Friendship in the Kingdom of Ends

by

Chevan Lloyd Lindsay
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Friendship in the Kingdom of Ends

With Kant’s introduction of his concept of the kingdom of ends, we are introduced, for the first time, to the social dimension of his ethical thought. Here, we get a glimpse of what such an ethical theory would look like in practice if it were adopted by individuals living among, and dealing with, each other. Of the kingdom of ends Kant writes, “...by a kingdom I mean a systematic union of various rational beings through common laws.” (G4:433) Evoking the image of the biblical kingdom of God metaphorically, Kant’s kingdom of ends presents us with an ideal of a society in which all persons follow the categorical imperative in the three distinct ways Kant expressed it: we refer to them as the Formula of Universal Law, the Formula of Humanity and the Formula of Autonomy respectively. In the kingdom of ends, we see all three aspects of the categorical imperative come together. To make this abstract ideal more concrete we need to examine Kant’s conception of genuine friendship. This model of the intimate relationship between two persons is the environment in which Kantian ethics takes place in practice. In this paper, I will (1) lay out precisely what Kant means by a ‘kingdom of ends’, (2) illustrate how friendship embodies the kingdom of ends on Kant’s account and, (3) establish the link between Kant’s conceptions of ideal and genuine friendship. Furthermore, I will argue that Kant’s idea of friendship challenges a common misconception of Kantian ethics as a theory that, at best, is either uninterested with our emotional life or, at worst, demands of us to suppress it.

I. The Kingdom of Ends
As I have stated in the beginning of this essay, the kingdom of ends presents us with a social ideal; a society in which everyone lives in accordance with the categorical imperative. We can understand more clearly this ideal by defining its major components: the Formula of Humanity, the Formula of Autonomy, and the Formula of Universal Law.

First, in the kingdom of ends, an individual acts only according to those maxims that she legislates for herself insofar as those maxims are “universalizable”. The focus of the Universal Law formula is the possible form of any maxim, or underlying principle, by which one chooses to act. When adopting a maxim we are asked to imagine a world in which everyone adopts our maxim. From here we ask ourselves whether we are able to still adopt our maxim without contradiction. Is it possible, to use one of Kant’s examples, to imagine a world in which everyone makes a false promise in order to obtain some kind of benefit? If one cannot, then one’s maxim is morally impermissible. When we engage in this kind of reflection by creating the world of a universalized maxim, we are taking care to never make an exception of ourselves. If everyone cannot adopt my maxim, I am not allowed to adopt it to achieve my end. The maxims we adopt for ourselves prescribe how every human being ought to act. (GII 4:432)

By dictating how every human being ought to act one not only respects one’s own capacity for rational choice but that of everyone else as well. One treats oneself and all other members of one’s community as ends and never merely as means. In his second formulation of the categorical imperative, Kant implores us to “act that
you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of anyone else, always at the same time as an end, and never merely as a means.” (G: 4:429) On the traditional interpretation of Kant, humanity is only the capacity for rational choice. We would be acting against humanity if we were to abuse, disrespect or fail to recognize this capacity regardless in which particular individual it is embodied. This interpretation of humanity is supported by Kant’s eliminative argument for the identity of the content of the moral law. (G4:428) In so far as a categorical imperative commands universally and within all contexts, by definition, its end, for Kant, is such that we are obligated to pursue, respect and follow it in spite of any other consideration. This process rules out our inclinations and non-rational beings such as animals. The fact that we choose among inclinations suggests that they are subject to some higher faculty, namely, our rational capacity for deliberation and choice. Similarly, for Kant, non-rational beings are valuable only insofar as they serve some human purpose. (G4:428) It follows from all of this that our capacity for rational choice is the source of value and worth in the world.

Third, it is important that we legislate our laws autonomously. Autonomy, for Kant, is self-governance. One acts autonomously only because one believes one’s action is the right one to pursue upon rational reflection. This is to say that one must determine whether or not one’s maxim could become a universal law (FUL) and (or) respects humanity (FH). As I have stated earlier, by legislating one’s maxim to oneself, one also prescribes a law to the rest of humanity. When one acts autonomously one presents oneself as an example of how everyone else ought to
act. To be sure, to adopt a principle because of some sanction or interest other than duty to the moral law - whether internal or external - is to fail to govern oneself - i.e. heteronomy - on the Kantian account. When we act heteronomously we fail to respect our own capacity for rational choice. A heteronomous person follows a principle on the condition that some interest or sanction is satisfied. However, the categorical imperative is unconditionally binding by definition: we are obligated to abide by it in all possible cases irrespective of any other considerations. If we follow the categorical imperative heteronomously, the categorical imperative cannot be unconditionally binding. It follows that if there is a categorical imperative we are bound to it autonomously. Actions are morally praise worthy if and only if they are self-legislated. This is important to keep in mind when we consider Kant’s thoughts on friendship.

In a kingdom of ends, then, all rational agents are self-legislating under common objective laws and respecting humanity by not infringing upon another’s agency. This portrait is only an ideal for it is realizable if, and only if, every single individual follows the categorical imperative unfailingly. By abiding by the categorical imperative we help to realize the kingdom of ends. Indeed, helping to achieve the kingdom of ends is a duty. We each achieve in part by living in accordance with the categorical imperative. This duty, however, is not merely a matter of individual responsibility. Insofar as we are obligated to help establish a moral community we are compelled to hold others accountable as well. It is not as if it is given that every human being will be moral. This leads us to the question how
do I hold another person accountable? How do I motivate another person to act in accordance with the categorical imperative? This thought takes us back to the Formula of Humanity. As I have stated earlier, we are required to never treat a person merely as a means but as an end. To treat someone as an end is to acknowledge and respect another’s capacity for rational choice. This is to say that we recognize another as free and capable of engaging in moral and rational deliberation. When we regard someone as capable of choosing whether to act morally or not we are holding that person as morally accountable or answerable for his actions and principles. Indeed, we are condescending to someone when we regard him as incapable of acting morally. Still, the picture of the moral community that we have here is far too abstract. We can’t see how this will work in our personal and private lives. Moreover, the idea of holding another person accountable suggests a relationship in which there could potentially be constant moral judgment. Certainly, this cannot be the ideal vision of personal lives. How can such relationship be expected to endure? We can clearly see Kantian ethics in practice in Kant’s thoughts on friendship.

II. Friendship

As I have said in the beginning of this essay, Kant’s conception of a genuine friendship -also referred to as the friendship of disposition or moral friendship- is important in the Kantian account because it is the only social relation in which equality is a real possibility. Equality is important in the Kantian account because, for Kant, what is morally praiseworthy is, in part, that which is authored autonomously
on the part of the moral agent. Other social relations such as that between parent and child do not make equality a real possibility. There is a hierarchy built within this familial social relation. The child is expected to obey the parent: the child’s behavior is expected to conform to the parent’s desires and as such is not an expression of what the child chooses for herself. Whether or not children obey is not really of prime importance. The point is that, in principle, a child cannot live the moral life as Kant had envisioned. This is not to say that such a social relation is not important in the development of the human being as a social creature. There is a strong case to be made that Kant thought the contrary as we will see toward the end of this essay. I will not be pursuing that argument in this essay. Rather, this example demonstrates that such relations in which hierarchy is built in are not the environments in which to see Kantian ethics at work.

In his *Lectures on Ethics*, Kant posits a theory of friendship in which he identifies and distinguishes between three forms of friendship. Like Aristotle, he regards only one of the three as complete and true in contrast to the other two which are imperfect likenesses of the former. Aristotle’s theory of friendship distinguishes between the friendship of advantage, the friendship of pleasure, and the friendship based on moral character. Analogously, Kant differentiates between the friendship of need, the friendship of taste, and the friendship of disposition. (LE: 27: 424-426)

The important difference between the theories of friendship of Aristotle and Kant lies in their respective accounts of the ideal friendship. Aristotle conceived of a
perfect friendship as that in which a friend is “another self”. (NE1166b) A perfect friendship, on Aristotle’s account, is that which occurs between complete and good people who are similar in virtue. By virtue, I do not mean the contemporary understanding of what virtue is in, for example, American society; that is to say, the notion that virtue is morality. The Greek word for what is sometimes translated as virtue is arête which simply means excellence. The person of arête is one who lives life to her full potential. This ancient Greek conception of virtue is very broad and inclusive of the more narrow contemporary conception. Human excellence is inclusive of moral virtues. People who are similar with respect to arête, according to Aristotle, wish for goods in a similar way. They wish for goods to each other for the sake of the other. Aristotle goes on to say that each friend in a perfect friendship has this attitude because of the friend himself and not because of chance or circumstance. In fact, Aristotle states that each friend is “good without qualification and good for his friend”. (NE1156b: 13) Each friend is intimately involved with the other’s well-being. Because these passionate friendships occur between excellent and complete people, Aristotle believed that they were long lasting unlike the other imperfect variations; i.e. the friendships of pleasure and advantage.

In contrast to Aristotle, the only thing that is “unconditionally good”, or good without exception, for Kant, is a good will. On Kant’s account, what matters most, morally, is one's internal, and deliberate, commitment to the moral law. This is what Kant refers to as duty. In his Groundwork, Kant submits to us several familiar examples that conform to duty against which he argues to make this point. In one
such case, Kant offers the example of the philanthropist; a paradigm of virtue ethics. In so far as the philanthropist takes great pleasure in “doing good” or acting in a way that conforms to moral duty and makes others feel joy, he is the standard of virtue ethical theory. Kant argues that such a person demonstrates no true moral worth since the moral agent takes delight in what he does. The moral agent’s happiness whether derived from a certain inner satisfaction or that of others is a condition of carrying out his duties. This is problematic for Kant. Our commitment to the moral law cannot be merely conditional. What if such a person loses the satisfaction he finds in acting morally? Will he act immorally instead? It is not clear. On the other hand, the miserable man who acts in accordance with duty in spite of the way he feels exemplifies for Kant true moral worth. His commitment cannot be conditional; it is duty and is unconditional.

Here we encounter what distinguishes Kant’s ideal of friendship from that of Aristotle. Kant emphasizes duty whereas Aristotle focuses on developing character. This is not to say that Kant is demanding that we not take pleasure in acting morally. We don’t have to be loveless and unlovable people in order to be moral on Kant’s account. We should read Kant’s example of the miserable man as an epistemic test for what is morally praiseworthy. It is an illustration of what he means by moral duty rather than a prescription for how to live. In Kant’s vision of friendship, both duty and love are required.

To arrive at a clear idea of what Kant had in mind about the nature of genuine friendship, i.e. the friendship of disposition, it is helpful to explore what it is
not; that is, we will explore the shortcomings of both the friendships of need and taste. This is not to say that such forms of friendship are bad in principle. In fact, for example, Kant tells us that the friendship of need was the origin of all forms of friendship. (LE: 27:425) This is to only say that such relationships are not sufficient.

A friendship that is based solely on need is in principle ephemeral. So long as need remains the sole basis of the friendship, the relationship will continue; however, once the need evaporates, so does the friendship itself. For instance, imagine that you are in high school taking a course in Pre-Calculus. It’s almost halfway into the semester and you have not too long ago received the results of your second exam. Like the first one, you failed it and you are deeply concerned about your potential to pass the course. With great anxiety, you speak to your instructor after class. Your instructor strongly recommends that you seek the services of a tutor who can meet with you every week for extra support. After asking around, you meet someone from your local community college who is willing to help you. Within a couple of weeks you and your tutor develop an affinity for each other. You start to talk about things that are not related in any way to calculus. You each take an interest in the other outside of academic work. A month of tutoring passes and you realize a marked improvement in your performance in class. As your grades and confidence in your abilities rise you and your tutor see each other less and less. In fact, you soon no longer need your tutor anymore. The relationship that was growing begins to fade. Sooner than later, communication between the both of you
ceases. Both of you have resumed your lives as they were prior to what brought the both of you together; a need for extra cash and a need for academic improvement.

The resulting relationship is merely contractual in nature. With that said, though, such a relationship might be founded with the intention of being one of mutual advantage to both parties involved, and it is easy for such an agreement to give rise to unfairness and lack of respect. For one thing, it is easy to imagine, as Kant did (LE: 27:425), a passive partner striving to secure some benefit for himself without seemingly giving any thought of doing the same for his benefactor. In the same passage Kant also tells us that if one discovers that another’s intent is to obtain some advantage from him, then the relationship quickly dissolves as a result of lack of interest. A friendship based on need alone may very well devolve into a relationship founded with the purpose of satisfying self-interest without regard for the other. Indeed, there appears to be something distasteful about a person who solely seeks to secure something for himself. In such a scenario, one merely uses another as a mere means to satisfy his own desires. One fails to recognize the other as a person with his own goals, desires and concerns. Because of this potential for disrespect, a conscientious person, according to Kant, would take care to not burden another with his problems. In an “honorable” relationship, each, according to Kant, will take care to not engage in such behavior so much so as to not even desire to burden the other. An honorable relationship is such that each aims to maintain, at the very least, a certain level of respect for the other such that one never uses the other as a mere means.
In a similar fashion, a friendship of taste is also brief. It is a relationship in which both persons find pleasure in each other’s “company and mutual association.” (LE 27: 44) For example, imagine two friends who meet every Friday to cook together or a philosophy professor who meets with a musician every week to play tennis. Kant refers to the friendship of taste as only an analogue of friendship. That is, it is similar to but not the same as friendship. Such an association, according to Kant, that is based only on emotions or the good feelings that arises in both parties will not last. Tastes are like needs; they change over the course of time. Moreover, of such associations, Kant writes:

“There is something in the mutual possession of each other that approaches fusion into one person, friendship is something so delicate that it is never for a moment safe from interruptions if it is allowed to rest on feelings, and if this mutual sympathy and self-surrender are not subjected to principles or rules preventing excessive familiarity and limiting mutual love by requirements of respect…the love in friendship cannot be an affect; for emotion is blind in its choice, and after a while it goes up in smoke.” (MM6:471)

This brings us back to the notion of respect we have encountered from analyzing the friendship of need. Genuine friendship, as we shall soon see, requires a balance between love and respect.

In his Lectures on Ethics, Kant portrays the human being as the creature who uniquely lives in tension between two motives: the motive of self-love and that of the “general love of mankind”. (LE: 27: 423) In other words, we are each subjected to the existential task of balancing between attending to our own individual happiness and that of others. According to Kant, human beings do not see acts of
self-love as having any moral merit. Indeed, we see as worthy of great moral merit one who is moved to promote the happiness of others. Nevertheless, we each hold on to what gives our own particular person worth and it is from this fact of our existence, according to Kant, that friendship evolves. (LE: 27:423) In the same passage, Kant goes on to explore the question that remains: how is friendship pursued? It is not that we pursue our own happiness first before that of others, he concludes, for then we risk focusing on our own happiness to the detriment of caring for others. In the same way, the alternative is no better because our own happiness may very well be left behind. The ideal state of affairs, following Kant’s analysis here, would be such that when one cares for the happiness of others they in turn care for his happiness. In this scenario, no one loses because each cares for the other’s well-fare. Friendship, as such in its perfection, is a reciprocally rewarding relationship in which, “self-love is swallowed up in the idea of a generous mutual love.” (LE: 27: 423)

Of the perfect friendship, Kant writes that it “is the union of two persons through equal mutual love and respect.” (MM6: 470) Kant speaks of friendship as an ideal set for us by reason which is necessary with respect to morals. (LE: 27: 424) We have a duty to adopt this ideal and to put it into practice; each of us is commanded by reason to pursue friendship. It is important to note that Kant conceived of friendship in its perfection only as an idea; it does not actually exist in the world. (MM6: 470) Ideas for Kant are standards through which we judge empirical objects. Therefore, in this case, it simply serves as a standard by, and against, which we judge
actual friendships. (LE: 27:424) Experience can never either provide or serve as the ground upon which we evaluate the friendships we might have and observe. (LE:27:424) Experience only tells us how particular friends, or otherwise actual people, behave; it cannot tell us how friends ought to behave or that we ought to pursue friendship. Why is it then that Kant theorizes that we cannot fully realize our ideal of perfect friendship?

We glean a sense of the problem from the comments that Kant makes about the potential difficulties that may arise among friends. From a moral point of view, Kant maintains that it is of course a duty for one of the friends to point out the faults of the other to him. It is, Kant tells us, in the other’s best interests and as such is a duty of love. (MM6:470) Nevertheless, Kant recognizes that the friend who is being judged could very well view this as a lack of the respect he expected from his friend. We often fear, as Kant says, that our friend might come to believe that he has already, or might be in danger of, losing our respect. We fear he might feel as if he is being secretly criticized; that “even the fact his friend observes him and finds fault with him will seem itself offensive.” (MM6:470)

Let’s imagine someone who did something that was in some way unpleasant. Imagine, for example, that a friend of yours was being less than courteous to the waitress who was serving the both of you dinner one night. You are disgusted by your friend’s behavior but you hesitate to say something to him in that moment. Perhaps it is not the right time- you think to yourself: after all, you are both in a public venue and it may seem to your friend that you are making a
spectacle of the situation. Or maybe your friend will take offense by the very fact that you are reprimanding him. Suppose then you decided that you will say something to him but now you have to figure out what to say and how to say it. After fifteen or so minutes of self-deliberation, when you both have received desert, you finally reveal your displeasure to your friend. Nonetheless, despite your best efforts, your friend takes great offense and you both find yourselves in an intense argument. Both of you feel very insulted and your friend threatens to leave you at the restaurant.

One of the obvious problems here is that you do not know how someone will react to your criticisms no matter your intention or your method of delivery. With respect to a situation such as the one I just sketched, there is much difficulty that comes with revealing your true feelings to a friend or anyone else really. Additionally, it is not always easy to accept criticism from someone else. Perhaps you yourself have not taken kindly to anything resembling a reproach that you may have received from others. It is not hard to imagine that we have each, at one time or another, felt that others were mistaken in their assessment about us. And with that, if we are willing to be honest with ourselves, in retrospect there may have been times when we were simply deceiving ourselves. We knew that we were wrong but somehow rationalized our behavior to the detriment of self-respect. In any case, we are all aware of the difficulty that comes with giving and receiving criticism. And perhaps because of this, in part, we often think of what might be the best way
to say something to a friend or even contemplate whether we should say anything at all.

This is all to say that one of the major hindrances to the friendship account Kant provides is what I refer to as “epistemic agnosticism.” We cannot see into each other’s minds: we cannot know our own moral status let alone that of another. On Kant’s account, human psychology is such that we cannot know ourselves fully. At any given moment we are each motivated by many, and sometimes conflicting, incentives and desires: we can’t truly become transparent to ourselves. (G4:407) According to Kant, we often deceive ourselves into believing that our motives for behaving in a way that is morally consistent were noble. The emphasis on moral duty—i.e. holding each other accountable—comes into conflict with all too human impulses that allow us to judge ourselves and others unfairly from our own first person subjective vantage point. Kant, as we have already seen, acknowledges this and says why it is so easy for friendship to fall apart. For one thing, a major component of friendship is learning to achieve, and then maintain, an appropriate balance of love and respect toward a particular person: “for love can be regarded as attraction and respect as repulsion, and if the principle of love bids friends to draw closer, the principle of respect require them to stay at a proper distance from each other.” (MM6:470) Kant goes on to suggest that one of the parties may take himself to be superior. On account of this perceived superiority, one may take offense at the moral reprimands by the other who is deemed inferior and may even desire to put
aside the respect he once held for him. Once respect is violated though, according to Kant, it is irretrievably lost even if the two reconcile afterward. (MM6:470)

Though we cannot have friendship in its perfection, Kant maintains that we can have genuine, or moral, friendship. Kant defines moral friendship as the, “complete confidence of two persons in revealing their secret judgments and feeling to each other, as far as such disclosures are consistent with mutual respect.” (MM6:472) It is a relationship that results from two friends trying to live up to the perfect picture of friendship, i.e. an appropriate balance between love and respect. Moral friendship is the what perfect friendship looks like in practice. This friendship does not arise simply out of a command by reason. Kant writes of the human being as one who is meant for society, a social animal who desires to reveal himself to others. (MM6:472) (LE: 27:427) Despite this, Kant tells us that we fail to enter completely in society when we socialize with each other and form companionships. We tend to withhold our feelings, desires, judgments, attitudes. We hold a deep mistrust of others. We have a need to hide our weaknesses and opinions for fear that others will use them against us. To free ourselves from this constraint, we need a friend in whom we can confide, a friend with whom we can share our views, fears, desires and goals. We each need someone from whom we need not hide anything. A man with a friend is one who is, “not completely alone with his thoughts, as in a prison, but enjoys a freedom he cannot have with the masses, among whom he must shut himself up in himself…” (MM6:472) On the basis of all this, moral friendship arises. (LE: 27:427) Unlike perfect friendship, the friendship of disposition actually exists but
is rare. (MM6:472) Kant suggests that such a relationship can only be possible with one or two friends. (LE:27:427) According to Kant, genuine friendship is possible when one finds someone else who is intelligent and shares one’s general outlook on certain matters. This is not to say that friendship occurs between people who are the same or share the same opinion on everything. This is just to say that friendship is possible between people who share the same principles which are in themselves very general and not specific.

Up until this point, I have been attempting to illustrate not only how Kant conceived of genuine friendship but also to show what that conception entails for an understanding of our friendships and the kingdom of ends more generally. The fact that genuine friendship arises out of a need for sociality coupled with the requirement to maintain an appropriate balance of both duty and love toward a particular person seems to lead us to reject a portrait of Kantian ethics as that which denies the significance of our emotional lives. It seems to suggest that there is more to an enduring and true friendship than measuring another person against a moral standard.

Still, it is arguable that what we have managed to show thus far seems to remain a very unsavory picture of friendship and Kantian ethics more generally. Insofar as genuine friendship is a task of a continual striving toward the correct balance of love and respect, it appears to be a fragile enterprise that can easily fall apart if one fails to strike this balance accordingly. Our deeply intimate relationships always seem to be on the verge of disintegrating. God forbid, I love someone ‘too
much’. Moreover, there is great emphasis on moral duty to hold the other accountable but hardly anything to say about other aspects of friendship that are familiar to us. It may be true that friendship arises out of a need for sociality and that my friend is a person to whom I share my innermost thoughts, fears, and desires but nevertheless this emotional component is subjected to duty. My commitment to correcting the faults of my friend takes precedence over any feelings I have toward him which may or may not be contrary to duty. Furthermore, I cannot reveal my whole self. I must be careful not to tell my friend everything lest I lose something of his respect. (MM6:472) (LE: 27:427) In the possible event that our friendship dissolves, my then-former friend may very well use what I have disclosed to him as a means of hurting me if we are no longer on good terms. (LE: 27:430) In addition to suggesting an unsavory view of humanity, this portrait of friendship, with respect to the problems that come with “epistemic agnosticism” and the emphasis on duty seems to be untenable in our real lives.

With that said, this view, however, is less plausible when we consider what Kant offers in his *Conjectural Beginning of Human History*. This essay entertains a narrative of human development through the lens of the Book of Genesis and sets the foundation for a philosophy of history. Here, the portrait that Kant presents us with is one in which we see the inclinations as intimately integral to what it means to be a human being. We encounter the primordial human being as one within whom reason is dormant; “Instinct, that voice of God which all animals obey, must alone have guided the novice. It allowed him a few things for nourishment, but
forbade him others." (CBHH8:111) Kant goes on to say that as long as the primordial human being obeyed instinct’s “voice” he did well for himself. He satisfied his inclinations like the rest of the animal kingdom. As soon as rationality began to develop within him, the primordial human existence became more burdensome. (CBHH8:112) Together with man’s rational awakening came the realization that there are several means of satisfying his desires. With his new-found rationality, man began to compare the methods by which he could become fulfilled. This is the first time we human beings learn preference.

At this point of the narrative, we see that the inclinations which once guided us have become subjected to reason. There is a growing distance between ourselves and the objects of our inclinations. We develop the capacities to choose in what way to satisfy our desires, to resist them, and to transform them among other things. We are beings who have evolved in such a way such that inclinations are subjected to reason. On the basis of this, one might be tempted to claim that we are meant to overcome our inclinations all together-that all that we really need is reason. This judgment, however, is pure conjecture. It is not based upon any textual observation. In fact, if we rely solely on the text, such a judgment comes into conflict with the examples that Kant provides. For example, if we return to the scene where primordial human beings learn preference we see that the inclinations are necessary. Our need to nourish ourselves and satiate hunger provide us with information in order to make a choice about how to satisfy such basic needs necessary for survival. In fact, if we did not have any sensuous inclinations we would
not act; we wouldn’t even be able to survive. Part of what it is to be human is being a sensuous being. It’s not a choice that we make; it’s fact of our existence. On the basis of this we cannot, and should not, deny our sensuous selves.

With this said, however, all I have shown is that sensuality is necessarily part of being human. I have not yet made the case that this aspect of humanity is not problematic. Kant himself tells us that, “when reason began its business and, weak as it is, got into a scuffle with animality in its whole strength, then there had to arise ills and, what is worse, with more cultivated reason, vices, which were entirely alien to the condition of ignorance and hence of innocence.” (CBHH:116) As I have stated earlier, our inclinations provide us with content. They are necessarily part of our existence and it is difficult to imagine living without them. Nevertheless, reason and sensual nature are not complimentary. In fact, Kant suggests here that evil arises when we subject our reason to sensual nature. Though this is the case, it does not follow that it is our sensual nature that is evil. The most that we can say here is that evil arises when there is an improper relationship between rationality and sensuality. If our sensual nature were evil, we would also have to judge animals and primordial man as evil. As we have already seen, Kant does not advocate this view. Moreover, Kant states outright that the sentiment for sociability is itself the foundation of morality. Morality could not be possible without this sentiment for sociability. (CBHH8:113)

With this narrative of human development in mind, we can give a more faithful reconstruction of Kant’s account of moral friendship. As discussed earlier, it
is arguable that what I had demonstrated up until the point of the analysis of Kant’s *Conjectural Beginning of Human History* appeared to remain an unsatisfying and implausible account of friendship and consequently Kantian ethics. Genuine friendship appears to be a fragile enterprise that can easily fall apart insofar as it is a task of a continual striving toward the correct balance of love and respect necessary for maintaining it. Moreover, there is great emphasis on moral duty to hold the other accountable but there appears to be hardly anything to say about the emotional component of friendship. While entertaining this counter argument I granted that while it may be true that friendship arises out of a need for sociality and self-revelation to another this otherwise emotional component is subjected to duty with respect to correcting the faults of the other. I do not deny this; however, with a new framework of humanity in mind we ought to re-think what Kant meant by duty.

I proffer that while it may be true that Kant expects us to hold each other accountable this expectation need not be taken solely as an account of moral judgment. We do not have to conceive of the duty to correct another as an invitation to assume the role of moral superiority. In fact, considering the account of epistemic agnosticism that I brought up earlier, such a relationship is impractical to say the least. Coupling this insight together with the full picture of humanity that we have just analyzed it is more helpful, if not more accurate, to view Kant’s account of moral friendship as that of mutual moral education. It is a framework in which there is no clear hierarchy—after all, we cannot see into the soul of the other let alone
ourselves. None of us are finished works of art; each of us stands in need of learning. As we can see, the antecedent of this framework is one of humility. When we participate in a genuine friendship we are each both teacher and student. In a friendship we are expected to learn and to teach. There is nothing static in this moral account. We are, in part, as Kant illustrates in his narrative, sensuous beings with needs, feelings, and desires that are always in flux. To participate in a relationship in which each of us shares our uniquely complex and fluctuating inner life requires an attitude, on the part of both friends, that is responsive to what the other needs in any given moment. Indeed, the friendships we entertain are processes we carry out in our lives not an achievement of moral perfection.

This account of friendship takes us back to the kingdom of ends. As I have stated near the beginning of this essay, while the kingdom ends provides us with a social dimension to Kantian Ethical thought it was still too abstract. On its own, it was not clear how personal interactions worked in a moral framework. We each have an individual duty to realize the kingdom of ends but there is clear picture of what it means to hold one another accountable. After all, what do we mean when we use the word “morality”? In a general sense, morality suggests a right way of living: it entails both a diagnosis and a prescription. As we already know, people with different values often come into conflict with each other. This is especially problematic when we are moved to motivate others morally. What does it mean to motivate someone morally? What does such a picture look like?
With Kant’s account of genuine friendship we finally get a clearer picture. To be sure, it is not a mirror of all of the relationships we entertain. We cannot equally be invested in the lives of everyone around us in as intimate a way that one is with a very good friend. Still, nonetheless we learn something from this portrait that is applicable in a general sense. Kant’s view of genuine friendship encourages the moral agent to assume an attitude of responsiveness to others. By responsiveness, I mean not merely an openness to listen to the other, to be receptive to another’s concerns, desires, and goals but also the willingness to be taught by another lest we become paternalistic. That is to say that together with an understanding of the limits of experiential knowledge comes the acknowledgement and acceptance that there is no strict hierarchy in our moral engagements. We approach responsibility and reciprocity in our community in a sense of humility lest we assume a posture of moral superiority.
Bibliography


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