# Conditioning Immigrant Incorporation:
## Regime Survival, Coalition Politics, Late Development, and the Palestinians in Jordan

by

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# ABSTRACT

Most analyses of immigrant incorporation are conducted on cases of industrialized democracies, polities with elaborate schemes, structures, and procedures for incorporating immigrants. Extant models of immigrant incorporation have been largely developed based on these polities, building on their established structures that guide and facilitate the integration of immigrants within the host polity. This narrow contextual scope leaves the scholar attempting to examine incorporation in atypical contexts, such as authoritarian/developing polities, at a disadvantage. In addition to this over-aggregation of case studies, most of these studies of immigrant incorporation explain *how* immigrants are incorporated, but stop short of explaining *why* incorporation progresses to the specific extent that it does.

This thesis addresses both gaps in the literature through its examination of Palestinian incorporation in Jordan. In pursuit of such knowledge, it continues the recent breakaway trend of examining incorporation in atypical contexts, while also accounting for immigrant incorporation outcomes. This objective is accomplished through two contributions to the immigrant incorporation literature. First, building on both existing literature and the case of Jordan, a revised framework of immigrant incorporation is developed for application across typical and atypical contexts of the phenomenon. Second, a hypothesized causal process is constructed linking regime survival logic, coalition politics, and the context of late development to immigrant incorporation outcomes in the case of Jordan. By integrating these literatures, this thesis lays the groundwork for future study of immigrant incorporation in typical and atypical contexts alike.

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"We in Jordan stand firmly west of the river and to its east.  The *Muhajirin* ('immigrants') and the *Ansar* ('supporters') members of the family in the east of the river, carry alone the burden of the strong standing right from the beginning."

-*King Hussein, December 1968*[1]

"It is time for the Fatherland to recognize two groups:

One has stolen his sword and pants

While the other has accepted to starve in order to feed him;

Hence there are two fronts on the two ends of the compass,

He who claims that he can reconcile them or equate them…is a hypocrite.

O Fatherland! Rise and say your word:

Which of the two do you bless?

Those who took the country as a homeland?

Or those who view it as a farm!"

-*Excerpt from* Marhala *("A Phase")*
*by Ali al-Fazza', a Transjordanian Poet*[2]

"We taught them how to eat with forks and knives."

-*Anonymous on Palestinians "civilizing" Transjordanians*

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[1] Fruchter-Ronen 2008, 248
[2] Abu Odeh 1999, 258-259

# CHAPTER ONE
# INTRODUCTION AND
# LITERATURE REVIEW

## INTRODUCTION

Studies of immigrant incorporation have almost exclusively focused on

industrialized democracies, polities with elaborate and extensive schemes, structures,

and procedures for incorporating newcomers.  Models of immigrant incorporation

have been developed based on these polities, building on their established structures

that guide and facilitate the incorporation of immigrants into the polity.  The

trajectories and subsequent outcomes that result from incorporation in such contexts

leave little to no marked change on the overall polity, and the relative levels of

incorporation across the polity are usually congruent and consistent.

As a consequence of this narrow research scope, attempting to examine

immigrant incorporation in authoritarian or developing contexts with existing

incorporation models is quite problematic.  Immigrant incorporation in these atypical

contexts is largely informal, with the phenomenon often occurring as an unintended

consequence of post-conflict government actions or territorial gains.  Often no

concrete schemes, structures, or procedures exist in authoritarian/developing polities

for incorporating immigrants.  As a result, decisions made regarding incorporation are

usually irregular and indirect.  Because of this, incorporation outcomes often vary

across different aspects (or "arenas") of the polity, resulting in inconsistent and

incomplete levels of incorporation.  For example, immigrants might be highly

integrated into the economy, but may be unable to vote or access state social insurance schemes.

Jordan, a country that has had to deal with successive waves of Palestinian migrants, fits into this collection of understudied and atypical immigrant incorporation cases. While most Palestinian-Jordanians[3] were given full citizenship and property rights in 1949, several subsequent events and monarchical actions have engendered different levels of citizenship among Palestinian-Jordanians, even leaving some without Jordanian citizenship at all. As a result of the trajectory of political development in the Kingdom, Palestinian-Jordanians have been mostly deprived of public sector employment and have come to dominate the private sector of the Jordanian economy as a result. Despite their certain demographic majority,[4] Palestinian-Jordanians are underrepresented in the Jordanian Parliament, Prime Ministry, Cabinets, and the military. This "selective" nature of incorporation in Jordan, a result of the interaction of regime survival logic, Hashemite coalition politics, and the context of late development, has resulted in incomplete Palestinian incorporation within the Jordanian polity.

The field of immigrant incorporation studies is beginning to witness a small shift away from the industrialized, democratic case towards authoritarian/developing polities. Such research has proven to be fruitful in both identifying informal

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[3] "Palestinian-Jordanian" refers to Jordanians of Palestinian origin that came to the Jordanian polity following their expulsion and flight at the hands of the Zionist army in 1948-49. "Transjordanian" refers to Jordanians that were on the East Bank at the time of the Palestinian inflow in 1948-49. The former usually trace their heritage back to Palestinian village of origin (Brand 1995b), while the latter usually trace their heritage through tribes (Shryock 1997). More on this distinction between Palestinian-Jordanians and Transjordanians is discussed in Chapter Three.

[4] Exact numbers are not available for "national security reasons" cited by the Hashemite monarchy. However, it is well-established that Palestinian-Jordanians comprise over half of the Jordanian population today (Brand 1999a, Susser 1999, Massad 2001, Nasser 2004, Lust-Okar 2006, Nanes 2008, Yom 2009).

procedures and trajectories of incorporation and accounting for incorporation outcomes. Immigrant incorporation trajectories and outcomes in these atypical contexts have been linked to culturally-driven group reification and geostrategic concerns (Adida 2010, Mylonas 2010). This thesis continues this breakaway trend in its examination of Palestinian incorporation in Jordan.

This study contributes to immigrant incorporation scholarship in two ways. First, the study provides a revised model of immigrant incorporation that captures the contextualized structural differences of incorporation trajectories in authoritarian/developing polities while retaining value for examination of the phenomenon in typical contexts concerning industrialized democracies. Second, through its analysis of the case of Jordan, this study will account for the outcomes of Palestinian incorporation in Jordan, explication that is largely absent from mainstream case studies of immigrant incorporation.

### *Research Questions*

This thesis seeks to answer two sets of questions regarding the nature and outcome of Palestinian incorporation in Jordan. First, the study seeks to uncover the trajectory of Palestinian incorporation in general: how have Palestinians in Jordan become part of the polity (in the most unconditional sense of the phrase)? What explicit or implicit policies or practices did the Hashemite monarchy pursue vis-à-vis Palestinian incorporation?

Second, given the specific trajectories and outcomes of Palestinian incorporation, the study seeks to identify the intervening causal process that generated such trajectories and outcomes: what general conditions either encouraged or limited

the incorporation of Palestinians? And how do these conditions inform the overall outcome of Palestinian incorporation?

### *Dependent and Independent Variables*

To answer these questions, a model of immigrant incorporation is constructed, connecting the interaction of regime survival logic, coalition politics, and the context of late development, to arena-specific incorporation outcomes. These end results are gauged by metrics developed within the model across the different aspects, or "arenas," of incorporation. The dependent variable is the respective incorporation outcome within each "arena" of incorporation examined in the analysis. The interaction between the logic of regime survival, coalition politics, and the context of late development is the independent variable in this analysis.

#### Dependent Variable: Incorporation Outcomes

Incorporation outcomes are the result of the trajectories and progression of immigrant incorporation within a polity. Incorporation trajectories are influenced by a multitude of factors, the most significant concerning the pre-incorporation conditions and characteristics of immigrant and native populations and the implicit and explicit incorporation policies and procedures promulgated and enacted by the state towards immigrants. Taken together, these two factors determine the initial phases of incorporation following migration to the polity, although their influence can be seen in subsequent periods as well.

In order to capture the dynamic nature of the trajectory of immigrant incorporation and pinpoint the crucial episodes and trends that influence its outcome, incorporation needs to be disaggregated based on the main aspects of the

phenomenon itself. In other words, different macro tools are required to analyze how immigrants are brought into the different "arenas" of incorporation within a polity. Building on other studies of immigrant incorporation, this study constructs a model of incorporation differentiated across the State, Government, Economic, and Social arenas of a polity. In examining the case of Jordan, arena-specific analysis of the trajectory and outcome of incorporation provides an end value, classified as either "Full" or "Incomplete/Partial" (compounded for semantic purposes) and based on extended definitions provided in Chapter Two.

<u>Independent Variable: The Interaction between the Logic of Regime Survival, Coalition Politics, and the Context of Late Development</u>

As a typical authoritarian polity, regime actions in Jordan are conditioned largely by the demands and preferences of the Hashemite regime coalition, a collective consisting of Transjordanian tribes and merchants that dates back to the pre-independence Mandate era of the Kingdom (Peters and Moore 2009). By virtue of their disparate preferences, the tribes and merchants impose mutual costs on one another that limit the policy space in which the Hashemite monarchy is able to move. Moreover, this preference disparity further limits monarchical actions through its strain on government resources. In order to maintain coalition cohesiveness in the face of these competing constituency preferences, the Hashemite monarchy is forced to distribute high levels of side-payments, or costly constituency-specific benefits such as state employment or tax breaks, to both Transjordanian tribes and merchants (Waldner 1999, 34-36).

In the context of Palestinian incorporation, the Hashemite coalition has largely conditioned the scale and scope of incorporation policies and practices the monarchy

can pursue out of fear that such policies and practices may eventually displace them from their positions of privilege and access to the King. Thus, mere overtures towards Palestinians or suspected policy concessions along the lines of Palestinian incorporation engender significant backlash from both coalition constituencies and a subsequent demand for increased levels of coalition side-payments to maintain political acquiescence.

Coupled with the monarchy's consistent budget insecurity, this threat of coalition defection has forced the Hashemite monarchy to curtail full incorporation of Palestinian-Jordanians in order to secure long-term incumbency. However, the context of late development compelled the monarchy to induce some modes of Palestinian incorporation in order to harness the initial (and, subsequently, long-term) capital and knowledge advantages of Palestinian-Jordanians for use in the Kingdom's late industrialization process. As a result, the monarchy has selectively enacted implicit and explicit incorporation policies and practices towards Palestinians to maximize the incorporation of Palestinians in a manner that is both within the limits of its coalition strategy and works to ensure the continued survival of the Hashemite monarchy. This "selective incorporation" influences the respective extent of Palestinian incorporation within each arena according to its impact on Hashemite coalition politics and strategy.

### *Outline of the Thesis*

The objective of this thesis is two-fold: to explain *how* Palestinian incorporation has progressed and *why* Palestinian incorporation in Jordan has

progressed to the specific extent that it has. In pursuit of these two goals, the study proceeds as follows.

A general discussion of the literature on immigrant incorporation begins the next section, laying the groundwork for subsequent examination of the phenomenon in atypical contexts through a review of typical conceptualizations, measurements, and explanations utilized by scholars in examining incorporation and accounting for incorporation outcomes. Included in the latter discussion is a brief overview of regime survival logic, coalition politics, and late development, setting the stage for expanded discussion of the subject as it relates to immigrant incorporation in Chapter Two. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the research methodology used in the study.

In Chapter Two, a model of immigrant incorporation is developed for use in analyzing Palestinian incorporation in Jordan. The first part of the chapter provides a revised conceptualization and framework of immigrant incorporation, including model metrics and end value definitions of incorporation outcomes. The second part of the chapter develops a hypothesized causal process connecting the logic of regime survival, coalition politics, and the context of late development to immigrant incorporation outcomes.

The work done in Chapter Two is expanded in detail in Chapters Three through Six. Chapter Three provides the epistemological justification for examining the case of Palestinians in Jordan within the framework of immigrant incorporation, briefly discussing Palestinian migration to Jordan and the distinction between Transjordanians and Palestinian-Jordanians. Chapters Four through Six examine the

trajectory and outcome of Palestinian incorporation in Jordan across the arenas of incorporation, identifying relevant causal mechanisms through process-tracing of events, observations, and modes of incorporation in Jordanian history. Chapter Seven closes out the thesis with an analytical synthesis of Palestinian incorporation in Jordan, followed by a critique of current immigrant incorporation research and suggested avenues for future research. A discussion concerning the scale and scope of the study's findings and methodology concludes the final chapter.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

As noted earlier, much of the literature on immigrant incorporation has developed out of case studies on countries in Western Europe and North America, industrialized democracies with elaborate schemes, structures, and procedures for incorporating immigrants. Such a narrow focus results in findings and subsequent conceptualizations and models over-aggregated on a discrete number of similar cases.

Applications of these conceptualizations and models of immigrant incorporation to contexts unlike those of the typical industrialized, democratic polity are inherently limited in their potential scholarly utility. As Adida points out, the findings and subsequent theories and models constructed from typical case studies of immigrant incorporation are often based on three assumed factors (Adida 2010, 9). First, national identities in these industrialized, democratic polities are grounded and well-defined. Second, formal processes and policies exist to facilitate incorporation. Third, economic activity in such polities is structured and features competition based on merit.

In authoritarian and developing polities, these three factors are usually absent and/or weak, resulting in informal structures and procedures of incorporation. The absence and/or weakness of these factors, and the subsequent informal nature of incorporation, can lead to variation and associated incomplete outcomes across the different aspects (or "arenas") of incorporation. For example, immigrants might have attained living standards on par with the native population, but remain clustered in certain sectors of the economy. Or immigrants may be granted political rights and representation, but electoral institutions prevent equitable exercise of such rights in order to produce proportional representation.

There thus exists a need for not only a more comprehensive and robust model of immigrant incorporation, but also one that can be applied to atypical contexts of the phenomenon as it is studied. The following review examines common conceptualizations and measurement tools employed in studies of incorporation, highlighting their specific strengths and weaknesses for analyzing the phenomenon in authoritarian/developing contexts.

### *Conceptualizing Incorporation*

Existing conceptualizations of immigrant incorporation are inherently problematic in two ways. First, like many concepts in the social sciences, there is no agreed-upon definition of "immigrant incorporation" among scholars of the field. Due to the trajectory and outcome of concept development in the field, this state of affairs is ineluctable and must be accepted as such by scholars of immigrant incorporation. Second, whether for reasons of research limitations or case study bias (or both), extant studies that attempt to conceptualize incorporation tend to focus on

its political aspects (Browning et al. 1984, Shefter 1986, Brubaker 1992, Soysal 1994, Koopmans and Statham 1999, Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009) or its economic aspects (Portes and Borocz 1989, Portes 1995, Reitz 1998, van Tubergen et al. 2004), often neglecting the social and/or cultural aspects of the phenomenon. These two issues present a challenge to the scholar attempting to examine immigrant incorporation in general, let alone in the context of an authoritarian/developing polity. Incorporation is a complex operation. It proceeds in an interactive (though not necessarily concurrent) manner across different domains of state and society, and therefore must be analyzed as such. This condition requires a holistic examination of incorporation as it progresses across the political, economic, and social aspects of a polity in order to obtain the most extensive and thorough findings of its trajectories and outcomes.

Some recent works have attempted to address the narrow nature of existing conceptualizations of immigrant incorporation. Freeman argues that incorporation is defined by the ways in which membership is accessed across the political, economic and cultural domains of society (Freeman 2004). More specifically, Freeman views incorporation as an aggregation of "policies and regulations and the ideas that underlie them and that constitute the political opportunity structures" that occur within a multi-sectoral framework (Ibid., 949). Taking a more multidirectional viewpoint, Phalet and Swyngedouw define incorporation as the "redefinition of national socio-political spaces to incorporate new immigrants" (Phalet and Swyngedouw 2003, 7). Like Freeman's conceptualization of the phenomenon, Phalet and Swyngedouw see incorporation as "multidimensional," and argue that such

complexion "allows for the selective inclusion or exclusion of immigrants in different segments or institutions of the host society" (Ibid., 8). Noting the lack of comprehensive focus on all aspects of incorporation, Entzinger argues that incorporation should be viewed as comprising three major dimensions: the legal-political, the cultural, and the socio-economic (Entzinger 2000, 99). Along the same lines as Phalet and Swyngedouw, Entzinger views incorporation as a "multidimensional process which becomes manifest in different domains of society," those domains being the state, market, and nation (Ibid., 105).

While these conceptualizations will certainly prove to be somewhat useful in studying incorporation in authoritarian/developing contexts, they nevertheless suffer inherent limitations in applicability due to their epistemological grounding in case studies of industrialized democracies. There thus exists a clear need for a conceptual revision of the phenomenon that both captures the political and socioeconomic aspects of incorporation and is applicable to contexts other than the typical industrialized, democratic polity.

Recalling Adida's three assumptions vis-à-vis incorporation in typical contexts further illustrates this need for a conceptual revision. First, industrialized democracies usually have cohesive, salient national identities that, while certainly fluid, permeate political and national discourse and resonate with the majority, if not all, of the population. In authoritarian/developing polities, this is usually not the case. National identity is often incongruent with the borders of the polity, and was likely non-existent or multidimensional at the time of independence (Migdal 2004). As a result, these polities often find themselves still in the process of developing an

identity while at the same time attempting to incorporate disparate segments of the population into the polity. In this context, it becomes less clear who is the "native" and who is the "immigrant," especially at the individual level.

In industrialized democracies, elaborate schemes, structures, and procedures exist for incorporating immigrants into the polity. Legislation and legal mechanisms are introduced to layer the incorporation of immigrants across different segments of the polity and to ensure that consistency and parity are established across these different modes of incorporation. In the context of authoritarian/developing polities, the situation is quite different. The operations and structures of immigrant incorporation are often informal, producing variation across incorporation trajectories and outcomes that often results in incomplete or incongruent incorporation outcomes (Adida 2010). This is most clearly seen in polities where citizenship is differentiated across different groups, often along ethnic or religious lines (Sabagh 1990, 357).

Economic activity in industrialized democracies is generally based on merit and qualities. While immigrants to these countries often face discrimination and may end up self-employed, there usually exists a structural means for economic ascendency independent of background or origin. In authoritarian/developing contexts, this is usually not the case. These polities often possess fragmented social networks, with certain exclusive groups tied to particular groups in power. Such groups use their access to state resources to disproportionately benefit their own kinship groups (Anderson 1987, 6). Economic activity and employment in such polities is not based on merit or pure competition, but rather on social connections and/or ethnic, religious, or sectarian ties (Bellin 2004, 149). As a result, newcomers

to the polity are usually left out of the primary economic group and business class, and often face employment discrimination vis-à-vis specific sectors or the economy overall.

It is thus clear that a conceptual revision of immigrant incorporation is indeed required if one wishes to examine the phenomenon as it occurs in authoritarian/developing contexts. The nature of national identity, the operations and structures of incorporation, and the economic conditions in these polities all have clear implications for the trajectories and outcomes of incorporation. A conceptual revision of this type is grounded within a holistic model of immigrant incorporation, which also includes pertinent measurements of the phenomenon. A review of this literature is necessary before such revision can be conducted.

### *Measuring Incorporation*

Studies that attempt to measure immigration incorporation stress the need for analysis to include the pre-incorporation conditions and characteristics of both the immigrants and the receiving polity (albeit in a descriptive rather than normative manner). Because various factors can affect the extent to which immigrants can and/or will be incorporated into the receiving polity upon their arrival, preliminary examination of incorporation should include observation of specific conditions and characteristics that can potentially affect the nature of incorporation outcomes. Extant studies highlight immigrants' relative levels of education and industrialization, demographic characteristics, and the specific motivation for migration as relevant for such preliminary analysis (Goldlust and Richmond 1974, Portes and Borocz 1989, Bueker 2005). For the native polity, the levels of education and urbanization, the

stage of industrial development, social stratification, and native population

perceptions of immigrants are important for understanding the subsequent trajectory

of incorporation (Goldlust and Richmond 1974, Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003).

These characteristics and conditions are certainly useful for the

authoritarian/developing polity context, though specific aspects will need to be

altered to compensate for the dearth of empirical evidence in some of these areas

given the nature of the polities under examination.

Political Incorporation

Within the extant literature on political incorporation in industrialized

democracies, indicators for measuring this aspect of the phenomenon focus mostly on

the nature of immigrant citizenship, access to social and welfare services, and

political representation and participation (Shefter 1986, Brubaker 1989, Brubaker

1992, Soysal 1994, Koopmans and Statham 1999, Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009).

Although these indicator categories are somewhat useful in the context of

authoritarian and developing polities, additional elaboration and adaptation are

required to comprehensively measure political incorporation in such contexts.

In many authoritarian/developing polities, there often exist different levels of

citizenship among the same segments of the population (Sabagh 1990, 357). Indeed,

mere possession of citizenship does necessarily entail equal treatment before the law

or access to state resources (Russell 1990, 376-382). Residents of such polities may

hold passports and national ID numbers, but attempting to utilize legal entitlements

and benefits may elicit different responses for different citizens based on other

inherent factors, such as ethnicity, wealth, kinship, or personal connections (Anderson

1987, Cunningham and Sarayrah 1994, Bellin 2004). Moreover, in these polities, mechanisms for political participation, if they exist, are usually very limited and/or ineffectual (Brumberg 1995, Brumberg 2002, Lucas 2004). Actual political decisions are made behind closed doors, and citizen input into such decisions is absent. And formal political participation, whether effective or not, often favors certain segments of the population over others by virtue of specific political structures or representative mechanisms (Lust-Okar 2009).

The limited applicability of extant indicators is also seen vis-à-vis immigrant access to social and welfare services. In the industrialized, democratic context, it is assumed that governments are the sole providers of such services to all citizens, whether native or immigrant (Mirilovic 2010). In the context of authoritarian/developing polities, however, non-state actors, such as sub-national groups or international organizations, are often the ones providing such services to large segments of the population (Harik 2004, Peters 2009). Capturing this dynamic is essential for examining social and welfare service provision vis-à-vis immigrant incorporation in the context of authoritarian/developing polities, as it can influence the degree of interaction between citizens and the state apparatus.

<u>Economic Incorporation</u>

Attempts at measuring the economic incorporation of immigrants are by far the most widespread in the literature on immigrant incorporation. These studies often focus on immigrants' occupations, levels of economic activity, unemployment risk, economic mobility, the nature of the labor market after incorporation (split, dual, or mixed), and immigrant labor market experience (Schmitter 1980, Portes 1981,

Richmond 1981, Portes and Borocz 1989, Portes 1995, Roberts 1995, Reitz 1998, van

Tubergen et al. 2004). These quantitative indicators are quite practical for the typical

context of industrialized democracies vis-à-vis incorporation, but are of limited use in

instances where economic data is incomplete, unavailable, or unreliable, as is often

the case in authoritarian/developing polities. A creative approach to avoid an overly

statistical method in measuring economic incorporation is thus needed for these

atypical contexts.

It should be emphasized that the conceptual indicators themselves are not the

problem when attempting to measure economic incorporation in such contexts.

Rather, the dearth of economic data available in these polities is the issue in

attempting to measure economic incorporation. Regime survival logic compels

authoritarian leaders to shape information in a way that will perpetuate regime

incumbency (Geddes and Zaller 1989). Widespread knowledge about the economic

well-being of others, demographic statistics, and/or other background information on

citizens in an authoritarian/developing polity, can spell the beginning of the end for

the regime. In short, the methodological issue does not concern the existing

conceptual components or indicators of economic incorporation, but rather the lack of

empirical information on which to employ these components and indicators in

authoritarian/developing contexts.

Social Incorporation

Historically, structural efforts to measure immigrant social incorporation have

largely been avoided by political scientists and sociologists, leaving anthropologists

to fill the research void. As indicated in the previous discussion of conceptualization,

this has begun to change within the past two decades. Scholars have increasingly

begun to include an examination of the social aspects of incorporation in their

analyses (Entzinger 2000, Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003, Phalet and Swyngedouw

2003, Freeman 2004). The indicators employed in studies of social incorporation

include government policies towards immigrant culture (whether "assimilationist" or

"multiculturalist"), levels of acculturation, immigrant self-conception and identity,

kith and kin dynamics (especially rates of intermarriage), and residential patterns.

These studies, however, tend to reserve a primary role for culture in their

analyses, assuming that immigrant culture and native culture are inherently different

and incongruent. As a result, existing indicators emphasize culture as the central

force driving the social interactions of immigrants with the native population,

influencing their kith and kin relationships, and determining their residential patterns.

Such a narrow research focus has limited the scope of extant indicators, leaving much

room for improvement in the quest for more robust measurements of social

incorporation. Interpretivist studies in political science concerning semiotic practices

may be of particular help in this regard, as they can provide for holistic analyses of

these indicators at both the individual and aggregate levels (Wedeen 1999, Wedeen

2002).

### *Incorporation Outcomes*

<u>Existing Explanations</u>

As demonstrated by the preceding discussion, studies of immigrant

incorporation analyze its trajectory and outcome, but do not take the analysis a step

further to explain why certain policies were chosen over others or why incorporation

has progressed (or regressed) to its specific outcome.  In other words, scholars

describe *how* immigrants came to be incorporated (or not) within a polity, but do not

attempt to answer *why* such immigrants were incorporated to the extent that they

were.  Incorporation outcomes, both overall and specific to political, economic,

and/or social aspects of the phenomenon, are thus left unexplained.

There are exceptions to this trend, however.  In his work on nation-building in

the Balkans, Mylonas posits that international and geostrategic concerns drive the

modes of incorporation a state employs towards minority ethnic groups (Mylonas

2010).  Specifically, Mylonas argues that a state's foreign policy goals and interstate

relations drive whether it chooses assimilation, accommodation, or exclusion towards

these groups (Ibid., 86).  In the specific case he examined, Mylonas found that during

WWI, the Greek government chose to accommodate allied-backed groups (such as

the Albanians and "Roman-leaning" Vlachs) but excluded enemy-backed groups (like

the Koniareoi and "Bulgarian-leaning" Slavs) due to a foreign policy aiming to

recover lost territory ("revisionist") (Ibid., 109).  However, after WWI, the Greeks

adapted assimilationist policies towards the same enemy-backed groups due to the

fact that the Greek government was content with the status quo (Ibid.).

Mylonas's theory is innovative and quite useful in the context of immigrant

incorporation.  However, it tends to overlook several important domestic factors that

can potentially play a role in the outcome of immigrant incorporation.   At the onset

of the state-building process in post-colonial polities, there often exists a lack of an

educated and/or trained segment of the native population to take on the duties once

performed by the colonial power (Ayubi 1986, Schwarz 2008).  As a result, post-

colonial leaders may be forced to rely on non-indigenous persons within the country to run the government until an adequate bureaucracy is developed.  Or, bureaucratic development may proceed regardless of these inadequacies, resulting in long-term inefficiency within the state apparatus and a "personalization" of administrative practices (Ayubi 1986, Waldner 2002).

A second factor concerns the potential dearth of economic resources in authoritarian/developing polities (Gerschenkron 1962).  Economic requirements, such as the need for skilled labor, can lead a state to initiate incorporation vis-à-vis non-native populations within the polity.  Related to economic needs is the potential lack of indigenous persons to comprise a viable merchant class within a polity in the early stages of state-building (Rosenstein-Rodan 1943).  In this case, immigrants may possess resources and/or training that lead the state to begin incorporating them into the polity, such as capital or transnational trade connections.  In authoritarian/developing polities, income tax collection is almost non-existent, often due to historical factors that preclude the state's ability to undertake such activities out of fear of political backlash and/or loss of political support (Schwarz 2008).  Establishing and supporting a merchant class allows the state to potentially compensate for the lack of income tax revenues, as taxes on economic transactions and exchanges can provide increased state revenue without forcing the government to undertake the political and logistical challenges of individual-level tax extraction.

In her work on immigrant exclusion in Africa, Adida finds that cultural distance has a direct causal effect on the trajectory of incorporation (Adida 2010).  Specifically, Adida argues that in cases where immigrant cultural values and customs

overlap with those of the host society, one will find a reification of group identities and the initiation and perpetuation of exclusionary practices and discourses by the host group in order to defend the latter's positions within society and the status quo in general (Ibid.). Such an argument over-emphasizes the cultural aspect of incorporation as the driving force of its progress and trajectory, neglecting other essential incorporation determinants, such as economic and political factors.

One will notice that the arguments of Mylonas and Adida both stem from case studies that focus on atypical contexts of incorporation. As a result, their work operates outside of the three scope conditions highlighted by Adida concerning grounded national identity, the existence of formal incorporation operations and structures, and merit-based economic activity (Adida 2010, 9). In both authors' examinations, national identity is incoherent and/or nascent and operations and structures of incorporation are informal and inconsistent, while economic activity is discriminatory and exclusive in nature. The scholarly utility of the two authors' findings is quite high and demonstrates the need for more work to be done in accounting for the relative extent and progression of immigrant incorporation in atypical contexts.

Moreover, studies of incorporation in such contexts are useful in that they allow for a more expanded view of immigrant incorporation. In typical case studies, the process of incorporation is assumed to have no major effect on the overall polity. This is not always the case, as more often than not, immigrants demand specific concessions from the host polity that inherently change the nature of the country. In the context of authoritarian/developing polities, the effects of incorporation are even

more pronounced, as weaker institutions find themselves more vulnerable to shifts in

demographics. Analyzing such cases can yield a multitude of findings concerning

both context-specific incorporation and the phenomenon in general.

A New Approach: The Logic of Regime Survival, Coalition Politics,
and the Context of Late Development

Regime survival is the driving principle behind the actions and policies of

rulers in authoritarian polities (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Domestic politics in

these polities is ultimately viewed as a zero-sum game, much like the "anarchy" that

characterizes international politics (David 1991, 242-243). As a result of this logic,

domestic policies are promulgated with the aim of maintaining regime staying power

(Ibid.). Immigrant incorporation policies, whether implicit or explicit, are certainly

no exception to this logic. If the driving principle behind regime actions and

decisions is to ensure incumbency of the regime, then immigrant incorporation

policies in these polities are promulgated to the same effect.

Such policies, however, are largely conditioned by coalition politics and

preferences (Riker 1962, Waldner 1999, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Regime

coalition constituents may oppose the incorporation of immigrants out of fear of a

loss of patronage and privileges. As a result, the impending threat of coalition

backlash and/or defection conditions the relative policy options regimes have vis-à-

vis immigrant incorporation. When examining specific policies, then, coalition

politics should thus be included as a determining factor in the context of immigrant

incorporation in authoritarian/developing polities.

Economic factors also drive incorporation policies (Mirilovic 2010),

especially in the context of late development. Domestic factors, such as a lack of

native manpower to staff the state bureaucracy or a lack of economic resources and human capital to develop a viable merchant class, can serve as catalysts for the incorporation of non-natives into the polity (Gerschenkron 1962, Ayubi 1996). On the other hand, incorporating immigrants may serve as a conduit for access to external financial resources that allow a regime to extend its grip on power. The context of late development can thus serve as an incentive to incorporate non-natives into the polity in order to gain access to both internal and external financial and human capital.

Aggregating these determinants together provides one with an integrated framework of regime survival logic, coalition politics, and the context of late development that can serve as a potential causal framework for immigrant incorporation outcomes. Viewing immigrant incorporation in this manner may in turn inform much about the nature of incorporation policies and the principles behind such policies in authoritarian/developing polities.

## METHODOLOGY

### *Inherent Research Limitations and Scope of Analysis*

There are two ways of going about conducting research for this project. The first and ideal way would be to combine both primary fieldwork and analysis of secondary sources, conducting interviews with Jordanians, government officials, academics, and civil servants on aspects related to Palestinian incorporation in Jordan using the model metrics developed in Chapter Two as a survey guide. A second way to conduct research for this project is to step back and historically examine the process from secondary sources and evidence. Given the time and resource

constrains faced by this thesis, the second approach will have to suffice.  Fortunately, there exist appropriate and proven methodological techniques and procedures that permit scholarly examination of Palestinian incorporation in Jordan in such capacity, such as process-tracing and other tools of within-case analysis.

While these methodological techniques and procedures will certainly suffice for an analysis of Palestinian incorporation across the State, Government, and Economic arenas, they unfortunately do not permit a robust and comprehensive analysis of Palestinian incorporation in the Social arena.  While the other aspects of Palestinian incorporation can be comprehensively examined to an extent using secondary sources and evidence, analyzing Palestinian social incorporation requires extensive fieldwork in Jordan.  Surveys of individual-level immigrant and native population dispositions and perceptions vis-à-vis both each other and national discourse, as well as archival research concerning residential patterns and internal mobility, are required.  Moreover, secondary source analysis would be of little assistance in this regard, as one cannot apply monolithic secondary perceptions or employ faulty extrapolations in such analysis for reasons of both scholarship quality and evidence distortion.  Unfortunately, for the same reasons mentioned earlier, such undertakings are not possible given the time and resource constraints accompanying an undergraduate thesis.  However, the study does briefly examine social incorporation in both abstract and case-specific contexts, with a discussion of the phenomenon contained in Chapter Two and a preliminary examination of Palestinian social incorporation included in Chapter Seven.  A comprehensive analysis of

Palestinian social incorporation in Jordan, however, remains an avenue for future research.

### *Analyzing Immigrant Incorporation in Atypical Contexts*

As outlined in the previous section, extant studies on immigrant incorporation assume that elaborate and extensive policies and procedures exist for incorporating immigrants into polities. That is, the existence of "incorporation regimes," as Soysal calls them, is taken as a given in these analyses (Soysal 1994). But what about polities where such elaborate, codified policies and procedures are absent or informal? In such cases, there are no archives or documented policy decisions vis-à-vis incorporation for analysis, leaving the scholar at a disadvantage when attempting to deconstruct the trajectories of incorporation.

Such is often the case in authoritarian/developing polities. Along with general explanations of how incorporation has occurred within a polity, studying the phenomenon in these contexts requires concurrent analysis aimed at identifying informal or inexplicit incorporation schemes in the polity. Historical analysis and explanation can be of great use in this case. In performing an analysis of immigrant incorporation in such contexts, one should ask the following question: what historical processes, decisions, and events have led to shifts and alterations in the positions, interactions, and transactions between immigrants and the polity? Answering this question within the constructed framework of immigrant incorporation should clarify two things: first, what (if any) informal incorporation "regimes" exist; and second, the nature and extent of these "regimes" in contexts where it is unclear how and through what mechanisms and structures immigrants are incorporated into a polity.

### *Single Case Studies and Theory Development*

In the context of qualitative research, single case studies are potentially limited in their ability to produce generalizable findings (George and Bennett 2005, 32). However, single studies of "deviant" cases like Jordan can prove to be quite useful for heuristic purposes (Ibid., 71). Examination of the outcome of Palestinian incorporation in Jordan will elucidate original findings on immigrant incorporation in an atypical context, contributing to the small but growing literature on the authoritarian/developing polity subfield of immigrant incorporation studies.

Single case studies also allow for the development of new theoretical ideas (Rueschemeyer 2003). In this regard, the case of Jordan will allow for the inductive identification of relevant causal mechanisms that can be collectively employed as a hypothesized causal process to account for the end value of Palestinian incorporation outcomes. This method will allow the scholar to uncover the potential ways in which regime survival, coalition politics, and the context of late development are related to immigrant incorporation trajectories and outcomes.

### *Within-Case Analysis and Process-Tracing*

In differentiating examination of Palestinian incorporation across multiple arenas, within-case analysis will be employed. Besides methodological support (Mahoney 2000, Rueschemeyer 2003, George and Bennett 2005, Mahoney 2007), this approach is supported by the extant literature on immigrant incorporation, where scholars have called for a multi-dimensional analysis of incorporation (Entzinger 2000, Freeman 2004). In analyzing Palestinian incorporation in Jordan, "process-tracing" will be used to examine the formulation and execution of the specific

incorporation policies and practices pursued by the Hashemite monarchy vis-à-vis the Kingdom's Palestinian population. "Process-tracing" is a technique whereby the researcher "attempts to locate the causal mechanisms linking a hypothesized explanatory variable to an outcome" (Mahoney 2000, 409). In other words, extensive historical analysis through the use of process-tracing within a theoretical framework can illuminate the researcher as to what (if any) potential causal processes are occurring, and whether such processes are related to the outcome observed in the presence of a suspected explanatory variable.

Besides its scholarly utility vis-à-vis the observations and subsequent findings generated, process-tracing is also useful in its capacity to help the researcher to identify any potential alternative explanations extant within the observations (George and Bennett 2005, 215), as well as to elucidate whether or not the two variables are linked together in situations of potential spurious correlation (Mahoney 2000, 412-413). Utilizing process-tracing will allow for qualification and tracing of the causal effects of the main interacting independent variable, the interaction of regime survival logic, coalition politics, and the context of late development, on the incorporation outcomes across each of the three arenas of incorporation (the dependent variable). The use of process-tracing will not only allow for robustness in the examination of Palestinian incorporation in Jordan, but will also allow for identification of alternative explanations regarding the relative extent of Palestinian incorporation within each of the arenas analyzed.

# CHAPTER TWO
# INCORPORATING IMMIGRANTS:
# *HOW* AND *WHY*

Much of the literature that has provided the conceptualizations and models of

immigrant incorporation is based on case studies in industrialized democracies, where

elaborate and sophisticated schemes exist to incorporate immigrants.  In

authoritarian/developing polities, the context is quite different.  Modes and structures

of incorporation in these polities are often informal and irregular, and provide little

consistency and congruency in facilitating stable incorporation trajectories and

outcomes.  As a result, the outcome of incorporation usually varies across its political,

economic, and social aspects, and is often incomplete.  As mentioned previously, in

addition to this over-aggregation of case studies, few scholars have attempted to

provide explanations for immigrant incorporation outcomes.  There thus exists a lack

of comprehensive models of incorporation with which the case of the Palestinians in

Jordan can be analyzed.

In this chapter, a comprehensive model of immigrant incorporation is

presented.  The first part of the chapter presents a revised conceptualization of

incorporation.  This "re-conceptualization" is followed with development of a revised

framework of measurement for immigrant incorporation designed for gauging the

phenomenon in both typical and atypical contexts.  The second part of the chapter

concerns the "why" part of immigrant incorporation outcomes.  A hypothesized

causal process connecting regime survival logic, coalition politics, and the context of

late development to immigrant incorporation outcomes in Jordan is developed and

discussed, followed by an examination of the specific connection between regime coalition preferences and Palestinian incorporation outcomes in Jordan.

# A REVISED FRAMEWORK OF IMMIGRANT INCORPORATION

## CONCEPTUALIZING INCORPORATION

Building on Chapter One's discussion of the concept, I define **incorporation** as the course of action by which immigrants become part of the State, Government, Economic, and Social arenas of a polity.[5] Differentiating incorporation across four relatively exclusive arenas provides the scholar with four measured outcomes of incorporation. Conceptualizing incorporation in such a manner thus allows for comprehensive and robust analysis that captures the variation in and the value of incorporation outcomes at all levels.

## ANALYZING AND MEASURING INCORPORATION

### *Preliminary Analysis*

Before examining incorporation as it occurs across the four arenas, one must begin with a dual analysis of the pre-incorporation conditions and characteristics of both the immigrants and the native population and the relevant incorporation policies and procedures (if discernable). These two factors can play decisive roles vis-à-vis the trajectory of incorporation, and therefore must be analyzed as such.

Of course, in the context of authoritarian/developing polities, data will be scarce, and it will be hard to ascertain the exact specifications and dynamics of either

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[5] The phrase "become part of" has no conditional qualifier, as I wish to refrain at this point from making any subjective claims as to what does and does not constitute "incorporation."

of the two factors. However, the use of process-tracing can inform the scholar as to the nature of the general pre-incorporation conditions and characteristics of a given group of immigrants, as well as the types of policies and procedures influencing incorporation within the polity. In other words, the following factors do not necessarily demand empirical evidence for satisfaction of measurement and utility of findings. General observations and verified factual determinations will suffice.

Pre-Incorporation Conditions and Characteristics

The pre-incorporation conditions and characteristics of immigrants play an influential role in both the initial and subsequent immigrant interactions with the host polity. These interactions are in turn influenced by the prevailing conditions and characteristics of the native population within the polity. For immigrants, the relative levels of education and urbanization, demographic characteristics, and the specific motivation for migration are potential important determining characteristics of incorporation within a polity. For the native population, the relative levels of education, urbanization, and social stratification; demographic characteristics; the stage of industrial development; the degree of cultural pluralism; and specific government policies (both implicit and explicit) vis-à-vis incorporation must be taken into account. While these conditions and characteristics can certainly serve as causal factors of incorporation itself (and are indeed addressed as such in the second part of this model), their metrics should nevertheless be considered before embarking on comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon.

<u>Policies, Procedures, and Outcomes</u>

Government incorporation policies and procedures must be extensively analyzed prior to arena-specific examination. Such analysis can potentially clarify preliminary governmental aims vis-à-vis the influx of immigrants. More specifically, determining whether incorporation policies are geared towards the overall assimilation of immigrants or towards the preservation and integration of immigrant identity (i.e. "multiculturalism") can allow the researcher to make informed postulates on the potential dynamics of incorporation outcomes.

It is equally important to determine whether these overarching incorporation policies are aimed at immigrants as a group or as individuals. For example, if policies and procedures are known to be more assimilationist, then the researcher might posit that immigrant populations are likely to cluster residentially and shun specific modes of participation and interaction within the polity. On the other hand, immigrants targeted with multiculturalist policies might be expected to accede to incorporation, as becoming incorporated in this case may entail access to resources that can improve socioeconomic standing and/or increased participation through the guise of immigrant-specific interest groups and organizations. In examining incorporation within the context of authoritarian/developing polities, where policies and procedures are likely informal and implicit, the researcher may ultimately be forced to leave out this component of the analysis until the research has been completed and incorporation outcomes have been deconstructed. That being said, one must still acknowledge the epistemological utility that this dichotomous

theoretical framework provides when examining immigrant incorporation, even in cases where incorporation policies and procedures are not so clear-cut.

### *Arena-Specific Analysis*

Incorporation proceeds across the State, Government, Economic, and Social arenas of a polity. However, one must keep in mind that the dynamics and outcomes of incorporation in each arena are in no way limited to that arena alone. That is, arena-specific incorporation will most certainly have residual effects that will somewhat influence, reinforce, and alter incorporation as it occurs in other arenas.

That being said, to comprehensively measure the extent of immigrant incorporation in a polity, one must analyze the phenomenon as it occurs across the four arenas in as much isolation as possible. This is most thoroughly done through the construction of a series of indicators for each individual arena that serves to illustrate the relative extent of arena-specific incorporation. The following discussion highlights the questions and subsequent indicators that should be employed in analyzing the arena-specific incorporation of immigrants within a polity.

<u>State Incorporation</u>

The State arena of incorporation concerns immigrant possession of citizenship (and subsequent acquisition/possession of associated civil rights), general access to public social services and welfare benefits, and the extent of immigrant employment in the public sector. Taken together, these aspects constitute *state incorporation*. When attempting to gauge *state incorporation*, the following questions should be asked: how is citizenship defined in general? What is the process of naturalization? How secure is naturalized citizenship (i.e. can it be revoked or removed)? Are there

different "levels" of citizenship?  Are naturalized citizens entitled to the same civil

rights as native citizens?  To what extent are immigrants able to obtain public sector

employment, especially in administrative organs, the national army, and key security

services?  Do immigrants have access to social services and welfare benefits?  If so,

who provides such services and benefits to immigrants?

To gauge state incorporation, the following indicators should be employed:

*1. Immigrant Citizenship:* citizenship as it is defined and outlined in
legislation, decrees, and any other governmental policies, actions, or practices
       *a. Dynamics of the Naturalization Process*
*2. Security of Naturalized Citizenship:* whether or not: citizenship can be
removed from naturalized citizens; naturalized citizenship objectively entitles
its holders to the same rights and benefits possessed by native citizens; there
exist multiple "levels" of citizenship within the polity due to the primacy of
other factors, such as ethnicity or sect
*3. Immigrant Civil Rights:* whether or not naturalized immigrants possess civil
and political rights; the level of equality of immigrant rights vis-à-vis native
rights
*4. Public Sector Employment:* level of immigrant employment in the public
sector; the ease/ability of immigrants to obtain such employment
*5. Provision of Social Insurance and Provider Identity:* ability of immigrants
to access state social insurance schemes, such as education, healthcare, and
subsidies; whether or not the typical entity providing such social insurance
differs from that which serves the native population and/or is independent of
the state

Indicators 1, 3, and 4 are common measurement tools within the literature,

and build on the work of Shefter (1986), Brubaker (1989), Brubaker (1992), Soysal

(1994), Koopmans and Statham (1999), and Hochschild and Mollenkopf (2009).

However, Indicators 2 and 5 are relatively novel, and thus require a bit more

elucidation.

Indicator 2 captures the citizenship dynamics often at play in

authoritarian/developing regimes, where kin-based ties frequently outweigh legal

connections (such as codified enfranchisement) to the polity. In these polities,

citizenship can be said to have multiple levels, and can often be arbitrarily removed

by the state. Indicator 2 thus accounts for the instability that certain groups of

authoritarian/developing polities often face in both retaining their citizenship and

exercising the political and civil rights that usually accompany such citizenship.

Indicator 5 is not wholly new to the literature, but is novel in that it is a further

elaboration of existing tools used to measure immigrant access to social and welfare

services. Besides the ordinary measurement of access to services such as education,

healthcare, and subsidies, this indicator also accounts for the entity providing such

schemes to immigrants. In authoritarian/developing polities, international

institutions, NGOs, and/or aid agencies often step in to fill the gaps in state provision

of social insurance or other services. In some cases, these institutions are the sole

providers of such services to certain segments of the population. This clearly has an

effect on the level of incorporation, as non-interaction with the state in the context of

service provision perpetuates non-incorporation within the State arena of the polity.

Government Incorporation

The Government arena concerns the political rights and representation of

immigrants in executive and legislative institutions and the nature and levels of

immigrant political participation. Taken together, these aspects constitute

*government incorporation*. When attempting to gauge *government incorporation*, the

following questions should be asked: do immigrants possess political rights? To what

extent are immigrants represented in government? Is such representation on par with

immigrant demographics?  Does the political system respond to the demands of

immigrants?  What is the intensity of immigrant political participation?

To gauge government incorporation, the following indicators should be

employed:

*1. Political Rights and Representation:* whether or not immigrants possess
political rights, such as the right to vote and run for representative bodies, and
are present within the polity's representative bodies; the level of equality of
such rights and representation vis-à-vis native citizens
*2. Levels of Political Participation:* the nature of immigrant participation in
political organizations and pluralist procedures, such as elections and
referendums

These two indicators are both taken from the existing literature, and as such

do not require additional elaboration.  They build on the work of Shefter (1986),

Soysal (1994), Koopmans and Statham (1999), and Hochschild and Mollenkopf

(2009).

Economic Incorporation

The Economic arena concerns the nature of employment, living standards, and

sectoral location of immigrants within the economy of the polity.  Taken together,

these aspects constitute *economic incorporation*.  When attempting to gauge

*economic incorporation*, the following questions should be asked: what is the nature

of immigrant participation in the economy?  Where are immigrants located within the

economy?  What are the living standards among immigrants?  What levels of

mobility do immigrants possess vis-à-vis the economy?  Are immigrants

discriminated against in economic transactions and activities?

To gauge economic incorporation, the following indicators should be

employed:

*1. Participation and Location in the Economy:* the nature of immigrant participation in the economy; whether or not immigrants are concentrated in certain sectors of the economy

> *a. Immigrant Standards of Living:* the typical living situation of immigrants within the polity, indicated by relative income levels, residential location, food security, infrastructural access, and dependency on social insurance schemes

*2. Levels and Nature of Economic Discrimination*: whether immigrants can obtain certain jobs, or if they are prevented from employment in certain sectors due to factors related to their status or former status as immigrants, or others such as origin, race, language, religion; whether or not immigrants are discriminated against in their interactions with the state administration in attempting to obtain state permissions for economic activities, such as import licenses or government approval for start-ups

Indicators 1a and 2 are basic measurement tools for economic incorporation, and build on the work of Schmitter (1980), Portes (1981), Richmond (1981), Portes and Borocz (1989), Portes (1995), Roberts (1995), and van Tubergen et al. (2004). However, Indicator 1 is novel in some aspects and thus requires elaboration.

The examination of immigrant location within the economy usually focuses on whether immigrants are located in the formal or informal markets (i.e. whether or not they are self-employed).  Indicator 1 further elaborates on this metric, examining whether or not immigrants are concentrated in certain sectors of the economy.  That is, whether immigrants are potentially clustered within the economy due to an inability to obtain certain types of formal employment over others as a result of inherent state policies or historical practices of favoritism towards certain segments of the population.  Indicator 1 thus captures the dynamics often at play vis-à-vis staffing policies in authoritarian regimes, with their emphasis on kinship and personal ties.

<u>Social Incorporation</u>

The Social arena concerns the aspects of incorporation related to: one, the nature and outcomes of social interactions and transactions between immigrants and the native population; two, the perceptions held by immigrants and the native population vis-à-vis each other; and three, the position of immigrants and immigrant culture in societal discourse and the national narrative.  Taken together, these aspects constitute *social incorporation*.  When attempting to gauge *social incorporation*, the following questions should be asked: what perceptions do immigrants and the native population hold vis-à-vis each other at both popular and elite levels?  What is the nature of social interactions between immigrants and the native population?  What are the positions of immigrants and immigrant culture in societal discourse and the national narrative?

To gauge social incorporation, the following indicators should be employed:

*1. Perceptions and Attitudes of Immigrants and the Native Population*
    *a. Popular Perceptions:* views/attitudes in individual-level discourse within both groups vis-à-vis each other
    *b. Elite Perceptions:* views/attitudes of immigrant and native elites vis-à-vis each other
*2. Social Interactions between Immigrants and Native Population*
    *a. Interpersonal Relations:* friend groups, social acquaintances, modes of communication
        *i. Rates of Intermarriage*
    *b. Residential Patterns:* where and how immigrant populations live
        *i. Loci of Immigrant Settlement (Clustered or Dispersed)*
        *ii. Quality of Immigrant Housing versus Native Housing*
        *iii. Levels of Discrimination vis-à-vis Immigrant Residential Mobility:* whether immigrants have freedom to move and live where they desire
    *c. Inter-Communal Conflicts:* number and nature of conflicts between natives and immigrants
*3. Position of Immigrants and Immigrant Culture in Societal Discourse and the National Narrative:* whether or not immigrant cultural practices, values,

and symbols are accepted, incorporated, and acknowledged into the national narrative and societal discourse

Indicator 1 is a general measurement tool, and builds on the work of Entzinger (2000), Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003), Phalet and Swyngedouw (2003), and Freeman (2004). However, Indicators 2 and 3 are mostly novel, and thus require elaboration.

The use of intermarriage rates to gauge social interactions between immigrant and native populations is quite established. Less attention is paid to interpersonal relations, residential patterns, or inter-communal conflicts between immigrants and the native population. However, these three sub-indicators can elucidate crucial information on social interactions between immigrants and the native population across multiple levels of society. For example, incorporation in the political arena does not necessarily mean that immigrants have been accepted into the native social group; these three sub-indicators can capture the level of relative social acceptance in this case.

Existing studies on incorporation that examine immigrant culture often assume that such culture is inherently incongruent and incompatible with the host polity's culture (Freeman 2004, 959-960). As a result, immigrants and their associated practices and values are also often excluded from and/or left out of the host polity's national narrative. Indicator 3 thus serves as an objective gauge for interpreting and evaluating the presence and position of immigrant cultural practices and symbols in both societal discourse and the national narrative.

***Defining Incorporation Outcomes***

"Full" state incorporation is realized when immigrants possess secure citizenship and civil rights on par with native citizens and are represented accordingly in the public sector.  These naturalized citizens are able to access the same social and welfare services as native citizens, and the provision of such services to immigrants is performed by the same entities that serve the native population.  Full government incorporation occurs when immigrants are granted political representation and rights on par with native citizens and are able to participate in the political life of the polity an equivalent and effective manner.  They are also proportionally represented within the polity's legislative and executive institutions, and are encouraged by the state to participate in political life.

Full economic incorporation occurs when: immigrants are accorded full and equal property rights; earn incomes on par with native citizens; possess freedom of economic mobility; and face no discrimination in seeking employment or pursuing economic transactions.  With regard to the economy overall, immigrants are dispersed across different sectors and areas of the market.  Full social incorporation occurs when immigrants and native populations transact and interact through kith and kin groups and residential settlements and regard each other as equals in standing perceptions.  Full social incorporation is also reflected when immigrants and immigrant culture are synthesized into societal discourse and acknowledged in the national narrative.

It is useful to explore what "incomplete" or "partial" immigrant incorporation may look like on an arena-specific basis.  To qualify as such an outcome, these

scenarios need not encompass all indicator values described below.  Rather, one such indicator value is enough to lead the scholar to potentially conclude that immigrants are "incompletely" or "partially" incorporated within that specific arena.

In the State arena, incomplete incorporation of immigrants may occur in cases where they have been enfranchised but their civil rights are repeatedly infringed upon by explicit or implicit state policies, or by the structure and character of state institutions that shape individual-state and individual-individual transactions and interactions.  Partial state incorporation may also occur in situations where immigrants possess full citizenship but are excluded from public sector employment and/or state social insurance schemes.

In the Government arena, immigrants may be granted voting and candidacy rights, but electoral institutions may be shaped in a manner that precludes proportional representation of immigrants.  These institutions may also be designed to shape voting behavior that dilutes the appeal of electoral politics among immigrants.

In the Economic arena, partial incorporation can occur when immigrants are given economic rights on par with native citizens, but are clustered in certain economic sectors.  In this context, immigrants may attain living standards on par with members of the native population, but they may face discrimination from certain forms of employment and economic activities and interactions with the state.

In the Social arena, incomplete incorporation may be observed in instances where newcomers to the polity are clustered residentially and social interactions are delineated by membership in either the immigrant or native population.  In this case, group perceptions may be constitutive of apprehension or contempt for one another.

Such an outcome may be reinforced by the exclusion of immigrants and their culture

from societal discourse and the official national narrative.

## REGIME SURVIVAL, COALITION POLITICS, AND IMMIGRANT INCORPORATION

The preceding framework of immigrant incorporation accounts for *how*

immigrant incorporation progresses within a polity, but does not explain *why*

incorporation progresses to the extent that it does.  In order to account for immigrant

incorporation outcomes, it is necessary to shed light on the primary modes and

pathways upon which incorporation occurs and is determined.  This can be done

through the construction of a hypothesized causal process linking mechanisms

together in a theoretical sequence (George and Bennett 2005, 212).  Through the use

of process-tracing in the context of this causal framework, the scholar can rule out

alternative causal pathways to incorporation outcomes while examining the individual

steps that contribute to the overall end value of incorporation.

In the context of Palestinian incorporation in Jordan, this causal chain can be

constructed by identifying the linkage between regime survival logic, coalition

politics, late development, and the ensuing Palestinian incorporation outcomes in

Jordan.  The nature of the Jordanian regime coalition and its politics have conditioned

the relative policies the Hashemite monarchy has been able to promulgate vis-à-vis

incorporating Palestinians.  On the other hand, long-term regime survival along with

the context of late development have compelled the monarchy to pursue "selective

incorporation" policies and practices in order to maximize the resources of

Palestinians in Jordan while adhering to the parameters of the Hashemite coalition

strategy. This "selective incorporation" has resulted in incomplete Palestinian incorporation outcomes across the State, Government, and Economic arenas of the Jordanian polity.

## WHY INCORPORATE IMMIGRANTS?

In his work on nation-building in the Balkans, Mylonas argues that a polity's foreign policy goals and interstate relations determine whether it chooses assimilation, accommodation, or exclusion towards minority ethnic groups (Mylonas 2010, 86). Adida moves to the domestic level, arguing that cultural distance has a direct causal effect on the trajectory of incorporation (Adida 2010). More specifically, Adida argues that in cases where immigrant cultural values and customs overlap with those of the host society, one will find a reification of group identities and the initiation and perpetuation of exclusionary practices and discourses by the host group in order to defend the latter's positions within society and the status quo in general (Ibid.).

The arguments of Mylonas and Adida are potentially relevant to this study because they operate outside the three scope conditions of typical immigrant incorporation, contexts with: a grounded national identity, the existence of formal incorporation operations and structures, and merit-based economic activity (Adida 2010, 9). Yet it is also important to consider structural and institutional constraints within the domestic realm – particularly those that frequent authoritarian/developing polities.

At the onset of state building in authoritarian/developing polities, the native population often lacks the expertise and education necessary to adequately perform

state functions and duties (Ayubi 1996).  Given the central role of the state in late

industrialization, a dearth of persons able to sufficiently perform bureaucratic

functions and implement state economic policy will retard and harm late

industrialization processes (Waldner 1999).  As a result, a regime may incorporate

and subsequently employ non-indigenous persons until a sufficient bureaucratic

staffing pool is developed.  On the other hand, bureaucratic development may

proceed regardless of these inadequacies, engendering rampant inefficiency within

the state apparatus and a "personalization" of administrative practices that

institutionalizes discrimination against those without such personal connections

(Ayubi 1986, Waldner 2002, Bellin 2004).

The same lack of expertise and education among the native population may

render certain economic functions impotent in the context of late development

(Gerschenkron 1962).  If non-indigenous groups possess the skills and connections

upon which an economic class can be built for late industrialization, then the state

may not hesitate to incorporate the outsiders to fulfill this function (Moore 2004).  An

additional incentive to incorporate outsiders in this case is that economic transactions

provide opportunities for increased state revenue, especially in

authoritarian/developing polities where political acquiescence is often obtained in

exchange for little or no domestic extraction (Schwarz 2008, Mirilovic 2010).

These domestic factors and constraints must be taken into account when

attempting to deconstruct the policies, practices, and actions of a regime vis-à-vis

immigrant incorporation.  The next section contextualizes these factors in the case of

Jordan, integrating the literatures on regime survival, coalition politics, and late

development to provide the theoretical background for the hypothesized causal

process, which follows the subsequent discussion.

## THE LOGIC OF REGIME SURVIVAL, HASHEMITE COALITION POLITICS, AND PALESTINIAN INCORPORATION IN JORDAN

### *Regime Survival and Coalition Politics in Jordan*

While scholars debate the exact definition of authoritarian regimes, several

general characteristics can be enumerated regarding such polities.  Within

authoritarian states, rule is centralized around a single leader or a small unit of elites

from whom all political decisions emanate, streamlining the decision-making process

as a result (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).  The successful co-optation of key

societal groups into state largesse provides political support for both the regime and

the state, including its institutions and administrative actions, while continuously

excluding the majority of the population from policy and decision-making (Brumberg

1995, Schwarz 2008, Bank and Richter 2010).  Those left out of such patronage

networks are repressed (Bellin 2004, Slater and Fenner 2011).  These twin practices

of co-optation and repression are facilitated by access to external financial resources

(Luciani 1990, Richter 2007), and are employed along with several other "survival

strategies" to secure regime incumbency (Brumberg 1995, Brumberg 2002, Lucas

2004).  Over time, the institutionalization of these two regime practices leads to a

severe pushback to reform from entrenched regime elites (Brumberg 2002, Bellin

2004, Peters and Moore 2009, Muasher 2011).  Access to external resources, coupled

with the context of late development, drives authoritarian regimes to intervene

extensively in the economy in order to initiate the industrialization process and

maintain state primacy in the economy (Gerschenkron 1962, Beblawi 1990, Waldner 1999, Bellin 2002).

The Jordanian monarchy exhibits several characteristics typical of an authoritarian regime. The King holds absolute power as defined in the 1952 Constitution, and all decisions come from the palace (Dann 1992, 3-4). Political activity is limited and controlled, with the regime setting the rules of the game (Mufti 1999, Lust-Okar 2004, Lucas 2005) and civil society bureaucratized and largely dependent on state financing (Wiktorowicz 2000). Like many authoritarian regimes, the Hashemite monarchy relies on external financial resources to maintain regime staying power and budget security (Brand 1994, Brynen 1995, Greenwood 2003a, Yom 2009). These external resources or "rents" not only consist of traditional bilateral and multilateral foreign aid, but also institutional and developmental assistance, direct military assistance and financing, and remittances from Jordanians abroad (Richter 2007).

The Hashemite monarchy relies on a regime coalition of East Bank tribes and Transjordanian merchant elites,[6] two groups that predate the modern Jordanian state. In exchange for political support from these two constituencies, the monarchy pursues a coalition strategy consisting of patronage distribution in the form of public sector employment and targeted subsidies to the East Bank tribes and tax breaks combined with protectionist economic policies, selective trade policies, and joint-stock ventures to the Transjordanian merchant community (Greenwood 2003a, Moore 2004, Peters 2009, Peters and Moore 2009). The coalition can be characterized as "disparate" in

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[6] As an overall group, these business elites should be viewed as distinct from the Palestinian-Jordanian business class that controls the majority of the private sector. This distinction is discussed in detail in Chapters Three and Six.

nature due to the fact that the preferences of the two coalition constituencies not only impose mutual costs on one another, but are variable within each constituency (Alon 2005, Peters 2009). As a result of such disparate preferences both across and within coalition constituencies, the monarchy is required to disburse high levels of "side-payments," or disproportionate constituency-specific benefits (Waldner 1999, 34-36), to both constituencies as compensation (Peters 2009). This distributive practice illustrates what Waldner calls "constituency clientelism," a relationship in which the ruler and defined social groups are linked through patronage distribution as a means of maintaining political support (Waldner 1999, 38-39). As a result of constituency clientelist practices in Jordan, the monarchy has become dependent on external rents for patronage distribution (Schlumberger and Bank 2001) at the expense of genuine budget security and effective institutional development (Peters 2009, Peters and Moore 2009).

A robust coercive apparatus is maintained through extensive financing and welfare benefits provided directly by the state to security sector employees, especially those in the Jordanian Army (Dann 1992, Baylouny 2008), in line with staffing and financial practices that are typical of authoritarian regimes (Brownlee 2002, Bellin 2004). The elements that make up the security sector in Jordan draw extensively (and nearly exclusively) from the East Bank tribal constituency within the Hashemite coalition (Herb 1999, 226). The monarchy has not hesitated to use force to suppress and eliminate domestic dissent and opposition, especially coming from those left out of the regime coalition (Sirriyeh 2000, Lucas 2008). Indeed, the Hashemite monarchy has been able to utilize force as a survival tool precisely because of this

coalition-coercion crossover and the exclusion of historical opposition segments from the regime coalition.

In addition to the Hashemite coalition and security apparatus, the Hashemite monarchy has employed several other "survival strategies" to maintain regime staying power and coalition cohesiveness. Historically, political liberalization in the Kingdom has often been followed by "deliberalization," progressing and regressing as the Hashemite kings see fit vis-à-vis regime stability (Brumberg 2002, Lucas 2005, Yom 2009). Elections in Jordan are used as a tool to increase political support through popular participation while in turn reinforcing societal cleavages and strengthening existing social and political forces, such as patronage distribution and *wasta*[7] (Brynen 1992, Fathi 2005, Lust-Okar 2009). Electoral districts are drawn to ensure the election of tribal loyalists to Parliament and minimize the presence of Palestinian-Jordanians in Parliament (Greenwood 2003a, Lust-Okar 2006).

The reshuffling of elites is a primary strategy used by Hashemite monarchs to ensure that no officials become too autonomous or independent from the palace (Bank and Schlumberger 2004, Perthes 2004), as well as to achieve balance in tribal appointments and access to the monarchy (Alon 2009). This system of elite change is what Schlumberger and Bank call "formalized informality," due to the "informal," neopatrimonial nature of appointments to institutions that become "formal" policymaking forums and consultative bodies for the King (Schlumberger and Bank 2001). Under King Abdullah II, new elite institutions have been created to both

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[7] There is no direct English translation of *wasta*, but the closest parallel is the Western notion of having "connections" or "knowing somebody." For more on *wasta* in particular, see Cunningham and Sarayrah (1994).

capture new sources of rent and serve as new mechanisms of patronage distribution (Bank and Schlumberger 2004).

The durability of the monarchy in Jordan is in large part due to astute foreign policy decisions. The Hashemite kings have not hesitated to align Jordan with the interests of more powerful states, especially the United States (Greenwood 2003a, Yom 2009) and other Arab countries (Brand 1994) in order to ensure regime survival through budget security. Financial shortfalls in the past have compelled the Kingdom to negotiate peace with Israel in 1994 (Brand 1999b, Peters and Moore 2009) and embrace unpopular post-9/11 American "War on Terror" policies (Greenwood 2003b, Ryan 2004, Yom and Momani 2008) in exchange for new inflows of foreign aid to replenish the monarchy's distributive networks and cover both internal and external debts.

Jordan, like many authoritarian regimes, was "late to the game" vis-à-vis industrialization (Bellin 2002). As a result, extensive state intervention in the economy has been required to spur on the process of industrialization and take the Kingdom from "backwardness" to "modernity," while at the same time allowing the state to control potential political conflicts resulting from institutional change endogenous to late industrialization (Gerschenkron 1962, Bellin 2002, Smith 2007). Several practices illustrate this extensive state intervention. In the 1950's and 1960's, the Jordanian state encouraged labor migration to the Gulf as a means of decreasing potential domestic unemployment and providing a source of informal social welfare through high volumes of labor remittances (Brand 2006, 176-193). A handful of state-owned companies came to perform the most significant economic activities,

such as phosphate and potash mining (both significant components of Jordan's annual GDP) (Piro 1998, 37-58). Moreover, the public sector is the largest employer in the Jordanian economy (Kanaan 2005, 9). Joint ventures between the state and select business elites have allowed the monarchy to hold relative sway over private sector actors (Moore 2004, 68-69). More recently, the monarchy has induced selective privatization by offering up sales of "public" companies (as defined in Jordanian law) to groups led by "strategic" investors, often a member of one of the pre-1948 Transjordanian business elite families (Peters and Moore 2009, 277).

Such extensive, calculated intervention has enabled the monarchy to stifle calls for democratic reform and political pluralism by compelling the entrenched Transjordanian business elite to prioritize their material interests over collective, broad-based enfranchisement of the Jordanian population (Bellin 2002, 174-175). However, the monarchy has not been the sole source of pushback towards "structural reform efforts," such as rationalizing the bureaucracy or removing price controls on basic foodstuffs, policies that would significantly alter the institutional makeup at the expense of current entrenched regime elites and beneficiaries of regime patronage. The nature of Hashemite coalition politics and patronage distribution have severely limited the structural reforms the monarchy has been able to implement (Peters and Moore 2009, Muasher 2011). Several instances of attempted structural reform have resulted in violent manifestations of opposition from the monarchy's strongest supporters in the population, indicating clearly to the Hashemite monarchy what can and cannot be done vis-à-vis structural reforms and changes in the Kingdom (Brand 1992, Brynen 1992, Greenwood 2003a, Ryan 2004).

### *Palestinian Incorporation in Jordan*

As a result of the disparate nature of the Hashemite coalition, any policy reforms or institutional changes are in general strongly opposed by the coalition out of fear of a loss of patronage and privileges (Peters and Moore 2009, Muasher 2011). Given this coalition's hypersensitivity to change, mere overtures towards Palestinians or suspected policy concessions along the lines of Palestinian incorporation engender significant backlash from both coalition constituencies and a subsequent demand for increased levels of side-payments.

This limited policy space requires the monarchy to either temper potential incendiary policies or facilitate an increase in side-payments and concessions in exchange for coalition acquiescence to proposed policies (Waldner 1999, 202). The former is the more desired strategy (and, in practice, the one more frequently chosen), with the monarchy initiating illusory reforms that increase both the opportunities for political participation and access to the palace in exchange for popular acquiescence to disproportionate reforms. In turn, these "reforms" provide the monarchy with access to new sources of external rent for budget security and/or patronage distribution (Brynen 1992, Brumberg 2002, Greenwood 2003a, Greenwood 2003b).

The threat of coalition defection and a lack of budget security compel the monarchy to curtail the full incorporation of Palestinians in order to secure long-term incumbency. However, the logic of long-term regime survival and the context of late development require the monarchy to initiate some modes of Palestinian incorporation (Abu Odeh 1999, 59). The presence of a non-indigenous population, along with a lack of extensive indigenous sources of human capital for late

industrialization, leads the monarchy to induce incorporation of the Palestinians, with their relatively higher levels of urbanization, education, and technological skills, in order to maximize their economic resources and skills for the Kingdom's economic benefit while at the same time serving the monarchy's security interests vis-à-vis regional rivals and potential external interference.  In other words, these coalition-conditioned limitations on incorporation compel the Hashemite monarchy to selectively enact implicit and explicit incorporation policies towards Palestinians in order to maximize their presence in the polity in a manner within the limits of the Hashemite coalition strategy.  This procedure is called "selective incorporation," and results in incomplete Palestinian incorporation across the arenas of incorporation.

## REGIME SURVIVAL, COALITION POLITICS, AND IMMIGRANT INCORPORATION OUTCOMES

In this section, the concepts, theories, and observations of the literature on regime survival, coalition politics, and late development in Jordan are connected to the components of immigrant incorporation within a procedural framework from which incorporation outcomes can be explicated and accounted for.  Several theoretically relevant mechanisms are pulled from the preceding discussion and employed collectively as a hypothesized causal process that accounts for the relative extent of Palestinian incorporation in Jordan both within and across the different arenas of incorporation.

### *From Regime Survival to Immigrant Incorporation*

A nine-step hypothesized causal process serves as an inferential procedural guide for the outcome of Palestinian incorporation in Jordan.  Steps 1 through 4 draw

heavily on Peters's hypothesized causal process concerning the formation of disparate

regime coalitions and the effect that such coalitions have on institutional outcomes

and efficacy (Peters 2009, 91-92). Adapting Peters's causal framework for use in this

context is valid due to the fact that it was developed partially on the case of Jordan.

Steps 5 through 9 of the process build on the preceding discussion of regime survival,

coalition politics, and late development in Jordan, with Step 9 differentiated into four

separate sub-steps for each arena-specific outcome of incorporation.

**Figure 1: Hypothesized Causal Process for Incorporation Outcomes**



Figure 1 above depicts the following hypothesized causal process:

(1) A disparate authoritarian regime coalition is constructed based on the

immediate local requirements of political and economic stability in Transjordan. (2)

The disparate nature of the Hashemite coalition engenders a coalition strategy based

on high levels of side-payments resulting from the inherent inequity of regime policies vis-à-vis individual coalition constituencies. (3) In order to obtain favorable policy and institutional outcomes from such a coalition, the Hashemite monarchy constructs costly distributive institutions and mechanisms on the basis of constituency clientelism. (4) As a result of these annual budget shortfalls and institutional gaps, the Jordanian monarchy comes to rely heavily on external resources and foreign aid that allow it to maintain these distributive practices. (5) Any policy reforms or institutional changes in general are strongly opposed by the coalition out of fear for a loss of patronage and privileges. This requires the monarchy to either temper potential incendiary policies or facilitate an increase in side-payments and concessions in exchange for coalition acquiescence to desired policies. (6) This threat of coalition defection, along with a lack of budget security, compels the regime to curtail the full incorporation of Palestinians in order to secure its long-term incumbency. (7) However, long-term regime survival and the context of late development require the Hashemite monarchy to initiate some modes of Palestinian incorporation. (8) Along with the coalition-conditioned limitations on incorporation, regime survival logic and the context of late development require the monarchy to selectively enact implicit and explicit incorporation policies towards Palestinians in order to maximize the presence of Palestinians in a manner that is within the limits of its coalition strategy. This procedure is called "selective incorporation." As a result, Palestinian incorporation is incomplete across the arenas of incorporation.

(9a) Palestinian incorporation in the State arena is incomplete. Although legally incorporated within the arena as full Jordanian citizens and possessing

associated civil rights, Palestinian-Jordanians have often had their citizenship removed since 1949 and implicit state actions undertaken to restrict their civil rights. Palestinian-Jordanians are largely excluded from public sector employment and face discrimination and unfavorable circumstances when interacting with the state bureaucracy due to Transjordanian dominance of state institutions. The use of parallel institutions, such as UNRWA, to provide public goods and services to some Palestinian-Jordanians implies that interaction with the state, a major component of State incorporation as discussed earlier in the incorporation framework, does not occur among these Palestinian-Jordanians. Besides camp residents, Palestinian-Jordanians are generally excluded from state social insurance schemes and are forced to rely on informal organizations and associations to cover this gap.

(9b) Palestinian incorporation in the Government arena is incomplete. The monarchy's adherence to the Hashemite coalition strategy has engendered Palestinian-Jordanian underrepresentation in the Parliament, Prime Ministry, and Cabinets. As a result of this underrepresentation, Palestinian-Jordanians have largely come to refrain from voting in elections or participating in the Kingdom's political life.

(9c) Palestinian incorporation in the Economic arena is incomplete. Although many Palestinians work in the upper levels of the private sector (Reiter 2004), the majority of Palestinian-Jordanians continue to have limited job mobility. Staffing practices and historical trends have led to discrimination against Palestinian-Jordanians vis-à-vis public sector employment, with Transjordanians dominating the state bureaucracy. Although primarily the result of coalition politics, this

incorporation outcome is also due to the context of late development and government encouragement for Palestinian-Jordanians to work in the private sector (Susser 2000).

(9d) Although not included in the subsequent analysis, Palestinian incorporation in the Social arena is incomplete, though not necessarily as a direct result of the causal mechanism.  Preliminary analysis of secondary information (contained in Chapter Seven) illustrates that Palestinian-Jordanians are excluded from Jordan's national narrative, and that they remain relatively clustered residentially while social interactions occur largely on the basis of communal groupings.

### *Hashemite Coalition Politics and Palestinian Incorporation Outcomes*

The logic of long-term regime survival and coalition politics, along with the context of late development, has shaped the modes of "selective incorporation" that have produced the specific outcomes of Palestinian incorporation in Jordan.  In order to be most robust in connecting regime survival to immigrant incorporation outcomes, a further examination of coalition politics and constituency preferences vis-à-vis incorporation outcomes is necessary.  These coalition preferences differ based on the specific arena in which Palestinian incorporation progresses.

In the State arena, the full incorporation of Palestinians would extensively threaten coalition interests due to the nature of constituency clientelism in Jordan. The 1970-71 civil war was a watershed in state bureaucratic staffing practices, with the monarchy expelling the majority of Palestinian-Jordanian civil servants from the state and moving to an almost exclusive Transjordanian recruitment pool for the security services (Abu Odeh 1999, Sirriyeh 2000, Fruchter-Ronen 2008, Lucas 2008). The reversal of this exclusive staffing practice would endanger one of the monarchy's

most significant forms of patronage distribution to East Bank tribes by removing their

monopoly on public service employment and its associated welfare benefits.

Realizing an equality of citizenship between Transjordanians and Palestinian-

Jordanians would require a dampening of the importance of informal connections and

*wasta* vis-à-vis everyday state business such as renewing a passport. The majority of

Palestinian-Jordanians does not possess such connections, and therefore rely on

informal/familial social safety nets as opposed to formal state welfare benefits and

privileges (Lust-Okar 2009, Baylouny 2010). Such a change would infringe upon the

position of larger patrimonial practices of patronage distribution, threatening their

replacement with impersonal rules and rationalization that would effectively limit

these problems of institutionalized discrimination (Horowitz 1985, Waldner 1999).

In the Government arena, coalition preferences mandate Palestinian under-

representation in the Jordanian government. Palestinian-Jordanian under-

representation in the Jordanian Parliament is not a product of the typical desire for

institutionalized dominance of political opposition and subjugated groups (Horowitz

1985). Rather, it is a product of the Parliament's role as one of the main vehicles for

patronage distribution in Jordan (Lust-Okar 2009). Redistricting the electoral areas to

provide adequate representation of Palestinian-Jordanians would result in fewer seats

going to coalition members, especially tribal MPs, engendering lower tribal access to

state resources. Ensuring that as many tribes as possible are represented in

Parliament and have access to such resources goes a long way in facilitating coalition

constituency acquiescence and continued support for the monarchy. Maintaining

Transjordanian dominance of the Prime Ministry and Cabinets ensures that tribal

balance is attained in senior appointments, a rotational strategy that has been a

hallmark of Hashemite rule since the Mandate era (Alon 2009).

In the Economic arena, full incorporation of Palestinians would completely

alter the makeup of both the Jordanian economy and the Jordanian state, disrupting

the interests of coalition members (and by extension the monarchy) in the process.

As mentioned earlier, the 1970-71 civil war engendered a sectoral split in Jordan's

economy that has persisted until today (Reiter 2004). Attempting to disaggregate the

concentrations of Transjordanians and Palestinian-Jordanians from their respective

sectoral clusters would harm the clientelist manner in which the monarchy distributes

benefits to the Hashemite coalition constituencies. Equalizing employment practices

and removing institutionalized employment discrimination would endanger the

positions of privilege that the Hashemite coalition members enjoy and expect from

the monarchy.

In the Social arena, full incorporation of Palestinian-Jordanians would

threaten the predominant position that Transjordanians have in national discourse and

official propositions of Jordanian national identity. The Hashemite coalition

members have an interest in maintaining their monopoly as the source of national

discourse and heritage, as it reinforces their institutional positioning and standing as

coalition members and exclusive beneficiaries of the monarchy's patronage.

### *Incorporating Palestinians: Increasing the Pie as a Coalition Member?*

One might argue that because of their higher levels of resources and skills,

incorporating Palestinians would actually "increase the pie," and thus increase the

overall marginal social benefit in the polity. This is unlikely to be the case. While

Palestinians certainly did possess more resources and skills attuned to development and industrialization (and therefore ideally higher future growth returns), the nature of constituency clientelist politics and the context of late development would prevent such an outcome from occurring in Jordan. In Jordan, political and economic institutions are structured to facilitate the flow of exogenous financial resources to the population in exchange for political acquiescence. These external resources are consistently strained, and incorporating Palestinians into the network of patronage would require either diversion of already-targeted resources or obtaining access to new sources of rents. For a regime seeking to stay in power, the first option is out of the question, while the second option is nearly impossible to come by. As the discussion on reform pushback highlighted, simply restructuring these institutions is not an option.

One might also argue that the Hashemites could simply kick out one of the coalition constituencies, either the Transjordanian tribes or merchants, and replace them with Palestinian-Jordanians. However, coalition ejection is out of the question for two reasons, both constituency-based. First, expelling the Transjordanian business community from the Hashemite coalition is not an option, as these elites provide a relative tool with which the regime can control activity in the Palestinian-dominated private sector and undertake certain top-down policy requirements stemming from structural adjustment policies, such as mandated privatization. Cutting off the East Bank tribes would prove to be even more drastic for the monarchy, as the tribal constituency is the primary source of those that staff the

security apparatus in Jordan (which has historically been the main source of institutional support for the Hashemite monarchy).

## CONCLUSION: INCORPORATING IMMIGRANTS

This chapter has laid the theoretical foundation for exploring the trajectory and outcomes of Palestinian incorporation in Jordan. First, a revised conceptualization and metric for immigrant incorporation were presented, with a particular emphasis on the potential determinants of incorporation in authoritarian/developing contexts. Second, a hypothesized causal process linking regime survival logic, coalition politics, and the context of late development to immigrant incorporation outcomes was constructed, providing the epistemological groundwork necessary to account for the outcomes of Palestinian incorporation in Jordan.

Using this comprehensive model as a guide, analysis of Palestinian incorporation in Jordan proceeds over the next four chapters. The following chapter provides a brief overview of Palestinian incorporation in Jordan, weaving a historical narrative of the trajectories and modes that have brought Palestinian-Jordanians into the Jordanian polity. Chapters Four through Six go into greater historical detail, describing and analyzing the trajectory of Palestinian incorporation as it has occurred in each of the arenas of incorporation examined in the study.

# CHAPTER THREE
# IMMIGRANT INCORPORATION
# IN JORDAN

This chapter provides both an introduction to Palestinian incorporation in Jordan and the analytical framework to be employed in each of the three subsequent discussion chapters. An overview of Palestinian migration to Jordan since 1948 is provided, followed by a summarized narrative of Palestinian incorporation in Jordan. The second part of the chapter discusses the terms "Transjordanians" and "Palestinian-Jordanians," including the context-specific subgroups extant within the "Palestinian-Jordanian" classification. A discussion of the framework to be employed in the subsequent analysis of Palestinian incorporation concludes the chapter.

## THE PALESTINIANS IN JORDAN

### *The Pre-1948 Palestinians in Transjordan*

Merchants from Palestine and Syria began settling in present-day Jordan towards the end of the Ottoman era of rule in Transjordan, and immigration continued throughout the Mandate period (Moore 2004, 57). At the time of the Hashemite annexation of the West Bank in 1949, Palestinians comprised about 10% of the East Bank's population and much of the merchant constituency of the Hashemite coalition (Amawi 1992; Massad 2001, 233). This analysis, however, will only focus on the Palestinians that came to Jordan after 1948. The sheer magnitude of the 1948-49 inflow of Palestinians overwhelmed existing Jordanian institutions and significantly

altered the political, economic, and social conditions and characteristics of the Jordanian polity (Brand 1995b, Abu Odeh 1999, Susser 1999).  The first wave of Palestinian migration to Jordan in 1948-49 is thus taken as the starting point of analysis for Palestinian incorporation in the Kingdom.

### *Post-1948 Palestinian Migration to Jordan*

The first wave of Palestinian migration to Jordan occurred in the midst of the 1948-1949 Arab-Israeli war (Brand 1995b, 47).  Close to a million Palestinians were expelled by the Zionists or fled from their homes, with about 110,000 going directly to the East Bank, whose population at the time was about 375,000 (Massad 2001, 233).  In December 1949, King Abdullah I annexed the West Bank and granted Jordanian citizenship to the 425,000 indigenous Palestinians and 360,000 Palestinian refugees in the territory, as well as the aforementioned 110,000 Palestinians that had fled directly to the East Bank in 1948-49 (Ibid.).  This tripled Jordan's population overnight from 375,000 to 1.27 million (Ibid.).

After the 1967 war in which Jordan lost the West Bank to Israel, about 300,000 Palestinians came to the East Bank from both Gaza and the West Bank (Yorke 1988, 31), with about 100,000 more coming over subsequent years until the early 1980's (Gubser 1983, 12).  They thus constituted a certain demographic majority in Jordan after 1967 (Susser 1999).  However, labor migration to the Gulf during the 1970's and 1980's, along with King Hussein's 1988 administrative disengagement from the West Bank, lessened this majority (Brand 2006, 176-185).  Saddam Hussein's 1991 invasion of Kuwait led to the return of about 300,000 Palestinian-Jordanians to Jordan, the majority of whom possessed Jordanian

citizenship dating back to 1949 (Van Hear 1995, 354). This mass return brought the demographic balance to its current slight majority of Palestinian-Jordanians (Yom 2009, 153).

### *Post-1948 Palestinian Incorporation in Jordan*

In the midst of Jordan's annexation of the West Bank in 1949, King Abdullah I granted Jordanian citizenship to all Palestinians in the East Bank and West Bank. The majority of these newly enfranchised Palestinian-Jordanians possessed high levels of financial and human capital and came to form the core of Jordan's middle class in the 1950's and 1960's. However, they came to be underrepresented in the Jordanian Parliament, the Prime Ministry, Cabinets, and the military and security services, while remaining outside of the Hashemite monarchy's social insurance schemes. The subsequent influx of Palestinians following the 1967 war further strengthened such underrepresentation and exclusion in Jordan's legislative and executive institutions, as the Hashemite monarchy sought to retain the political support of the native Transjordanians through an expansion of state employment and associated social and welfare benefits. This "Transjordanian-first" trend in the public sector continued throughout the 1960's and became firmly established as state policy in the aftermath of the civil war of 1970-71 ("Black September") between the Jordanian army and Palestinian guerrillas.

The post-Black September "de-Palestinization" policies pursued by the Hashemite monarchy accelerated the Palestinian-Jordanians' increasing dominance of the private sector and their concomitant exclusion from the public sector. Following the 1970-71 episode, Palestinian-Jordanians were purged from the state bureaucracy

and Jordanian army, leading large numbers of Palestinian-Jordanians to work abroad in the Gulf countries in skilled employment schemes. As a result of remittances from these expatriates, the standard of living among Palestinian-Jordanians increased during the 1970's and 1980's. Despite continued Palestinian-Jordanian control of the private sector and their associated high levels of capital, it was the pre-1948 Transjordanian merchant elites that were ultimately selected by the Jordanian government for joint-sector ventures and state divestment schemes in the 1990's and 2000's.

In 1983, the Jordanian government instituted an internal migration policy that resulted in the removal of Jordanian citizenship from Palestinian-Jordanians residing on the West Bank on or after June 1, 1983. This policy became official with the 1988 administrative disengagement from the West Bank, in which the monarchy declared all Palestinian-Jordanians residing or holding residency on the West Bank as of July 31, 1988 to be "Palestinians" and not "Jordanians." Removal of citizenship from Palestinian-Jordanians has continued up to the present day, with several thousand cases being reported in the 2000's. These cumulative policies and practices have altogether resulted in the incomplete incorporation of Palestinian-Jordanians within the State, Government, and Economic arenas of the Kingdom.

## FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

### *Defining "Transjordanians" and "Palestinian-Jordanians"*

Nanes writes that "one's physical location in May 1948, either east or west of the Jordan River, marks the critical distinction" between "Transjordanians" and "Palestinians" in Jordan (Nanes 2008, 86). This distinction has been institutionalized,

perpetuating the divisions to the point where relatively general statements can be made about the constituents of each group (Susser 1999, Sirriyeh 2000, Lucas 2008). "Transjordanians" are the indigenous inhabitants of what is now Jordan (Ibid., 85-86). They usually trace their heritage through tribes (Perez 2011, 171), and often define their communal grouping through employment in the public sector, specifically the army and security services (Brand 1995b, 48). "Palestinian-Jordanians" are those that were expelled or fled to Jordan and/or the West Bank following the 1948-49 war (Nanes 2008, 86) and subsequently granted citizenship in December 1949 by King Abdullah (Abu Odeh 1999, xv).

### Palestinian-Jordanians in Jordan

When examining the status of Palestinians in Jordan, scholars often disaggregate Palestinian-Jordanians into several stratified subgroups (Gubser 1988, Yorke 1988, Brand 1995b). This tactic is a reflection of the interaction between pre-migration Palestinian social structures (Kimmerling and Migdal 1993, 192-193) and the dynamics and outcomes of successive migration into Jordan (Perez 2011, 74), which together have engendered variegated levels of incorporation among Palestinian-Jordanians to an extent. This interaction result is influenced by both variation in the desire for incorporation among Palestinian-Jordanians and targeted Jordanian administrative actions (such as the 1988 disengagement from the West Bank). This in turn produces subgroup differentiation that is highly correlated with and driven by the relative levels of incorporation of these respective subgroups.

Brand divides Palestinian-Jordanians into four subgroups, which vary based on their self-perception as "Jordanians," as well as their relative feeling of attachment

to the Kingdom (Brand 1995b, 49-50).  The first group consists of those that reside in refugee camps or have recently left the camps; the second of Palestinian-Jordanian middle class of "small merchants and lower-level government employees"; the third of Palestinians consisting primarily of those both at the top of the private sector and the upper levels of the Jordanian bureaucracy; and fourth, those Palestinian-Jordanians that returned to Jordan after the 1990 expulsion from Kuwait (Ibid.). Brand's disaggregation implies a differentiation based on relative incorporation levels, as her divisions concern residency location and socioeconomic status indicated by economic and political positions within the polity.

Gubser divides Palestinian-Jordanians into five subgroups based on data of arrival in Jordan and relative living conditions (Gubser 1988, 95-96).  As mentioned previously, Gubser identifies the pre-1948 Palestinian families in Transjordan as "Jordanians."  The four post-1948 Palestinian groups are: those Palestinians that fled directly to Jordan in 1948 and do not reside in refugee camps; those Palestinians that fled to Jordan in 1967 and do not reside in refugee camps; the Palestinians of both 1948 and 1967 that live in refugee camps; and finally, (at the time of writing in 1988) the Palestinians of the West Bank that reside under Israeli occupation but possess Jordanian citizenship (Ibid.).  These are also in line with the incorporation paradigm, although Gubser leaves out Palestinian-Jordanians working in the Gulf due to his publishing before the 1990-91 mass return of Palestinian-Jordanians to Jordan.

Yorke divides Palestinian-Jordanians into three groups based along socio-economic lines (Yorke 1988, 31-32).  The first group consists of refugee camp residents; the second of 1967 refugees that do not live in refugee camps; the third

group of 1948 refugees that do not live in camps; and the fourth group of Palestinian-Jordanians working in the Gulf (Ibid.). Yorke's differentiation is also in line with the relative levels of incorporation, as she implies that socioeconomic integration is a key distinguishing indicator for such groupings (Ibid., 32).

In general, Palestinian incorporation in the Kingdom will be examined vis-à-vis the overall communal group. It can be stated with certainty that Palestinian-Jordanians share several characteristics that spurn migration or integration differences, such as strong attachment to town or village of origin in Palestine, "a sense of loss of homeland and of gross injustice at the hands of the international community, and the centrality of the notion of return" (Brand 1995b, 48-49). One scholar has observed that Palestinian-Jordanians, whether residing in camps or in greater Jordanian society, all identify as "Palestinian refugees" due to their shared experience of displacement (Perez 2011, 93-94).

In specific contexts, however, it will be necessary to differentiate among Palestinian-Jordanians to provide a clearer picture of incorporation outcome variations within the communal group. Differences among refugees exist within camps based on when they came to Jordan: a refugee is either a *laji* (displaced in 1948) or a *nazih* (displaced in 1967), and symbolizes either *al-Nakba* ("the catastrophe"/1948) or *al-Naksa* ("the setback"/1967), respectively (Ibid., 74, 93). And despite the relative overall Palestinian-Jordanian claim to status as "Palestinian refugees," Palestinian-Jordanians living outside the refugee camps often differentiate themselves from those living in the camps (Ibid., 76-77). Indeed, some Palestinian-

Jordanians consider themselves to be "Jordanians" first (Fathi 1994, 219-220; Brand 1995b, 49-50; Reiter 2004, 87).

Given this context-driven need for subdivisions, I differentiate Palestinian-Jordanians into four different subgroups based on the factors of location and migration. The relative location of immigrants within a polity is an important factor in incorporation outcomes, as discussed in Chapter Two. Time is an endogenous determinant in the trajectory of incorporation, and as such affects the outcome of immigrant incorporation in a polity (Grzymala-Busse 2011, 1278). It can be stated *a priori* that higher levels of Palestinian incorporation are associated with earlier arrival and more general integrated residential patterns.

The first subgroup of Palestinian-Jordanians consists of those that reside outside of the refugee camps and arrived in Jordan in 1948. These Palestinian-Jordanians have become the most integrated within the Jordanian polity, achieving economic success and obtaining limited representation at some of the highest levels of the Jordanian government.

The second subgroup consists of those that reside outside of the refugee camps and arrived in 1967. This subgroup has done relatively well economically since coming to Jordan following the 1967 war, and, like the first subgroup, is dispersed throughout the Kingdom. However, it is slightly less integrated than the first subgroup due to its more recent arrival in Jordan.

The third subgroup consists of those Palestinian-Jordanians that reside in refugee camps, regardless of the time of arrival. Arrival time is not a factor here, as

the nature of the refugee camps perpetuates the temporality and social exclusion of these Palestinian-Jordanians regardless of the date of migration.

The fourth subgroup consists of those that returned to Jordan in 1990-91 following expulsion or flight from Kuwait.  Many of these Palestinian-Jordanians had never been to the Kingdom before their return, having been born in Kuwait.  While economically successful for the most part, this subgroup's mass return to Jordan resulted in a significant amount of these Palestinian-Jordanians clustered together on the outskirts of Amman or in wealthy neighborhoods in certain parts of the city.

## CONCLUSION: ANALYZING IMMIGRANT INCORPORATION IN JORDAN

In addition to providing a brief introduction of Palestinian incorporation in Jordan, this chapter has developed the framework of analysis that will be used in the proceeding empirical discussion chapters.  Discussion of incorporation within each arena proceeds over the course of the next three chapters, accounting for Steps 6 through 9a-c of the hypothesized causal process.  Within each chapter, the indicators from the immigrant incorporation framework developed in Chapter Two are used to informally guide the discussion of Palestinian incorporation.  A narrative of arena-specific incorporation provides the empirics connecting the interaction of regime survival logic, Hashemite coalition politics, and the context of late development to Palestinian incorporation outcomes, while the indicators from the constructed model in Chapter Two are formally evaluated in the Appendix.

# **CHAPTER FOUR**
# **THE STATE ARENA**

This chapter examines Palestinian incorporation in the State arena of the Jordanian polity, accounting for Steps 6 through 9a of the causal process. The chapter begins with a brief discussion of regime survival and state incorporation. A discussion of Palestinian incorporation in the State arena follows, examining the nature of Palestinian-Jordanian citizenship, civil rights, representation in public sector employment, and access to social insurance schemes. A summary of Palestinian state incorporation concludes the chapter.

## **REGIME SURVIVAL AND STATE INCORPORATION**

The incorporation of immigrants into the State arena of a polity is usually instigated through the granting of citizenship to immigrants. In most polities, citizenship is the only means of gaining permanent residency and rights in a polity and subsequently obtaining access to employment and state social insurance schemes. In authoritarian/developing polities, the importance of citizenship in the context of social insurance schemes increases significantly, with citizenship often serving as a ticket to the means of subsistence in these polities and public sector employment providing access to these schemes (Russell 1990, Brynen 1992). However, the mere possession of citizenship in these polities does not necessarily entail access to social insurance schemes, as kinship-based ties can often take precedence in the context of welfare regimes and state employment (Bank and Richter 2010).

The case of Jordan illustrates this well.  At present, the majority of Palestinians that came to Jordan in 1948-49 possess Jordanian citizenship.  Since 1949, however, the number of enfranchised Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin has fluctuated partially because of citizenship withdrawals and differentiations initiated by the Hashemite monarchy.[8]  The nature of the Hashemite coalition strategy and its associated schemes of patronage distribution Transjordanians leave no room for Palestinian-Jordanians, who are consequently excluded from public sector employment and state social insurance schemes.  Such Transjordanian access and Palestinian-Jordanian exclusion is one of the main ways in which the monarchy has garnered continued Transjordanian acceptance and support of Hashemite rule.

The logic of regime survival, coalition politics, and the context of late development have together compelled the Hashemite monarchy to maintain partial incorporation of Palestinian-Jordanians in the State arena of the Jordanian polity.  At the onset of Jordan's economic and political development, the Hashemites granted citizenship to Palestinians in order to exploit their relatively higher levels of financial and human capital for the Kingdom's late industrialization process.  However, to both ensure the continued primacy of Transjordanians within the polity and perpetuate Hashemite staying power, specific policies, amendments, and legal actions have been enacted and undertaken by the monarchy in order to maintain the marginalized status of Palestinian-Jordanians vis-à-vis the equality of citizenship, civil rights, public sector employment, and state social insurance schemes.  As a result, Palestinian-Jordanians have been incompletely incorporated within the State arena.

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[8] The other contributing factor of course being the successive inflows of Palestinians in 1967 and 1990-91.

# PALESTINIAN INCORPORATION IN THE
# STATE ARENA

## *Immigrant Citizenship*

The Hashemite monarchy enfranchised all Palestinians that came to the West and East Banks in 1948-49. The logic behind this was to not only buttress King Abdullah I's territorial aspirations, but more importantly to secure the higher levels of financial and human capital possessed by the Palestinians for use in Jordan's late industrialization process. Subsequent government policies illustrated this logic, concentrating economic resources and industries on the East Bank despite the West Bank's higher initial industrial base.

Upon granting Jordanian citizenship and civil rights in December 1949 to the approximately 800,000 Palestinians that fled to or resided in the East and West Banks, King Abdullah I signed an addendum to the 1928 Law of Nationality that codified this mass enfranchisement into law (Massad 2001, 39). The 1928 law was subsequently annulled and replaced by the 1954 Law of Jordanian Nationality, which confirmed the possession of "Jordanian nationality" of those Palestinians that came to Jordan before the 1950 annexation (Ibid.). The 300,000 Palestinians that came to Jordan from the West Bank and Gaza Strip following the 1967 war retained their Jordanian citizenship, with the exception of Gazan refugees that were under Egyptian administration at the time of flight and consequently remained stateless (Yorke 1988, 31). In the mid-1980's and 1990's, select financially successful Gazan refugees were given Jordanian passports by King Hussein in return for their investment in the Kingdom (Abu Odeh 1999, 214-215; Brand 2006, 194n47).

While it is well known that King Abdullah I had territorial ambitions and certainly viewed the incorporation of Palestinians as a means to an end in that regard, he also demonstrated that he clearly understood the economic value they could bring to Jordan (Abu Odeh 1999, 59). Abdullah was correct in his observation, as the naturalized Palestinians had significantly higher levels of education and economic activity, and were coming from a more urbanized society than his native subjects (Lerner 1958, 306-307). Nowhere was this more evident than the doubling of Jordan's money supply that occurred following the influx of Palestinians and their capital in 1948-49 (Baster 1995, 29).

As discussed in Chapters One and Two, at the onset of state-building in authoritarian/developing polities, there is often a dearth of personnel qualified to either perform state functions or act as agents of economic growth among the native population (Gerschenkron 1962, Ayubi 1996). Jordan was certainly no exception in this regard. Granting citizenship to Palestinians would allow the monarchy to benefit from the relatively higher levels of financial and human capital possessed by the Palestinians, and the Hashemites acted accordingly. Following the 1950 unification, the monarchy promulgated economic policies shaped to direct Palestinian financial and human capital to develop the East Bank at the expense of the West Bank (Plascov 1981, 36-37; Massad 2001, 235-236). From 1948-1967, only one-third of total investment in Jordan went to the West Bank (Mansour 1988, 74). The majority of manufacturing came to be concentrated on the East Bank after 1950, while industry on the West Bank constituted just 20% of Jordan's industrial sector from 1959-1966 (Gharaibeh 1985, 13-14). These policies induced economic migration from the West

Bank to the East Bank, with the West Bank declining 6% in its share of Jordan's overall resident population from 1961-1966 (Ibid., 10).

The effects of these economic policies are illustrated below in Table 1, with the West Bank averaging around only 40% of GNP from 1959-1966 despite its higher initial industrial base and initial source of half of the Kingdom's population (Baster 1955, 28; Mansour 1988, 73).

**Table 1: West Bank share of Jordan's GNP, 1959-1966 (in JD millions)**

| Year | West Bank GNP | East Bank GNP | Total GNP | West Bank % of Total GNP |
|------|---------------|---------------|-----------|--------------------------|
| 1959 | 36.1 | 54.8 | 90.9 | 40 |
| 1960 | 38.6 | 58.3 | 96.9 | 40 |
| 1961 | 46.5 | 71.3 | 117.8 | 39 |
| 1962 | 48.2 | 72.3 | 120.5 | 40 |
| 1963 | 49.9 | 76.3 | 126.2 | 40 |
| 1964 | 57.9 | 89.4 | 147.3 | 39 |
| 1965 | 63.7 | 100.1 | 163.8 | 39 |
| 1966 | 64.5 | 100.2 | 164.7 | 39 |
| Average | | | | 40 |

*Source: Adapted from Gharaibeh 1985, 12*

Thus, by legally incorporating Palestinians in the polity through the granting of Jordanian citizenship and residency rights, the Hashemite monarchy was able to gain access to Palestinian financial and human capital that came to play a significant role in Jordan's industrialization process of the 1950's and 1960's (Gharaibeh 1985, 10-15; Robins 2004, 82-87).  Even as late as the 1990's the monarchy illustrated this logic, with King Hussein granting Jordanian citizenship to select Gazan refugees in exchange for their investment in the Kingdom (Brand 2006, 194n47).  The context of late development was thus key in driving Hashemite actions to enfranchise and, at least initially, subsequently incorporate Palestinians into the Jordanian polity.

*Security of Naturalized Citizenship*

Not all Palestinians granted Jordanian citizenship in 1949 have remained enfranchised to date. The monarchy has removed citizenship on several occasions from Palestinian-Jordanians, either by mass disenfranchisement or, more recently, in the context of routine Palestinian-Jordanian interactions with state administration. The logic behind these removals differs slightly in each instance, but two driving principles behind these actions concern Transjordanian fears of marginalization and the related prospect of Israel's potential attempt to settle West Bank Palestinians in Jordan, making the Kingdom the "alternative" Palestinian homeland.

In 1983, the Jordanian government introduced measures that effectively left thousands of Palestinian-Jordanians stateless. To facilitate movement between the two banks in the aftermath of the 1967 Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Jordanian authorities instituted a system of color-coded travel cards to West Bank-origin Palestinian-Jordanians (Ababsa 2011, 8). Palestinian-Jordanians from the West Bank whose residency was on the East Bank on or after June 1, 1983 were given yellow travel cards, while those Palestinian-Jordanians whose residency was on the West Bank on or after June 1, 1983 were given green travel cards (Ibid.). Those with yellow travel cards continued to possess their full citizenship rights, while green card holders were given a renewable two-year Jordanian passport without residency rights, thus rendered stateless (HRW 2010, 20-22).

This 1983 policy set the stage for the 1988 administrative disengagement from the West Bank. In a speech on July 31, 1988, King Hussein announced that Jordan was severing legal and administrative ties with the West Bank, a decision later

confirmed by royal decree (Abdul Hadi 1995).  Disengagement regulations released

by the Prime Minister's office three days prior to the July 31 announcement stated

that every Palestinian-Jordanian residing in the West Bank as of July 31, 1988 was

considered a "Palestinian," and had thus lost his or her Jordanian citizenship

(UNHCR 1988).  The Jordanian authorities gave these newly stateless Palestinians

the option of obtaining temporary two-year passports without national numbers,[9]

making them stateless.  These Palestinians remained stateless until the signing of the

Oslo Accords in 1993, when they were issued ID papers by the Palestinian Authority

(Ababsa 2011, 8n16).  Also stateless after the 1988 disengagement were holders of

the green cards working abroad: several thousand Palestinian-Jordanians that returned

to Jordan from Kuwait in 1991 had their citizenship withdrawn due to possession of

green cards (HRW 2010, 36-37).  In 1996, these Palestinian-Jordanians were given

the ability to apply for five-year Jordanian passports with no national ID numbers

(Ababsa 2011, 8).  In 2009, these green card holders were numbered at about 725,000

(Ibid.).

Green card holders are not the only Palestinian-Jordanians that have had their

citizenship withdrawn since the 1988 disengagement.  Since the early 2000's, the

Hashemite monarchy has been withdrawing the citizenship of Palestinian-Jordanians

holding yellow cards that have not renewed their West Bank residency permits under

the Israeli occupation authorities (Ibid., 9).  This group numbers about 280,000

(Ibid.).  Such withdrawal is arbitrary and is usually the result of routine interactions

between Palestinian-Jordanians and the state, during which Palestinian-Jordanians are

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[9] In 1992, the Jordanian government instituted national ID numbers as the marker of Jordanian citizenship.  In this case, a passport without a national ID number is merely a travel document.

informed that they are no longer citizens of the Kingdom (HRW 2010, 3).  The

amount of Palestinian-Jordanians that have had their citizenship withdrawn in this

most recent phase is unknown, though most estimates place the number at several

thousand (HRW 2010, 26-27).

　　　　These episodes of citizenship removal since the initial 1949 Palestinian-

Jordanian enfranchisement are the result of the Hashemite monarchy's desire both to

ensure its incumbency in the face of domestic and regional instability and to allay

Hashemite coalition fears regarding the perceived "growing presence" of Palestinian-

Jordanians in the Kingdom.  The driving principle behind the citizenship removals in

the 1980's was to ensure the Hashemite monarchy's incumbency by countering

Israeli political rhetoric positioning Jordan as an "alternative homeland" for the

Palestinians and subduing the related fear among Transjordanians that they would

become a minority in their own country in the process (Abu Odeh 1999, 213-214).

Lowering the numbers of Palestinian-Jordanians in the Kingdom was a way to

counter Israeli assertions that "Jordan is Palestine," a design that, if implemented,

would spell the end of the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan (Dann 1992, 36).  The

move also served to subdue Transjordanian concerns while retaining the group's

continued political support for the monarchy by acting favorably on one of its major

demands: reducing the "demographic threat" of Palestinian-Jordanians (Robins 1989,

171).

　　　　It has been argued that the 1988 disengagement was an attempt to "free up"

the West Bank and its Palestinians for PLO control in the context of the 1987 *Intifada*

in order to strengthen the PLO's position as a player in the Arab-Israeli peace process

(Andoni 1991, 168-172; Brand 1999a, 291). This line of thinking does not infringe upon the discussed centrality of domestic factors in this case; rather, it reinforces the claim regarding regime survival logic. The disengagement sent a clear message to the PLO that its past record of interference within Jordanian affairs was no longer acceptable, given both that the 1988 decision implied both PLO "possession" of the West Bank and an effective end to the Hashemites' claim to speak on behalf of the Palestinians outside the East Bank (Lynch 1999, 84; Massad 2001, 261). This understanding between the monarchy and the PLO was formalized with the Kingdom's subsequent recognition of the State of Palestine and the acceptance of the credentials of the Palestinian ambassador to Jordan in 1989 (Abu Odeh 1999, 227-228). By "freeing up" the West Bank and its Palestinians to buttress the PLO's position at the negotiating table, the Hashemite monarchy was able to further consolidate its power on the East Bank by removing the long-term threat the PLO had posed to the monarchy since 1964.

The citizenship removals of the 1990's and 2000's have reinforced the logic behind the 1988 disengagement. The monarchy has continued to act on its assertion that Palestinian-Jordanians should choose between the monarchy and the PLO/PA, removing citizenship from those Palestinian-Jordanians that have not renewed their Israeli West Bank documentation (Ababsa 2011, 9). Ababsa notes that the logic behind these actions is clear: "Jordan is not the substitute homeland for Palestine that Israel would like it to be, and the 280,000 Jordanians who have residence cards and property in the West Bank should keep them" (Ibid.). Continuing to pursue a resolution of the uncertainty surrounding the professed loyalty of Palestinian-

Jordanians through citizenship removals contributes to a greater but still limited sense of clarity and satisfaction among Transjordanians and the Hashemite coalition in particular.

### *Immigrant Civil Rights*

The Jordanian government has restricted the civil rights of Palestinian-Jordanians since granting them citizenship in 1949.  Initially, the monarchy employed governmental policy in some instances to obtain political quiescence from Palestinian-Jordanian citizens by limiting their right to mobility.  Subsequent pursuit of the policy of "de-Palestinization" after Black September has led to a Transjordanian-dominated state apparatus that discriminates against Palestinian-Jordanians by virtue of the associated conditions inherent to individual-individual interactions and transactions in the Kingdom.  Moreover, elements of this apparatus have often pursued their own agendas against Palestinian-Jordanians, arbitrarily denying them passport renewals or refusing them administrative services altogether.

As mentioned previously, the majority of Jordanian expatriates working abroad in the 1950's and 1960's were Palestinian-Jordanians (Abu Odeh 1999, 83). In order to travel abroad in the 1950's, Jordanians were required to obtain an exit permit from the authorities (Brand 2006, 186).  In the context of the domestic instability of the 1950's, the Jordanian government began to control Palestinian-Jordanian transnational movement through calculated use of the exit permit (Abu Odeh 1999, 83).  As Brand notes, "any suspicion about an applicant's political affiliation or activity was sufficient to deny him or her the travel permit" (Brand 2006, 186).  As Palestinian-Jordanians were hard-pressed to find work in the

Kingdom, denial of the exit permit resulted in the loss of one's job and the imposition of hardships upon one's dependents in the Kingdom, of whom there could be up to four or five (Abu Odeh 1999, 83-84; Baylouny 2010, 81-82). In this way, the Jordanian state was able to control the political activities and affiliations of Palestinian-Jordanians both at home and abroad. Although the 1962 abolishment of the exit permit requirement eased restrictions on Palestinian-Jordanian transitional movement, tight security cooperation between the Jordanian government and those of the Gulf countries served to temper expatriate activities abroad (Brand 2006, 187, 221).

The post-Black September purge of Palestinian-Jordanians from the state bureaucracy and the subsequent dominance of Transjordanians in the same capacity significantly altered Palestinian-Jordanian interactions with the state apparatus. The increasing Transjordanian presence in the bureaucracy increased the importance of *wasta* and tribal heritage in state-citizen interactions, leaving Palestinian-Jordanians at an increasing disadvantage due to their lack of such personal connections or characteristics (Abu Odeh 1999, 199-200). Indeed, in order to get any demands met for business or other administrative issues, Palestinian-Jordanians have been forced to rely on Palestinian-Jordanian "sub-middlemen" with connections to Transjordanian middlemen with both access to state resources and connections to those in the state bureaucracy (Ibid., 200).

In the aftermath of the 1988 disengagement from the West Bank, the Jordanian government began to require Jordanians to indicate their place of origin (i.e. "Palestine" or "Jordan") on official forms (Sayigh 1991, 78). In this same

context, Palestinian-Jordanians were often told to "go to Arafat" upon requesting

administrative documents or services from the Jordanian state, and were refused

services in some cases (Andoni 1991, 175n40).  In 1995, reports surfaced (and were

later confirmed) that the Ministry of the Interior was denying passports to Palestinian-

Jordanians eligible for them (Abu Odeh 1999, 194).  Although King Hussein stepped

in and demanded an end to this practice, the Ministry of the Interior continued quite

frequently to deny passports to Palestinian-Jordanians residing on the East Bank

(Ibid.).

These measures taken to limit and control Palestinian-Jordanian civil rights fit

in with the long-term aim of monarchical incumbency in the context of late

development.  Calculated use of the exit permit allowed the monarchy to conduct a

simple exchange of political rights for individual benefit in a transaction that

cumulated into a significant source of hard currency for the Kingdom, boosting the

late industrialization process by raising purchasing power and standards of living.

Even after the 1962 abolishment of the exit permit, tight security cooperation with the

countries of employment allowed the Kingdom to keep watch over Palestinian-

Jordanian activities abroad while ensuring the continued flow of remittances to

Jordan (Brand 2006, 221).

The discriminatory practices instituted following Black September within the

Jordanian administrative apparatus, such as mandating the indication of origin on

official forms and denying Palestinian-Jordanians administrative services from the

state, evinces an institutionalized disposition whereby the Transjordanian-controlled

state apparatus accepts this convention of discrimination as the norm and perpetuates

it through subsequent transactions (Abu Odeh 1999, 193-201). Restricting

Palestinian-Jordanian civil rights thus serves as a tool by which the Hashemite

monarchy has been able to harness the economic resources and capabilities of

Palestinian-Jordanians while controlling for outcomes and actions that that could

potentially undermine both Hashemite staying power and/or the favored position of

Transjordanians within both the Jordanian state and the Hashemite coalition.

### Public Sector Employment

Since the Mandate era, the Hashemite monarchy has used public sector

employment and its associated social and welfare schemes as the primary form of

patronage for the tribal constituency of the Hashemite coalition (Peters and Moore

2009). Indeed, employment in the Arab Legion and civil service was one of the main

ways King Abdullah I co-opted Transjordanian tribes into the state before Jordan's

independence in 1946 (Alon 2005). Since the 1949 mass enfranchisement of

Palestinians, Transjordanians have come to constitute the overwhelming majority in

the Jordanian security forces and civil service (Perez 2011, 177-184). Along with

these discriminatory employment practices, Transjordanian dominance of the public

sector has been reinforced by the events of Black September in 1970-71, which

resulted in a massive purge of Palestinian-Jordanians from the army and state

bureaucracy and their subsequent replacement by Transjordanians (Sirriyeh 2000, 77-

78; Fruchter-Ronen 2008, 254-256).

The military has served as one of the main conduits for patronage distribution

and side-payments to non-merchant constituents in the Hashemite regime coalition,

and has been dominated by Transjordanians since the creation of the Arab Legion in

1922 (Hurewitz 1982, 315; Baylouny 2008).  In the 1960's and 1970's, the state expanded security sector employment such that by 1975, one-fourth of the domestic labor force was in the security services (Ibid., 288).  Extraordinary benefits accompanied this employment: free health care, pensions, and state-subsidized higher education with seats reserved through admissions quotas (Ibid.).  In the structural adjustment era of the late 1980's and 1990's, the military retained these employment benefits and welfare through an increased budget and introduced new benefit schemes, such as exclusive access to special military co-ops selling goods at below-market prices, one-time benefit payments to retiring soldiers, and the creation of military-specific jobs through the establishment of Jordan's defense industry in 1999 (Ibid., 301-302; Amara 2008).

As a result of the military's role in the Hashemite coalition strategy, there has been little room for Palestinian-Jordanians in its employment schemes.  Although they were recruited directly into the Arab Legion following the 1950 annexation, the majority of Palestinian-Jordanians generally remained low on the military hierarchy, working mostly in technical and non-combat positions, while Transjordanians continued to dominate the Legion's mobile and combat units (Plascov 1981, 97; Smith 1984, 101-102; Massad 2001, 206).  The main military recruitment point for Palestinian-Jordanians in the years after 1949 was the National Guard, created exclusively for Palestinian-Jordanians in January 1950 (Fathi 1994, 136).  However, the Guard was largely underfinanced and ineffective, which led to its ultimate amalgamation with the Arab Legion in May 1956 and disbandment in 1966 (Massad 2001, 206).

As a result of the 1956 amalgamation, Palestinian-Jordanians came to comprise 40-45% of the Arab Legion by the mid-1960's (Fathi 1994, 140). However, the purge of thousands of Palestinian-Jordanian soldiers from the Legion following the 1970-71 civil war reduced the Palestinian-Jordanian component in the army once again (Pappe 1994, 74; Massad 2001, 213). In the years after, the Jordanian government began a recruiting campaign aimed at Transjordanians that deliberately excluded Palestinian-Jordanians (Ibid.). The composition of the Cadet School in 1972 reflected the results of this campaign: just twenty Palestinian-Jordanians were in the class of 273 candidates (Ibid.).

In 1976, national conscription was reinstated, and the share of Palestinian-Jordanians in the army subsequently increased (Fathi 1994, 140-141). However, Palestinian-Jordanians continued to be recruited into primarily non-combat positions, a trend that has preserved the "impression that the army is still tribal domain" (Ibid., 141). In the mid-1980's, the army was estimated to be just 25% Palestinian-Jordanian as a result of the "de-Palestinization" policies (Massad 2001, 241). Palestinian-Jordanians are currently not permitted to rise above the rank of major or lieutenant colonel in the army (Bligh 2001, 13-14). Moreover, the suspension of national conscription in 1992 has allowed for Transjordanian dominance of the military once again (Baylouny 2008, 301).

Palestinian-Jordanian employment in the civil service follows a similar historical pattern. Although Palestinian-Jordanians came to serve in prominent positions following the 1950 annexation, Transjordanians dominated the state bureaucracy in the 1950's and 1960's (Mishal 1978, 8-9; Smith 1984, 97-102; Perez

2011, 179). Following the civil war of 1970-71, the "de-Palestinization" policy was codified through promulgation of a Civil Service Law that gave the Jordanian government broad powers to dismiss and retire civil servants (Susser 1994, 156). In the four months following enactment of the law, hundreds of Palestinian-Jordanian civil officials were dismissed (Massad 2001, 246; Fruchter-Ronen 2008, 255). This favoritism towards Transjordanians and discrimination against Palestinian-Jordanians in the state bureaucracy continues in the present day as a result of this "de-Palestinization" (Perez 2011, 185).

In the Kingdom's public universities, a similar pattern ensued following Black September. The government began to favor Transjordanian candidates over Palestinian-Jordanian candidates for faculty appointments, and started to screen lecturers and professors for political affiliations (Abu Odeh 1999, 215). These policies had significant results: Palestinian-Jordanians went from comprising about 95% of the faculty in the 1970's to just 50.5% of the faculty in 1997 within the Kingdom's public universities (Reiter 2002, 144-145). At both the state and university levels, these discriminatory practices continue through the present day and have essentially become official state policy (Ibid.; Massad 2001, 258).

The continued pursuit of a "Transjordanian-first" employment policy in the public sector is driven by the monarchy's adherence to the Hashemite coalition strategy. As mentioned earlier, state employment was one of the main ways in which King Abdullah I both co-opted Transjordanian tribes into the Jordanian state and distributed patronage to the Hashemite coalition. The Hashemites' adherence to this coalition strategy has had the implicit effect of large-scale Palestinian-Jordanian

exclusion from the public sector, a trend that has become increasingly pronounced since the civil war of 1970-71.  The suspect loyalty perceived by the Hashemites towards Palestinian-Jordanians, as well as the actions of Palestinian resistance groups and some elements of the army and civil service during Black September, led to the entrenchment of "Transjordanian-first" recruitment policies within the public sector that continue to the present.  This "de-Palestinization" has simply reinforced the long-term Hashemite practice of utilizing public sector employment as a means of patronage distribution to the tribal constituency of the Hashemite coalition, meeting its demands and satisfying its preferences with the long-term aim of monarchical incumbency.

### *Provision of Social Insurance and Provider Identity*

Palestinian-Jordanians have been largely left out of the state social "safety net" within the Kingdom, and have been forced as a result to establish professional and mutual aid associations to cover for this exclusion from state largesse.  The monarchy has maintained this exclusion through calculated use of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the Social Security Corporation (SSC), and public sector employment policies with the overall aim of securing continued political support through a favorable distribution of social insurance and benefits to the Hashemite coalition and Transjordanian population at large.

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) was established in December 1949 to provide relief and assistance to Palestinian refugees displaced in 1948 (UNRWA website).  In Jordan, ten official UNRWA camps were set up to house the 1948 refugees and 1967 displaced persons, "mostly jobless farmers and

laborers who had not been able to afford any decent housing" (Al Husseini 2011, 1-5).  Refugees were allowed to register with UNRWA but could choose not to live in the camps and still retain their access to UNRWA services (UNRWA website).  By 1987, about two-thirds of Palestinian-Jordanians in Jordan had access to UNRWA's services, while only one-sixth actually lived in the camps (Brand 1988a, 9; Yorke 1988, 32).  As of January 2012, 2 million Palestinian-Jordanians are registered with UNRWA, of which 360,000 live in the refugee camps (UNRWA 2012).  These UNRWA-registered Palestinian-Jordanians comprise an estimated 40% of the total Palestinian-Jordanian population in the Kingdom (Ibid.).

Since its founding in 1949, UNRWA has remained the sole provider of services to refugees residing in its camps (Al Husseini 2011, 25).  Palestinian-Jordanians registered with UNRWA obtain traditional state social services directly from the agency and independent of the Jordanian state (Plascov 1981, 63).  These include education, health care, social services, community support, microfinance, and emergency programs (UNRWA website).

In 1975, the Jordanian government took over the physical infrastructure part of the camps, providing housing, water, sewerage, electricity, and road networks to camp residents (Al Husseini 2011, 25).  In the late 1980's, the Jordanian government further expanded its functions vis-à-vis the refugees, establishing the Department of Palestinian Affairs (DPA) within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1988 (Ibid.).  The DPA assists UNRWA with its agency duties and monitors refugee action and camp upkeep, and acts as the coordination point for refugee committees (Ibid.).  Following the 1994 peace treaty with Israel, the Jordanian government began to include the

refugee camps in its national development plans for the first time (Ibid., 29). Despite such increasing integration of the camps within the Jordanian institutional framework, UNRWA nevertheless remains the sole provider of social insurance schemes to camp residents (Al Husseini and Bocco 2010).

For those Palestinian-Jordanians residing outside of the camps, few options have existed for accessing social and welfare resources in general. The main form of access to social insurance in Jordan during the 1950's was the army (Fathi 1994, 140; Tal 2002, 17). By the late 1960's, Palestinian-Jordanians came to comprise about 40-45% of the Jordanian army, and thus gained access to the military's social insurance schemes, such as educational assistance, healthcare, and subsidized foodstuffs (Fathi 1994, 140; Baylouny 2010, 53-54). However, the post-1971 purge of Palestinian-Jordanians from the public and security sectors reversed this progress, leaving nearly all outside of the Kingdom's social "safety net" once again.

Even government schemes designed to cover those left out of state social insurance schemes have mostly benefitted Transjordanians. In 1978, the Jordanian government created the Social Security Corporation (SSC) through royal decree (SSC website). The SSC was tasked with providing retirement income to those not covered under civil service pension laws, and is financed by both contributions from beneficiaries and revenues from investment (Roberts 1994, 104-105). As direct budget support to the monarchy increased in the midst of the oil boom of the 1970's and 1980's, beneficiaries began to contribute more and more to the SSC, swelling its resources and expanding its coverage (Peters 2009, 168). In 2009, the SSC covered 736,829 Jordanians, which accounted for nearly half of Jordan's total labor force

(SSC 2009). However, nearly half of these beneficiaries were employed in the Kingdom's public administration and security apparatus, jobs that have historically been and continue to be dominated by Transjordanians (Baylouny 2008, 301-302; SSC 2009, 54).

In response to their exclusion from state social insurance schemes, Palestinian-Jordanians formed professional associations and unions in the early 1970's that provided social insurance schemes like pension plans and loans to those working in the private sector (Baylouny 2008, 290-291). In the midst of increasing levels of remittances from the Gulf in the 1970's and 1980's, "mutual aid" associations were formed that served as sources of welfare for Palestinian-Jordanians working both in Jordan and abroad (Baylouny 2010, 94-96). These latter associations are structured around the Palestinian village of origin, a design facilitated by the clustering of refugees by village in the UNRWA camps (Ibid.). Such associations increased in both numbers and importance with the return of Palestinian-Jordanians from Kuwait in 1991 (Ibid.). In the 1990's, these associations began to widen their membership base from specifically family units to "broader" kin-based connections (Ibid., 98).

The Hashemite monarchy granted citizenship and accepted the burden of absorbing about 800,000 Palestinians, a task seemingly unthinkable for a polity in the early stages of its political and economic development that was struggling to provide services to its own indigenous population. For the Hashemite monarchy, however, such enfranchisement makes sense for two reasons. First, by taking on the refugees and establishing camps and proposed integration schemes, the Hashemites obtained

access to large amounts of foreign aid with UNRWA's presence in Jordan, often

diverting such funds to Hashemite coalition members (Peters 2009, 151).  Related to

this aid access is the second reason, which concerns UNRWA's function as a

"parallel institution," or one that relies "completely on foreign finance and expertise

to plan, implement, and maintain specific outputs, such as infrastructure,

decentralized governance, and employment" (Peters and Moore 2009, 271).

As mentioned earlier, UNRWA's provision of social insurance to those

registered Palestinian-Jordanians is done independently of the Jordanian government,

precluding the typical interactions between state and citizen that occur in traditional

institutional settings concerning social insurance distribution and procurement.  The

Hashemite monarchy has supported UNRWA partially because of this function, as

such practices not only allowed the monarchy to maintain an uninterrupted flow of

patronage to the Hashemite coalition, but also to "deal with the Palestinians on the

cheap" by not having to utilize state resources for social insurance provision or

patronage distribution to Palestinian-Jordanians (Peters and Moore 2009, 271).

Indeed, the Jordanian budget at both the time of enfranchisement and in

subsequent years would not have permitted such rationing or diversion of patronage

to Palestinian-Jordanians.  In the 1950's and 1960's, the monarchy was already

chronically overspending on defense and public security expenditures targeted at the

tribal constituencies of the Hashemite coalition, while relying largely on foreign

grants and loans to cover both the resulting budget deficit and its weak extractive

capabilities.  As illustrated below in Table 2 on the following page, the monarchy was

receiving an annual average of 55% of its revenue from foreign sources and spending,

on average, 55% of such revenue to maintain its Transjordanian base of support through the army and security services.  There was thus no piece of the "pie" to be had for Palestinian-Jordanians.

**Table 2: Government Budget, 1955-1966 (in JD millions)**

| Fiscal Year | Domestic Revenue | Foreign Grants/Loans | Foreign Grants/Loans as % of Total Revenue | Expenditures | Defense and Public Security as % of Total Expenditures |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1955-56 | 7.979 | 10.868 | 58 | 17.628 | 60 |
| 1956-57 | 8.582 | 12.517 | 59 | 21.318 | 63 |
| 1957-58 | 9.889 | 15.621 | 61 | 23.857 | 54 |
| 1958-59 | 10.878 | 19.711 | 64 | 29.339 | 57 |
| 1959-60 | 13.350 | 18.400 | 58 | 30.700 | 59 |
| 1960-61 | 13.839 | 18.050 | 57 | 32.839 | 56 |
| 1961-62 | 14.679 | 18.889 | 56 | 32.979 | 57 |
| 1962-63 | 21.100 | 17.739 | 46 | 37.518 | 51 |
| 1963-64 | 19.250 | 15.339 | 44 | 39.339 | 53 |
| 1964-65 | 23.821 | 27.039 | 53 | 43.618 | 48 |
| 1965-66 | 26.921 | 24.000 | 47 | 58.518 | 46 |
| Average | - | - | 55 | - | 55 |

*Sources: Adapted from Aruri 1972, 61 and Brand 1988, 156*

The state policy of excluding Palestinian-Jordanians from state social insurance schemes is in keeping with the historical practice of utilizing state welfare both as a privilege for Transjordanians and as a means of contracting continued loyalty from the monarchy's social base of support.  The continued existence of UNRWA as the sole provider of social and welfare services to camp residents allows the monarchy to get away with not providing such services to a significant portion of the Jordanian population, allowing the flow of patronage to the Hashemite coalition to continue uninterrupted.  The function of the Social Security Corporation (SSC) further illustrates this exclusion: although it was established to cover any Jordanians

left out of civil service pensions and welfare schemes (who happen to mostly be Palestinian-Jordanians), nearly half of SSC beneficiaries are Transjordanians.

In the context of social insurance exclusion as a method of coalition maintenance, the logic behind permitting Palestinian-Jordanians to form professional and/or mutual aid associations makes sense. The existence of these associations is another instance where the Jordanian state can get away with excluding Palestinian-Jordanians in social service and/or welfare provision, allowing the monarchy to keep the Hashemite coalition and its associated social and welfare privileges intact. Incorporating Palestinian-Jordanians into these welfare frameworks would render welfare access no longer an exclusive privilege for Transjordanians, removing one of the main Hashemite coalition benefits and thereby risking the incumbency of the Hashemite monarchy. As a result of the monarchy's adherence to the Hashemite coalition strategy, Palestinian-Jordanians continue to remain outside of the state's social "safety net."

## CONCLUSION: STATE INCORPORATION

This chapter has examined the trajectory and outcome of Palestinian incorporation within the State arena of the Jordanian polity, accounting for Steps 6 through 9a of the causal process. Driven by the logic of regime survival and the context of late development, the Hashemite monarchy has moved to partially incorporate the majority of Palestinian-Jordanians into the polity by granting them citizenship and permanent residency rights.

At the same time, the monarchy has taken several steps to limit Palestinian incorporation in the State arena that illustrate the strategic logic concerning

Hashemite incumbency. The monarchy has withdrawn Palestinian-Jordanian citizenship on several occasions in order to both allay domestic fears of marginalization among Transjordanians and counter Israeli claims of Jordan as the "alternative homeland." The monarchy has also worked to limit the civil rights of Palestinian-Jordanians working abroad, and has institutionalized discrimination against them at home through a perpetuation of administrative conditions resulting from public sector recruitment policies that favor Transjordanians and their mode of personal and kin-based connections.

The Hashemites have taken advantage of the Palestinian refugee presence in the Kingdom, facilitating UNRWA's continued existence as the sole provider of social and welfare services to camp residents while often diverting UNRWA resources to benefit the Hashemite coalition and securing large amounts of foreign assistance in the process. Related to this practice has been the monarchy's pursuit of a "Transjordanian-first" recruitment policy within the public sector, distributing patronage through associated employment benefits and welfare. In turn, this has led to the exclusion of Palestinian-Jordanians from state social insurance schemes. As a result of these cumulative policies and actions, Palestinian incorporation in the State arena is incomplete.

# CHAPTER FIVE
# THE GOVERNMENT ARENA

This chapter examines Palestinian incorporation in the Government arena of the Jordanian polity, accounting for Steps 6 through 9b of the causal process. The chapter begins with a brief discussion of regime survival and government incorporation. A discussion of Palestinian incorporation in the Government arena follows, examining Palestinian-Jordanian representation in legislative and executive institutions within the Kingdom and the levels of Palestinian-Jordanian participation in Jordanian political life. A summary of Palestinian government incorporation concludes the chapter.

## REGIME SURVIVAL AND
## GOVERNMENT INCORPORATION

It is quite easy for regimes to maintain partial or even "non-incorporation" of immigrants in the Government arena. Immigrants may simply be denied the right to vote or to be represented in executive and/or legislative institutions. Indeed, even if immigrants are granted the right to vote, legislation and/or decrees may be promulgated that effectively prohibit or deter immigrant participation in the voting process. In addition, electoral districts can be drawn up to minimize or marginalize immigrant presence in elected bodies while the government works to manipulate voting behavior to limit the appeal of participation.

Such has been the case of Palestinian-Jordanians within the Government arena of the Jordanian polity. Since the 1950 annexation, the Hashemite monarchy has

pursued a Transjordanian-first policy in nearly all aspects of the Government arena.

After the initial democratic experiment of the 1950's, parliamentary districts and

voting regulations have since been implemented to ensure the election of loyal

parliaments and the continued primacy of tribal connections and patronage

distribution vis-à-vis the functioning of the representative body. Because of this,

Palestinian-Jordanian participation in parliamentary elections and the Jordanian

Parliament itself has been remarkably low. This under-representation of Palestinian-

Jordanians is seen within executive bodies as well, with Transjordanians historically

dominating the Prime Ministry and Cabinets.

Adherence to the Hashemite coalition strategy has led to such partial

incorporation of Palestinian-Jordanians within the Government arena. Since the

1960's, the primary function of the Jordanian Parliament has been to ensure balance

in tribal representation for Transjordanians and continued access to patronage

resources for distribution to coalition constituents. In other words, the role of

Parliament is to serve as a vehicle for redistribution to Hashemite coalition members,

specifically the Transjordanian tribes. To facilitate this role, the monarchy has

gerrymandered the Kingdom to ensure that Transjordanians dominate the legislature

at the expense of Palestinian-Jordanians. The Hashemites have reinforced this

Transjordanian dominance in the legislature by continuing to rely on political figures

from prominent Transjordanian families and tribes to serve as Prime Ministers and in

Cabinets. These policies and practices have together resulted in incomplete

Palestinian-Jordanian incorporation in the Government arena.

# PALESTINIAN INCORPORATION IN THE GOVERNMENT ARENA

*Political Rights and Representation*

All Palestinians granted citizenship in December 1949 were concomitantly given the right to vote and the right to run for Parliament, though suffrage laws required the paying of at least one Jordanian dinar in land or municipal taxes for twelve consecutive months preceding an election (Brand 1988a, 162). This provision effectively excluded the majority of the 1948 refugees from voting in the parliamentary elections in the 1950's and 1960's in Jordan (Ibid.). The majority of Palestinian-Jordanians have retained the right to vote since their 1949 enfranchisement. However, Palestinian-Jordanians have been underrepresented in both legislative and executive institutions since 1948 due to the positions of these institutions in the Hashemite coalition strategy as conduits of patronage distribution and elite rotation.

To specifically incorporate the West Bank into Jordan's parliament following the 1950 annexation, the 1947 electoral law was amended to add twenty representatives for the newly acquired territory to the Chamber of Deputies[10] (Massad 2001, 231). This allocation was unbalanced, as there were 175,000 voters on the West Bank but only 129,000 voters on the East Bank (Ibid.). Thus began the long-term trend of Palestinian-Jordanian malapportionment in the Jordanian Parliament.

Parliament was suspended from 1971 until 1984, when it was recalled by King Hussein and drafted a new electoral law in 1986. In terms of proportionality,

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[10] Jordan's Parliament consists of the Chamber of Notables (appointed by the King) and the Chamber of Deputies (elected). For the purposes of focusing on electoral politics and participation, only the Chamber of Deputies will be analyzed.

the 1986 law over-represented the rural districts of the country in order to undercut the representation of urban areas, which are heavily populated by Palestinian-Jordanians (Lucas 2005, 27-28). For example, Amman had 41.1% of Jordan's population at the time of the 1986 law, but was accorded only 25.6% of the eighty-two East Bank seats in Parliament under the law (Robins 1991, 202). On the other hand, Karak, which had only 4.2% of Jordan's population, was apportioned 12.7% of East Bank seats (Ibid.). Although refugee camps were accorded representation under the 1986 electoral law, the heterogeneity of the East Bank refugee camps' populations meant that certain more dense camps, like those in Amman, were malapportioned (Ibid., 198). Moreover, the refugee camps were given their own districts, politically separating the Palestinian-Jordanian camps from their non-camp surroundings (Massad 2001, 259). To account for this apportionment of refugee camp seats, the total number of deputies was increased from sixty to 142, with the East Bank apportioned half of the total seats and the West Bank getting just sixty seats as a consequence of the eleven refugee camp seats (Ibid.).

Subsequent electoral laws and amendments continued this practice. The 1989 electoral amendment, promulgated in the aftermath of the 1988 disengagement from the West Bank, created a purely East Bank electorate with eighty seats representing twenty districts, and redistricting that resulted in increased malapportionment for Palestinian-Jordanians in comparison to the 1986 districts (Lucas 2005, 28). Statistics concerning the origins of candidates from the 1997 parliamentary election, conducted under the 1989 electoral districts, illustrate this malapportionment of Palestinian-Jordanians. Amman's 2nd district, in which 73% of parliamentary

candidates were Palestinian-Jordanian in the 1997 election, was accorded just three seats under the 1989 law; under proportional representation, it would have been accorded 9.9 seats (Lust-Okar 2006, 464). In the same vein, the city of Zarqa was accorded six seats under the 1989 law and Palestinian-Jordanians constituted 59% of the city's candidates in the 1997 election; under proportional representation, Zarqa would have been accorded 12.4 seats (Ibid.). On the other hand, Karak, in which Palestinian-Jordanians comprised just 7.5% of parliamentary candidates in the 1997 election, was accorded nine seats under the 1989 electoral law (Ibid.). Under proportional representation, it would have been accorded just 3.2 seats (Ibid.).

In 2001, the monarchy promulgated a new electoral law, increasing the number of Deputies from 80 to 104 and adding a quota of six seats for women (Ryan and Schwedler 2004, 146). The electorate was redrawn into 45 districts that again favored rural areas over urban areas (Lust-Okar 2006, 464-466). Amman was accorded 23 total seats in Parliament under the 2001 law. If proportional representation was implemented, the city would have been accorded nearly 39 of the Parliament's 104 total seats (Ibid., 466). On the other hand, Karak again was over-represented, given ten seats in Parliament under the 2001 law (Ibid.). Under proportional representation, Karak would have been accorded just four seats (Ibid.).

The 2010 electoral amendment increased the number of Deputies from 110 to 120 and divided each of the 45 districts into subdistricts, with seats for each subdistrict (Lust and Hourani 2011, 123). The cities of Amman, Zarqa, and Irbid, all with heavy Palestinian-Jordanian populations, were accorded four new seats under the 2010 law but nevertheless remained malapportioned (Beck and Collet 2010, 3).

Under the 2010 law, cities in the south of the Kingdom, predominantly

Transjordanian, had an MP for every 3,000-5,000 Jordanians, while districts in the

north of the Kingdom with large numbers of Palestinian-Jordanians, such as those in

Amman, had one MP for every 20,000 Jordanians (Schwedler 2010).

Given the institutionalized malapportionment of Palestinian-Jordanians in the

Jordanian Parliament, it is not surprising that they have been marginally represented

in successive Parliaments despite being in the demographic majority.[11] Table 3

displays the numbers of Palestinian-Jordanian MPs holding East Bank seats in

Jordanian Parliaments since 1950. Despite comprising the majority of Jordan's

population since 1949, Palestinian-Jordanians have constituted on average just around

14.2% of MPs in the Jordanian Parliament.

**Table 3: Number of Palestinian-Jordanian MPs in the Jordanian Parliament since 1950
(excluding quota for West Bank; based on available data)**

| Parliament | Palestinian-Jordanian MPs | % of Total MPs |
|---|---|---|
| Second - Eighth (1950-1966) | 4[a] | 9.4 |
| Ninth/Tenth (1967-1988) | N/A | N/A |
| Eleventh (1989-1993) | 13[b] | 16.3 |
| Twelfth (1993-1997) | 14[c] | 17.5 |
| Thirteenth (1997-2001) | 11[d] | 13.8 |
| Fourteenth (2003-2007) | 20[e] | 18.2 |
| Fifteenth (2007-2009) | 18[f] | 16.4 |
| Sixteenth (2010-Present) | 9[g] | 7.5 |
| *Average* | - | *14.2* |

Sources:
a. Aruri 1972, 48
b. Braizat 2011, 4n14 (calculated average)
c. Robinson 1997, 385
d. Abu Bakr 2003
e. MARP 2003
f. MRGI 2008
g. Ammon News 2010

[11] This underrepresentation in Parliament is also partially due to lower voter turnout among Palestinian-Jordanians in elections, a topic that will be discussed in the following section.

Article 35 of the 1952 Jordanian constitution empowers the King to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister and Cabinets (HKJ 1952). Just five Palestinian-Jordanians have been appointed to serve as Prime Minister out of the fifty-eight total Prime Ministers since 1948 (Bailey 1977, 102-113; Ryan 2002, 25). These appointments have lasted a cumulative total of just eight months. Table 4 lists the names, terms, and lengths in office of the five Palestinian-Jordanian PMs.

**Table 4: Palestinian-Jordanian Prime Ministers since 1948**

| Prime Minister | Term | Length |
|---|---|---|
| Husain Fakhri al-Khalidi | 4/15/1957 - 4/24/1957 | 9 days |
| Muhammad Da'ud | 9/16/1970 - 9/24/1970 | 8 days |
| Ahmad Tuqan | 9/26/1970 - 10/28/1970 | 34 days |
| Qassim al-Rimawi | 7/3/1980 – 8/28/1980 | 56 days |
| Taher al-Masri | 6/19/1991 – 11/21/1991 | 158 days |

*Sources: Bailey 1983, 4n10 and Robinson 1998, 393*

Although data is scarce, one can also see this trend of underrepresentation in the Jordanian Cabinet as well. Palestinian-Jordanians constituted a majority in just two of the forty-nine cabinets formed from 1950 to 1977, despite comprising two-thirds of the population during this period (Bailey 1977, 106). The post-Black September "de-Palestinization" consolidated this underrepresentation, with Palestinian-Jordanians falling from 46% of ministers in the previous cabinet of 1973 to just 20% of ministers in the 1974-1976 Cabinet (Abu Odeh 1999, 211). In the 1976-1979 Cabinet, Palestinian-Jordanians held just four out of eighteen total portfolios (Ibid., 212-213). The 1985-1989 Cabinet had ten Palestinian-Jordanian ministers out of twenty-three total ministers (Ibid., 227). In the 1997-1998 Cabinet, just six out of twenty-four portfolios were held by Palestinian-Jordanians (Abu Odeh 1999, 231).

Palestinian-Jordanian underrepresentation and malapportionment in the Jordanian legislative and executive institutions is a direct outcome of the positions that the Jordanian Parliament, Prime Ministry, and Cabinets occupy in the Hashemite coalition strategy. The Jordanian Parliament serves as one of the main vehicles for patronage distribution and access to resources for Hashemite coalition members (Greenwood 2003a, Fathi 2005, Lust-Okar 2009). Given this crucial role of Parliament in the Hashemite coalition strategy, the monarchy has a strong interest in ensuring that successive Parliaments reflect both a pro-monarchy disposition and disproportionate representation of Hashemite coalition members. The successive electoral laws and gerrymandering that have been undertaken to achieve these outcomes have been largely successful in this regard. Parliament after parliament has been dominated by monarchical loyalists and Transjordanian tribal MPs (Robinson 1998, Ryan and Schwedler 2004, Lust-Okar 2009, David 2011). Meanwhile, Palestinian-Jordanians have comprised just 14.2% of MPs elected to Parliament since 1950.

Palestinian-Jordanian underrepresentation in the Prime Ministry and Cabinets is a byproduct of similar strategic logic concerning patronage distribution and coalition maintenance. A significant part of the Hashemite coalition strategy is the rotation of elites aimed at both balancing Jordanian tribal rivalries and ensuring that no one elite or group of elites becomes powerful enough to threaten the monarchy (Bank and Schlumberger 2004). To continuously co-opt tribal constituencies, appointments need to be made to ensure that all tribes have equal representation in these executive bodies while taking care to ensure that the King reigns supreme (Alon

2009, 154-155).  Thus, much like Parliament, executive institutions serve as a vehicle for patronage distribution, through the appointment of coalition members and elites to positions of power like the Prime Ministry and Cabinets.  The underrepresentation of Palestinian-Jordanians is a byproduct of this policy, as there is little room left for them after coalition demands for representation in such appointments have been taken into account by the monarchy.  A secondary factor in this underrepresentation is the fact that appointing significant numbers of Palestinian-Jordanians to positions of power will antagonize the monarchy's Transjordanian base of support, and will be perceived by the Hashemite coalition as an encroachment on their privileged position within the Jordanian state (Nanes 2008, 90).  As a result of this incumbency logic, Palestinian-Jordanians have come to be underrepresented in Jordan's executive institutions.

One might alternatively posit that such Palestinian-Jordanian underrepresentation is in fact a strategy employed by the Hashemite monarchy to counter Israeli rhetorical designs positioning Jordan as the "alternative homeland" for the Palestinians.  This alternative explanation may especially come to mind when one recalls the logic behind the citizenship removals discussed in Chapter Four, which were partially done to counter such Israeli claims.

However, this argument does not hold when one considers the historical trajectory of Palestinian-Jordanian representation.  As the preceding discussion has demonstrated, Palestinian-Jordanians have been underrepresented in both legislative and executive institutions since 1948.  However, Israeli rhetoric postulating Jordan as the "alternative homeland" did not enter mainstream Israeli political discourse until

the late 1970's (Abu Odeh 1999, 213-214). While Palestinian-Jordanian underrepresentation certainly assists in countering these Israeli claims, the driving principle behind such underrepresentation continues to be the monarchy's adherence to the Hashemite coalition strategy and the primacy that such strategy places on Transjordanian representation in and access to the Jordanian government as forms of patronage.

### Levels of Political Participation

Palestinian-Jordanian political participation largely reflects the community's institutionalized malapportionment in both legislative and executive bodies within the Kingdom. Although Palestinian-Jordanians dominated the political party scene in the 1950's, the 1957 crackdown on political organizing in Jordan instigated their long-term withdrawal from pluralist participation. This trend is reinforced by the consistently low turnouts among Palestinian-Jordanians in successive parliamentary elections since the legislature was reinstated in 1984.

Initially, Palestinian-Jordanians were quite active in Jordanian political parties and organizations (Cohen 1982, Anderson 2005). They formed the backbone of what came to be called the Jordanian National Movement (JNM), a multi-party coalition that dominated Jordanian politics during the 1950's (Anderson 2005, 130-131). In the aftermath of the 1957 ban on political parties, Palestinian-Jordanians became increasingly active throughout the 1960's in labor unions and professional associations within the Kingdom (Brand 1988a, 177-179; Brand 1995a, 165-171).

However, the monarchy's crackdown on independent political organizing in the 1960's and 1970's began to limit the efficacy of such organizing in the Kingdom,

and the 1970-71 civil war accelerated the departure of Palestinian-Jordanians from these organizations (Abu Odeh 1999, 202; Fruchter-Ronen 2008, 255-256). After the 1992 reinstatement of political parties, the only significant organization that Palestinian-Jordanians came to join en masse was the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the Jordanian arm of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood that has typically enjoyed good relations with the Hashemite monarchy (Robinson 1997, Wiktorowicz 2001). Although many of the JNM political parties banned in 1957 have re-established themselves since 1992, Palestinian-Jordanians have largely refrained from joining their ranks (Lust-Okar 2001, 557).

Palestinian-Jordanian participation in parliamentary elections illustrates a similar pattern. Although statistics for Palestinian-Jordanian participation in the parliamentary elections in the 1950's and 1960's are not available, information regarding electoral participation and political parties in the 1950's can potentially inform Palestinian-Jordanian participation in this period to a limited extent. As mentioned earlier, Palestinian-Jordanians dominated the Jordanian National Movement (JNM) in the 1950's (Anderson 2005, 130-131). The JNM was a collection of political parties with similar goals: complete independence from Britain and the return of Palestinians to their homeland (Peters 2009, 104n31). In 1956, MPs affiliated with JNM political parties accounted for over half of the seats in Parliament (Lust-Okar 2001, 548). Given this electoral success of the JNM and the dominance of their ranks by Palestinian-Jordanians, perhaps it can be postulated that Palestinian-Jordanian electoral participation was relatively high in the 1950's.

Along with the electoral framework designed to minimize Palestinian-Jordanian representation, the nature of electoral participation and behavior in Jordan has engendered low Palestinian-Jordanian participation in parliamentary elections since the reinstatement of Parliament in 1984, as illustrated below in Table 5. A change in the voting process in 1993 contributed to low Palestinian-Jordanian turnout in subsequent parliamentary elections. In response to the 1989 Islamist- and opposition-dominated Parliament, the monarchy instituted a "one-person, one-vote" system for the 1993 elections (Robinson 1998, 397). This strengthened the role of tribal and familial affiliations in parliamentary elections, and individuals began to vote for the candidate that could best deliver on their *wasta* (connections) as opposed to voting based on ideological affiliation, which they were able to do under the previous "open-list" system (Lucas 2005, 75-76). This effectively decreased the utility of Parliament for those Jordanians that did not have strong *wasta*, the majority of whom were Palestinian-Jordanians (Lust-Okar 2009, 13). As a result, Palestinian-Jordanian turnout has averaged an estimated 31% in elections since the reinstatement of Parliament in 1984.

**Table 5: Estimated Palestinian-Jordanian Turnout in Parliamentary Elections since 1984**

| Election | Estimated Palestinian-Jordanian Turnout | Overall Turnout |
|:---:|:---:|:---:|
| 1984 | N/A | 50%[a] |
| 1989 | N/A | 41%[b] |
| 1993 | 30%[c] | 47%[b] |
| 1997 | 34%[d] | 44%[b] |
| 2003 | 47%[d] | 48%[e] |
| 2007 | N/A | 54%[f] |
| 2010 | 12%[g] | 30%[g] |
| *Average* | *31%* | *45%* |

*Sources:*
*a: Day 1984 42*
*b: Ryan 1998, 192*
*c: Robinson 1998, 399-400*

*d: Lust-Okar 2006, 463 (calculated turnout)*
*e: Sweiss 2005, 38*
*f: IPU 2012*

*g: David 2011*

These participatory trends in political parties and parliamentary elections are a reflection of Jordanian political institutions specifically shaped by the Hashemite monarchy to ensure Transjordanian access to patronage and state resources. When political parties were legal during the 1950's, Palestinian-Jordanians comprised the majority of their ranks. However, the 1957 ban on political parties marked the end of large-scale Palestinian-Jordanian participation in Jordanian politics. Both the 1957 ban and the subsequent crackdowns on labor unions and professional organizations undertaken by the monarchy throughout the 1960's, 1970's, and 1980's effectively neutralized Palestinian-Jordanian participation in other political spheres and led to their mass exit. In addition, Palestinian-Jordanians have largely refrained from joining the ranks of political parties since their 1992 reinstatement.

This decline in Palestinian-Jordanian participation in political organizations is in concert with their declining levels of electoral participation since Parliament was reinstated in 1984. As mentioned earlier, parliamentary elections in Jordan were and continue to be primarily about competition over access to state resources and patronage (Lust-Okar 2009, 9). The most important function an MP can perform as an MP is to gain access to state resources and then distribute them to constituents. This phenomenon results in voter self-selection: individuals who have connections to candidates (whether familial or tribal) will go to the polls and vote, knowing that there is a chance that doing so will cause them to be better off in the future due to their pre-existing connections and ties to potential MPs. In other words, individuals will vote when they believe that their MP can capitalize on their *wasta* and deliver resources and favors (Ibid., 13). Naturally, Jordanians with such connections tend to

be of Transjordanian origin, as Transjordanians overall tend to reside in districts that have closer ties to the monarchy and concomitantly tend to have better *wasta* as a result (Ibid.).  Shaping voter behavior and electoral participation around competition over access to state resources and patronage distribution serves the Hashemite coalition strategy: kin- and tribe-based voting patterns elect loyalist parliaments, making parliamentary elections in Jordan a purely Transjordanian affair.

## CONCLUSION: GOVERNMENT INCORPORATION

This chapter has examined the trajectory of Palestinian-Jordanian incorporation as it has occurred in the Government arena, accounting for Steps 6 through 9b of the causal process.  The logic of regime survival has compelled the monarchy to maintain limited government incorporation of Palestinian-Jordanians due to the implicit conditions imposed on it by the Hashemite coalition.  The Parliament in Jordan primarily serves as a vehicle for redistribution of patronage, and as such requires over-representation of coalition members at the expense of Palestinian-Jordanians.  Electoral and legal frameworks complement this marginalization by deterring Palestinian-Jordanians from voting in parliamentary elections.  Reinforcing this trend is the Transjordanian dominance of Prime Ministry and Cabinets, a result of strategic logic aimed at servicing coalition demands for positions of power and the accordance of tribal balance in appointments.  As a result of these cumulative policies and practices, Palestinian incorporation in the Government arena is incomplete.

# CHAPTER SIX
# THE ECONOMIC ARENA

This chapter examines Palestinian incorporation in the Economic arena of the Jordanian polity, accounting for Steps 6 through 9c of the causal process. The chapter begins with a brief discussion of regime survival and economic incorporation. A discussion of Palestinian incorporation in the Economic arena follows, examining Palestinian-Jordanians' location and participation in the economy and the levels and nature of economic discrimination against Palestinian-Jordanians. A summary of Palestinian economic incorporation concludes the chapter.

## REGIME SURVIVAL AND ECONOMIC INCORPORATION

An authoritarian regime has multiple tools at its disposal for controlling the trajectory and outcome of immigrant economic incorporation within a polity. In many authoritarian polities, state support is generated through large-scale public sector employment of key constituencies (Ayubi 1986, Bellin 2004, Schwarz 2008). In the context of immigration that threatens the regime's social base of support and its own political survival, discriminatory policies and practices can be implemented to essentially make the public sector off-limits to these immigrants. At the same time, in the context of late development, regimes can induce immigrants to reside in the polity by granting them exclusive domain over certain sectors of the economy, allowing immigrants to reap the benefits of their possessed financial and human capital while generating economic growth that boosts the polity as a whole.

Such has been the case in Jordan. The preference for Transjordanians in public sector employment has been Hashemite policy since the Mandate era, when state employment was institutionalized as a scheme of patronage distribution in the Hashemite coalition strategy. This practice became further entrenched after the 1970-71 civil war, with the monarchy's pursuit of a "de-Palestinization" policy and concomitant state economic policies aimed at inducing increased Palestinian-Jordanian out-migration for employment abroad. As a result, there has been an ethnicization of the private and public sectors, with Palestinian-Jordanians dominating the private sector and Transjordanians comprising the overwhelming majority of public sector employees. To secure continued support of the merchant constituency of the Hashemite coalition, the monarchy has disproportionately favored Transjordanians in various economic activities since 1948, from the granting of import licenses in the 1950's to the privatization schemes in the late 1990's. As a result of these policies and practices, Palestinian-Jordanians have been incompletely incorporated within the Economic arena of the Jordanian polity.

## PALESTINIAN INCORPORATION IN THE ECONOMIC ARENA

### *Participation and Location in the Economy*

The participation and location of Palestinian-Jordanians in the Kingdom's economy is driven by the requirements of the Hashemite coalition strategy. As discussed in Chapter Four, public sector employment and its associated welfare benefits is one of the main forms of patronage distribution that the monarchy provides to the non-merchant constituents of the Hashemite coalition. This has resulted in the

concomitant exclusion of Palestinian-Jordanians from the public sector, a trend that became institutionalized following the civil war of 1970-71.  Since the events of Black September, Palestinian-Jordanians have come to dominate the private sector and Transjordanians the public sector.

Following the 1950 annexation of the West Bank, the Hashemite monarchy carefully pursued a policy of economically integrating the majority of Palestinian-Jordanians while keeping the Transjordanian base of support "satisfied" in the process through continued preferential public sector recruitment policies (Nanes 2008, 90).  As a result, the majority of Palestinian-Jordanians retained their pre-1948 entrepreneurial activities and worked in Jordan's private sector, leading to a boom in the 1950's and 1960's driven by the commerce and construction industries (Aruri and Farsoun 1983, 117-118; Gubser 1983, 51).  Middle-class Palestinian-Jordanians that came to the East Bank in 1967 joined their 1948 counterparts as part of Jordan's growing middle class (Moore 2004, 179).

For those Palestinian-Jordanians residing in the camps, the majority remained dependent on UNRWA for employment in the initial years after 1948 (Yorke 1988, 31).  However, segments of the camp population eventually found work outside of the camps, with many coming to be employed in wage jobs as part of agricultural projects, services, and the industrial sector in the 1960's and 1970's (Aruri and Farsoun 1983, 118).  Another small group of refugees came to work as farmers again in Jordan after the implementation of the East Ghor Canal Project (Peters 2009, 155-157).  In the 1970's and 1980's, other former farmers eventually found informal work

in construction, health care, and retail as economic conditions improved during these decades (Baylouny 2010, 82).

Palestinian-Jordanians came to constitute the overwhelming majority of Jordanians working abroad in the 1950's and 1960's (Abu Odeh 1999, 83-84; Brand 2006, 176-193). This out-migration was facilitated first by the British and later by the Jordanian government, with the latter establishing vocational programs and promulgated policies that encouraged Palestinian-Jordanian out-migration for employment abroad, especially in the Gulf countries (Abu Odeh 1999, 63-64; Brand 2006, 188-192).

The 1970-71 civil war was a watershed for Palestinian-Jordanians that had come to work in the public sector during the 1950's and 1960's. The policy of "de-Palestinization" was implemented at all levels of government, and Palestinian-Jordanians were purged from the public sector (Sirriyeh 2000, 77-78). This scale of this exclusion from the public sector is made clearer when one takes into account that public sector jobs accounted for over half of the Kingdom's employment in the years following the civil war (Moore 2004, 105).

The aforementioned Palestinian-Jordanian "purge" swelled the number of Jordanians living and working abroad from 80,000 in 1972 to 261,500 in 1980 and 276,000 in 1985 (Brand 2006, 181, 195). As noted earlier, the overwhelming majority of those abroad were Palestinian-Jordanians (Day 1986, 101). Remittances from expatriates came to constitute a significant part of Jordan's GNP in the 1970's and 1980's (as illustrated in Table 6 on the next page).

**Table 6: Remittances as a Percentage of GNP, 1970-1985**

| Year | Remittances as % of GNP |
|------|-------------------------|
| 1970 | 3.0 |
| 1971 | 2.5 |
| 1972 | 3.4 |
| 1973 | 6.1 |
| 1974 | 8.6 |
| 1975 | 14.2 |
| 1976 | 24.3 |
| 1977 | 23.4 |
| 1978 | 20.4 |
| 1979 | 19.6 |
| 1980 | 19.9 |
| 1981 | 23.0 |
| 1982 | 22.8 |
| 1983 | 22.8 |
| 1984 | 25.6 |
| 1985 | 21.8 |

*Source: Adapted from Brand 2006, 180*

The result of both this large-scale Palestinian-Jordanian out-migration and initial clustering in the private sector, as well as the consolidation of the "Transjordanian-first" employment policy within the public sector, has led to Palestinian-Jordanian domination of the Kingdom's private sector. Of the 500 largest companies in Jordan in 1995, 60% were owned by Palestinian-Jordanians and accounted for 63% of the assets of the total group of companies while Transjordanians owned just 31% of the companies and accounted for just 16% of assets (Reiter 2004, 77-78). In the banking and finance sector, the most valuable part of the Jordanian economy, Palestinian-Jordanian-owned banks accounted for 92% of the market share and employed 90% of all banking employees (Ibid., 79-80). Transjordanian merchant dominance of the public sector is illustrated by the following statistic: of the eleven largest companies on the Jordanian Stock Exchange in 1996, the five companies headed by Transjordanians are all government-owned

companies (Ibid., 81).  Even so, companies owned by Palestinian-Jordanians still

control 59% of the overall market share of these aggregated companies (Ibid.).  In

1996, a study found that Palestinian-Jordanians accounted for 82.6% of capital

participation in Jordan's economy and Transjordanians just 11% (Abu Odeh 1999,

196).  This sector dichotomy persists in the present (Baylouny 2010, 80).

The clustering of Palestinian-Jordanians in the private sector of the Jordanian

economy is a direct result of the monarchy's adherence to the Hashemite coalition

strategy.  Public sector employment is one of the main schemes utilized by the

monarchy as patronage for the Hashemite coalition, and the nature of the associated

employment benefits has conditioned the exclusion of Palestinian-Jordanians in order

to maintain the privileged nature of access to such benefits.  On the other hand,

Palestinian-Jordanians have been relatively concentrated in the private sector from the

beginning, coming to Jordan with significant amounts of capital and skills.  Driven by

the Hashemites' pursuit of coalition strategy in the form of a "Transjordanian-*only*"

recruitment policy within the public sector, Palestinian-Jordanians have come to

dominate the private sector in the Kingdom's economy and concomitantly excluded

from the public sector.

### *Levels and Nature of Economic Discrimination*

As a direct result of the Hashemite coalition strategy, Palestinian-Jordanians

are frequently discriminated against by the state vis-à-vis economic activities and

ventures.  Such activities and ventures constitute the main schemes of patronage for

the merchant constituency of the Hashemite coalition.  Palestinian-Jordanians have

largely been left out of these schemes and discriminated against in their attempts to

partake in them as a result of the monarchy's adherence to the Hashemite coalition strategy in this regard.

Palestinian-Jordanians have been largely excluded from joint ventures with the Jordanian state since 1948. In developing key industries of the Jordanian economy in the 1950's and 1960's, the state partnered with select pre-1948 Transjordanian merchant elites for joint-sector ownership in the most valuable sectors of Jordan's economy, such as phosphate and potash mining (Moore 2004, 68-69). These "semi-public" companies came to be known as Jordan's "Big 5," and came to comprise a "significant" portion of industrial employment and production in Jordan (Ibid., 69). Because of the majority ownership stake it possesses in these companies, the Jordanian government has been able to appoint most of the personnel on the executive boards of these companies (Ibid., 69). The majority of government appointees to these boards are members of the pre-1948 Transjordanian merchant elite, as well as former government ministers (Piro 1998, 52-53). These executive board appointments serve as another opportunity for the monarchy to "rotate" Jordanian elites in and out of positions of power, driven by the same logic of rotation vis-à-vis the Prime Ministry and Cabinets discussed in Chapter Five.

Join-sector ownership is not the only economic activity in which Palestinian-Jordanian business elites have been excluded from time to time. In 1950, West Bank merchants sent a letter to King Abdullah complaining of discrimination against Palestinian-Jordanian merchants in the government's distribution of import licenses (Massad 2001, 235). The government had indeed been employing such discriminatory practices, giving two-thirds of import licenses to East Bank merchants

during the 1950's (Mishal 1978, 21). The same pattern can be seen in the state privatization schemes of the 1990's. Care was taken to ensure that the state unloaded its equity into the pockets of Transjordanian businessmen or a group of investors headed by a Transjordanian (Moore 2004, 172). As a result, Palestinian-Jordanian businessmen were largely excluded from these schemes (Greenwood 2003a, 262).

Other government ventures have favored Transjordanians over Palestinian-Jordanians. In 2001, the Jordanian government established the autonomous Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ) to attract foreign investors with tax breaks and a streamlined, autonomous bureaucracy (Peters 2009, 256). Through the guise of the ASEZ, the government matches wealthy foreign investors with select displaced Transjordanian businessmen (Ibid., 262). Palestinian-Jordanians are conspicuously absent from this scheme.

As Transjordanians came to dominate the state bureaucracy following Black September, the importance of possessing *wasta* vis-à-vis obtaining state employment increased significantly (Abu Odeh 1999, 199-200). As a result, Palestinian-Jordanians often employ Transjordanians as business partners in order to ensure that official transactions make it through the "obstructive" bureaucracy in the Kingdom (Abu Odeh 1999, 197). Indeed, Transjordanians have often admitted that they are likely to refrain from providing assistance to Palestinian-Jordanian businessmen in event that the latter have a problem (Brand 1994, 62).

Palestinian-Jordanian exclusion from joint ventures with the state and economic activities is the result of the monarchy's desire to secure continued support from the merchant constituency of the Hashemite coalition. By continue to co-opt

Transjordanian merchants through favorable economic policies and ventures, the monarchy is adhering to a coalition strategy that dates back to the Mandate era. Much like was the case with representation in executive institutions, Palestinian-Jordanians are "crowded out" by Transjordanian merchants as a result of the monarchy's adherence to the Hashemite coalition strategy.

Moreover, the monarchy continues to exclude Palestinian-Jordanians from these economic schemes because it simply does not have the financial means to include them vis-à-vis the potential increase in coalition side-payments that would be required as part of such an action (Waldner 1999, 202-203). Indeed, the disparate nature of the Hashemite coalition is truly exhibited in the case of economic incorporation: state economic policies must be carefully designed to walk the fine line between coalition satisfaction and backlash given the competing, mutual cost-imposing nature of the preferences held by Transjordanian tribes and merchants. In other words, if the monarchy begins to institute policies that serve to favor the tribes over the merchants, increased side-payments must be made to the merchants (and vice versa). This coalition preference disparity already contributes to a lack of budget security in the present, with the monarchy operating on an annual budget deficit since 1992, as illustrated in Table 7 on the following page. If the monarchy attempted to co-opt Palestinian-Jordanians *en masse* into the Hashemite coalition, *both* tribe and merchant constituencies would demand higher side-payments. As seen in Chapter Four with the initial potentiality of incorporating Palestinian-Jordanians during the 1950's, there are again no pieces of the "pie" left over for Palestinian-Jordanians at present.

**Table 7: Government Budget, 1992-2010 (in JD millions)**

| Year | Domestic Revenue | Foreign Grants/Loans | Total Revenue | Expenditures | Balance |
|------|------------------|----------------------|---------------|--------------|---------|
| 1992 | 1221.2 | 137.4 | 1358.6 | 1372.5 | -13.9 |
| 1993 | 1208.6 | 197.7 | 1406.3 | 1411.6 | -5.3 |
| 1994 | 1296.1 | 241.2 | 1537.3 | 1587.8 | -50.5 |
| 1995 | 1404.3 | 215.7 | 1620.0 | 1693.9 | -73.9 |
| 1996 | 1431.9 | 316.9 | 1748.8 | 1789.6 | -40.8 |
| 1997 | 1378.3 | 242.5 | 1620.8 | 1952.0 | -331.2 |
| 1998 | 1474.5 | 257.6 | 1732.1 | 2087.7 | -355.6 |
| 1999 | 1497.1 | 318.8 | 1815.9 | 2039.5 | -223.6 |
| 2000 | 1592.1 | 391.2 | 1983.3 | 2187.1 | -203.8 |
| 2001 | 1658.6 | 433.4 | 2092.0 | 2316.3 | -224.3 |
| 2002 | 1644.1 | 491.9 | 2136.0 | 2396.2 | -220.2 |
| 2003 | 1675.6 | 937.4 | 2613.0 | 2809.8 | -196.8 |
| 2004 | 2147.2 | 811.3 | 2958.5 | 3180.5 | -222.0 |
| 2005 | 2561.8 | 500.3 | 3062.1 | 3538.9 | -467.8 |
| 2006 | 3164.4 | 304.6 | 3469.0 | 3912.2 | -443.2 |
| 2007 | 3628.1 | 343.4 | 3971.5 | 4586.5 | -615.0 |
| 2008 | 4375.4 | 718.3 | 5093.7 | 5431.9 | -338.2 |
| 2009 | 4187.8 | 333.4 | 4521.2 | 6030.5 | -1509.3 |
| 2010 | 4260.1 | 401.7 | 4661.8 | 5708.2 | -1046.4 |

*Source:* **Central Bank of Jordan,** *Yearly Statistical Series (1964-2010): Public Finance*

# CONCLUSION: ECONOMIC INCORPORATION

This chapter has examined the trajectory and outcome of Palestinian incorporation in the Economic arena of the Jordanian polity, accounting for Steps 6 through 9c of the causal process. The monarchy's adherence to the Hashemite coalition strategy has led to an ethnicization of the public and private sectors within the Jordanian economy, with Transjordanians dominating the public sector and Palestinian-Jordanians the private sector. This has been complemented by discriminatory policies and practices enacted towards Palestinian-Jordanians vis-à-vis economic activities and initiatives, with the pre-1948 Transjordanian merchant elite largely taking the place of Palestinian-Jordanians when it comes to the roles typically

played by private sector actors in joint-sector contexts.  The merchants have gained

exclusive access and rights to specific economic activities and ventures promulgated

by the state as a means of patronage.  As a result of these policies and practices,

Palestinian-Jordanian incorporation in the Economic arena of the Jordanian polity.

# CHAPTER SEVEN
# CONCLUSION

This thesis has continued the recent breakaway trend of studying immigrant incorporation in atypical contexts by examining the trajectory and outcome of Palestinian incorporation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.  The aim of the thesis was two-fold: to examine *how* Palestinian-Jordanians have been incorporated within the Jordanian polity and *why* they have been incorporated to the extent that they have. To satisfy these objectives, a model of immigrant incorporation was constructed and employed as a heuristic to explain the incorporation trajectories and outcomes of Palestinians across the arenas of incorporation within the Jordanian polity.

Analysis within the framework of this model has confirmed two points regarding the case of Jordan.  First, the analysis conducted in the preceding empirical discussion chapters demonstrates that Palestinian incorporation is "incomplete" across the State, Government, and Economic arenas of incorporation in Jordan. Second, the study has demonstrated that these incorporation outcomes are largely a result of the interaction between regime survival logic, Hashemite coalition politics, and the context of late development, that has conditioned the extent to which Palestinian-Jordanians can and have been incorporated within the Kingdom.

The conclusion proceeds in three parts.  First, the findings from the preceding empirical discussion chapters are synthesized within the framework of the constructed model.  The second section provides a critique of current immigrant incorporation research and suggested avenues for future abstract and case-specific research based

on the findings of the analysis.  Finally, the scale and scope of the methodology

employed in this study are discussed and evaluated.

# THE INCORPORATION OF PALESTINIANS IN JORDAN

The previous three chapters described the trajectory and outcome of

Palestinian incorporation in Jordan across the State, Government, and Economic

arenas of the Kingdom.  In this analysis, process-tracing was employed to uncover the

policies and practices pursued by the Hashemite monarchy vis-à-vis Palestinian

incorporation, accounting for Steps 6 through 9a-c of the hypothesized causal

process.  In each of the three arenas of incorporation analyzed, Palestinian-Jordanians

have been incorporated to an extent, but the outcome is far from complete.  These

incomplete incorporation outcomes are the result of the interaction of regime survival

logic, Hashemite coalition politics, and the context of late development.

### *State Incorporation*

Palestinian-Jordanians have been somewhat incorporated within the State

arena, with the majority possessing Jordanian citizenship and the civil rights that

accompanied such enfranchisement since December 1949.  This was an action taken

by the Hashemite monarchy to harness the financial and human capital of Palestinian-

Jordanians for use in Jordan's late industrialization process, as illustrated by state

economic policies in the 1950's and 1960's that over-aggregated resources and

industry on the East Bank at the expense of the West Bank and encouraged out-

migration of skilled Palestinian-Jordanians for employment abroad.  Incorporating

Palestinian-Jordanians into state largesse was not an option, as the Hashemites

depended on an already overstretched budget to maintain existing patronage schemes targeted at the Hashemite coalition.

The Hashemite monarchy has withdrawn citizenship from Palestinian-Jordanians to subdue domestic fears among its Transjordanian subjects at the prospect of becoming marginalized in the Kingdom, while at the same time attempting to counter continuing Israeli rhetoric seeking to invoke "the Jordanian option," in which Israel will annex the West Bank and settle its Palestinians in the Hashemite Kingdom. In addition to these citizenship removals, Palestinian-Jordanian civil rights have often been curbed by the monarchy in order to suppress their political activism.

This suppression of rights is reinforced by the institutionalization of discriminatory policies that perpetuate continued Transjordanian dominance of the state bureaucracy, a byproduct of the Hashemite coalition strategy. This practice of targeting Transjordanians for public sector employment dates back to the Mandate era, and constitutes one of the main forms of patronage distribution to the Hashemite coalition. After 1948, this policy continued unabated, and was consolidated following the Palestinian-Jordanian purge from the civil and security services in the aftermath of the 1970-71 civil war. This long-term Palestinian-Jordanian exclusion from the public sector was accompanied by large-scale exclusion from state social insurance schemes, as state employment provided the main means of obtaining social and welfare services from the Jordanian government. Palestinian-Jordanians were thus forced to seek social insurance from non-state organizations and professional associations. Regime survival logic, conditioned by coalition politics, has dictated the exclusion of Palestinian-Jordanians from state largesse in this regard.

*Government Incorporation*

Palestinian incorporation within the Government arena is incomplete. The same logic driving the exclusion of Palestinian-Jordanians from state largesse is behind this outcome. While Palestinian-Jordanians have certainly been appointed Prime Minister and have held significant portfolios in the Jordanian cabinet, Transjordanians have largely dominated the executive institutions since 1948. This is the result of the monarchy's pursuit of the Hashemite coalition strategy. One of the ways in which the monarchy maintains its overall political supremacy and perpetuates Hashemite rule is through the rotation of elites to ensure that representative balances are achieved between competing societal forces, such as tribes and geographic regions of the Kingdom, and that no one elite or group of elites threatens the King's supremacy.

The nature of electoral politics in Jordan ensures that Parliament continues to serve as a conduit for patronage distribution to the Hashemite coalition. Voting behavior is shaped to ensure that Jordanians vote based on personal concerns rather than ideological concerns, resulting in the election of MPs based on their ability to obtain resources for their "constituencies" or tribes rather than based on their political goals. Electoral institutions are designed to disproportionately favor Transjordanians securing election to Parliament, as successive electoral laws have over-represented rural areas at the expense of urban areas, where most Palestinian-Jordanians reside. As a result of this malapportionment, Palestinian-Jordanians have historically been underrepresented in Parliament. Along with the role that Parliament plays in the Hashemite coalition strategy, this malapportionment has consistently dissuaded

Palestinian-Jordanians from voting in parliamentary elections, with their turnout

levels lower than the national average in nearly every election since the 1984

reinstatement of the legislative body.  As a result of these policies and practices

driven by the monarchy's adherence to the Hashemite coalition strategy, Palestinian-

Jordanians remain incompletely incorporated within the Government arena of the

Kingdom.

### *Economic Incorporation*

Palestinian-Jordanians have come to play a significant role in Jordan's

economy, but are still only partially incorporated within the Economic arena.  High

initial levels of financial and human capital among Palestinian-Jordanians, along with

their historical exclusion from the public sector, have led to their clustering within the

Kingdom's private sector.  This Palestinian-Jordanian exclusion from the public

sector is driven by the requirements of the Hashemite coalition strategy, which dictate

patronage in the form of state employment and its associated welfare access as one of

the main benefit schemes for the tribal constituency of the Hashemite coalition.

Along with this exclusion from the public sector, Palestinian-Jordanians have

been discriminated against in the context of state economic activities and practices.

Joint-sector ventures and state divestment schemes have been almost exclusively

undertaken with members of the pre-1948 Transjordanian merchant elites, who have

also historically received the majority of licensing and investment rights in the

Kingdom.  Ensuring that the key industries of Jordan's economy are under the control

of the government, or individuals and groups dependent on the government, is a

primary goal of the Hashemite monarchy.  This is typical of authoritarian regimes:

preventing the development of political autonomy based on economic power is a necessary task for any regime seeking to ensure its incumbency, and the Hashemite kings have acted accordingly in this regard. The driving principle behind this policy, however, is to ensure the continued support of the merchant constituency within the Hashemite coalition. Favorable economic activities and partnerships with select pre-1948 Transjordanian merchants are the primary forms of patronage distributed in exchange for merchant political support of the Hashemite monarchy. As a result of such policy pursuits, Palestinian-Jordanians are left out of these schemes and ventures.

## EXPANDING THE RESEARCH AGENDA

The findings of this study indicate three main avenues for further research. First, the preceding analysis concerning Palestinian incorporation in Jordan remains incomplete, as an examination of the trajectory and outcome of social incorporation was left out of the study for methodological limitations discussed in Chapter One. To this end, preliminary evidence concerning the incorporation of Palestinian-Jordanians in the Social arena will be discussed with the aim of specifying further potentialities for research in this regard. Second, potential applications of the elucidated causal mechanisms are discussed, as well as potential variance in result generated by altering case conditions. Finally, abstract applications of the constructed incorporation model are discussed, including the ways in which this study can augment previous work done in both typical and atypical contexts of immigrant incorporation studies.

### *The Social Arena*

Of the four modes of immigrant incorporation discussed in this study, social incorporation of immigrants presents the biggest test of a regime's ability to control the arena-specific incorporation trajectory and outcome. Continuing along with the regime survival argument employed in this analysis, the most direct way a regime can seek to influence society is through manipulation of state institutions, especially in weak states where nation-building is an ongoing process and state institutions often provide a means through which the nation can be "imagined" (Migdal 1988, Massad 2001). Even then, a state is limited in the extent that it can condition what individuals actually *think* and how they *perceive* others.

Social incorporation also presents the greatest challenge to a scholar attempting to study immigrant incorporation from purely secondary information and evidence. The model of immigrant incorporation developed in Chapter Two included an extensive discussion of social incorporation and the indicators that should be used to examine its trajectory and outcome: the perceptions and attitudes of immigrant and native populations; social interactions between the two populations, including interpersonal relations, residential patterns, and inter-communal conflicts; and the position of immigrants and immigrant culture in societal discourse and the national narrative. All of these indicators, at varying levels, require fieldwork in the form of surveys and interviews that a short-term project like an undergraduate thesis does not permit. Attempting to extrapolate dispositions or to construct and attribute monolithic perceptions to communal groups is not only substandard scholarship, but

uninformative as well, given the individual experiences that shape such dispositions and perceptions vis-à-vis the social incorporation of immigrants.

Nevertheless, the nature of some aspects of social incorporation does allow for some initial exploration concerning the extent to which Palestinian-Jordanians have been incorporated within the Social arena of the Jordanian polity.  The limited secondary information and evidence available, along with the constructed metrics of social incorporation from Chapter Two, can together provide for a preliminary analysis that can serve as a starting point for discussion of Palestinian social incorporation in Jordan and in turn lay the foundation for potential research in this regard.

It is possible to provide a general picture of the aspects that shape social interactions between Transjordanians and Palestinian-Jordanians by examining secondary sources and accounts of such phenomena.  In terms of residential patterns, Palestinian-Jordanians are often clustered in certain neighborhoods, especially within Amman (Perez 2011, 190).  18% of Palestinian-Jordanians continue to live in UNRWA refugee camps, separate enclaves that only recently have been brought into the Jordanian government's economic development schemes (Al Husseini 2011). While intermarriage does occur frequently, kith and kin relationships and interactions remain generally communalized (Abu Odeh 1999, 111; Perez 2011, 186-196).  Inter-communal conflicts, such as Black September, have left unresolved cleavages and polarizations that influence communal interactions to the present day (Sirriyeh 2000, Fruchter-Ronen 2008, Lucas 2008, Nanes 2008, Nevo 2008).  This preliminary

analysis illustrates that the immigrant and native populations have largely refrained from mixing in permanent circumstances.

Palestinian-Jordanians have been historically excluded from the Jordanian national narrative, with Transjordanians, especially the tribes, serving as the primary source of articulation and representation in the Hashemite monarchy's ongoing "imagining" process of the Jordanian nation (Anderson 2006).  The King bases his interactions with the population on Bedouin cultural practices regarding socializing and conducting business, taking on the role of the fatherly tribal *sheikh* for all of Jordan's tribes (Alon 2009, 155-156).  The official national dish of Jordan, *mansaf,* is a traditional Bedouin tribal dish (Layne 1994, 147).  The Hashemite kings have adopted the red-and-white checkered scarf (*hatta/shmagh*) of the Transjordanian tribes as their own, frequently donning the headwear both at home and abroad (Massad 2001, 251).  The most prominent symbols of state-cultivated nationalist iconography today are the 2000-year old Nabataean city of Petra, the semi-desert of Wadi Rum, and the Jerash Roman ruins, all of which are located on the East Bank and all of which are under the patronage of Transjordanian tribes and communities (Nasser 2004, Corbett 2011).  As this analysis illustrates, official Jordanian "imagining" and "myth-making" practices have been largely bereft of any representation, acknowledgement, or inclusion of Palestinian-Jordanian particularities.  Indeed, many scholars have noted that these official discursive practices have reinforced the communal cleavages between Transjordanians and Palestinian-Jordanians (Abu Odeh 1999, Massad, 2001, Frisch 2002, Nasser 2005, Fruchter-Ronen 2008, Lucas 2008).

This brief examination of Palestinian social incorporation in Jordan has provided the context in which further avenues for research can be undertaken. A major pathway is to conduct surveys on present-day perceptions and dispositions concerning communal relations and interactions between Transjordanians and Palestinian-Jordanians in the Kingdom, especially as they relate to the context of Palestinian incorporation. As secondary analysis remains inherently limited in its robustness as a research method, care must be taken to also ensure that the surveys investigate and indicate individual-level views on both sides concerning the Jordanian national narrative and modes of societal discourse.

Particularly useful in ensuring robustness in this regard is Wedeen's concept of "semiotic practices," "the processes of meaning-making in which agents' practices interact with their language and other symbolic systems" (Wedeen 2002, 713). In the context of official state practices and discourse that appear to emphasize Transjordanians over Palestinian-Jordanians, it is important for the scholar to observe how the two groups interact with each other, contextualize and synthesize their interactions, and provide such interactions with meaning and significance. This observation is vital to ascertaining the extent to which Palestinian-Jordanians feel socialized within the Jordanian polity. In other words, analyzing semiotic practices in the context of immigrant incorporation can inform the scholar as to how individual perceptions and dispositions concerning Palestinian social incorporation have both formed and endured. Analysis of semiotic practices can work towards bridging the gap between monarchical actions and individual-level dispositions concerning Palestinian social incorporation, providing for a robust examination of the

phenomenon by marrying primary and secondary evidence to inform the trajectory and outcome of Palestinian incorporation within the Social arena of the Jordanian polity.

### *Generalizing Context and Causality*

It is clear that the scope conditions of the analytical findings on Palestinian incorporation in Jordan are immediately limited to analyses of the phenomenon in authoritarian/developing polities with regime coalitions that impose high costs on deviations from policy norms that have been conditioned by the preferences of the said coalition. In Jordan, this happened to be the case because of the disparate nature of the Hashemite coalition and the high-levels of side-payments required to keep it functional and supportive of the monarchy.

Cases of immigrant incorporation that fit these scope conditions are indeed quite limited. The case of the Palestinians in Syria is one possibility. The regime relies on a disparate coalition of peasants, workers, and business elites to ensure its incumbency, and Syria itself is a late developer (Waldner 1999, 74-94). However, the regime has made some moves to incorporate Palestinians into the polity, granting them socioeconomic rights and allowing for an expression of a unique Palestinian national identity (Brand 1988b).[12]

In her study, Brand notes that Syria differs from Jordan in two respects: first, that Syria was not suffering from issues related to late development at the time of the Palestinian influx; and second, that the Palestinians have never constituted more than 2-3 percent of the population in Syria (Ibid., 622). With regard to the case of Jordan,

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[12] Brand's study focuses on the socioeconomic incorporation of Palestinians in Syria through two case studies of unions, as opposed to the overall trajectory and outcome of incorporation itself.

these differences highlight the need to explore counterfactuals given the various antecedent conditions within the case of Jordan.

Suppose the Palestinian influx into Jordan was much smaller, more along the lines of that which the Syrian polity witnessed. Certainly the "demographic threat" issue would not play a role in contemporary Hashemite coalition politics and monarchical actions. By extension, the postulation of Jordan as an "alternative homeland" would cease to be an issue, largely removing the need for citizenship removals. On the other hand, it is likely that Palestinian incorporation in Jordan might be *worse* than at present, with Palestinian-Jordanians clustered in one geographic locale and stuck in the informal sectors of the Jordanian economy. Moreover, it is likely that the disparate nature of the Hashemite coalition would still engender the non-incorporation of Palestinians into patronage distribution schemes, perhaps in a more nuanced fashion than was observed in the analysis. On a related note, what if the Palestinian inflow was spread out and controlled over a series of decades? Certainly the communal tensions that have driven Hashemite policies would not be as high. However, the disparate nature of the Hashemite coalition may still have prevented full incorporation, in particular due to the role that access to state largesse would continue to play in the Hashemite coalition strategy.

One could also introduce variation vis-à-vis coalition preferences. If the Hashemite coalition was "uniform" in its preferences (Waldner 1999, 34-36), perhaps there would be pieces of the "pie" left over for Palestinian-Jordanians. While plausible, it remains likely that the nature of patronage distribution, especially the exclusivity of public sector employment, would still prevent the Hashemites from

incorporating Palestinian-Jordanians into state largesse. Perhaps the monarchy would devise another means of distribution targeting Palestinian-Jordanians, though this would be hard to do given the nature of patronage distribution vis-à-vis Transjordanians.

### *Re-Examining the Old and the New*

One of the aims of this thesis was to address the existing inadequacies and byproducts stemming from the over-aggregation of case studies within the literature on immigrant incorporation. Existing studies often do not account for immigrant incorporation outcomes, examining only the trajectory and its end result while overlooking the intervening causal process that has engendered such trajectories and outcomes. In addition, existing models of incorporation often focus too narrowly on one aspect of incorporation or fail to capture wholly the different elements of the phenomenon. To correct for this, existing literature on immigrant incorporation was employed to construct a model of immigrant incorporation that took into account the trajectories and outcomes of the phenomenon as it occurred in both typical and atypical contexts.

As a result of its broad theoretical foundation, the model can serve as a framework of guidance and evaluation for both typical and atypical case studies of immigrant incorporation. While not meticulously applying every single parameter of the model, the general notion that there is some strategic logic driving the specific outcomes of incorporation serves as a starting point for discussion of the phenomenon in both industrialized democracies and authoritarian/developing polities.

Even in industrialized democracies, there exists a strategic logic behind allowing certain persons to immigrate to a polity, whether through quotas or other policy procedures designed to preferentially shape the composition of the population. Indeed, even the United States, one of the most immigrant-heavy and diverse polities in the world, has historically instituted ethnic quotas on immigration, as enshrined in the Immigration Act of 1924 that governed immigration policy until the 1950's. Thus, even in typical contexts, the ultimate outcome of incorporation may potentially be traced back to the central government institutions themselves, and may indeed not be as disconnected and decentralized a procedure as many have concluded.

Another potentiality is to revisit the typical contexts of immigrant incorporation in order to obtain a more holistic analysis of the phenomenon. The typical cases of Germany, France, and the United States can be re-examined using the model indicators in order to obtain a more complete picture of the extent of incorporation of specific immigrant groups within these polities. Indeed, the diverse nature of these polities provides for a potential case study type of examining multiple groups of immigrants within a polity and subsequent analysis of the group-specific levels of incorporation. Polities with multiple immigrant groups of substantial sizes will be quite instructive in this regard, such as the United States, Britain, and Canada.

At an abstract level, the possibilities for future application are mostly concentrated on the neglected areas of incorporation study discussed in Chapter One. While analyses of political and economic incorporation are well-established avenues within the literature, the study of social incorporation is still in its infancy. Most studies on this aspect of incorporation have focused primarily on immigrant culture

and its relative congruency with the host polity's culture. The earlier discussion on Palestinian social incorporation in Jordan highlighted the importance of examining the modes and ways in which immigrants are socialized into a polity to the extent that they are. Social interactions, perceptions, inter-communal conflicts, and societal discourse are all important metrics of the extent to which immigrant and native populations hold equitable views concerning the outcome of incorporation within the polity. Moreover, these indicators can inform the effects of incorporation trajectories in other arenas as well, providing for a more robust analysis overall.

## CONDITIONING IMMIGRANT INCORPORATION: A METHODOLOGICAL RETROSPECTIVE

This study sought to explain and account for the trajectory and outcomes of Palestinian incorporation in Jordan. In pursuit of this objective, the literatures of immigrant incorporation, authoritarian durability, and late development were integrated within the framework of a constructed hypothesized causal process connecting the logic of regime survival, coalition politics, and the context of late development to immigrant incorporation outcomes. The use of process-tracing to examine the historical outcomes of Steps 6 through 9a-c of the process confirmed this connection, illustrating the constraints of the Hashemite coalition strategy vis-à-vis incorporation policies and practices. And the previous section highlighted the several case-specific and abstract avenues for future research indicated by the findings in this study.

So what does this approach to the case of Jordan have to say about single case studies and their associated techniques in general? The methodology and findings of

this study certainly add to the growing evidence concerning the utility and scholarly value of single case studies in comparative analysis. The general validity of single case studies and their associated techniques is that they allow for examination of cases previously overlooked and/or ones thought unemployable in conventional comparative analysis. The latter type, that of "deviant" cases, can especially shed light on typically studied phenomena in atypical contexts. Jordan is an example of this utility. Existing incorporation conceptualizations and models were shown to be insufficient for analyzing Palestinian incorporation in Jordan, but methodology constructed through both a refinement of typical metrics used for immigrant incorporation and an integration of several literatures was able to correct for this inadequacy, while producing a nuanced set of analytically-grounded findings that can be used for future research and exploration.

At an explanatory level, the findings of this study certainly confirm the validity of employing within-case analysis techniques, particularly process-tracing, to both uncover underlying causal linkages and avoid the potential pitfall of spurious correlation in the context of single case analysis. Employing the indicators of incorporation to guide a structured historical analysis of the trajectory and outcome of incorporation in each arena allowed for the identification of the causal linkage between the Hashemite monarchy's actions, policies, and practices and the corresponding levels of Palestinian incorporation, while concomitantly precluding spurious causal connections and alternative explanations through such process-tracing and analysis. Besides its case study value, then, this analysis also reinforces the utility of within-case analysis and process-tracing in particular.

The field of immigrant incorporation studies is already witnessing a breakaway trend of analysis towards case studies in atypical contexts. The disparate nature of these cases mandates that typical methodological approaches be critically revised and modified in matters of analysis, as the structures and procedures that govern incorporation in these atypical contexts are markedly different from the rigidity and formality found in typical cases of immigrant incorporation. The validity of the approach taken here indicates that single case studies and their associated techniques can be employed to overcome the perceived limitations of studying incorporation in typical and atypical contexts alike. When one accedes to this state of the world, scholarly avenues and methods for analyzing immigrant incorporation are seemingly endless.

# APPENDIX: INDICATOR EVALUATIONS

## STATE ARENA

| INDICATOR | EVALUATION | SOURCES |
|---|---|---|
| *Immigrant Citizenship* | King Abdullah I granted Jordanian citizenship to the approximately 800,000 Palestinians in the East Bank and West Bank on December 20th, 1949.  The Palestinians that fled to the East Bank after the 1967 war retained their Jordanian citizenship, with the exception of those from Gaza, who were not granted Jordanian citizenship due to their possession of Egyptian administrative documents at the time.  In the 1980's and 1990's, some Gazans were given citizenship in exchange for their investment in Jordan. | -Abu Odeh 1999: 214-215, 274<br>-Massad 2001: 39<br>-Brand 2006: 194n47<br>-Perez 2011: 41 |
| *Dynamics of the Naturalization Process* | In 1954, a new law was promulgated that confirmed the 1949 mass enfranchisement of Palestinians.  From 1954 until 1987, Arabs who resided in Jordan for 15 consecutive years were eligible for Jordanian citizenship provided they relinquished their prior nationality. Non-Arabs, however, only had to reside in the Kingdom for four years before being eligible, *inter alia*, for Jordanian citizenship.  In 1987, Jordanians were granted the right to hold dual citizenship for the first time.  The 1987 amendment to the nationality also prohibited naturalized Jordanians from holding political or diplomatic positions, and required the passage of ten years since an individual's acquisition of Jordanian nationality in order to run for Parliament.  It also forbade naturalized Jordanians from serving in municipal, village councils, or vocational unions until the passage of five years from their acquisition of Jordanian nationality. | -Massad 2001: 39-42<br>-HRW 2010: 16 |
| *Security of Naturalized Citizenship* | Jordanian citizenship has been removed from Palestinian-Jordanians on multiple occasions:<br><br>-In 1957, the Jordanian government withdrew citizenship from several Palestinian-Jordanians residing in Syria and Lebanon for engaging in "subversive activities." | -Plascov 1981: 48<br>-UNHCR 1988<br>-HRW 2010: 20-27<br>-Ababsa 2011: 8 |

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| | -In 1983, the Jordanian government introduced measures that effectively differentiated Palestinian-Jordanian naturalized citizenship among current or former West Bank residents. To facilitate movement between the two banks in the aftermath of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Jordanian authorities issued color-coded travel cards to West Bank-origin Palestinian-Jordanians.  Palestinian-Jordanians from the West Bank whose residence was on the East Bank on or after June 1, 1983 were given yellow travel cards, while those Palestinian-Jordanians whose residence was on the West Bank on or after June 1, 1983 were given green travel cards.  Those with yellow travel cards were accorded full citizenship rights, while green card holders were given a renewable two-year Jordanian passport and no residency rights on the East Bank.<br><br>-The 1988 disengagement from the West Bank resulted in the loss of Jordanian citizenship for all Palestinian-Jordanians residing in the West Bank and thousands working abroad.   These newly stateless Palestinians the option of obtaining temporary two-year passports that did not contain the now-important national number that came to define Jordanian citizenship in 1992.  In 1996, these Palestinian-Jordanians were given the ability to apply for five-year Jordanian passports with no national ID numbers.  In 2009, these green card holders numbered about 725,000.<br><br>-Since the early 2000's, the Hashemite monarchy has been withdrawing the citizenship of Palestinian-Jordanians holding yellow cards that have not renewed their West Bank residency under the Israeli occupation authorities. | |
| *Immigrant Civil Rights* | Palestinians were granted full Jordanian civil rights upon their enfranchisement in 1949, including the right to a passport, employment, residency, and property ownership.  However, Palestinian-Jordanian rights have been infringed upon in several instance since 1949:<br><br>-Calculated use of the exit permit in the 1950's and early 1960's allowed the monarchy to limit Palestinian-Jordanian movement from and to the Kingdom, which they did on many occasions.  The | -Plascov 1981: 44-45<br>-Andoni 1991: 175n40<br>-Sayigh 1991: 78<br>-Abu Odeh 1999: 83-84; 194; 199-200<br>-Brand 2006: 185-187 |

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| | exit permit requirement was abolished in 1962, but the Jordanian government's close relationship with Palestinian-Jordanian countries of destination led to frequent suppression of Palestinian-Jordanian organizing and activities abroad.<br><br>-In the aftermath of the 1988 disengagement, the state began to require Jordanians to indicate their place of origin (i.e. "Palestine" or "Jordan") on official forms.<br><br>-In the 1990's, the Ministry of the Interior denied passports to Palestinian-Jordanians eligible for them (i.e. those holding yellow cards) on a frequent basis.<br><br>-In order to get any demands met for business or other administrative issues, Palestinian-Jordanians have been forced to rely on Palestinian-Jordanian "sub-middlemen" with connections to Transjordanian middlemen possessing access to state resources and connections to those in the state bureaucracy. | |
| *Public Sector Employment* | Palestinian-Jordanians are largely absent from the public sector in Jordan:<br><br>-Palestinian-Jordanian levels in the army have fluctuated from 40-45% in the 1960's, to 25% in the 1980's, and are believed to be decreasing as a result of the halt in conscription put into effect in 1992. Palestinian-Jordanians are not allowed to rise above the ranks of major or lieutenant colonel in the army. They have historically held mostly non-combat/technical positions, a trend that continues today.<br><br>-The government policies concerning the Kingdom's public universities in the aftermath of Black September have resulted in a significant decrease in Palestinian-Jordanian faculty within Jordan's public universities. The preferential policy towards hiring Transjordanian faculty members led to a marked change in the composition of faculty at Jordan's public universities, as Palestinian-Jordanians went from comprising about 95% of the faculty in the 1970's to just 50.5% of the faculty in 1997. | -Plascov 1981: 97<br>-Smith 1984: 101-102<br>-Fathi 1994: 140-141<br>-Abu Odeh 1999: 215<br>-Bligh 2001: 13-14<br>-Massad 2001: 206<br>-Reiter 2002<br>-Baylouny 2008: 301<br>-Perez 2011: 176-186 |

| *Provision of Social Insurance and Provider Identity* | Palestinian-Jordanians are largely left out of state social insurance schemes:<br><br>-As such schemes are almost exclusively limited to those who possess state employment, Palestinian-Jordanians are largely excluded from such schemes as a result of their large absence from the state bureaucracy.<br><br>-A significant amount of Palestinian-Jordanians obtain social insurance from informal means, such as kin-based and mutual aid associations, as well as occupation-related professional associations. These institutions are independent from the state and rely on contributions from individual members to function.<br><br>-18% of Palestinian-Jordanians live in UNRWA refugee camps, which are wholly served by the agency independent of the Jordanian government. UNRWA provides employment, education, healthcare, and social services to camp residents. | -Plascov 1981: 63<br>-Baylouny 2008<br>-Baylouny 2010<br>-Al Husseini and Bocco 2010<br>-Al Husseini 2011<br>-UNRWA website<br>-UNRWA 2012 |

# GOVERNMENT ARENA

| INDICATOR | EVALUATION | SOURCES |
|---|---|---|
| *Political Rights and Representation* | -All Palestinians granted citizenship in 1949 were concomitantly given the right to vote in Jordan. However, the majority of refugees were prevented from voting in elections during the 1950's and 1960's as the result of a provision stipulating that individuals had to pay at least 1JD in land or municipal taxes in order to be eligible to vote.<br><br>-Palestinian-Jordanian voting rights and representation as codified do not translate into meaningful representation. Successive electoral laws have ingrained this trend within the Jordanian electoral system. Parliamentary districts overrepresent rural areas and other minorities (such as the Circassians, Chechens, and Christians) and underrepresent urban areas (where most Palestinian-Jordanians reside). For example, under the current electoral law promulgated in 2010, cities in the south of the Kingdom (predominantly Transjordanian), have | -Bailey 1966<br>-Aruri 1972: 48<br>-Bailey 1977<br>-Bailey 1983, 4n10<br>-Brand 1988a: 162<br>-Robins 1991<br>-Amawi 1994<br>-Robinson 1997<br>-Robinson 1998<br>-Ryan 1998<br>-Abu Odeh 1999: 211-213; 227; 231<br>-Abu Bakr 2003<br>-Ryan and Schwedler 2004<br>-Fathi 2005<br>-Lucas 2005: 27-28<br>-Sweiss 2005<br>-Lust-Okar 2006<br>-MARP 2006<br>-MRGI 2008<br>-Lust-Okar 2009<br>-Ammon News 2010<br>-Beck and Collet 2010 |

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| | an MP for every 3,000-5,000 Jordanians, while districts in the north of the Kingdom with large numbers of Palestinian-Jordanians, such as Amman, have one MP for every 20,000 Jordanians.<br><br>-Refugee camps were not accorded their own representation until promulgation of the 1986 electoral law, in which each camp was given one seat in the legislature.<br><br>-Palestinian-Jordanians have been underrepresented in the Jordanian Parliament, comprising just 14.2% of all MPs since 1950.<br><br>-Just five Palestinian-Jordanians have been appointed Prime Minister since 1950, out of a total of fifty-eight PMs. Their terms lasted a cumulative total of just eight months.<br><br>-Data is scarce, but just two cabinets out of fifty from 1950-1977 had a majority of Palestinian-Jordanian ministers. Subsequent cabinets continued this trend, with Palestinian-Jordanians usually holding no more than one-fourth of portfolios. | -Schwedler 2010<br>-Braizat 2011<br>-Lust and Hourani 2011<br>-IPU 2012 |
| *Levels of Political Participation* | Palestinian-Jordanian participation reflects their malapportionment in Jordanian political institutions.<br><br>-Palestinian-Jordanians have largely refrained from participating in political organizations since the 1957 ban was reversed in 1992. They do, however, constitute the majority of membership in the Islamic Action Front, the Jordanian wing of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.<br><br>-Since Parliament was reinstated in 1984, Palestinian-Jordanian turnout has averaged just around 31%, well below the national turnout average of 45%. | -Day 1986: 42<br>-Robinson 1997<br>-Robinson 1998: 399-400<br>-Ryan 1998: 192<br>-Lust-Okar 2001<br>-Wiktorowicz 2001<br>-Sweiss 2005: 38<br>-Lust-Okar 2006: 463<br>-Lust-Okar 2009<br>-Lust and Hourani 2011<br>-Ryan 2010a<br>-David 2011<br>-IPU 2012 |

## ECONOMIC ARENA

| INDICATOR | EVALUATION | SOURCES |
|---|---|---|
| *Participation and Location in the Economy* | -Palestinian-Jordanians have historically dominated the Jordanian private sector, a trend that started in the 1950's and became entrenched following the purges of Palestinian-Jordanians from the public sector in the aftermath of the 1970-71 civil war.  This sector dichotomy persists in the present, as Palestinian-Jordanians are largely excluded from public sector employment.<br><br>-Palestinian-Jordanians came to constitute the majority of Jordanians working abroad during the 1960's, 1970's, and 1980's, a number that reached as high as 276,000 in 1985 (one-third of the total working-age population in the Kingdom at the time).  This was largely the result of implicit (and later explicit) government policies aimed at inducing Palestinian-Jordanians to migrate for employment.<br><br>-In 1995, Palestinian-Jordanians owned 60% of the 500 largest companies in the Kingdom.  In the most valuable sector of Jordan's economy, banking, Palestinian-Jordanians accounted for 92% of the market share and employed 90% of all banking employees.<br><br>-In 1996, a study found that Palestinian-Jordanians accounted for 82.6% of capital participation in Jordan's economy and Transjordanians just 11%. | -Aruri and Farsoun 1983: 117-118<br>-Gubser 1983: 51<br>-Abu Odeh 1999: 196<br>-Sirriyeh 2000: 77-78<br>-Reiter 2004<br>-Brand 2006: 176-194<br>-Nanes 2008: 90<br>-Baylouny 2010: 80<br>-Brand 2010: 99 |
| *Immigrant Standards of Living* | The majority of Palestinian-Jordanians have attained high standards of living in Jordan. However, differences among the group population do exist, mostly between camp and non-camp residents:<br><br>-First subgroup (1948 non-camp residents): these Palestinian-Jordanians came to constitute the majority of the private sector in the 1950's and 1960's, and are among some of the wealthiest Jordanians today.<br><br>-Second subgroup (1967 non-camp residents): most of these Palestinian-Jordanians have joined their 1948 counterparts as part of Jordan's middle | -Gubser 1988: 95-96<br>-Yorke 1988: 31<br>-Brand 1995b<br>-Van Hear 1995<br>-Arneberg 1997<br>-Khawaja and Tiltnes 2002<br>-Khawaja 2003<br>-Moore 2004: 179<br>-Reiter 2004<br>-Baylouny 2010: 82 |

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| | class.<br><br>-Third subgroup (camp residents): while economic conditions have certainly improved since the 1950's, the majority of camp residents remain impoverished.  In 2002, over 22% of camp households had incomes of JD900 or less (compared to just 10% of non-camp households). The majority of camp residents still depend on UNRWA for employment, although some have found informal work in construction, agricultural, health care, and retail.  Many camp residents had relatives working in the Gulf countries during the 1970's and 1980's and benefitted from their remittances.<br><br>-Fourth subgroup (expatriate workers): these Palestinian-Jordanians benefitted from the oil boom of the 1970's and 1980's.  Upon their mass return to Jordan in 1990-91, the majority joined the Jordanian middle class and settled relatively comfortably in the wealthier neighborhoods of Amman.  However, a significant amount of the returnees remained unemployed and/or near poverty in subsequent years. | |
| *Nature and Levels of Economic Discrimination* | -Palestinian-Jordanians have historically been discriminated against in economic transactions and activities.  Besides their exclusion from the public sector, Palestinian-Jordanians have been left out of roles usually taken on by private sector actors, such as state divestment schemes and special investment initiatives.<br><br>-Palestinian-Jordanian businessmen often report discrimination in their interactions with state bureaucracy.  They often employ Transjordanians as business partners in order to ensure that official transactions make it through the "obstructive" bureaucracy in the Kingdom. Transjordanians have often admitted that they are likely to refrain from providing assistance to Palestinian-Jordanian businessmen in event that the latter has a problem. | -Abu Odeh 1999: 197; 200<br>-Brand 1994: 62<br>-Piro 1998: 52-53<br>-Moore 2004: 68-69 |

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