During the late medieval period, Venice predominated the shipping lanes, serving as the gateway to the East through its trade with port cities on eastern edge of the Mediterranean. Once Portugal, and later Britain, France, and Holland, managed to cut out the Middle Eastern middle men by going to Asia directly, Venice lost its competitive edge and fell into decline. Ibid., 149-50.
new global trade and access. Mercantilism created new sources of revenue and wealth for European capitalists, in the forms of land, raw materials, bullion, and labor. The result was a much richer concentration of capital in Europe, especially within the existing “old money” class of aristocrats and the emerging “new money” class of capitalists in the cities.

Here, too, states were able to take advantage of this growing concentration of wealth. The most obvious method, of course, was taxation: through the use of customs taxes (among others), states were able to harness the booming economy to their own purposes. States also helped to fund technological innovation and overseas exploration (and exploitation), using growing navies to stake claims to land and defending colonies that would subsequently be exploited by national capitalists—and the crown itself was often an active capitalist participant. As with mercantilism, banking played a crucial role, though a quite different one. War being an expensive enterprise, states required huge quantities of capital to finance their wars, and growing banking sectors served this purpose. Bankers, meanwhile, profited considerably from this arrangement because states, as semi-permanent institutions, were safe and profitable bets for banks. As loans poured into the state treasury, the state became more able to execute successful warfare and the loans simultaneously became more profitable. States that pursued policies and relationships beneficial to bankers therefore became stronger and survived.30

30 Ibid., 85-91.
Bargaining for Power

To acquire accumulations of both coercion and capital, states could not simply exploit growing concentrations of these commodities within society—they had to be bargained for. States and capitalists experienced a symbiotic relationship. States required capital to conduct successful wars; capitalists needed protection for their profits. Much like a gang-operated protection racket, states offered cities and their capitalists protection from invasions and sacks by other aggressors (and themselves) in exchange for capital—taxes and tariffs on trade and commerce as well as the privilege of taking on enormous loans in times of war.

In the world of coercion, however, the relationships were slightly more parasitic in nature. Though states possessed advantages in developing concentrations of coercion as described above, transnational organizations such as the Catholic Church as well as smaller and more local sovereign polities certainly contested the exclusivity of states’ legitimate claim to the use of armed force. Contestation took many forms, running the gamut from unenforced papal bulls and excommunications to piracy and the actual clash of pitched battle. Legitimacy had to be acquired from the population of a state to successfully wrestle away the coercive power formerly held by lesser local lords, the Pope, and other alternative political forces.

States purchased this legitimacy in several ways. Superior military might was, in some cases, sufficient to buy out all of the other contestants within a given territory. The rise of secular nationalism among the populations of Europe, whether cultivated by the state elites (as Tilly and other scholars of nationalism, such as Eric Hobsbawm and Anthony Marx, have argued) or not (as scholars of nationalism, such
as Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner, have argued), certainly contributed as well to legitimizing states as the sole possessors of military force.  

States also explicitly bargained, however, by exchanging rights and privileges—first to nobles and knights in the form of land and titles, then to the bourgeoisie in the form of political participation, and then finally to the whole population in the form of citizenship—for legitimacy, taxes, and soldiers, among other important war-making commodities.

In some ways, the causal arrow here is a little bent. Loans to states were made safer and therefore more common by a state’s success in war. Nationalism, coercive power, and state legitimacy typically grew in together, feeding off of each other; a state’s legitimacy was heightened by its superiority on the battlefield, and this heightened legitimacy strengthened its position vis-à-vis potential competitor-sovereigns, whereas nationalism contributed to and was enhanced by both coercive capability and legitimacy. Thus the bargaining process between the state and society for power in the forms of coercion and capital can be understood as a positive feedback loop that sped the formation of the modern state in Europe, with a growth in state power alongside.

A System of Warring States

Coercion and capital, of course, flowed across the continent in relative ignorance of state boundaries. The concentration of both commodities was made possible by the contemporary nature of the international system—namely the anarchic

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security structure, but also the ubiquity of mercantilist capitalism—and this had important influences on the shape and rapidity of European state formation.

The anarchic nature of security on the continent lent itself to a continual condition of warfare among the states of Europe.\textsuperscript{32} Great powers in particular rarely experienced even a whole year of complete peace, without warring with at least one other power. Moreover, as the concentration of coercive capacity shifted from local authority to centralized authority, the simultaneous accumulation of coercive capacity deepened the security predicament. From the perspective of each individual state, other states were now more capable of destroying that state. Likewise the opportunity to destroy and absorb other states, which would strengthen the absorbing state’s security position, grew. This anarchic condition of security, in which no state was guaranteed safety except through its own strength and perhaps its allies, forced many states of the continent to pursue continual armament and territorial aggression to survive.

As with any system, variation among states within the European state system was quite significant. The state formation process for the Dutch Netherlands differed considerably from that of France or tsarist Russia. Some states followed a more coercion-intensive or capital-intensive path to the formation of a modern state. Which path any particular state took—and during what time period—was dependent on a great array of factors, but geography was often a key element. The Italian city-states, whose wars had largely “proceeded in a genteel, limited way,” and which were already quite wealthy commercial centers by the early modern era due to the

\textsuperscript{32} For an extensive—though inescapably incomplete—catalog of formal European wars during the early modern period, see Jack S. Levy, \textit{War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975} (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983).
Mediterranean trade with the Levant, pursued a capital-intensive path to modern statehood by accumulating and concentrating capital ahead of the development of powerful state coercive capacity. In contrast, the Scandinavian power of Sweden, with only limited access to the Atlantic trade, pursued a coercion-intensive path by developing a sophisticated state-military apparatus and profiting from extremely successful wars on the continent. Nevertheless, the shape of the European state system changed throughout the early modern period, each state progressing along the same general path, or else perishing.

*The Thirty Years’ War: An Illustrative Case*  
For understanding how war-making can causally contribute to the development of state power, the Thirty Years’ War, a collection of overlapping conflicts that took place mostly in central Europe between the First Defenestration of Prague in 1618 and the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, makes an excellent illustrative case. At the outset of the war in 1618, the Habsburg-dominated Holy Roman Empire was the largest power in Europe and controlled much of the continent’s central territories through a feudalistic hierarchy of sovereignties. Nearly all of present-day Germany, Austria, Hungary, Italy, and the Balkans owed the Empire some level of loyalty, and the Habsburg family also controlled Spain and much of the Low Countries. By war’s end, however, the Holy Roman Empire’s system of sovereignty was shattered and its supremacy over European affairs was fast fading in favor of the

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34 Much of this case study was published previously in the Wesleyan University undergraduate history journal, *Historical Narratives*. All reproduced content is done so with permission. See Andrew Trexler, "Innovation and Transformation in the Thirty Years' War," *Historical Narratives* Volume 11(2013).
burgeoning modern states of Western Europe and their blossoming overseas empires. During this period of near-continual conflict, states sustained massive strains on their capabilities that forced them to innovate, adapt, and develop. The war had dramatic and lasting effects on the military, social, and political structures of European states and contributed greatly to the development of the modern international state system—and, not coincidentally, to a growth in consolidated state power among many of the war’s participant states.

Several distinct paradigms characterized the European state system in 1618. Socially, confessionalism was still a powerful organizing force that divided Europe into Protestant and Catholic, though secular nationalism was beginning to supplant the importance of religious identity. Militarily, warfare on the continent was dominated by mercenary armies employed by continually warring states and smaller sovereignties (principalities, bishoprics, city-states, et cetera). Politically, latent feudalism persisted—especially in central Europe—with the dominance of the Holy Roman Empire, a very decentralized intra-European imperial power. These paradigms would all but vanish by 1648. States operating under these paradigms faced, in the Thirty Years’ War, new levels of intensity in warfare that exposed the weaknesses of the old systems; those states that managed to innovate gained in the war while others lost. At the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the state system of Europe

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35 While it managed to retain a social importance, religious authority had, by 1618, all but lost its political power. The oft-made description of the Thirty Years’ War as the ‘last war of religion’ is not particularly accurate. Religious identities mapped very easily onto the political, secular, and national ones which characterized Europe’s states. See S. H. Stienberg, "The Not So Destructive, Not So Religious, and Not So German War," in The Thirty Years' War: Problems of Motive, Extent, and Effect, ed. Theodore Rabb (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1947). Even so, individuals and states with particular religious affiliations often fought on behalf of the opposite cause, most notably Catholic France’s intervention on behalf of the Protestant side. See Philip J. Haythornthwaite, Invincible Generals: Gustavus Adolphus, Marlborough, Frederick the Great, George Washington, Wellington (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 27.
operated under radically different—and more modern—paradigms than in 1618, and the states of the system were themselves radically different, more modern, and more powerful.

The Thirty Years’ War emphasized the weaknesses of the pre-existing paradigms. For example, Imperial army under Count Albrecht von Wallenstein, a highly effective fighting force that stands as the very pinnacle of the mercenary system—and certainly the most powerful of the armies fielded by the Catholic side—threatened the Holy Roman Empire as much as it did the Habsburgs’ adversaries.  

Though formally in the employ of the Empire, in reality Wallenstein controlled his own territory, executed a state-like protection racket in occupied north Germany, accumulated self-awarded titles and lands, and deployed his troops (at a profit) from this territory for the Empire.  

Realizing that only whim and the continued flow of the soldiers’ pay kept Wallenstein fighting for the Empire, and furthermore that they had no military force whatsoever that could oppose him, the Catholic leaders grew fearful and dismissed him (an order with which he complied) before recalling him in a moment of dire need when Sweden invaded, before dismissing him again and assassinating him.  

Precisely, the trouble was that the feudal and fragmented structure of authority, legitimacy, and sovereignty in the Holy Roman Empire precluded the development of a core national identity tied directly to the state, while its dependence on the mercenary system precluded the development of a standing

professional army. Thus there was no possibility of raising a standing and national (and therefore loyal) army that could oppose Wallenstein, and other mercenary armies could not match the organizational, tactical, and financial might of Wallenstein’s sophisticated state-like organization. Hampered by its dependence on mercenaries that owed no loyalty but to gold, the Empire was thus extremely limited in terms of its state power. As such, the existent military and political structures of Europe’s state system before and during the war presented substantial dangers to the survival of the states themselves.

Faced with the need for a way around these problems—a way to more effectively war—states innovated in their technological, social, and tactical approaches to war. One of the most successful was the Swedish state under King Gustavus Adolphus, who ruled from 1612 until his death at the Battle of Lützen in 1632. In the service of his near-continuous wars, Adolphus implemented sweeping improvements in Sweden’s institutions and practices, greatly enhancing legitimacy, effectiveness, and capability. These improvements included administrative reforms that expanded Swedish commerce, the creation of bureaucratic structures that extracted capital and supplies from occupied territories, and regularization of conscription practices aimed at nationalizing the army—thus creating the only permanent system of conscription then in existence.\(^{39}\) His reforms permitted a regular flow of trained, loyal, and nationally invested troops, a core that was vital on the

battlefield and around which he built the rest of his armies. Combined with significant Swedish advances in tactics and supply—especially tactical advances in mobility and firepower, which allowed campaigns to be more quickly conducted and with far fewer losses, and the supply advances in the standardization of improved muskets and cannon, which Sweden also very profitably exported to other states—Adolphus’s innovations in the state and its notion of “citizen” vastly improved Sweden’s legitimacy and state power and made it into a military tour de force. Sweden’s enormous successes in the war faltered only after Adolphus’s battlefield death in 1632 (revealing another weakness of the period’s purely monarchical-aristocratic socio-political elite structures).41

By the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the paradigms that dominated Europe’s state system in 1618 were replaced with new ones. Characterized largely by belligerent mercenary armies of which Wallenstein’s was only the greatest, the Thirty Years’ War was the last period in which states predominantly called upon the capabilities of non-state actors by marketizing and internationalizing coercion. The unwieldiness of mercenaries, in control of ever-larger military and bureaucratic forces and partially enabled to act independently of the state, exhibited inherent issues of command and control for states.42 National standing armies were overall more capable in war and more effective institutions than mercenary armies, and also called upon and reinforced a (modern) national state’s legitimacy. While the Holy Roman

Empire employed mercenaries almost exclusively during the War, other states began to make shifts toward national armies, namely Sweden, France, the Dutch Republic, and England. Despite being relative latecomers to global imperialism when compared to the Spanish and Portuguese, these latter three were able to utilize their consolidated state power, national identities, and state developments as a core around which to build vast overseas empires at a time when the major intra-European imperial power, the Hapsburg Holy Roman Empire, was collapsing.

Within the shattered German Holy Roman Empire, extensive fragmentation was the norm while politico-geographic consolidation reigned elsewhere. Inherent to this fragmentation was a definite reinforcement of ultimate state power over alternatives—but that of national states, not imperial ones. The Hapsburgs would only recover in the second half of the 17th century when imperial identity was rebuilt around Austrian lines and the Empire finally instituted a standing national army. In the meantime, other states grew at the expense of the empire and established and capitalized on new systemic structures: the beginnings of nationalized professional standing armies, the stirrings of a new and increasingly meritocratic elite, and a substantial consolidation of centralized political power in the sovereign national state—the modern state. The Thirty Years’ War of 1618 to 1648 was thus an important catalyst for innovation and transformation in the structures of the European state system, necessitating the ultimate growth of state power and its concentration within states.

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43 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1990, 81.
Conclusion

As discussed in this chapter, the bellicist theory of state formation in early modern Europe emphasizes the relationships between coercion, capital, cities, and the state, which all contributed to a homogenization of the European state system into a system of modern (national) states, and relatedly contributed to the growth of state power. In this theory, war-making plays a very central role in the developmental process for states. In the next chapter, I examine the applicability of this Europe-centric bellicist state formation theory to the modern Middle East, and propose and detail a modified but distinctly bellicist developmental map for the state system of that region.
In the previous chapter, I explored the basic bellicist argument as was originally laid out for the early modern European state system by Tilly and other similar theorists. In this chapter, I examine key differences between the early modern European and modern Middle Eastern state systems, discuss the application of bellicist theory in the literature on contemporary state development in the modern Middle East, and present a modified theoretical framework for how bellicist mechanisms can apply to modern Middle Eastern contexts.

**Contextual Differences in State Systems**

The states of the modern Middle East, much like their predecessors in early modern Europe, must fight for power, legitimacy, and survival within an anarchic and capitalist environment. The presence of the United Nations and the interference of the global powers, notably the United States, have no doubt made the Middle East’s state system somewhat less anarchic than the free-for-all of the mid-millennium European continent. Capitalism, meanwhile, has sometimes been subjugated to large public

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44 Ian Lustick, for example, contends that states of the modern Middle East were “not allowed” the same degree of anarchy as early modern Europe. Ian S. Lustick, "The Absence of Middle Eastern
sector economies, both under states like the petro-monarchies of the Gulf and under states like import substitution industrialization–era Turkey. Nevertheless, like regions and states all over the globe, capitalism predominates as an economic system in the Middle East, and the region’s states face external and internal rivals for their power, necessitating a continuous struggle in an anarchic security environment.

Also as in early modern Europe, sources of authority in the Middle East are quite varied.\(^{45}\) On the local level, tribal and kinship ties among local populations function as an alternative to nationalisms that themselves only sometimes coincide with state structures and boundaries. Regions with Kurdish majorities encompass a roughly contiguous geographic area stretching from eastern Turkey across northern Syria and Iraq to western Iran. Moreover, tribes and kinship groups throughout the Middle East have retained significant levels of coercive power. Though few tribes have access to armored tanks, heavy artillery, military aircraft, or missile arsenals, the ability of these groups to wage insurgency wars in opposition to the state—for example, the ongoing multi-decade conflict in Turkish Kurdistan, confessional violence in Lebanon, or the recent takeover of the Iraqi cities of Ramadi and Fallujah by the al-Qaeda–linked Islamist organization, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant—is significant enough to substantially challenge the legitimacy of the state as a governing institution with the rightful monopoly on physical force.\(^{46}\) On a systemic level, transnational ideological forces also threaten the legitimacy of states: pan-

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Arabism and pan-Islamism—whether sectarian in nature or not—are powerful shapers of identity politics, especially when well financed, armed, or otherwise supported by global or regional powers. These socio-political ideological forces contest states’ ability to, as Tilly defines them, “exercise clear [political] priority … over all other organizations within substantial territories.”47 A New York Times article from September 2013, though hyperbolic and exaggerated in its analysis, was not wholly wrong in suggesting the possibility of a redrawing of the Middle East’s political map along more confessional and ethnic lines than the current weakly-national ones.48 States of the Middle East are thus constantly threatened by competing centers of authority and power.

The present international political order has made the security predicament for Middle Eastern states even more difficult to navigate, reducing stability rather than promoting it. Global superpowers have frequently intervened in the Middle East to support certain states or their rivals (including state-like organizations), usually in an attempt to effect or prevent a regime change. These interventions have occurred through the history of the modern Middle East, from its very shaping in the aftermath of the First World War, to the re-installation of the Western-friendly Shah in Iran, to the more recent Western support for anti-Qaddafi rebels in Libya or anti-Assad rebels in Syria. Support for certain states over other states has also been a common feature of international politics in the region—a neighboring and hostile state with the backing of a superpower is a dangerous condition for any state. Finally, the international political order has largely closed off particular methods, especially

47 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1990, 1.
coercive ones, for securing a state’s legitimacy and dominance over its territory. Whereas in early modern Europe it was common, even acceptable, for a state to respond to internal threats to its legitimacy with an overwhelming use of force, such actions taken presently by the states in the Middle East often draw the condemnation of the international community and serve to isolate the state, reducing its overall security rather than preserving it.

**Bellicist Literature on the Modern Middle East**

Although the standard bellicist theory as presented by Tilly and others is very Euro-centric, discussions of such theories as applied to the developing world emerged almost simultaneously with bellicist literature itself.49 In this branch of the literature, the Middle East has had relatively little attention from bellicist scholars.50 Nevertheless, several scholars have made valuable contributions in that regard, particularly (among many others) Michael Barnett, Yayha Sadowski, Ian Lustick, Thierry Gongora, and Rolf Schwarz. Throughout the Middle East literature, the general consensus stands that bellicist theory of a positive relationship between war-making and state power is inconsistent with the developmental conditions of the

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49 One of the earliest such works is Youssef Cohen, Brian R. Brown, and A. F. K. Organski, "The Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order," *American Political Science Review* 75, no. 901-910 (1981). This literature has generally accepted the positive relationship between war-making and state power as a theoretical framework for the developing world. For example, see Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*. Considerable scholarship, particularly the recent work of Cameron Thies, has aimed to adapt standard bellicist theory to particular regional contexts, as I attempt to do here. See Thies, "State Building, Interstate, and Intrastate Rivalry: A Study of Postcolonial Extractive Efforts, 1975-2000."

modern Middle East. In this section, I explore this literature in detail and contest its consensus.

Among these and other authors, there are several common threads of scholarly thought. The first is the exploration of the costs of war in the Middle East. Barnett, among the very first to extend bellicist theory to the Middle East, argues in Confronting the Costs of War that the process of war-making contributed to both the growth of state power and its decline in Israel and Egypt (through 1977). His analysis of those two states over the course of their several wars concludes that both states were often forced by the security predicament to pursue policies that simultaneously maintained military strength but relinquished state control over the economy and society, typically through privatization and market-oriented policy shifts aimed at safely generating increased state revenue that could be used to pay for expensive militaries—a development he considers a loss of state power. Sadowski’s analysis in Scuds or Butter? similarly examines the enormous expense of the Middle East’s bulky militaries. She argues that the gargantuan militaries so proudly built by states across the region were not only exorbitantly expensive, but also completely ineffective. She therefore argues that war has had a negative effect on state power in

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51 Among other works, see Barnett, Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel; "Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Regional Order in the Arab States System," International Organization 49(1995); Yahya M. Sadowski, Scuds or Butter?: The Political Economy of Arms Control in the Middle East(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993); Lustick, "The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political 'Backwardness' in Historical Perspective."; Gongora, "War Making and State Power in the Contemporary Middle East."; Heydemann, War, Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East; Rolf Schwarz, War and State Building in the Middle East, Governance and International Relations in the Middle East (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2011).
52 Barnett, Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel.
53 She makes a powerful case for this argument in light of the 1990-1991 Gulf War, in which a US-led coalition easily decimated “the largest, best equipped, and most expensive” army in the Middle East (Iraq’s). She writes that “in seventy-two hours, the armies that the Arabs had spent a generation
the Middle East because it has so severely limited spending on the economy and social programs but has been unsuccessful in producing military success. Thierry Gongora echoes Barnett and Sadowski in arguing that war-making has forced states to loosen their control over their economies and spend unnecessarily and unproductively on their militaries. In particular, Gongora examines the measures taken by Iran and Iraq during their eight-year war from 1980 to 1988, arguing that the privatization and liberalization of their economies effected a loss of infrastructural power for the state. Like these authors, later scholars have tended to recognize the importance of war-making to state development in the modern Middle East but contend that war’s effect has largely been negative on state power.

A second common thread in the literature is the discussion of the modern Middle East’s relative lack of interstate war in comparison to early modern Europe. Lustick in particular hits on this issue, echoing other work in the broader bellicist literature on the developing world that attributes state weakness to a general relative absence of war. He argues that compared to the truly anarchic nature of the early modern European state system, in which wars of aggression and aggrandizement were the acceptable norm, the modern Middle Eastern state system has been stifled by the post–World War II international norms of territorial integrity and nonaggression. Prevented from conducting wars for state-building purposes (intentionally or

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54 Gongora, "War Making and State Power in the Contemporary Middle East."
55 For example, see Heydemann, *War, Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East*; Bahgat Korany, ed. *The Changing Middle East: A New Look at Regional Dynamics* (Cairo: The American University of Cairo Press, 2010); and Lu and Thies, "War, Rivalry, and State Building in the Middle East."
otherwise), the states of the Middle East failed to condense into fewer but more powerful states as in Europe, precluding the possibility of a Middle Eastern global power. Lustick’s focus particularly on war, rather than on conflict or the war preparation aspects of war-making, is also reflected in the work of Barnett, Sadowski, Heydemann, and many other scholars among Middle Eastern bellicist theorists. This is somewhat surprising, given that interstate war is the exception rather than the rule in the modern Middle East and that the importance of other forms of war-making is a common theme among the broader bellicist literature.

The literature also emphasizes outside intervention and meddling in the Middle East state system. This is a central element of Lustick’s contributions, as he discusses the role of Western and international powers in discouraging, prohibiting, and punishing wars among states of the Middle East. Schwarz presents a different but related argument, concluding that the extraction of capital should be the central theoretical feature of Middle Eastern state development. Given the lack of war and war preparation’s expensiveness, he argues that abundance of external rents in the region (the sale of oil and other natural resources, foreign military and economic aid,

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58 For example, see Sørenson, "War and State-Making: Why Doesn't It Work in the Third World?" Emizet Kisangani and Jeffrey Pickering, in keeping with bellicist theory, argue that the presence of transnational non-state actors, such as separatist rebels or terrorist organizations, provides an incentive to build state power just as the threat of interstate war does. Emizet F. Kisangani and Jeffrey Pickering, "Rebels, Rivals, and Postcolonial State-Building: Identifying Bellicist Influences on State Extractive Capability," International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 1 (2014). Cameron Thies has been a particularly important and prolific scholar on regional bellicist applications; he particularly emphasizes the importance of rivals over explicit interstate war, including in the Middle East. See (among other works) Thies, "State Building, Interstate, and Intrastate Rivalry: A Study of Postcolonial Extractive Efforts, 1975-2000."; and Lu and Thies, "War, Rivalry, and State Building in the Middle East." Schwarz is another exception among the Middle East bellicists, arguing that war preparation functions much the same way theoretically as does interstate war. Schwarz, War and State Building in the Middle East.
et cetera) supplants the domestic bargaining between state and society for resources and removes the state’s incentive to build extractive capacity.59

There are several issues with the consensus of this existing literature. The overwhelming focus on interstate war is problematic because non-traditional forms of conflict are far more common in the Middle East, as with the rest of the developing world. Intrastate conflicts (domestic or transnational in nature) can be existentially threatening to states and require the development of extractive capabilities and state power to survive, just as interstate war does. Moreover, the mere preparation for war and intrastate conflict encourages such growth.60 Indeed, the contemporary decentralization of coercion, resulting from the ease of acquisition of effective war-making materials (such as Kalashnikovs, bomb-making supplies, and even advanced weaponry) among today’s civilian populations of the Middle East, mimics the decentralized nature of coercion in very early modern Europe.61 These less obvious forms of war-making therefore play as much a role in state development in the Middle East as interstate war, if not a greater role.

The existing literature also tends to ignore non-economic and non-infrastructural measures of state power (a concept notoriously difficult to quantify, of course). Sadowski, Gongora, Schwarz, and to a lesser degree Barnett restrict their

59 War and State Building in the Middle East. Schwarz’s argument is also reflected in the broader bellicist literature. For example, see Anna Leander, "Wars and the Un-Making of States: Taking Tilly Seriously in the Contemporary World," in Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research, ed. Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung(London: Routledge, 2004).
61 Michael Mann, "Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents: Diversifying, Developing, Not Dying," Daedalus 122, no. 3 (1993).
notions of state power to economic and infrastructural power, with Schwarz going so far as to tie state strength directly to the proportion of state-collected taxes relative to external rents—which prompts the puzzling question of whether the tiny North African state of Tunisia is really stronger than, say, Saudi Arabia or Iran.62

State power is multidimensional, however, and infrastructural power and economic control are only two aspects of it.63 Government stability, regime security, the ability to conduct and implement preferred policy, social control, regional and international influence, the ability to enforce law and order, and state legitimacy are all major additional aspects of state power. With limited or nonexistent controls on their economies and small public sector economies, the developing states of early modern Europe could also be considered weak states under the types of definitions used by Schwarz, Barnett, Gongora, and others. Poor marks on economic measures could certainly be damaging to state power for European states; the ruin of Imperial Spain can be largely accredited to the state’s lack of fiscal controls over new influxes of gold and silver from the Americas—influxes similar enough to the oil rents received by many Middle Eastern states today.64 Still, Spain remained a major power in Europe for a significant period of time, deep into the early modern era.

62 Schwarz, War and State Building in the Middle East, 22-23. The strict adherence to economic indicators of state power is common problem throughout political science. For example, Faeron and Laitin contestably use gross domestic product per capita as a proxy for state strength to argue the civil wars lead to state weakness. See James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," American Political Science Review 97(2003). The same contestation can be made against Lu and Thies in their work on the Middle East. See Lu and Thies, "War, Rivalry, and State Building in the Middle East."

63 Nor can state power’s various dimensions be generically separated or delineated. David Sobek and Cameron Thies, "War, Economic Development, and Political Development in the Contemporary International System," International Studies Quarterly 54(2010).

64 The so-called “resource curse” discussed by Schwarz and other scholars, whereby an abundance of external rents is damaging to the state, is very much under debate. See Marcus J. Kurtz, "The Social Foundations of Institutional Order: Reconsidering War and the 'Resource Curse' in Third World State Building," Politics & Society 37, no. 4 (2009).
Moreover, European states benefited immensely by supporting *private* enterprises, such as the joint-stock ventures of the Dutch and British East India Companies. To declare the privatization of Middle Eastern economies a sign of weakening state strength or to decry the meager nature of Middle Eastern economies relative to the West is to apply a standard not present in early modern Europe. Thus the use of this comparison in the context of war-centric and state-centric theories is misguided and discredits the regional conclusion of weakening states under bellicist paradigms.

Finally, the role of external actors in the Middle East has often been greatly overemphasized, and this is the case here as well. The prominent role of extra-regional actors does not fundamentally change the role of war-making; states of the Middle East do not and cannot solely court even the mightiest superpowers. External assistance alone is insufficient for survival: the Shah of Iran fell from power in 1979 despite immense political, economic, and military support from the United States. Nor can the dominant international political order fully effect the regional political order it desires. The persistent resilience of the Hussein and Assad regimes in Baghdad and Damascus are strong evidence of an overall dominance of Middle Eastern politics over international politics within the region. The regional preponderance of conflict within *state* boundaries, too, means that the bulk of war-making’s impact on state formation occurs largely irrespective of the manipulations of external actors unless channeled through regional actors.

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66 Ibid.
This dynamic was not absent from early modern Europe, either. Interest groups of all colors and causes—religious, national, state, popular, ideological—attempted to shape political and military affairs to their own benefit. The British state, for example, long attempted to forge alliances with the weaker powers of the continent, always seeking to thwart a potential hegemon on the mainland that could strike at the Isles. Support from any number of European powers located outside the Low Countries was similarly critical in ensuring the successful rebellion of the Protestant Dutch Netherlands against Catholic Spain. Thus the undue attention given to the well-studied relationship between global powers and the developing Middle East examines, at best, a contributory component of state development in the region.

To be successful, a comprehensive theoretical framework for the development of states and state power in the Middle East needs to incorporate all of the region’s contextual differences from the early modern European experience and a thorough understanding of the relationship between modern Middle Eastern states, their societies, and the security predicament.

_A Modified Conceptual Map_

Drawing heavily from bellicist theories of state formation, I propose a modified model for mapping state formation in the Middle East that takes into account the particulars of regional politics, economics, society, and culture—a model that I summarize here. The balance of this chapter will be dedicated to the model’s further explication, using comparisons with other conceptual maps, produced by Tilly and other scholars of state formation, and examining several key causal linkages.
In essence, the model characterizes a cyclical development pattern that ultimately results in greater state power. The security predicament faced by states in the Middle East presents a need for state-controlled coercive capacity. Consequently, states innovate and develop in pursuit of this resource, accumulating and concentrating coercion in the hands of the state when they do so successfully. Simultaneously, the security predicament presents a need for capital to finance the development of coercion; states therefore also innovate and develop to acquire capital. The acquisition of these resources is very rarely an easy task, and requires states to continually develop and adapt extraction strategies. Because extraction is eased by a willingness on the part of the domestic population to surrender these resources to the state, this process encourages the development of state legitimacy. Because effective government also eases the extraction, management, and conservation of these resources, it encourages the development of institutional effectiveness. And finally, because coercion and capital are refined resources derived only from raw wealth—in population, in economy, in arms, in energy, et cetera—states are encouraged to develop improved overall capability.

Growth in legitimacy, institutional effectiveness, and capability feed off of each other but ultimately generate the growth of stable, adaptable, powerful, and effective state institutional structures necessary for the accumulation of state power. Systemically, increases in state power for any one of the system’s competitors typically reinforce the security predicament for all others, further driving the cycle. This is not to say that states are universally made more powerful by the security
Figure 1: New Model of Middle East State Development

Figure 2: Tilly’s European State Formation Model

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68 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1990, 27., Figure 1.8 "Relations among coercion, capital, states, and cities."
predicament. The security predicament is a source of state weakness by presenting threats to states, but this bellicist model of development argues that such threats provide incentives and encouragement for state development and the ultimate growth of state power. This model applies equally to states and state-like organizations in the region: to the extent that states acquire state power, the security predicament for state-like organizations is exacerbated—forcing their own growth or extinction. To the extent that state-like organizations acquire state power, then, the security predicament for states is exacerbated and the cycle continues.

This model bears great similarity to Tilly’s own model for early modern Europe, but also has a few key differences. Writing about an age when the very form of states was extremely varied, Tilly sought to explain why the “national state” (the “modern state” to which I refer to simply as the “state”) came to dominate the system of states first in Europe and then the world. Growth in state power is therefore only one aspect of his model, though a very central one, and the ultimate output is instead the form of states. Similarly, the rise of capitalism and the growth of cities—two very solidified trends in the modern day—are much more important to early modern European development and thus figure more centrally in his theoretical model.

In the present day, however, the form of states is fairly uniform—Tilly’s “national state” hugely predominates, with only governmental differences among democracies, autocracies, and everything in between. The course of development for states in the modern day is not written in their very shape, but is instead written in the rise and fall of their relative state power.69 State power, therefore, is the ultimate

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69 Military power, as an aspect of state power, is often afforded especial significance in the international community, but other elements of state power are important too: Germany’s powerful
output of my development model, rather than a generator of something else as in Tilly’s model (the national state).

A final difference is the cyclical emphasis to the modified conceptual map. The security predicament does not appear directly in Tilly’s theoretical model, though it features prominently in his theory itself. However, since the output in Tilly’s model is slightly more definite, the modern state rather than an arbitrary growth in relative state power, its cyclical nature is comparatively de-emphasized. The security predicament’s deliberate inclusion in the modified model dovetails with the model’s ultimate output, its cyclical nature, and also its relative prioritization of the coercion side of the state development process.

The Security Predicament

States of the Middle East find themselves in a variety of security predicaments. Most discussed among scholars of state formation is the external systemic security predicament. States must be able to ensure their survival in the case of war with their neighbors, or any state that could conceivably project power into their territory. Taken to a reasonable extreme, a state such as Israel must have the military capability to hold its thin strip of territory against “any imaginable coalition of Arab states.”

Sadowski, *Scuds or Butter?: The Political Economy of Arms Control in the Middle East*, 58. A current example of the security predicament taken to an unreasonable extreme would be a (fictional) Israeli military maxim that the state must possess sufficient military might to conquer and hold the Arabian peninsula or win a war against the combined might of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
caught in a security predicament that presents a need for coercion and capital such that they might develop defenses against potential aggressor states.

A second version of the security predicament, one that I believe is much more relevant for most states of the modern Middle East (Israel being the prime exception), is the insecurity of the state from within. Few Middle Eastern states involve the bulk of their populations in the political process, and most are controlled by small political elites; even after the much-lauded Arab Spring, democracy remains weak and alien to the Middle East. For the political elite, political security is therefore obtained (the elite can more easily control the character and execution of government) at the cost of existential insecurity: the non-elite are encouraged to seek other centers of authority by their exclusion from the political system, and as those alternative centers of authority grow in popularity (and thus legitimacy), the state’s own legitimacy and power are threatened. Throughout the Middle East, political Islam, tribal loyalties, and ethnic ties are powerful currents of alternative authority for populations excluded from the state. Very often, these imagined communities develop their own militias, governing and legal systems, and other institutions which qualify them for state-like organizations. Lodged within the state’s territory but politically separated, these politicized quasi-state communities pose immense threats to the security of the state. States of the Middle East have therefore sought out the power to suppress internal dissent, de-legitimize or destroy state-like organizations, and ensure the continued rule of the present regime and its political elite.71

71 Note that the distinction between ‘regime’ and ‘state’ here is largely irrelevant. From the perspective of the regime, it is the state; from the perspective of the state, regime change in the Middle East over the past century has typically been rather violent and effected significant damage to the state (defined as a political infrastructure). Indeed, in some cases such as the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the
For Tilly and the state formation of early modern Europe, what I call external security is what mattered, derived from the state system’s increasingly nationalized character and reinforced by the norm of warfare on the continent. Alternative sources of legitimacy, such as the political power of religion, were greatly overshadowed by secular power by mid-millennium. Indeed, as seen in the example of the Thirty Years’ War in the previous chapter, religion was tied neatly to relatively congruent ethnic, national, and state territorial boundaries. The legitimation power of “alternative” foundations for state-making were in fact at the very employ of the states themselves. Not so in the Middle East: tribal, ethnic, and religious identities are often territorially incongruent with states, presenting a more hostile internal security environment than that faced by early modern European states. Regardless, the security predicament faced by states persists whether it is more external or more internal in nature. In the face of insecurity, therefore, states of the Middle East seek to acquire the concentrated means of coercion and the capital to finance such means.

*The Acquisition of Coercion and Capital*

As in early modern Europe, states developed varying strategies to acquire the resources necessary for security. Coercive capacity almost invariably requires capital, so states have employed a variety of strategies for extracting capital—most typically existing state was almost completely overhauled and replaced. Of course, in those rare cases of peaceful, smooth, or democratic transition, there is a security-based distinction between the state and the regime, for the state might care little about the character of its occupant. Still, the regime is unlikely to be totally destroyed in these cases, and may yet return to the seat of the state. Thus these cases form an altogether different situation than the security-scarce one described above. (Concerning external security issues, the regime and the state are usually indistinguishable.)

There are many, many exceptions to that congruity, of course, but it applies as a general characterization. Note also that the line between internal and external security is often blurred in the literature on European state formation. For example, the birth of the Dutch Netherlands is regularly described both as a rebellion (internal) against Habsburg Spain and as a war (external) between them.
from the ground, from the economy, and from other states and foreign powers.\textsuperscript{73}

These strategies have included rigorous pursuit of natural resources (particularly oil), import-substitution industrialization, state-led growth through public-sector development, state-led growth through expressly military-oriented technological development, privatization, urban development, and the securing—through strategic alliances or, more rarely, war—of loans and aid for both military and economic pursuits from other states inside and outside the region.\textsuperscript{74}

Over time, these strategies have met with varying success and varying side effects, but those states that managed to pursue successful strategies for the acquisition of capital have used their wealth to build enormous militaries, surveillance networks, secret police infrastructures, paramilitary police forces, and other coercive means of effecting state security.\textsuperscript{75} Some strategies do this more directly than others. State-led growth through military-oriented technological development simultaneously contributes to the development of coercion and capital. Strategic alliances can provide a cover of security against external aggression, as well as arms, funding, and training that contribute to internal security. The development of natural resources, 

\textsuperscript{73} The need for coercion is not the only reason states seek capital, of course. Capital is also beneficial to states in its own right beyond its effects on the ability to acquire coercion, and contributes directly to the development of legitimacy, institutional effectiveness, capability, and ultimately state power.

\textsuperscript{74} For a robust discussion on many of these various strategies and their effectiveness in extracting capital, see Alan Richards and John Waterbury, \textit{A Political Economy of the Middle East}, 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008). Note that the urban centers developmental path so important to Tilly’s model is far less pronounced here, primarily because although urban growth has been significant in the Middle East (though not to the degree experienced in early modern Europe) the bargaining between states and cities—the exchange of capital for protection—is a more or less permanent and pre-existing feature of modern state systems, including the Middle East. The percentage of Europe’s population in cities did not reach ten percent until the late 18\textsuperscript{th} century; comparatively, the percentage of the Middle East’s population in cities throughout the late 20\textsuperscript{th} century has been near 50 percent. Tilly, \textit{Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1990}, 50; Richards and Waterbury, \textit{A Political Economy of the Middle East}, 266. Thus in the Middle East there is very little variation in Tilly’s bargaining dynamic over the modern period, and it is therefore not an important feature of the proposed model.

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{A Political Economy of the Middle East}, 344-60.
contrastingly, contributes most directly to the acquisition of capital, which is then subsequently used by the state to acquire coercion. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf petro-monarchies, for example, have used their vast oil wealth to pursue strategic alliances with the West, develop robust security apparatuses, and pacify their domestic populations through enormous cradle-to-grave social welfare.76 Regardless of strategy, however, states across the region have been encouraged by the security predicament to pursue the tools of coercion.

Coercion’s Impact on Legitimacy, Institutional Effectiveness, and Capability

An increase in a state’s coercive power can strengthen that state’s legitimacy (defined as the authority granted to the state by the relevant population), institutional effectiveness, and capability. In terms of legitimacy, the state benefits from garnering credit for the protection of its populace from outsiders, terrorists, or other groups successfully dubbed enemies of the state. Maintaining order on the streets, suppressing violence, and exercising clear superiority over other armed groups (such as militant tribes or local militias) lends clout to the state in terms of right to rule. When considering a state’s legitimacy, might very often does make right—or at least suppresses opposition. Conversely, an inability to maintain order and being publicly challenged by alternative armed groups unsurprisingly damages a state’s claim on the monopoly of legitimate use of force and therefore its overall legitimacy as a governing organization. Institutional effectiveness also benefits from the growth of coercive might. Military and paramilitary forces require administrative capacity to

recruit, equip, train, feed, and deploy them. Police forces require justice systems—even crude ones based on bribery or blood relations. Governments need systems in place to make budgets, allocate funds, purchase military hardware, pursue development and research, and engage in diplomatic efforts. As coercive power increases, institutional structures are encouraged to develop alongside to manage and exercise the newly acquired power effectively. Unsurprisingly, with an increase in coercion come expanded capabilities for the state to exercise and enforce its will over the population. Actions that might once have courted rebellion, such as creating new taxes or the banning of a minority ethnic group’s language, can now be done with relative impunity and without a significant drop in the regime’s security.

*Capital’s Impact on Legitimacy, Institutional Effectiveness, and Capability*

The story with capital is much the same: capital shares a positive relationship with legitimacy, institutional effectiveness, and state capability. A wealthy treasury requires an army of bureaucrats to manage it, so increases in capital—especially the arrival of new revenue streams (new trade agreements, oil sales, *et cetera*) or complex enterprises such as integration into the world economy—often result in stronger and more effective institutional structures, and subsequently greater increases in capital. The connection to state capability is obvious: more money allows the state to do more, to undertake the bigger and better. A state can expand its military, its welfare state, its economic development, or a host of other projects and endeavors or some combination therein. Capital’s effect on legitimacy is perhaps the least direct. Legitimacy benefits significantly from the presence of functional state institutions and
from high state capability, both boons of concentrated capital, but state legitimacy also benefits the very image of wealth itself: no nation likes to be considered poor, and greater wealth often means greater status, both internationally and domestically.

The Interrelation of Legitimacy, Institutional Effectiveness, and Capability

As elements of state power, legitimacy, institutional effectiveness, and capability are not wholly separable. If, say, a particular state bureaucracy is streamlined and becomes more efficient, this development will likely have a subsequent impact on the state’s legitimacy as citizens see and support effective governance. A similar development could also occur, however, if the state acquired additional resources from new oil drilling—increasing its capability—and dedicated the new funds to expanding the bureaucracy’s budget. Alternatively, growth in the state’s legitimacy could also enhance capability by making new pools of supportive and loyal manpower available to the state. Each readily contributes to the others. Legitimacy facilitates the extraction of resources, resources spur the development of institutions, and effective institutions lend legitimacy to the state. Effective institutions also ease the extraction of resources, which subsequently also lend legitimacy, which also then encourages loyalty in institutional actors and makes them more effective. These three proxies for state power are therefore highly interrelated. When examining specific cases in later chapters, certain developments will be categorized under one or another of these elements but will very often be readily applicable to two or even all three.
The Impact of Legitimacy, Institutional Effectiveness, and Capability on State Power

As the degree to which a state can readily exercise its will, both within its territory and without, state power is not much without legitimacy, institutional effectiveness, and capability. In the exercise of the state’s will, legitimacy allows the state to trump the wills of others (populations, tribes, civil society, state-like organizations, and even other states). Institutional effectiveness permits the state to maximize the use of its resources. And capability, as the measure of the state’s raw human and material resources, allows the state to simply do more. Legitimacy, institutional effectiveness, and capability are therefore very efficient proxies for state power: any growth in legitimacy, institutional effectiveness, or capability results in a corresponding growth in state power.

State Power’s Impact on the Security Predicament

In early modern Europe, the growth of state power in some states heightened the security predicament and forced the other states to also grow in state power, or perish—so too for Middle Eastern states. When any one state accumulates state power, the other states in the system become less secure because the newly powerful state could exercise its power against them. The relationship between the security predicament and state power is thus a self-reinforcing feedback loop: the security predicament forces states to accumulate resources and adapt to meet the challenge, generating state power, which in turn generates greater systemic insecurity that each state must then face and overcome.
This feedback loop applies to state-like organizations as much as states. To the extent that a state-like organization accumulates state power, states within the system are threatened and forced to accumulate their own state power. Conversely, to the extent that states accumulate state power, state-like organizations are threatened and forced to adapt, innovate, and extract new resources to again face the challenge of the state. This dynamic of converse pressures is vital to the development of states in the Middle East, precisely because states and state-like organizations so commonly co-exist throughout the region—in the very same way that near-constant interstate warfare in early modern Europe spurred development of state power in the European state system.

Conclusion

With a modified theoretical framework for state formation in the modern Middle East so laid, case studies are now needed to prove the framework’s worth. The next chapter examines the Iran-Iraq War, which raged from 1980 to 1988, and explores the work of conventional, interstate war-making upon the state power of two Middle Eastern states. A study of Turkey’s internal conflict with Kurdish nationalists follows to elucidate the effects of long-term intrastate conflict on state power. A final case study in Chapter 7 discusses the development of Hamas from a state-like organization into an actual state in Gaza, attending closely to the relationship between this transition and Hamas’s war-making practices. In these three cases, we see this modified model played out in the Middle East, from security predicament to state power and back again.
IV

Case Study: The Iran-Iraq War

On the 22nd of September, 1980, Iraqi military forces launched a war with Iran that would last for nearly eight years—the longest and bloodiest war between developing states to date. Despite an incredible loss of both life and capital, both states profited substantially from the conflict. On the eve of war, the regimes of both states looked precarious, Saddam Hussein’s having conducted what amounted to an internal coup in 1979 and Ayatollah Khomeini having declared a theocracy on the wave of social revolution that same year in Iran. By war’s end, however, the supremacy of the state within Iran and within Iraq was effectively unquestioned. Rivals for statehood were checked, censored, or destroyed. The rise in each states’ respective legitimacy is only the most obvious benefit to state power for Iran and Iraq as a result of the war. Though the change in state capabilities is difficult to evaluate, having increased in some areas and declined in others, institutional effectiveness undoubtedly improved for both Iran and Iraq by 1988. The story of increasing state power, however, is not the typical tale of the Iran-Iraq War. Scholarly analysis and history textbooks alike tend to focus on the losses incurred without considering the less tangible gains that the losses purchased.
Attention to the negative aspects of the War is understandable, as there were many such aspects. Millions of soldiers, vast financial resources from all over the world, huge quantities of chemical weapons, and the enormous oil wealth of two of the world’s leading oil producers flooded into the conflict. But the war simply ground on, longer than any other conventional war between sovereign states of the 20th century, with few major successes for either belligerent amid widespread destruction and loss of life. By the end of the war, neither side had made any territorial gains. Iraq failed to achieve any of Saddam Hussein’s primary objectives for the war, in particular to obtain exclusive control over the Shatt al Arab waterway, annex Arab regions and cities in Western Iran, and topple the regime of Ayatollah Khomeini to remove the threat of Shia Islamic unrest within Iraq. Iran, meanwhile, failed to achieve any of its principle aims, namely to export the Islamic Revolution to Iraq, incite rebellion among Iraq’s Shia majority and Kurdish minority, and remove Saddam Hussein and his Sunni Ba’athist regime from power.77

Thus the conventional wisdom holds that the Iran-Iraq War was an “ill-conceived military venture”78 in which “neither side gained anything tangible”79 but “resulted in a decline in centralized state power,”80 a “disastrous war”81 characterized by “a monumental waste of men and lives, a vaulting testimony to the cynicism of leaders [and] the naivety of populations.”82 In the succinct words of F. Gregory Gause, a Professor of Middle East Studies at the University of Vermont, “[i]n the

77 Ray Takeyh, "The Iran-Iraq War: A Reassessment," The Middle East Journal 64, no. 3 (2010).
80 Lu and Thies, "War, Rivalry, and State Building in the Middle East," 243.
catalogue of evidence that war is a senseless endeavor, the Iran-Iraq War is exhibit A.83 This chapter offers a contrasting judgment. I contend that the Iran-Iraq War directly resulted in expanded state power for both participant states. First, let us examine the effects of the war on state power’s tripartite components according to our state formation model: legitimacy, institutional effectiveness, and capability.

Legitimacy

The legitimacy of the Iraqi state in 1980 was not particularly strong. After the state had been formed in 1920 as a protectorate of the British Empire in the aftermath of the First World War, the state of Iraq had first been ruled by monarchy under British auspices and then as an independent kingdom, suffered a brief coup d’état during 1941 followed by a second British occupation until 1947, and then a series of coup d’états in 1958, 1963, and finally 1968 by the Ba’ath Party. Most recently, in 1979, Saddam Hussein had conducted an internal coup removing then-President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr from power as part of a long-running usurpation of state powers to himself. Despite the relatively calm period of Ba’athist rule since 1968, during which Iraq experienced a substantial economic boom bolstered by the 1970s steep climb in oil prices, Iraq was still a very young nation with a history of coup-trap politics, and now the ruling party was wracked by infighting between Hussein’s faction and al-Bakr loyalists. Meanwhile, on the national scale, Iraq’s national identity was quite weak. The state’s Shia majority had little love for the Sunni-dominated ruling Ba’ath party, the large Kurdish populations in northern Iraq sought

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to establish their own independent state, pan-Arab sentiments still ran strong throughout the country, and tribal loyalties and tribal politics were incredibly important to the Iraqi citizen. Hussein’s internal coup was derived in part from these very divisions, sparked as it was by a disagreement with al-Bakr over the nature of the state’s response to Shia unrest—with Hussein preferring the more militant route just as he had with Kurdish unrest a few years prior. Under these circumstances, the legitimacy of state power granted to the Iraqi state was relatively limited.

Iran suffered from similar difficulties. 1978 had seen the eruption of a social revolution in Iran that toppled the Shah of Iran—Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, who had also come to power only a few decades prior after the rise and fall of several other governments—by January 1979. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a prominent Shia cleric, returned to adoring crowds in February and declared the Islamic Republic of Iran to replace the old monarchy. Not all revolutionary factions supported the new theocratic government, however, and the old-guard monarchists still offered strong political resistance. Particularly threatening to the new regime’s legitimacy were the pro-democracy liberals and secularists, moderate theocrats taking issue with Khomeini’s hard anti-Western line, and the ethnic minorities—Azeris, Baluchis, Kurds—clamoring for cultural rights, autonomy, and independence. Though most Iranians had a sense of national pride, many disagreed about the state’s new direction in the post-Shah era. In this environment, the reconstruction of state institutions was difficult to say the least. The Iranian military, the jewel of the Shah’s regime on which he had spent so lavishly, experienced heavy desertion and fell into further organizational disarray once the new regime began conducting retributive and
precautionary purges of the officers. With political turmoil convulsing the incredibly youthful state, Iran’s state legitimacy was even weaker than Iraq’s.

By the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, both states enjoyed strong state legitimacy. Again, how this change came about was not very different for Iran versus Iraq. The outbreak of war allowed each side to break off political infighting within its own borders and consolidate its regime power. Both states attempted—and largely succeeded—in garbing the war effort in legitimizing language. Saddam Hussein costumed himself as a pan-Arab nationalist (in the form of Iraqi leadership, of course) defending the Sunni Arab world against the Shia Persian threat and liberating the Arab populations under Persian rule. Khomeini cast the war as a defensive war to protect the homeland against the Iraqi invaders and to protect Islam and its newest political form, the Islamic Revolution. For Iran, the war became a way of carrying on the revolution, preserving and advancing the legitimacy of the revolution and the regime it birthed.\textsuperscript{84} Indeed, the Iranian decision in 1982 to carry the war into Iraqi territory, after successfully effecting an Iraqi withdrawal from Iran, was made in large part to preserve the momentum of revolutionary fervor on the part of the Iranian population and political consolidation on the part of the regime.\textsuperscript{85} After all, Khomeini had promised to export the Islamic Revolution throughout the Islamic world (which served, incidentally, to legitimate the Iraqi state as well) and could now claim to be liberating the suppressed Shia majority of Iraq along the way. Iran’s invasion of Iraq

\textsuperscript{85} Hiro, \textit{The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict}, 86.
also served to enhance Iraq’s legitimacy, as the state claimed the same sort of defense-of-the-homeland heroism that the Iranian state had claimed at the outset.

The long back-and-forth slog between the two states continued for years in this same vein. For much of the war, Hussein’s regime cast itself as the peacemaker against an intransigent Iran, while Iran cast itself as a righteous warrior-state determined to defeat a disgraced enemy. What finally ended the war—with no territorial changes or other substantial gains for either side—was the Iranian regime’s calculation that it could better preserve and enhance its legitimacy by making peace. The regime had very effectively consolidated its power through the course of the war, and the population was ready to make peace, less and less swayed by the notion of jihad. The reversal in policy on a peace deal was therefore quick. Both sides then attempted to claim victory—Hussein claiming that he had contained the Persian threat and Khomeini claiming that he had defended Iran and the Revolution.

The most critical point, however, is that at war’s end there was no doubt that Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime held control of the sole legitimate state in Iraq, and Ayatollah Khomeini headed the sole legitimate state in Iran, unlike the many doubts that festered on both sides of the Shatt al Arab before the war. Thus the Iran-Iraq War led directly to an advance in legitimacy for both Iraq and Iran.

**Institutional Effectiveness**

Difficulties with institutional effectiveness facing Iran and Iraq were even more substantial in 1980 than their legitimacy problems. In Iran, the turbulent transition from the Shah’s monarchical government to Khomeini’s theocratic state

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86 Ibid., 4-5.
heavily disrupted the operation of everyday governance. The new regime opted to introduce a more or less entirely different governance structure and institutional framework, adding to the already lengthy and chaotic transition period. Though the moderates in the interim Parliament led by the interim Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan attempted to administer government through existing institutions, these steadily lost power and importance to the Khomeini-governed Revolutionary institutions. Adding to this institutional disorganization was the political infighting between revolutionary factions and opposition from monarchy loyalists, which continued to wrack the country. The institutional effectiveness of the military, in particular, fell apart.\textsuperscript{87} At the onset of the transitional period between the Shah’s departure and Khomeini’s declaration of the Islamic Republic, different factions within the military warred among themselves, some forces defecting to Khomeini and others remaining loyal to the Shah’s still-standing transitional government. A new military branch, the Revolutionary Guards, was introduced into the confusion and the powerful old secret police network, SAVAK, was disbanded. Even by September 1980, the military institutions that the Shah had so lovingly crafted still lay in shambles.\textsuperscript{88}

Iraq did not fare much better, though for different reasons. With a long history of masterful political intrigue and the tendency to ruthlessly eliminate any rivals, Saddam Hussein instilled a deep fear throughout the ranks of the state, even within his inner circle of Ba’ath elites. This fear damaged institutional effectiveness, as few were willing to contest Hussein’s will on policy or other matters, and this was

\textsuperscript{87} Though, importantly, not as much as Iraq and many international powers believed.\textsuperscript{88} Gause, \textit{The International Relations of the Persian Gulf}, 58.
particularly acute within the military. Saddam Hussein was a civilian with no military training, but he styled (and imagined) himself a general—often appearing in military dress during and after the Iran-Iraq War—and played a very active role in determining military strategy throughout his rule. This was to Iraq’s detriment, causing the state’s armed forces to regularly pursue ineffective and nonsensical strategies on the battlefield. Furthermore, the fear felt among the state elite was reciprocated in Saddam. Hussein’s political acumen was well matched by his paranoia. Fearful that his subordinates, perhaps led by another like himself, might attempt to remove him from power, Hussein actively crippled the military establishment to prevent it from being used in a coup attempt. Military organizations were fractured and split to generate protective redundancy, with extra paramilitary organizations added on top for extra security. Purges and executions in the officer corps and other critical members of the armed forces were regular. Unfortunately for Iraq, these problems persisted throughout the war and beyond. However, one element of the military’s institutional effectiveness dramatically increased as a result of the war: training. Hussein’s paranoia had ensured that soldiers received remarkably little training, even and especially among the air force and other services that required significant training to be effective, to ensure that they could not be effective during a coup. The Iran-Iraq War provided the needed training through a trial by fire. The fiasco of Iraq’s invasion into Iran at the beginning of the war can be attributed substantially to the inexperience of the Iraqi air force—which failed miserably to

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89 Institutional effectiveness and capability are linked here: access to a trained and experienced military is a mark of both elements of state power.
90 Indeed, Iran was so easily able to shut off Iraqi access to the Gulf in part because the Iraqi airmen had received no training whatsoever on hitting naval targets. Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict, 41.
eliminate Iran’s grounded air force and other important military installations in a
surprise attack, and was consequently dispatched to bases in neutral countries
throughout the region to avoid the Iranian air forces’ much more effective reprisal—
and the application of poor tactics by inexperienced ground forces in the conquest of
Iran’s western cities. Iraq’s army attempted to employ tactics that had worked with
some success to suppress Kurdish unrest in northern Iraq, a practiced strategy that
aimed to protect a paranoid regime’s security, against an entirely different kind of
enemy.91 The capture of Khorramshahr was incredibly costly as a result, whereas the
attempts to take other Khuzistani cities failed altogether. By the second phase of the
war when Iran invaded Iraq, however, Iraq’s military was in a better position—
fighting on home ground and experienced by two years of war—and was able to
regularly stymie Iranian advances into Iraq. By the end of the war in 1988, this had
progressed even further. Iraq’s air force and small navy engaged the stronger Iranian
navy in the Gulf with effect, albeit with significant help from the United States 5th
Fleet, and Iraq managed to push the war back into Iranian territory. Finally, by
increasing the size of the Iraqi military establishment nearly tenfold, the state’s
institutional ability to recruit, arm, finance, train, and deploy both troops and
bureaucrats was forcibly increased by the war. Necessitated by full-scale warfare,
Iraq’s military institutional effectiveness rose considerably as a result of the war.

Iran’s military also benefited from war-pressured administrative development
and from putting the Shah’s vast military through a trial-by-fire training program. On
the military front, the newly formed Revolutionary Guards blossomed into an
enormous and effective fighting force backed by a strong ideological tie to the

91 Ibid., 45.
Islamic Republic to boot; Iran also developed the highly effective “speed-boat swarm” tactic for naval warfare during the war, which it continues to employ today. However, the growth of Iran’s institutional effectiveness during the war extends far beyond military developments: the most important growth in Iran’s institutional effectiveness lay in its political and governing institutions. As a by-product of the power consolidation the war afforded to Khomeini’s regime, the long years of fighting gave Iran the opportunity to freely reboot the state’s entire political infrastructure, from monarchy to theocracy, without the presence of a hobbling counter-revolutionary opposition. Moreover, these brand new institutions were immediately put to the test by the strains of the war, and by 1988 had developed into functional state institutions. These capable institutions, which Iran had not possessed before Iraq’s momentous decision to invade, remain in place today.

**Capability**

Much like legitimacy and institutional effectiveness, the raw capability of Iran and Iraq also increased over the course of the war. At the outset, both states had sizable and well-equipped militaries and possessed vast natural resource reserves, particularly oil. Iran’s population was one of the largest and most educated in the Middle East, affording it ample manpower reserves. Iraq’s economy was running strong and Iran’s had been doing so as well up until the unrest that toppled the Shah began to grind the country to a halt. Unlike the two states’ legitimacy and institutional effectiveness difficulties, on the capability track both were performing fairly well.
The war caused each state’s capability to balloon by 1988, however. Despite immense casualties on both sides, the number of men under arms had more than doubled for each state, to over a million military personnel in the case of Iraq—nearly six percent of its total population. Facilitated by international support for its war effort, Iraq’s supply of advanced military technology—tanks, aircraft, artillery—dramatically increased by 1988, although its navy remained virtually nonexistent. After the war, these resources were available to the state in its efforts to quell internal dissent, and then again for use in the (ultimately counter-productive) grab at Kuwait in 1990. Energy production, almost exclusively oil production, actually increased for both states, in spite of considerable damage wrought upon production infrastructure during the war. Although oil exports and general economic development were disrupted by the fighting, both states were able to keep a war-oriented economy afloat. Iraq came out with substantial debts, particularly to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, but also with valuable new infrastructure that directed Iraqi oil production and exports away from the Gulf (which was, of course, decimated during the 1991 Gulf War). Iran came out of the war with relatively little debt, a functional economy, and a substantially more urbanized population, and was able to build upon its upward trend in energy production after the war to grow its economy further.

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93 The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict.
94 Singer, "Composite Index of National Capability."
95 Indeed, both states used the war as an opportunity to limit labor rights for its own ends, such as Iraq’s elimination of public employees’ rights to unionize and legal protection against layoffs. Gongora, "War Making and State Power in the Contemporary Middle East," 326.
96 Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict.; reflected in data from Singer, "Composite Index of National Capability."
Conclusion

This case study can help us to understand the role of war-making, particularly the role of formal interstate war, in state formation theory in the Middle East. Examined holistically, the Iran-Iraq War had an expansionary effect on state power for the principle participant states, Iran and Iraq. This reality runs contrary to the popular conception of the war as an unequivocated disaster for both sides: as we have seen, each state experienced a strengthening of national unity and state legitimacy, an upturn in the effectiveness of its institutions, and a growth in the raw resources available to it. As a result of the war, Iran and Iraq were each stronger states, not weaker. War, therefore, can set into motion processes that force the development of stronger states, if and when it occurs. But what of intrastate conflict? Can that also contribute to the development of stronger states in the Middle East? To answer that question we turn to our next case study and examine the conflict between the Turkish state and its recalcitrant Kurdish population.
Case Study: Turkey and the PKK

The perennial “Kurdish question” has long been a contentious subject of debate in Turkey, as it has also been in Iraq, Iran, and Syria—the four states whose intersections criss-cross the nation of Kurdistan. Since 1984, the Turkish state has been at war with the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), a militant Kurdish organization operating out of southeastern Turkey, with the conflict scaling down only during very occasional cease-fires and very recent developments toward a lasting peace. Despite the cross-border and trans-state nature of the Kurdish nation, the Turkey-PKK conflict has remained an almost exclusively intrastate conflict, just as similar Kurdish unrest and agitation has been in Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Much like the Iran-Iraq War, the cost of the Turkey-PKK conflict over its thirty-year history has been enormous in expenditure, infrastructural damage, and human loss. Nevertheless, also much like the interstate Iran-Iraq conflict, this intrastate conflict was a catalyst for wide-ranging development and expansion of Turkish state power. Again, I examine this developmental process through the lenses of state power’s base elements: legitimacy, institutional effectiveness, and capability.
Background

The history of this conflict reaches much farther back than 1984, stretching at least back to the dying days of the Ottoman Empire, during which the Ottomans employed Kurdish militias to maintain order through much of Anatolia’s interior. Since the birth of the modern Turkish state under Kemal Ataturk, a Kurdish independence movement has more or less been present in Turkish politics, concentrated in the local politics of the predominantly Kurdish southeast. This independence movement certainly saw bloody days before 1984, but for the purposes of this chapter the eruption of nearly-continuous low-level warfare between the Turkish state and the PKK in 1984 is the important date of consideration.

The PKK is the main Kurdish-nationalist political and military organization operating in Turkey. The organization fights to achieve expanded Kurdish self-determination, cultural, educational, and language rights in southeastern Turkey and dreams of creating an eventual independent Kurdish state. Since 1984, the PKK has conducted a sustained guerilla war against the Turkish state, primarily in southeastern Anatolia but occasionally reaching into Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and other major Turkish cities outside ethnically Kurdish areas. The exact shape of the conflict has fluctuated slightly over the decades, but the PKK has generally struck both military and civilian targets—including schools and teachers, which the organization targets because of state limitations on the teaching of the Kurdish language and Kurdish history. Besides the political statement regarding the rights of the Kurdish minority, the PKK has aimed to threaten the state’s hold over society, culture, and security in the Kurdish areas.

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97 Which would thus be, in Tilly’s terminology, a truly national state.
The state, for its part, long sought to suppress any notion of a “Kurdish problem” or question within Turkey, preferring to instead attempt to assimilate Kurdish populations and opting to define Turkish nationalism in very ethnically Turkish (rather than multi-ethnic) terms. The state banned the use of the Kurdish language in schools and on the radio, denied the existence of a Kurdish nation or identity, and forbade the use of the term “Kurdistan.” From the outset of the guerilla war, the state conducted an equally sustained military campaign to destroy the PKK’s forces operating in Turkey, at times even venturing into neighboring Iraq to destroy PKK bases in Iraq’s mountainous northern regions. To improve security in southeastern Turkey, the state often evacuated, burned, or attacked villages in the border regions, and set up anti-PKK militias known as “village guards” to secure the remaining villages. The state also tried a variety of tactics to win the hearts and minds of the local populations. Some methods have been more hardline, such as brutal military campaigns to eliminate possible bases of support for the PKK, systemic suppression of the Kurdish culture, or media campaigns to de-legitimize the PKK as a terrorist group with no popular base. Other tactics have been less draconian, such as intense economic development efforts in the region and, more recently, the relaxation of laws around Kurdish language use and education.

Peace prospects strengthened significantly in 2013. In recent years the reigning Justice and Development Party (AKP), a moderate Islamist party that has steadily battered the military-dominated Turkish secular establishment at the polls since 2002, slowly shifted its stance on Kurdistan further from the historical hard line held by the military and their secular Kemalist ideals and more toward
accommodation of Kurdish rights and interests. Negotiating directly and publicly with the PKK’s imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan, the AKP in late 2012 announced an impending agreement that would exchange a PKK ceasefire and withdrawal of its fighters to northern Iraq in exchange for new legislation by the Turkish state which would enable the release of many imprisoned pro-Kurdish activists, provide expanded language and cultural rights to ethnic Kurds, and potentially result in autonomy or even independence for Turkish Kurdistan. In mid-2013, the PKK withdrew its fighters to Iraq as agreed, and the ceasefire has held with only a modicum of residual violence.\footnote{Ömer Taşpinar and Gönül Tol, "Turkey and the Kurds: From Predicament to Opportunity," in \textit{US–Europe Analysis Series} (Brookings Institution: Center on the United States and Europe, 22 January 2014).} Time will tell whether these developments will go the way of previous ceasefires or not, but for now the current peace process must be considered the open endpoint of our considerations and will be discussed, as with the earlier stages of the conflict, in terms of state power.

\textit{Legitimacy}

War is an impressive force with which a state can rally society to its banner, and under most circumstances this is true for intrastate conflicts as much as interstate ones. In the Turkey-PKK conflict, the battle lines very clearly trace the Turko-Kurdish ethnic and identity divide—something the state has readily exploited to its advantage. The state is heavily dominated by ethnic Turks, whose perspectives on Turkish nationalism echo the Turkish unity of the state itself: the nation and state coincide in a single, unitary, indivisible, and unrequitedly \textit{Turkish} identity. For the state, since its inception, the overwhelming paradigm has been to reject any notions
of a multi-ethnic state and to declare Kurdish and other minorities either nonexistent, Turkish, second-class citizens, or not citizens at all. Those who disagree with the paradigm—such as Kurds wishing to express a different ethnic and cultural identity, politically or otherwise—were typically branded by the state as agitators, rebels, and terrorists aiming only to destabilize the state and disrupt the peaceful lives of law-abiding citizens. The state thus easily creates an out-group of a sinister character, against which it can legitimize itself and mobilize society (in this case, the sizable Turkish majority) to achieve its own aims. For example, when the PKK attempted to set up its own shadow-government quasi-administration in Kurdish regions after an intense military campaign, the Turkish state was able to use both its connections with the Turkish press and an upswing in anti-PKK nationalism to brand this quasi-administration as a brutal imposition of martial law against an unwilling populace by a repressive PKK regime (the actual brutality of the PKK’s tactics more generally made this line all the easier to sell). The political atmosphere shifted, and the military was given a free rein to combat the terrorist PKK threat, ultimately resulting in a restoration of state control over the Kurdish southeast. In this, too, state legitimacy benefited, for Turkey was able to demonstrate its military prowess and force a recognition of its right, by force of arms, to control the disputed southeast.

The language of this state legitimization and out-group de-legitimation in the Turkey-PKK case, as in many other cases in the Middle East, largely takes the shape of the state defending itself and the people against a terrorist threat, with tie-ins to

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100 Kirişçi and Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict*, 127.
Turkish nationalism based on the Turkish ethnic identity.\textsuperscript{101} Thus the conflict acts as a focal point around which pro-state Turkish nationalism can be generated—often through “thinly disguised populist speeches” on the part of politicians, which exacerbate the conflict and bolster their own positions simultaneously.\textsuperscript{102} The conflict also stoked Kurdish nationalism, largely because of the state’s own brutality against the populations of southeastern Turkey and, even more so, because of the state’s effort to stamp out the Kurdish identity. Many Kurds who previously felt little connection to the Kurdish nation were made more aware of their connections to the broader struggle precisely because the conflict reached so deeply into Turkish public life.\textsuperscript{103} Thus both Turkish and Kurdish nationalism were fueled by the self-reinforcing conflict; the state, with its overwhelmingly Turkish nationalist identity, readily benefited as a result.

It is important to note that the state–in-group divide along ethnic or religious lines is extremely common throughout the Middle East, and the mechanics in each case are quite similar. In Iraq, the state was dominated until 2003 by Sunni Ba’athists and pushed out Kurds and Shia; now the state is dominated by Shia. In Iran, Persian Shia dominate a state which suppresses Kurds, Baluchis, and Azeris, among other minorities. Saudi Arabia is Sunni-Wahhabi dominated with a Shia minority. The Syrian state is dominated by Alawites, at the cost of the now-rebelling Sunni majority (who many Syrian minorities fear will suppress them if they succeed in overthrowing

\textsuperscript{101} Conveniently for the Turkish state, Turkish nationalism is also rather militant in nature—likely a result of the long-reaching influence of Kemal Ataturk on Turkish society. See Jenny White, \textit{Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).

\textsuperscript{102} Kirisci and Winrow, \textit{The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict}, 133.

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 131.
President Bashar al-Assad). Palestinians have long face second-class status in Israel, Jordan, and elsewhere. Similar characterizations can be applied, in varying but always substantial degrees, to every iteration of every modern state in the Middle East—power-sharing among ethno-religious groups is very rare. In each case, the state is dominated by a particular in-group ethno-religious population that fails, expressly or otherwise, to include large segments of the overall polity based on ethnic or religious difference. In this, Turkey is very much indicative of the rule, rather than the exception. Nevertheless, the state is often able to exploit this divide for its own legitimation, frequently through the use of force.

Institutional Effectiveness

Turkey’s decades of conflict with the PKK have presented huge challenges to the state, and these challenges ensure that the state cannot stagnate and decline, but must instead innovate and grow to survive and defeat the PKK. Specifically, the PKK “aimed to polarize society along Kurdish and Turkish lines … weaken the presence of the state and disrupt its ability to provide basic services … [and] challenge the state’s ability to maintain security in south-eastern Turkey and thus impose itself as an alternative source of authority.” The success that the PKK achieved in these regards at various points in the conflict mandated effective and innovative responses from the state in order to re-establish the level of control it wields today. Each side in the conflict is forced to adapt its tactics, methods, and radicalization by the same evolutions on the other side. In terms of institutional effectiveness, this experimentation is very likely to lead to growth rather than decline, and this is indeed

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104 Ibid., 127.
the case for both the Turkish state and the PKK. Responding to fluctuating escalations, de-escalations, radicalizations, and de-radicalizations on the part of the PKK (whose shifts typically responded to the successes or failures of the Turkish efforts, military or otherwise), the Turkish state has alternately tried heavy-handed military responses, mass imprisonment of activists, defamation in the press, legal and judicial measures such as state of emergency laws, relaxation of anti-Kurdish laws and regulations, and genuine peace negotiations with the PKK. No single effort was likely to solve the conflict—indeed, some were wholly counterproductive—but adaptability and innovation in institutional measures were key to maintaining Turkey’s hold over the Kurdish southeast.105

These measures have had lasting effects. The regular use of mass arrests to silence Kurdish political activists during the conflict has de-sensitized the Turkish population to the phenomenon, allowing its continued use to prevent both a Kurdish Spring spillover from the Arab Spring and to solidify power for the current ruling AKP against the military-secular establishment (which itself regularly used the measure against Islamist political opposition).106 New legislation made much of this possible, including an ambiguous and broad-reaching Anti-terror Law in 1991 and a 1990 decree permitting extensive control over the press, limitations on assembly, and

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105 The most draconian of measures were often less effective. Anti-Kurdish brutality on the part of the military caused many Kurds, especially the youth, to become more connected with the Kurdish issue and the PKK specifically, swelling the PKK’s ranks rather than reducing them.

extensive forced migration for security reasons. The village guard system, implemented to off-load the logistics of securing vast mountainous areas onto the inhabitants and reduce the strain on the military, combined with vast increases in the military presence in southeastern Turkey has radically changed the security dynamic there—with an unintentional side effect of urban migration (a factor very important in Tilly’s theory of state formation) as villagers found themselves caught between the anvil of the PKK and the hammer of the state.

The military itself has also benefited, gaining extensive experience in counter-insurgency and receiving an ample flow of resources and corporate interests from the state. During the conflict, Turkey’s military has been one of the largest in NATO, and for much of the conflict it more or less controlled the state itself. Even today with the AKP in power, however, the Kurdish conflict acts as something of a stabilizing force in the political battle between the military-secular establishment and the AKP, for these two sides must collaborate to handle the PKK threat despite their policy differences.

**Capability**

The word “terrorist” is a great boon to modern states, especially since its rise in popular culture during the late 20th century; the Turkey-PKK conflict is a case in point. Because of the eruption of guerilla warfare instigated by the PKK, the state was able not only to brand the PKK and its supporters as terrorists but also to sweep the

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paint of that brush over the whole of the Kurdish rights and independence movement. Although the PKK itself often resorted to acts of terrorism, many of the Kurdish activists jailed, imprisoned, tortured, or killed by the Turkish state were instead nonviolent activists petitioning the state for their rights. Simple bystanders with no stake in the conflict whatsoever were also often caught between the state and the PKK, especially in the remote villages of the southeast, and swept into the terrorist label. Importantly, however, the state was granted a convenient means of sweeping away its opposition through broad-reaching legal measures and repression in the name of “anti-terrorism efforts.” Furthermore, beyond expanded institutional effectiveness, the broad reach of new legislation created to address the Turkey-PKK conflict has created a vast array of new tools by which the state can exercise control over society.

Beyond new legitimation, the mobilizing incentive of the conflict greatly improved Turkey’s state power in terms of capability. Given an enemy against which the state could marshal society, the force of Turkish nationalism did not disappoint: Turkey’s electorate regularly supported the war efforts and permitted huge spending in the Kurdish southeast, on guns, jeeps, and soldiers as well as new roads, schools, and other economic infrastructure. The military presence in the restive regions swiftly swelled during the conflict to hundreds of thousands of soldiers, while the village guard system also quickly ballooned after its implementation in 1990 to many tens of thousands of personnel—all to secure the region against a few thousand PKK fighters.109 Turkey has also been able to use the conflict to its advantage in its foreign affairs, securing partnerships and collaborations with the United States, Iraq, Syria,

109 Ibid., 130.
and other states to fight the PKK—producing additional resources for the state’s overall security development. Of particular note is a 1984 agreement with Iraq that allowed the Turkish military to pursue PKK fighters into Iraqi territory; similar arrangements with Syria were made at various points in the conflict. The state was thus incentivized and able to greatly improve its border security as a result of the conflict.

Conclusion

At the present and possibly final stage of the Turkey-PKK conflict, the Turkish state enjoys levels of state power it did not possess in 1984, and the conflict has directly contributed to this development. An increase in the state’s legitimacy on the basis of a growing security establishment is perhaps obvious. However, developments in Turkish nationalism, state legitimation through messaging centered on the Turkish identity, and the state’s pivotal importance in the formation of both also proved extremely valuable to the state’s legitimacy and power. The development of state institutions to address the challenges presented by the conflict has been similarly beneficial, as has the array of new tools and resources made available to the state because of the conflict. In this case, at the least, the impact of intrastate conflict on state power is clear. The extrapolation follows that, in the Middle East, intrastate conflict can expand state power just as interstate conflicts do. According to bellicist theories of state formation, then, this much more regionally prevalent form of war

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bears much the same importance here as a system of interstate war did for early modern Europe.

The Iran-Iraq case in the previous chapter and the Turkey-PKK case in this chapter have explicated the effects of war-making (of the interstate and intrastate varieties, respectively) on states and state power. The next chapter examines war-making’s effects on state-like organizations, exemplified through a discussion of Hamas’s transitional development from a state-like organization into a state.
Case Study: Hamas in Gaza

In January 2006, Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, or the Islamic Resistance Movement) shocked the Western world by scoring a resounding election victory in the Palestinian legislative elections, capturing 74 of the 132 seats and defeating the internationally-backed Fatah government, which had dominated the politics of the Palestinian independence movement for decades. This followed a similar election victory at the municipal level a few months before in 2005. Despite clear willingness on the part of both Hamas and Fatah to work together through a coalition government, an incredulous US government, which had been largely responsible for suggesting the elections in the first place, immediately launched a vicious campaign to discredit and dislodge Hamas from its new, democratically elected and legitimate place in Palestinian government. The US-marshaled international pressure against the Hamas-led government was sufficient to prompt a reluctant Fatah to scrap its present agreements with Hamas, sparking internecine violence between the two parties and plunging the Palestinian Territories into a period of violent civil conflict. Denied its right to govern as the democratically elected government and facing rampant lawlessness and violence throughout the West Bank and Gaza, Hamas conducted a military takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, routing Fatah’s gangs in the region and seizing Palestinian National Authority (PNA)
buildings and facilities there. This accomplished, Hamas found itself transformed from a violent resistance movement bordering on a government into a government bordering on a state.

This chapter will argue two related points: first, that Hamas has functioned as a state since 2007, and second, that that transition was possible primarily because of the organization’s war-making activities. Before these points can be proved, however, some brief historical background is necessary for understanding the nature and position of Hamas as a movement, organization, and state.

Background

An offshoot of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas was founded during the early days of the First Intifada, or uprising, in 1987. Within the Brotherhood, the guiding principle of preparing for the implementation of an Islamic state as a means of resolving the Israeli occupation was steadily losing ground to the push for immediate and armed resistance to the occupation, whereas the eruption of the First Intifada formed the catalyst that produced the institution of Hamas. Very quickly, the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood became subsumed into Hamas, which assumed the Brotherhood’s mantle of forefront Islamist faction among the Palestinians. During the period between the founding of Hamas to the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, Hamas followed a policy of offering Israel both stick and carrot: the organization regularly conducted attacks on Israeli soldiers, including inside Israel, as a rejection of the status quo while also offering proposals (always rejected by Israel) with concessions that would allow for a two-state solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. During this time Hamas officially formed its military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, and was outlawed by Israel and international powers as a terrorist organization, marking the beginning of targeted assassinations and mass arrests of Hamas leaders and members by Israel, which continue to this day. In effect, Hamas and Israel have been in a constant state of low-level war, pockmarked by brief periods of intensified conflict, since the late 1980s. During the Oslo period, from 1993 until the start of the Second Intifada in 2000, Hamas maintained this basic strategy of armed resistance but also intensified its opposition to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and its main political party, Fatah, and tried to shore up its political and social support bases. Hamas’s continued use of violence put the organization at loggerheads with the PLO and its international backers, causing outright conflict between the two groups, which considerably weakened Hamas during the late 1990s. However, the militarization of Palestinian nationalism during the Second Intifada in 2000 allowed Hamas to rebuild its power base and reassert its role as the armed resistance faction distinct from the politically ailing and corrupt PLO and Fatah. Hamas was further strengthened, and Fatah further weakened, by the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005, which Hamas attributed to its own continued armed resistance making the Gaza Strip inhospitable for Israeli occupation.

Also in 2005, Hamas first boycotted the PNA’s presidential election before deciding, for the first time, to formally enter the political arena and participate in the municipal elections that same year followed by the legislative elections of 2006. Hamas won resounding victories over Fatah in both, achieving an outright majority in
the legislative elections. Hamas then attempted to form a government, clearly expressing willingness to collaborate with Fatah and even Israel to do so under normal governmental circumstances, but was prevented from doing so by the United States, Israel, the United Nations, and eventually Fatah, which succumbed to international pressure and began a protracted campaign to deny Hamas the institutions of state and dislodge it from its democratically elected position of power, eventually prompting Hamas to military take control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007.

**Hamas as a State**

Since its expulsion of Fatah in 2007, Hamas has functioned as the uncontested de facto government of the Gaza Strip and exhibited extensive state-like behavior. The most important of these behaviors, at least for the concerns of this work, is the exercising and enforcement of a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within Gaza. Hamas, since its founding, has rejected the authority of Israel to use armed force within the Territories, and has since 2007 also rejected the authority of the PNA under Fatah, but it is Hamas’s *actual* monopoly within the Gaza Strip that lends state-like qualities to the Hamas government. At several points during Hamas’s tenure in Gaza through today, Hamas has successfully suppressed the martial activities of other armed groups in Gaza—particularly other Islamist Jihadis—and all but eliminated rocket fire into Israel during periods of negotiated truce following government-to-government, state-to-state talks between Hamas and Israel.\(^{112}\) The powerful clans,

crime families, and similar organizations of the Gaza Strip were similarly undermined, both militarily and economically, by the Hamas regime at the very outset.\textsuperscript{113} The notorious lawlessness of the Strip, which was a defining feature for years and had recently escalated during the internecine conflict between Hamas and Fatah, mostly disappeared as Hamas enforced order and took over the operation of government services—despite the acute lack of funds and basic goods in Gaza imposed by the international community.\textsuperscript{114} In effect, Hamas found itself in control of a territory and moved to fill the vacuum therein of not only political power, but also government and all its typical duties, including enforcement of law and order, economic development, crafting legislation, conducting diplomacy, and providing desperately needed social services to the population.\textsuperscript{115} Moreover, in the face of incredible adversity, Hamas has been quite successful in both monopolizing and performing the tasks and functions of a modern government.\textsuperscript{116}

These behaviors contrast sharply with the Hamas of the previous decades. Prior to its takeover of Gaza, and particularly prior to its election victory in 2006, Hamas understood itself as an opposition force and a resistance movement, and it functioned that way. Hamas rejected a governmental role and distanced itself from all activities associated with the PNA and the PLO, which was (according to Hamas) the PNA’s understood overlord. Before the 2005 municipal elections, Hamas had refused

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\textsuperscript{115} Incidentally, we are today beginning to see much the same occurrence in parts of rebel-held Syria, particularly in the Kurdish regions on the border with Turkey and Iraq.
\textsuperscript{116} Yezid Sayigh, "Hamas Rule in Gaza: Three Years On,"(Crown Center for Middle East Studies: Brandeis University, 2010), 2.
\end{flushleft}
to participate in any formal elections to the PNA since its founding. Although Hamas controlled a vast network of social sector institutions and administered a great variety of social services to the Palestinian people in both Gaza and the West Bank, always complementing the work of the official government services provided by the PNA, Hamas refused to integrate its network into the government until its sudden election victory in 2006 and subsequent seizure of Gaza. Hamas also refused to participate in the official peace process, denouncing even the Oslo Accords, preferring continued armed resistance as the method of achieving a Palestinian state. On every level from 1987 to 2005, Hamas existed outside the framework of the PLO, the PNA, Palestinian governance, and Palestinian government operations. Yet after the events of 2006 and 2007, this was neither desirable nor possible for Hamas, and so the opposition became the government, and the movement became a state.

What made this transition possible? As with the Iran-Iraq and Turkey-Kurdistan cases, I examine the development of Hamas’s state power (such as it is) through the troika of legitimacy, institutional effectiveness, and capability.

Legitimacy

For Hamas, legitimacy has always been based in two essential aspects of its character: an armed resistance to occupation and a network of grassroots social service organizations. Both aspects had been with Hamas since its inception in 1987. The Muslim Brotherhood of Palestine, with its vision of preparing society to become an Islamic state, had long supported a wide network of ground-level social and religious charitable organizations—soup kitchens, mosques, Islamic banking
institutions, health clinics, *et cetera*—and these were absorbed into Hamas along with the Brotherhood itself, from the very beginning. Hamas’s violent character, which it has retained throughout its history with varying periods of radicalization and de-radicalization, was a product of the time of its founding—the First Intifada, a violent uprising to mark the 20th anniversary of Israeli’s 1967 occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. The Intifada itself was a product of a shift in the philosophy of the Palestinian population toward armed struggle as a means to throw off an armed occupation. Indeed, the decision of the Brotherhood to form an armed wing called Hamas was made reluctantly (it compromised the Islamist path to a Palestinian state, namely the slow preparation of society for an Islamic state—for once society was ready the state could not be far behind) in response to its eroding membership as much as in response to the need to participate in the Intifada. As an organization born out of a conflict that has not finished, violence has always been a defining feature of Hamas (and, not coincidentally, of states).\(^{117}\)

Concerning Hamas’s legitimacy as a government and a state, its military activity and its provision of social services have been even more critically important than during the faction’s time as a mere movement. As a movement, armed resistance and social work both lent Hamas significant legitimacy, for Hamas was seen as truly fighting the occupation and truly working to benefit the needs of Palestinians—honesty being another feature of contrast with the widely corrupt Fatah-dominated

\(^{117}\) An Israeli intelligence officer related in an interview the mindset of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, one of the founders of Hamas and a longtime leader: “I always told him, ‘Stop blowing up buses, stop murdering women and children.’ He replied: “Tzvika, listen. . .You established a state thanks to your military power. The dead I take from you are for the sake of establishing a state, but you are killing women and children for the sake of the occupation. You already have a state. . .I have no interest in destroying you—all I want is a state.’” Kobi Ben-Simhon, "Israel Could Have Made Peace with Hamas under Yassin," *Ha'aretz*, April 18th 2009. Cited in Sara Roy, *Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza.*
PNA—and both aspects were important in retaining a substantial membership base and sympathetic constituency. These bases of legitimacy are what translated Hamas into statehood. Its social sector services and reputation—boosted substantially by the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, for which Hamas claimed much of the credit—produced its legitimate democratic victory. Its long history of militarization and its significant martial power enabled it to rout Fatah from Gaza, enforce its rule of law, suppress other armed factions throughout the Strip, and resist a massive and prolonged attack by Israel during Operation Cast Lead in 2008 and 2009. While in power, Hamas’s ability to maintain order; keep the Gaza economy functioning; ensure the arrival of much-needed food, fuel, and other essentials; provide basic government services; and still oppose the Israeli occupation has been essential to maintaining its legitimacy—and it is Hamas’s long history of doing exactly these things from underground and in adverse conditions that has enabled it to succeed. Hamas’s popular legitimacy and statehood are therefore both derived from the organization’s militarized political character.118

Institutional Effectiveness

As mentioned above, Hamas’s historical function as a shadow government pre-2006 lent itself to effectiveness as an actual government post-2006 because Hamas’s extra-governmental networks almost seamlessly fused with the new Hamas-controlled government. On the institutional effectiveness scale of state power for the

118 Hillel Frisch’s study of Palestinian military organizations concludes that the broader failure to realize a Palestinian state, as typically conceived, is inextricably linked to the inability to create a functional military and “internalize the insights of [Charles] Tilly,” among others. Hillel Frisch, The Palestinian Military: Between Militias and Armies, Middle Eastern Military Studies (New York: Routledge, 2008), 189.
Palestinian quasi-state more broadly speaking, however, there are a few additional important points. Prior to Hamas’s election victories and especially during the period between the 2006 legislative elections and Hamas’s seizure of the Gaza Strip in 2007, the PNA in Gaza (and in the West Bank) faced considerable difficulties regarding institutional effectiveness that the Hamas takeover more or less resolved within Gaza. Bureaucratic disorganization (particularly in the security sector), rampant corruption, and factional infighting were the most prominent problems. The first problem was quickly resolved by an intense bureaucratic consolidation of the various security apparatuses in the days following the Hamas takeover, at first into the Executive Force policing body and Qassam Brigades military. The corruption problem and the factional infighting were both resolved by the flood of Hamas members and sympathizers into the Gaza government’s institutional framework. In addition to Hamas’s forceful ejection, apprehension, or elimination of Fatah’s leaders within the Gaza Strip, the new government was greatly aided, unintentionally, by Fatah’s punitive decision to forbid PNA staff in Gaza from showing up to work. Hamas was thus able to fill government posts with its own members, develop an incredibly loyal police force, and all but eliminate factional intra-governmental rivalries and infighting (as well as formally engender collaboration between its existing social sector network and government social service institutions). Simultaneously, the

corruption problem effectively disappeared—Hamas deserved its reputation of honesty vis-à-vis Fatah’s corruption.120

Like legitimacy, institutional effectiveness for Hamas and for Palestine is also linked to Hamas’s military activities, and improved with Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in 2007.

**Capability**

In theory, Hamas’s decision to participate in PNA elections in 2005 and 2006 should have increased its capability by making more resources available to it, trading de-radicalization for a relaxed blockade. This was not, of course, the result. Although the new Hamas government should have gained access to hundreds of millions of dollars in Israeli-collected taxes owed to the PNA, the political fallout of the election and immediate boycotting of the Hamas government by the international community, most importantly the United States, effected the total stoppage of this revenue flow until President Abbas’s dismissal of the Hamas government and swearing in of a government of Fatah technocrats. The situation for Hamas worsened its seizure of Gaza: even during periods of negotiated truce, Israel kept the crossings into Gaza closed and effectively kept the impoverished Strip under constant siege, leaving the tunnels to Egypt at Rafah as Gaza’s only lifeline. Moreover, rather than gaining access to the resources of the PNA, Fatah orchestrated, at the prodding of international governments, the closure of much of Hamas’s charitable network in the West Bank. Between 2005 and 2007, Hamas’s capability—at least insofar as

capability is not intimately connected with institutional effectiveness—actually declined.

This decline is arguably attributable to Hamas’s international reputation as a terrorist organization, and thus attributable to its militarized nature, but in reality the Hamas government very clearly “wanted to govern normally without sanctions and the constant threat of Israeli attacks,” in concert with Fatah through a unity government, and was willing both to negotiate with Israel and to make compromises to do so.\(^{121}\) Hamas’s loss of resources and capability can therefore be laid squarely at the door of the US government, which was totally unwilling to accept the free and democratic decision of the Palestinian people and conducted an extensive campaign to cripple the Hamas government through an economic blockade, arm Fatah to fight Hamas, collectively punish Gaza for its continued tenure of the Hamas government, and finance (mostly unsuccessfully) standard-of-living improvements in the West Bank to score political points for Fatah among the Palestinian people.\(^{122}\) Although capability declined, therefore, this was caused by external factors that were only themselves precipitated by Hamas’s military history and military takeover of Gaza.

Conclusion

As Tilly’s theory proved for early modern Europe, and as my theory of Middle East state development would predict, war-making has encouraged the birth and growth of a new, modern state. Since 2007, the resistance movement that was once Hamas has clearly exhibited the behaviors and markers of a modern state and

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\(^{121}\) Roy, *Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza: Engaging the Islamist Social Sector*, 41.

\(^{122}\) See Sara Roy’s extremely well documented account of the US plan to undo the Hamas government. Ibid., 41-47. See also David Rose, "The Gaza Bombshell," *Vanity Fair*, April 2008.
functional government. In the face of immense international pressure, intra-national conflict, and diminished resources, Hamas has taken and retained control over the Gaza Strip territory, filled the governmental vacuum of the PNA, administered law and government service, negotiated as an independent state with other independent states, and maintained its order in an area known for its lawlessness. Hamas is, in effect, a state. That statehood would not have been possible were it not for Hamas’s inherent nature as a militarized organization with deep grassroots social programming and a broad political base. Therefore, a close link exists between Hamas’s military activities and its growth in state power, from almost nothing to the substantial power it wields today.
VII

Conclusion

The state system of the modern Middle East is radically different from that of early modern Europe, and theoretical frameworks for how modern Middle Eastern states develop must reflect that difference. Although there has been some contemporary scholarship which does precisely that for other regions, the existing scholarship on bellicist theories of state development in the Middle East does not—for one reason or another—adequately adjust for regional and temporal contexts.

The relative absence of war and state death, the abundance of external rents, and the modern (as opposed to early modern) normative culture of a globalized international system are features of the modern Middle East that should be used to modify and specify bellicist theory, not compromise and negate its regional applicability. The theory I have presented here, modified from Tilly’s and other bellicist theories of state formation, attempts to do precisely that. Whereas my theory retains war-making as its driving force—channeled through the critical elements of coercion, capital, legitimacy, institutional effectiveness, and capability—it particularly contrasts with other bellicist theories by drawing its central relationship between state power and the security predicament, rather than between the form of states and ongoing developments in coercion and capital as in Tilly’s theory. This arrangement reflects that the form of states is not much varied across the modern
Middle East, but the state power wielded by each state at any particular point in time is. Similarly, the evolutions in coercion and capital described by Tilly have long passed, but the security predicament faced by states has not.

The case studies examined in the preceding chapters have aimed to illuminate greater contextualization of my theory. The case study of the Iran-Iraq War explored the application of the theory to conventional interstate conflict, war. Once again contrary to the existing scholarship, an examination of the case in terms of state legitimacy, institutional effectiveness, and capability shows that both Iran and Iraq gained substantial state power because of their war-making. Discussing the theory with respect to intrastate conflict, rather than explicit war, the second case study also uses the trifecta of legitimacy, institutional effectiveness, and capability to show that the challenges to the Turkish state presented by militant Kurdish nationalism encouraged the growth of Turkey’s state power. Finally, the case study on the evolution of Hamas expanded the theory’s application beyond states to the development of state-like organizations from non-state actors into state actors.

As these case studies have shown, war-making can play an important role in the development of states in the modern Middle East. In this thesis I have laid out a theory which conceptualizes that cyclical process, a contribution which presents policy implications as well as considerable opportunities for further research.

**Policy Implications**

Objectively, war is a baleful blight on human society. Nevertheless, bellicist theories such as Tilly’s and my own indicate that war-making contributes to the
growth of states and state power, which can—sometimes—be an objectively positive development for human society. As powerful institutional structures, states can support those left behind by society and tackle enormous issues like national defense and macro-economic management in ways that society’s entropy generally cannot. Understanding the exact process by which war-making contributes to the development of state power and the precise conditions under which it does so facilitates a search for other activities undertaken by states that mimic the developmental contributions of war-making. States and their policy-makers could then—following the development path described by bellicist theory—shift to pursuing those activities in place of war-making activities while still accruing greater state power, providing greater opportunities for states to act as forces for the betterment of humanity.

To provide an unproven hypothesis by way of example, the provision of social services to citizens requires enormous resources to effectively perform, much like war-making does. Effective provision requires manpower and wealth (capability), efficient bureaucracies (institutional effectiveness), and trust (legitimacy)—because citizens that do not trust their government will be unlikely to accept complicated medical care or similar services from the state. If scholars can fully understand precisely how each of those enormous endeavors contributes to the generation of state power, the energy states currently pour into war-making activities could be carefully redirected into the provision of social services. Of course, such a development first requires that states (and the policy-makers that inhabit them) be well-meaning and genuinely interested in the welfare of their populations, not just interested in their own survival and power, necessitating that authority not be compelled unwillingly.
greater resources to continue providing services, creating a positive feedback loop of
development that betters both states and their populations. Simultaneously, the
redirection of resources away from war-making would draw down the security
predicament (its external components, at least; the provision of social services might
also have a de-intensifying effect on the internal security predicament), further
facilitating redirection for all states.

Opportunities for Further Research

This thesis has aimed to provide a theoretical framework for understanding
war-making’s possible contributions to state development and state power
specifically in modern Middle Eastern contexts, and to apply this framework to
specific wars and conflicts as a way of grounding and explicating the theory. The
limited and circumscribed scope of this work, in the face of significant gaps in
bellicist literature, provides a great many opportunities for further study and research.

First and foremost, the theory I present in this work is unproven. A rigorous
examination of each causal mechanism of my theory, the exact conditions under
which each does or does not function, and of alternative causal processes would be a
first step toward solidifying the theory. For example, there is likely a point (which
this thesis makes no attempt to identify) at which an internal security predicament
becomes sufficiently acute so as to produce comprehensive state failure rather than
providing an effective incentive for state growth.124 Second, a comprehensive analysis
of this theory applied to specific states of the Middle East and their conflicts,

124 Contemporary Lebanon would make a particularly valuable case study in this regard. The Euro-
centric bellicist literature may also be useful in exploring this point of state failure; the collapse and
disappearance of states is as important to the European theory as is state growth.
examining the ebb and flow of their relative and absolute state power over time, is also necessary to proving the theory. Such efforts require immense expertise, time, effort, and space, more than a mere undergraduate thesis can realistically provide. The full proof or disproof of my theory is thus an area with much need of further study.

In light of the policy implications discussed above, examinations of other activities of states and their impacts on state power, and their potential relationships with bellicist theory, are opportunities for further research. As with the proof of my theory, a thorough analysis of the process and conditions under which these activities can generate positive (and negative) effects on states and human society requires considerable study, and is necessary before policy can adequately be calibrated to produce more positive effects and few negative effects.

Finally, there is potential for broader applicability of my theory to other states and regions, or at least the methodology used to construct my theory from other bellicist literature specifically for the modern Middle East state system. The Middle East region is not especially unique; all states and state-like organizations of the world experience the security predicament to some degree. Indeed, the sheer size of the international community of states affords scholars a great degree of cross-national variation on state power and war-making processes. Future scholarship could therefore build off of this thesis and other similar works to conduct theory-oriented bellicist studies on state development across specific war-making behaviors, within specific states, across multiple states, within specific regions, across multiple regions,
within specific time periods, across multiple time periods, within specific wars, across specific wars, and many combinations therein.

Moreover, such studies would be immensely valuable in comprehensively exploring the usefulness of my theory and its mechanisms. To continue on an earlier example, the point at which the security predicament is sufficient to overwhelm the state—and effect state failure or death rather than state growth—could be better understood through cross-comparison of several regional or temporal state systems, their relative incidence of state failure and state growth, their respective systemic contexts, their relative relationships with war-making, and the comparative shape of their security predicaments. Similar analyses present opportunities to explore other important elements and questions of bellicist theory. What comparative difference in the legitimation process of war-making exacerbates the coup trap experienced in sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia relative to the Middle East? Does a historical longevity of state institutions typically promote or inhibit state growth? Is systemic access to capital an important variable for explaining, through bellicist theory, differing regional rates of state failure? The comparative, systemic, and theoretical scholarship on bellicist theory in the developing is far from complete, just as it is incomplete with respect to the Middle East state system specifically and the modern global state system more broadly.

The bellicist theory of war-making and state power in the modern Middle East that I present here is only one small scholarly contribution to bellicist literature and the broader field of state formation studies. Myriad more contributions to our understanding of the interaction between wars and states all around the modern world
are waiting to be made. And they need to be made—because war is terrible in every sense of the word. Our understanding of war-making may yet make war less prevalent in the human experience.
References


