## Table of Contents

Acknowledgments ................................................................................................................................. 2

Introduction............................................................................................................................................ 3

1. Fukuyama’s Mistaken Critics and Fukuyamaean Theoretical Plasticity .......................... 11
   1.1. Fukuyama’s History: Progressivity of Technology and Master-Slave Dialectic ............... 13
   1.2. Fukuyamaean Theoretical Plasticity: Synthetic and Eclectic Philosophy ......................... 20
   1.3. Three Semantic Qualifications of the End of History ......................................................... 31
   1.4. Fukuyama’s Politics: Prudent and Multilateral Democratization ....................................... 40

2. Huntington and Fukuyama: The End of the Clash of Civilizations ............................................. 46
   2.1. Huntington’s History: Friend-Enemy Dialectic and Progressivity of Technology .............. 48
   2.2. The End of the Clash of Civilizations: Three Considerations .............................................. 60
      2.2.1. On Culture and Community: Civil Society, Social Capital, and Radius of Trust ............ 61
      2.2.2. On Democracy: Its Desirability and Compatibility with Islam and Confucianism ........... 70
      2.2.3. On Timing: Short-run vs. Long-run Predictions and the End of the Clash of Civilizations... 77

3. Fukuyama and Hardt-Negri: The Beginning of Alter-History and the End of Civil Society ...... 87
   3.1. Hardt and Negri’s History: Transcendence-Immanence Dialectic and Biopolitical Technology .. 89
      3.1.1. Empire: Immanent Sovereignty and Biopolitical Production........................................ 90
      3.1.2. Multitude: Three Marxist Political Agendas and Absolute Democracy ..................... 95
   3.2. The Beginning of Alter-History and the End of Civil Society ................................................. 101
      3.2.1. The Beginning of Alter-History: Altermodernity and Factor X .................................... 102
      3.2.2. The End of Civil Society: Postcivil Society and Historical Parallelism .......................... 111

Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 122

Bibliography ....................................................................................................................................... 136
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Introduction

The end of the Cold War was not just a political landmark: It also triggered an extraordinary intellectual event, inviting the construction of a number of ambitious paradigms that attempt to account for its meta-historical implications. In “The End of History?” (1989) and The End of History and the Last Man (1992), Francis Fukuyama controversially asserts that the end of the Cold War marks the End of History. The triumph of capitalism and liberal democracy over communism points to the conceivable perfection of human ideology and institutions. In “The Clash of Civilizations” (1993) and The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996), Samuel Huntington suggests an alternative, the theory of the Clash of Civilizations: The end of the Cold War primarily indicates the end of conflicts within Western civilization, whereas a new era of intercivilizational conflicts has begun. In their trilogy Empire (2000), Multitude (2004), and Commonwealth (2009), Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri attempt to revive Marxism in their postmodern theory of Empire. Modern dialectical history has come to an end with the end of the Cold War, but only to be replaced by postmodern nondialectical history and correspondingly a postmodern political agenda.

This thesis is devoted to reassessing Fukuyama’s paradigm of History, first by correcting some common misconceptions about it, and second by expanding it through synthesis with Huntington’s and Hardt and Negri’s paradigms. Not surprisingly, given the ambitious tone of his assertion, Fukuyama’s End of History has provoked controversy and a great number of mistaken criticisms. Some of them
are empirical, and some philosophical. A few will be addressed in the chapters to follow. Yet it should be noted in advance that the overwhelming majority (not all) of the misconceptions about Fukuyama are products of inadequate communication rather than misinterpretation. Many commentators tend to read Fukuyama selectively, skipping the sections where he artfully addresses the raised and potential objections. Some even skip whole books: Probably because the controversies of the late 1980s and early 1990s have long ago subsided, many commentators on Fukuyama do not account for his major subsequent publications, such as *The Great Disruption* (1999) or *Our Posthuman Future* (2002), which significantly refine his original End-of-History thesis. As such, the biggest problem with Fukuyama’s critics (and Huntington’s and Hardt and Negri’s as well) is not one at the level of hermeneutic schema, the resolution of which would require an innovative, subtle reading between the lines of the texts. Rather, it is primarily at the level of textual comprehension, and solving the problem will thus take a careful reading of the texts.

The first objective of this thesis, in this respect, is quite modest: to provide a reading of the three paradigms that is as comprehensive as time and space allow. It is to unearth as many relevant nuances, qualifications, clarifications, and modifications the authors attach to their paradigms as possible; and to organize these findings and their immediate implications clearly enough to articulate the internal logic of the paradigms—to iron out the conceptual wrinkles into a smooth surface. The second, more ambitious, objective of the project is to apply those basic findings to accommodate creative syntheses between the paradigms. If the first objective is largely a mechanical repair job, the second objective is a chemical fusion. It would be
too strong to claim that the syntheses suggested here are in themselves groundbreaking. Nevertheless, they tend to distill the oft-unnoticed versatility of Fukuyama’s philosophy of history, in adapting to and absorbing alternative paradigms. This is the original contribution this project hopes to make.

In view of the two primary objectives of the thesis, Chapter One aims to rediscover some of the virtues of Fukuyama’s philosophy of history and thereby to vindicate the internal coherence of his system. It first delineates Fukuyama’s basic argument that the progressivity of science and the Hegelian master-slave dialectic together drive History to its End. It then surveys Fukuyama’s synthetic and accumulative adoption of diverse strands of philosophical traditions, such as Plato, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Kojève. Expanding upon this, the chapter identifies three semantic qualifications of Fukuyama’s End of History, showing thereby that the End of History is an artfully nuanced and multifaceted concept. The chapter also dispels the misconception of Fukuyama as an outright advocate of American global hegemony. Rather, Fukuyama proposes multilateralism, volunteerism, and democratization-from-below. The vindication of Fukuyama’s internal coherence and the clarification of the relevant points in turn provide the basis for Chapters Two and Three to facilitate inter-paradigmatic interactions. Of particular importance here is Fukuyama’s Hegelian method of inter-theoretical dialectics, or what will be called “Fukuyamaean theoretical plasticity.” The term indicates the inherent elasticity of Fukuyama’s paradigm and the potential for its expansion by absorbing aspects of other paradigms.
Chapter Two argues that a synergetic blend of Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s paradigms is possible—a claim that debunks the myth, taken for granted by the overwhelming majority of commentators, that juxtaposes Fukuyama and Huntington in an irreconcilable opposition. The first half of Chapter Two investigates Huntington’s system of History (in which the friend-enemy dialectic and the progressivity of technology drive History toward the era of the Clash of Civilizations), his normative recommendations on how to avoid the Clash, and some of Huntington’s qualifications of his system. The second half attempts to repudiate the claim that Fukuyama’s End of History is incompatible with Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations. The two paradigms share the conception of human beings as community-beings, which enables a synthesis between Fukuyama’s master-slave dialectic and Huntington’s friend-enemy dialectic. This in turn points to what will be called the “End of the Clash of Civilizations,” a term embodying the completed dialectic between liberalism and communalism. The chapter claims that this synthesis not only enlarges the analytical applicability of Fukuyama’s History, but also resolves an inherent contradiction between the predictive and normative implications of Huntington’s dialectic.

Chapter Three attempts another merger, this time between Fukuyama’s modern paradigm of the End of History and Hardt and Negri’s postmodern paradigm of Empire. This merger represents a radical break from the conventional wisdom of relevant secondary sources, which often link the two paradigms as antithetical, and rarely in any positive relation. The first section of Chapter Three examines Hardt and Negri’s system of History, in which the transcendence-immanence dialectic and
biopolitical technology converge into Empire, today’s capitalist regime of global sovereignty. This section also sets out Hardt and Negri’s neo-Marxist theory of the Multitude as the antidote to Empire’s exploitation. The second half of Chapter Three aims to integrate Hardt and Negri’s Empire and Fukuyama’s End of History on two fronts: the possibility of posthistorical History and the evolution of civil society. The admixture, again, expands Fukuyama’s History to account for what will be called the “Beginning of Alter-History” and the “End of Civil Society”; meanwhile, it also tones down Hardt and Negri’s overly generalizing and totalizing tendency.

Before going further, it should be acknowledged that there are certain regrettable omissions in this thesis. The space and time allowed for this project seriously limit the range of issues that can be properly analyzed without distorting the intended shape of the project. One topic of practical importance left out of the discussion, for example, is the empirical validity and implications of the theoretical framework developed here. This thesis is primarily an intellectual exercise at the level of theory and paradigm. While it tries to account for relevant empirical considerations wherever possible (for instance, some of the empirical evidence cited by Fukuyama and Huntington), to do so is not this thesis’s primary preoccupation. Likewise, this thesis does not present case studies to which its findings can be applied, although there are practical implications the project entails that could be further studied. The thesis consequently avoids the discussion of institutional or policy implications, except for the sections devoted to clarifying Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s stances concerning the American position in the world order.
The thesis, furthermore, does not aim to provide any external value judgments in regard to the empirical or theoretical implications of the paradigms at stake. It does not, for instance, condone or condemn past and current foreign policies of the USA. At the theoretical level, it intends to derive normative evaluations of the three paradigms primarily from the standard of internal non-contradiction. Less frequently, the thesis adopts the criteria rising from within inter-paradigmatic interactions and the analyses of insightful commentators. In a similar vein, it does not intend to employ any external criteria (for example, one’s assumptions about human nature) to suggest that one theory can claim an epistemological primacy over another. Admittedly, the very purpose of the thesis (of revisiting Fukuyama) grants a sort of vantage point to Fukuyama’s paradigm, with the other two paradigms measured in terms of their usefulness in enabling the expansion of Fukuyama’s. Aside from this consideration, all three paradigms will be accommodated on as equal a footing as possible.

Many other relevant secondary theorists (secondary for the purposes of this thesis, including Plato, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Foucault, Deleuze) that underlie or parallel the three main paradigms, could have been brought more directly into this debate; however, an adequate and full-fledged discussion of those theories would turn the thesis into an entirely different project, if not many. This thesis is thus focused almost exclusively on the relatively manageable literature on the three paradigms. Another related disclaimer is in line, for even this once-filtered literature is extremely multilayered and multidimensional. All four authors of the paradigms discuss a variety of topics ranging from nation-building, human rights, just war, weapon proliferation, postmodern interpretations of literary works, the role of women, queer
theory, to aging society, and more. This thesis, alas, is dedicated primarily to the question of the End of History and other directly contributing themes. While some relevant topics will be briefly discussed in footnotes, this thesis will not cover many of the themes that could be highly meaningful outside of its scope.

Last but not least, there is a geographical and temporal bias to this thesis. The range of theories discussed primarily concerns the Western tradition of philosophy of history and political theory, mainly from the eighteenth century onwards with the important exception of Plato. Admittedly, Fukuyama seriously engages with Confucianism and his communitarian inclination speaks to his upbringing in an Asian ethical tradition; Huntington tries to be sensitive to a variety of political opinions from the non-Western civilizations. But these references do not constitute the fundamental basis of the authors’ philosophies of history. A proper accommodation of philosophies of history from all different Western and non-Western traditions is far beyond the delimited scope of this thesis.

To restate the purpose of the project: It is to reevaluate the relevance of Fukuyama’s paradigm of the End of History, first by defending it against some misdirected criticisms and second by synthesizing it with its competing paradigms, namely, Huntington’s paradigm of the Clash of Civilizations and Hardt and Negri’s paradigm of Empire. This thesis expects to make a two-fold contribution to the existing literature on Fukuyama: first, to provide as comprehensive a reading of Fukuyama’s texts as possible, which most secondary resources are lacking; second, to highlight the ongoing adaptability of Fukuyama’s paradigm in its synthetic relations to other paradigms, positing an arguably more proper and fruitful alternative than the
conventional interpretation that views these paradigms as irreconcilable. The reading of the following chapters, nonetheless, has to be tempered with caution: The thesis has left out certain relevant topics due to limited time and space, and at the least for that reason, its findings have not exhausted potential for dispute or further study.
1. Fukuyama’s Mistaken Critics and Fukuyamaean Theoretical Plasticity

Part of the reason that I enlarged the article into *The End of History and the Last Man* was to correct these misinterpretations by presenting the argument at much greater length. Surely, I thought, a 400-page book would go a long way to setting the record straight. I should have known better, of course: what you are is what you are *recognized* as being, to use one of the book’s central concepts. We exist not “in ourselves,” but only in an intersubjective social context; and in that context, what I said was that event would somehow stop happening, or there would be perpetual peace. –Francis Fukuyama

Hegel wants to take on all-comers, not simply by defeating them in a head-to-head confrontation, but rather by including what is true in their ideas within his own philosophy. Hegel’s philosophy aims at totality, a totality which reduces all other points of view into moments in his own thinking. – Howard Williams

In “The End of History?” (1989) and *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992), Francis Fukuyama makes the provocative assertion that the evolutionary process of human ideologies and institutions has come to a conceivable end with the universal triumph of economic and political liberalism. The end of the Cold War has proven the limitations of liberalism’s alternatives, such as monarchy, fascism, and finally communism, all of which Fukuyama claims stumbled over their internal contradictions. Fukuyama’s argument was put in the spotlight and heavily criticized. Political theorist Benjamin Barber accuses Fukuyama of mistaking a transient victory of American unipolarity as a permanent end of history, for the world is still fraught

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with conflicts, such as Balkan nationalisms, Rwandan genocide, and Islamic terrorism.3 Political theorist John Dunn labels Fukuyama’s essay as “the worst sort of American undergraduate term-paper.”4 Thirteen days after the September 11 terror, Fareed Zakaria observed Islamic fundamentalism’s tangible resistance against the West and declared “surely the End of the End of History.”5 These examples, in short, represent what might be called “the End of Fukuyama”: There has emerged a consensus among Fukuyama’s commentators that Fukuyama’s analysis is no longer relevant, if it ever was.

The goal of this chapter is to announce the End of the End of Fukuyama: It is to reassess the philosophical sophistication and logical coherence of Fukuyama’s theory and to show that Fukuyama’s thesis deserves more serious intellectual recognition and respect than many critics have granted it. This chapter argues, as a few astute commentators and Fukuyama himself have, that the majority of Fukuyama’s critics are guilty of a sloppy reading of Fukuyama’s texts (probably due to his overexposure and simplification through the media). Most critiques do not fully grasp, in political theorist Martin Griffiths’ words, “the subtleties of [Fukuyama’s] argument, an ingenious blend of political philosophy, historical analysis of tentative futurology.”6 This chapter consists of four sections: (a) the basic concepts and mechanics of Fukuyama’s End of History argument; (b) the synthetic and eclectic way in which Fukuyama evokes and combines the traditions of great thinkers; (c)

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3 Benjamin Barber, “Can History Have an End?,” in Big Questions in History, ed. Harriet Swain (London: Jonathan Cape, 2005), 262.
4 John Dunn quoted in Martin Griffiths, Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations (London: Routledge, 1999), 68.
6 Griffiths, Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations, 68.
Fukuyama’s three qualifications of the semantics of the End of History; (d) Fukuyama’s political stance and general policy recommendations. Vindicating the \textit{internal} coherence of the Fukuyamaean system, in turn, will lay the foundation for the next two chapters—the task of facilitating \textit{external} and inter-theoretical communication with the other two paradigms.

\section*{1.1. Fukuyama’s History: Progressivity of Technology and Master-Slave Dialectic}

The structure of Fukuyama’s basic analysis is two-fold: first, philosophical investigation of human nature and the normative logic of Universal History; and second, descriptive observation of the empirical reality of post-Cold War world politics. Note, however, that the philosophical and empirical-political components are so subtly and profoundly intermingled that discussing the two in isolation is counterproductive. As discussed later in this chapter, Fukuyama’s thesis springs out of a highly complex and synthetic structure of dialogue with such great thinkers as Kant, Hegel, and Marx. Fukuyama subscribes to Hegel’s philosophical idealism and Kant’s moral philosophy, and argues that the End of History is above all \textit{ideal} and \textit{normative}. At the same time, Fukuyama adopts Marx’s anti-metaphysical and materialist methodology into his theory. Taken together, the End of History is a normative idea that is \textit{empirically demonstrable}—although \textit{not conclusively}, since History has no metaphysical grounding. Many of Fukuyama’s critics tend to focus on either the philosophical \textit{or} empirical grounding of the End of History, without the due awareness of Fukuyama’s dualist methodology of philosophical idealism and empiricism. This section will present \textit{both} theoretical considerations and statistical
data, from which Fukuyama concludes that the triumph of economic liberalism and political liberalism marks the End of History.

Fukuyama’s account of liberalism is predicated on the assumption of the existence of History with a capital H, defined as the “coherent and directional transformation of human societies [affecting the whole] of mankind.” One of the two main engines of History is the combination of human desire for physical well-being and the technological knowledge that satisfies that desire (the second, thymos [spiritedness], will be discussed later). Science and technology are irrevocably progressive and cumulative in nature and exercise a uniform impact on all societies. The discovery or invention of the wheel, gun powder, printing, steam, nuclear energy, and so on improves and accumulates upon the previous technological conditions and cannot be undone. The progressivity of science dictates that countries adopt the newest technology, first in order to survive the military competition in the waves of imperialism, the Great Wars, and the Cold War, and second to improve their economic performance. Examples include the Ottoman reforms of Mahmud II, Meiji reforms in Japan, and perestroika in the USSR. Technological modernization, in turn, homogenizes the societal arrangements of modern countries, necessitating centralized statehood, urbanization, replacement of traditional economic organizations (such as tribe and family) with more efficient ones (such as corporations), universal education, social mobility, interaction with global markets, consumer culture, and so forth.

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Fukuyama further gives substantial historical background for his theory. After the information revolution of the twentieth century, technological modernization uniformly transformed its adopters into capitalist economies. Centralized economies fared well during the industrial era of mass production; but they did not do so well compared to their decentralized counterparts in the post-industrial era of information and communication innovation, in which local knowledge and spontaneous transactions are privileged. As a result, the USSR experienced a zero to one percent rate of growth between 1975 and 1985. Open capitalist economies, by contrast, experienced tremendous economic success: Japan grew at an annual rate of 9.8 percent in the 1960s; the Four Tigers (namely, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea) grew at 9.3 percent in the same period. South Korea and North Korea had nearly equal levels of GNP per capita in 1960, but South Korea’s GNP per capita after opening its market reached $4,550 in 1989, four times that of North Korea. In short, economic liberalism, by the logic of progressive science, has been empirically demonstrated to satisfy human economic desire better than its alternatives.

After establishing the universal and necessary connection between modern science and economic liberalization, however, Fukuyama makes a crucial concession: Advanced industrialization does not necessarily lead to political liberalization. American democracy, for instance, emerged from the pre-industrial context, while political authoritarianism was compatible with successful capitalism, as in Meiji Japan, Bismarckian Germany, Lee Kuan Yew’s Singapore, and Park Jung-hee’s

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9 All the data cited in this paragraph is from Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, 1st ed. (New York: Free Press, 2006), 28, 102.
South Korea.\textsuperscript{10} Fukuyama therefore introduces the second engine of History: *thymos*—the Platonic, psychological formulation of the Hegelian desire for recognition—and the resultant master-slave dialectic.\textsuperscript{11} Fukuyama adopts Hegel’s understanding that humans are differentiated from animals in that *thymos* [spiritedness] enables humans to risk their lives for the sake of prestige, in negation of their natural desire for self-preservation. From this competition for prestige arose an aristocratic society that was divided into a class of slaves and one of masters. Yet the aristocratic society had an internal “contradiction”: It satisfied neither the thymotic aspiration of the slaves nor that of the masters. The slaves were recognized by their masters as lesser beings, while the masters were recognized only by those lesser beings. Egalitarian principles, crystallized in Christianity and secularized by the French Revolution, dialectically overcame this “contradiction” by introducing the self-mastery of slaves (popular sovereignty) and a legal system of universal and mutual recognition (guarantee of individual rights under the rule of law).\textsuperscript{12} Here, liberal democracy marks the End of History, since it satisfies *thymos* in the fullest way—fuller than any conceivable alternative human institutions.

Fukuyama supports his transhistorical analysis of *thymos* [spiritedness] with the empirical observations of the nearly universal collapse of authoritarian and

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., xv.
\textsuperscript{11} Strictly speaking, *thymos* and the desire for recognition are not identical concepts, although interchangeable in Fukuyama’s analysis. *Thmos* is a Platonic, objective part of the soul that creates value to oneself, while desire for recognition is a Hegelian, inter-subjective desire that seeks other people’s agreement in that self-estimation. Williams, Sullivan, and Matthews, *Francis Fukuyama and the End of History*, 95-6.
\textsuperscript{12} For Fukuyama, the rule of law and popular sovereignty are the definitive attributes of liberalism and democracy, respectively. A state is ‘liberal insofar as it recognizes and protects through a system of law man’s universal right to freedom, and democratic insofar as it exists only with the consent of the governed.’ Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” *The National Interest* (Summer 1989): 5; also quoted in Williams, Sullivan, and Matthews, *Francis Fukuyama and the End of History*, 77-8.
extremist politics in the late twentieth century. In Southern Europe, authoritarian and/or military regimes fell to democratic regimes in Portugal in 1974, in Greece 1974, in Spain in 1977, and in Turkey in 1983. In Latin America, democratic governments were introduced or restored in Peru in 1980, in Uruguay in 1983, in Brazil in 1984, in Nicaragua in 1990, in Paraguay and in Chile in the late 1980s. In East Asia, dictatorships were ousted, and at times democratic politics became visible in the Philippines in 1986, in South Korea in 1987, and in Taiwan in 1988. Most pertinently, the Revolutions of 1989 overthrew most of the Soviet-style communist states across Central and Eastern Europe, such as Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania; meanwhile, the USSR dissolved itself with the election of Boris Yeltsin and banned the communist party in Russia after the failure of the August 1991 coup attempt by communist hardliners. Admittedly, not all countries succeeded in achieving stable liberal democracy with free markets. In that sense, “what [was] emerging victorious… [was] not so much liberal practice [but] the liberal idea.”14 Taken as a whole, Fukuyama’s theory of Universal History concludes that the combination of economic liberalism and political liberalism constitutes the End of History, defined in the terms that “we cannot picture to ourselves a world that is essentially different from the present one, and at the same time better.”15

In addition to presenting his own argument, Fukuyama directly addresses criticisms from the left and the right and thereby refines the intricate balance between capitalism and liberal democracy. On the one hand, the radical leftists argue that the

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13 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, 13,14.
14 Ibid., 45. Italics original.
15 Ibid., 46. Italics original.
internal “contradiction” of universal recognition in liberal democracy is that economic liberalism creates a division of labor and inequality. Although much more egalitarian than aristocratic societies, capitalist economies necessarily provide different levels of thymotic satisfaction to different groups of people, based on wealth and skills. Yet Fukuyama argues that government’s intervention to give more dignity to the disadvantaged group would deprive other groups of liberty, undermining the principle of liberty. On the other hand, the rightists (following Nietzsche) believe that modern democracy is not the self-mastery of the previous slaves, but rather their mastery over their previous masters. They argue that human beings are inherently unequal and must desire the satisfaction of megalothymos (desire for unequal recognition) rather than that of isothymos (desire for equal recognition). It is therefore possible that the “new” slaves, whose thymos is not satisfied, might reverse History; humans might return to their aristocratic engagement in prestige battles, but now with destructive modern weapons.

In response to the leftist critique, Fukuyama contends that the remaining social inequalities in democratic societies represent a tension to balance, rather than a contradiction to resolve, between the twin principles of liberty and equality. This tension concerns “not the principles of liberal society, but the precise point at which the proper trade-off between liberty and equality should come.”16 Attempts to balance liberty and equality can be made without undermining the principles themselves, leading to different forms of liberal democracy, such as the individualism of Reagan’s

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16 Ibid., 293.
America, the Christian Democracy of Continental Europe, or the social democracy of Scandinavia.\textsuperscript{17}

Fukuyama takes the rightist critique more seriously, to the extent that he describes the tension between \textit{megalothymia} (desire for unequal recognition) and \textit{isothymia} (desire for equal recognition) within liberal democracy as “the ‘contradiction’ that liberal democracy has not yet solved.”\textsuperscript{18} This is, in Nietzschean terms, the problematic of the “Last Man.” However, Fukuyama believes that \textit{megalothymia} and \textit{isothymia} can be made compatible within liberal democracy, depending on “the quality and number of outlets for \textit{megalothymia}… [to] bleed off excess energy that would otherwise tear the community apart.”\textsuperscript{19} One of the most effective outlets for \textit{megalothymia} is capitalist entrepreneurship, in which people take risks for wealth and reputation, but in non-militaristic manner and under the auspice of democratic governance. Moreover, community (such as community churches, sports clubs, and advocacy groups) provides individuals with a tailored, personalized sense of recognition and thus complements the relatively impersonal recognition by the state. Community, Fukuyama claims, is “democracy’s best guarantee that its citizens do not turn into last men.”\textsuperscript{20} Moreover, competition for scientific achievement, politics, foreign policy, sports, and formal arts all enable the individual to channel their megalothymic urges into productive activities.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 293-4.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 314.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 314, 315.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 323; also quoted in Williams, Sullivan, and Matthews, \textit{Francis Fukuyama and the End of History}, 100.
1.2. Fukuyamaean Theoretical Plasticity: Synthetic and Eclectic Philosophy

It should be stressed that Fukuyama’s argument outlined above is indeed an echo of philosophical debate dating back up to two millennia. Political theorists Howard Williams and David Sullivan applaud Fukuyama for having “almost single-handedly revived philosophical debate about the nature of history [and] given a new lease of life to the philosophy of history.”

Fukuyama summons many of the great philosophers of history to this debate in a highly unorthodox manner—his intentionally selective and manipulative usage of their works, as if engaging a dialogue “carried out with only half an ear to what the other is saying.”

Unsurprisingly, Fukuyama has been criticized for his seemingly self-contradictory evocation of conflicting philosophers. Political theorist Robin Fox, for instance, accuses Fukuyama of “eating one’s intellectual cake and having it,” and of adopting the Hegelian view of humans as historically constructed beings and insisting on grounding this view by reference to Platonic human nature. And Hegelian scholars criticize Fukuyama for misunderstanding Hegel, whose End of History arguably culminates in constitutional monarchy, not liberal democracy. Such criticisms, although often valid on their own terms, nevertheless do not take into account one central feature of Fukuyama’s method: to treat great thinkers, not solely on their own terms, but instrumentally. It can be argued that his primary concern is not to create a museum full of methodically well-preserved “mummies” of dead philosophies; it is to

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21 Ibid., 160.
22 Ibid., 70.
selectively distill what is still “alive” in them in the twentieth-century political
context.\textsuperscript{24}

Among the philosophers drafted to make up, in Michael Roth’s words,
Fukuyama’s “all-star team”—mainly, Plato, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Kojève—
the single most important figure is Hegel.\textsuperscript{25} The idea of Universal History, although
first conceived by Kant, was systematized by Hegel. Hegel theorizes History as the
empirical manifestation of the metaphysical system of what he calls Spirit (\textit{Geist}),
modeled after the Christian God. Spirit is the great consciousness that \textit{both}
encompasses and transcends individual consciousnesses. The self-conscious unity of
Spirit and concrete individual consciousnesses—the self-discovery of Spirit in
worldly reality—is the End of History.\textsuperscript{26} The metaphysics of Spirit relates to
philosophical idealism, the belief in the supremacy of ideas (vis-à-vis material
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{[24] Michael Roth presents an alternative account of, or at least adds a nuanced perspective to,
Fukuyama’s motive for collapsing distinctions between a variety of philosophers—Plato, Hegel,
Kojève, and Nietzsche (and more, although Roth does not mention them)—and lumping them together
in what Roth calls “the nostalgic nest.” The nostalgic nest is where “we can feel proud of our
achievements in the present and still glance back on the past from which we have emerged. [Here,]
Plato, Hegel, Kojève, and Nietzsche can be lumped together in a family romance to show that we were
meant to win the struggles of world history, but also that we must be careful always to keep open the
possibility for inequality and excellence (for example, capital entrepreneurship) in order to remain as
worthy of our history as our forebears who made it for us… to remind ourselves that the satisfactions
of liberal capitalism are not the only things in this world (even if they are the most important).”
\textsuperscript{[25] Ibid., 192.
\textsuperscript{[26] According to David Walsh, any conclusive interpretation of Hegel needs to heed the dialectical
ambiguity of Hegel’s philosophy of history. One example is the dialectic among theism and secularism
in the conception of the End of History. That is, “self-actualization in the medium of ‘universal self-
consciousness’ belongs neither to God nor man—since they each constitute it by transcending their
separate selfhoods.” Eric Voegelin quoted in David Walsh, “The Ambiguity of the Hegelian End of
History,” in \textit{After History?: Francis Fukuyama and His Critics}, ed. Timothy Burns (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994), 181. Moreover, Hegel’s State as the “positive expression of self-
conscious freedom” presupposes the dialectical self-identity between the individual and the State. Here,
individuals “no longer look on the public realm as imposing a negative limitation on their freedom but,
as exemplified by the universal class, ‘find their satisfaction in, but only in, the dutiful discharge of
their public functions.’” Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, \textit{Hegel's Philosophy of Right} (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), para. 294. This creation of the “public man” in turn is possible only
with the spiritual unification of finite and infinite Being, and without “its theological underpinnings,
Hegel’s Idea of the State would only be another liberal articulation of the tensions of politics, not their
conditions). That is, the End of History is not “the end of worldly events but the end of the evolution of human thoughts,” and the sphere of ideas “in the long run… creates the material world in its own image.”\textsuperscript{27} The materialization of Spirit is exemplified by Napoleonic revolutionary France (for the earlier Hegel) and the early nineteenth-century Prussian monarchy (for the later Hegel). Hegel’s notion of Universal History as a teleological and idealist process, in turn, constitutes the most fundamental aspect of Fukuyama’s History.

Fukuyama, however, inherits Hegel’s tradition only after filtering it through Kojève’s secular and liberal interpretative schema. Fukuyama’s theory is grounded “not in Hegel \textit{per se} but in Hegel-as-interpreted-by-Kojève, or perhaps a new, systematic philosopher named Hegel-Kojève.”\textsuperscript{28} Adopting Kojève’s interpretation, Fukuyama has reduced Hegel’s Spirit to a metaphysically thinner notion of secular universal consciousness. There is no external agency in History besides desire-driven individuals and nothing on earth is externally predetermined. Also, liberal democracy has replaced Hegel’s constitutional monarchy as the political embodiment of the End of History.

Fukuyama, however, further expands Kojève’s vision of the End of History by reformulating and addressing it in terms of the Nietzschean problematic of the “Last Man.” Kojève’s End of History points to liberal democracy, but not as the fulfillment of History, but as its exhaustion—the universal emergence of complacent consumerism, possibly tempered with “snobbishness,” like Japanese tea-ceremonials

\textsuperscript{28} Fukuyama, \textit{The End of History and the Last Man}, 144; also quoted in Williams, Sullivan, and Matthews, \textit{Francis Fukuyama and the End of History}, 71.
and ritual suicides. In his letter (1957) to Kojève, Leo Strauss equates Kojève’s End of History with Nietzsche’s Last Man, who is tired of life, self-indulgent in peace, and reluctant to take risks. As discussed earlier, Fukuyama recognizes the danger of the Nietzschean Last Man (although Kojève himself did not comment on Strauss’s equation). He theorizes on outlets by which megalothymia (desire for unequal recognition) can be institutionally “sublimated, channeled into productive endeavors, privatized, or collectivized.” Fukuyama asserts that liberal democracy, by devising those institutional outlets, manages to be the fulfillment of History, rather than its exhaustion.

Fukuyama’s vision of liberal democracy as such represents an institutionalized perpetual peace, and this marks his departure from the Kojève-Hegelian to Kantian formulation of the End of History. Hegel claims that war will persist at the End of History because it is essential for the internal moral solidification of the sovereign state and its external recognition by other states. Patriotism also gives a moral purpose to the individual as a communal being, since it is “the sentiment which, in the relationships of our daily lives and ordinary conditions,

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29 Kojève quoted in Victor Gourevitch, “The End of History?,” in After History?: Francis Fukuyama and His Critics, ed. Timothy Burns (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994), 118. Gourevitch, better known for his work on Plato and Rousseau, will be further discussed later in this chapter.
30 Leo Strauss writes in the letter: “You have never given me an answer to my questions: a) was Nietzsche not right in describing the Hegelian-Marxian end as ‘the last man’?” Leo Strauss, On Tyranny: Including the Strauss-Kojève Correspondence, ed. Victor Gourevitch and Michael S. Roth, revised and expanded. (New York: Free Press, 1991), 291.
32 On the necessity of war, Fukuyama disagrees with Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel, as he notes: “Kojève suggests that the end of history will mean the end of all large disputes... Why Kojève chooses to make this very un-Hegelian position is not at all clear.” Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, 389. Also note that Hegel’s war is of a limited, humane, and public nature, and not to be waged around domestic institutions, private individuals, or personal emotions, such as hatred outside the boundary of dutiful hostility. Williams, Sullivan, and Matthews, Francis Fukuyama and the End of History, 47.
habitually recognizes that the community is one’s substantive groundwork and end.” Kant, on the other hand, views the end of struggle, or perpetual peace, to be the *telos* of History. Human history is the gradual realization of Nature’s hidden purpose—which, unlike Hegel’s metaphysically grounded Spirit, is hypothetical and prophetic at best. What Kant calls “unsocial sociability” drives history towards a legally constructed pacific union of republican states: Wars arising from human unsociability “are the means by which nature drives nations to make initially imperfect attempts, but finally, after many devastations… to take the step which reason could have suggested to them even without so many sad experiences.”

Except for Kant’s belief that such an end is only asymptotically approachable, Kant’s “pacific union” fittingly describes Fukuyama’s general notion of “democratic peace” at the End of History.

Another dimension of Kant’s perpetual peace that is central to Fukuyama’s theory is its fundamentally normative nature. Kant denies the empirical certainty and predictability of the End of History which, he argues, would require supernatural access to a noumenal (as opposed to phenomenal, which refers to perceivable appearance), otherworldly world of God. Instead, Kant puts forward the End of History as a moral, normative *imperative* and *hope*: Humans can “dictate in advance

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35 Hegel calls Kant’s impenetrable noumenal world (and therefore the notion that the End of History is only perpetually approachable but not attainable) a “bad infinity” and points to the unity of the infinite and the finite in the historical process of the self-actualization of Spirit. Since Spirit is both inside and outside of the this-worldly world, the human mind can metaphysically perceive the totality of History, which Kant reserves to a transcendent God. Susan Shell, “Fukuyama and the End of History,” in *After History?: Francis Fukuyama and His Critics*, ed. Timothy Burns (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994), 41-2. Fukuyama rejects Hegel’s metaphysics as well, as he precludes the possibility (or at least relevance to his End-of-History thesis) of an otherworldly, transcendent world *per se.*
what they ought to do” and act “as if [History] could [progress], in order to sustain our effort to ensure that it will do so.”³⁶ Fukuyama’s thesis, although rejecting Kantian otherworldliness and anti-empiricism, displays the same moral dimension of the End of History. For Fukuyama, the End of History is “not a statement about the is, but about the ought,” and his announcement in itself functions as a “self-fulfilling prophecy” that accelerates the coming of the End.³⁷ Indeed, one of the primary motives for Fukuyama to announce the End of History was to promote liberal democracy and fight the decline of the idea of progress that permeated the twentieth century.

Fukuyama’s dialectical and accumulative adoption of a variety of philosophies of history climaxes in his inclusion of Plato, whose transhistoricist construction of human nature seems in conflict with Kojève-Hegel’s historicism. Plato (or Socrates in Plato’s Republic) introduces the tripartite composition of the soul: desire (epithymia), spiritedness (thymos), and reason (logistikon). For Fukuyama, History is the manifestation of the working of these attributes—human nature—and in that sense Fukuyama’s project, according to political philosopher Victor Gourevitch, is essentially an effort to reconcile the teaching of Kojève-Hegel and that of Socrates-Plato.³⁸ Fukuyama therefore substitutes human nature in the place of Hegel’s metaphysical Spirit as the transhistorical reality underlying the historical progression of History. He also reinterprets Kojève’s formal and internal (not transhistorical) standard of non-contradiction (that is, whether a given political

system has potential for further dialectical movement due to unresolved internal contradictions) as one grounded in the thymotic [spirited] part of human nature.

*Thymos* “may have required an historical march of ten thousand years or more, but it was no less a constitutive part of the soul for [Kojève and] Hegel than for Plato.” As such, Fukuyama adds a transhistorical twist to Kojève-Hegel’s historicism.

Fukuyama, at the same time, reconstructs the Platonic conception of human nature to be a historical albeit relatively inelastic variable, rather than a transhistorical constant. He remarks that “human nature is not created ‘once for all’ but creates itself ‘in the course of *historical* time’”; nonetheless, this process of self-creation of human nature is not random, but follows “a clear directionality dictated by the [gradual] unfolding of reason” which over the past couple of millennia has led to “our modern democratic-egalitarian consciousness… as a permanent acquisition.” In addition, human nature can be conceptualized as “an end-point or *telos* toward which human historical development appears to be moving.” In this regard, Fukuyama’s adoption of Plato has a Kantian-normative thrust (which Gourevitch fails to acknowledge

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39 Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 207; also quoted in Gourevitch, “The End of History?”, 124. Gourevitch holds that Fukuyama’s interpretation of Kojève is essentially wrong, since for Kojève, equal recognition of all by all marks the End of History not because it best satisfies any part of human nature, but because it has no internal contradictions (thereby satisfying the formal criterion of noncontradiction). In this regard, Fukuyama’s End of History in which megalothymia (desire for unequal recognition) finds its outlets through capitalism, religion, sports, and so on, is irreconcilable with Kojève’s End of History in which no unequal recognition is justifiably permitted, perhaps except some ceremonial “snobishness” such as Japanese ritual suicides (This difference probably explains why Kojève is a communist). Gourevitch’s criticism might be valid on its own. Nonetheless, in the light of Fukuyama’s highly selective and synthetic methodology, the inaccuracy of Fukuyama’s interpretation of Kojève, let alone Hegel, does not necessarily adversely affect the internal coherence or persuasive strength of Fukuyama’s argument.


fully): Human nature is a moving variable, and yet it can be approximately riveted as a constant end-point.

Another unusual component of Fukuyama’s philosophical mix is the methodological and anti-metaphysical assumptions he shares with Marx. It is well known that Fukuyama openly confronts Marxism: He criticizes it first for its overemphasis on equality at the expense of liberty, and second for its assumption of infinite human malleability, which Fukuyama argues, is simply untrue given the relative permanence of human nature. However, as Williams and Sullivan point out, Fukuyama is more Marxian than often thought to be. The first underlying commonality is Fukuyama’s adoption of the methodological assumption that historical progress is empirically demonstrable. For Kant, the End of History is recognizable not by “its empirical likelihood but [by] its moral necessity.”[^42] By contrast, Marx argues that the fundamentals of History, grounded in the material conditions of production, can “be verified in a purely empirical way,” and are led “with iron necessity toward inevitable results.”[^43] Fukuyama synthesizes Kant and Marx such that the plausibility of theoretical and moral considerations is at least partly derived from factual evidence. Overall, Fukuyama bases his thesis on the empirically demonstrated progressivity of science, and as addressed later, on the

[^42]: Shell, “Fukuyama and the End of History,” 40. On the same topic, Hegel takes a more nuanced view that the End of History requires the self-actualization of the transcendent Spirit in the concrete, empirical reality.

[^43]: Karl Marx quoted in Williams, Sullivan, and Matthews, Francis Fukuyama and the End of History, 55, 58. It is not to claim that Marx’s theory of communism does not have any moral or non-material component in it. According to Williams, Marx draws a normative notion that capitalism has to collapse, because it is an exploitive economic system that alienates humans as species beings against themselves and their economic products.
secular (that is, lasting over a long horizon of time) upward trend of the number of liberal democracies in the last several hundred years.\footnote{Williams and Sullivan rightfully point out the distinction between “the factual accuracy of Fukuyama’s account” of History and “the intellectual coherence of putting forward such an account in the first place.” The history of human affairs are so unpredictable and diverse that turns of events might not conform to Fukuyama’s conjecture. However, it “may well be reasonable to modify the details of the conjecture, but not to reject it altogether.” Williams, Sullivan, and Matthews, \textit{Francis Fukuyama and the End of History}, 169.}

A second assumption Fukuyama shares with Marx is the lack of finality in the idea of the End of History, partly because there is no metaphysical grounding behind it. Hegel presupposes the both transcendent and immanent agency of Spirit (\textit{Geist}) that guarantees the completion of History in its totality. By contrast, Marx’s anti-metaphysical inclination neither promises such agency nor expects a total, once-for-all fulfillment of History. Instead, Marx views the emergence of communist society as “the necessary pattern and the dynamic principle of the immediate future… [but] not the goal of human development.”\footnote{Marx quoted in Williams, Sullivan, and Matthews, \textit{Francis Fukuyama and the End of History}, 56.} Communism only marks the end of “prehistory” and the beginning of history proper in which free human beings abolish any fixed human nature as well as Hegelian dialectics, and begin to control their own destinies. This new history is an open-ended history with material conditions and political priorities inconceivable to the prehistoric human beings, since, according to Marx, “the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present.”\footnote{Ibid., 56.} And as with Marx, Fukuyama secularizes Hegel’s Spirit into a universal human consciousness that has neither ontological reality nor metaphysical grounding, and marks the “provisional inconclusiveness” of his End of History (as discussed later with regard to his theory of “posthuman” history). Hence the ultimate paradox of Fukuyama’s thesis: The End of History is not really the end of history.
Fukuyama’s highly synthetic philosophy of history is well-captured by Gourevitch’s summary of the three criteria by which Fukuyama decides whether a certain political system marks the End of History. It has to be determined: first, whether we cannot conceive of an essentially different and better political order; second, whether the given political system is free of internal contradictions to resolve (distinct from tensions to balance); third, whether the system satisfies and conforms to human nature more fully than its alternatives.47 The three conditions in turn point to Fukuyama’s subscription to Marx, Kojève-Hegel, and Plato, respectively. The first condition regards the factual basis of the End of History, hence Marxian standard of empirical demonstrability; the second pertains to the formal dialectics of Kojève-Hegelian historicism; the final criterion has the transhistoricist thrust of the Socratic-Platonic typology of human nature.

Gourevitch, while aptly summarizing Fukuyama’s three criteria, does not fully appreciate the symbiotic dynamism of the philosophical traditions in which the criteria are grounded. Gourevitch thus too quickly concludes that Fukuyama’s End-of-History thesis fails to satisfy all three conditions. According to Gourevitch, the first condition is satisfied in an inconclusive way at best. The second condition is tightly tied to the third condition due to Fukuyama’s marriage of historicism with transhistorical human nature, while the third condition is compromised by Fukuyama’s qualification of human nature as variable and provisional. That is, if human nature is no more than a temporary and relative consensus, Fukuyama’s conception of human nature cannot be justifiably prioritized over, for example, the feminist assumption or the Anglo-Saxon individualistic assumption of human

nature. However, in so arguing, Gourevitch underestimates the synergetic effects of fusing Marx, Kojève-Hegel, and Plato into a “Marx-Kojève-Hegel-Plato.” First, given the Marxian assumption that the End of History is not meant to be the eternally conclusive end but a presently conceivable end, the empirical inconclusiveness of Fukuyama’s End of History has already been internalized in his system. Second, the Kantian-normative reconciliation of human nature as a moving variable, which nonetheless functions as a constant end-point, provides a normative standard by which Fukuyama can prioritize one conception of human nature over another. Therefore, the second and third conditions also could be potentially satisfied within Fukuyama’s system without internal contradictions. In other words, Fukuyama’s End of History could satisfy all three conditions (although, admittedly, this does not conclusively confirm that it actually does).

As such, Fukuyama dialectically creates the synergetic, eclectic personality that might be called “Hegel-Kojève-Nietzsche-Kant-Plato-Marx”; this, in turn, brings the readers’ attention back to Hegel—his accumulative view of philosophy. Kant adopts philosophical pluralism, in which all philosophical systems can stand on their own terms and one system should not completely internalize others. By contrast, Hegel regards his own philosophy as the summation and conclusion of all previous philosophies. He “takes on all-comers, not simply by defeating them in a head-to-head confrontation, but rather by including what is true in their ideas within his own philosophy,” and thereby attempts at “a totality which reduces all other points of view

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48 Ibid., 125.
49 Williams, Sullivan, and Matthews, Francis Fukuyama and the End of History, 29.
into moments in his own thinking.” This is precisely what Fukuyama, in creating his “melting pot” of philosophies, is doing. In this sense, despite all the other ways he can be labeled—Kantian, Platonic, Marxian, and more—Fukuyama is Hegelian at heart.

One vital implication of Fukuyama’s identity as a Hegelian dialectician is that Fukuyama’s system is highly fluid internally and expandable outwardly. As with Hegel, Fukuyama deconstructs the rigid boundaries between different philosophical systems and creates a dialectically higher framework that cuts across their borders. Then it can be reasonably argued that the theoretical boundaries Fukuyama has originally set up can also be redefined, without contradicting the internal logic by which he maintains the internal coherence of his system (although, strictly speaking, the product of such modification is no longer Fukuyama’s, but Fukuyamaean). That is, his all-encompassing empire of philosophy is a nomadic, ever-expanding one. This ongoing adaptability ingrained in Fukuyama’s system—which might be called “Fukuyamaean theoretical plasticity”—not only helps to guard the internal consistency of his philosophy against mistaken critics; it also justifies (even invites) the next two chapters’ attempts to expand his paradigm through its synthesis with two other, seemingly irreconcilable, paradigms.

1.3. Three Semantic Qualifications of the End of History

Fukuyama draws on his synthetic and eclectic collection of philosophical traditions to bolster his argument, particularly by refining and qualifying the meaning of the End of History. This section will discuss three of those semantic qualifications.

— Ibid., 28.
The first qualification is that, for Fukuyama, an avowed Hegelian idealist, the notion of the End of History is fundamentally *normative* rather than descriptive. Many critics attempt to refute Fukuyama’s thesis by listing examples of military struggles—such as the violent nationalisms in the previous Soviet republics, Rwandan genocide, and most recently, Islamic terrorism. However, in acknowledging that not all countries have yet succeeded in democratization and economic liberalization, Fukuyama emphasizes that “the democratic-egalitarian trend can be resisted and even reversed on a local level (i.e., in large groups of countries) for considerable periods of time (i.e., for generations).”51 The End of History is not defined by the short-run unfolding of contingent events, but by its normative nature. It is illuminating how Fukuyama relates to Hegel’s and Kojève’s announcements of the End of History two-hundred years ago and seventy years ago, respectively:

The truth of the assertion of the “end of history” did not in any way depend on the events of 1989. It could have been asserted with equal validity ten years earlier, at the height of the Brezhnev era; it was asserted in the late 1930s on the eve of World War II (by Alexandre Kojève); and in the aftermath of the Battle of Jena in 1807 (by Hegel himself)… in each case they signified that the principles of the French revolution were normatively the best available principles of political organization.52

Fukuyama’s End of History does not so much refer to liberal practice, but its normative *idea*, or in political theorist Peter Fenves’ words, the “emergence of a universal language of political life” that even nondemocrats have started speaking in the twentieth century.53

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This is not to suggest, however, that Fukuyama only relies on the normative justification in declaring economic and political liberalism to mark the End of History. First of all, as discussed earlier, he seeks to demonstrate empirically that economic liberalism is the natural end-point of science. In so doing, he relies on the cumulative nature of scientific knowledge that is not culture-specific, but objective and universal (analogous to the law of gravity). Fukuyama also provides, arguably with more difficulty, empirical groundings for his advocacy of liberal democracy. He first points out a correlation, although not a causal relation, between technology-driven capitalism and liberal democracy, citing Adam Przeworski’s empirical work: Above a level of $6,000 per capita CDP in 1992 (Purchasing Power Parity), there is not a single democratic country that had reverted to authoritarianism. Furthermore, Fukuyama emphasizes that the triumph of liberal democracy is explainable by the progressive unfolding of macrocosmic events over long periods of time. He notices a secular trend in the number of democracies: There were no democracies before 1776, three democracies in 1790, five in 1848, 13 in 1900, 25 in 1919, 13 in 1940 (a reversal), 36 in 1960, 30 in 1975 (another reversal), and 61 in 1990 (and to update, 123 in 2007). Despite some discontinuities, there definitely has been a progressive secular trend, just as “the existence of business cycles does not negate the possibility of long-term economic growth.” All in all, for Fukuyama, the normative statement of the End of History does not rest on individual contingencies, but on theoretical

56 Ibid., 50.
considerations, the workability of which has been empirically affirmed by broader patterns of events.

Fukuyama’s second semantic qualification of the End-of-History thesis is that economic and political liberalism marks the end of the evolutionary process of political-economic institutions—but not necessarily that of social-moral institutions. In *The Great Disruption* (1999), Fukuyama notes that there are two parallel processes in history. In the political and economic sphere, history is dialectically progressive. Economic and political liberalism in this sense is the best ideological option for technologically advanced countries. However, in the social and moral sphere, history seems to be “cyclical, with social order ebbing and flowing over the space of multiple generations.”57 In this respect, the twentieth-century liberalism (at least in the USA) presents yet another downturn in the cycle—what Fukuyama calls the Great Disruption—characterized by “increasing levels of crime and social disorder, the decline of families and kinship as a source of social cohesion, and decreasing levels of trust.”58 The Great Disruption occurs in two ways. First, excessive individualism and a principled belief in pluralism reduce social capital, that is, social virtues like honesty and reciprocity that coordinate social cooperation. Moral relativism, or the notion that no particular norms can or ought to be authoritative, “shoots down” all the virtues, possibly undermining liberal democratic values. In this sense, “liberal societies buy political order at the price of moral consensus.”59 Second, the technological transition from the industrial to the information era undermines the

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58 Ibid., 60.
59 Ibid., 281.
traditional understanding of social relations and relevant norms. The substitution of mental for physical labor, for instance, propels women into the labor market, redefining the traditional role of women in the family. This redefinition creates a vacuum of traditional social norms, and the demand for a new type of social capital. The replenishment of social capital—the Great Reconstruction—is not an automatic process, and conscious efforts to reconstitute social order determine “the upward direction of the arrow of History.”

Fukuyama’s distinction between the political-economic and social-moral histories is rooted in Hegel’s view of the importance of community, which will be addressed in depth in the next chapter.

Fukuyama’s third qualification for the End of History thesis is that economic and political liberalism is not the perfect political-economic ideal, the best for eternity: Liberalism simply conforms to human nature, as Fukuyama understands it, in a fuller way than any currently conceivable alternative institutions, such as monarchy, fascism, and communism. The famous paragraph on Fukuyama’s wagon analogy is as follows:

Alexandre Kojève believed that ultimately history itself would vindicate its own rationality. That is, enough wagons would pull into town such that any reasonable person looking at the situation would be forced to agree that there had been only one journey and one destination. It is doubtful that we are at that point now, for despite the recent worldwide liberal revolution, the evidence available to us now concerning the directions of the wagons’ wanderings must remain provisionally inconclusive. Nor can we in the final analysis know, provided a majority of the wagons eventually reach the same town, whether their occupants, having looked around a bit at their new surroundings, will not find them inadequate and set their eyes on a new and more distant journey.

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60 Ibid., 282.
Fukuyama’s usage of the qualifiers, such as “provisionally inconclusive” and “a new and more distant journey,” suggests the possibility of “posthuman” politics. His tentative futurology, according to Williams and Sullivan, bears resemblance to Marx’s anti-metaphysical thrust (as opposed to Hegel’s metaphysics of Spirit) that the proletarian revolution will end the dialectics of prehistory, only to open a new dawn of a non-dialectical history. Fukuyama indeed speculates on at least two concrete factors that might restart History. First, he briefly suggests feminization of future politics, but without much substantial analysis. Second, as discussed below, Fukuyama develops a more systematic argument of the possibility of biotechnological engineering of human nature and the necessity to prevent it.

Fukuyama’s Universal History is intelligible only by assuming the directionality of scientific knowledge and the existence of a transhistorical constant of human nature (reason, desire, and thymos). Fukuyama defines human nature in biological terms as “the sum of the behavior and characteristics that are typical of the human species, arising from genetic rather than environmental factors.” Therefore, in “Second Thoughts: the Last Man in a Bottle” (1999) and Our Posthuman Future (2002), Fukuyama concedes that an end of History is impossible without an end of modern science, and that human nature could potentially be altered by the biotechnological revolution to come. Fukuyama speculates on the posthuman world, in which “we will deliberately take charge of our own biological makeup rather than

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leaving it to the blind forces of natural selection.” In such a world, genetic engineering technology might be able to hybridize human genes with those of other species, thereby forever changing the conception of humanity. Behavior-altering pharmaceutical technology might turn us into the “Last Men in a bottle” because we have found a “shortcut: instead of striving for recognition by the painful building of a just social order… we can now just pop a pill!” The altered definition of humanity (or the abolition of the “human”), in turn, would affect the arrangements of political institutions necessary to protect human rights and human dignity.

Fukuyama is deeply wary of this biotechnologically extended horizon of History, and suggests government regulation in order to drive the “wagons of History” back on track to liberalism. He is particularly worried about the eugenic, transhumanist idea that humanity as a species can be biomedical-genetically enhanced. Transhumanism’s attempt to engineer a complex, interdependent set of genetic information resembles socialism’s failed attempt to engineer the post-industrial information economy. Humans may never get the formula right and the outcome will betray their intentions. Also, artificial enhancement of human genetic traits undermines the fundamental belief on which political liberalism is built—that humans are born equal. Wealthy parents would be able to afford to “improve” their children (the genes of which will be inherited down the generations), and the economic inequality of capitalism, previously tempered by liberal democracy, would be translated into permanent and inherited inequality. A new era of class war would be on the rise. In order to prevent these negative consequences, Fukuyama calls for the

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65 Ibid., 218.
type of national and international regulation that is required to monitor the usage of nuclear materials and the disposal of toxic waste.

The point of perhaps the severest moral-philosophical gravity (and the most vital reason for his call for regulation) is that genetic engineering threatens human nature—the very grounding of the human moral sense as well as political liberalism. Fukuyama regards human nature as what gives us a moral sense, allows us to enter into a moral relationship with other humans regardless of visible differences such as skin color, and enables a sophisticated philosophical conception of human rights and justice.67 Fukuyama believes that the triumph of liberal democracy is explainable by the tenacity of human nature. That is, liberal democracy’s ability to better satisfy human desire and thymos than Nazism or Communism derives from how liberal democracy was at peace with the idea of relatively inelastic human nature. Liberal democracy, in other words, shaped “politics according to historically created norms of justice while not interfering excessively with natural patterns of behavior.”68 For Fukuyama, any attempt to radically restructure human nature is both undesirable and unfeasible in the long-run.

While Fukuyama’s conjecture on the biotechnological revolution adds a nuanced perspective to his End of History thesis by highlighting its anti-metaphysical open-endedness, it can also potentially undermine the internal coherence of his overall philosophy. One of the most fundamental premises underlying Fukuyama’s End-of-History thesis is that History has a directionality that is recognizable by the

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progressive evolution of scientific knowledge. In his retrospective, however, Fukuyama denies the progressivity of science. Biotechnological engineering of human genes, it appears, is an inherently regressive development, since it enables artificial alteration of what defines humanity, and thereby undercuts the grounding of human moral sense and liberal democracy. However, the reason why undermining liberal democracy is regressive is because liberal democracy represents the End of History, which in turn is not intelligible without the cumulative progressivity of technology. Here it seems that Fukuyama takes for granted the desirability of liberal democracy, while compromising one of its premises. It is as if attempting to build the second floor, while simultaneously demolishing the first floor. One might suspect that Fukuyama is contradicting himself due to his irrational, perhaps nostalgic, attachment to liberal democracy. In the end, it is his own maxim that a functional democracy requires its citizens to “develop a certain irrational thymotic pride in their political system” and “love democracy not because it is necessarily better than the alternatives, but because it is theirs.”

However, it can be reasonably maintained that the account of the “Last Man in a bottle” does not imply inconsistency in Fukuyama’s philosophy of history but reveals that which has been veiled in Fukuyama’s original End-of-History thesis—Fukuyama’s conceptual prioritization of Platonic transhistoricism. That is, as Shell argues, Fukuyama’s pursuit of the End of History is “ultimately guided, not by Hegel or Nietzsche, but by Plato.” This is not obvious in Fukuyama’s original article and book, because the notion of Universal History (driven by the double motors of the

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70 Shell, “Fukuyama and the End of History,” 44.
progressive directionality of technology and the master-slave dialectic) is still compatible with the notion of human nature. And Fukuyama subscribes to both. The biotechnologically-enabled possibility of manipulating human nature, however, places Hegelian historicism at odds with Platonic transhistoricism. Given the choice to defend either the progressivity of science or the tenacity of human nature, Fukuyama chooses the latter at the expense of the former.71

1.4. Fukuyama’s Politics: Prudent and Multilateral Democratization

Many commentators fail to note the subtlety of Fukuyama’s view of the political and practical role of the USA at the End of History.72 Political theorist Irving Kristol, for instance, mistakenly regards Fukuyama to claim that “the United States of America is the incarnation we have all been waiting for.”73 Williams and Sullivan misinterpret Fukuyama to mean that “the burden of being, in Hegelian terms, a ‘historical nation’ is that the people of the United States will take the rest of the world with them in whatever direction they may choose to go.”74 Granted, Fukuyama acknowledges in a sense that the USA has a special task of executing the End-of-

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71 It is still possible to reconcile Fukuyama’s Platonic transhistoricism and Hegelian historicism, by dividing History into two different systems of Pre-History and Post-History. Pre-History still maintains the directionality of technology and the Hegelian dialectic of the desire for recognition; Post-History, however, operates on a completely different logic. This account perfectly fits into the Marxian system of History, which also presupposes the patterns of history proper to diverge from those of pre-history. In the terms of Fukuyama’s “wagon” analogy, the town at which all the wagons arrive has “new surroundings.” In this town, Hegelian Pre-History fades into Marxian Post-History.

72 This section will only deal with Fukuyama’s general attitude towards the USA as an agent of History and political theory with regard to post-Cold War international institutions on the macro-level. As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore in detail Fukuyama’s theories on policy-making and micropolitical institutions. For further reference, see Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq (2006) and State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (2004).


74 Williams, Sullivan, and Matthews, Francis Fukuyama and the End of History, 177.
History project in the still-in-history world. Reflecting on the American interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, Fukuyama comments that the USA is “likely to take on other nation-building commitments in the future, simply because the failed-state problem is one that we cannot safely ignore.” Fukuyama labels the USA a transitional empire of democracy and human rights that should “teach other people to govern themselves.”

However, Fukuyama is not an advocate of American unilateralism. Fukuyama’s statement below on the positioning of the USA at the End of History is worth quoting at length:

The End of History was never linked to a specifically American model of social or political organization… I believe that the European Union more accurately reflects what the world will look like at the end of history than the contemporary United States. The EU’s attempt to transcend sovereignty and traditional power politics by establishing a transnational rule of law is much more in line with a "post-historical" world than the Americans' continuing belief in God, national sovereignty, and their military.

Likewise, on the American democratic intervention business, Fukuyama continues:

… I never linked the global emergence of democracy to American agency, and particularly not to the exercise of American military power. Democratic transitions need to be driven by societies that want democracy, and since the latter requires institutions, it is usually a fairly long and drawn out process. Outside powers like the US can often help in this process by the example they set as politically and economically successful societies. They can also provide funding, advice, technical assistance, and yes, occasionally military force to help the process along. But coercive regime change was never the key to democratic transition.

In a more political-strategic vein, Fukuyama criticizes the Bush Administration’s doctrine in the National Security Strategy of the USA in September 2002 in the wake of the growing threat of Islamic terrorism. First of all, the doctrine unwarrantedly

endorses both preemptive (responding to immediate threat) and preventive (responding to presumed future threat) war against Islamic radicalism. Fukuyama holds the view that war is a last resort to be employed only under the compelling conditions of emergency and after the exhaustion of all nonmilitary alternatives. While taking a preemptive action against an immediate and visible threat is justified, waging a preventive war against speculated and estimated future threat is neither normatively justifiable nor practically sensible; it is, as Fukuyama cites Bismarck, “suicide for fear of death.”

Fukuyama further criticizes the Bush Administration’s doctrine for its assumption of American unilateralism, as reflected in such language as “coalitions of the willing.” What is undermined is the importance of international legitimacy that derives from the consensus of multilateral organizations. Legitimacy not only drafts allies and international sympathizers; it also helps isolate militant Muslim “insurgents”—who hate the USA for what it is—from its 1.5 billion potential Muslim supporters—who hate or like the USA for what it does. The Bush Administration, while well aware of this problem, expected to build legitimacy ex post rather than ex ante. This, according to Fukuyama, is a mistaken expectation in the era of global counterinsurgency warfare, particularly given the poor record of 18 USA-led nation-building projects since its conquest of the Philippines in 1899.

Here Fukuyama refines the role of American agency by drawing a meaningful distinction between power and legitimacy. If necessary, the USA should function as

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the main supplier of hard power, defined as the ability to quickly deploy coercive forces, in democracy-building operations. In this regard, Fukuyama’s political recommendation does not do away with the USA, as it dictates that the USA “must not adjure, in principle, unilateralism, preemption, or coalitions of the willing,” for this sort of action might be necessary to deal with weapons of mass destruction.\textsuperscript{79} At the same time, Fukuyama denounces political commentator Charles Krauthammer’s vision of American-led “democratic globalism” as a type of muscular Wilsonianism.\textsuperscript{80} Fukuyama urges that the USA should not “bea[t] its chest about its determination to use its power on the world’s behalf” but instead “deliberately downplay American hegemony and seek to meet friends and allies more than halfway on the terrain of their concerns.”\textsuperscript{81} In short, according to Fukuyama, the USA should take a more prudent rhetorical stance, in order to acquire legitimacy for its democratizing efforts in international contexts.

What is also noteworthy is Fukuyama’s more general recommendation of what ideal type of world institutions should bear the mission of the End of History. The global democracy-building project, including defeating Islamic radicalism, relies neither on American unilateralism nor on existing international institutions, such as the United Nations. The UN, first of all, lacks a hierarchical and decisive decision-making mechanism to promptly deploy hard power when necessary. More pertinently, the UN lacks legitimacy, since its membership is based on the formal \textit{de facto}

\textsuperscript{79} Fukuyama, “Fighting the War on Terrorism”, 151, 152. Italics added; also see Fukuyama, “The Neoconservative Moment”, 183.


\textsuperscript{81} Fukuyama, “Fighting the War on Terrorism,” 152.
possession of sovereignty rather than the substantive legitimacy of sovereignty—without requirement of democracy for its membership. As a result, the former Soviet Union was granted a veto right, and Syria and Libya, arguably non-democratic countries, chaired the UN Human Rights Commission in 2001 and 2003, respectively. Fukuyama views it as a problem at the End of History and proposes to satisfy both sides of the power-and-legitimacy equation by relying on a multiplicity of international institutions: the NATO alliance during the Kosovo conflict, the Community of Democracies comprising like-minded democratic countries, or the Six-Power framework to handle the North Korean nuclear problem.  

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This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that Fukuyama’s paradigm is much more sophisticated, more multifaceted, more coherent, and perhaps more relevant, than his critics normally recognize. It has served two specific purposes. The first has been to dispel some of the most common undeserved criticisms in the areas of Fukuyama’s synthetic method of blending philosophies, his semantic sophistication, and his nuanced political stance. It is illuminating how Fukuyama recognizes that “what you are is what you are recognized as being… We exist not ‘in ourselves,’ but only in an intersubjective social context”; he thus acknowledges the regretful reality that, in the intersubjective social context of scholarly interactions, his own theory of the End of History is not what he intends it to be. Rather, it is what his commentators have collectively recognized it to be. This chapter’s first objective, in

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82 Ibid., 148.
83 Ibid., 153.
this regard, has been to invade the preexisting intersubjective reality of Fukuyama’s paradigm and present an alternative reality that does more justice to Fukuyama’s own intentions and his own subjectivity. The rediscovered reality of Fukuyama’s History in turn reintroduces various poignant concepts Fukuyama exploits in order to refine the semantics of the End of History, including but not limited to Hegelian idealism, historical parallelism, Marxian open-ended futurology, and Platonic transhistoricism.

The second purpose of this chapter has been to prepare the way for the next two chapters’ endeavors to reconstruct a Fukuyamaean system of History. The notion of Fukuyamaean theoretical plasticity crystallizes how Fukuyama’s theoretical territory dialectically cuts across the fields of many different philosophies and creates a unified landscape. It further implies that the boundaries of his theoretical framework are intrinsically flexible and can be reinvented and expanded outwardly. The concept of Fukuyamaean theoretical plasticity, therefore, provides a sense of legitimacy and coherence to the following two chapter’s attempts: They are to be understood as an intellectual exercise in “being in Fukuyama’s shoes” and expanding his scheme of History by being faithful to the very logic by which its internal coherence is sustained. At a more substantive level, Fukuyama’s Hegelian idealism, historical parallelism, and multilateralism will return in Chapter Two, enabling an organic synthesis between Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s paradigms. Likewise, Fukuyama’s open-ended futurology, discourse on biotechnological revolution, and historical parallelism will ground the synthesis between Fukuyama’s and Hardt and Negri’s paradigms in Chapter Three.
2. Huntington and Fukuyama: The End of the Clash of Civilizations

Perhaps someday, the peoples of the world will all be seeking to strike the balance of modernity and tradition within a broadly liberal democratic framework. Until that day, however, the end of history and the clash of civilizations will remain perplexing and simultaneous truths, the measure of which we shall be compelled to take without benefit of overarching formula or guide. – Stanley Kurtz

In “The Clash of Civilizations (1993)” and *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996), Samuel P. Huntington appears to reject Fukuyama’s End-of-History assertion as an illusion of harmony. For Huntington, the end of the Cold War only indicates the end of conflicts within Western civilization and the beginning of a new era of intercivilizational conflicts. Note that both theorists draw a meta-historical implication from the end of the Cold War and ambitiously attempt to construct a grand theory of history that is on the level of paradigm: For one, the end of the Cold War signifies a watershed of History and, for the other, there is a Kuhnian shift in the paradigm of international relations. Precisely because of their ambition, however, both paradigms have been severely criticized and grossly misunderstood, not only in isolation, but also when put together in comparative

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reference. The two paradigms tend to be mistaken by political commentators, and even more in the media, as contradictory beyond reconciliation, especially in light of the events of 9/11. Within a month of the 9/11 attacks, political theorist Fareed Zakaria declared the “End of the End of History,” while political theorist Fred Halliday observed that “in the field of cultural speculation, the great winner has been the theory [of the Clash of Civilizations], first espoused by Samuel Huntington in 1993.”86 This is what might be called the “Clash of Fukuyama and Huntington.”

This chapter contends that the Clash of Fukuyama and Huntington is resolvable and the differences between the two paradigms have been overstated: Despite their overall intentions of explaining History with a degree of generality and exclusivity, both paradigms are sufficiently subtle and cautious on many points that they can facilitate productive dialogue. The first part of this chapter investigates Huntington’s descriptive analysis of History, his normative recommendations with regard to the positioning of liberal democracy in post-Cold War politics, and a few qualifications attached to the paradigm. The second part attempts to construct a Huntington-Fukuyamaean system of History by drawing on the striking similarities and meaningful differences underlying the two paradigms. A synthesis of the two into what might be called the paradigm of the “End of the Clash of Civilizations,” in turn, will add to the analytical dynamics and coherence of both paradigms. Fukuyama contributes a corrective to Huntington’s self-contradictory system of History; Huntington enriches Fukuyama’s History by unveiling the final moments of historical dialectics implicit in it, and providing a shorter-term timeline.

2.1. Huntington's History: Friend-Enemy Dialectic and Progressivity of Technology

Huntington’s comment on endism, including Fukuyama’s End-of-History thesis, reveals his methodological assumptions and predictive scopes that differ from those of Fukuyama. Huntington criticizes endism as “oriented to the future rather than the past and is unabashedly optimistic… [and] rooted in philosophical speculation rather than historical analysis… based not so much on evidence from history as on assumptions about history.” Although this comment fails to grasp Fukuyama’s methodological complexity (his mix of idealist speculation with empirical demonstrability of historical trends), it still aptly highlights Huntington’s own methodological presumption. That is, Huntington is less a philosopher of history than an empirical theorist. His paradigm is inductive rather than deductive—grounded in a generalization of empirical observations, rather than an empirical application of speculative philosophy. As a result, unlike Fukuyama who draws on the collective personality of “Hegel-Kojève-Nietzsche-Kant-Plato-Marx,” Huntington hardly makes explicit and systematic reference to classical philosophers or any philosophers per se (except some passing references to sociologists such as Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Immanuel Wallerstein). It also follows from Huntington’s relative lack of philosophical references that his general prediction, though ambitious, is not totalizing and is at best limited to the short-term unfolding of events (such as, in the next few generations); Fukuyama, by contrast, makes a universalist, albeit artfully

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88 See Chapter One.
qualified, philosophical assertion about the End of History and its concrete unfolding in the long run.

Nevertheless, it is still possible to extrapolate from Huntington’s empirically-grounded system of History some philosophically sophisticated concepts, which will in turn enable comparison between his and Fukuyama’s Histories on an equal level of abstraction. As addressed in the previous chapter, Fukuyama’s History is driven by human economic desire and *thymos* [spiritedness], respectively reflected in the progressivity of science and in the master-slave dialectic. If Fukuyama’s History is supposedly the dialectic of a stretching line, Huntington’s History is the dialectic of an expanding balloon. For Huntington, one clear trend of History is “the amalgamation of smaller units into larger ones” and modern history is understood as the history of conflicts of broadening scope.⁸⁹ The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 marked both the end of the Thirty Years’ War and the beginning of a century and a half of conflicts between individual princes and emperors; from the end of the French Revolution in the 1780-90s onward, nation-states waged the wars; the Russian Revolution in 1917 launched the wars of ideologies, mainly between communism, fascism, and democracy; with the end of the Cold War around 1989, the wars of civilizations have begun.⁹⁰ The agency of human conflicts has been dialectically expanded, first from individuals, then to national groups, to ideological alliances, and finally to civilizations.

⁸⁹ Huntington, “No Exit,” 8.
As with Fukuyama, Huntington conceptualizes the modern history of conflicts as one grounded in a fundamental reality of human nature—the human desire for identification. The desire for identification is the human propensity to define oneself and is satisfied only when “we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against.”

As this friend-enemy distinction is clearly drawn, conflicts arise. When a group of people eliminates its enemies either by terminating them or absorbing (“befriending”) them as new friends, the new group needs a new source of collective identity. The history of conflicts therefore reflects the dialectical, and indeed paradoxical, process in which groups of individuals keep defining themselves by eliminating sources of identity—only to search for a higher level of identification until they approach the irreducible, primal source of identity. For Huntington, this primal identity is embodied in civilization—Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox, Western, Latin American, or African.

Civilization here refers to “the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity,” or “a deterministic totality that is not reducible to either religion, ethnicity, geography, or attitude… [but] gestures to all these factors.” It is, in other words, the highest threshold below which the human desire for identification can be satisfied.

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92 The list here only includes the eight currently existing civilizations. According to Huntington, civilizations have “no clear-cut boundaries and no precise beginnings and endings,” and people “can and do redefine their identities.” Also, civilizations are long-lived, but still mortal. For instance, the original list of major civilizations in history included (on top of Huntington’s eight civilizations) Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Cretan, Classical, Byzantine, Middle American, and Andean civilizations, but these seven are now extinct. While Huntington as such acknowledges the flexibility and dynamism of civilizations over the very long term (millennia), he seems to believe that the current division between the eight contemporary civilization is immutable in the short run (the next few generations or centuries). Ibid., 43.

The dialectic underlying Huntington’s History—which might be called the “friend-enemy dialectic”\(^{94}\)—is similar to the Kojève-Hegelian master-slave dialectic as interpreted by Fukuyama, in that both dialectics stem from the desire for intersubjective recognition. That is, humans need not only recognition, but recognition through interactions with one another. Several differences, however, exist between the two types of dialectics. First, the Huntingtonian desire for identification is the desire to be recognized against someone else; the Hegelian desire for recognition is to be recognized by someone else. Second, for a Huntingtonian man, the process of the fight, or the fact that he has an enemy to fight, is what satisfies his desire; for a Hegelian man, the result of the fight, or the fact that he has earned the recognition by winning the battle, is what counts. Third, after the battle, a Huntingtonian man keeps searching for external enemies; a Hegelian man establishes an internal hierarchy between the loser and himself (only to realize later that equal and universal recognition is the only rational way to satisfy his desire). In other words, Huntington’s History, unlike Fukuyama’s History, explicitly articulates a trend toward external expansion of the scope of recognition, conflict, and community—the broadest of which, according to Huntington, is civilization.

This is not to suggest that Hegel and Fukuyama are unmindful of the friend-enemy dialectic. Indeed, Hegel is fully aware of both types of dialectics, when he argues that war is necessary both for internal consolidation and external recognition of the state. The state, here, is understood both as an individual agent that fights with other states for its recognition (out of the master-slave dialectic) and as a community

\(^{94}\) Note that this is an extrapolated concept—a Huntingtonian rather than Huntington’s concept—and Huntington himself neither explicitly uses the term “friend-enemy dialectic” nor analyzes his theory in terms of Hegelian dialectics *per se.*
that draws the boundary between the friend camp and the enemy camp (out of the friend-enemy dialectic). Fukuyama, although disagreeing with the necessity of war, shares Hegel’s emphasis on community. He formulates it in terms of social capital and also radius of trust, a close equivalent of the friend-enemy dialectic, as further surveyed later in this chapter.

Another illuminating parallel between Fukuyama and Huntington is that both identify, in addition to the progressive logic of dialectics, the cumulative trend of technological evolution as a motor of History. For Fukuyama, the directionality of technology irreversibly tends toward economic liberalism in the era of high-tech communication and transportation. For Huntington, the cumulative nature of technology, in parallel to the expansionary friend-enemy dialectic, also constitutes a coherent pattern of History: the trend of progressive intensification of civilizational interactions. Huntington posits that a civilization is not only the broadest identity source, but also the oldest: Civilizations are several thousand years older than emperors, nation-states, or ideologies. Initially, the contacts between ancient civilizations were intermittent and minimal, mainly due to geographical distance and lack of the technological means to overcome it. After the sixteenth century, the maturation of European culture (through trade, technological innovation, expansionary commerce, and so forth) enabled the sustainable and generally unidirectional expansion of Western Christian civilization all over the world. The West ended up controlling 35 percent of the earth’s surface in 1800, 67 percent in 1878, and 84 percent in 1914.  

However, the twentieth-century technological innovations, such as communication and transportation revolution, increasingly

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shifted the balance of military, economic, and technological power towards non-Western civilizations. The previously unilateral civilizational order evolved into a plural one, from the one world of the 1920s, to the three worlds of the 1960s, and finally to the eight worlds of the 1990s.  

Taken as a whole, for Huntington, the post-Cold War era represents a historical watershed where the two parallel historical trends—the friend-enemy dialectic and the progressive amplification of intercivilizational interactions—coincide in their latest phases. First, due to technological innovation, civilizations have grown more interactive and multilateral than ever before. Second, alternative sources of identity for civilization (at least largely in the West) have been removed, not necessarily in the sense of being annihilated but in the sense of being dialectically overcome or subsumed. Nationalism, for example, is still a powerful source of political action. A nation, defined by political scientist Walker Connor as a group of people who *feel* as if they were ancestrally related, is the “fully extended family” that can command the wellspring of exclusive emotional loyalty of individuals. The enduring dynamics and power of nationalism was vividly presented in the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia along ethnonational lines. However, Huntington would respond that if a nation is an extended analogy of kinship for *individuals*, a civilization is an extended family of *nations* as well as individuals. The collapse of the federal system in Yugoslavia indeed constitutes an illuminating example of the so-called “kin-country” syndrome. The dissolution of Yugoslavia was clearly a product of Albanian, Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian, and

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96 Ibid., 54.
Slovene nationalisms; but the nationalist factors were situated in the broader context of civilizational alliances between and among different kin-nations, mainly along religious lines—the Iranian with the Bosnian nation, the Vatican with the Slovene and Croatian nations, and so on.98 Intercivilizational conflicts, in short, “will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world,” for a civilization embodies the most fully developed analogue of kinship-identification, especially given today’s technologically-enabled civilizational interactions.99

For Huntington, a historically peculiar fact of today’s multicivilizational era is the ripe possibility of the Clash of Civilizations, as the West hegemony is in a growing tension with the economic dynamism of Asia and the demographic dynamism of Islam. On the one hand, the rapid rates of economic growth have encouraged cultural assertiveness in Asia. In the late twentieth century, the Four Tigers (Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore), along with China, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, India, and Vietnam (although the last three to a lesser extent) often experienced decades of average annual growth rates of 8-10 percent. While it took Britain and the USA 58 years and 47 years, respectively, to double their GDP per capita, it only took Japan 33 years, Indonesia 17, South Korean 11, and China ten.100 This rapid economic development, in turn, was largely attributed to the “Asian values”—communitarian values such as discipline, responsibility, diligence, and obedience. Lee Kuan Yew, the long-time Singaporean Prime Minister, asserted that the “East Asian model” of economic growth rooted in Confucianism and

100 Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 103.
benevolent authoritarianism was a functioning alternative to Western liberal democratic capitalism.

On the other hand, rapid rates of demographic growth fueled cultural assertiveness in the Islamic world, which in turn presented a challenge to the West on both cultural and military fronts. Between 1965 and 1990, the population in Muslim societies grew annually at 2-3 percent, while the world population grew at the annual rate of 1.85 percent. Muslims constituted around 18 percent of the world’s population in 1980 and are predicted to grow to 30 percent in 2025. The Islamic population growth was most concentrated in a large bulge of youth, which forms a great source of social instability, recruits for terrorists, and immigration to other countries. The Islamic Resurgence (advocacy of a purer form of Islamic religion) and militant Islam were products of this demographic dynamism, combined with other situational factors—such as frustration with unsuccessful modernization, the absence of pluralism and open politics, and historical resentment against Western imperialism.

Islamic cultural assertiveness, in turn, constituted a substantial cultural and even military challenge to Western attempts at democratization. Huntington in fact regards Islamic demographic dynamism as a crucial contributing factor to what he calls the “bloody borders of Islam”: Muslims participated in 26 out of 50 ethno-political conflicts in 1993 and 1994 and there were three times as many intercivilizational

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101 Ibid., 117.
102 Samuel P. Huntington, “Religion, Culture, and International Conflict After September 11: A Conversation with Samuel P. Huntington,” Ethics and Public Policy Center Online, June 17, 2002, 4. Note that there is a contradiction between Huntington’s actual normative stance (that civilizational conflicts have to be avoided) and the friend-enemy dialectic extrapolated from Huntington’s system of History (that the scope of conflicts is ever-expanding). This contradiction has rarely, if ever, been noticed by Huntington’s commentators and even Huntington himself, because his theory has not been analyzed in terms of an expansionary dialectic. The contradiction between Huntington’s normative and predictive arguments will be more fully addressed later in this chapter.
conflicts involving Muslims as there were conflicts among all non-Muslim civilizations.\textsuperscript{103} Taken as a whole, Western civilization is on the verge of a Clash of Civilizations—cultural, economic, and even military conflicts with Sinic and/or Islamic civilizations.

It should be stressed that although Huntington’s paradigm is almost entirely descriptive, it also has a few normative implications as to how the world, especially the West, should respond to avoid intercivilizational conflicts. Huntington supposedly attempts “not to advocate the desirability of conflicts between civilizations… [but] to set forth descriptive hypotheses as to what the future may be like.”\textsuperscript{104} And yet he also draws from these descriptive hypotheses a few practical and normative suggestions (mainly for the USA) both on the intercivilizational and intracivilizational levels. On the intercivilizational level, Huntington advocates what he calls the abstention rule, joint mediation rule, and commonalities rule. The \textit{abstention} rule dictates that core states abstain from intervention in conflicts involving other civilizations unless vital national interests are at stake (as they were, Huntington says, when the USA engaged in the First Gulf War). The \textit{joint mediation} rule is that core states of civilizations in conflict negotiate with each other to jointly restrain or stop these conflicts from becoming intercivilizational wars. The \textit{commonalities} rule recommends multiculturalism and the discovery of a “thin” minimalist universal morality (such as rules against murder or oppression) that distills universal features of basic human conditions that are common to most civilizations. What is necessary for a peaceful reordering of civilizations is the articulation of already universally present virtues,

\textsuperscript{103} Huntington, \textit{The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order}, 256-7.
\textsuperscript{104} Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” 405.
and not the universalization of the Western conception of human rights (what Huntington calls human rights “imperialism”) and liberal democracy. A universal civilization as such can “only be the product of universal power” (as exemplified by the near-universal Roman civilization under the Roman Empire), which is currently unavailable to Western civilization.\(^{105}\)

There is a paradox here, however, and indeed a controversial one: Huntington, while recommending multiculturalism at the intercivilizational level, nonetheless propounds uniculturalism at the intracivilizational level. With regard to American cultural unity, for instance, Huntington comments that “American national identity is under challenge from a multiculturalism that subverts it from below”; he claims that “conceivably, in the future serious external threats could arise from China, Russia, Islam… At present, however, the principle threats to American unity, culture and power are closer to home.”\(^{106}\) As an alternative to “divisive multiculturalism” within the USA, Huntington proposes that American conservatives promote “robust nationalism” that reaffirms what have historically been American conservative virtues (namely, belief in God, conception of human nature, and patriotism). Huntington’s paradoxical recommendation of intercivilizational multiculturalism and intracivilizational uniculturalism consistently point to his fundamental conception of cultural identity: Cultural identity is path-dependent (that is, defined in large part by the inertia of its past trajectory) and inflexible and its boundary is to be respected and


not to be transcended. Huntington’s main theme, therefore, is not so much the Clash of Civilizations as Avoiding the Clash of Civilizations.

As with Fukuyama’s, Huntington’s design of a grand narrative of History is tempered by qualifications, often unheeded by most commentators. First, Huntington neither claims that his theory accounts for every fact of the twentieth-century world, nor that his theory’s imperfect explanatory power discredits the theory’s validity as a paradigm. According to Thomas Kuhn, to be accepted as a paradigm, “a theory must seem better than its competitors, but it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it can be confronted.” Anomalous events may exit, but the Clash-of-Civilizations paradigm can be disproved only by an alternative paradigm (such as Fukuyama’s End-of-History paradigm) that accounts for the more important phenomena in equally simple, abstract terms.

Second, Huntington assumes neither the complete autonomy of a civilization as a political entity nor the complete elimination of more traditional political factors, such as nationalism, national security, and balance-of-power politics. Political theorist Fouad Ajami, for instance, criticizes Huntington by noting that “civilizations do not control states, states control civilizations… We remain in a world of self-help. The solitude of states continues.” Huntington agrees that “nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs.” However, Huntington’s paradigm does not concern the question of whether the nation-states still control the world, but of where they belong. As individuals and nation-states as political actors once belonged to one

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107 Thomas Kuhn quoted in Huntington, “If Not Civilizations, What?,” 56.
108 Ibid. 57.
of the three worlds (namely, the “Free,” Communist, or Third World) during the Cold War, now they belong to a multipolar world of civilizations. As noted above, the expansionary friend-enemy dialectic does not refer to the process of zero-sum elimination of non-civilizational units, but to their dialectical subsumption on the meta-historical level. Therefore, sub-civilizational factors, such as nationalism and power politics, still operate in international politics (as during the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia), but now in the more invasive presence of civilizations than ever before.

Third, Huntington does not set out civilization as an internally unified or homogeneous unit of community; indeed, he is fully aware that today’s conflicts are intracivilizational as well as intercivilizational. Admittedly, Huntington declares the end of intracivilizational conflicts and believes that a civilization will be ultimately embodied in a civilization-wide union of states. But it needs to be stressed that his analysis is primarily based on his observation of the history of Western civilization and that even the West has not “reached its universal state as yet, although it [is] close to it, but it certainly has evolved out of its warring state phase.”111 Political commentator Fred Halliday therefore is mistaken in criticizing Huntington for “miss[ing] what is the most important cause of the events of recent days… namely the enormous clash within the Muslim world between [the reformers] and [the fundamentalists]” in Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, Turkey, and Afghanistan.112 Huntington dismisses such criticism as “totally false,” as one of his book chapters on Islam is

112 Halliday, “Beyond Bin Laden.”
titled ‘Consciousness Without Cohesion.’\textsuperscript{113} The Muslim world, Huntington stresses, consists of a billion constituents in different sects, such as the Sunni and Shia, and a myriad of sub-cultures. The Muslim world is still in its intracivilizational period, a step behind the West: The Muslim world lacks a core state that can represent Islam as a whole, and Muslim states, such as Saudi Arabia, fight for Islamic-civilizational hegemony by creating a bifurcating friend-enemy distinction with the non-Muslim world. The non-Muslim world in turn cannot effectively negotiate with the Muslim world, exactly because there are no one or two Muslim states with whom to negotiate. Huntington echoes Henry Kissinger’s question during the 1970s, “If I want to call Europe, what number do I call?” with regard to Islam today: “If you want to call the Islamic world, what number do you call?”\textsuperscript{114} As such, intracivilizational conflicts not only persist in the midst of intercivilizational conflicts; the former also fuels the latter.

2.2. The End of the Clash of Civilizations: Three Considerations

Based on a rudimentary reading of both paradigms, many critics, perhaps naturally, conclude that there is an uncrossable chasm between the two. They argue: First, the notion of culture, Huntington’s master-concept, is largely missing in Fukuyama’s system. Second, Huntington and Fukuyama disagree on the feasibility and desirability of global democratization in general and the compatibility of liberal democracy with Islamic and Sinic cultures in particular. Third, in light of the current unfolding of events, such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the explanatory power of


\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
Huntington’s paradigm appears superior to that of Fukuyama’s. All of the points of incompatibility above are largely mistaken, if not blatantly false. On each point, Huntington and Fukuyama share several crucial assumptions and points of convergence that could possibly dwarf other differences and produce a meaningful synergy.

2.2.1. On Culture and Community: Civil Society, Social Capital, and Radius of Trust

Fukuyama neither underestimates the persistence and dynamics of culture nor rejects it as inherently antagonistic to liberal democracy. Political commentator Stanley Kurtz wrongly accuses both Hegel and Fukuyama of “constructing an imaginary history that, unlike actual history, takes the individual as the fundamental unit of society” and of never grasping that “traditional hierarchies are not so much master-slave relationships as they are by-products of group solidarity.”115 Admittedly, Fukuyama’s rhetoric sometimes suggests that liberal democracy is in competition (although it is not an even match) with some political residues of cultural traditions (such as Islamic fascism) in the world that is still stuck in History. However, Fukuyama as well as Hegel, as interpreted by Fukuyama, are also keenly aware that culture grounds civil society—intermediary groups standing between the individual and the state—which in turn is necessary for liberal democracy to function properly.116 Fukuyama’s model of liberal democracy is based on Hegelian “non-selfish” liberalism, which he considers to be “nobler and more accurate” than

Hobbesian-Lockean liberalism (such as Anglo-Saxon liberalism including American democracy). Hobbesian-Lockean liberalism tends to view liberty solely in the “selfish” terms of desire and reason: Liberty is the pursuit of rational self-interest in the absence of physical constraint, or self-preservation of the body. Hegelian liberalism, by contrast, views liberty in the “non-selfish” terms of *thymos* [spiritedness]: Liberty is the pursuit of rational recognition—equal and homogeneous recognition of all by all—and lies in the human ability to negate one’s own nature, including the instinct for self-preservation. For Hobbesian-Lockean liberalism, recognition of individual rights is a means to preserve the body and private sphere; for Hegelian liberalism, recognition of individual rights is an end in and of itself. Accordingly, the Hobbesian-Lockean ideal man is the *bourgeois* who is “preoccupied primarily with his own material well-being… not public-spirited, virtuous, or dedicated to the larger community around him… composed entirely of desire and reason but lacking in *thymos* [spiritedness].” In contrast, the Hegelian ideal man is the *civil servant* of the universal class that embodies the dialectical reconciliation between the private and public, the individual and the State, and thereby the individual and Spirit. The fact that Fukuyama grounds his theory of liberal democracy in Hegelian terms (as opposed to Hobbeisan-Lockean) implies that the sustainability of the cooperative public sphere of community is one of Fukuyama’s highest conceptual priorities.

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118 Ibid.

119 Ibid., 23.
In the Hegelian “non-selfish” liberal system, liberal democracy does not arise from a social vacuum but originates in and is sustained by civil society and community. For Hegel, the State, the earthly embodiment of the realization of Spirit, emerges out of civil society: It is not “imposed upon society but rather… grow[s] organically from the day-to-day relationships of individuals.”

Civil institutions or interest groups, such as architects’ associations and district council associations, bridge the individual and the State, by providing a social shelter for individuals to pursue their interests and by aggregating private interests so that the State can monitor them better.

Fukuyama reformulates this relationship between civil society and non-selfish liberal democracy in terms of “social capital” (and “radius of trust,” soon to be discussed). Social capital is an “instantiated informal norm that promotes cooperation between two or more individuals.” Social capital is that which fuels civil society’s functioning, manifested as traditional virtues like reciprocity or honesty and often systematized into complex doctrines like Christianity or Confucianism. The role of social capital in fostering economic and political liberalism is two-fold. In the

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120 Williams, Sullivan, and Matthews, *Francis Fukuyama and the End of History*, 34. For Hegel, civil society (as understood primarily as commercial society) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the emergence of the State. Hegel does not fully accept the laissez-faire economic system and believes that it has to be supplemented by state intervention, such as provision of public goods and mitigation of economic crises. Ibid., 34. Fukuyama agrees with Hegel that the state plays a certain crucial role in maintaining civil society. While government cannot (or should not) duplicate the function of religion or cultural habits in producing social capital, it can indirectly promote social capital by providing public goods, such as safety and property rights. The Sicilian Mafia, for instance, could be seen as a private guarantor of property rights where the state fails to perform the role. Francis Fukuyama, “Social Capital, Civil Society and Development,” *Third World Quarterly* 22, no. 1 (2001): 18.

121 Williams, Sullivan, and Matthews, *Francis Fukuyama and the End of History*, 33.

122 Fukuyama borrowed the term “social capital” primarily from other sociologists and political theorists such as Lyda Judson, James Jacobs, Glenn Loury, Ivan Light, James S. Coleman, and Robert Putnam; and the term “radius of trust” from political theorist Lawrence E. Harrison.

economic sphere, social norms of cooperation function to promote economic liberalism by reducing “the transaction costs associated with formal coordination mechanisms like contracts, hierarchies, bureaucratic rules, and the like.”¹²⁴ The decentralized organization of the economy is essential in light of highly complex networks of communication and transportation. In the political sphere, social capital promotes liberal democracy both indirectly and directly. Indirectly, social capital creates a vigorous capitalist economy (which both uses and creates social capital) that in turn forms the civil basis for political society—a complex division of labor, a locus of social identity, and a pivot for cooperative socialization.¹²⁵ The privatized market also functions as an outlet for megalothymic [desiring unequal recognition] competition that would otherwise take the form of political and military struggles in the public realm. Social capital can also more directly produce a dense civil society, a stable soil for liberal democracy. Alexis de Tocqueville observes in Democracy in America (1835) that the early American propensity for civil association (the so-called Tocquevillian “art of association”) based on religion and township counterbalanced the vice of modern democracy—excessive individualism.¹²⁶ In the absence of self-

¹²⁵ Fukuyama criticizes a mistaken tendency encouraged by contemporary economic discourse “to regard the economy as a facet of life with its own laws, separate from the rest of society.” That is, as Adam Smith understands, economic life is “deeply embedded in social life, and it cannot be understood apart from the customs, morals, and habits of the society… from culture.” Fukuyama, Trust, 6, 13. Fukuyama stresses that Hegel, too, conceptualizes the capitalist economy as overlapping with civil society. Fukuyama traces the conceptual separation between the capital economy and civil society back to Antonio Gramsci and Jürgen Habermas, who had “an interest in delegitimating capitalism itself.” Francis Fukuyama, “The Illusion of Asian Exceptionalism,” in Democracy in East Asia, ed. Larry Jay Diamond and Marc F Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 225.
¹²⁶ As with Fukuyama, Tocqueville regards egalitarianism as the product of the natural progress of history, as a “Provincial fact [that]… endures all human interference, and all events as well as all men contribute to its progress” Alexis Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York N.Y.: Signet Classic, 2001), 29. He argues that historically significant events such as the Crusades, the English wars, the introduction of the municipal corporations, the invention of fire-arms, the development of the art of printing, Protestantism, and the discovery of the New World all point to the universal demise of the
organizing civil society, society either goes anarchic or demands too much intervention of the state.

In conjunction with that of social capital, Fukuyama’s concept of “radius of trust,” an equivalent of the Huntingtonian friend-enemy dialectic, reveals the most direct and straightforward connection between Fukuyama and Huntington. Although social capital is essential to civil society’s proper functioning, for Fukuyama, it could be a double-edged sword in the context of multi-layered society, since in-group solidarity (the “friend” cohesion) often implies exclusivity toward out-group members (hostility toward the “enemy”). Therefore, the net utility of social capital needs to be measured with reference to “radius of trust,” the circle of people among whom cooperation is possible. The concentration of social capital in a narrow radius of trust, as exemplified by exclusive familialism in South Italy or China, implies the relative lack of cooperative norms in overall society. The Protestant Reformation, by contrast, was the cradle for liberal democracy, “not so much because of honesty, reciprocity, and thrift among individual entrepreneurs, but because these virtues were

notion of a human superior to another. Ibid., 28. And yet, Tocqueville realizes, democratic egalitarianism could produce two perverted outcomes, anarchy and tyranny. First, with regard to anarchy, the sense of equality leads to excessive individualism, which is “a mature and calm feeling, which disposes each member of the community to sever himself from the mass of his fellows.” Ibid., 193. In addition, as the number of participants in the political decision-making process increases, the share of power attributed to each citizen becomes smaller than during aristocratic rule. This leads to the sentiment of low self-importance, which in turn reduces a society to a mere summary of individuals insensitive to public affairs. Second, tyranny is the other side of the same coin of anarchy: The atomized individual “feel[s] time to time the want of some outward assistance… [and] naturally turns his eyes to that imposing power which alone rises above the level of universal depression.” Ibid., 294. This imposing, totalizing tyranny in a democratic setting is what Tocqueville calls the “tyranny of the majority.” Tocqueville observes that “American exceptionalism” stems from the fact that the early American egalitarianism did not degenerate into anarchy or tyranny, thanks to its “art of association” and federalist structure of governance. Primarily religion-based civil participation and federal government structure counterbalanced excessive individualism and transported “[the individual’s] attachment to his little republic into the common store of American patriotism.” Ibid., 84.
for the first time widely practiced outside the family.\textsuperscript{127} The enlargement of the radius of trust, as such, is as essential as the creation of social capital for the overall health of civil society.\textsuperscript{128}

Huntington’s expansionary friend-enemy dialectic, in this sense, can be understood as the dialectical enlargement of the radius of trust (for instance, from an ideological radius of trust to a civilizational one) through conflict resolution processes. A few meaningful differences are to be noted, however. First, Huntington’s units of analysis range from nation-state to ideological alliance and to civilization; Fukuyama’s units of analysis are usually on a domestic scale, ranging from family to nation-state. Second, for Huntington, the enlargement of the radius of trust (or more accurately, the radius of identification) has \textit{intrinsic} value in itself, as a manifestation of the human desire for identification; for Fukuyama, the broadening of the radius of trust merely has \textit{instrumental} value because it functions to sustain civil society, which is in turn necessary for liberal democracy. Third, Huntington simply \textit{describes} how the radius of trust has been broadened, while Fukuyama makes a \textit{normative} statement that it should be broadened further. Finally, Huntington observes that the expansion of the radius of trust beyond the level of civilization (the broadest cultural grouping) is unlikely; Fukuyama would advocate and expect that the radius of trust would expand to the level of humanity, as in universal human rights. Overall, a combination of Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s dialectics produces a more holistic understanding of


\textsuperscript{128} A caveat is that to broaden the radius of trust is not to completely eliminate the narrower radii of trust: The human world consists of a “series of concentric and overlapping radii of trust,” and the health of civil society depends on the balance of power between different radii of trust. Fukuyama, “Social Capital, Civil Society and Development,” 8.
the human desire for community: Community has both meta-historical and political implications; it has both intrinsic and instrumental values; and it can function as both descriptive and normative standards of History. The most pertinent point of synthesis of all, however, is the final point of difference—Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s differing views on the expandability of dialectics. It can be argued that Huntington’s “civilizational ceiling” on the friend-enemy dialectic contradicts the ever-expanding logic of his dialectic. The necessity of resolving this contradiction, in turn, justifies and enables a fundamental reconstruction of Huntington’s paradigm through synthesis with Fukuyama’s, as more fully discussed later in this chapter.

Another crucial dimension of Fukuyama’s discussion of social capital is that it is more often than not a path-dependent variable mainly derived from preexisting, hierarchical, and non-rational sources of authority, especially major religious and cultural systems like Christianity, Islam, or Confucianism.¹²⁹ Unlike social contract theorists like Hobbes and Locke, Hegel argues (and Fukuyama would certainly agree) that society is not constituted by the choice of individuals in contractual terms, but “by the far deeper communal values which these members all inherited from their common past.”¹³⁰ Preexisting communal values, such as religion, nationality, and ethnicity, are as crucial, if not more so, as the spontaneous order of civil society, such as through commercial networks. Admittedly, Fukuyama regards religion and nationalism as sources of irrational recognition, in that “the distinction between one

¹²⁹ Fukuyama rightfully acknowledges that social capital could also be derived from long-term self-interest seeking behaviors of individuals, namely, as a product of repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma games. If individuals are engaged in repetitive, long-term interactions with others, they will come to value a reputation for honesty and reliability, thereby creating and conforming to cooperative social norms and habits. And yet, “social capital more often than not is produced by hierarchical sources of authority, which lay down norms and expect obedience to them for totally arational reasons.” Ibid., 16.
¹³⁰ Williams, Sullivan, and Matthews, Francis Fukuyama and the End of History, 87.
human group and another… is an accidental and arbitrary by-product of human history.”¹³¹ He argues that liberalism alone is the pursuit of rational recognition because the only distinction it draws is between human and non-human based on a natural trait (that only humans are free to negate their desires), and every human being is recognized on a universal and equal basis. However, he recognizes the paradox in which the implementation of liberal democracy requires “the survival of peoples and the incomplete victory of states.”¹³² First of all, people need to develop irrational thymotic pride in liberal values. Second, without voluntary civil associations based on religion, nationality, race, and so on, liberal democracy cannot survive. Compared to the USA, such Latin American countries as Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, failed to derive political stability and economic growth from their formally democratic institutions. The most crucial reason for this, according to Fukuyama, is that the USA had inherited sectarian Protestantism, which reinforced the Tocquevillian “art of association” or “the tendency of the society to be self-organizing in a myriad of voluntary associations and communities.”¹³³ In contrast, the imperial and Catholic traditions of Latin America reinforced dependence on large, centralized institutions. Successful liberal democracies were “lucky to have married strong formal institutions to a flexible and supportive informal culture.”¹³⁴

It should be further noted that for Fukuyama culture is not just a necessary condition for a liberal democracy in general; it is also a necessary component of the highest form of liberal democracy, one that strikes a fine balance between the need

¹³¹ Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, 201.
¹³² Ibid., 222. Italics added.
¹³³ Fukuyama, The Great Disruption, 11.
¹³⁴ Ibid., 12.
for community and for individual liberty. Note that culture is a fundamentally communitarian concept: Culture is to a community what personality (based on human nature) is to an individual. Fukuyama’s approach to the clash between the American and Asian civilizations best illustrates his awareness of the hidden tension between community and individual. According to Fukuyama, one of the main reasons the American model of democracy might be unattractive to Asian countries is the perceived decline in the American quality of life: growing crime, the dissolution of the family, and excessive individualism—that is, the decline of social capital, or the “Great Disruption” (as discussed in Chapter One). Fukuyama argues that this perception of American moral decline is somewhat exaggerated, but also bears some truth. The USA inherits the Lockean-Jeffersonian traditions of individualistic liberal democracy, while in Europe, individual rights are often constitutionally balanced against communal responsibilities.\textsuperscript{135} Admittedly, American individualism has been balanced in practice by religion- and ethnicity-based communitarian traditions, which has in turn enabled the Tocquevillian arts of association and so-called “American exceptionalism.” However, as Fukuyama extensively discusses in his book \textit{The Great Disruption}, the past couple of generations (perhaps except during the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks when patriotism returned to fashion) witnessed the relative decline of American communalism and the rise of atomic individualism. Fukuyama appears to hold that communitarian traditions such as Confucianism can not only work well with liberal democracy, but also ennoble the latter into a higher form of society, by finding a “stable balance between the need for liberty and the need for

One example of such balance can be found in the Asian immigrant societies in the USA, where Asian values tend to counterweigh the overall society’s individualizing forces.

2.2.2. On Democracy: Its Desirability and Compatibility with Islam and Confucianism

Huntington’s rejection of democratic and human rights “imperialism” is much more nuanced and more compatible with Fukuyama’s recommendation of careful democratization than critics commonly perceive. Fukuyama’s recommendation for global democratization, as extensively surveyed in the previous chapter, is a democratization executed through prudent rhetoric, multilateral cooperation, and full consideration of local needs and particularities. That is, the democratization process has to be realistic, although its desirability is ideal. A curious feature of Huntington with regard to global democratization is that he seems to have two distinct personalities. On the one hand, *The Clash of Civilizations* (1996) criticizes the American universalist assumption that American values constitute the best governance system that the world can and should emulate regardless of one’s civilizational origins. On the other hand, Huntington’s earlier publication *The Third Wave* (1991) discusses the third wave of democratization in the late twentieth century and strategies for best promoting the global expansion of liberal democracy. The

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136 Fukuyama, “Confucianism and Democracy,” 54.
137 According to Huntington, the first wave of democratization led to the triumph of democracy in around thirty countries by 1920; after a reversal of democracy during the 1920-30s, the second wave produced another thirty democracies after the Second World War; after yet another reversal, the third wave that began in Portugal turned more than 60 percent of the countries in the world into democracies from 1974 onward. Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 13-26.
ambiguity of Huntington’s view of liberal democracy is best distilled in his simultaneous publication of seemingly contradictory arguments in 1997. In *Foreign Affairs* (September – October 1997), Huntington argues that “foreign policy elites might well devote their energies to designing plans for lowering American involvement in the world in ways that will safeguard possible future national interest.”\(^{138}\) In *Journals of Democracy* (also October 1997), however, Huntington lays out strategies for effective democratization. He recommends coordinating an international association of governments and organizations committed to expanding democracy, such as the National Endowment for Democracy in the USA and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy in the UK. Now “[t]he Comintern is dead. The time for a Demintern has arrived. The creation of such an association will be a major step toward ensuring the consolidation and the continuation of the momentous expansion of human freedom that began [during the third wave of democratization].”\(^{139}\) Political commentator Jacob Helibrunn calls Huntington’s ambiguity “the clash of Samuel Huntingtons” and argues that, out of this clash, Huntington’s paradigm collapses “under the weight of its own assumptions.”\(^{140}\)

However, despite the seeming inconsistency between the optimistic Huntington and pessimistic Huntington, Huntington can still agree with Fukuyama without undermining the coherence of his own theory. Huntington commented at a panel discussion in 2002 that “I don’t think there is any inconsistency between [*The

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...[The former] deals with international relations, with the sources of conflict in global politics. The other book dealt with transitions to democracy and was trying to explain why this happened.” Huntington in other interviews explicitly recognizes that the USA and the West “should stand by their commitment to human rights and democracy and should try to influence other countries to move in that direction,” and “that’s perfectly natural.” But the West’s expansion of democracy is justifiable not because democracy is universally desirable, but because it is part and parcel of the West’s unique civilizational identity. The mission of promoting democracy is therefore a priority for the USA for its own sake, and only as far as it is realistically within its power and not at the expense of more urgent agendas, such as avoiding intercivilizational violence. Huntington accordingly recommends the USA to “encourage the ‘Westernization’ of Latin America,” because Latin America is culturally close to the West, is already equipped with basic democratic institutions adopted during the third wave of democratization, and hence constitutes a hospitable terrain for liberal democracy (a similar reasoning applies to Orthodox Christian countries). On the other hand, the American promotion of democracy in the Middle East “would be desirable but also difficult [due to the Middle Eastern] tendency to resist the influence of the West.” The bottom line for the West is therefore to “act in a more cautious, moderate way” and grow sensitive to the reality that cultures, values, and priorities are different across civilizations and the

144 Steinberger, ”So, Are Civilisations at War?”
West’s relative power has declined due to East Asia’s economic dynamism and Islam’s demographic dynamism.\textsuperscript{145} In short, although the lack of universalist faith in democracy undeniably differentiates Huntington from Fukuyama, both agree on the desirability and possibility of global democratization, in the long run and under realistically favorable conditions.

Huntington and Fukuyama not only agree on the potential of global democratization in general, but also on the compatibility of democracy with Islam and Confucianism in particular—the two civilizations, according to Huntington, that are in potentially violent civilizational conflicts with the West. Fukuyama shares Huntington’s observation that Islam and Confucianism pose an obstacle to democratization in their respective areas. Both thinkers nevertheless argue that both Islam and Confucianism could be made compatible with democracy, since they are, like any other major world religions, systems of “extraordinary complexity that ha[ve] evolved in manifold ways over time.”\textsuperscript{146} Christianity, regarded by Fukuyama and Huntington as the cultural origin of democracy, was used to legitimate and delegitimate both slavery and democracy.\textsuperscript{147} It was after the Reformation and the Thirty Years War that the political actors of the time increasingly politicized the more egalitarian aspects over the hierarchical tenets of Christianity.

As for Islam, Fukuyama emphasizes the past instances in which the Ottoman millet system peacefully accommodated different faiths, and liberal trends of Islam.


arose in Egypt, Iran, and Turkey in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.\textsuperscript{148} According to Fukuyama, the Islamic movement responsible for the events of 9/11 is not to be categorized merely as a religion or civilization; it is a type of fascism feeding on religious sentiments, equivalent to the racial fascism of early twentieth-century Germany. The root causes of Islamo-fascism are not the teachings of Islam in itself, but practical factors such as failed modernization, poverty, and economic stagnation, which constitute “combustible material” for extremist politics.\textsuperscript{149} Fukuyama suggests that Islamo-fascism has to be defeated militarily, as German fascism was. However, for him, what is equally crucial, if not more so, is a reformation from within the Islamic world that is at “the juncture today where Christian Europe stood during the Thirty Years’ War in the seventeenth century.”\textsuperscript{150} Creating societal conditions favorable for political adoption of democratic components of Islam, both from within and outside if necessary, is key to the democratization of the Islamic world; and it is not an impossible task as seen in the past incidences of Islamic reformist attempts. Confucianism is also a highly complex and therefore adaptive civilizational system, which is demonstrated in what Fukuyama calls the debate between the two Lees. Against Lee Kuan Yew’s theory of Asian “soft” authoritarianism based on Confucian values of community, Fukuyama evokes Lee Teng-hui, the fourth President of Taiwan. Lee Teng-hui distinguishes what he calls political Confucianism and the Confucianism of everyday life. The former mandates a hierarchical political authority around an emperor, while the latter regulates everyday relations, such as

\textsuperscript{148} Fukuyama, “History and September 11,” 31.

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., 33.

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., 34.
gender and family relations and work ethics. Lee Teng-hui and Fukuyama argue that the Confucianism of everyday life can exist without its hierarchical political counterpart, the presence of which has been increasingly muted since the overthrow of the Qing imperial dynasty in 1911.\textsuperscript{151} Indeed, Confucianism could be made highly supportive of democracy. The traditional Confucian exam system presumes a meritocratic and potentially egalitarian upward mobility; the Confucian emphasis on education can produce a highly-literate and politically-sensitive social class; and the Confucian civil sphere has been relatively tolerant of various religions, compared to Islam and Christianity.\textsuperscript{152}

Perhaps to the surprise of many critics, Huntington agrees in principle with Fukuyama that the current difficulty of establishing democracy in the Middle East and in China does not imply the impossibility of doing so. In response to the question whether some cultures are inherently unfavorable to democracy, Huntington argues that “some cultures are more favorable, some less… [but] there is [no] major culture where it would be impossible for democracy to take root” since “any great religion or culture has all sorts of diverse elements within it that can be capitalized on for a variety of purposes.”\textsuperscript{153} In \textit{The Third Wave}, Huntington shows that while Protestant egalitarianism historically constituted a basis for democracy in the West, the Catholic Church modified its hierarchical structure in the Second Vatican Council and played an indispensable role in the third wave of democratization in the 1970-80s.\textsuperscript{154}

\textsuperscript{151} Fukuyama, “The Illusion of Asian Exceptionalism,” 226; Fukuyama, “Confucianism and Democracy,” 47.
\textsuperscript{152} Fukuyama, “Confucianism and Democracy,” 47.
\textsuperscript{153} Huntington, “Religion, Culture, and International Conflict After September 11: A Conversation with Samuel P. Huntington,” 11, 12.
\textsuperscript{154} Huntington, \textit{The Third Wave}, 45.
Islam, Huntington comments that “I don’t think Islam is any more violent than any other religion,” and the so-called “bloody borders of Islam” do not have “much to do with the Koran or any other traditional religious teaching.” As discussed above, militant Islam is grounded in situational factors such as the demographic dynamism of a huge youth bulge, frustrated modernization efforts, historical tension with Western imperialism, and the divisions within Islam. Huntington speculates that in a generation or two the youth demographic might decline and Islam might grow less violent and radical, although not inevitably or automatically without the efforts of Muslim countries themselves. The bottom line is that under socially favorable conditions the Islamic religion might be interpreted as inherently compatible with, even conducive to, institutionalization of democracy.

Huntington and Fukuyama are admittedly in a less enthusiastic agreement on Confucianism than on Islam, but the difference is one of degree, not of nature. Huntington contends that Confucianism, due to its more hierarchical cultural assumptions, is less compatible with democracy than Islam is. He believes that Confucianism is non-democratic or anti-democratic, as it emphasizes “the group over the individual, authority over liberty, and responsibilities over rights… The conflict of ideas, groups, and parties [i]s viewed as dangerous and illegitimate… Confucianism merge[s] society and the state and provide[s] no legitimacy for autonomous social institutions at the national level.” Nevertheless, Huntington’s assumption remains that social conditions ultimately determine which parts of a

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155 Steinberger, “Interview”; Steinberger, “So, Are Civilisations at War?”
157 Ibid., 12.
158 Huntington quoted in Fukuyama, “Confucianism and Democracy,” 46.
religio-cultural system are politically capitalized on. The cultural assertiveness of Asia is rooted in its economic dynamism in the late twentieth century. And yet the same economic development, in the future, “will leave a legacy of wealthier, more complex economies, with substantial international involvements, prosperous bourgeoisies, and well-off middle classes [which] are likely to lead towards more pluralistic and possibly more democratic politics, which will not necessarily, however, be more pro-Western.” In short, Fukuyama and Huntington agree that both Islam and Confucianism, when the situations are ripe, will be able to accommodate their cultural assumptions within a democratic framework, although not necessarily Western in style.

2.2.3. On Timing: Short-run vs. Long-run Predictions and the End of the Clash of Civilizations

The apparent empirical vindication of Huntington’s Clash-of-Civilizations paradigm in the wake of the events of 9/11 does not undermine the normative validity of Fukuyama’s End-of-History paradigm. Stanley Kurtz insightfully points out that “the question of time,” or a tension between short- and long-term predictions, “is a central, though hidden, difficulty in the Huntington-Fukuyama debate” and that “conceivably, Fukuyama could be correct about the long term, while Huntington could nonetheless be correct about the next several decades.” The materialization of the End of History as an idea, Fukuyama admits, can be “resisted and even reversed

160 Kurtz makes a mild criticism that Fukuyama’s compatibility with Huntington in the long-run is too convenient: “[W]hen Huntingtonian civilizational clashes emerge to complicate the picture, Fukuyama can fall back on his confidence in the eventual triumph of democracy and remind us that he never said that universal democratization would come swiftly or easily, only that democracy is the sole remaining political ideology with universal potential. Between the short- and long-term prediction, there is a fair amount of wiggle room.” Kurtz, “The Future of ‘History’,” 57.
on a local level (i.e., in large groups of countries) for considerable periods of time” which could “last several generations, if not centuries.”\textsuperscript{161} Fukuyama emphasizes that Hegel was the first one to declare the End of History in 1806 after the battle of Jena; and that even after two hundred years, the End of History has not yet fully materialized. Fukuyama’s End of History ultimately refers to the idea of economic and political liberalism; its universal implementation and the achievement of perpetual peace lag behind. Therefore, Huntington’s argument that there are still intercivilizational conflicts in the short run does not fundamentally contradict Fukuyama’s argument that there is an emerging world-wide consensus that there should not be those conflicts in the long run.

Huntington’s and Fukuyama’s paradigms are not just compatible, but they are also complementary. Huntington’s focus on the short-term process moderates Fukuyama’s preoccupation with the long-term result. An appreciation of Huntington’s emphasis helps answer the question posed by Kurtz: “Fukuyama has written, ‘Modernity is a very powerful freight train that will not be derailed by recent events.’ One wants to know the precise speed at which this powerful train is traveling.”\textsuperscript{162} Huntington, for example, argues that the secular trend of democratization, in the short run, tends to “grow irregularly in a two-step forward, one-step backward pattern.”\textsuperscript{163} The nineteenth-century first wave of democratization experienced regressions to authoritarianism in the 1920-30s; the second wave after World Wars also witnessed reversals in the 1960-70s. Although the third wave of democratization began with the 1970s onwards, “if the previous pattern prevails,

\textsuperscript{162} Kurtz, “The Future of ‘History’,” 57.
\textsuperscript{163} Huntington, “No Exit,” 6.
some of these new democracies are likely to revert to authoritarianism.”

Huntington’s criticism does not negate the possibility of a long-run secular trend of democratization; rather, it zooms in on a smaller unit of time and provides a more detailed picture of the End of History.

Furthermore, Huntington’s explicit focus on culture unveils the dialectic between culture and ideology and the tension between community and individual—possibilities that are already present but often unnoticed in Fukuyama’s history of ideology. First of all, the Huntington-Fukuyamaean “End of the Clash of Civilizations” anticipates a full synchronization between culture and ideology.

According to Fukuyama, ideological conflicts have ended with the triumph of economic and political liberalism as the best conceivable political idea concerning the rational system of state institutions. And yet the implementation of liberalism requires

164 Ibid., 7. Huntington further makes two valid and constructive criticisms of Fukuyama, which suggest good starting points for further comparative analysis. First, Huntington argues that the universal emergence of liberal democracy does not preclude conflicts within liberalism. Ibid., 9. There is in fact a rich literature on the varieties of economic liberalism (such as the Varieties of Capitalism approach) as well as of political liberalism (such as, discussion on majoritarianism versus consociationalism). This point does not undermine Fukuyama’s theory, but could possibly elaborate and sophisticate it, if further capitalized on. Second, Huntington emphasizes the evil and irrationality of human nature—that people could often be selfish, vicious, and unwise. Hence he notes, “In history there may be total defeats, but there are no final solutions. So long as human beings exist, there is no exit from the traumas of history… To hope for the benign end of history is human. To expect it to happen is unrealistic. To plan on it happening is disastrous.” Ibid., 10. Fukuyama, the follower of Kant’s self-fulfilling prophecy of moral progress, would reject such a pessimistic view of human nature. He would rather argue that human irrationality can possibly be domesticated institutionally. Nevertheless, Fukuyama criticizes an overoptimistic view of human ability such as the transhumanist project of the biotechnological enhancement of the human species, because it undermines the fact that the goods and evils of humans are so intertwined and cannot be selectively manipulated. However, Huntington also misunderstands Fukuyama’s History in two other aspects. First, Huntington dismisses Fukuyama’s endism as overestimating human foresight since the triumph of one ideology does not preclude the emergence of new ideologies. Fukuyama internalizes this criticism by acknowledging that the End of History is the end of history as presently conceivable and that there is a possibility for a totally different form of future politics, for instance, in the posthuman world created by biotechnological revolution. Second, Huntington argues that Fukuyama’s image of the End of History is no different from Marx’s vision of a society with total equality. Fukuyama addresses this criticism by distinguishing Marxism and liberal democracy: In Marxism, the balance of liberty and equality is totally tipped toward equality, while in liberal democracy, there is a more moderate and moving balance between liberty and equality. Ibid., 9.
a harmonious accommodation of its rational institutions within non-rational civilizations. In this sense, the Clash of Civilizations can be understood as a process in which civilizations increasingly reconfigure themselves so that the idea of liberalism can be fully implemented. What arises, in turn, at the End of the Clash of Civilizations is “democratic civilization,” which is not a civilization in the Huntingtonian sense: Democratic civilization is a dialectically higher (or more rational) form of civilization than individual cultural civilizations. The democratic values of tolerance, pluralism, and universal human rights function as the guideline for the ordering of multiple civilizations. Democratic civilization is the value system that assembles and organizes local value systems. Using the terms of Aristotle’s four causes, it is the formal cause, or constitutive principle, of intercivilizational peace, while individual civilizations are the material cause. In this sense, democratic civilization is compatible with, or even equivalent to, Huntington’s multiculturalism: It is the dialectical discovery, articulation, and systematization of Huntington’s multiculturalism, “thin” universal morality, and multicivilizational cooperation.

The notion of the End of the Clash of Civilizations is also a great contribution to Fukuyama’s paradigm in that it renders visible the hidden tension to be balanced.

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165 Kurtz agrees on the possibility that Huntington’s warning of the Clash of Civilizations could promote the realization of Fukuyama’s End of History. He argues that “the very fact of [Huntington’s] being right about the clash of civilizations might actually help to push the international system in Fukuyama’s direction.” Huntington “was right about renewed Islamic confidence—so right that he might now be proven wrong by the American response to Islamic overreach. With the Taliban defeated, Osama bin Laden taken down a notch or two, and perhaps the ousting of Saddam Hussein and the installation of a pro-Western regime in Iraq, can the forces of Islamic reaction remain as confident and ascendant as Huntington once suggested?” Kurtz, “The Future of ‘History’,” 52.

166 Aristotle, using his famous concept of the four causes, compares politics with the art of pot-making, in which a potter (efficient cause) molds clay (material cause) into a vase shape (formal cause) so that it can contain water (final cause). The form of government is decided by how the legislators and politicians of a city state (efficient cause) make a constitution (formal cause) that gives an order to the citizens (material cause), and defines and fulfills the purpose of the city-states (final cause). Fred Miller, “Aristotle's Political Theory,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2002, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-politics/.
between individualism and communitarianism. The Clash of Civilizations can be understood as a process of competition between different models of democracy, out of which would emerge the highest form of democracy. Fukuyama emphasizes that cultural differences are not necessarily the source of conflict, but could potentially lead to a deeper cross-cultural understanding and creative cross-stimulation.\textsuperscript{167} For instance, as mentioned above, the USA’s interaction with and attempt to democratize Confucian countries can create an incentive for the USA to find an appealing balance between individual liberty and community. Moreover, the West’s interaction with Islamic backlash against democracy could end up modifying the secular model of democracy with a thicker and heavier notion of religious accommodation. India’s democracy, for example, is situated in a highly multinational, multireligious setting, and its majoritarian democratic infrastructure is tempered with consociationalism: a mode of power-sharing that recognizes “community rights” and attempts to keep balance between different community groups (in India’s case, primarily between the Hindu majority and religious minorities).\textsuperscript{168}

The amalgamation of the two paradigms not only bolsters Fukuyama’s but also Huntington’s, as the former serves as a corrective to the self-contradictory logic of the latter. As discussed earlier, Huntington’s History is the history of the dialectically-expanding scope of identification—from princes to nation-states, to

\textsuperscript{167} Fukuyama, \textit{Trust}, 6.

\textsuperscript{168} According to political theorist Arend Lijphart, India is a confirming case of working consociational (power-sharing) regime. In India, for example, religious minorities were granted “personal laws” and separate judiciary proceedings on marriage/divorce, as established by the 1937 Muslim Personal Law Application Act, the new 1986 Muslim Women Act, and the new 1993 Christian Marriage Act. Also, the political representation of different social groups has been largely proportional to their demographic composition. For instance, the shares of ministerships were proximately proportional to the Muslim minority of 12\% and the Sikh minority of 2\%. Arend Lijphart, “The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation,” \textit{The American Political Science Review} 90, no. 2 (June 1996): 261.
ideologies, and finally to civilizations. The expansion of the boundaries of community is in turn governed by the friend-enemy dialectic in which the contradiction between friend and enemy on one level (for instance, between nation-states), once resolved, leads to a higher platform of contradiction (between ideologies). In this system, the presence of contradiction implies the process of resolution and the potential for an upward dialectical movement. The inconsistency in Huntington’s system of History is that Huntington recognizes the clash between civilizations, while arguing simultaneously that civilization is “the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity.”¹⁶⁹ That is, Huntington mistakenly decouples the presence of contradiction (the Clash of Civilizations) from the potential for an upward dialectical movement. Huntington is therefore obliged, but unable, to answer the following question: What would be the conclusion of the Clash of Civilizations, after several generations or even centuries down the road? Or, in other words, what is the next stage of History, according to the dialectical logic of the broadening of the scope of identification?

Fukuyama’s longer-termed paradigm straightens out the interrupted logic of Huntington’s History. The synthesis of the two—the merger of the friend-enemy dialectic with the master-slave dialectic—produces a fruitful answer to the question above. That is, the triumph of democratic civilization marks the convergence point of the friend-enemy dialectic and the master-slave dialectic, and the final stage of rational identification in which people no longer identify themselves as against one another, but on the positive merits of being human. The End of the Clash of Civilizations refers to the rationalization and self-destruction of the friend-enemy dialectic.

¹⁶⁹ Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 43. Italics added.
dialectic (that is, the abolition of the “friend” and “enemy,” from the meta-historical perspective), in the same way that the master-slave dialectic has evolved into the rational recognition of all by all—the abolition of the “master” and “slave.” It is, in philosopher Michael Gelven’s words, the transformation of the “we-they” modality (the friend-enemy dialectic) to the “we-ye (not we-we, however)” modality, with the ye referring to the nonthreatening, neighboring others that highlight our worth. The we-ye modality—which might be named the “friend-neighbor axiomatic”—reflects the completion of Huntington’s friend-enemy dialectic and humanity’s maturation into “a willingness to respect not only one’s own autonomy, but the right, and indeed delight, for there to be others who have their own autonomy.”

However, despite all the commonalities underlying the two paradigms and the synergetic effects of their synthesis, one fundamentally irreconcilable difference persists. Huntington and Fukuyama have different assumptions on the extent to which cultural identity is malleable. Fukuyama, while acknowledging several points of convergence between his and Huntington’s theories, maintains that “overall, the question is whether cultural characteristics are so rooted that there is no chance of universal values or a convergence of values. That is where I disagree.” Huntington conceives a civilizational identity as perennial and primordial (although it evolves and adapts in the very long run, over millennia). Western civilization, for example, exclusively refers to “the countries which historically have been part of Western

172 Huntington acknowledges that civilizations evolve, adapt, and even demise, but civilizations also are “the longest stor[ies] of all.” Fernand Braudel quoted in Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 43.
Christendom going back a thousand years or more.”

Fukuyama, by contrast, maintains that identity is not infinitely malleable, but it is not predetermined either. For him, History dictates a “long-term convergence across cultural boundaries, first and most powerfully in economics, then in the realm of politics and finally (and most distantly) in culture”: Cultural differences, by their path-dependent inertia, will persist and yet tend to be “put in a box, separated from politics, and relegated to the realm of private life.” For Fukuyama, culture is the last and the weakest area of convergence, but an area of convergence nonetheless.

It should be remembered that Fukuyama synthesizes Hegelian historicism and Platonic transhistoricism: Human nature is historically and dialectically constructed in the very long run (or alternatively, human nature serves as a fixed, normative standard by which History should operate). As with human nature, Fukuyama would argue, cultural identity is relatively stable in the short run, but subject to dialectical reconstruction in the long run. Political philosopher Akeel Bilgrami would characterize Fukuyama’s notion of cultural identity as lacking “codification in one’s understanding of identity” and thereby allowing “for revision of commitments and values without the necessary loss of identity”; and yet Fukuyama’s conception, in Bilgrami’s view, is not “some postmodern conception of an incoherent psyche produced by immigrant or postcolonial experience,” but rather a “neo-Hegelian idea—of a psyche informed by an internal conflict of values.” That is, Fukuyama’s conception of dialectical identity hits the balance between the Huntingtonian conception of primordial identity, on the one extreme, and the postmodern

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173 Huntington, “Many World Orders.” Italics added.
conception of hybrid identity, on the other. The discussion of postmodern hybrid identity will come back in further detail in the next chapter.

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Despite their fundamentally differing views on cultural identity, a close reading of Fukuyama and Huntington has allowed for a fruitful synthesis of their paradigms—the End of the Clash of Civilizations. This chapter in this sense has been a head-on confrontation with the view, conventionally shared by commentators with the exception of Kurtz, which regards the Clash of Fukuyama and Huntington as inevitable and irresolvable. Kurtz is unique among his peers in his attempt to bring together the two paradigms. He insightfully comments that, perhaps in the long run, “the peoples of the world will all be seeking to strike the balance of modernity and tradition within a broadly liberal democratic framework”; in the short run, nonetheless, “the end of history and the clash of civilizations will remain perplexing and simultaneous truths.” 176 Kurtz would agree with this chapter’s finding that Fukuyama is focused mainly on the long-run result, while Huntington is focused on the short-run process, and that the two perspectives are complementary.

However, Kurtz’s insight is at best incomplete, as he perceives the reconciliation of the two paradigms merely as a perplexing coexistence of the two simultaneous truths, “the measure of which we shall be compelled to take without benefit of overarching formula or guide.” 177 As a result, Kurtz’s attempt is no more than a game of juxtaposition: He is plugging each of the paradigms, as if physical

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177 Ibid.
pieces of a puzzle, into different time slots. This chapter has attempted to transcend Kurtz and to provide an overarching formula that could facilitate an organic synthesis rather than a mechanical comparison or parallel. That is, the synthesis is possible and guided by the interactions between Huntington’s friend-enemy dialectic and Fukuyama’s master-slave dialectic.

Meaningful interactions between the two dialectics, in turn, are only tenable on two grounds, in addition to their different time scales (the long-run versus short-run). First, Fukuyama and Huntington agree substantially on the meta-historical relevance of culture and community, and on the validity of conceptualizing humanity as communal-beings (as opposed to individual-beings and, as later discussed, species-beings). This is where Kurtz’s analysis falls short most explicitly. As noted earlier, he erroneously accuses Fukuyama and Hegel of neglecting that “traditional hierarchies are not so much master-slave relationships as they are by-products of group solidarity.”178 Second, Fukuyama and Huntington also agree in principle on the converging end-point of their dialectics— the abolition of both friend-enemy and master-slave dialectics. In other words, both agree on the possibility and desirability of full-fledged global democratization, and in particular, on the compatibility of democracy with Islam and Confucianism. Overall, this chapter has shown that this synthesis benefits both paradigms by enlarging the analytical applicability of Fukuyama’s and by resolving an internal contradiction in Huntington’s. Indeed, in a stricter sense, speaking of mutual benefit might no longer be relevant, for the two paradigms have already fused into one admixture—the Huntington-Fukuyamaean paradigm of the End of the Clash of Civilizations.

178 Ibid., 49.
3. Fukuyama and Hardt-Negri: The Beginning of Alter-History and the End of Civil Society

We can already recognize that today time is split between a present that is already dead and a future that is already living—and the yawning abyss between them is becoming enormous. In time, an event will thrust us like an arrow into that living future. This will be the real political act of love. – Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri

If Fukuyama announces the conception of the End of History, Huntington reminds that the birth of the End of History is not yet due. The realization of the End of History requires, first, the End of the Clash of Civilizations. Hardt and Negri now tell of the postmodern womb of History and the conception of twins. In their trilogy, Empire (2000), Multitude (2004), and Commonwealth (2009), Hardt and Negri attempt to construct a neo-Marxist theory of History by synthesizing the political vision of traditional Marxism with the postmodern approach of the post-Cold War era. Of the three paradigms being discussed in this thesis, Hardt and Negri’s paradigm of Empire is distinct in its high level of abstraction partly due to its use of postmodern language. Some commentators applaud Hardt and Negri’s postmodern obscurity as “an intellectual roller coaster ride” that traverses “the arid plains of postmodernist theory, an intellectual landscape that now seems as quaint as Middle-earth,” or “a

fascinating tapestry of innovative ideas, brilliant interpretations, flamboyant provocations, shameless exaggerations, and bold generalizations.” Others criticize it for its “the-world-according-to-me” rhetoric in which things are explained merely via quotations, assertions, and clever formulations, without substantive justifications. At any rate, Hardt and Negri’s theoretical aloofness explains why there are far fewer inter-paradigmatic dialogues involving Empire than between the End of History and the Clash of Civilizations, even though all three paradigms attempt to extract a meta-historical inference from the end of the Cold War. Fukuyama and Huntington, unlike Hardt and Negri, try to provide unambiguous empirical evidence wherever possible, and provide a relatively accessible arena for readers to compare their views.

This chapter attempts to tear down this communication wall and facilitate a meaningful dialogue between Empire and the End of History. The first part of the chapter surveys Hardt and Negri’s descriptive analysis of their system of History and Empire, founded on the transcendence-immanence dialectic and biopolitical modes of production. It then turns to their normative analysis of the Multitude and addresses the political agendas of the Multitude to subvert Empire and create a new political landscape. The second part of this chapter, as with the previous chapter, attempts to expand the analytical scope and dynamics of Fukuyama’s schema by synthesizing it with Hardt and Negri’s. The concepts derived from the synthesis, such as the “Beginning of Alter-History” and the “End of Civil Society,” enlarge the horizon of

Fukuyama’s History; meanwhile, Fukuyama’s discussion of Factor X and method of historical parallelism mitigate Hardt and Negri’s generalizing and simplifying tendency.

3.1. Hardt and Negri’s History: Transcendence-Immanence Dialectic and Biopolitical Technology

Hardt and Negri’s Empire represents the new regime of globalization, the “irresistible and irreversible globalization of economic and cultural exchanges” in the post-Cold War era.¹⁸² And yet Empire refers to more than just a physical process of globalization: It is the constitutive principle of the contemporary global order that regulates the physical processes of global exchanges and governance. In the age of Empire, “the distinct national colors of the imperialist map of the world have merged and blended in the imperial global rainbow”: The sovereignty of nation-states has declined with the emergence of a series of decentered and deterritorializing organizations, such as GATT, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the IMF.¹⁸³ Hardt and Negri formulate the postmodern world order of Empire, first in terms of sovereignty and second in terms of modes of production.

¹⁸³ Ibid., xii, xiii, 336. The decline of nation-states, Hardt and Negri regard, is not only an empirical tendency of the twentieth century, but also a normative necessity. It is their empirical observation that the decline of the nation-state as an effective political actor is a structurally irreversible process that cannot be reversed by an act of political will. And yet “even if the nation were still to be an effective weapon,” its re-ascendence should be resisted. The nation-state, according to Hardt and Negri, from its very beginning in the French Revolution, inherently contains the seed of totalitarianism, as manifested by Nazi Germany or Stalin’s Soviet Union. Ibid., 336.
3.1.1. Empire: Immanent Sovereignty and Biopolitical Production

Hardt and Negri’s system of History, as with Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s, is founded on the double pillars of formal dialectic and technological progress. Fukuyama’s History is governed by the master-slave dialectic and the directionality of technological development that point toward the End of History; Huntington’s History, by the friend-enemy dialectic and the progressive trend of inter-civilizational communication that together climax in the Clash of Civilizations. Likewise, Hardt and Negri’s History is motored by the transcendence-immanence dialectic and by the biopolitical modes of production that converge into today’s Empire and create the possibility of the post-historical politics of the Multitude.

For Hardt and Negri, the modern history of Europe has been the history of what might be called “progressive immanence.” The first moment of progressive immanence is the introduction of the secular idea of immanence: the Renaissance’s break from the divine authority of medieval sovereignty, or the discovery of the creative forces immanent in this world. The second moment is when the dialectic between anti-modernity (representing the Renaissance’s plane of immanence) and modernity proper (attempting to maintain transcendental elements, embodied in the notions of the Sovereign, the People, the Nation, and so forth) led to a synthesis—sovereignty based on both transcendence and immanence via the mediation of representation. Now sovereignty draws its legitimacy not from an external theological justification, but from the internal consent of its subjects—not as a divine agent, but as a representative of its subjects.
Modern sovereignty as such is still largely transcendent and exclusive, because the dialectical method in itself is transcendent. Modern sovereignty derives its legitimacy from the dialectical binary of Self and Other (or the Huntingtonian friend-enemy dialectic), which in turn constructs a purified Self or identity. The republican concept of the People, for instance, is a reification of the uncoordinated Multitude; the former is presumed to maintain one homogeneous consciousness and identity, while the latter is marked by open multiplicity. As Huntington observes, the internal maintenance of homogeneity entails the conception and exclusion of what is external. Hardt and Negri contend that modern imperialisms, colonialisms, sexisms, and racisms are all natural products of the transcendent, exclusive logic of Hegelian dialectics.

The end of the Cold War finally represents the third moment of progressive immanence. Empire’s imperial (not imperialist) sovereignty is immanent, inclusive, and nondialectical. The modern dialectic of Self and Other has been replaced by the postmodern axiomatic of differences—“a play of degrees and intensities, [and] of hybridity and artificiality” and “the affirmation of fragmented social identities.” The affirmative and non-oppositional nature of Empire, for Hardt and Negri, in turn derives from the expansion of the American constitutional project, which climaxed at the end of the Cold War. American sovereignty, which “bloomed like a rare flower

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184 As discussed more extensively later, the Multitude refers to the uncoordinated, perpetually mobile, and singular multiplicity—yet distinguished from the irrational, passive, and easily manipulated forces of the masses or the mob in that the multitude “is an active social agent… the foundation of all social creativity.” Michael Hardt and Thomas L. Dumm, “The Theory & Event Interview: Sovereignty, Multitudes, Absolute Democracy: A Discussion between Michael Hardt and Thomas L. Dumm about Hardt's and Negri's Empire,” in Empire's New Clothes: Reading Hardt and Negri, ed. Paul A Passavant and Jodi Dean (New York: Routledge, 2004), 173.

185 Hardt and Negri, Empire, 187-8, 139.

186 Ibid., 182.
in the tradition of modern sovereignty," is rooted in the concept of republican
democracy and developed through the American struggle for independence.187 The
American republican order emerges not from a transcendent transfer of power from
the multitude and back again, but from the constitutional checks and balances which
centralize power and internalize it under the multitude’s control.188 The expansion of
the American imperial constitution is differentiated from the European imperialist
expansionism in that the former is inclusive and reformist. It “does not annex or
destroy the other powers it faces but on the contrary opens itself to them.”189 It opens
up a basis of consensus, on which the entire sovereign body can be continually
reinvented and reformed through the synergetic network of balances and
counterbalances (This is not to argue that the USA was all but an inclusive
constitution. See the footnote).190

An illuminating example of the passage from the transcendent dialectic to the
immanent non-dialectic is the postmodern mode of war. Crisis, defined as the
continual conflict between immanent force and transcendent authority, loses its focal

187 Ibid., 160.
188 Ibid., 161.
189 Ibid., 166.
190 Ibid. The USA also possessed the European imperialist tendency, rooted in African slavery, the
genocidal wars against the Native Americans, and the Monroe Doctrine. American imperialism
reappeared during the Cold War period (particularly during the Vietnam War), during which the USA,
in fighting Soviet imperialism, became imperialist itself. The American imperialist adventure was
stopped by the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam, which signaled the irretrievable defeat of the American
military. In addition, a series of civil movements in the 1960s, such as the civil rights and Black Power
movements, the student anti-war movements, and the second-wave feminist movements, pressed the
USA to return to its original republican principles. At the end of the Cold War, the USA did not
unilaterally dominate the world, but was called to serve “the role of guaranteeing and adding juridical
efficacy to... the formation of a new supranational right [i.e., human rights].” Ibid., 181. This is best
demonstrated in the events of the Gulf War and the dollar standard replacing the gold standard. Hence
the most important impact of the Cold War was “to reorganize the lines of hegemony within the
imperialist world, accelerating the decline of the old powers and raising up the U.S. initiative of the
constitution of an imperial order.” Ibid., 179. What marked the end of modernity was the triumph of
American republicanism over European imperialism, Soviet imperialism, and most importantly,
America’s own imperialism.
point, and turns into a fluid network of proliferating microcrises everywhere.\textsuperscript{191} This state of “omni-crisis” is called corruption—an organic, continual process of micro-deconstruction, like the perpetual deconstruction of cells in a body. Without external enemies, war now takes the form of civil war (or even war against domestic crimes) within a single sovereign territory of Empire. It is a police activity invoking abstract concepts, such as human rights violation, injustice, or any other evils against which all the subjects of Empire (that is, all humanity) can be united in principle. Taken as a whole, the paradigm shift from modernity to postmodernity is a shift “from the people to the multitude, from dialectical opposition to the management of hybridities, from the place of modern sovereignty to the non-place of Empire, from crisis to corruption.”\textsuperscript{192}

In conjunction with the logic of progressive immanence, the postmodern mode of technology, articulated by Foucault as biopolitical, underpins the evolution of the mode of control in the age of Empire: the passage from a disciplinary society to a society of control. In a modern, disciplinary society, the Multitude is disciplined through a network of disciplinary institutions, such as the prison, factory, school, hospital and so forth, which are all external to their consciousnesses and bodies. In a postmodern society of control, by contrast, the mechanism of command has been internalized within the Multitude and can directly affect their brains (for instance, through communicative networks) and their bodies (through welfare systems).\textsuperscript{193}

Therefore, what defines the society of control is its biopolitical nature. The Foucaultian concept of biopower refers to power that “regulates social life from its

\textsuperscript{191} Ibid., 201.
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid., 203.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid., 23.
interior, following it, interpreting it, absorbing it, and rearticulating it.”\textsuperscript{194} Power is directed towards controlling the \textit{totality of life} (of both brains and bodies) produced and reproduced by the multitude on a daily basis.

The passage to the biopolitical modes of production has emerged through the shift from the modern industrial economy to the service economy, since the early 1970s. The service sector, including health care, education, finance, transportation, entertainment, and advertising, operates on a network of information, emotion, and communication. The service sector is marked by \textit{immaterial labor} (labor that produces an immaterial good, such as cultural productions, knowledge, communications), and in particular, \textit{affective labor} (labor that produces emotional affects). Affective labor, such as that of health service staff or media entertainers, creates a biopolitical network of emotional contacts and interactions, and thereby enables the direct manipulation of human affects and sentiments. Today’s economic activities take the form of “cooperative interactivity through linguistic, communicational, and affective networks” and therefore are “completely immanent to the laboring activity itself.”\textsuperscript{195} In the modern, Fordist model of production, the communication channels between the factory and the market are restricted and centralized, and the production processes are external to labor; in the postmodern, post-Fordist (or Toyotist) model, communication is omnipresent, biopolitical, and affective, and production is internalized within labor’s consciousnesses and bodies.\textsuperscript{196}

\textsuperscript{194} Ibid., 23-4.
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid., 294. Italics removed.
\textsuperscript{196} Ibid., 289.
3.1.2. Multitude: Three Marxist Political Agendas and Absolute Democracy

While Empire—the combination of immanent sovereignty and a biopolitical society of control—presents itself as the third moment in the process of progressive immanence, Hardt and Negri envision the fourth moment in the future. For them, the postmodern structure of Empire is more progressive than the modern imperialist order only “in the same way that Marx insists that capitalism is better than the forms of society and modes of production that came before it.”\(^{197}\) The returning transcendence-immanence dialectic is between Empire and the Multitude. For Hardt and Negri, the Multitude refers to the most immanent, most heterogeneous, and least reified form of human being (less reified than the People or the Nation). It is equivalent to (but not identical to) Marx’s conception of “living labor” that is the form-giving fire and immanent source of all values. Hardt and Negri emphasize that Empire lacks any independent ontological ground, but was called into being by the Multitude in the first place, based on artificially constructed international consensus after the Cold War. The Multitude, in other words, is “the real productive force of our social world, whereas Empire is the mere apparatus of capture… a vampire regime.”\(^{198}\) Hardt and Negri attempt to leverage the Multitude’s ontological supremacy to subvert Empire from within, on three fronts: capital against labor, private property against the Common, and identity against singularity.

With regard to their first political program of overcoming capital, Hardt and Negri cast Empire in Marxian guise: They formulate Empire’s passage from disciplinary society to society of control as the passage from formal to real

\(^{197}\) Ibid., 43.
\(^{198}\) Ibid., 62.
subsumption of labor under capital. In the modern society of formal subsumption (disciplinary society), labor is born outside of capital and subordinated to capital through the dialectical process of importation, abstraction, and discipline; in the postmodern society of real subsumption (society of control), labor is born within and immediately subordinated to capital. Now capital eludes any kind of dialectical engagement with labor, but rather “constructs a separate plane, a simulacrum of society that excludes or marginalizes social forces foreign to the system… [in which] labor becomes invisible.” Real subsumption, in short, is the highest form of capitalist exploitation—emancipation of capital from the demands of labor. The automation of capital is best captured by what Fredric Jameson calls commodity fetishism, in which commodities autonomously communicate with each other and with customers, without revealing the information of labor put into their production. From this follows Hardt and Negri’s first political agenda: Marx’s “living labor” has to emancipate itself from capital.

Hardt and Negri’s second political project of instituting the Common is also fundamentally built on the traditional Marxist method of giving ontological primacy to the collective over the individual. Marx holds that the natural essence of humanity is not embodied in private individuals, but in “the ensemble of social relations.”

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200 Ibid., 39.
201 Ibid., 43.
202 Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” in The Marx-Engels reader, ed. Robert Tucker, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1978), 145. Based on his conceptual prioritization of species-beings, Marx explicitly criticizes the concept of human rights as defined in the 1791 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. For instance, Article 6 defines liberty as “the power which man has to do everything which does not harm the rights of others.” According to Marx, such a notion of liberty presumes humans to be a potential obstacle and limitation to one another, and therefore is grounded not in the cohesive “relations between man and man, but rather upon the separation of man from man.” Karl Marx, “On
That is, for Marx, the abstraction of humanity as species-beings (defined in terms of the fluid totality of variable social situations) is a “rational abstraction that is in fact more real and basic” than the reification of humanity as individual-beings.²⁰³ Likewise, Hardt and Negri conceptually prioritize the Common over the private. The Common primarily refers to anything that enables social communication and production, such as languages, emotional relationships, common sense—and even the fact that “we share bodies with two eyes, ten fingers, ten toes; we share life on this earth; we share capitalist regimes of production and exploitation; we share common dreams of a better future.”²⁰⁴ The Common, as with language and the Internet space, should not be privatized lest it lose its source of creativity and dynamic communication. However, the republic of property, another name of Empire, tends to “subjugate, exploit, and privatize the Common in order to reallocate it in accordance with the laws of individual ownership and liberal political representation.”²⁰⁵ The republic of property labels the non-privatized components of the Common as “externalities” outside of the economy proper. The recovery of the Common is to overturn such perspective, by internalizing the externalities and making the economic processes ever more internal to the circuits of social life. Here Hardt and Negri deviate from traditional Marxism by rejecting socialism, since they regard the subordination of the Common to public authority as just another form of property regime. Instead, the Common “cuts diagonally across these false alternatives—neither

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²⁰³ Hardt and Negri, Multitude, 144.
²⁰⁴ Ibid., 128.
private nor public, neither capitalist nor socialist, and opens a new space for
politics."\textsuperscript{206} Hence Hardt and Negri’s second project: The Common, the immanent
ontological basis of humanity, has to overcome the private and public.

Hardt and Negri’s third political objective is for singularities to replace
identities. Grounded in the Marxist notion that humans are self-creative agents,
singularity refers to a temporal multiplicity of identities within singular individuals
that is “always engaged in a process of becoming different.”\textsuperscript{207} Singularity is also the
manifestation of the Common in individualistic terms: “[N]o singularity can exist or
be conceived on its own,” but it derives its existence and essence from the Common
and “its relations with other singularities that constitute society.”\textsuperscript{208} Singularity
attempts to abolish any fixed identities that restrict the plasticity of singularities in the
same way that private property undermines the fluid dynamics of the Common. The
politics of singularity (or \textit{liberation} as opposed to \textit{emancipation}) will be further
discussed later in this chapter.

Deduced from Hardt and Negri’s three political agendas is the final definition
of the Multitude as the ultimate alternative to Empire: It is the life-giving labor that is
exploited by imperial capital, but capable of forming “an open network of
singularities that links together on the basis of the common they share and the
common they produce.”\textsuperscript{209} A useful analogy of the Multitude is to a swarm of bees
that is “a seemingly amorphous multiplicity that can strike at a single point from all

\textsuperscript{206} Ibid., ix.
\textsuperscript{207} Ibid., 339.
\textsuperscript{208} Ibid., 338.
\textsuperscript{209} Hardt and Negri, \textit{Multitude}, 129.
sides or disperse in the environment so as to become almost invisible.”

The Multitude’s three political programs, in turn, converge into the ultimate project of absolute democracy. Absolute democracy is simply the self-rule of the Multitude—rule of all by all, replacing representative democracy, or rule of all by many. Representative democracy, as in the American Constitution, is composed of plural agents, relatively open, and formed ‘from below’; and yet its “multiplicity is highly restricted to only a privileged set, an oligarchy of powers hierarchically related to one another.” Absolute democracy by contrast suggests that the constitutive forces of the Multitude are no longer represented by or immanent to other external constituted forces: There should be the complete identity between the constitutive and the constituted. Taken as a whole, Hardt and Negri’s normative theory of the Multitude challenges Fukuyama’s advocacy of capitalism and liberal democracy, first by exposing the exploitative forces of capitalism and second by presenting an alternative and more radical definition of democracy.

Before moving onto synthesis between Hardt and Negri and Fukuyama, a couple of Hardt and Negri’s devices to refine their system of History have to be acknowledged. Typically unnoticed by commentators is Hardt and Negri’s nuanced concession to the empirical limitations of their sweeping postmodern generalizations. One noteworthy legacy of Marx in Hardt and Negri’s theory is the method of historical tendency. In Marx’s time, agriculture was still a quantitatively dominant mode of production, but Marx realized that the qualitative break introduced by capital would impose a tendency or direction towards a near-future transformation of the

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210 Ibid., 57.
211 Hardt and Negri, Commonwealth, 227.
economy. Likewise, Hardt and Negri’s discourse on Empire “is to grasp the direction of the present, to read which seeds will grow and which wither.”\footnote{Hardt and Negri, \textit{Multitude}, 141.} In this sense, Empire is “the \textit{tendency} of global political order in the course of its formation,” or “the only form of power that will succeed in maintaining the current global order in a lasting way.”\footnote{Ibid., xii,xiii.} As for the hegemony of immaterial labor, immaterial labor is “not dominant in quantitative terms” but “it has imposed a tendency on all other forms of labor, transforming them in accordance with its own characteristics.”\footnote{Ibid., 141.} In short, the tense in which Hardt and Negri’s manifesto is written is neither present nor future, but present-future tense.

In a similar vein, the empirically-based argument that nation-states remain supreme in the quantitative sense or in individual cases does not constitute an effective criticism of Hardt and Negri’s paradigm. Political theorist Manfred Steger criticizes Hardt and Negri for “never discuss[ing] in sufficient detail contrary empirical evidence… that national governments seem to possess enduring powers to regulate economic activities.”\footnote{Steger, “Review: [untitled],” 265.} Political philosopher Slavoj Žižek also questions whether the state is really withering away and whether “the ‘War on Terror’ [is] not the strongest-yet assertion of state authority.”\footnote{Slavoj Žižek, “The Ideology of the Empire and Its Traps,” in \textit{Empire’s New Clothes: Reading Hardt and Negri}, ed. Paul A Passavant and Jodi Dean (New York: Routledge, 2004), 264.} Hardt and Negri would respond, first, in the same way that Fukuyama sustains his End-of-History thesis against individual counterexamples such as Chinese authoritarianism. That is, Empire represents the
meta-historical and qualitative break from the past and presents the historical
tendency towards its ultimate fulfillment in concrete reality. Secondly, they would
also argue that nation-states persist as agents of Empire and Empire is the order by
which nation-states are arranged; this response is parallel to Huntington’s statement
that nation-states are still the primary political actors and civilization is the pivot of
international alliance. Hardt and Negri comment on the false dichotomy between
Empire and nation-states:

We should not get caught up here in the tired debates about globalization and nation-
states as if the two were necessarily incompatible. Our argument instead is that
national ideologues, functionaries, and administrators increasingly find that in order
to pursue their strategic objectives they cannot act and think strictly in national terms
without consideration of the rest of the globe. The administration of Empire does not
require the negation of national administrators. On the contrary, today imperial
administration is conducted largely by the structures and personnel of the dominant
nation-states.217

For Hardt and Negri, Empire is a three-layered pyramid of mixed constitution. The
top layer represents the “monarchs” of the global order, or the USA and other elite
states; the middle layer is occupied by the “aristocrats,” or the networks of
transnational corporations, capital flow, production flow, and so forth; the bottom
layer consists of the democratic entities that represent popular interests, mainly non-
governmental organizations. As such, nation-states persist as an indispensable
element of Empire, but they cannot function unilaterally without relating to the other
tiers of global forces.

3.2. The Beginning of Alter-History and the End of Civil Society

217 Hardt and Negri, Multitude, 60.
Fukuyama is a Hegelian dialectician and Hardt and Negri are postmodern Marxists, and yet there exist substantial overlaps, meaningful disagreements, and synthetic interactions between the two paradigms. Admittedly, a synthesis between Fukuyama’s and Hardt and Negri’s paradigms is far more atypical, indeed difficult, than the one between Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s. In fact, Fukuyama himself criticizes Hardt and Negri at length for proposing “an imaginary solution to the real problem.” For him, Hardt and Negri’s suggestion of replacing virtually all hierarchies with a network of the Multitude neglects today’s reality, in which hierarchies are an indispensable part of human politics. Today’s world problems (such as uneven development, poverty, terrorism, financial shocks) demand a scheme of reforming and reinforcing institutions—or as Fukuyama quotes Antonio Gramsci, “a long march through institutions”—rather than a “utopian dreaming” of deconstructing sovereignty and hierarchies. He notes, for instance, how strong and effective state institutions have enabled China and India to experience rapid economic growth, compared to sub-Saharan Africa. However, even if Fukuyama’s observation is valid at the micro- and even macro-political levels, Hardt and Negri’s “imaginary” suggestion remains relevant and comparable at the meta-historical level.

3.2.1. The Beginning of Alter-History: Altermodernity and Factor X

The most easily detectable area of convergence is the semantic of Fukuyama’s End of History and that of Hardt and Negri’s Empire. First, both paradigms are describing exactly the same phenomenon (the global triumph of liberalism) in the

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same period of history (post-Cold War). Second, as with Fukuyama, Hardt and Negri regard Empire as embodying the *telos* of modern History, “the way [things] were always meant to be.”

Third, Empire is not an internal moment of History, but its final point of arrival, or “a regime with no temporal boundaries and in this sense outside of history or at the end of history.”

Fourth, both Empire and the End of History represent the *qualitative* break from the past, not necessarily materialized in quantitative terms. Hardt and Negri, as addressed above, adopt the Marxist method of historical tendency to convey the present-future temporality of Empire. Empire also captures Fukuyama’s idealist (as opposed to materialist) perception of the contemporary world that the idea, not the practice, of perpetual peace is widespread. That is, “the *concept* of Empire is always dedicated to peace” but “the *practice* of Empire is continually bathed in blood.”

Taken together, Empire as “a perpetual and universal peace outside of history” shares the essence of Fukuyama’s End of History in teleological, temporal, and qualitative terms.

Empire nevertheless should be understood as an extension, rather than a synonym, of the End of History. Hardt and Negri properly understand the Hegelian foundation of Fukuyama’s History and claim that “History has ended precisely and only to the extent that it is conceived in Hegelian terms—as the movement of a dialectic of contradictions, a play of absolute negations and subsumption.”

History as such, however, ends with the modern era. For Hardt and Negri, the end of the Cold

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220 Ibid., xiv-xv.
221 Ibid., xv. Italics added.
222 Ibid.
223 Ibid., 189.
War represents not only the End of Modern History, but also the Beginning of Post-modern History.

This moves the focus to the speculative futurology implicit in both paradigms: Empire is ultimately a systematic articulation of Fukuyama’s anti-metaphysical futurology. This discussion pivots on questions posed by political philosopher Gregory Bruce Smith. He ponders whether Fukuyama’s End of History is merely an “end understood teleologically” or a “terminus beyond which there is one kind of nothingness or another.” Smith would concur with Hardt and Negri that Fukuyama’s End of History only points to the End of Modernity and posits that Fukuyama’s thesis is in need of a speculative political philosophy for the future: a political philosophy that is so genuinely postmodern as to transcend the global, egalitarian, bourgeois, and technological longings of the modern paradigm. He therefore contemplates on the possibility of such a speculative political ideal:

The central question is, what ideal is possible beyond a world devoted to universal equality (hence the pursuit of equal dignity and recognition), prosperity for all individuals, a secure, long, fear-free life, etc.? That idea may not be fully-manifested in present concrete reality, but what ideal could conceivably replace it that would win substantial acceptance? If no such ideal is imaginable, history could be at an end.

Fukuyama and Hardt and Negri are not incompatible in their responses to such questions. Admittedly, Fukuyama would maintain that there is no better ideal than liberalism that is conceivable and would gain substantial acceptance under the material conditions of the contemporary world. And yet, as extensively discussed in Chapter One, he also concedes the “provisionally inconclusive”

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225 Ibid., 8.
nature of his thesis and admits the possibility of a future politics based on different future conditions. In the wagon analogy introduced in Chapter One, Fukuyama recognizes that “provided a majority of the wagons eventually reach the same town… their occupants, having looked around a bit at their new surroundings, [might] find them inadequate and set their eyes on a new and more distant journey.”226 As such, Fukuyama shares with Hardt and Negri Marx’s anti-metaphysical critique of Hegel’s transcendental metaphysics of Spirit (as discussed in Chapter One)—that there is no externally predetermined path of humanity independent of specific spatial and temporal contexts.

Hardt and Negri’s paradigm is not simply compatible with Fukuyama’s in a passive sense; indeed, it is a systematic articulation and extension of the latter. Although Fukuyama acknowledges that there is room for speculative postmodern philosophy in his theory, truly postmodern (not premodern or merely anti-modern) speculation as Smith conceives it is difficult within Fukuyama’s modernity-oriented system of History. Admittedly, Fukuyama contemplates the possibility of “posthuman” politics, dedicated to defending human nature against the potential of biotechnological manipulation (which will be further discussed later in contrast to Hardt and Negri’s theory of the Multitude). However, posthuman politics as such is a fundamentally reactive conception, a shadow of modernity under its gravitational pull. It only conceives a political ideal against which—not for which—humanity should strive. Back to the wagon analogy: A new destination might excite the wagon occupants to set

on their new journey, but the nostalgia of the present dictates that they suppress such excitement.

Hardt and Negri’s paradigm, by contrast, is much more future-oriented in a positive sense, as evident in their discussion of *altermodernity*. As addressed earlier, Hardt and Negri posit the transcendence-immanence dialectic between two modes of modernity: modernity proper that embodies the idea of transcendence and republican representation, and anti-modernity born from the Renaissance tradition of immanence. Hardt and Negri, while grounding their paradigm in the anti-modern lines of thought like those of Marx, eventually reject the pursuit of anti-modern politics, since it is “stuck in a reactive, oppositional position and never get[s] out of the dialectic with modernity.”  

Hardt and Negri even regard the term postmodernity as not sufficiently post-modern. While the term rightfully emphasizes the historical break from the old conditions of modernity, it is a “conceptually ambiguous” and “negative designation, focusing on what has ended.”  

It dramatizes the end of the modern dialectic and resultant conditions for new politics, but fails to articulate what positively constitutes post-modernity in and of itself. Hardt and Negri therefore adopt the term *altermodernity*, which represents two movements away from modernity: First, it is grounded in the dialectical resistance of antimodernity, and, second, it breaks with antimodernity by situating itself in a diagonal and oblique, not dialectical, relationship with modernity.  

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228 Ibid., 144.
229 Ibid., 115, 102. Hardt and Negri also differentiate altermodernity from strands of hypermodernity, such as second modernity or reflexive modernity conceptualized by Ulrich Beck and Jürgen Habermas.
not the antimodern notion of static opposition or the postmodern notion of the finality of modernity, but a dynamic and autonomous metamorphosis—the “Beginning of Alter-History.”

It should be acknowledged that synthesizing the Hardt-Negrian and Fukuyamean systems of History reaches its limit when it comes to the normative substance of Alter-History based on Hardt and Negri’s conception of human nature. For Hardt and Negri, “the most important fact about human nature (if we still want to call it that) is that it can be and is constantly being transformed.” Hardt and Negri’s alter-historical project therefore proposes an anthropological exodus—a metamorphosis “that breaks all the naturalistic homologies of modernity [through] hybridization and mutation” and inaugurate the creation of a new body that is:

… completely incapable of submitting to command… [and] of adapting to family life, to factory discipline, to the regulations of a traditional sex life, and so forth. (If you find your body refusing these ‘normal’ modes of life, don’t despair—realize your gift!)”

Likewise, Hardt and Negri defy the Hegelian desire for recognition and identification. They echo Marx’s critique of Hegel’s dialectic of identities that it “merely affirms what exists rather than creating new” and takes identity as an end rather than a means. They draw an illuminating distinction between emancipation and liberation: Emancipation aims at the negative freedom of identity, or the freedom to be who we really are; liberation, which Hardt and Negri regard as the higher form of ideal, aims

Although proposing a movement beyond the traditional elements of modernity (such as structural changes of the nation-state, or the biopolitical organization of society), hypermodernity fundamentally envisions “perfecting [modernity] by applying its principles in a reflexive way to its own institutions”—reforming, not transcending, modernity. Ibid., 113.

230 Ibid., 191.
232 Hardt and Negri, Commonwealth, 330.
at the positive freedom of singularity, or the freedom to determine *what we can become*.\(^{233}\) Liberation, admittedly, does not mean that it plunges humanity into “an indifferent sea with no objects of identification” but rather that “the existing identities will no longer serve as anchors.”\(^{234}\) For Hardt and Negri, then, the Huntington-Fukuyamaean synthesis of the friend-neighbor axiomatic and the End of the Clash of Civilizations (as discussed in Chapter Two) downgrades human liberty to the reactive affirmation of identities, the sterile tolerance of differences, and multiculturalism in a cage—emancipation without liberation.

Fukuyama, by contrast, assumes the *desirability* of a relatively fixed human nature. As demonstrated in Chapter One, Fukuyama’s History is ultimately guided not by Hegelian dialectics, but by a Platonic human nature: Liberalism is the conceivably best form of governance primarily because it best satisfies the demands of human nature (reason, desire, and *thymos* [spiritedness]). However, for Fukuyama, human nature is not founded on any purely Platonic or transcendental justifications, such as Reason with a capital R or a divine design; rather, human nature refers to the generic commonality immanent in humanity, or what he calls Factor X—the essential human genetic qualities beneath a person’s contingent and accidental characteristics.\(^{235}\) Therefore, at the *descriptive* level, Fukuyama would fully agree with Hardt and Negri that humans *can* take charge of their own nature and identity, for instance, through biotechnological manipulation of human genes. However, at the *normative* level, Fukuyama believes that human nature *should* be protected. For Fukuyama, the knowledge of a common humanity constitutes a moral equivalent of

\(^{233}\) Ibid., 331.

\(^{234}\) Ibid., 339.

the Hardt-Negrian concept of the Common—the foundation of human moral sense, moral communications, and moral philosophy of justice.\textsuperscript{236} Liberal democracy triumphed over the attempted anthropological revolution of communism, because of the “tenacity of human nature”: Liberal democracy formed “politics according to historically created norms of justice while not interfering excessively with natural patterns of behavior.”\textsuperscript{237} Fukuyama would thus predict that Hardt and Negri’s postmodern Marxism will eventually fail for the exact same reason that modern Marxism has collapsed.

Nonetheless, a further synthesis between the two alternative notions of human nature is possible based on the fundamental similarities underlying Fukuyama’s Factor X and Hardt and Negri’s Common. Factor X and the Common are functionally comparable concepts (although the former is exclusively pertaining to a genetic basis of human nature, whereas the latter concerns biopolitical subjectivity in general): Both refer to a set of fundamental human commonalities that enable social communications between a multiplicity of singular individuals. Furthermore, both Factor X and the Common are based on the conception of humanity as a \textit{collective} being: Factor X is a genetic product of the macrocosmic biological evolution of humanity as a species, and the Common represents the Marxist notion of species-beings. If Factor X and the Common can be understood in equal terms as a set of collective commonalities, then it is clear that Hardt and Negri’s theory of the Multitude contains a self-contradiction, for which Fukuyama provides a synthetic resolution. An unresolved question for Hardt and Negri is whether a radical


\textsuperscript{237} Fukuyama, “Biotechnology and the Threat of a Posthuman Future,” 8.
anthropological exodus, or proliferation of manufactured singularities, is always compatible with the maintenance of the Common. For instance, Hardt and Negri argue that the Common includes the sharing of “bodies with two eyes, ten fingers, ten toes”; but they at the same time propose the creation of singular bodies through radical mutation and hybridization—some of which, it can be imagined, might be with a thousand eyes, thousand fingers, and thousand toes, and some others with no eye, no finger, and no toe. Hardt and Negri simply assume away the possibility that experiments with given components of human nature might reach the critical point beyond which the Common is no longer sustainable.

Fukuyama would address this question by positing that maintaining the Common requires conforming to the blind forces of natural selection. Slavo Žižek presents an illuminating and playful analogy of a chocolate eggshell with a plastic toy inside. The Common or Factor X is the plastic toy that stays intact despite singularly different types of chocolate eggs—white, milk, dark, with nuts, or without. Fukuyama’s wisdom is that:

… if we mess too much with the production of the chocolate egg, we might generate an egg without the plastic toy inside. How? Fukuyama is quite right to emphasize that it is crucial that we experience our ‘natural’ properties as a matter of contingency and luck: if my neighbor is more beautiful or intelligent than me, it is because he was lucky to be born like that… The philosophical paradox is that if we take away this element of lucky chance, if our ‘natural’ properties become controlled and regulated by biogenetic and other scientific manipulations, we lose the Factor X.238

The emerging synthesis suggests that anthropological metamorphosis is feasible and might well be desirable to a degree, but has to be tempered by careful execution and

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238 Žižek, “The Ideology of the Empire and Its Traps,” 256.
consideration of the point of disequilibrium between plastic singularities and collective commonalities.

3.2.2. The End of Civil Society: Postcivil Society and Historical Parallelism

A not well-advertised fact is that, in his article “The Withering of Civil Society” (1995), Hardt explicitly shares (and Negri would too) with Fukuyama the Hegelian formulation of civil society as the educative and mediating space between the State and the untamed realm of private interests. For Hardt, “Hegel’s greatest contribution to political philosophy” is his redefinition of civil society—not in terms of the dualism between natural society and civil society (as Hobbes and Rousseau previously conceived), but in terms of the trialism between natural society, civil society, and political society (the State).239 Civil society is the mediating stage through which natural society becomes political society: It is not only a realm of particular self-interests that overlaps with natural society, but also a “sphere of relatedness—a sphere of education.”240 Through the institutions of civil society, such as market exchange, corporations, and institutional trade unions, unorganized particular interests of natural society (that is, the Multitude) are “educated” and brought into line with the universal interests of the political State. In terms of labor relations, civil society corresponds to the subsumption process of labor by which, in Hegel’s words, raw labor “like a savage beast” is “constantly subjugated and tamed.”241 In short, for Hegel as interpreted by Hardt, civil society is the society of the

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abstraction and organization of labor, or the subordination of particular and concrete labor to the universal interests of the State.  

It is however pertinent to note that Hardt’s conception of civil society is distinct from Hegel-Fukuyama’s, in that the former is more precisely understood as a Foucaultian reformulation of the latter. Foucault’s conception of disciplinary society, according to Hardt, specifically highlights the authoritarian aspect of the Hegelian educative civil society. Hardt notes that the institutions and enclosures (enfermements) of disciplinary civil society (such as the church, the school, the prison, the family, the union, and the party) “produce normalized subjects and thus exert hegemony through consent in a way that is perhaps more subtle but no less authoritarian than the exertion of dictatorship through coercion.” And yet the most pointed distinction between Foucault’s and Hegel’s conceptions of civil society is that the former explicitly reflects the evolutionary trend of progressive immanence.

Foucault’s disciplinary society, according to Hardt, is characterized by what Foucault

242 Hardt notes that Kojève also recognizes the functional importance of labor that, in Kojève’s words, “labor is what ‘forms or educates’ man, distinguishing him from the animals.” And yet for Kojève, Hardt further elaborates, the educative laboring process aims at the thymotic recognition of the laborer. By contrast, for Hardt and Hegel, labor is important because it aligns the particular interests of the laborer with the universal interests of the State. Hardt, “The Withering of Civil Society,” 42.

243 Hardt argues that Gramsci, in contrast with Foucault, highlights the democratic potential of the Hegelian civil society. Gramsci posits (as Fukuyama and Tocqueville would argue) that the pluralism of civil institutions, such as interest groups, political parties, church movements, or popular reform movements, constitute the democratic civil sphere. Gramsci, however, departs from Fukuyama’s understanding of the Hegelian civil society by inverting the causal relationship between civil society and the State. For Gramsci, civil society is the cause of the State, not vice versa. The State’s goal is its own collapse, as Hardt quotes Gramsci, “its own disappearance, in other words, the re-absorption of political society within civil society.” Hardt, “The Withering of Civil Society,” 30. Gramscian civil society empowers the revolutionary class, instead of the State, to assimilate and represent all spheres of society. Hardt seems to acknowledge both Foucaultian and Gramscian interpretations of the Hegelian civil society and therefore the duality of civil society as the terrain for both authoritarian discipline and democratic liberation. He notes that “Gramsci and Foucault highlight the two contrasting faces of Hegel’s civil society.” Ibid., 33. Hardt and Negri’s dualism is also reflected in the duality of Empire both as the global exploitative system and as the potential source of the Multitude’s democratic revolution.

244 Ibid., 31.
calls the governmentalization of the State: It is the transformation of the medieval State with transcendent sovereignty over its population into the modern government that is immanent to and effectively indistinguishable from civil society. While Hegel ascribes moral and teleological essences to his modern State, Foucault’s government derives its power not from any external sources, but from multiple relations internal to civil society, such as economic relations, knowledge relations, and even sexual relations. Hardt in short regards Foucault’s reformulation of civil society “not so much as a contradiction but as an extension of Hegelian theory”: Hegel’s causal relationship between the State and civil society is such that the State “is not the result but the cause”; Foucault adds that the State is “not a transcendent but an immanent cause.”

And yet it can be argued that an even more radical departure of Hardt’s understanding of civil society from Fukuyama’s is Hardt’s introduction of the Deleuzian conception of what he calls postcivil society. Hardt contends that “neither Hegel nor anyone else should be blamed for theorizing the existing relationship between the State and society,” but “they should be blamed only when they cast that formation as necessary and eternal, outside of history.” Indeed, Hardt observes that the Hegelian and Foucaultian civil society has withered away, at least in North America and Western Europe, where the factory, the church, the family, and other disciplinary institutions are in deep crisis. However, this phenomenon of withering civil society—which might also be called the “End of Civil Society”—and the resultant social void is not the end of civil society per se. The decline of civil society

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245 Ibid., 33.
246 Ibid.
247 Ibid., 34. Italics added.
heralds the rise of postcivil society. In order to explain this transition, Hardt employs Deleuze’s formulation of the postmodern passage from a disciplinary society to a society of control, as addressed earlier in this chapter. In a society of control, the relationship between the State and natural society (or the Multitude) is no longer mediated by educative institutions; rather it “sets the State in motion directly through the perpetual circuitry of social production.” In other words, the State’s control is more immanent in society than ever.

Metaphorical comparison might further illuminate the End of Civil Society. Central to disciplinary society is the metaphor of structure and superstructure: The striation of civil institutions branches out like the skeleton, or to quote Gramsci again, “the trench-systems of modern warfare,” and penetrates through social space, in Deleuze’s words, in “structured networks like the tunnels of a mole.” Disciplinary society is akin to the Foucaultian image of the panopticon in which the prison is generalized in the fixed forms of the factory, the school, the hospital, and so on. A society of control, by contrast, is better understood through the metaphor of smooth surface: The trenches are replaced by “the shifting desert sands, where positions are continually swept away” or by “the smooth surfaces of cyberspace, with its infinitely programmable flows of codes and information”; and the tunnels of a mole, by “the infinite undulations of the snake.” In sum, the structured striae and fixed identities

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248 Ibid., 35.
250 Ibid., 36. The panopticon is a type of prison social theorist Jeremy Bentham designed in 1785 in order to allow the jailor to be an omniscient but invisible observer—to monitor all the prisoners at once without letting them be aware of their being monitored.
251 Deleuze quoted in Hardt, “The Withering of Civil Society,” 36. Hardt cautions the readers not to be carried away “with applying these metaphors absolutely.” The passage to postcivil society does not mean the disappearance of disciplinary deployments, but rather its generalization across society. Ibid., 35, 37.
The notion of the End of Civil Society adds synthetic dynamics to Fukuyama’s concept of civil society that is primarily cyclical. As discussed in Chapters One and Two, Fukuyama’s civil society—the sphere of community—is marked by its cyclical and static evolutionary pattern. Unlike political-economic institutions whose performance improves progressively in the long run, civil institutions produce social capital that is within a delimited range and “ebbing and flowing over the space of multiple generations.”254 One example of the cycle’s downturn is what is termed by Fukuyama as the Great Disruption: the withering of civil society and the corollary decline in social capital (manifested mainly as growing crime) in Western civilization from the 1960s and to the early 1990s. It in turn anticipates the Great Reconstruction—the (not necessarily automatic) process of adjusting to the new configurations of civil society. By focusing on the functional cyclicality of civil society, Fukuyama fails to notice the secular trend of civil institutional evolution that Hardt and Negri articulate. That is, the Great Disruption is

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252 Ibid., 37.
253 Hardt and Negri would not be satisfied with calling it the End of Civil Society, for it is a backward-looking concept that merely denotes what has ended. For them, even the term postcivil, like postmodern, is “too reactive to do justice to the new paradigm of social relations.” Ibid., 40. Hardt and Negri would probably formulate the End of Civil Society as the Beginning of Alter-Civil Society. Nonetheless, for the purpose of highlighting the common secular trend underlying the evolution of social-moral institutions and that of political-economic ones, the End of Civil Society is a more appropriate term that directly parallels Fukuyama’s original thesis of the End of History.
254 Fukuyama, The Great Disruption, 282.
not simply “some sort of social evacuation but rather… the generalization of the logics that previously functioned within these limited domains… spreading like a virus.” The Great Disruption is therefore not just a transitory regression, but a radical rupture from the Hegelian model of civil society: It is a reflection of the transcendence-immanence dialectic underlying the evolution of civil society, and the maturation of civil society into its final form—the End of Civil Society. Casting the Great Disruption in terms of the End of Civil Society, by articulating the broader layer of historical trend, widens the analytical scope of Fukuyama’s History.

Broadening the reach of Fukuyama’s History, however, should not be overdone. Hardt and Negri’s comprehensive system of History, on the other side of the coin, indicates their totalizing tendency that reduces all spheres of social life into one biopolitical amalgam exploited by capital. Empire operates on “all registers of the social order extending down to the depths of the social world… in its entirety.”

Political theorist Sanjay Seth, evoking historian Dipesh Chakrabarty’s analysis of Marx, confronts Hardt and Negri in this regard. According to Seth, Marx concedes that “the total universe of pasts that capital encounters is larger than the sum of those in which are worked out the logical presuppositions of capital.” That is, in non-Marxist terms, the claim that all elements of the past have been coherently arranged and internalized to the universal logic of History (either the logic of progressive democratization or that of progressive immanence) is compatible with the claim that some elements are internal to, but also independent of, that logic. Multiple structures

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256 Hardt and Negri, Empire, xv.
of human interactions still coexist with and within the trend of a Universal History, but in “intimate and plural relations” to it, “ranging from opposition to neutrality.”

Here lies the virtue of Fukuyama’s analytical distinction between the evolutionary trajectory of the political-economic sphere, and that of the civil. Although Fukuyama fails to discern the broader progressive trend common to both, he rightfully grants a certain degree of autonomy to each. They do not completely merge into one identity, but rather constitute interdependent parallels that are embedded in one single biopolitical infrastructure. This historical parallelism is largely absent in Hardt and Negri’s account of History. For them, every aspect of life without exception is not only internal to, but also subsumed in, the capitalist-biopolitical logic of Empire.

Civilization is one example of the human interactions that in Hardt and Negri’s view are subsumed in Empire, but in fact are arguably somewhat autonomous from Empire. Hardt and Negri simply dismiss Huntington as “the old mole of reactionary thought” who “conjured up the phantasm of… civilizations.” What they unwarrantedly ignore here is that civilization, whether imagined or real, represents the singularities and multiplicities of humanity as cultural beings, or community-beings—an intermediate between species-beings and individual-beings. Hardt and Negri’s analysis underestimates the autonomous sphere of culture and, in particular, that of non-European cultures. Hardt, for example, focuses on “the genealogy of civil society in the Euro-American context,” and he “hope[s] that this genealogy will be

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258 Chakrabarty quoted in Seth, “Back to the Future?,” 574.
259 Hardt and Negri largely misunderstand Huntington’s Clash-of-Civilizations hypothesis to be “not so much a description of the present state of the world but rather an explicit prescription, a call to war, a task that ‘the West’ must realize.” Hardt and Negri, Multitude, 34. Italics original. In reality, as demonstrated in Chapter Two, Huntington’s hypothesis is largely descriptive, and its normative inference in fact suggests avoiding the Clash of Civilizations.
relevant also for evaluating the question of civil society in other parts of the world.”

Hardt and Negri attempt to address their Eurocentricism and acknowledge, for instance, that India (and every local reality within India) “is not merely different from Europe… [but] is singular”; however, Hardt and Negri rather too quickly conclude that the Eurocentric analysis of History is universally applicable because the Common is there to make the world more than a mere “collection of incommunicable localities.”

Admittedly, Hardt and Negri are not any more Eurocentric in their aspirations than Fukuyama and Huntington. The difference is, however, that while Fukuyama and Huntington systematically address the problematic of communities as seen in Chapter Two, Hardt and Negri seem to simply assume away the possibility of a cross-cultural differentiation and segmentation. Their analysis only engages the dialectic between the modes of humanity as a species and individuals, neglecting communities as a valid unit of analysis.

Hardt and Negri’s analytical neglect as such invites the Huntington-Fukuyamaean system of History to fill the void, particularly with regard to religion. Hardt and Negri’s unitary system of the biopolitical world does not allow any form of transcendental religion (or more generally the belief that certain elements of human life can be and should be determined by a transcendental design) in any layer of social life. Religion, to survive in Hardt and Negri’s world, has to reconfigure itself to a completely immanent form and serve the Multitude as a means of communication.

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261 Hardt and Negri, Multitude, 128. Hardt and Negri acknowledge divisions within the Multitude that the political objectives of various identities “do not necessarily agree but rather are often divided, divergent, or even conflicting.” Hardt and Negri, Commonwealth, 340.
and production of radical subjectivities—and no more.\footnote{For Hardt and Negri, there are four modes of religion. First, premodern religion represents the purely transcendent basis of medieval patrimonial sovereignty. Second, modern religion (the mode of religion that Fukuyama has in mind) has been largely absorbed in civil society and functions as a mediator between the State and natural society. Third, postmodern religion either constitutes a substantial sector of non-governmental organizations or underpins fundamentalist backlashes against modernity, as in Islamic fundamentalism. Fourth, altermodern religion embodies a great biopolitical potential and represents “the communicative matrix that comprises the interhuman world itself” and “the promise and guarantee of finding something that would radically change [the Multitude’s] subjectivity” as Foucault observes in the Iranian Revolution. For Hardt and Negri, only the fourth, altermodern mode of religion as a means of radical transformation of subjectivity is sustainable in the future. Foucault quoted in Hardt and Negri, \textit{Commonwealth}, 36; Chris Fox, “From Representation to Constituent Power: Religion, or Something like it, in Hardt and Negri's Empire,” \textit{Journal of Cultural and Religious Theory} 9, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 40.} Fukuyama would agree with Hardt and Negri that in the public realm of politics, a trend of progressive immanence (such as the separation between the State and the Church) has been and will be observed. However, Fukuyama’s dual system of parallel histories accommodates the possibility that the transcendence-immanence dialectic might not operate as uniformly in the realm of civil society, especially outside of Europe. Fukuyama would predict or even support, for instance, the de-politicization of Islamic fundamentalism; but he would also leave room for the flourishing Islamic civil sphere marked by substantially transcendental ways of life. The Huntington-Fukuyamaean synthesis (as discussed in Chapter Two) would even suggest that public mechanisms, such as India’s consociational apparatuses, have to be devised to equitably represent religious diversity in politics and thereby ensure civil harmony. Most pertinently, the Huntingtonian insight of the Huntington-Fukuyamaean synthesis suggests that religion cannot be defined solely in terms of its \textit{instrumental} value as a mediator between the State and natural society; it is also a path-dependent and sticky variable that has its own \textit{intrinsic} value, partly as a direct expression of human desire for community. Religion therefore can and does coexist with and in the trend of a Universal History and also maintains its own autonomous sphere of operation.
Note that there is a tension of time between Fukuyama’s and Hardt and Negri’s projects: The former is present-oriented, while the latter is future-oriented. As addressed above, what is common to both paradigms is that their core concepts (the End of History and Empire/Multitude) are framed in the present-future tense at the descriptive level: Both concepts capture the paradigmatic, meta-historical breaks from the past, which nonetheless have yet to materialize fully in the present. However, a temporal tension, indeed a contradiction, emerges at the normative level. Fukuyama’s aspiration is best characterized by what might be called the “nostalgia for the present”—a defensive instinct, for instance, to preserve the current form of liberalism against a radical future looming with the possibility of biotechnological manipulation of human nature. Hardt and Negri, on the other hand, indulge in the “nostalgia for the future.” They remark: “We can already recognize that today time is split between a present that is already dead and a future that is already living,” but the “yawning abyss between them is becoming enormous.”263 There is a sense of acute anxiety and suspense in their perception of this growing yawning abyss—and a correspondingly strong sense of yearning, indeed nostalgia, for an event that “will thrust us like an arrow into that living future.”264 As a result, Fukuyama is relatively conservative and protective of what is currently given (although not conservative in the sense that Huntington, apparently “nostalgic for the past,” tries to preserve the remnants of the past such as fixed cultural identities); Hart and Negri are radical and anxious to create new laws of history that are not necessarily conceivable as of now. This contradiction

264 Ibid.
between the two temporalities, in turn, has been the underlying fulcrum of the synthesis of this chapter.

The products of this synthesis—the concepts of the Beginning of Alter-History and the End of Civil Society—reflect the symbiotic coexistence of the two temporal modes. First, the Beginning of Alter-History refers to a post-dialectical arena for future politics, in which humans learn to maintain equilibrium between inventing their own future and preserving the given commonalities that unite them as humanity. Hardt and Negri’s contribution is their conception of altermodernity, a well-speculated and systematic philosophy of what is genuinely posthistorical. Fukuyama’s contribution is his discourse on Factor X, which “slows down” Hardt and Negri’s fast-moving wagon: It points to a critical point at which the inertia of Hardt and Negri’s Common might clash with the centrifugal force of singularities. Second, the End of Civil Society signifies a post-dialectical civil, cultural, and communal sphere that is internal to, but still substantially independent of, the biopolitical Empire. Hardt and Negri’s conception of postcivil society reconfigures Fukuyama’s cyclical and static civil society into a directional one, which by the logic of progressive immanence has broken off its modern mold and become internal to the postmodern logic of Empire. Fukuyama’s historical parallelism, however, grants due autonomy to civil society and the communal sphere: Civil society is embedded in Empire, but not consumed by it. Taken together, the conception of the Beginning of Alter-History and the End of Civil Society dialectically reconciles the nostalgia for the future and that for the present—into the simultaneous realities of a future that lives in the present and of a present that lives in the future.
Conclusion

The overarching objective of this thesis has been to reassess Fukuyama’s philosophy of history by achieving two specific goals: first by rectifying some of the common misconceptions, and second by expanding his paradigm through inter-paradigmatic dialogue. A considerable portion of the work devoted to the first goal has been to clarify misunderstood and fuzzy concepts of the authors at stake. Given the general culture of the End of History debate, in which most criticisms of Fukuyama are plagued by a selective and sloppy reading of his major texts, the relevant clarifications comprise an unconventional, although not entirely original, work. The more original contribution this thesis has hoped to achieve, however, is its second goal—that of discovering the ongoing versatility implicit in Fukuyama’s paradigm and reinventing the paradigm while remaining faithful to its internal constitutive principles. The synthesis of Fukuyama’s with two other paradigms not only reconstructs the former, but also makes the latter more coherent and richer.

In pursuit of the two intermediate aims of the thesis, Chapter One has argued, mainly by vindicating the internal coherence of his system, that Fukuyama’s philosophy deserves more intellectual respect than many critics have accorded it. Chapter One has set out six arguably invalid criticisms, from outside sources and also raised in this thesis. (1) Commentators, quite understandably, accuse Fukuyama of evoking mutually contradictory philosophers or misinterpreting them. They, however, fail to appreciate Fukuyama’s peculiar method of treating great thinkers not solely on their own terms, but in terms of their instrumentality for analyzing the twentieth-century political context. He also overcomes apparent contradictions between
competing theories, such as between Plato and Hegel, by creative dialectical processes. (2) Some critics argue that the contemporary unfolding of political events, such as violent conflicts based on nationalism and/or religious fundamentalism, invalidate Fukuyama’s thesis. This type of criticism is mistaken, given that Fukuyama’s End of History is fundamentally a Hegelian idealist and Kantian normative concept, the empirical workability of which can be confirmed only by very broad trends of events. The End of History is thus to be understood in terms of the idea rather than the practice, an ought rather than an is, and the long-run trend of centuries rather than the short-run. (3) It is also wrong to argue that Fukuyama’s paradigm lacks a systematized conception of culture. Fukuyama employs a dual system of History—the directional trend of political-economic evolution along with the cyclical trend of social-moral fluctuation. The latter perceptively captures the Hegelian sphere of community and civil society, in which informal culture plays an irreplaceable role in sustaining formal institutions.

(4) Fukuyama’s anti-metaphysical assumption has internalized the criticism that the End of History is at best inconclusive. Fukuyama fully acknowledges that the End of History is the currently best form of ideology. An open-ended horizon of material conditions and assumptions of the future might initiate a new form of future politics, as he speculates on the biotechnologically-enabled possibility of posthuman politics. (5) Chapter One raised a potential criticism that Fukuyama’s rejection of the biotechnological manipulation of human species in defense of liberal democracy is self-defeating. He seems to endorse liberal democracy blindly, while denying one of the two premises of his Universal History—the progressivity of science—on which
the desirability of liberal democracy is established in the first place. Chapter One then argued, however, that Fukuyama’s rejection of the biotechnological manipulation does not imply any inconsistency in his philosophy, but rather unveils his conceptual prioritization of Platonic transhistoricism even over Hegelian historicism. That is, when Hegelian historicism is at peace with Platonic transhistoricism, as in his original End-of-History thesis, Fukuyama holds on to both; however, when they are at odds with each other, as in his discussion of biotechnology, Fukuyama prioritizes Platonic transhistoricism at the expense of Hegelian historicism. (6) Fukuyama is wrongly accused of being American-centric in his alleged advocacy of American democracy’s unilateralism at the End of History. Fukuyama’s political recommendation is rather to accommodate multilateral cooperation, volunteerism, and the prudent exercise of American power.

Overall, the findings of Chapter One can be more or less summarized by the concept of “Fukuyamaean theoretical plasticity.” Fukuyama’s philosophy has multiple personae (Hegel, Kojève, Nietzsche, Kant, Plato, and Marx) accumulated in one fluid body of work. This eclectic personality, in turn, is distinctive in its Hegelian roots. Kant espouses philosophical pluralism in which all philosophical systems stand on their own axioms and one system should not subsume others; Hegel, by contrast, attempts to build one philosophical system that dialectically internalizes all other systems. A great number of commentators, as represented by the above list of invalid criticisms, overlook how Fukuyama tears down the rigid walls between different philosophical systems and dialectically creates a fluid network of interactive philosophies. In this regard, Fukuyamaean theoretical plasticity represents more than
just a conceptual arsenal from which Fukuyama can draw a wide variety of philosophical defenses against his critics; it also implies that the boundaries of his theoretical framework can be made as malleable as those of the philosophical systems he has absorbed. In other words, his theoretical system can be outwardly expanded simply by being true to the very logic by which the system’s internal coherence is maintained. This in turn has justified this thesis’s attempts in Chapters Two and Three to incorporate Fukuyama’s paradigm with Huntington’s and Hardt and Negri’s, respectively.

Chapter Two provided three considerations that attempt to repudiate the widespread view that Huntington’s and Fukuyama’s systems of History are incompatible. First, Chapter Two sought to demonstrate that Fukuyama, a subscriber to the Hegelian tradition of communal liberalism, agrees with Huntington on the value of culture and of the communal sphere. For Fukuyama, the political utility of culture and community is measured in terms of social capital and radius of trust. A healthy civil society—an adequate supply of social capital and a sufficiently broad radius of trust—is a necessary condition for liberal democracy to prosper. Second, it can be argued that Huntington’s rejection of democratic and human rights “imperialism” is highly nuanced and largely in line with Fukuyama’s recommendation of prudent and multilateral democratization. Huntington believes that the West can and should carry on the democratizing mission—as long as it is executed realistically and cautiously, and pursued not because it is universally desirable but because it is unique part and parcel of Western civilization. Huntington and Fukuyama also concede that Islam and Confucianism, commonly known to be
un- or anti-democratic, are both systems of extraordinary multidimensionality and in principle can be tailored to liberal democracy. In short, Huntington and Fukuyama, although disagreeing on the universal desirability of democracy, agree on the desirability and possibility of global democratization in the long run and under realistic conditions. Third, the apparent empirical vindication of Huntington’s paradigm in the wake of the 9/11 attacks does not undermine the long-run and normative validity of Fukuyama’s. Fukuyama’s End of History is primarily a triumph of the liberal idea; its implementation, while normatively desirable, will come in the longer run.

These three considerations, in turn, have enabled a creative synthesis between the two paradigms—the “End of the Clash of Civilizations”—which enhances the analytical strength and dynamics of both. Huntington’s focus on the short-term process mitigates Fukuyama’s on the long-term result (and vice versa), and provides a more detailed portrayal of the End of History in a smaller unit of time (such as a decade as opposed to a century). Furthermore, the End of the Clash of Civilizations highlights the final moment of History’s dialectic between culture and ideology and the hidden tension to balance between communalism and individualism. First, what is anticipated at the End of the Clash of Civilizations is the emergence of “democratic civilization,” a constitutive principle by which individual civilizations are reordered and attuned to the global implementation of democratic ideology. Second, the End of the Clash of Civilizations represents democracy’s maturation into its highest form, such as consociational democracy, that neutralizes the vice of liberalism (excessive individualism) and finds a right balance between individual liberty and community.
Finally, the End of the Clash of Civilizations resolves an internal contradiction between the normative and predictive inferences of Huntington’s dialectic. Huntington’s normative recommendation is to respect civilizational divisions (such as the West versus Islam) as the highest cultural grouping; however, his ever-expanding friend-enemy dialectic predicts another upward dialectical movement out of and beyond the oppositions among civilizations. Democratic civilization resolves this contradiction and embodies the final moment of the friend-enemy dialectic (its rationalization and self-abolition) as well as the final converging point of the friend-enemy dialectic and master-slave dialectic. The emerging “friend-neighbor axiomatic” (or in philosopher Gelven’s words, the “we-ye” modality in the place of the “we-they” modality) reflects the stage in which humans identify themselves on the positive merit of being human and delight in celebrating differences.

Chapter Three has once more exploited Fukuyamaean theoretical plasticity to expand Fukuyama’s paradigm by absorbing aspects of Hardt and Negri’s paradigm; even though the latter’s roots are Marxist and postmodern, a meaningful synthesis is possible on two grounds. First, Hardt and Negri’s Empire represents a systematic articulation of Fukuyama’s Marxian anti-metaphysical futurology. Empire, it can be reasonably argued, is equivalent to the End of History, understood as the telos of History and a qualitative break from the past (although not yet in quantitative terms). And yet Hardt and Negri move away from the dead present to the living future: The End of History only represents the end of modernity, or the end of Hegelian dialectics. It is to be replaced by the “Beginning of Alter-History” that is in a diagonal and oblique, not dialectical, relation to History proper. Empire here is the future political
arena, in which conflicts between Empire’s exploitative force and the Multitude’s constitutive force anticipate an alternative turn of political evolution. Such a conception, in turn, throws Fukuyama’s History into its future realm, the possibility of which is already present within his Marxian assumption of historical open-endedness. Another benefit of this synthesis is that Fukuyama’s conception of Factor X (genetic qualities that all humans share) addresses one of the overlooked contradictions in Hardt and Negri’s paradigm. For Hardt and Negri, the Multitude’s project of absolute democracy includes the emancipation of the Common (anything that enables communication between human subjectivities) and that of singularities (such as anthropological exodus or the creation of a new body). Hardt and Negri here simply assume that the Common and singularities are always compatible. Fukuyama rightfully challenges this assumption with his conception of Factor X. Factor X can be understood in similar terms to the Common, in that both refer to the underlying commonalities that enable communications between humans as a species. Fukuyama posits that manipulation of human attributes might at some point destroy Factor X; he thereby highlights that the maintenance of the Common and the proliferation of manufactured singularities might reach a critical point of disequilibrium. And such a possibility, which Hardt and Negri simply assume away, needs to be taken seriously.

Second, Hardt and Negri’s conception of the progressive evolution of civil society adds directional dynamics to Fukuyama’s cyclical conception of civil society. Fukuyama adopts historical parallelism in his division of history into the directional history of political-economic institutions and the cyclical and static history of moral-social institutions. Whereas the performance of political-economic institutions
improves progressively, that of civil institutions fluctuates within a delimited range. Hardt and Negri, by contrast, assume certain directionality (the transcendence-immanence dialectic) in the evolution of civil institutions. They announce that the Hegelian conception of civil society as a mediator between natural society and the State is outdated; instead, Empire is marked by the Foucaultian and Deleuzean passage from a disciplinary society to a society of control, in which the biopolitical rule of the State is now completely immanent in social life without the mediation of civil society. This is what might be called the “End of Civil Society.” The concept of the End of Civil Society, by articulating a broader trend underlying Fukuyama’s parallel histories, in turn broadens the analytical applicability of his philosophy. Fukuyama’s historical parallelism, however, is still fruitful: It moderates Hardt and Negri’s totalizing tendency that reduces every register of life into one biopolitical alloy, and in particular, disregards the autonomy of the communal sphere. The virtue of Fukuyama’s historical parallelism lies in its acknowledgement that a diversity of autonomous logics, which are *within* but *not subsumed* under the broadest logic of History (here, the transcendence-immanence dialectic), interdependently govern different local spheres of social life. Fukuyama grants a certain degree of autonomy to civil society and the sphere of community, thereby recognizing community-beings (an intermediate mode of humanity between individual-beings and species-beings) as a valid unit of analysis. Fukuyama’s view of religion as a civil and communal institution, for instance, allows the elements of transcendental ethics to survive on their own terms in the civil sphere, although not in the political sphere. This
significantly mitigates and qualifies Hardt and Negri’s totalizing and simplifying logic of the transcendence-immanence dialectic.

Moving beyond the two primary goals of this thesis (clarifying and expanding Fukuyama), there are several potential directions for future studies. First of all, further research could be done on the practical implications of this thesis’s findings. For instance, the theory of the End of the Clash of Civilizations predicts that the Clash of Civilizations is bound to continue, perhaps for centuries, but it is also bound to end eventually. The Clash, presumably, does not have to be on a military front: It could as well be a cultural war, economic competition, intellectual debate, or any type of confrontation out of which dialectical movements of History can advance. What is neither likely nor desirable in the long-run is a forced multiculturalism in the sense of a peaceful stalemate between cultural forces, which Huntington in a sense recommends. History, as it has been, will keep moving forward until its dialectical potential is exhausted. Putting an artificial halt to it might just delay a more progressive turn of events. Political recommendations based on this prediction could vary, but in general point to the adoption of foreign policies that are realist in rhetoric and tactics but liberal in aspiration and faith in progress. The question of micro-political specifics depends on the contingent contexts of future political landscapes, and can be further studied.

Most poignantly, a future version of this thesis should move to a more adequate discussion of the theory of war. Gelven asserts that the we-ye modality of human existence is in effect unachievable except through war: It is only “through war,
as a means of achieving peace [that] the they is defeated so as to allow a ye.\textsuperscript{265}

Gelven’s assertion then greatly refines what constitutes a meaningful dialectical contradiction out of which human politics could evolve. This leads to the classical question dating back to Carl von Clausewitz: Is war an extension of politics, or vice versa?\textsuperscript{266} In other words, is military conflict a necessary part of human politics (at least until the dialectics of History come to self-abolition)? Or could politics be an effect, rather than a cause, of military conflict? Also central to the discussion are questions such as: Is military conflict qualitatively different from its analogues, such as cultural war or intellectual debate? If so, does the End of the Clash of Civilizations necessarily anticipate a bloodbath, as opposed to a peaceful and deliberative negotiation? As with Gelven, Kant would respond with a yes: Without being reminded by the wake-up call of tragic war, humans would never wholeheartedly understand what is best (or what is not) for them.\textsuperscript{267}

A relevant contemporary example is the drafting of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Although it was drafted by multilateral and peaceful deliberations, would it have been possible in the first place if humanity had not so recently gone through the Holocaust and other atrocities? What complicates the question, however, is the concept of the End of Civil Society: Political and civil

\textsuperscript{265} Gelven, \textit{War and Existence}, 253. Gelven stresses the existential necessity of war. According to him, while no \textit{individual} war is inevitable or necessary, war in general is an essential “part of our resistance to nihilism.” Gelven also establishes the relationship between war and idea such that an existential meaningfulness derives from a marriage between ideology and war, for the ideas “of a Socrates, of a Christ, of a Kant, are not beneficial without the spirit to defend them against those who would eliminate them.” Ibid., 270, 62, 54.

\textsuperscript{266} Clausewitz states that war is a “real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means.” Carl von Clausewitz, \textit{On War}, ed. Anatol Rapoport (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), 12.

\textsuperscript{267} Kant argues: “Wars… are the means by which nature drives nations to make initially imperfect attempts, but finally, after many devastations, upheavals and even complete inner exhaustion of their powers, to take the step which reason could have suggested to them even without so many sad experiences.” Kant, “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” 47.
spheres share a similar pattern of evolution and the gap between the two is getting narrower, although not completely closed. The postmodern modes of war cut across the military, political, economic, civil, personal, real, and virtual—the biopolitical. Such a perspective would imply that attuning human subjectivities to what History dictates to be the most rational course of action is now possible without the trauma of war or equivalent political experiences; it can be equally effectively done within the civil sphere through various non-military resources for manipulation. One suggestive example is Richard Rorty’s sentimental education. Rorty argues that through storytelling and other sentimental manipulation, humans can empathetically appreciate what constitutes common humanity over superficial differences.268 That is, the End of the Clash of Civilizations might be possible with a handful of well-written, tear-inducing books. Some might reasonably argue that Rorty is too naïve and that the emotional foundations that bifurcate humanity need a more radical breakthrough—again, going back to the existential necessity of war. The question of war, as briefly touched upon here, is unresolved in this thesis and constitutes a promising subject for future study.

There are also several procedural and methodological directions a further development of this thesis could take. It could obviously benefit from interviews with the authors of the paradigms (alas, Huntington died in 2008). It would be useful to learn where and how the authors’ intellectual preoccupations have further evolved, and whether and where they disagree with the findings of this thesis. Also, as pointed

268 Rorty argues that sentimental education, such as story-telling, operates on people’s moral intuitions at the deepest level so that they are re-composed from the inside to “imagine themselves in the shoes of the despised and oppressed.” Richard Rorty, “Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality,” in On Human Rights: The 1993 Oxford Amnesty Lectures, ed. Susan Hurley and Stephan Shute (New York: Basic Books, 1993), 127.
out earlier in the Introduction, the analysis could be thickened and deepened by more serious engagement with the literature of the theorists (such as Plato, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Deleuze, Foucault) on which the three paradigms are founded. A deeper knowledge of the modern and postmodern works could reveal additional potential for synthesis among the three paradigms and for internal contradictions in the paradigms that this thesis has failed to identify. Likewise, an investigation of non-Western philosophies of history, if possible in their original languages, would substantially enrich the project and keep its findings in perspective. So would an extensive discussion of alternative philosophies of history, such as one that views history as a series of random events, void of any directionality let alone progressivity. Lastly, empirical tests, especially regarding Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s analyses, would greatly supplement the findings of this thesis.

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The ending of this thesis deserves a metaphor. Walter Benjamin’s oft-cited passage vividly portrays the Angel of History:

His face is turned towards the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress.269

Many of Fukuyama’s critics have misinterpreted his End-of-History thesis as a premature announcement of the calming of the storm and the closing of the Angel’s

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wings—the end of progress, the end of history *per se*. This project’s attempt to clarify and expand Fukuyama’s conception of History has demonstrated the contrary; indeed, the discovery of the Huntington-Hardt-Negri-Fukuyamaean mode of History has completely rewritten the metaphor of the Angel of History. For Fukuyama, the End of History (the universal triumph of liberalism) primarily refers to the End of Ideology: It occurs only in one of Fukuyama’s two parallel histories—in the history of the political-economic sphere, and not in that of the civil sphere. For him, the end of history or progress requires the End of Civilization, or the universal triumph of a civil infrastructure that is tailored to the universal implementation of liberalism. The Huntington-Fukuyamaean synthesis implies that Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations represents the dialectical potential and process for the End of the Clash of Civilizations—where liberalism meets democratic civilization and the End of Ideology coincides with the End of Civilization. To apply this finding to Benjamin’s metaphor, there are now two Angels instead of one: the Angel of the History of Ideology and the Angel of the History of Civilization. The former is simply floating high in the clouds where the storm has finally faded away; the latter is still at the mercy of the storm, flying at a distance behind the first Angel, but slowly closing in on it. Eventually, the two will meet where no wind is fierce enough to propel their wings.

However, even the End of the Clash of Civilizations is not the end of history *per se*: In the Hardt-Negri-Fukuyamaean language, the End of History heralds the Beginning of Alter-History. Alter-History denotes a post-civil society—the End of Civil society—in which Fukuyama’s two parallel histories largely converge toward,
but do not completely merge into, a single biopolitical sphere; it also represents a post-dialectical history, in which humans invent their own future, while respecting the boundaries set by their human commonalities. This is as if the two Angels discover that the calming down of the storm is only transitory, for they are in the eye of the typhoon and the storm will soon reappear. At the storm’s return, the Angels will be flying side by side and hand in hand, but far enough apart so that each set of wings can spread to its fullest. Then they will finally avert their eyes from the past and plunge straight into the future. It is a sky unchartered, albeit not beyond the atmosphere—where a new but familiar wind is blowing and the Angels will dance at its whim.
Bibliography


