The Dynamic Role of Youth in Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Lessons from Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Kosovo

by

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**Acronyms and Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFDL</td>
<td><em>Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo</em> (Alliance of democratic forces for the liberation of Congo)</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>CCPN</td>
<td>Community Child Protection Networks</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CIVPOL</td>
<td>International Civilian Police</td>
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<td>CO</td>
<td>Orientation Centers (for the DDR program in the DRC)</td>
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<td>CONADER</td>
<td><em>Commission Nationale de la Demobilization et Reinsertion</em> (National commission for Demobilization and Reintegration in the DRC)</td>
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<td>CRC</td>
<td>Convention on the Rights of the Child</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DDRRRR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>ex-FAR</td>
<td>Former <em>Forces Armées Rwandaises</em> (Rwandan Armed Forces)</td>
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<td>EYES</td>
<td>Effective Youth Empowerment Strategy (in Kosovo)</td>
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<td>FAC</td>
<td><em>Forces Armées Congolaises</em> (Congolese Armed Forces)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frelimo</td>
<td><em>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique</em>, Liberation Front of Mozambique</td>
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<td>GPA</td>
<td>General Peace Agreement for Mozambique</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced persons</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labor Organization</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Migration Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRS</td>
<td>Information and Referral Services (in Mozambique)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo International Security Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>KLA</td>
<td><em>Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës</em> (Kosovo Liberation Army)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KYC</td>
<td>Kosovo Youth Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDK</td>
<td><em>Lidhja Demokratike Kosovës</em> (Democratic League of Kosovo)</td>
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<td>MDRP</td>
<td>Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLC</td>
<td><em>Mouvement pour la liberation du Congo</em> (Movement for the liberation of Congo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>OHCA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<td>OSD</td>
<td>Occupational Skills Development program (in Mozambique)</td>
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ONUMOZ  United Nations Operation in Mozambique
PN-DDR  Nation Plan for Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration
         (in the DRC)
QIP     Quick Impact Projects (in Mozambique)
Renamo  Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, Mozambican National Resistance
RCD     Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (Congolese Assembly for
         Democracy)
RCD-ML  Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie – Mouvement de
         Libération
RCD-Goma Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie - Goma
RSS     Reintegration Support Scheme (in Mozambique)
SE*CA   Synergie d’Éducation Communautaire et d’Appui à la transition
         (Action for community education and transitional support)
UN      The United Nations
UNDP    United Nations Development Program
UNESCO  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR   United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Fund
UNMIK   United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNOHAC  United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
USAID   United States Agency for International Development
YPCPP   Youth Post-Conflict Participation Project (in Kosovo)
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Chapter I.
Youth and Post-Conflict Reconstruction:
An Analytical Framework

“Now, I have been demobilized and I am with my family. It is good to be home, but I have nothing to do. I would like to study or work, but I have no money, there is no training and there is no work. I feel sad, because I feel unhelpful to my family. I am at home but I am worthless. During the day I try not to think of my life as a fighter, because it makes me cry, but sometimes I think maybe I should go back to the armed groups…”
John, 15, Democratic Republic of Congo

“I’m trying to join the Children’s Club so we can work together as children to help our community. We don’t have water or toilets here, and we don’t even have proper shelter to live in. So we’ll come together and help each other to help organizations promote our community.”
Hawa, 16, Sierra Leone

Both John and Hawa served in armed groups during their country’s civil war. Yet, as each conflict moved towards resolution and the reconstruction processes began the transition from war to peace, John and Hawa embarked on distinctly different paths. Where John is contemplating going back to the armed forces, Hawa has a clear idea of how she can make a positive difference in her community. Both of these stories reflect the experiences of millions of other young people affected by armed conflict who must make choices that may decide how they will survive and

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2 Vldar Ekehaug and Chernor Bah, ”"Will You Listen?" Young Voices from Conflict Zones " in Companion to the 10 year Machel Study Strategic Revies, ed. UNICEF and UNFPA (UNICEF and UNFPA, 2006).
succeed in the future. This thesis seeks to better understand the factors that influence these choices by answering the question:

*What causes some young people, like John, to consider returning to the life of a fighter, whereas others, like Hawa, choose to work and hope for a better future?*

Despite the abundance of literature available on the role of youth in conflict, the effects of a large youth population during the post-conflict reconstruction period has been largely understudied. There remain significant gaps in our understandings of how the post-conflict reconstruction process affects young people, and the role youth play in determining the success of the reconstruction program. Most of the research on youth in conflict focuses on young men, suggesting that a large proportion of male youth will increase the likelihood of instability, but does not consider the youth population’s role in building peace. However, in examining the youth roles in modern conflicts, pigeonholing youth as a destabilizing population oversimplifies the evidence: while young people do participate in and help to incite conflict, there are a number of instances where young men and women became leaders in peace building movements and made significant contributions to the post-conflict reconstruction environment. As such, youth are not only important to examine as a potentially dangerous demographic, but the management of the youth transition from war to peace is integral to breaking the cycle of violence that leads to civil war and

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instability. As this population of young adults becomes the next generation to lead their countries, their experiences during the reconstruction period will affect their understandings of peace and conflict and therefore have the potential to alter the national trajectory towards reconciliation or reincitation. This potential incites two further questions:

*Can actions be taken in the reconstruction process to break the cycle of violence so that young people like John choose to remain in civilian society rather than taking up arms?*

*If so, what structures can be put in place so that the Hawa’s of the world can better contribute to their society?*

This thesis will attempt to answer these questions by examining three cases of modern post-conflict reconstruction. Through a thorough investigation of the impact of different actors’ policies and programs, this study attempts to draw comparisons across cases that experienced varying degrees of success with reconstruction in order to generate hypotheses that may guide future research regarding the role of youth in post-conflict reconstruction and the ability of reconstruction actors to facilitate the youth population’s war-to-peace transition.

The process of post-conflict reconstruction, and the youth demographic’s role within it, has become a particularly salient area of study for political science. Intrastate conflict is the dominant form of war in the modern era, and young people are increasingly involved in efforts to wage these civil wars. As such, in order to

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5 Compared to the 25 interstate wars fought between 1945 and 1999, with 3.33 million battle deaths, there were approximately 127 civil wars in the same period in 73 different countries with an
promote stability and maintain peace after civil wars it is especially important to understand how to make post-conflict reconstruction efforts as successful as possible while also addressing the needs of young people affected by conflict. Post-conflict reconstruction and nation building has been studied at length in modern scholarship\(^6\) and the process itself involves an exhaustive list of actors with the youth demographic representing just one factor within the broader context. However, the often-overlooked youth population does have the potential to impact, both positively and negatively, the prospects for durable peace in a post-conflict environment: where youth gangs in South Africa continue to destabilize the country and young people in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continue to recruit other youth to fight in armed forces, former youth combatants in Mozambique and Kosovo have contributed to community reconciliation and development projects and youth groups in Belfast have worked with local peace building organizations to promote social development in their communities.

In order to facilitate the study of the dynamic youth roles in post-conflict reconstruction, the rest of this chapter will consider the existing knowledge regarding youth roles in conflict and outline the methodological framework of the thesis. In order to better grasp the dominant structures for studying youth in conflict the review of existing literature highlights a number of key gaps in the scholarship that this study will seek to address. The literature review also provides background information on a

\(^6\) This study does not attempt to examine the processes of nation building and post-conflict reconstruction as a whole. For a thorough selection of current scholarship on broader concepts in reconstruction see Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall, *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World* (United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007).
number of related issues that are critical for an understanding of the case studies, including current methods for evaluating post-conflict reconstruction, the importance of the process of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) within the reconstruction framework, and the impact of the rising trend of non-governmental organization’s (NGO) involvement in reconstruction processes. Finally, I will present the overarching hypothesis and argument made in this study. The chapter then concludes with a discussion of the methodology used in designing and carrying out the study.

**Youth in Post-Conflict Reconstruction: A Theoretical Framework**

**Definitions:**

Defining just exactly who “youth” are is a complicated task in and of itself. However, in order to examine the role that youth play in post-conflict reconstruction, it is first necessary to define the terms of the inquiry. The issues surrounding the definitions of “youth” can be described as falling within three broad categories, each of which will be discussed below: 1) Locating youth in between the legal definitions of child and adult; 2) Understanding how experiences during conflict may alter conceptions of childhood and adulthood; and 3) Understanding how the labels of “children” as opposed to “youth” can be manipulated to serve particular ends. Elucidating the tensions and ambiguity surrounding these issues provides important insight into the difficult circumstances facing young people affected by conflict and the existing structures available to address youth-specific issues.
First, the international community has created a legal distinction between child and adult, and more recently has acknowledged (though not legally) the existence of a youth demographic in between the two. These distinctions, however, are often conflicting, overlap, and are generally more in line with western concepts of “childhood” and life cycle than representative of all-encompassing cross-cultural norms. For instance, under the legal status of the Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC), a “child” is defined as “every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.” However, while the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (2002) affirms the special rights of children under the age of eighteen during conflict, the CRC itself and the Rome Statute of 2002 allow for voluntary recruitment of children over the age of fifteen into armed forces.

While these policies seek to delineate the legal differences between children and adults, pinpointing “youth” along this continuum is particularly problematic. For instance, the World Health Organization (WHO) designates three different categories of youth: adolescents (10-19 years old), youth (15-24 years old) and young people (10-24 years old) and the United Nations program on youth defines youth as those aged 15-24. However, these age-defined boundaries do not necessarily capture understandings of “youth” across cultures. Chronological definitions of youth are

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8 The Convention on the Rights of the Child has been signed by 192 nations and includes 54 articles and two Optional Protocols that outline the civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights of children. The text of the convention can be accessed at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm
much more in line with western concepts of childhood and promote an individualistic understanding of development outside of social contexts. This view is in direct contrast to other cultural interpretations in which the idea of adolescence or pre-adulthood is community dependent and understood as developing through a social dynamic, where age may be a common characteristic, but not the defining criteria. For instance, some cultures define youth as the time before certain life events, such as marriage or land ownership, rights of passage, or an assessment of an individual’s personal capacity. In these cases, a person maybe considered a “youth” well past the western age-definition’s cut-off. While the chronological definitions may not provide the best understanding of who youth are, what is important is that there is a gradation between child, youth and adult in which the characteristics that define a child are different than those of an adolescent or youth, whose identity is strongly characterized by their transition from child to adult. As such, the age-bound definitions serve as a simplistic indicator of this stage in between childhood and adulthood.

Second, to even further complicate the issue, when children and youth live through times of war or crisis, these definitions may be subject to change. Experiencing extreme crises is generally associated with a loss of the “innocence” that characterizes childhood, forcing the process of “growing up” to accelerate, and potentially inflicting permanent psychological damage. For instance, children or youth’s role as an active participant in war (whether as a soldier/rebel, refugee, sexual

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14 Kemper, ”Youth in War-to-Peace Transitions. Approaches by International Organizations,” 8.
slave, etc.) can drastically change their psychological state and their own personal identification as “youth” or “adult.” In addition, civil war often renders many children and youth as orphans, responsible for taking care for their own and their siblings’ livelihood. While these individuals may not have satisfied other generally accepted criteria of adulthood such as age, “financial independence, marriage, initiation rites, the right to vote or full judicial liability,” taking on the responsibility as the head of the household seems to afford children and youth in these cases a “de facto status of adulthood.” This creates a tension between the real situation of children and youth performing adult functions and the economic and socio-cultural restraints that prevent them from achieving recognition as adults in the greater political and social community.

Finally, different actors within the conflict may manipulate labels of “child,” “youth,” and “adult” in order to gain advantages in public opinion. For instance, because the term “child” carries both social and legal obligations of protection, it is often used by NGOs and other outside actors to cite human rights infringement, or by individuals seeking to benefit from certain programs that are legally obligated to serve persons under the age of eighteen. Whereas the international community has an obligation to protect the innocence of a child, officials may rely upon stereotypical connotations of the term “youth” to invoke images of menacing gangs and out-of-hand teenagers in order to enforce legal culpability (and visa versa for youth activists

15 Ibid.
who call themselves “children” to avoid punishment).\textsuperscript{17} The media and conflict participants both use these connotations to manipulate the public opinion and policy agenda.

The differences between the legal and operational definitions of youth are particularly important for this study. International policy makers and non-governmental actors most often focus on children during conflict and post-conflict reconstruction, as the international legal definitions create a suitable framework with which to separate child-specific needs. However, while the definition of who a “young adult” is may vary in cultural contexts, youth have more agency as a potentially destabilizing force in regards to exerting influence during the reconstruction period.

While “youth” can be understood in a variety of different ways, in order to facilitate comparisons across the three cases, this study will focus on individuals ages 10-24, as per the WHO definition of “young people”. This definition is most useful because it encompasses both the typically defined adolescent age group (15-24) along with including some of the younger population, who having lived through times of crisis, may in fact be acting as \textit{de facto} youth or adults. While it is not ideal to use a chronological definition, it is necessary for facilitating a consistent cross-case comparison, and where appropriate each of the cases will take cultural context into account in discussing the youth demographic. This is a distinct advantage of the case study methodology as it allows for comparisons of how well the \textit{de jure} definitions of youth apply to the \textit{de facto} situations in each case.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
**Evaluating Post-Conflict Reconstruction**

Just as it is necessary to define the scope of inquiry regarding the definition of “youth,” in order to examine the impact of the youth demographic on post-conflict reconstruction, it is also necessary to 1) define post-conflict reconstruction and the important functions that fall under its umbrella and 2) understand how other scholars have attempted to evaluate the success or failure of reconstruction efforts.

First, the phrase “post-conflict reconstruction” is used loosely to describe a number of situations: nation-building, post-accord peacekeeping or enforcement, and reconciliation can all fall under the umbrella of post-conflict reconstruction. Paraphrasing the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 report *An Agenda for Peace*, Michael Doyle defines the task of reconstruction as “foster[ing] economic and social cooperation with the purpose of building confidence among previously warring parties, developing the social, political and economic infrastructure to prevent future violence, and laying the foundations for a durable peace.”18 This definition portrays both the negative goals of preventing reincitation of violence and the maintenance of law and order, along with the positive goals of developing political, social and economic systems that will guide the country through prolonged stability and peace.

Post-conflict reconstruction takes on many different forms in order to address specific needs, but there are a few key elements that are generally acknowledged as critical in creating a stable environment and rebuilding after war. According to the

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Center for Strategic and International Studies’ *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project*,
the four essential pillars of reconstruction are: security and public safety, justice and
reconciliation, governance and participation, and economic and social progress.\(^{19}\)
Where ensuring public safety represents a negative peace, the goals of reconciliation,
good governance and social and economic progress all move beyond establishing a
cessation of violence, towards achieving a positive peace through the processes of
capacity and nation building. Within each of these sectors, there are certain reforms
that leaders in the field identify as necessary for successful reconstruction. For
instance, within the context of establishing safety and security and reforming the
security sector one of the first requirements of a successful reconstruction program is
the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former militants.

While the DDR process can take on many different shapes, the functions of
the three processes remain the same: disarmament refers to the collection and disposal
of the of weapons used by former combatants, where the process of demobilization
involves the disbanding of military structures as part of the transformation from a
wartime environment to a peacetime environment. Both disarmament and
demobilization are therefore more inline with the negative goals of reconstruction in
dismantling the structures of the war in order to prevent further outbreaks of violence.
Reintegration, on the other hand, goes further to address the long-term goals for the
return of former combatants to civilian life. This process often involves training and
support programs that enable ex-combatants and their dependants to (re)adapt and
succeed in peacetime social, political and economic life. Successful and effective
DDR programs can greatly contribute to the stability of the post-conflict community

\(^{19}\) [http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr/](http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr/)
and reduce the chance of the re-inciting of violence. However, ineffective DDR programs that only partially disarm, demobilize and reintegrate combatants or do not include all the three tasks over time “pos[e]…significant threats to security and stability.”\textsuperscript{20} For example, with an incomplete or ineffective DDR program that does not provide adequate support to former combatants or fully disarm the competing factions, many former combatants may have more of an incentive to recidivate than to comply with the program.\textsuperscript{21}

Recent conflicts, where soldier populations increasingly involve youth and child militias have called attention to the specific issue of disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating child-soldiers, and the particular problem of addressing of gender roles within the conflict experience. However, because the designation between child and adult DDR programs depend on legal definitions and obligations to children, most of the child-specific DDR programs predominantly focus on protection and family reunification.\textsuperscript{22} These programs, however, are not necessarily well adept at serving a young-adult population from 15-24. For instance an 18 year-old is left out of the “child” category under international law and therefore not given access to resources provided to children, and is instead grouped along with adult soldiers. In the same vein, through her experiences in war time, a 16-year old may expect more agency in a post-conflict community than a “child” is generally attributed and might require more of an economic and political reintegration than does an 8-year-old ex-combatant. While in many respects the designations between child and adult are

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22} Lilian Peters, \textit{War Is No Child's Play : Child Soldiers from Battlefield to Playground} (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005).
useful, if not necessary, in protecting children and ensuring proper protection during the reconstruction process, the delineation between children and adults, and the differences in the programming, can also generate a great deal of tension.

While the United Nations does not implement a DDR module that treats youth as a separate category, the organization has identified a number of guiding principles that, if followed, enable DRR programs to successfully address the needs of the youth demographic. According to these principles, successful youth DDR will 1) involve effective coordination between the respective programs for children and adults in order to “make sure that people who started out as child soldiers but are now 18 receive proper support”; 2) provide for long-term sustainability by fulfilling full youth reintegration, rather than separation from their peers; 3) “Do no harm” by planning a smooth transition and recognizing youth as an asset in the reconstruction process. This third task can be achieved by “dealing with root causes of youth’s participation in armed conflicts; understanding the youth labour market and increasing the employability of youth so they are not trapped in poverty; addressing the health needs of youth…. assisting youth who have child-care responsibilities; and opening up opportunities for further education and training.”

Second, while the overarching reconstruction goals of creating stability and durable peace are quite logical and easily understood, the method to getting there is much more obtuse. In order to better develop methods for successful reconstruction, scholarly literature has sought to understand key variables that contribute to stability

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after civil war and measure the relative success of different instances of post-conflict reconstruction.²⁴

One way to approach this issue is to examine different variables of a post-conflict environment in relation to the dependent variable of “stability.” Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild develop a method to test two different categories of variables in post civil-war environments against the number of months that peace endured after the conflict. They divide these variables into categories of: the “settlement environment,” or the structural characteristics of the country where the civil war occurred, such as former type of regime, the prevailing international system and characteristics of the country and the war itself; and the “settlement arrangement” which deals with the specifics of the peace agreement, such as whether it partitions territorial autonomy or provides for power sharing, and if there was third party enforcement or involvement.²⁵ These factors are then coded and analyzed against the number of months in the first five years after the conflict that peace endured. The use of a five-year measurement as the time-period of analysis is significant in that while Hartzell et al. were analyzing the long-term success of reconstruction, they felt that five years was the most appropriate proxy for measuring success over time: the five year measurement allowed Hartzell et al.’s test to demonstrate the importance of the short-term durability of the arrangement, allow for changes over time, and predict the

²⁵ Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, "Stabilizing the Peace after Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables."
likelihood of long-term stability, as only in rare instances have civil wars resumed after five years of peace.  
The majority of studies that try and evaluate the success or failure of reconstruction efforts focus on broad potential causal factors that are commonly held to affect the peace process, such as the negotiated settlement, regime type, the international environment, or 3rd party enforcement. However, the same logic has not been used to address the impact of the youth demographic as one of the broad issues that may affect the reconstruction process. While there is a growing literature on the possible correlations between youth and stability, this study aims to provide a systematic analysis that evaluates the youth cohort’s affect (both positively and negatively) on the post-conflict environment. This type of analysis would not expect to see that the youth demographic is the lynchpin in the success or failure of post-conflict reconstruction. Rather, exploring the impact of the youth demographic and of the reconstruction policies designed to facilitate the youth transition from war to peace can provide important contributions to the understanding youth roles in conflict and the ways in which the international community can successfully address youth issues in order to enhance reconstruction programming.

**General Trends in Youth-in-Conflict Literature**

Despite the significant lack of research on the roles of youth in post-conflict reconstruction, there is wide variety of scholarship concerning youth in conflict and the relationship between youth and conflict causation. Accompanying the surge of interest in the role of children and youth during conflict, there are also a number of

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26 Ibid.: 187.
recent studies that attempt to better understand youth roles after conflict and how the tensions between child-youth paradigms affect the structure of youth related reconstruction policy. The focus of these studies includes three broad categories including: 1) the issues surrounding child soldiers, 2) the role of youth in conflict, and finally 3) the potential for youth agency in post-conflict reconstruction.

I) Child Soldiers

One of the dominant trends of research concerning youth in conflict deals with the humanitarian and legal issues of demobilizing child soldiers. The predominance of child soldiers in modern civil has coincided with changes in the method of modern warfare and in the technology used to carry out war. Whereas traditionally young men are targeted as the most capable soldiers to carry out military actions, in the 20th century the role of younger adolescent youth and children has dramatically expanded, as they are increasingly seen as an extremely versatile resource. Technological innovations that allow for lighter and easily manipulated weaponry, combined with growing motivations, such as extreme poverty and insecurity, increase both children and youth’s capacity to participate in conflict and the likelihood to be recruited. Instead of a limited role as trained soldiers, adolescents and children in the 20th century’s civil wars increasingly participate (often against their will) as soldiers, messengers, spies, cooks, look-outs and sexual slaves.27

In part as a reaction to the plight of children and child soldiers in the modern era, a strong international movement began to bring attention to the moral issues involved in the recruitment of children into conflict. The international community

27 For more information on Child Soldiers see *Children at war* by P.W. Singer
ratified a number of different documents, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which defined the special political, social and economic rights of the child,\textsuperscript{28} and attempted to reduce the incidence of child soldiering by putting restrictions on the legal age to recruit young soldiers.\textsuperscript{29} However, while the international community paid special attention to children’s issues and established a legal framework for their protection, the topic of youth in conflict attracted much less attention. It is easy to understand why the issue of child soldiers is seen as a clear-cut moral issue. Children are vulnerable and dependent on adults. Because they cannot care for themselves, they readily become the innocent victims of conflict. Youth, however, have more of a capacity to think for themselves and carry out actions on their own behalf. Instead of being categorized as the innocent victims, youth are stereotyped as mischievous instigators, and a significant portion of the literature concerning youth in conflict focuses on their destabilizing potential.\textsuperscript{30} While the CRC declares a child to be any person under the age of 18, \textit{de jure}, there is not a clear cut \textit{de facto} difference in development such that a 17-year-old solider is an innocent victim and a 19-year-old is a troublemaker. This blurred distinction between child and youth creates a tension as to how to deal politically and socially with young adults and adolescents involved in conflict.

Parallel to the issue of child soldiering, many international organizations active in post-conflict areas work under a “rights-based approach,” that seeks to

\textsuperscript{28} “Convention on the Right of the Child.”
\textsuperscript{29} The CRC forbids recruitment of children under 18 into the armed forces, although the Optional Protocol allows for the voluntary (as opposed to forced) recruitment of children as young as 15 \textit{Ibid.}
provide for the basic needs of children and ensure their security based on the legal provisions of the CRC. These efforts are generally more advocacy related and are often manifest in policies and programs designed to reunite orphans with their families, provide food and shelter, and establish social outreach and education programs. While these organizations provide many needed services, the overall approach is incomplete, especially in reaching out to older youth. The rights-based approach is limited first by an age cut off at 18, which excludes a significant proportion of youth from the benefits of advocacy and protection programs. However, more significantly the rights-based approach is limited by its underlying assumptions that children need special protection because they are innocent and dependant actors within an adult world. This theoretical framework, however, becomes the basis for programming which, instead of focusing on long-term development, instead tends to be short-term or preventative in nature seeking primarily to promote the legal fulfillment of the CRC – either by creating awareness of the special rights of the child, or by instituting humanitarian programs that serve to protect children in crises situations. As such, the right’s based approach does not leave much room to recognize young people’s agency in the programming itself or in the broader context of the conflict and peacemaking process.

2) Youth in Conflict

There are a number of different theories that examine the relationship between youth and conflict, however in the current literature there are three dominant models that are the most relevant to the discussion of youth roles in a post-conflict

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31 Kemper, "Youth in War-to-Peace Transitions. Approaches by International Organizations."
reconstruction context: 1) the “youth bulge” theory, 2) what I will call the “Greed-Grievance” model, and 3) the literature on spoilers to the peacemaking process.

First, the approach that is most often cited when discussing the relationship between the youth demographic and conflict is the literature on so the called “youth bulge”. Youth bulge theory deals primarily in the realm of conflict causation, and is founded on the logic that large cohorts of young men will increase a country’s susceptibility to political instability. This argument proposes that the sheer number of young men in a country or region affects the decision-making framework such that both the motives and the opportunity for political violence are increased. For example, the motives for violence and rebellion are amplified as institutional crowding (and often poor governance) lead to political grievances such as poverty, lack of economic opportunity, lack of democracy and unemployment. In response, violence and rebellion may provide more of a payoff, and emerge as a rational and seemingly more effective means to deal with the situation.

Second, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler develop an econometric model to predict conflict that also examines the issue of the youth demographic in terms of institutional motives and opportunity for violence. Collier and Hoeffler’s “Greed-Grievance” model identifies a number of issues that can influence the opportunity

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31 Urdal, "A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence," 607. It is important to note, that this framework examines the decision to join an already existing organization and therefore negates the collective action problem. This is not speaking to the idea that youth gather together to form their own new and distinct rebel organization, but that a large population of young men combined with institutional crowding increases the likelihood that young men will turn to violent methods to express their grievances. Urdal, "A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence," 609.
35 Collier and Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War."
cost structure that determines the decision to join rebel organizations. Opportunity cost in this sense means the foregone costs of choosing one action (i.e. joining a rebel organization or using violence to fight for a cause), over another option (such as maintaining a non-violent method of expressing political grievances). Joining a rebel organization carries a number of significant sacrifices, often including leaving one’s family or job, that preclude a number of people from choosing to join as compared to other methods of political activism. Young men, however, with fewer family obligations, faced with unemployment and very few political outlets have a distinctly low opportunity cost to joining a rebel group. Membership in these groups may also provide a number of distinct benefits including food, education, and camaraderie in return. Therefore a large youth cohort with low opportunity costs increases the chances for rebel groups to successfully recruit for their cause.\(^36\) In addition, a higher percentage of males in higher education may affect decision-making, either in reducing the number of young men with low opportunity cost because of the increased potential income lost, or conversely increasing the number of young men joining rebel movements, because of the government’s inability to provide opportunities appropriate for those with higher education.\(^37\)

Both the Youth Bulge model and the Greed-Grievance model address the youth demographic’s potential within the context of conflict causation. However, the framework of analysis only addresses youth’s potentially destabilizing influence, and does not go on to describe the youth role during the post-conflict reconstruction process. Nor do these theories provide a model for how the existence of “youth

\(^{36}\) Ibid.: 569.
“bulge” conditions may change or enhance the conflict itself. In the same way that these models demonstrate how the youth demographic may contribute to instability on one end of the conflict life cycle, a large proportion of youth may also comprise a threat to the peace-making and reconstruction process. However, it is not entirely clear that the same opportunity-cost structures described by Urdal, Collier and Hoeffler that determine the decision to resort to violent or destabilizing behavior will continue to govern the decision making process in the post-conflict environment. Having lived through the conflict, certain key structures that initially lowered the opportunity cost or increased the motive to join the conflict, such as relatively few family obligations or the potential benefits of safety, shelter and community, may have changed. For instance, as young people are forced to cope with the terror of war, and many become responsible for the livelihoods of their families due to the loss of parents, they may see the maintenance of violent activity as less productive. The intervening affects of reconstruction actors may also change the cost-benefit structure in terms of the benefits of maintaining destabilizing behavior rather than reintegrating into civilian life, or even contributing to community development. If reconstruction policy successfully provides venues for reintegration and transition to civilian life, such as transitional stipends, vocational training and other socio-political empowerment programming, the potential benefits of returning to civilian life may outweigh those of staying with a rebel organization. As such, while the two models demonstrate how the youth demographic is related to issues of instability and conflict causation, the models do not provide a complete analytic structure for understanding the role and impact of the youth population during and after the conflict.
The third theory concerning youth involvement in conflict is the “Spoiler” approach. Where the previous literature focused on conflict causation, this area of scholarship examines methods of conflict resolution and focuses on the role of individuals or groups seeking to hamper peace-making processes. Coined by Stephen J. Stedman in 1997, the term “spoiler” is used to describe elites and other groups that are party to the conflict and peace-process who strive to thwart negotiations and block the implementation of peace treaties based on their own preferences and goals. As such, Stedman’s spoiler model is predominantly focused on the individual characteristics of elite actors, and examines how varying personality attributes and objectives frame a spoiler’s approach to obstructing the peacemaking process.

More recently, however, the spoiler problem has been reexamined and reframed in terms of analyzing the structural dynamics that determine the actions of potential spoilers.38 In their Capabilities Model, Kelly M. Greenhill and Solomon Major show that spoilers act based on the cost-benefit structure of bargaining and cooperating verses continuing the conflict and spoiling the peace process. As opposed to Stedman’s model examining the individual personalities and intentions of actors, Greenhill and Solomon outline a model of an analysis that examines the existing opportunities and power structures which determine the potential methods of action for the groups involved in the peace making process.39 In addition to redefining spoilers in terms of a group or individual’s structural and situational capacity, Greenhill and Solomon add the category of “latent spoilers” to the paradigm, defined

as groups of “determined but weak actors who would oppose the implementation of a peace accord, if only they had the material wherewithal to do so.”

While both spoiler models focus on elite groups in the peace-making process, the Capabilities Model of structural causation is especially applicable to the youth demographic in a post-conflict environment, if the existence of a large youth cohort is understood as a latent or potential spoiler. The structural causes of opportunity and motive that increase the risk of inciting conflict, also play into the cost-benefit analysis of living under a peace agreement verses expressing frustration through violence that undermines the process. Whereas youth previously held relatively powerful political, social and economic positions during wartime, in peace time that power structure changes. Instead, youth may have high expectations for peace time, but are faced again with inadequate opportunity. As such, youth’s “expected utility of continuing to fight,” (what Greenhill and Soloman characterize as the most important factor in determining spoiler behavior) may be greater than the perceived benefits of integrating into the peace regime. As such, the type of cost-benefit analysis that drives elite spoiler behavior may also be related to the behavior of youth actors. However, because of their relative power position and the varying degrees of benefit of different types of action, youth may choose different methods to act on their grievances, along a spectrum from peaceful demonstrations, to riots, participation in street gangs, or rejoining rebel armies.

Where the Capabilities Model demonstrates the strength of a structural based analysis in determining spoiler behavior, it does not treat youth specifically or

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40 Ibid.: 10.
41 Ibid.: 12.
describe how the structures and incentives in the post-conflict environment affect the particular choices that determine youth behavior. However, this type of analysis that underlines the structural determination of motives and opportunities opens the door for the possibility that the nature of youth behavior is not predetermined, but rather has the potential to change if the proper conditions are in place. As such, these theories point to the need to examine the specific conditions that youth face in order to find ways to change the structures that generally lead youth towards destabilizing behavior and instead invest young people in the peace process. If the policies implemented during the reconstruction processes changed the incentive structure such that youth benefited more by working with the peace process, rather than resorting to violence, not only would young people be less likely to be recruited by other spoilers, but they may instead choose to contribute positively to the peace-process and the stability of the community.

Understanding the dynamic of the cost-benefit and incentive structure during post-conflict requires an analysis of the various types and relative success of intervening programs during the reconstruction process. As the post-conflict environment is generally characterized by a degree of humanitarian crisis as a country deals with the consequences of war from mass displacement to disease, the factors that create the incentive structure may be related to a variety of needs that were not present in the initial conflict scenario. As such, in order to further examine the youth role as potential latent spoilers, and the impact of changing structural dynamics on determining that behavior, this study will attempt to use the case studies as a spring
board to analyze how structural factors and intervening reconstruction actors affect youth behavior during the post-conflict reconstruction period.

3) Youth Agency in Post-Conflict Reconstruction

The focus of scholarship on the potentially destabilizing characteristics of youth, as with the youth bulge literature, or the moral and protection issues surrounding children’s involvement in conflict, as with the literature concerning child soldiers, does not provide an adequate model for understanding youth behavior in the post-conflict environment. Two recent models, however, strive to first address how varying approaches to youth programming reflect limits in current conceptions of potential youth roles, and second develop a more encompassing understanding of youth behaviors during post-conflict reconstruction.

First, Yvonne Kemper in her recent report “Youth in War-to-Peace Transitions: Approaches of International Organizations” provides a model for understanding the various approaches used to address youth issues during post-conflict reconstruction. Kemper divides the approaches into three distinct categories: Rights-based, Economic, and Socio-Political. Each approach has significant value for the reconstruction process, reflects a different understanding of children and youth needs, and addresses a different time frame in youth development in conflict situations. For instance, as previously discussed, the rights-based approach predominantly focuses on preventative policy and views children as victims of a hostile situation that has undermined their legal human-rights as social actors. An economic approach moves further away from the passive role of the child. Instead,

42 Kemper, ”Youth in War-to-Peace Transitions. Approaches by International Organizations,” 47.
similar to the Greed-Grievance model, an economic approach “views youth as
decision-makers in the marketplace” who make rational decisions in pursuit of their
best interests. As such, an economic approach is driven by the potential roles of
youth as either an easily exploitable resource for conflict production, or productive
peacetime economic actors. The respective programming is therefore aimed at the
short-term reintegration of youth into productive economic activity. However, just
as the rights-based approach is limited by its underlying principals, the economic
approach is limited as it reduces young men’s role to simply being a resource
available for manipulation and therefore “inadvertently accepts th[e] narrow view of
those who exploit them and carries on myths of youth’s inherent violence.” As
such, the more traditional child’s-rights and economic approaches are meant to help
children and youth fulfill their potential along a spectrum of potential roles as both
social and economic actions. While this description of possible roles for children and
youth may be descriptively accurate, it is not complete. Young people do fill these
roles; however, they are not limited to them. Youth also have the potential to act as
social and political agents that can contribute to the post-conflict reconstruction
process. In this respect, a socio-political approach to youth programming regards
youth as critical members of civil-society and understands the precarious long-term
dynamic of youth as significant and active agents in the community, both as potential
spoilers and as peace-builders. While socio-political youth programming is the least
utilized of the three approaches, successful socio-political programs can aim to

43 Ibid.: 25.
44 Ibid.: 5.
“rebuild war-torn societies through and by youth.” Each of the three types of programming provides a distinct value to the reconstruction process. However, Kemper notes that most often one approach is favored over another. Instead she suggests that a holistic perspective on youth programming would include all three approaches, and recognize youth agency as social, economic and political actors.

Second, in her recent works “Youth as Social and Political Agents: Issues in Post Settlement Peacebuilding” and “Troublemakers or Peacemakers? Youth and Post-Conflict Peace-Building,” Siobhán McEvoy-Levy portrays youth as dynamic agents that parallel the dual task of the post-accord peace process. Just as peace building requires both the negative task of preventing a relapse into violence, and the positive task of state building and solving underlying causes of conflict, youth can be both positive and negative agents in post-conflict reconstruction. As such, the roles that youth take on during and after conflict may change over time and either actively or passively contribute to peace or instability. In addition, just as peace-building efforts to address one aspect of youth behavior are not sufficient without the others, an understanding of the youth role in conflict is incomplete without both sides of the equation: youth are on the front lines as perpetrators and victims of violence in the post-accord period, and as leaders of grassroots peace efforts. While these child and youth dimensions within the post-accord process may not be fatal if ignored, they have the potential to cause instability and are central to the structural issues of peace

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46 Ibid.: 36.
building.\textsuperscript{50} Furthermore, McEvoy-Levy states that the endurance of the peace will depend “on whether the next generations accept or reject it, how they are socialized during the peace process and their perceptions of what that peace has achieved.”\textsuperscript{51}

McEvoy-Levy’s work is representative of an emerging field that acknowledges the dynamic youth dimensions and influence in post-accord peace building. While this literature on youth in conflict and youth agency presents a number of different causal theories (for a summary of these arguments see Table 1.1) and includes several in depth single-case studies, there lacks a cohesive study that examines the youth demographic’s role in the post-conflict and peacemaking processes and attempts to draw conclusions across different cases. In addition, as evidenced by Yvonne Kemper’s work, in order to develop programs that better cater to youth needs, it is important to understand the relationship between the policies of local, international and third party institutions on the emergence and impact of youth participation. Therefore, this study will attempt to fill this gap by utilizing a cross-case analysis methodology to further explore the nature of youth roles in conflict and analyze the impact of various types of youth programming during post-conflict reconstruction.

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.: 5-6.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.: 5.
Table 1.1
Summary of causal hypotheses in existing literature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Logic</th>
<th>Driving factors affecting youth behavior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Youth Bulge</td>
<td>A large population of young men is a potentially destabilizing factor, as this demographic has particular motive and incentive to resort to violence.</td>
<td>Lack of opportunity, few obligations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greed-Grievance</td>
<td>The opportunity-cost structure in the decision-making process for involvement in conflict highlights young men as an especially dangerous demographic and destabilizing population as their low opportunity cost in joining rebel forces makes them easy targets for recruitment.</td>
<td>Econometric Model, where unemployment and low opportunity-cost for fighting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spoiler</td>
<td>Certain actors may have the incentives to disrupt the negotiation or peace-making process, dependant on personality or structural conditions. Youth may be a potential demographic of “Latent Spoilers” who, if given the means, would obstruct the conflict resolution process.</td>
<td>Structural forces dictate decisions of actors as to how or if they can spoil the peace process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamic Role</td>
<td>Youth have the potential to act as both negative and positive sociopolitical agents. The types of policies implemented during the reconstruction process reflect conceptions of the youth role in conflict, from child protection, to economic and socio-political empowerment. These conceptual frameworks of various programs may limit or empower youth to exert a positive influence on the peace building process.</td>
<td>Youth roles may change over time dependent on the situation or type of policy</td>
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</tbody>
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**Youth Oriented Policies in Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of NGOs**

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have become one of the leading types of institutional actors responsible for implementing post-conflict reconstruction programs, particularly for youth. While international organizations, such as the United Nations, and aid organizations of foreign countries, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), are both active players in post-conflict reconstruction, they often depend on NGO partners to help implement their programs. The abundant and increasing activity of non-governmental parties has created a situation where NGOs with specific grants and objectives have more of an
ability to cater programs to youth issues, and have thus taken a more dominant role in dealing with the 15-24 year-old demographic. As a result, an analysis of the impact of youth programming during post-conflict reconstruction must include an examination of NGO involvement.

The trend of rising NGO involvement in conflict and post-conflict situations has been discussed at length in recent literature as part of a global phenomenon that is shifting power away from states and into the hands of multinational corporations and organizations. The power and influence that NGOs have by sheer numbers is impressive. In the late 1990s, NGOs were providing “more official development assistance than the entire U.N. system (excluding the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund).” Within conflict zones the prevalence of NGOs is also increasing. For instance, in Bosnia in 1996 over 240 international NGOs were active, requiring thirty coordination meetings per week.

With the help of various NGO programs, youth actively contribute to community safety, crime prevention, economic development and peace building efforts in post-conflict situations. However, this vast expansion of third party and non-governmental action in conflict zones may also bring severe costs. Specifically in conflict situations involving humanitarian and refugee crises, the presence of numerous organizations and an abundant supply of aid can be a detriment to the situation by prolonging the war and even serving “as a catalyst for the spread of

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53 Ibid.
conflict.”\textsuperscript{56} For instance, in refugee camps it is extremely difficult to separate non-combatants from rebels seeking to use the humanitarian assistance to recuperate their armies and continue to launch attacks from a safe haven, as was the case with the Democratic Republic of Congo in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide.\textsuperscript{57}

In addition, while NGO efforts may be humanitarian and altruistic in nature, the competitive environment in which they exist can change the way these organizations behave, with severe consequences on the populations they originally sought to serve. Cooley and Ron (2002) use a political-economic approach to develop a model that explains NGO behavior that is seemingly out of sync with originally stated humanitarian goals. This model indicates that as the number of NGOs operating within a sector increase, competition between NGOs also increases as NGOs must vie for limited funding resources. This marketization of the NGO community through competitive bidding and renewable contracts provides incentives for “dysfunctional” behavior whereby NGO operations may resemble profit-seeking modalities and loose sight of humanitarian and non-profit objectives.\textsuperscript{58}

Since NGOs play such a dominant role in facilitating youth programming during reconstruction, in order to understand youth behavior in post-conflict environments it is especially important to understand how the nature of NGO involvement affects the youth demographic. While the types of NGO programs (as previously discussed in relation to Kemper’s categorizations) are critical to youth development during the reconstruction process, the relative impact of NGO

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{58} Cooley and Ron, "The NGO Scramble - Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action," 6.
programming may also be reflective of how well NGOs were able to escape the traps of competition and successfully coordinate their efforts. While the original intentions and policies may be positive, youth-oriented NGO programs may suffer from similar malfunctions as outlined by Cooley and Lischer, and as a result NGO competition may instead have a negative impact on youth development and the post-conflict reconstruction process. Therefore, in order to capture the impact of NGO programming, this study will attempt to include an analysis of both the types of NGO programming provided during the reconstruction process, along with an examination of the NGO atmosphere, including accounts of competition and coordination with other NGOs and international organizations.

Causal Expectations

The existing literature suggests a broad range of hypotheses regarding the impact of youth populations on post-conflict stability. Negative causal hypotheses, as articulated in the youth bulge and spoiler logic, predict that large youth contingents may serve to increase the likelihood of instability. These arguments focus on overarching structural conditions, such as the lack of economic resources and institutional crowding (unemployment, land scarcity, urban crowding), which lower the opportunity of cost of joining rebellion. These conditions make the youth cohort an easily exploitable resource, likely to address their frustration through violence.

On the other side of the spectrum, scholars assert more theoretical and dynamic propositions about the unique affect that conflict has on younger generations, and the resulting implications for the role young people in post-conflict
situations. Significant to this literature is the possibility that youth may have a positive effect by becoming leaders in the post-conflict peace-building environment. The agency youth have in wartime can be redirected to efforts to build safer communities. This approach points to significant evidence that youth can be (and are) on the front lines, both in war and in grassroots efforts mobilizing for peace. Thus, in the long run, shaping the political attitudes and skills of the younger generation in a positive direction contributes to developing a durable peace.

(Table 1.1, above, summarizes these existing perspectives)

While these theories cover a broad range of potential youth roles, there are still a number questions left unanswered. Each of the arguments discussed so far present an idea of youth’s potential impact or role in conflict, but none seem to adequately provide a model to understand why some children, like John, may choose destabilizing behavior, while others, like Hawa, choose to have a positive impact on their community. Where the different structural characteristics that may create the opportunity for young people to turn to violent behaviors have been explored at length in the context of conflict causation, the possibility that structural characteristics or intervening programming could create the opposite situation has been largely ignored. As such, while the limits of different types of youth programming have been explored, it remains unclear the extent to which post-conflict reconstruction programming can affect youth behavior. Finally, while the success of post-conflict reconstruction has been evaluated through a number of different variables, there has not been a cohesive study that examines the youth demographic’s impact on the level of stability during post-conflict reconstruction.
The Argument

Although the literature differs to a degree on the logic, most scholars portray a large youth demographic as having a consistently destabilizing influence: Young men are one of the most likely demographics to turn to violent behavior or some form of rebellion. However, based on the evidence developed in the following case studies, I conclude that far from being a uniformly negative influence, a high percentage of youth in the population does not automatically presage instability. In fact, the influence that the youth population has on the level of stability is highly conditional. Whether youth become a part of the ongoing conflict or a part of the solution is not a given, but is instead affected by the larger institutional context and the effects of intervening reconstruction policy. The types of policies implemented, and the efficiency with which they are carried out, are integral in shaping this youth role. If actors recognize the special needs of the youth demographic and carry out comprehensive reintegration and reinsertion policies, not only can the youth’s negative potential be quelled, but youth energies can be redirected toward peace and nation building activity, contributing to the safety, stability and progress of their community.

Successful reconstruction with regards to the youth demographic is not necessarily dependent on the creation of a specific youth policy or the presence of a large number of NGOs concentrating on youth issues. Instead, what the cases suggest is that the reconstruction programs that are most successful in catering to youth needs and realizing youth’s positive potential are programs that efficiently fulfill certain
critical functions that facilitate young people’s positive transition from war to peace. For instance where family reunification policies were not always effective in preventing young people from rejoining armed forces, providing quality reintegration programming and education opportunities were essential functions in each case in order to fulfill youth needs. Often times these programs were also effective in providing young people with the opportunity to positively contribute to their communities. In turn, these critical functions highlight a number of youth needs in the post-conflict environment, ranging first from safety, security, and reintegration, to capacity building or empowerment. The importance of successfully completing certain key types of programming is highlighted by the fact that while actors may develop youth specific policies, such as a child specific DDR program, or there may be a high concentration of actors all dedicated to youth issues, if these actors do not carry out these programs effectively and completely, the benefits of a youth-specific policy may not be as influential compared to a more efficiently executed community-based policy. Who it is that performs these functions does not seem to matter as much as the fact that someone is doing them. In fact, a broad range of actors, from the international community to NGOs and local religious leaders, can contribute individually and collectively to the effective fulfillment of these needs.

However, what the case studies also suggest is that the existence of youth programming that successfully addresses critical youth needs is not enough. Sequencing seems to be equally important. Depending on the situation, these various youth needs must be met in the appropriate progression in order for each to be fully effective. For instance, the success of youth capacity building is dependent on first
addressing immediate survival needs of food, shelter, and then positive reintegration into communities. The demands of the post-conflict environment might require that more attention be paid to resolving immediate security issues, or may allow for the immediate implementation of youth capacity programming. Because successful youth policy is contingent on structural conditions and the sequencing of programming, the level of efforts need not be extreme, so long as it sufficiently meets the demands of the youth demographic at each stage. Without certain needs being met, from establishing safety to successful reintegration, there is a greater possibility that youth will emerge as a negative or destabilizing factor during the reconstruction process. However, if those needs are met, many youth choose to participate as agents of peace, reconciliation and community development.

Methodology

This study employs an in-depth analysis of three case studies of modern post-conflict reconstruction: Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Kosovo. Since the role of youth in post-conflict reconstruction is currently understudied compared to its counterpart in conflict causation, the field requires the development of hypotheses associating youth population levels with reconstruction outcomes. To achieve this, this thesis is structured with a hypothesis-generating focus and heuristic case study design. This type of research design provides detailed case examinations in order to generate hypotheses and research questions with the purpose of developing increasingly more refined hypotheses, so as to address increasingly

59 An in depth discussion of sequencing in regards to youth programming and post-conflict reconstruction is provided in Chapter 5 in order to integrate lessons demonstrated in the case studies.
more specific ends. Stephen Van Evera dissuesses this type of case study method in detail in his *Guide to Methods For Students of Political Science*. Van Evera notes that hypotheses can be generated through both the “Controlled Comparison” of cases studies, whereby “the investigator infers hypotheses from contrasts or similarities in aspects of several cases,” and through “Congruence Procedures,” which explore “within-case correlation[s] between the study variable and other phenomena.” Using both methods, the comparisons of similarities and differences in the reconstruction process in Mozambique, the DRC and Kosovo allows for the generation of possible cause and effect relationships between the variables and the role of youth in conflict. Given the current state of the literature on youth in post-conflict reconstruction, this type of analysis is particularly beneficial.

While this type of research design can yield new insights, it is also limited in its ability to derive firm conclusions. However, the purpose of the inquiry is not to generate absolute statements about youth in the post-conflict reconstruction process, but to gather, explore and compare the available data in order to better locate possible causal relationships. As the case study design allows for both in-case and cross-case evaluation of the different variables on the overall level of post-conflict stability, it provides a cohesive and comparative study of the relationships between youth, intervening reconstruction actors, and stability, to a field where few similar studies exist. The value of the study, then, is not in drawing finite conclusions but in identifying future avenues for exploration and development in the field.

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Case Selection

The cases were carefully selected in order facilitate the best possible comparative research design. The standards for choosing the cases were drawn from Van Evera’s designations of eleven criteria for case selection. Specifically, cases were chosen based on how they fulfilled the requirements of: data richness; extreme values on the independent variable, dependant variable or condition variables; and divergence of predictions made of the case by competing theories. In order to find cases that fulfill these criteria, a number different cases of post-conflict reconstruction were vetted across potential variables in order to construct a group of cases that were similar enough to allow comparison, but different enough to provide variability. These variables included the percentage of youth in the population, level of international involvement, and relative outcomes of stability. Finally, where two cases would have been too few to make significant comparisons, due to space constraints only three cases were selected to be explored in the thesis.

The three cases that were chosen, Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Kosovo exhibit a number of similarities. Each case is representative of a post-accord environment where reconstruction activity has occurred involving differing degrees of domestic and international influence. In all three cases, there was a relatively large youth cohort in the population and also a significant degree of youth

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62 Ibid., 88.
involvement during the conflict itself. In addition, each conflict can be defined as a civil war, rather than simply an insurgency.\textsuperscript{63}

There is also variability built into the design in regards to the dependant variable, as the case studies fall along a spectrum of success and failure in reconstruction efforts and levels of stability post-conflict, ranging from Mozambique – often considered the “poster-child” of reconstruction – to the DRC, which experienced high levels of instability and is representative of the regionalization and spread of conflict. Kosovo, represents the middle case, with evidence of successful peace building and increased security, along with ongoing tension and violence. Variation in geography also expands the scope of inquiry, and potential inferences. While using two cases located in sub-Saharan Africa provides for similarities in initial conditions, the case of Kosovo allows for cross-regional comparison, with the expectation that reconstruction policy and the involvement of the international community in the European context may differ than that towards African conflicts.\textsuperscript{64}

\textit{Cases that were not included:}

There were a number of cases that could have been included in this study, but were left out of the research design for several reasons. First, for some cases data on the reconstruction process was not as readily available as in others. In addition, because the criteria for selection was dependent on extreme variability in the

\textsuperscript{63} Where a civil war is defined as a war between opposing groups from the same country, a rebellion is a “condition of revolt against a government that is less than an organized revolution and that is not recognized as belligerency [war].” Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 11th ed. (Springfield, Mass.: Merriam-Webster, Inc., 2003).

\textsuperscript{64} The differences in the cases and the potential problems with comparison are discussed in Chapter V as a part of the evaluation of the inferences drawn from the three case studies.
dependent variable, some cases were left out if they did not present as conclusive or extreme value of stability or instability. For instance, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea were all considered as potential cases for comparison against Mozambique. However, data on the conflicts in Liberia and Guinea was initially less available than for the DRC, which could have presented a significant obstacle to the success of the study.\textsuperscript{65} The DRC was chosen instead of Sierra Leone because it represented a more extreme variation on the level of stability and could be considered as a potential case of reconstruction failure as compared to the success Mozambique.\textsuperscript{66} While a research design that included Mozambique, Sierra Leone and the DRC might have been just as appropriate, with Sierra Leone representing the medium in comparison to the “stable” and “instable” environments in Mozambique and the DRC, the types of issues raised in regards to the youth demographic may have been more limited than with the inclusion of a case representing a different region. For instance, all three of these cases involve the widespread use of child soldiering. However, youth involvement in conflict is not limited to this context, and as such examining other cases adds an important level of variability. While including a cross-regional case complicates the comparative design, it also enhances the scope of inquiry, and the inclusion of a European case enables a significant comparison of the role of the international

\textsuperscript{65} The availability of data was based on initial searches in a number of social science databases including the Social Science Citation Index, Social Science Full Text database, and PAISInternational.\textsuperscript{66} The reconstruction process in Sierra Leone has seen both elements of success and failure, particularly in relationship to the youth demographic. While it is an important case in and of itself for understanding the roles of youth in post-conflict reconstruction, because it has not experienced as decisive a level of instability as the DRC, it was not selected. For more information on the conflict in Sierra Leone and the roles of youth see: M. Chege, "Sierra Leone: The State That Came Back from the Dead," \textit{Washington Quarterly} 25, no. 3 (2002), Angela McIntyre, "Children and Youth in Sierra Leone's Peace-Building Process," \textit{African Security Review} 12, no. 2 (2003), Krjin Peters, "From Weapons to Wheels: Young Sierra Leonean Ex-Combatants Become Motorbike Taxi-Riders," \textit{Journal of Peace Conflict & Development}, no. 10 (2007).
community in reference to a generally more developed region over a lesser developed region.

Variable Structure and Coding Methods

For each case I consider the influence of several independent variables on the level of stability during the first five years following reconstruction process. To begin, the dependant variable of instability is defined in terms of the existence of political violence, riots and demonstrations, terrorism, tension between opposing parties and within the general population, and/or participation in rebel or violent groups that hinders the progress of peace and reconstruction. In order to evaluate the level of stability, data indicating these incidences of violence and the general atmosphere of tension, stability and peace was gathered from various sources including the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Country Profiles for each case, which describes the “Political Scene” in quarterly updates with an archive that spans the time-frame each study. In addition ratings from the Global Peace Index, Ibrahim Index of African Governance, Failed States Index and RiskMap 2008 guide the

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67 If the conflict took place far enough in the past such that data is available for more than five years after the peace accord, it is also included in the individual analysis, but not in the cross-case comparisons.
68 The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) is an electronic database providing expert analysis on over 200 countries, available at www.eiu.com
69 The Global Peace Index “ranks 121 nations according to their relative peacefulness. [The Index] is composed of 24 indicators, ranging from a nation’s level of military expenditure to its relations with neighbouring countries and the level of respect for human rights. The index has been tested against a range of potential “drivers” or determinants of peace—including levels of democracy and transparency, education and material wellbeing. The team has used the latest available figures (mainly 2004-06) from a wide range of respected sources, including the International Institute of Strategic Studies, The World Bank, various UN offices and Peace Institutes and the Economist Intelligence Unit. The Global Peace Index is intended to contribute significantly to the public debate on peace. The Global Peace Index is available at http://www.visionofhumanity.com/rankings/
70 The Ibrahim Index of African Governance ranks sub-Saharan African nations according to the quality of governance in relation the five key areas: safety and security; rule of law, transparency and
analysis on a number of key stability factors, and serve to support the stability rating developed in the case studies. From this data, Instability is coded along a scale of extreme, high, medium and low. An extreme coding reflects a reincitation of violence consistent with the corresponding levels during the conflict. A high level of instability indicates the existence of numerous instances of prolonged violence, rioting or terrorism that is politically motivated. A medium level of instability describes a situation were tensions may be high, but instances of violence or rioting may not be prolonged or directly politically motivated. Finally a low level of instability reflects an environment with very few incidences of violence. In this case, if some violence exists, it is not necessarily politically motivated.

The analysis of independent variables begins with an evaluation of macroeconomic and demographic factors that describe the post-conflict situation. This includes an examination of the proportion of youth ages 10-24 in the population, the level of youth involvement in the conflict, and degree to which youth were affecting by the conflict. These indicators are evaluated as high, medium or low, where high represents a large percentage of youth in the population, or youth corruption; participation and human rights; sustainable economic development; and human development.

The Ibrahim Index of African Governance is available at [http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/the-index.asp](http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/the-index.asp)

The Failed States Index ranks countries based on social, economic, and political pressures that may predict state failure. In order to evaluate each country, the index uses the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) “to assess violent internal conflicts and measure the impact of mitigating strategies. In addition to the risk of state failure and violent conflict, [CAST] assesses the capacities of core state institutions and analyzes trends in state instability.”


RiskMap 2008 assesses the level of political and security risk for businesses looking to operate in foreign countries. The political risk examines “the likelihood of state or non-state political actors negatively affecting business operations in a country,” whereas the security risk rating examines the likelihood of “state or non-state actors engaging in actions that harm the financial, physical and human assets of a company.”

involvement, relative to the global baselines, *medium* represents an average percentage compared to the baselines, and a *low* rating indicates below average percentages. In addition, the macroeconomic and demographic variables include data on the level of unemployment and the Gross National Income (GNI) per capita. Each of these indicators is then coded as *high, medium or low* as compared to a regional baseline.

The analysis then divides the reconstruction policy into four broad categories of independent variables, each of which are coded to describe the level of influence on the youth demographic and reconstruction process. The coding scheme for these variables uses two analytical determinants: First, each variable is coded as having a directional influence of either *positive* or *negative* impact. Then the level of the directional impact is graded along a scale of *low, medium, or high*.

The first independent variable, *International Involvement*, includes policies ranging from the specific stipulations of the peace treaty, to the involvement of foreign governments and the impact of the United Nations or other international organizations. This includes for instance, how the peace treaty establishes the DDR process, what type of peacekeeping mission the United Nations or other regional organization arranged, and an evaluation of the type and impact of the youth specific programs that these organizations may have implemented.

The *Domestic Policy* examines the national government’s reconstruction policies as they affect the youth demographic. For instance, this includes how local officials address education and unemployment programming during the reconstruction process. In addition, the variable may also examine nationally run
demobilization and reintegration programs, such as family reunification or other youth specific policies.

Both the *International Involvement* and *Domestic Policy* variables are coded as having a *positive* impact if the overall effect of the programs and policies had an influence that progressed the country towards peace and stability, and a *negative* impact if the results of the programs hindered the reconstruction process or moved the country in the opposite direction towards reincitation of the conflict. They are coded on a scale of *high*, *medium* and *low* levels of impact depending on the extent to which the actor’s positive or negative impact was felt across the conflict: a *high* level indicates widespread influence on the process, a *medium* level indicates a substantial degree of influence, and *low* level is felt in individual situations rather than on a large scale.

The *NGO Involvement* variable examines the level of efforts, coordination, type and quality of programming implemented by non-governmental organizations during the reconstruction process. This includes an examination of certain key NGO programs along with an evaluation of how well coordination efforts were facilitated and whether or not competition influenced the efficacy of NGO operations. The coding for *NGO involvement* uses the same measurement of *positive* or *negative* impact that is used to assess the domestic and international variables. The level of the positive or negative impact is then graded along a scale of *high*, *medium* or *low* in regards to the how the level of NGO efforts (number of NGOs active relative to the situation), the efficacy of coordination, and the quality of programming affected the general trajectory of the positive or negative impact. A *high* impact would indicate
that NGOs had a widespread influence on reconstruction outcomes, a *medium* impact indicates a significant, yet not extensive, impact, and *low* levels indicate that NGOs had nominal or anecdotal impact, but due to mitigating factors (which may include poor coordination or high competition) the NGO community did not exert a great influence on the overall process and the youth demographic.

The final variable, *Cultural/Environmental Factors*, isolates certain circumstantial characteristics and their impact on the youth demographic and overarching reconstruction process. These factors may include cultural characteristics, religious practices that were relevant to the reconstruction process, or environmental issues, such as the type of terrain or accessibility of transportation infrastructure that affected the outcome of reconstruction efforts. The *Cultural/Environmental Factors* are then coded as having a *positive* impact if they help to enable successful reconstruction policy or a *negative* impact if they serve as obstacles to the reconstruction process. The level of impact ranges from a scale of *low* level impact, affecting only certain programs, communities etc, *medium* level of impact, substantially affecting the reconstruction efforts, to a *high* level of impact, where the effects are felt structurally across the reconstruction process.

*Missing Data*

Due to a lack of availability, there are a number of instances where data is missing from the analysis. Most notably, statistical data for Kosovo is hard to come by, as most databases include Kosovo as a part of Serbia. Therefore, where available the Kosovo-specific data are used, but if the information is unavailable, the
corresponding information for Serbia is used as a proxy, and the discrepancy is indicated in the analysis. In addition, some information, particularly for the African cases, is simply unavailable due to the lack of up-to-date surveys. For instance, while statistics on youth unemployment are available for Kosovo, unemployment information is less accurate for Mozambique and represents the overall unemployment rate, and unemployment data is not available at all for the DRC. In addition, while population data on Mozambique and the DRC are readily available, because Kosovo has not been considered an independent nation until February of 2008, population statistics are not as readily available. Unfortunately, the missing data create an unavoidable discrepancy in the analysis. However, where possible, substitutes or comparable statistics were included in the analysis, or it is otherwise indicated that the specific data is missing and therefore not included in the study.

In addition, all three countries are not included in each of the stability indices: the Global Peace Index does not include information on the DRC and Ibrahim Index of Governance in Africa only covers sub-Saharan African countries and therefore does not include comparable information for Kosovo. However, the broad range of resources used in evaluating stability, including relevant literature on the reconstruction process and data from the Economist Intelligence Unit, compensates for inconsistencies in the availability of established peace and stability rankings, and for each case at least three different indices are used to ensure an accurate description of the level of stability.

For an evaluation of the programs and policies implemented during the reconstruction process, I rely on reports from the implementing agencies along with
analytical accounts by various scholars and international agencies. As such, due to space constraints and data availability, each case study attempts to provide as inclusive an account of the reconstruction process as possible, but focuses on the main actors and highlights the most significant programs.

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The rest of this study follows with an examination of each of the three cases, and a conclusion discussion drawing together the observations and trends outlined in the argument presented. Chapter 2 is the Mozambique case study, which evaluates the reconstruction processes that led to one of the most successful peace building efforts to date in sub-Saharan Africa. Mozambique is a particularly interesting case, as it was able to forge a successful reconstruction program in regards to youth issues without a specific youth-focused policy. The next chapter examines the extreme opposite case of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The conflict in DRC represents the case with the most instability, and is also characterized by an extremely high involvement of child and youth soldiers in the initial conflict and the perpetuation of the violence. Chapter 4 moves away from the extreme comparisons to the case of Kosovo, a territory with one of the highest percentages of youth in the population, which saw an extreme level of involvement from the international community directed towards the youth demographic – with unclear results. Chapter 5 explores the similarities and differences between the cases, and the potential implications for youth policy and post-conflict reconstruction drawn from the studies. This final chapter concludes with
a discussion of the questions generated from the case study analyses and the potential directions for future research on the role of youth in post-conflict reconstruction
Introduction

The twelve-year civil war in Mozambique left behind a legacy of human rights violations and systematic violence against civilians – with young men and boy soldiers responsible for most of the atrocities. The war devastated the country, as close to one million Mozambicans lost their lives, and over five million citizens were displaced by the violence. Over the course of the war, an additional 250,000 children were separated from their families.¹ The extremely high level of child and youth involvement in the conflict not only set the tone of the international community’s reaction, as the civil war in Mozambique brought the issue of child soldiering to the forefront of international dialogue, but also presented a significant complication to the post-conflict reconstruction environment, as the country had to grapple with a generation of young men socialized into war. Yet, despite the years of destruction, and without a specific international policy directed at reintegrating the large population of youth who participated in the conflict, Mozambique emerged from its civil war as the most stable of the three cases studied, and has become a model for successful post-conflict reconstruction in sub-Saharan Africa.

The fact that Mozambique overcame the potentially destabilizing problem of the youth bulge is all the more surprising considering that, unlike in many other

reconstruction processes, Mozambique was not flooded with international organizations or NGOs dedicated to peace building or reconstruction. In fact, the United Nations mission to Mozambique, while significant in size and capacity, did not create or implement a comprehensive policy on how to deal with youth and child soldiers as a distinct population. As such, the success in Mozambique is especially intriguing as it directly contradicts the assumption that in order to successfully counter the youth demographic’s potentially negative impact and meet young people’s needs during post-conflict reconstruction, that there must be a high level of involvement and programming that also includes specific policies catering to youth and children.

The explanation to this puzzle lies in how effectively Mozambique and the international actors involved implemented the reconstruction program. For instance, the United Nations ran an especially efficient mission to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate ex-combatants. While, with the exception of one program that demobilized about 850 child soldiers, this process did not have a specific method of demobilizing and reintegrating children or youth, many adolescents and young ex-combatants were included in some capacity in the overarching demobilization and reintegration process. One of the most important aspects of the reconstruction program was the United Nations recognition of the importance of reintegration as a part of the DDR process. The UN was quite successful in reintegrating demobilized soldiers back into their home communities in a relatively timely manner, armed with some form of support that would aid them in building a civilian life. Where the United Nations did not satisfy specific youth needs, a select number of NGOs and
domestic actors efficiently and successfully filled in the gaps, providing advocacy, reintegration and youth empowerment programming as needed. Through the combination of an effective DDR program, focused on reintegration, and a number of effective NGOs focused on youth issues, such as preventing former child soldiers from being drafted into the army or providing youth with the skills to become leaders in peace and reconciliation in their home communities, the dangerous potential of the large youth population was largely avoided. In fact, where given the opportunity, many young people contributed to the community building and reconciliation process.

**Background – The Civil War in Mozambique**

The conflict in Mozambique emerged directly from its colonial heritage. Therefore, in order to have a complete understanding of the situation facing reconstruction actors in 1992, the case study must begin first with an examination of Mozambique within the context of Portuguese colonization. Unlike the colonial networks of Britain and France, highly efficient in creating an infrastructure for extracting raw materials from their protectorates, the Portuguese struggled to profit from their colonial endeavor. The more-industrialized countries sought to expand their capitalist structure by both extracting raw materials and investing in markets and infrastructure within their colonies in order to expand their home economies. Portugal, however, did not have the capability to create such a colonial structure, and instead sought only to extract the resources and foreign exchange from Mozambique.
and Angola to develop (rather than expand) the Portuguese economy.\textsuperscript{2} Despite Mozambique’s prime location for the shipping industry, the Portuguese failed to invest sufficient capital to develop Mozambique internally. The railroad system, which would have promoted trade between the African colonies and with other European nations (particularly the British), was never completed -- despite a series of railways in the South, most of Mozambique’s railways remained disconnected. Any infrastructure that was developed was contained in the main cities of Lourenço Marques (later Maputo) and the Port City of Beira. As a result, the various provinces of Mozambique “developed largely in isolation from each other,” creating a modern colonial state characterized by “a high degree of dis-integration.”\textsuperscript{3} With the flight of the Portuguese population (and their capital) after 1975, the newly independent Mozambique was faced with the task of building the country’s modern infrastructure virtually “from scratch.”\textsuperscript{4}

While the lack of development of basic physical and institutional infrastructure would prove a great detriment to human development in Mozambique, the lack of Portuguese investment in the indoctrination of the native Mozambicans into the colonial system allowed the many indigenous cultures and religions to survive. Mozambican culture was largely dominated by traditional and animistic religions, and included a wealth of knowledge in traditional medicine and healing, along with philosophical understandings of relationships between individuals, society

\textsuperscript{2} Manlyn Newitt, \textit{A History of Mozambique} (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 392.
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid., 397.
and the universe.\textsuperscript{5} Traditional understandings of justice and peace would play a crucial role in the transition from civil-war to peace in Mozambique, as religious leaders, such as the traditional healers or \textit{curanderos(as)}, guided communities through grassroots reconciliation, reintegration and justice efforts.

The civil war that ended in 1992 grew directly from anti-colonial and nationalist sentiments and the Mozambican movement for independence. After World War II, when Britain and France began to dismantle their empires, the Portuguese maintained a strong stance to retain their colonies.\textsuperscript{6} In response, indigenous anti-colonial organizations in Mozambique came together in 1962 to form the \textit{Frente de Libertação de Moçambique} (Liberation Front of Mozambique), more commonly known by its acronym, Frelimo. In September of 1964 Frelimo launched an armed campaign to overthrow the colonial government.\textsuperscript{7} Portugal could not contain the insurgency, and following a military coup in Lisbon in 1974, Mozambique gained its independence on June 25\textsuperscript{th} 1975. Frelimo possessed uncontested control of the newly independent government and aligned itself with the Soviet Union as a Marxist-Leninist party.\textsuperscript{8}

With the help of the Soviet Union and its clients, Frelimo began its rule in Mozambique by forming a single-party socialist state. While Frelimo attempted to organize a number of progressive initiatives in health and education, it soon succumbed to a more radical authoritarian doctrine – banning strikes, limiting

\textsuperscript{5} Ibid., 157.
\textsuperscript{6} For example, In the 1950s Portugal changed its constitution to use the word “overseas province” instead of “colony” to emphasize the claim that “the African territories and Portugal formed a single indivisible country.” Newitt, \textit{A History of Mozambique}, 473.
\textsuperscript{8} In 1989 Frelimo officially dropped its Marxist-Leninist affiliation. Ibid.
religious activity and nationalizing certain sectors of the economy. In seeking to mobilize Mozambique’s “workers and peasants,” Frelimo tended to “ride roughshod” over the complex cultural composition including the various regional, ethnic and religious divides that existed within Mozambican society.\(^9\)

Opposition to Frelimo emerged largely from an external context. Along with Frelimo’s domestic endeavors, it began a foreign policy campaign, which placed sanctions on Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), cutting off the land locked country from the port city of Beira. In addition to these grievances, the white minority governments of Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa had a vested interest in fueling an insurgency in Mozambique as they felt threatened by the collapse of white colonial rule in Mozambique and Angola and Frelimo’s support for “Black” nationalist movements inside Rhodesia.\(^10\) As a result Rhodesia began launching direct attacks into Mozambique, and the Rhodesian secret service, eventually with the help of the South African military, fostered the development of an internal insurgent group, the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance), or Renamo.

The conflict in Mozambique is often simplified as an externally driven Cold-War-era proxy conflict.\(^11\) However, there were a number of internal dimensions that contributed as well. While the conflict was largely political struggle between the pro-Soviet and socialist Frelimo and the pro-Western and free-market Renamo, fueled by regional tensions, Renamo attempted to ground the insurgency within the domestic

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\(^11\) For instance, the background to the conflict in Mozambique in Moran and Pitcher’s article is a standard characterization of the conflict, which emphasizes the cold-war alignments over the internal aspects of the conflict. Mary H. Moran and M. Anne Pitcher, "The 'Basket Case' and the 'Poster Child': Explaining the End of Civil Conflicts in Liberia and Mozambique," Third World Quarterly 25, no. 3 (2004).
population. Comprised largely of mercenaries and forced recruits (often kidnapped children), Renamo “prey[ed]” upon the ‘regional sensibilities’ and ‘traditional’ loyalties that Frelimo disregarded.”12 The Rhodesians were not fostering an insurgency amid a population completely satisfied with its government. Domestic anti-Frelimo sentiment did exist, along with other ethnic, religious and territorial tensions. For instance, while the conflict did not pit one religion against another, Renamo sought to mobilize the more ardent religious community members who were opposed to the absolute secularism proclaimed by the Frelimo government.13 In addition, while Frelimo initially had support throughout the country, the base of their power was concentrated in the North – the first areas to be liberated from Portuguese rule. Many of Renamo’s commanders were members of the Ndau language group, which resided in the center of Mozambique, (not coincidentally, the easiest area for Rhodesia to access). However, these divisions did not become the mobilizing cause for resistance. Because Renamo did not have the internal capacity to develop as a powerful insurgency on its own, it was dependant on the support from Rhodesia and South Africa, who drove the anti-socialist cause.14

While it is important to note the existence of internal tensions, the struggle is best characterized as first an ideological war brought in from the outside that became an internal struggle between domestic actors for the spoils of office.15 Essentially, the “war came from outside. Once it started a variety of internal factors fed the conflict, but they did not become responsible for continuing the war. Ethnic and

12 Ali and Matthews, Civil Wars in Africa : Roots and Resolution, 128.
14 William Minter, Apartheid's Contras : An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique (Johannesburg : Witwatersrand University Press; London ; Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1994).
15 Ali and Matthews, Civil Wars in Africa : Roots and Resolution, 129.
regional tensions, while they existed, did not divide Mozambicans so deeply as to have sustained a war on these grounds.\textsuperscript{16} The predominance of ideological rather than ethnic, religious or territorial dimensions is evident in the many cases of family members who fought for opposing sides during the war.\textsuperscript{17}

In 1980-1981 Renamo, with the help of the South African military, began a bloody campaign of destabilization against the Frelimo regime, which would escalate to full-scale civil war.\textsuperscript{18} To complicate matters, the Frelimo government allowed the African Nation Congress (ANC), an organization ardently opposed to the apartheid regime in South Africa, to take up residence in Mozambique in order to launch sabotage campaigns into South Africa.

In 1983 Mozambique and South Africa attempted to reach a compromise over the situation. The efforts culminated in the 1984 Nkomati Accord, in which Mozambique agreed to curb ANC activities, in exchange for South Africa’s withdrawal of support from Renamo. However, despite the agreement, South African officials continued to support the Renamo insurgency. With the mysterious death of Mozambican President Samora Machel in a plane crash over South Africa in 1986, the Nkomati agreement collapsed.

The civil war in Mozambique continued as neither side could win a definitive victory. By the late 1980s both Renamo and Frelimo were dependant on external resources for their campaigns, and a changing regional and international climate threatened to cut off this support: Nelson Mandela’s release in 1990 signaled the end

\textsuperscript{16} Minter, Apartheid's Contras : An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique, 283-84. 
\textsuperscript{17} See Chapter V for a discussion of how the nature of ethnic and religious tensions, and other factors specific to the Mozambican civil war, differ from the situations in the DRC and Kosovo. 
\textsuperscript{18} At this point, the transfer of power in Rhodesia in 1980 (then officially Zimbabwe) lessened Rhodesia’s influence on the conflict, and South Africa had become Renamo’s dominant supporter.
of South Africa’s involvement in Mozambique’s internal affairs, and Mikhail
Gorbechav’s political and economic reforms in the Soviet Union foreshadowed the
dwindling Soviet support. In addition, domestic conditions in Mozambique had
deteriorated to the point in 1989 where thousands of Mozambicans were on the verge
of starvation.¹⁹

The war-weary country eventually moved toward a negotiated settlement,
unable to bear the costs of continued conflict.²⁰ The road towards negotiations began
in 1989, and was facilitated by the mediation efforts of representatives of Catholic
and Protestant churches through the Mozambican Christian Council and the Italian
government. In 1992 the General Peace Agreement (GPA) was signed in Rome
establishing an official ceasefire in Mozambique. The GPA also outlined the process
of initiating democratic elections, committed both parties to participate in a
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program for ex-combatants,
and granted amnesty to all individuals involved in the conflict.

The United Nations took over control of the reconstruction effort, which was
lauded at the time as one of the most comprehensive and successful UN campaigns.
However, since 1994, the UN mission to Mozambique, ONUMOZ has come under
some scrutiny and criticism for various aspects of its program, including delays in
mobilization, failure to adequately address the issues of child soldiers and landmines,
and an incomplete DDR program. Nonetheless, despite growing tensions during the
campaign period, in 1994 Mozambique held its first democratic elections, and the
government has survived without any significant renewal of violence.

¹⁹ Alden, Mozambique and the Construction of the New African State : From Negotiations to Nation
Building, 21-24.
Today, Mozambique continues to struggle with long-term development. Since the civil war, Mozambique has experienced significant economic growth rates. However, the country remains one of the poorest nations in the world with a GDP per capita of $350 ($1500 PPP) and 64.8% of the population living on less than $1 per day. In 2000 and 2001 Mozambique suffered from crisis-level flooding that severely injured the country’s developing infrastructure. Despite debt relief programs, Mozambique remains dependent on foreign assistance for most of its budget.

Perhaps one of the most tragic legacies of the civil war in Mozambique is the widespread use of child soldiering. While Renamo was particularly active in forcibly recruiting and kidnapping children to serve in the guerilla forces, both parties used child soldiers as a part of their forces, and first-hand accounts of the violence in Mozambique note that young boys were responsible for carrying out much of the violence and terrorism against civilians. With the marked involvement of youth during the conflict, upon the resolution of the war, Mozambique and the international community involved during the transition process had to develop methods to reintegrate this population of children and youth back into normal civilian life.

Today, children and youth in Mozambique continue to suffer from a number of threats, particularly the prevalence of HIV/AIDS: 14,300 youth ages 15-24 in Mozambique are living with HIV along with 140,000 children under 14 years old.

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21 Ibrahim Index of Governance in Africa (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2007); available from http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/the-index.asp. According to the Human Development Index (calculated for 2005), Mozambique ranks 101st of 108 developing countries on progress in Human Poverty Development.
Approximately 1.5 million of Mozambique’s children are orphans, with 470,000 children having lost one or both parents to AIDS.22

While youth continue face a number of significant obstacles in Mozambique, the country as a whole has been able to move away from the history of conflict and emerge as “one of the international communities few success stories on the African continent.”23 As demonstrated in the following analysis, the relatively effective fulfillment of youth needs proved an essential factor to the successful completion of the reconstruction process. What is most striking, however, is that the reconstruction community was able to fulfill those requirements without a specific policy targeting the youth demographic.

In the following sections, I will argue that while the international community provided critical programming in relation to DDR and the return of refugees, the presence of a few markedly successful NGOs was a significant factor in the fulfillment of youth specific needs. In addition, the policy of amnesty after the war created an environment more amenable to reconciliation and acceptance of former combatants back into civilian life. Finally, the cultural environment in Mozambique and the role of traditional and religious leaders played a critical part in facilitating the difficult task of uniting communities and reintegrating young ex-combatants back into communities in culturally legitimate manner, as many of these young people had committed numerous atrocities during the war. With the combination of these policies

23 Alden, Mozambique and the Construction of the New African State : From Negotiations to Nation Building, xiii.
and characteristics, the reconstruction program in Mozambique effectively prevented youth from emerging as a destabilizing force during the peace building process.

**Variable Analysis**

**Demographics:**

*Population:* In the years immediately following the General Peace Agreement in 1992, Mozambique had a relatively high proportion of youth in the population: between 1993 and 1997 10-24 year-olds comprised roughly one-third of the population and the median age across the population was 18.\(^{24}\) Children and youth were also highly affected by the war. During the conflict approximately 60% of the 1 million people killed were children.\(^{25}\)

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\(^{24}\) United States Census Bureau, *International Data Base* ([cited April 2, 2008 2008]). While 33% of the population age 10-24 is just above average for sub-Saharan Africa in the respective years (with the regional percentage of youth in the population in 1996 at 32%) it is a number of percentage points higher than the global percentage of youth in the population (27.9% in 1996) and nearly 10 percentage points higher than in more developed countries which averaged 20% of youth age 10-24 in the population in 1996.

Youth Refugees and Soldiers: The 16-year civil war created 1.5-1.7 million refugees and 3-4.3 million internally displaced people from a total population of 13.2 million. UNHCR reported that of the refugee population that returned after the war, 50% were under the age of 15. According to an evaluation conducted for the International Labor Organization, one of the consequences of the displacement and destabilization was the increase in the number of so-called “street children.” As of 1997, the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport in Mozambique reported that there were 11,000-12,000 children in the streets in the capital city of Maputo, and 30,000 in total throughout Mozambique. Many of the street-children in the neighboring Zimbabwean capital, Harare, also claimed they were Mozambican refugees. When questioned, these children said that they came to Zimbabwe because they found “nothing to do in Mozambique,” and little chance of work. Despite the evidence that some of the younger refugees returned to their countries of asylum (many of whom may have been prompted by their families), UNHCR reported that there were no large-scale backflows of refugees and that the potential issue of unaccompanied minors in the refugee population being abandoned was largely avoided.

Finally, the conflict in Mozambique has become infamous for both parties’ recruitment of child soldiers. While it is now known that both Frelimo and Renamo

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27 *United States Census Bureau, International Data Base.*
abducted children to use as soldiers, Renamo’s tactics were decried across the international community as especially cruel, socializing children into war by subjecting them to a period of terror and abuse.\textsuperscript{30} It is estimated that Renamo utilized at least 10,000 child soldiers and altogether estimates suggest that over one quarter of former soldiers in Mozambique were recruited when they were younger than 18.\textsuperscript{31} Of the 92,881 officially demobilized soldiers 4,678 were under 13 years old when recruited, 6,289 were 14-15 years old, and 13,982 were 16-17 years old, accounting for almost 28% (25,498) of the demobilized soldiers.\textsuperscript{32} In addition, 50% of the demobilized soldiers were under 31 at the time of demobilization.\textsuperscript{33} These statistics indicate that while children were found to have been recruited at as young as 6 years old, the vast majority of demobilized child soldiers fall into the “youth” demographic of 10-24 years old at the age of recruitment, and most served in the militias for over five years.\textsuperscript{34}

While much less is known about the gender disaggregation of the youth and child soldiers, UNCHR estimated that a significant proportion of the returning refugee population were female heads of households.\textsuperscript{35} In the initial surveys conducted of the former military bases, over 40% of the 2,000 documented children were female. However, no females were included in the one official child-soldier

\textsuperscript{31} Boothby and Knudsen, "Children of the Gun," 60.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
demobilization program and only 1.5% of the officially demobilized soldiers were female.36

_Education:_ The conflict in Mozambique inevitably disrupted and damaged the education system. An estimated 600,000 children were deprived of regular education due to the destruction of roughly 50% (2,500) of Mozambique’s primary schools along with 22 secondary schools and 36 boarding schools.37 In 1995 the adult literacy rate was 38.7%.38 While civil war invariably destroys infrastructure, the extreme to which the already struggling education system in Mozambique suffered from the conflict is astounding. As such, education became a priority in domestic policy during post-conflict reconstruction.

_Unemployment:_ The majority of work in Mozambique is agriculturally based, usually consisting of subsistence farming, and a significant percentage of the population in the South has traditionally migrated to work on mines and farms in South Africa.39 The vast majority of new people to join the labor market are self-employed or work in family businesses or small-scale agriculture.40 In 1997, it was estimated that only 1 in 6 members of the workforce were waged, and only 1 in 123 is an employer.41

The availability and reliability of statistics on unemployment in Mozambique is strikingly low. However, there is some evidence of high levels of unemployment in

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36 (ARC), "Critical Issues: Child Soldiers." This program facilitated by Save the Children, USA demobilized and reunited 850 male child-soldiers with their families and conducted follow-up research on their reintegration into society.


38 World Development Indicators, World Bank

39 Maslen, _The Reintegration of War-Affected Youth: The Experience of Mozambique._

40 “Background Note: Mozambique,” in _Background Notes_, ed. Bureau of African Affairs (U.S. Department of State, 2008), Maslen, _The Reintegration of War-Affected Youth: The Experience of Mozambique._

41 Maslen, _The Reintegration of War-Affected Youth: The Experience of Mozambique._
Mozambique after the conflict. In 1996 the Minister of Labour in Mozambique, Guilherme Mavila, announced that the official rate of unemployment was 7.2%, but admitted that this figure was a gross underestimate. Mr. Mavila stated that the real rate was most likely in excess of 50% of the economically active population.\textsuperscript{42} According the U.S. Department of State, unemployment in Mozambique in 1997 was estimated at 21%, while the United Nations and the ILO report that, in 1997, there were 192,000 people officially unemployed in Mozambique.\textsuperscript{43}

Coding: Mozambique is rated as having a \textit{high} percentage of youth in the population and youth involvement in conflict. The percentage of youth in Mozambique is relatively on par with the average for sub-Saharan Africa at the time (32%), however it is a number points higher than the world average (29%) and significantly higher than the average for more developed countries (21%).\textsuperscript{44} The number of children and youth involved as soldiers or displaced by the conflict are also markedly high as percentage of the total soldiers involved in the conflict, as 28% of the combatants were under the age of 17 when recruited, and over 50% were under the age of 30.

**International Policy:**

Because the internal conflict in Mozambique had involved a number of regional and international actors, the process of peace building received a significant amount of international attention. While individual nations were involved in the

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{43} United Nations Statistics Division, "World Factbook: Mozambique," (United States Central Intelligence Unit (CIA)).
\textsuperscript{44} United States Census Bureau, \textit{International Data Base}. 

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peace-talks, the most active international player was the United Nations mission to Mozambique (ONUMOZ). After the UN’s problematic experiences in peace building in Angola and Cambodia, the UN mission was determined to work with local and international actors in order to establish a successful and complete peacekeeping operation in Mozambique without opening the door for a reincitation of the conflict. The most relevant UN programs for youth in the post-conflict environment were the demobilization and reintegration programs. However, it is important to note in analyzing these variables that the UN policies and programs were highly coordinated between the UN and NGOs, particularly in implementing the DDR program. As such, the influence of the UN as opposed to NGOs must be understood in some respects as interrelated rather than distinctly separate policies.

*The Peace Accord:* The General Peace Agreement achieved in Rome contained a number of different prescriptions that would indirectly affect youth in Mozambique. First, the GPA established the UN’s involvement in Mozambique, calling for the UN to monitor the ceasefire, assist in election planning and provide humanitarian assistance. The agreement also established a timetable for implementing the treaty, including a commitment by both parties to fully demobilize soldiers by April 1993.\(^{45}\) At the time, UN demobilization operations did not recognize soldiers younger than 16 to be included in official demobilization programs, nor did the operations delineate specific programs for soldiers of different ages. Therefore, there was no established mechanism to deal with the large proportion of child soldiers.

The GPA also outlined the structure for a new Mozambican army, to be composed of former government and Renamo forces.\textsuperscript{46} This meant that some former child soldiers who had been forcibly and illegally recruited could be subject to continued service in the armed forces (however a strong movement headed by an NGO and to be discussed later in this chapter successfully prevented the drafting of former child soldiers).

In this case, while the text of the peace treaty did not speak specifically to the youth demographic or the issue of child soldiers and reintegration, its specifications created both positive and negative consequences for Mozambican youth. For instance, while child soldiers were not recognized, the treaty did create a binding agreement for both sides to commit to demilitarization programs, and youth soldiers over 16 received the same treatment and resources in this process as older soldiers.

\textit{Foreign Government Involvement}: Aside from representation within the United Nations and from international NGOs, foreign governments were not highly involved in post-conflict reconstruction in Mozambique. The presence of foreign governments was most notable in the negotiations of the General Peace Agreement. The governments of Zimbabwe, Botswana, Kenya, South Africa and Malawi all took active part in the negotiations in Rome, and the official mediators for the negotiations were members of the Italian government and international Catholic Church organizations. Finally, representatives were present as observers from the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Portugal. These western powers also served

\textsuperscript{46} \textit{General Peace Agreement for Mozambique}, (August 7, 1992), Protocol VI section I.i.2.b.
as representatives to the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission, which oversaw the implementation of the General Peace Agreement.\textsuperscript{47}

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which has been active in Mozambique since 1984, assisted in the post-accord transition process by providing support for a number of different demobilization and humanitarian assistance programs.\textsuperscript{48}

The representation of foreign governments during the negotiation process was particularly important because of the regional implications of the civil conflict in Mozambique. However aside from their involvement in the GPA and the presence of USAID, direct involvement of foreign governments did not have a significant affect on the post-conflict reconstruction policy, nor did they cater directly to the youth demographic.

\textit{United Nations Involvement:} Although the United Nations was only an observer at the General Peace Agreement negotiations in Rome, the UN would take on a significant and largely unprecedented\textsuperscript{49} role in both implementing the treaty and orchestrating the reconstruction process. Officially established in December of 1992, the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) mandate would run for 2 years, ending with the successful execution of national elections in 1994.\textsuperscript{50} Over the two years ONUMOZ deployed 6,576 military personnel and 1,087 civilian police

\textsuperscript{47} Alden, \textit{Mozambique and the Construction of the New African State : From Negotiations to Nation Building}, 37.

\textsuperscript{48} These programs included demobilization, demining, elections, rehabilitation of roads and bridges, and the provision of seeds, tools, and health services to millions of Mozambicans displaced or affected by war and draught.

\textsuperscript{49} According to Christopher Alden, the “UN would have to play a role in the peace process which extended well beyond that of previous missions, with the exception of UNTAC in Cambodia.” Alden, \textit{Mozambique and the Construction of the New African State : From Negotiations to Nation Building}, 36.

\textsuperscript{50} ONUMOZ was established by UN Security Council Resolution 797 (3 Dec 1992).
observers and was supported by a gross financing of $492.6 million (US). The operation emphasized four main goals: maintaining the ceasefire, demilitarizing the country, providing humanitarian assistance and monitoring elections. Considering the large percentage of youth in both the armies and the refugee/IDP population, the demilitarization and humanitarian assistance programs coordinated by the UN are especially relevant in understanding how the UN programs satisfied youth needs.

While the primary goals of carrying out a swift and thorough demobilization and reintegration program seem to be common sense, the DDR program in Mozambique cannot be understood outside of the context of the UN experience in Angola. The disarmament and demobilization process in Angola was, by all accounts, a disaster. The failure to adequately disarm ex-combatants before elections were held opened the door to a resurgence of the war when election results were contested. In light of these events, UN officials in Mozambique ardently committed to disarming and demobilizing all of the former government and Renamo forces before elections were held. Considering the likelihood of a renewed violence, the goal of the demilitarization program in Mozambique was essentially to create a “negative peace”: officials hoped to prevent violence in the short term, and provide skills, information and basic provisions to demobilized soldiers in order to foster medium-term stability.

The demobilization program envisioned by ONUMOZ designated 49 assembly areas where former combatants would be held for no more than 8-10 weeks.

52 Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Gali is quoted as saying “In the light of the recent experience in Angola, I believe it to be of critical importance that the elections should not take place until the military aspects of the agreement have been fully implemented.” Alden, Mozambique and the Construction of the New African State: From Negotiations to Nation Building, 39.
The program was designed to offer a variety of programs to begin the psychological, economic and political (re)integration into civilian life. The various methods included education and recreational activities, along with providing former soldiers with information about the peace process and job placement. Provisions were also given to the dependants of the soldiers (generally wives and children) who were living in the camps. All of these efforts were to be carried out by the Technical Unit, in coordination with the International Migration Organization (IOM) for the transport of demobilized soldiers to their preferred destination.53

In addition to the demobilization program, the UN instituted a reintegration strategy with a four-pronged approach catered to ONUMOZ’s short and medium term stability goals. The Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS) provided a monthly financial subsidy (for 18 months) to all ex-combatants, with the amount of the subsidy calculated by the former soldier’s rank.54 This mechanism was intended to provide a “safety net” of guaranteed income so that ex-combatants returning to civilian life could have enough time to secure work. The program also operated with the underlying assumption that most of the ex-soldiers came from poor backgrounds and would prefer to return to working the land, rather than finding paid work in cities.55 As such, each ex-combatant received an agricultural kit, including tools and seeds, with the hopes that this would encourage demobilized soldiers to return to rural or agricultural communities where there was available work for unskilled labor.

53 Ibid., 40-41.
55 Ibid.
The second aspect of the reintegration strategy was the Information and Referral Service (IRS), implemented by the IOM (and later integrated into the Provincial Fund). This provided ex-combatants with information and counseling on returning to civilian life, how to work with the demobilization process (such as where to pick up their monthly payments) and where to find employment opportunities.

The third component of the reintegration strategy was the Occupational Skills Development program (OSD), implemented by the International Labor Organization (ILO). This program provided ex-combatants with various types of formal vocational training. Through the skills they learned, along with the distribution of supply kits and information, the OSD program was designed to supply ex-combatants with the tools they needed for starting their own business.56 The final element of the RSS, the Provincial Fund, was launched in 1994, and provided resources for extending the IRS and funding for demobilized soldiers to pursue entrepreneurial projects.

Overall the demobilization and reintegration programs were relatively successful. However, there were a number of instances of bureaucratic delays and infighting both within the UN system, and between the UN and NGOs.57 Early on in the mission there were a number of allegations of UN soldiers involvement in child prostitution and abuse. However, when the accusations were confirmed, the UN quickly disciplined and dismissed the offenders.58 Perhaps the factor that detracted the most from the demobilization program were the many delays and the UN’s slow reaction to the situation on the ground: while the GPA was signed in 1992,

56 Ibid.: 345.
58 Ibid., 52.
ONUMOZ was not fully operational until June of 1993 and did not deploy troops until August, well after the GPA’s April deadline for full demobilization. By November 1993 only 20 of the 49 assembly areas were open to receive troops, with the remaining 29 opening in February of 1994. Because of these delays soldiers were detained for much longer periods of time than originally planned. As a result, soldiers carried out a number of riots and disturbances in the assembly areas—either involving “attacks on UN officials, taking hostages in the camps, blocking major roads in the area or looting in neighboring towns.”\textsuperscript{59} However, the demobilization process was complete by August 1994 before the general elections were held. In total 64,130 government forces and 22,637 Renamo forces were officially demobilized.

One of the major setbacks to the time-table of the demobilization program was the issue of child soldiers. While it was widely known that Renamo forcibly recruited children during the war, neither side initially admitted to such practices. These attempts to cover up the use of child soldiers delayed the official demobilization program as the Renamo territory was not opened for general access until UNICEF, in coordination with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Save the Children, had instituted a reunification and repatriation program for child soldiers living on the Renamo bases. However, while there were an estimated 10,000 Renamo child soldiers, there were only 2,000 officially documented child soldiers. Of these 2,000, only 850 boys participated in the initial program. UNICEF also organized a follow-up home visitation program with the participants so that social workers could monitor the children’s progress in reintegrating into their communities. These 850

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 54.
See the Stability section in this chapter for further discussion of the riots and violence in the assembly areas.
children also received “trauma counseling, basic education services and technical apprenticeships,” as a part of the UNICEF program.60

There is some evidence that former child soldiers who were not included in the UNICEF or UN programs were dissatisfied with the process. Some voiced complaints that they were soldiers, too, and deserved access to the demobilization programs or turned to violence, such as banditry and theft. For instance, many young soldiers voiced their resentment over the pension system, as pensions were only given to soldiers who were 18 or older when they were drafted or had served for more than 10 years.61 One child soldier is quoted as saying “We make money by selling guns from arsenals. Some of our people also engage in banditry to get extras. It’s a way to survive…”62 However, many simply returned home on their own accord, and a number of NGOs attempted to fill the holes created by the official demobilization process in regards to child soldiers by instituting their own reunification programs.63 Because there was no structured method of dealing with child soldiers, reintegration was largely left up to the communities themselves.

Overall, each of the reintegration programs conducted by the UN reported, “unanimously that former combatants had been fully reintegrated into society.”64 However, the international community’s perception of success may be due in large

63 For example the Youth Social Reintegration Programme was established specifically to trace child soldiers’ families and place them back in their homes. Eventually, the Youth Social Reintegration Program developed more longer term reintegration programs aimed at helping this children to cope with their experiences and to empower them for future success.
64 Alden, "Making Old Soldiers Fade Away: Lessons from the Reintegration of Demobilized Soldiers in Mozambique," 345. However, as Alden points out, some of the reintegration programs were more successful than others. Specifically, the OCD program conducted by the ILO was particularly inefficient in providing demobilized soldiers with skills they could use upon return to civilian life
part to the lack of outright violence during and after the disarmament and
reintegration period. Aside from the disturbances in the assembly camps and
incidences of low-level criminal or gang activity, the violent reaction that the UN had
anticipated (and deeply feared in light of experiences in Angola) did not occur. Any
instances of violence that did take place were not coordinated or sustained in the post-
election period. A study prepared for the IOM reported that “in no cases did
[demobilized soldiers] show disposition towards violence or social disruption. The
importance of military structures has clearly waned and community structures
(family, traditional authority, community organizations) seem to have replaced
military structures in assisting with conflict resolution, problem solving and social
support.”65 In this case, it seems that the UN was successful in achieving its initial
goal of “negative peace.”66

The reintegration program was one of the most comprehensive “ever
attempted in the context of a UN peacekeeping” with $95 million supporting “four
different approaches and a diversity of implementing agents.”67 However, despite the
massive and highly coordinated reintegration effort, there were a number of
difficulties with the reintegration program. Interviews with Mozambican community
leaders, indicate that many Mozambicans did not share the UN and international
agencies’ view that reintegration was fully achieved. Instead these leaders comment
on the remaining need for a comprehensive “social peace,” with particular attention to
issues of vocational training, disabled war veterans and victims of landmines.68

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67 Ibid.: 341.
68 Ibid.: 351.
Specifically the OSD vocational training program was largely ineffective. The program did not conduct initial surveys that would provide a general picture of the economic landscape and the sectors with potential employment opportunities. Many of the demobilized soldiers were then “thrown into a labour market where there were no vacancies.” For instance, because the ILO did not conduct labor market surveys, the program often trained soldiers in vocations that were inapplicable to the area to which they were returning. Competition between the implementing agents in different regions meant that ex-soldiers in one region did not have access to the same resources or programs as those in other regions. Although child soldiers were explicitly excluded from these programs, a large percentage of the beneficiaries were youth (51% were between the ages of 16-31), and were largely given the same opportunities as adults in the program.

In addition to the demobilization and reintegration programs for former soldiers, the UN also implemented a number of humanitarian programs aimed primarily at the reinsertion and integration of the refugee population. Considering that there were over 1 million refugees living outside of Mozambique, and the potential for disruption caused by a massive influx of returnees, ONUMOZ was faced with managing a huge humanitarian effort. Instead of coordinating all the programs internally, ONUMOZ devised a method that would pool together the resources of NGOS and foreign development assistance programs in order to address all the

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69 Maslen, *The Reintegration of War-Affected Youth: The Experience of Mozambique.*
70 For instance, a number of demobilized soldiers were trained as electricians under the OCD programs, but returned to villages where there was no electricity. Ibid.
71 The OSD and the Provincial Fund operated in separate districts and therefore where some demobilized soldiers had access to vocational training but no subsidized income-generating opportunities, others received support from the Provincial Fund but did not have access to the vocational training courses. Alden, "Making Old Soldiers Fade Away: Lessons from the Reintegration of Demobilized Soldiers in Mozambique," 348.
different needs, without creating redundant programs or stirring resentment between the UN and NGO community. UNHCR also utilized this NGO coordination policy in implementing its vast array of repatriation and reintegration activities.\textsuperscript{72} While the program was designed to smooth relationships between the UN and NGOs, the relationship was not always amicable, and due to delays in the UN operation a number of NGOs began acting outside of the UN orchestrated effort. (For more detail on this relationship refer to the NGO section below).

The original UNHCR strategy document emphasized the specific need to cater programs to both women and young people. However, while UNHCR was aware of the acute and distinct needs of the women and youth living in the refugee camps,\textsuperscript{73} the organization chose instead to target specific districts rather than “population categories” in order to facilitate a “transition from emergency relief and initial reconstruction to longer-term development.”\textsuperscript{74}

Despite the area specific focus, the UNCHR methods were particularly successful in addressing important youth needs. UNHCR’s main tool for carrying out humanitarian assistance was the “Quick Impact Project” or QIPs. Quick Impact Projects are defined as “small-scale interventions made up of simple inputs and activities, intended to be an immediate injection of support to meet community-based needs in different sectors of assistance.”\textsuperscript{75} One of the main successes of the QIPs was rehabilitating, building and staffing a number of schools and health centers, providing

\textsuperscript{72} Crisp, \textit{Rebuilding a War-Torn Society : A Review of the UNHCR Reintegration Programme for Mozambican Returnees}. Section 53.
\textsuperscript{73} UNHCR, "Mozambique: Reintegration Strategy." Section 10.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., Section 14.
\textsuperscript{75} Crisp, \textit{Rebuilding a War-Torn Society : A Review of the UNHCR Reintegration Programme for Mozambican Returnees}. 

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all returnees, and specifically youth, access to basic services. The rehabilitation of the education system infrastructure was particularly important, considering the widespread destruction of schools during the conflict.

While the Quick Impact Projects were largely successful in assisting throughout the emergency period immediately following the peace treaty, the long-term goals inferred from UNHCR’s program have been left unmet, as evidenced by the current state of human development in Mozambique. With the ONUMOZ mandate officially terminated in 1994, by 1997 the cycle of reintegration efforts had largely ended: the money had dried up and most of the UN and UN-funded programs left the country.76 Long-term efforts from the UN were left to programs developed through the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).

Coding: The international efforts in Mozambique are rated as having a Medium-Level Positive Impact.77 The efforts are coded as positive since the United Nations and regional involvement, particularly in facilitating the DDR program and refugee reunification, played a significant role in moving the national trajectory towards peace and stability. The medium level of impact reflects the fact that while ONUMOZ and its partnering UN agencies had a widespread influence on the reconstruction process, its impact on the youth demographic was significant, but not necessarily sufficient, leaving a number of holes to be addressed by other agencies in order for successful reconstruction to occur.

76 Alden, Mozambique and the Construction of the New African State: From Negotiations to Nation Building.
77 See pages 40-45 in Chapter I for coding definitions
NGO Involvement:

The role played by NGOs in the post-conflict reconstruction process is particularly important in understanding the transition from war to peace for the youth demographic in Mozambique. While youth benefited in some form from both the UN demobilization program and the UNHCR reintegration programs, neither program specifically targeted youth as an at-risk demographic. NGOs however were free to focus on the youth population and were relatively successful in filling the gaps left open by the UN programs.

On a structural level, the post-conflict reconstruction effort was designed to include management and coordination between the UN and NGOs already on the ground. The decision to use UN agencies, such as UNOHAC, as coordination units to facilitate the effort was a direct result of the UN’s previous experiences in Cambodia, where there was marked tension between the UN and humanitarian agencies already working the in field.78 The goal of the coordination effort was not only to avoid duplicating efforts and competition, but also to allow the UN access to the NGOs wealth of knowledge regarding the local conditions and assistance programs already in place.

While it was clear from the initial plans that there was a strong desire for a smooth and beneficial relationship between NGOs and the UN, the reality is less clear. There were a number of instances of successful coordinated efforts between the UN and NGOs, such as the combined work of UNICEF, Save the Children and the International Red Cross. However, there is also evidence that there was a

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78 Alden, Mozambique and the Construction of the New African State: From Negotiations to Nation Building, 43.
considerable amount of friction between the donor community, NGOs and the UN. Specifically a number of NGOs and donors were frustrated with the UN program’s slow progress, and viewed the coordination effort as too authoritarian.\textsuperscript{79} While this friction undoubtedly decreased the efficiency of the program, it is unlikely that an operation of this scale would not encounter some forms of inter or intra-agency squabbling. Despite the controversy and the slow progress of UNOHAC and UNHCR, the benefits of coordination were acknowledged throughout the community. For instance, UNHCR created a comprehensive national database that pooled information from numerous organizations in order to facilitate their humanitarian assistance program.\textsuperscript{80} In addition, there was no evidence of the NGO community either exacerbating existing problems because of the disputes or as a result of excessive contract bidding and competition.

In addition to the structural coordination efforts, there were a number of successful NGOS that dealt specifically with youth needs in the post-conflict environment. For instance, while the Mozambican defense force was intended to be voluntary,\textsuperscript{81} because of over-reported troop numbers and a lack of volunteers, the former combatants were subject to compulsory military conscription. The draft would include former soldiers over 18 who may have been abducted as children into the Renamo or government forces. The mandatory conscription of former child soldiers not only presented a human rights issue, but also could have fueled a great deal of unrest among youth in Mozambique who were unwilling to serve in the army. In response, a number of child advocacy groups led by the local NGO, Rebuilding Hope

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 57.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 58.
\textsuperscript{81} General Peace Agreement for Mozambique. Protocol IV.
Foundation (Associação Reconstruindo a Esperança) launched a successful public campaign to exempt former child soldiers from military conscription and institute a screening process for those who volunteered. In addition to its work to prevent the conscription of former child soldiers, Rebuilding Hope was extremely successful in developing psycho-social reintegration programs, in conjunction with local cultural and religious practices, for former child-soldiers and their families. The program successfully reintegrated 600 male and female child soldiers, and has received international recognition for its efforts.

Another successful NGO that catered to youth issues in post-conflict reconstruction is ProPaz. ProPaz began operating in Mozambique in 1995 as a partnership of two organizations already working with former combatants, the Demobilized Soldiers Organization (AMODEG) and the Disabled Veterans Association (ADEMIMO). The organization sought to provide conflict resolution training to youth ex-combatants struggling to reintegrate into their home communities. To accomplish this goal, ProPaz created working-groups where youth members from both parties could discuss their experiences and needs and participate in leadership training and conflict-resolution workshops. As a result of the workshops and other ProPaz facilitated community outreach programs, many of the youth were accepted into the community – no longer seen as violent. Some of participants went on to become community leaders or were later employed by ProPaz. Others became official ProPaz “Peace Promoters,” traveling to other communities to continue the conflict resolution activities. For example, in one community dialogue participants discussed what peace would look like in their community and concluded that peace
would be a safe space without landmines where children could play without the fear of stepping on a mine. As a result of these discussions, a number of former soldiers voluntarily came forward to provide police with information on where they had planted landmines and revealed where a number of small arms were hidden. These ex-combatants went on to work with local officials in the efforts to clear the area. Since 1995 PROPAZ has trained 150 ex-combatants as peace promoters and involves over 1,000 people in peace building activities. These “Peace Promoters” work in 100 communities in six of Mozambique’s ten provinces and are organizing more conflict resolution teams.82

Today a number of issues still remain for NGOs to tackle in Mozambique, particularly regarding landmines, disabled youth and gender issues. However the proactive and coordinated effort of NGOs to treat youth as a specific target population had direct positive results for reintegration in the immediate aftermath of the war.

Coding: Mozambique receives a Medium Level, Positive Impact coding for NGO Involvement. The NGO variable is rated as medium level because, while there were a fair number of NGOs involved in Mozambique, the level of NGOs involvement was not extremely high, nor did it overwhelm the reconstruction process. In addition, coordination was relatively successful and did not serve impair the overall process. The evidence also indicates that the NGOs that were operating in

Mozambique had a positive impact on the youth demographic, meeting a number of critical needs.

**Domestic Policy:**

The majority of the domestic policies regarding children and youth were government sponsored reunification and education programs. During the conflict, the government’s official policy towards children involved in the conflict was to first and foremost reunite children with their families in the shortest time possible.\(^83\) This program, initially implemented by the Ministry of Health, was later integrated into a larger effort with the creation of the Programme for Family Localisation and Reunification (PLRF), which coordinated effort from numerous organizations including the Mozambican Women Organization, the Mozambican Youth Organization and local church groups.\(^84\)

In addition to the official stance on children involved in conflict, after the civil war the Ministry of Education began to repair the education system. The Ministry instituted mandatory seven-year primary education, and embarked on an effort in coordination with the UN and NGO presences to rebuild the physical infrastructure that was devastated by war and to design a comprehensive education strategy. By 1997, of the 60% of primary schools that were destroyed by the war, 96% had been rebuilt. In addition, school enrollment rose from 1.2 million in 1992 to 1.7 million by

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\(^83\) Miguel A Mausse, "The Social Reintegration of the Child Involved in Armed Conflict in Mozambique," (Maputo, Mozambique: Monograph No 37, 1999).

\(^84\) Ibid.
Despite the increase in numbers, as of 1998 the proportion of students repeating grades was still very high, with almost one-quarter of lower primary level students repeating. While this statistic is indicative of a low-quality level of primary education, it is not out of the ordinary for underdeveloped countries in the region to have a high proportion of repeating students.86

Finally, another significant domestic policy was the Frelimo government’s granting of retrospective, blanket amnesty to all individuals. While not specifically directed towards youth, this policy was especially significant in the process of reconciliation after the war, and the general ethos of acceptance of ex-combatants, including children and youth, back into their home communities.87

Coding: The domestic policy in Mozambique is coded as having a Medium-Level, Positive Impact. The emergency reunification programs, education reforms and amnesty policy were all beneficial for the reintegration of the youth demographic. The medium level coding is due to the fact that while the domestic policy orientation covered both the short and long term, its impact on the overall process was significant but not extensive.

Cultural Context

While the efforts of international interventions, NGOs and domestic agents were generally beneficial to the reintegration of youth into Mozambican civil society,

85EIU Country Reports," (Economist Intelligence Unit)., The proportion of school age children attending school rose from 45% in 1990-55% in 2002 .
the vast majority of the program did not directly target the youth demographic. Thus in order to understand why the Mozambican reconstruction effort has been seen as so successful, it is important to understand the cultural environment.

As previously explained, Mozambique’s unique colonial experience left intact strong and active traditional cultures and religious communities. These traditional belief systems provided a tool for former soldiers to be accepted back into community life. The traditional view in Mozambique of violence and war is very different from Western conceptualizations. For instance Fernando Manuel Dos Santos Zimba, a traditional healer or curandero, explained his view of the violence saying,

“If someone is violent then that is not a normal state of affairs. It must be a spiritual problem he’s suffering from, and this must be dealt with through traditional medicine. Someone who kills another person… must have some kind of wrong spirit with him.”

Another curandero explained that,

“Many of these boys never wanted to fight, they did not know what it meant to fight… you see, if you kill someone, their soul stays with you. The souls of the murdered follow these soldiers back to their homes and their families, back to their communities to cause problems… These soldiers … have learned to use violence. Their own souls have been corrupted by what they have seen and done… We have to take this violence out of these people, we have to teach them how to live nonviolent lives like they did before.”

In light of this spiritual conception of violence, many Mozambican communities were deeply committed to leaving the conflict in the past and helping former combatants, or even those who experienced or witnessed wars, to move away from their violent past.

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88 Ibid., 157.
89 Ibid., 158.
In order to make this spiritual transition, many Mozambican communities relied on traditional healers, who would often guide returnees through rituals and ceremonies to begin reintegration into the community. While differences in the type of ritual or religion varied, the communities’ acceptance and belief in the rituals was widespread.\textsuperscript{90} For instance, Helena Cobban describes one reintegration ritual, where a religious practitioner

\begin{quote}
“took the boy to the bush, where a small hut covered in dry grass had been built. The boy, dressed in the dirty clothes he brought from the rebel camp, entered the hut and undressed himself. Then the hut was set on fire, and an adult relative helped the boy out. The hut, the clothes, and everything else that the by brought from the camp had to be burnt. This symbolized the rupture with the past.”\textsuperscript{91}
\end{quote}

The boy would then go one to perform a number of other rituals that would help to cleanse his body and give him strength. The entire ritual was public, as relatives and neighbors assisted the practitioner, performed specific roles or simply observed.

While this example shows the community involvement in religious reintegration, in other cases the rituals were more private, with the personal significance of absolving sins committed during the war. For instance, one formal solider said that he participated in a purification ritual because “during the war I might have stepped over a place where people were killed, or I might have shot someone.”\textsuperscript{92} It is clear that these symbolic rituals of purification were integral to both individuals returnees and their communities, and in fact, the importance of traditional healing during the reconstruction process was so evident that many NGOs acknowledged the

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., 159-65. \\
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., 159. \\
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., 161.
\end{flushleft}
significance, either by working with the religious leaders (like ProPaz), or keeping their distance in order to not delegitimize the process.93

While there is ongoing debate as to how much the practices of traditional healing and justice affected the reintegration process, the basic tenants as explained by the *curanderos* are strikingly similar to the principals behind many of the official truth and reconciliation commissions. These reconciliation efforts aim to acknowledge a lasting memory of what happened, but also create a space for forgiveness and acceptance back into the community.94 In addition, while this process was oriented towards both children and youth returning from war along with other older members of the community, the different rituals used were recognized as appropriate for each individual. While the extent to which traditional healing helped the Mozambican population cope with the atrocities of war may be exaggerated, the role of indigenous culture and religion cannot be discounted as a significant factor in the successful transition from war to peace.

Coding: Cultural factors in Mozambique had a *Medium-Level, Positive Impact* on the youth demographic and overall reconstruction process. While traditional religious practices were successful in facilitating the successful reintegration of former soldiers on the community level, they did not exert an extreme impact on the greater reconstruction process.

94 Cardinal Alexandre Dos Santos in his interview said, pointing to a scar from an accident “I look at that scar and remember the accident that caused it. The wound no longer hurts at all. But it is important to remember what happened so I don’t make the same mistake again.” Cobban, *Amnesty after Atrocity? : Healing Nations after Genocide and War Crimes*, 161.
Dependant Variable: Level of Stability

Any country overcoming a civil-war may see fluctuating levels of stability after a cease-fire and peace accord are signed, and a complete and immediate cessation of violence is highly unlikely. In the case of Mozambique, while there continue to be many instances of low-level violence, the country seems to have emerged from the 12-year civil war without any significant reincitation of politically motivated or destabilizing violence.

Over the course of the ONUMOZ mission the majority of reported violence involved soldiers waiting in the assembly areas for the demobilization process to take place. Disarmed and confined to the monotony of life in the assembly areas, many of the demobilized soldiers were frustrated with the delayed progress.95 In addition, it seems that Renamo officials had made “elaborate promises” to soldiers in order to convince them to submit to the demobilization process, including assurances pertaining to the condition of the camps, substantial payments and a speedy return to their homes.96 The frustrations from unmet expectations and long term confinement led to a number of disturbances in the assembly areas and attacks on UN or government officials. Soldiers cited a number of different reasons for the violence. In Renamo camps the complaints usually stemmed from inadequate facilities, such as shortages in food and clothing.97 In the Government/Frelimo camps, the complaints

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were more oriented to the demobilization process itself, as soldiers were frustrated from being detained without knowing when they were going to be released.\textsuperscript{98} As of September 1\textsuperscript{st} 1994, there were a total of 37 reported incidents in the Renamo assembly areas and 40 in government assembly areas.\textsuperscript{99} However, while these riots and incidents were serious, they did not indicate the soldiers desire to continue the war, but rather to receive the benefits they believed they were entitled to with a speedy demobilization program. Aside from the incidents of violence in the assembly areas, there were no significant breaks to the ceasefire from 1992-1994.

By 1994 the level of instability in Mozambique had drastically improved since wartime. However a number of security risks continued to arise, especially in the months preceding the election in 1996. Data from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) country profiles from 1996 notes the emergence of a new violent gang called \textit{Chimwenje} that was operating in the west-central regions of Mozambique and allegedly harbored Zimbabwean dissidents. However, it is unclear what the specific goals of the group were. In addition EIU reports from 1996 indicate an increasing fear of violence from both parties, as Frelimo in particular may have had an electoral interest in cultivating the fear that Renamo was prepared to reincite the violence.

\textsuperscript{98} For instance On May 27\textsuperscript{th} 1994 a number soldiers in Frelimo assembly area forwarded a letter of demands to the UN Military observers:

\begin{quote}
"With respect we like to know why the demob process stopped? We are here for a long time without any definite answers. For this reason, we are demanding to know the exact dates for the next demob here in Rio Save...If Rio Save receives more soldiers ... and still we don't receive any answer we are not sure who we are going to kill – the Camp Commander or ONUMOZ group. We are tired and bored of staying here...we have the right to know our rights..."\textsuperscript{Ibid.}
\end{quote}

However by 1997 a strong Frelimo campaign against Renamo’s illegal control of territory and attacks on Frelimo property had quelled the violence.\textsuperscript{100}

In addition the emergence of low-level violence, road banditry and gang related activity became a considerable security risk. The same 1996 & 1997 EIU reports note the increasing level of violent crime, particularly prevalent in the Sofala, Zambezia and Tete provinces and on the main road connecting Maputo to the South African border. While in 1996, the level of road banditry and violence reached a “crisis point,” much of the violence was successfully controlled by 1997 with the deployment of paramilitary police units and regular provincial police patrols. There are a number of speculations as to who was carrying out the violence, however there does not appear to be a clear consensus on the motives. Chris Alden reported that as of 2002, the organization behind the gang violence was thought to have its roots in the upper echelons of the former militaries. In his interviews, Alden reported that a number of middle-ranking or highly trained officers, frustrated with the demobilization program that was largely oriented towards the “common” soldier but was “irrelevant to [professional soldiers] needs and backgrounds,” turned instead to lucrative and powerful positions within the developing ranks of organized crime.\textsuperscript{101}

\textsuperscript{100} From the October 1997 EIU Country report, “This was not the first occasion on which attempts by the government to extend state administration and dispatch staff to the area have been met with Renamo-backed mobs prepared to expel Frelimo officials from the region by force. However, the latest clash proved to be a test of the government's resolve on the matter. Riot police were dispatched to the district with orders to arrest and try any Renamo members involved in acts of intimidation and destruction of Frelimo property. Despite threats of counter-measures by Renamo, the party's effective defeat in Maringue proved particularly humiliating, given that Renamo relies on territorial control and the implicit threat of violence and disruption as a key element of its perceived political power and influence. The events in Maringue have effectively called Renamo's bluff, and Mr. Dhlakama, who visited the town on June 30 shortly after the arrest of the Renamo members involved, was seen to have been defeated on his home turf. Government police are to remain in Maringue until "law and order is restored". "EIU Country Reports."

\textsuperscript{101} Alden, "Making Old Soldiers Fade Away: Lessons from the Reintegration of Demobilized Soldiers in Mozambique," 350., “The connection between criminal gangs operating in Mozambique in the areas
However, other reports link the criminal activity to increasingly marginalized youth, particularly in overcrowded cities with few employment opportunities.\textsuperscript{102}

Specifically, one of Mozambique’s two national trade unions the Organizacionão dos Tralhadores de Moçambique (OTM) expressed concern that because of shortcomings in the demobilization and reintegration program, young people were increasingly turning to drugs and criminality.\textsuperscript{103}

The prevalence of violence and road banditry may also be linked to the proliferation of cross-border arms trafficking, particularly between Mozambique and South Africa.\textsuperscript{104} The control of weapons caches from the disarmament process was particularly problematic in Mozambique, as a number of weapons stockpiles went unreported, and parties were particularly resistant to turn over their weapons.\textsuperscript{105} The ease of access to small arms supported emerging gang activity and banditry. However, there is little evidence that this activity was politically motivated or aimed at destabilizing the situation in order to return the country to a state of civil war.

\textsuperscript{102} Maslen, \textit{The Reintegration of War-Affected Youth : The Experience of Mozambique.}, Aird, Efraime, and Errante, "Mozambique: The Battle Continues for Fomer Child Soldiers."

\textsuperscript{103} Maslen, \textit{The Reintegration of War-Affected Youth : The Experience of Mozambique.}

\textsuperscript{104} "EIU Country Reports.", October 1996.

\textsuperscript{105} Alden, \textit{Mozambique and the Construction of the New African State : From Negotiations to Nation Building}, 113.
Rather, the motives appear to have been economically oriented, as weapons trade may have been one of the most profitable forms of informal trade, particularly for youth.

Today, Mozambique has emerged from the end of the conflict in 1992 to a relatively stable society with no significant violent political movements:

- Mozambique earned an 86.1 out of 100 on the Ibrahim Index of African Governance’s rating for Safety and Security in 2000, 2002 and 2005. There are only three countries that rank higher than 86.1 for all three years. The subcategories where Mozambique received less than 100 were ease of access to small arms and level of violent crime.

- According to the Global Peace Index, Mozambique received an overall score for 2004-2006 of 1.909 on a scale of 1-5, most peaceful to least peaceful. On sub-indices related to stability, Mozambique received a 3 for level of organized internal conflict, and 2’s for level of political instability, likelihood of violent demonstrations and level of violent crime.

- On the Failed States Index, Mozambique is rated as at a “Warning” level for risk for 2005-2007, but dropped from a rank of 45th state most at risk for conflict in 2005 to 81st in 2007.

- RiskMap 2008 labels Mozambique at Medium political and security risks to foreign business.

These analyses indicate that while Mozambique is still struggling with the same issues that a number of developing states still struggle with, it is no longer at a crisis level of conflict, and, in fact, is relatively peaceful as of 2007. While issues such as

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106 On a scale of 0 being the least safe and secure to 100 most safe and secure.
107 This score ranked 50th out of 121 countries as most peaceful.
108 Scale of “sustainable, moderate, warning, alert”
arms control and violent crime continue to present a problem for Mozambique, the political structure has been able to survive without any large-scale waves of violence. Helena Cobban’s succinctly characterizes Mozambique’s transition:

“It should be noted that after the conclusion of the 1992 peace accord, the Mozambicans were remarkably successful in bringing to an end the deadly, widespread violence that had held the country in its thrall for more than fifteen years... Mozambicans struggled through many of the same processes of economic hardship and economic “reform” that other very low-income countries were going through in the 1990s. In 2000 and again in 2001, they had to deal with extremely serious floods – the kind of national disaster that puts huge strains on fragile political systems. There were some continued rights abuses, charges of graft and corruption, and occasional reports of low-level acts of violence that seemed related to politics. But nothing like a re-eruption of the violence of the civil war era ever threatened the country again in the thirteen years after 1992. In 1994, 199 and 2004, the country held national elections that were recognized by international observers as generally (though not totally) “free and fair,” And by the end of 2005 its broad political calm seemed set to continue.”

In line with Cobban’s assessment, while the success of economic and democratic development after 1992 are often exaggerated in Mozambique, the lack of sustained or large-scale civil unrest and violence should not be discounted. The successful elections of 1994, 1999 and 2004 along with Mozambique’s high marks in safety and security and overall peace from the Ibrahim Index and Global Peace index are evidence to that effect.

Coding: For the first five years after the conflict, I code Mozambique as maintaining a low level of instability, with small isolated instances of medium levels of violence. The coding reflects the evidence that there was relatively no significant and politically motivated violence, breaking of the ceasefire or emergence of

politically motivated violent crime. The instances of medium levels of violence, during the delays in the disarmament process and around the election, did not significantly detract from the overall transition from war to peace or prevent the creation of a generally stable environment.

**Coding summary of independent variables**

**Figure 2.1 International Involvement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Program Specifics</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treaty</td>
<td>• Establishes DDR Program under UN, but no other specific impact on youth</td>
<td>Low, positive impact</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Foreign Government | • Involvement in negotiation process  
|                 | • Humanitarian Aid                                    | Low positive impact                     |
| United Nations | • DDR  
|                 | • Humanitarian + Refugee reintegration  
|                 | • Quick Impact Projects                              | High positive impact                    |
| Time Frame     | • Short to Medium Term                                | Effective in allotted time frame, but lack of long-term vision |
| Overall Effectiveness | Medium-Level, Positive Impact                  |                                         |

**Figure 2.2 NGO Involvement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Program Specifics</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Coordination                | • Clear coordination mechanism  
|                             | • Despite instances of poor cooperation, relatively successful coordination helps facilitate the process | Medium positive impact                   |
| Types of Programming        | • Psycho-social support  
|                             | • Reintegration  
|                             | • Advocacy (e.g. preventing former child soldiers from military conscription)  
|                             | • Humanitarian  
|                             | • Conflict Resolution – Youth Empowerment              | Medium positive impact, Effective in filling in and complementing the international program. Successfully met critical youth needs that needed to be addressed in the short term. |
| Level of Efforts            | • Medium Level  
|                             | • Those NGOs operating were relatively successful and effective | Medium positive impact                   |
| Time Frame                  | • Short to Medium Term  
|                             | • Successful in time frame, but with a few exceptions lacking in long term focus | Low positive impact                      |
| Overall Effectiveness       | Medium-Level, Positive Impact                          |                                         |
### Coding summary, Continued

#### Figure 2.3 Domestic Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Program Specifications</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus on Youth</td>
<td>Some focus on youth in emergency efforts, and long term education policy. However most policies indirectly affect youth</td>
<td>Medium positive impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Programming</td>
<td>Education Reform, Reunification (emergency relief), Amnesty</td>
<td>Medium positive impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td>Medium-Level, Positive Impact</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Figure 2.4 Cultural/Environmental Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religion and Religious Practices</td>
<td>Helped to facilitate the reintegration of former child soldiers back into their home communities</td>
<td>Medium positive impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td></td>
<td>Medium-Level, Positive Impact</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Figure 2.5 Objective Statistics

| Population age 10-24 | 33% of population aged 10-24  
Total Population (1993): 13,691,368 |
|----------------------|----------------------------------|
| Baseline | Average for sub-Saharan Africa: 32% in 1997  
Average for more developed states: 21% in 1997 |
| Level of Youth Participation | Over 10,000 out of 93,000 soldiers were under 18  
28% under 17 at recruitment  
50% under age of 31st recruitment  
30,000 “street children” |
| Unemployment | Estimates range between 7-50%  
192,000 officially unemployed in 1997  
Baseline  
Average youth unemployment for sub-Saharan Africa: 17.8% in 1995 |
| GNI Per Capita | $210 (USD) – (2000)  
Baseline  
Average for sub-Saharan Africa (2000): $485.1 (USD) |
| Overall Coding | High proportion of youth in the population  
High level of youth involvement in the conflict |

#### Figure 2.6 Level of Stability

| Overall description of stability | Significant drop in level of violence after the conflict, no reinitiation of the conflict  
Some rioting in assembly areas for DDR  
Low-level violence, road banditry, crime |
| Youth Involvement | Youth suspected to contribute to an extent the increase in crime, although no evidence demonstrating significant link to youth as the driving force |
| Ibrahim Index of Governance in Africa | Safety and Security: 86.1/100 (100 most secure) |
| Global Peace Index | 1.909 on a scale of 1-5, most to least peaceful |
| Failed States Index | “Warning Level”  
Dropped from 45th to 81st most likely to fail from 2005 to 2007 |
| RiskMap2008 | Medium political risk  
Medium security risk |
| Overall Level of Instability | Low level of instability, with some instances of medium levels of politically motivated violence and crime |

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111 Baseline populations statistics taken from US Census Bureau, *International Data Base*.  
Baseline for GNI per capita taken from World Bank, *Key Development Data and Statistics* ([cited April 4, 2008 2008]); available from...
Conclusion:

On the surface, the success of the post-conflict reconstruction process in Mozambique in context of this study is a somewhat surprising outcome, as the international community’s programs did not include child and youth specific policies. Upon further examination however, the combined efforts of an efficient international effort along with the additional contributions of a few important NGOs, and the positive impact of the cultural and religious environment explain how the country overcame the potentially dangerous youth bulge situation and experienced one of the most successful periods of modern post-conflict reconstruction in sub-Saharan Africa.

During the reconstruction process in Mozambique, the youth demographic could have emerged as a significant destabilizing factor. However, while youth in Mozambique today remain a vulnerable demographic, the reintegration program managed to quell any potential risk of youth derailing the war-to-peace transition and Mozambique has emerged as a relatively stable country (see figure 2.5).

The outcome in Mozambique is largely explained through the constructive relationship between the United Nations program and NGO efforts. As the summary in figures 2.1 and 2.2 demonstrate, both the United Nations and NGOs were relatively successful in instituting their reconstruction programs. While the UN mission ran several critical programs, including DDR and refugee reintegration, they did not cater their policies to fit the needs of the youth demographic, leaving some issues unresolved. Where the United Nations programs did not explicitly address youth and children’s needs, its effective management of the overall process allowed a few


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NGOs to dedicate their efforts specifically to meeting the critical youth needs left out of the overall UN mission. In addition, certain domestic policies and cultural factors also contributed positively to the process, especially creating a constructive environment for the reintegration process. The government’s agreement to retrospective blanket amnesty for all individuals involved in the conflict, while not aimed at youth specifically, significantly contributed to creating a culture of reconciliation after the conflict. Religion also added to this culture of reconciliation, as religious leaders worked within the traditional cultures to guide returnees back into the communities.

Today, Mozambique is a relatively politically stable country and seems to have overcome the civil conflict without any serious or widespread reincitation of violence. While the reconstruction process was largely successful in stabilizing Mozambique and achieving a negative peace, it is important to note that most of the programs, with the notable exception of ProPaz, were focused on short to medium term relief, rather than continuing on to provide long-term socio-political empowerment programs for the youth demographic.\textsuperscript{112} Ironically, in the process of transitioning to a peacetime environment, Mozambique, like many developing nations, has also struggled in the face of economic reforms and development, and perhaps as a combined result of history, geography and recent humanitarian crises, including devastating flooding in 2000 and 2001, Mozambique remains one of the more underdeveloped nations in the world.

\textsuperscript{112} This relationship between humanitarian programming during post-conflict reconstruction as opposed to development programming will be examined in further depth in the concluding chapter. What is important to note is that while the short and medium term reconstruction efforts were highly successful in Mozambique, upon the conclusion of the civil war, Mozambique was also faced with widespread poverty and development issues that have far out-lasted the reconstruction period.
Chapter III.
The Democratic Republic of Congo: Youth and the perpetuation of conflict

Introduction

In direct contrast to Mozambique, the experience of post-conflict reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was riddled with ineffective policies and disorganized implementing agents. As a result, the reconstruction process has been relatively unsuccessful, as violence continues to destabilize the country, particularly in the eastern Kivu provinces. While Mozambique and the DRC faced similar situations, both with a high percentage of youth in the population, the DRC had an even higher percentage of child soldiers, and the international community’s response to the crisis was on a much larger scale of action both in the overarching reconstruction program and in youth and child specific policies. After the signing of the ceasefire and peace agreements, the DRC was inundated with international organizations and NGOs looking to provide humanitarian aid and transition assistance, with the United Nations mission sent to manage the reconstruction process becoming the largest peacekeeping mission in UN history. Each of the actors involved were acutely aware of the significance of the youth demographic and developed policies or programming to specifically cater to the youth demographic. Despite the extremely high levels of participation, neither the reconstruction efforts or the youth specific policies have created a lasting positive influence. In fact, the DRC is the least stable of the three cases, experiencing levels of violence during the reconstruction process nearly to the point of a reincitation of the
conflict. One of the reasons that elite actors were able to continue the violence was because of the ongoing youth participation. The case of post-conflict reconstruction in DRC is therefore particularly puzzling as even with the enormous level of effort from the international community, and the development across the board of policies and programs specific to youth, children and youth in the DRC have emerged as a significant feature in the ongoing destabilization.

I argue that a number of intervening factors and characteristics of the reconstruction program shaped the youth demographic’s behavior, and contributed to the relative failure of reconstruction efforts. Even with the money and manpower behind the international operation in the DRC, the mismanagement of the DDR program not only rendered the reconstruction process incomplete – without any significant reintegration programming – but also contributed to the deterioration of the situation and ongoing violence. Consequently, NGOs were forced to fill in for the failing DDR program, often responding to emergency situations to identify, shelter, feed and demobilize children on an ad-hoc basis rather than through a cohesive program. As these NGOs had to use their limited resources to compensate for the government’s failing DDR program, they did not have the capacity to provide critical reintegration or follow-up programming. In addition, extenuating circumstances, such as the extremely difficult operating terrain of the DRC and the ongoing violence and culture of impunity, must be taken in account as contributing to the overall ineffectiveness of the reconstruction efforts. However, rather than merely a case of an inhospitable environment to peacekeeping efforts, the evidence suggests that because of the poor management of the DDR program, a number of critical functions in
regards to facilitating reintegration programming and education opportunities were left unmet, leaving thousands of former child and youth soldiers with little hope of successfully transitioning into civilian society. As a result of the failure to adequately address youth issues within this context, children and youth became a source of strength for those wishing to destabilize the country.

**Background**

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) resides in the heart of central Africa, spanning an area that is roughly the size of Western Europe. While the jungle terrain has plagued the process of development in the DRC, (transportation is extremely difficult and water-borne tropical diseases, like malaria, are quite common) the environment is also one of the world’s most rich in natural resources, including diamonds, gold, timber, and coltan. The DRC is also home to nearly seventy ethnic groups, with significant regional and linguistic divisions.

With these environmental factors in mind, a firm understanding of the current situation in the DRC, as was the case in Mozambique, begins with an examination of the country’s colonial roots. In the late 1800s, Belgium, under the rule of King Leopold II, colonized the Congo Free State in the region known today as the DRC. King Leopold II became infamous for the brutal tactics he used against the native people in order to convert the Congo Free State into an extremely profitable resource-extracting machine. Despite its profit making capacity, the colonial enterprise left the colony largely politically underdeveloped. By the time the Congo was granted independence in 1960, and the Belgian civil servants left the country en masse, the
nascent government institutions were weak, with very few of the Congolese bureaucrats having any administrative experience, most of whom were largely preoccupied with capitalizing on resources for their own personal wealth and influence.\(^1\) This legacy of colonial extraction and power-driven elites would lead to decades of corrupt rule under the dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, and continues to remain a driving force in the modern Congolese political economy.

While the war for independence led to the first civil conflict in the DRC (and the first failed UN occupation), the most recent conflict emerged directly in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Amid the chaos following the ethnically charged civil war in Rwanda, where Hutu-dominated government forces organized the mass murder of over 1.3 million Tutsi and “moderate” Hutu,\(^2\) over one million predominantly Hutu Rwandan refugees fled to camps in the north-eastern region of the DRC (then Zaire) known as the Kivus.\(^3\) Intermixed among the civilian refugees were approximately 70,000 Hutu soldiers and militiamen, including both high-ranking leadership and common génocidaires (ex-FAR/ Interahamwe). The dire conditions in the camp (including a Cholera epidemic) attracted the attention of international humanitarian organizations and saw the influx of nearly $1.3 billion in humanitarian relief.\(^4\) However, with UNHCR’s lack of genuine control over the

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\(^1\) James Dobbins, *The UN's Role in Nation-Building : From the Congo to Iraq* (RAND Corporation, 2005).


\(^4\) Ibid., Lischer, "Collateral Damage: Humanitarian Assistance as a Cause of Conflict." According to Lischer, while donors were willing to send billions of dollars in humanitarian relief to “tens of thousands of unrepentant genocide perpetrators,” the same donors were unwilling to fund efforts to “disarm the militants, much less send peacekeeping troops to do so.” Lischer, "Collateral Damage: Humanitarian Assistance as a Cause of Conflict," 80.
situation, and with the tacit support of the Mobutu regime, the ex-Far/Interahamwe manipulated international humanitarian assistance to the refugee camps in order to reestablish their political and military system inside the camps and launch attacks against the Rwandan government. The presence of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe dominated camps in Zaire, and in Tanzania, would serve as a catalyst for both the civil unrest in the DRC (Zaire), and the instability that currently plagues the great lakes region.

In addition to creating tensions between the newly installed Rwandan government and Zaire, the influx of refugees began to exacerbate ethnic tensions in the Kivus. In the mid-1990s leaders in the Kivus had already begun a racially charged campaign against the Congolese Tutsi population, questioning their nationality status. In 1993 and again in 1996, local government leaders, with the support of the Mobutu regime, led “quasi-ethnic cleansing” campaigns against the Tutsi in the Masisi region of North Kivu and the Banyamulenge (ethnically Tutsi) group in south Kivu.5

These actions, combined the growing tensions in the refugee camps led to increased instability and tension along the border. By September of 1996, the “First Congo War” began, which pitted the Tutsi and Banyamulenge minority, backed by the Rwandan, Ugandan and Angolan governments, against the Zairian army and ex-FAR/Interahamwe in the refugee camps. The foreign governments, in addition to sending their own troops, attempted to couch their actions of aggression from the international community by allying with indigenous anti-Mobutu movements6 and supporting an alliance of Congolese revolutionary parties known as the *Alliance des*

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5 Boulden, *Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations.*

6 While there were a number of anti-Mobutu and revolutionary movements within Zaire, most adhered to nonviolent and nonmilitary strategies.
Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL), led by Laurent Kabila. The international community, particularly the West, perceived the conflict as a civil war and anti-Mobutu revolution, and focused instead on the unfolding humanitarian and refugee crisis, rather then the military conflict. Without international support, Mobutu was forced to flee the country in 1997, with Kabila assuming power, and renaming the country as the Democratic Republic of Congo.

However, Kabila ruled for only 15 months before war broke out again in August of 1998. During his short time in power, Kabila had agitated the UN, international community and his Rwandan allies over a number of issues, including his refusal to allow UN investigations of the massacre of thousand of the Hutu residents of the refugee camps. As a result, the second phase of the war saw a split in the former AFDL troops and regional alliances: Certain brigades within the AFDL rallied against Kabila and formed the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (Congolese Rally for Democracy or RCD) and later the Mouvement pour la liberation du Congo (MLC). Rwanda and Uganda broke with Angola to the support the RCD and other armed forces, such as the Mayi Mayi, in their attempts to overthrow the newly installed government. Angola continued to support Kabila’s government, backed by the Congolese army, the Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC), along with the governments of Namibia and Zimbabwe.

By July 1999, after a year of regional interventions and negotiations, the parties succumbed to international pressures to put an end to the violence, and signed the Lusaka Peace Accords (or Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement). However, it is important

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7 The RCD later split in to the RCD-ML (Mouvement de Libération) backed by Uganda and the RCD-Goma, backed by Rwanda.
to note that unlike in Mozambique, not all the parties fully supported an end to the hostilities, but rather signing the peace treaty was an opportunistic move for all those involved: the conflict had come to a stalemate and increased scrutiny of all actors (along with the dire humanitarian and refugee situation) had increased the international community’s desire to achieve a peaceful solution, leaving the parties no real alternative to the agreement. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement committed all parties, including representatives from the DRC and other regional actors (with the notable exception of the Mayi Mayi), to a cessation of the violence and authorized a United Nations Mission to the DRC in order to facilitate the peace keeping process. The accords also called for an Inter-Congolese Dialogue in order to resolve the political disputes involved and facilitate national reconciliation in the DRC. However, the reluctance of parties to fully commit to the peace process would continue to surface throughout the transition period, as various factions actively avoided full compliance with peacemaking operations.

The Inter-Congolese Dialogue was supposed to last 90 days. In fact it would take three years, a number of failed agreements and multiple United Nations and international interventions in the negotiations to finally achieve the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC (sometimes called Pretoria II). The Global and All-Inclusive Agreement outlined new government institutions and power sharing agreements, naming Laurent Kabila’s son, Joesph, as the head of the transition government. While this agreement officially marked the beginning of the transition and reconstruction phase in the DRC, the northeastern regions have remained largely unstable, as armed groups have continued to fight, and a former
RCD general, Laurent Nkunda, continues to wage an ethnically charged battle of instability against the transition government.

The fifteen-year war in the DRC/Zaire was characterized by extreme violence against civilians, resulting in more deaths than WWI and producing “one of the greatest humanitarian disasters in the world today.” By 2003, at least 3.3 million people had died as a direct or indirect result of the conflict, with an additional 2.7 million Congolese internally displaced (90% of whom had moved to the eastern regions), and 378,000 Congolese refugees seeking asylum in neighboring countries. The DRC, itself, was host to 330,000 foreign refugees. While the situation in the DRC, outside of the Kivu and Ituri districts, improved to a considerable degree after 2003, by 2006 the death toll had reached 3.9 million, and 1,200 people continued to die every day from violence, preventable disease or starvation brought about by the ongoing insecurity and lack of access to humanitarian and medical care.

The conflict in the Congo has also become renown internationally for its extreme affect on children and youth. Of the 3.9 million who died as a result of the conflict in the DRC, 45% were children (under 18). As of 2006, 45% of the estimated 38,000 who continue to die as a direct or indirect result of the ongoing violence are children. In addition, the use of child soldiers has been a common practice throughout the conflict, with all parties recruiting children to serve in their ranks. Children associated with armed groups were particularly vulnerable both

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8 Boulden, _Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations._
10 “Struggling to Survive: Children in Armed Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” (Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, 2006).
12 “Struggling to Survive: Children in Armed Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” 5.
during and after the conflict. Often subject to extreme brutality during recruitment, these children participated in the widespread violence, often while under the influence of drugs or other mind-altering substances. The young women and girls associated with armed groups were particularly at risk, as many not only served by fighting on the front lines, but were also regularly raped and sexually assaulted while with the armed forces, or taken as “wives” and later refused to be released by their male companions.

The education system also suffered to a large extent by the ongoing violence. Schools were the subjects of numerous attacks, and were often the sites of forced recruitment. By 2003, the DRC was one of the top five countries in the world with the largest number of children out of school, and a gross enrollment ratio of only 64%, less than the average in sub-Saharan Africa.13

Today, the situation facing youth in the Democratic Republic of Congo has not significantly improved. While recent negotiations with Laurent Nkunda in 2008 may prove important in the stabilization of eastern DRC, the humanitarian crisis continues to severely affect Congolese children and youth. Currently the average life expectancy in the DRC is only 44 years old, and 205 out of every 1000 children will die before reaching the age of 5. Close to one third of all children in the DRC are underweight, with malnutrition responsible for nearly half of all deaths among children under age five.14 Approximately 280,000 children under the age of 15 are living with HIV/AIDS, and of the 4 million orphaned children in the DRC, 1,100,000

lost their parents to AIDS.\textsuperscript{15} However, despite the efforts of the international community, there is not significant evidence that humanitarian aid is having a significant impact on the crisis in the DRC, and the prospects for the youth demographics development and empowerment are particularly bleak.

The following analysis explores the impact of international, domestic, and non-governmental organizations policies on the reconstruction process. The evidence suggests that the reconstruction actors’ failure to fully implement reintegration programs and education reform is directly connected to the ongoing instability. Without providing children and youth affected by the conflict with the resources necessary to successfully transition into civilian life, many young people became increasingly vulnerable to (re)recruitment into armed groups, and therefore constituted an enduring resource for those wishing to prolong the conflict. Cultural and environmental issues, such as the inaccessible operating terrain and ongoing culture of impunity, also played a significant role in hampering the implementation of reconstruction programs, and therefore served as additional obstacles to the fulfillment of critical reconstruction functions.

**Variable Analysis**

**Demographics**

*Population:* After the Lusaka agreement was signed in 2003, the government of the DRC estimated that approximately 60\% of the 54.9 million people living in the DRC were under the age of 25.\textsuperscript{16} According to US State Department census data,

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.

from 2002 to 2007, 32% of the population was 10-24 years old, with the median age across the population of 16. In addition to the high proportion of young adults and adolescents, more than 45% of the population was under 15 years old in 2007,\(^\text{17}\) with 35% of the population under 10 years olds and 19% under the age of 5. As young children and youth comprised an extremely high percentage of the population, they were also highly affected by the previous and ongoing violence.

Youth Refugees and Soldiers: In 2003 there were estimated to be approximately 3.4 million Congolese internally displaced and another 350,000 Congolese refugees in Congo-Brazzaville, Zambia, Tanzania, while 250,000 foreign refugees were residing the in DRC.\(^\text{18}\) Most of those internally displaced, (over 80%) were women and children.

Perhaps the most significant demographic data is the percentage of children and youth serving in armed groups. In 2003, of the approximately 150,000 government troops and members other armed forces, an estimated 30,000 were under

\(^{17}\) Failed States Index (Fund for Peace, 2007); available from http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=140.

18, 19 with children representing up to 40% of certain brigades. 20 Demonstrating the extent to which youth soldiers were an fundamental feature of the conflict, data from child demobilization programs conducted from 1999-2003 by Save the Children indicate that 82% of the children in these programs were over 15 at the time of demobilization, yet had been involved in the conflict for over 3 years often serving in more than one of the armed groups. 21 In fact, because children and youth comprise such a high proportion of children serving in armed forces, many of the older children quickly rose in the ranks, becoming non-commissioned or junior offices. 22

While it is unclear how many of the children were forcibly recruited compared to those who volunteered, children have been associated with nearly every armed group active in the DRC. However, those most widely known for their egregious treatment and recruitment of children are the Mayi-Mayi and the RCD-Goma. As the evidence of child soldiering brought pressure from the international community, in 2003 the government pledged to no longer recruit or use child soldiers. However as of 2005, the UN Secretary General reported that at least nine of the armed groups continued to recruit child soldiers, and in 2006 children were still associated with a number of integrated government brigades. Most notably, the troops loyal to Laurent Nkunda were still actively recruiting child soldiers in 2007.

19 The common term used to describe those under 18 who serve in armed groups is “Children associated with armed groups and forces.” This category encompasses child soldiers in addition to children serving in armed groups as cooks, spies, sexual slaves or in other roles. The government of the DRC and other national and international organizations involved in peacekeeping, humanitarian and reconstruction missions to the DRC use this term and definition in defining the scope of their policies focused on children.
20 Amnesty International, "Democratic Republic of Congo: Children at War, Creating Hope for the Future."
22 Amnesty International, "Democratic Republic of Congo: Children at War, Creating Hope for the Future."
Interestingly, an estimated 40% of the children associated with armed groups were female. Young girls and women associated with armed groups are particularly vulnerable as sexual violence is rampant in the DRC and used consciously as a weapon of war. In addition, many of the girls were taken on as “wives” to soldiers, and were regularly raped by multiple soldiers in the camps. However, because of their precarious position as “wives” of soldiers, many of the young women were not included in the DDR process, and therefore were not able to receive the potential benefits provided by demobilization and reintegration programs.

_Education:_ While civil conflict inevitably damages infrastructure, the extent to which the education system in the DRC has deteriorated during the civil war is extreme. In 2003, the World Bank reported that the DRC was one of top five countries in the world with the largest number of children out of school. One of the main reasons for education system’s poor functioning is “chronic under-funding,” which the World Bank has cited as the “main factor that perpetuates low enrollment rates and the extreme degradation in the quality of services delivered.”23 As of 2005 the primary school completion rate was only 27% with a pupil to teacher ratio of 70.3 to 1.24 Over the course of the conflict there were also a number of reports of armed groups (notably the Mayi-Mayi and RDG-Goma) systematically attacking, looting and destroying schools. In certain regions, nearly every school had been seriously damaged, if not destroyed.25

25 For example, the UN assessment mission in November 2003 to the Walikale Territory “had found the territory’s education system completely destroyed.” All the schools had been damaged or “completely pillaged and destroyed,” and of the eight schools visited by the team, none had a source of
However, despite the drastically low funding (less than 1% of the national budget was allocated to education in 2003), since 2003 there has been little effort to make education a political and financial priority. By 2006, while funding improved to a degree, less than 10% of the national budget in 2006 was allocated to education and the UN Secretary General reported that at least 3.5 million primary-aged children remained out of school, along with 6 million unschooled adolescents. In addition, the Secretary General reported ongoing targeting of schools by armed forces.

According to the *Small Arms Survey 2004*, armed confrontations resulted in the destruction of 211 out of 228 schools since 1999 and over 60% of students (39,600 down to 10,620) and teachers (1,771 down to 701) have left schools. As of 2004 the General Enrolment Ratio (GER) was 64%, lower than the average for sub-Saharan Africa, and the primary completion rate was only 29% with general literacy at 63.5%.

*Unemployment:* No unemployment data or estimates are currently available. This is in large part due to the dominance of the informal market in the DRC. Years of corruption created a dual economy whereby formal businesses must operate under a much higher cost, and most economic transactions take place in the informal economy.

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29 Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, "Struggling to Survive: Children in Armed Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo."
Coding: The DRC is coded as having a high percentage of youth in the population. While the percentage is on average for sub-Saharan Africa, it is five percentage points higher than the average percentage of youth in the world population (27% in 2003) and significantly higher than the corresponding rate in developed countries (20% in 2003).\(^{31}\) However it should be noted that there is an even higher percentage of children in the DRC under the age of 15. The DRC also saw high levels of child and youth participation in the conflict, as despite the fact that the DRC is a signatory on international treaties forbidding the use of child soldiers,\(^{32}\) nearly 1 of every 3 soldiers were under the age of 18, and an even greater proportion under the age of 25.

**International Policy**

By the time that the Lusaka Peace Accords were signed, the conflict in the DRC had become the focal point of a regional crisis, involving up to nine foreign states with a military presence in the DRC, in addition to the many domestic and foreign rebel groups. As such, the post-conflict reconstruction period in the DRC coincided with similar projects in neighboring counties, and the involvement of many foreign governments in the peace building process. The largest international player in the peacekeeping and peace building process was the United Nations. Established in 1999 out of the Lusaka agreements, the United Nations Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) is the largest and most expensive UN peacekeeping

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\(^{31}\) United States Census Bureau, *International Data Base* ([cited April 2, 2008 2008]).

\(^{32}\) The DRC is a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (ratified in 1990), the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (ratified 2001) and announced in 2001 that it would sign on to the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, but as of 2006 had not completed the ratification. In addition, the DRC signed the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court and attended the 2007 Paris Conference on Children in Armed Conflict
Included directly in the MONUC mandate, in addition to implementing the ceasefire and supporting the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program, was a specific duty to address the humanitarian crisis facing children and child soldiers in the DRC. Specifically MONUC’s mandate required UN representatives to:

Facilitate humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring, with particular attention to vulnerable groups including women, children and demobilized child soldiers, as MONUC deems within its capabilities and under acceptable security conditions, in close cooperation with other United Nations agencies, related organizations and non-governmental organizations.

Despite the fact that the international actors involved, including the United Nations, were acutely aware of the issue of child and youth involvement in the conflict, and created specific measures to address the problem, the programs and methods used were unsuccessful. However, it is important to note in analyzing these variables, that both the regional and UN policies and programs were highly coordinated between national actors and NGOs. As such, the influence of the UN as opposed to NGOs may not be easily separated.

*The Peace Accord:* From 1999-2002 the government of the DRC along with representatives of foreign governments and rebel groups participated in negotiating a number of agreements, from the Lusaka ceasefire agreement to the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in Democratic Republic of the Congo. The agreement that most explicitly addressed children and youth was the Lusaka Peace Accord. The agreement stipulated that all parties agree to end the recruitment of child
soldiers and cease all acts of violence against the civilian population, including all forms of sexual violence. In addition, the Lusaka accords prescribed an active DDR program where by the agreement empowered the United Nations, in coordination with the national government, the OAU and the Joint Military Commission (JMC), to “track down and disarm armed groups,” as a part of its peace enforcement duties, in addition to facilitating humanitarian assistance as part of the peacekeeping mandate. While it is clear that the Lusaka agreement envisaged forcible disarmament, MONUC’s interpretation of the mandate differed significantly (See the section below on the United Nations). Finally, while the agreement acknowledged child soldiers as a humanitarian issue, the agreement did not reference in any way how child soldiers would be handled within the DDR process.

The series of talks following Lusaka were largely unsuccessful and did not add significantly to the conditions of the ceasefire. For instance, the Pretoria I agreement left the official protocol for DDR unchanged, if not more muddled than the stipulations in the Lusaka accord. However, perhaps the most relevant addition to the agreements in reference to youth was the dialogue at Sun City in April of 2002 where signatories resolved to establish several institutions supporting democracy, including a national observatory for human rights, potentially including advocacy for children’s rights. This was later reiterated in the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement in December of the same year, where it was decided that the members of the civil society or “forces vivres” would take on the responsibility of establishing the institutions.

Foreign Government Involvement: As a result of the nature of the conflict, many of the neighboring governments remained highly involved in the transition period. While most notably these governments were signatories to the various treaties regarding the situation in the DRC (including Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe) a number of Western governments are active donors of humanitarian aide, particularly for programs related to children and youth.

For example, the United States government gives $200 million annually to the United Nations Peace Keeping Operation in the Congo in addition to supporting the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which finances and facilitates a number of programs in the DRC directly involving the youth demographic. From 1997-2001 and 2002-2006 USAID carried out a number of projects under its Transition Initiatives program aimed specifically to “increase the number of war affected youth who are reintegrated into host communities” and “increase awareness of and/or participation on issues key to the transition process.”

For instance, the majority of the Transition Initiative’s budget went to the implementation of the Synergie d’Éducation Communautaire et d’Appui à la transition (SE*CA), an initiative coordinated with the International Rescue Committee (IRC) that included a 6-month training program for youth affected by the conflict (including ex-combantants, IDPs, victims of sexual violence and others) which provided vocational training, basic living skills education and psycho-social assistance along with a small-grants program to support of community driven

activities and media programs to serve as a forum for information, discussion and participation.\textsuperscript{37} As a part of the SE*CA program, USAID carried out a Youth Empowerment and Skills (YES) module, which by October of 2005 had trained 10,164 people in 280 communities in the Orientale and Maniema Provinces. SE*CA also sponsored a number of emergency initiatives to deal with youth issues.\textsuperscript{38} For instance in 2005, as the elections were drawing near, political parties were sponsoring youth gangs to destabilize the Kisangani region. In response, SE*CA launched an emergency program that successfully stabilized the situation by providing “the youths with conflict management and democracy and governance training so that they could understand their role in creating conflict, as well as the proper role of political parties. In addition, the youths were involved in paid rehabilitation work on one of the roads so that they would be less enticed by the political parties' payments.”\textsuperscript{39}

In addition USAID was also contracting with CONADER, the national agency in charge of the DDR process, to carry out reintegration programs for ex-combatants in the Ituri region. As a part of the Ituri reintegration program, the ex-combatants along with 5,040 community members, were provided with Youth Education and Skills (YES) training. These community members were then offered the choice between being paid to work on rehabilitation projects or receiving basic vocational training with a corresponding resources kit. According to the 2005 annual reports this program was highly successful, especially in regards to its Conflict Management and Reaffirmation of Values module, which was instituted in 213 communities in the Ituri District. In addition the program reported that the ex-combatants were highly-

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{38} “USAID/OTI DRC Field Report,” (USAID, 2005).  
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
satisfied with the training, and as a result, word has spread about the program, producing a large demand for the program.\textsuperscript{40}

While these programs specifically targeting youth were relatively successful, because they were a part of the Transition Initiatives program,\textsuperscript{41} they were only intended as short-term initiatives, and ended in March of 2006 when elections were held. USAID continues to operate in the DRC, however with less of an emphasis on youth programming. USAID’s focus on short-term programming is representative of a larger trend throughout the reconstruction process in the DRC of the dominance of emergency and short-term programming, which is one of the contributing factors hindering the success of reconstruction measures. Currently the USAID programs in the DRC focus on health, food security and agriculture, democracy and governance, education, protecting biodiversity in the Congo Basin Region, and reintegrating former combatants and victims.

\textit{United Nations’ Involvement:}

The establishment of United Nations mission to the DRC (MONUC) directly followed the stipulation in the Lusaka Accords to bring in the United Nations in order to enforce the peace process. Originally under a Chapter VI mandate in 1999 with 500 military observers, the mission expanded to 5,537 military personnel in 2000. Due to the ongoing violence and crisis in the eastern regions, in 2003 the UN Security Council approved a Chapter VII status for MONUC, thereby authorizing the use of

\textsuperscript{40}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{41}The USAID Transition Initiatives Program (OTI) provides “fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key political transition and stabilization needs.”

USAID: Transition Initiatives
“all necessary means” to fulfill its mandate and increasing troop levels to 16,700 by 2004. While these troop numbers are extremely high for a UN mission, in comparison to the total civilian population there were less than 3 UN troops for every 10,000 citizens, and the Secretary General had recommended that 23,900 troops were needed to improve the “operational capabilities” of the mission, which were “severely under-resourced.”42 As of November 2007, there were 18,407 total MONUC uniformed personnel, including 16,661 troops, 735 military observers, 1,011 police, 931 international civilian personnel, 2,062 local civilian staff and 585 United Nations Volunteers.43

The MONUC mission encompassed five core programs: Peace and security, facilitating the transition to democracy, supporting the establishment of rule of law and human rights, improving human conditions for sustainable peace, and supporting the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. These core programs included ensuring and coordinating the DDR/DDRRR process, strong advocacy to fight the “culture of impunity” which in part fuelled the practice of recruiting children into militias, and providing support for the reintegration of child soldiers.44 Specifically, in 2004 the UN Security Council Resolution 1565 established within MONUC’s mandate the responsibility to “assist in the promotion and protection of human rights, with particular attention to women, children and vulnerable persons.”45

42 “MONUC: Background,” (United Nations).
To carry out its mandate in regard to the protection of child and child soldiers, MONUC established a Child Protection Unit, the largest of any UN peacekeeping operation, and the first to include Child Protection Advisers (CPAs), who have been deployed in the field since 2006. The unit’s main goal is monitoring and reporting violations against children in addition to promoting advocacy for children’s rights.

In 2003-2004 an interagency group coordinated by UNICEF including the MONUC Child Protection Unit and representatives from the transitional government and various iNGOs developed the Operational Framework for the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Children (le Cadre Opérationnel pour les Enfants Associés aux Forces et Groupes Armés), which outlined specific guidelines and procedures for CONADER to use in the national DDR process (See “Domestic Policy” section for details of the CONDER DDR/DDRR program). The goals outlined in the Operational Framework include removing all children from armed forces and groups, facilitating reintegration through reinsertion programs, using community mechanisms to reinforce “sustainable conditions for the protection of children,” developing specific strategies to reintegrate girls associated with armed forces, and preventing child recruitment by armed forces.

While CONDER took over the main responsibility for establishing the adult and child DDR Programs, MONUC and UNICEF played an extremely large role, especially in the management and operation of the child DDR programs. As of 2006, CONADER and UNICEF were working in coordination with nine iNGOs (including

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46 Amnesty International "Struggling to Survive: Children in Armed Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo."

47 Ibid., 47.
Save the Children and CARE) and 35 national NGOs to implement children’s DDR. While the DDR program has seen the official demobilization of about 31,000 children by mid-2007, the number itself is not necessarily representative of success. The 31,000 represents the total number of children reported to be associated with armed forces, however, the actual number of child soldiers may be higher, as there are many cases of self-demobilization where children and youth simply left the forces, or also instances where girls and young women were left out of the process as they had become “wives” or domestic and sexual servants during the war, and were not released by armed groups. As discussed in detail in the Domestic Policy section, the overall DDR process, including children’s DDR was riddled with delays, inefficiency and corruption. Most significantly, the official demobilization of children did not begin in earnest until 2005, and there was a severe lack in funding for reintegration programs. As a result, UNICEF and Save the Children were often forced to organize DDR and relief programs on an emergency ad-hoc basis, and many of the officially demobilized children did not receive any type of reintegration support.

In addition to UNICEF’s work in children’s DDR, MONUC worked with UNDP (considered the lead UN agency) to organize the national adult DDR/DDRRR program. However, MONUC was not responsible within the framework of its mandate to carry out the program in full, only having the authority to provide “advice and assistance to the Government of Transition” in facilitating the DDR process. As such MONUC defined the scope of its role in the following duties:

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“to assist in security for the [Centres of Orientation] process in partnership with the
FARDC and the national police force; to assist in the process of pre-disarmament and
disarmament in connection with the SMI and CONADER; to transport weapons and
ammunition to the centers of storage (CSA); to assist in the destruction of defective
weapons and non transportable ammunition.”51 The full responsibility of carrying out
the PN-DDR (National Plan for DDR) fell instead on the national commission for
DDR with aide from the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program
(MDRP), a multi-agency body supporting and funding demobilization and
reintegration of ex-combatants throughout the Great Lakes region.

However, while MONUC’s mandate to assist in the demobilization and
reintegration efforts stemmed directly from the stipulations of the Lusaka accords, the
nature of MONUC’s DDR program was distinctly different than the program
envisioned by the Lusaka signatories. According to the wording of the ceasefire the
United Nations was not only to “supervise disengagement of forces” but also to
“trac[k] down and disar[m] all armed groups.”52 While it is clear that the Lusaka
accords sanctioned a forcible demobilization program, “the Secretary-General and the
Security Council stated from the outset that any DDRRR programme undertaken by
MONUC must be voluntary.”53 There were a number of logistical and political
reasons for pursuing a voluntary program, not the least of which was that the UN did
not expect to be able to rally the necessary number of troops to carry out a long and

51 Ibid.
52 "Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.", Sections 8.2.1.b & 8.2.2.a.
53 Peter Swarbrick, "DDRRR: Political Dynamics and Linkages," in Challenges of Peace
Implementation: The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ed. Mark Malan and João
drawn out military campaign which was likely to suffer a number of casualties.\textsuperscript{54} Further complicating the matter, the demobilization program in the DRC was distinctly different than other DDR programs facilitated by the UN in that it 1) involved both domestic and foreign troops and 2) was sent to disarm groups that had “signed no agreement with MONUC or with any other party, still considering themselves at war.”\textsuperscript{55} It was therefore politically and logistically infeasible for MONUC to sanction a forced and all-inclusive demobilization program. As explored later in the chapter, this decision, while perhaps the only option available, led to the formation of parallel chains of command, as different armed groups volunteered for the demobilization program but maintained a degree of loyalty to their previous commanders once redeployed, most notably in the case of troops loyal to Laurent Nkunda. This formation of parallel structures within the newly operational mixed brigades opened the door for the re-recruitment of many child soldiers who had already been demobilized.

Finally, the UN mission also had a significant impact on emergency humanitarian relief projects, particularly for the large population of IDPs. For instance, attacks on schools became common practice among militias as a mechanism of terrorism and recruitment. In response, starting in 2004 UNIFEF and OCHA managed a Rapid Response Mechanism that provided immediate assistance to schools, including rehabilitating buildings and classrooms or providing temporary school facilities along with supplying replacement school materials. These repairs are estimated to have provided temporary education benefits to at least 12,000 displaced

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 167.
school children.\textsuperscript{56} By 2006, as the displacement crisis continued, the rapid response mechanism was aiding 120,000 new IDPs per month.\textsuperscript{57} However, because emergency programming has continued over such a long period of time, the UN has not necessarily been able to sustain the means to support the necessary programming. Despite the fact that MONUC was one of the largest funded UN missions to date, by June of 2006 OCHA had only received donations to cover a third of the requested funding for the year’s consolidated humanitarian action plan.\textsuperscript{58}

Despite money and manpower behind MONUC’s humanitarian programs, and its strong advocacy for the rights of the child, MONUC was largely ineffective in carrying out its peacekeeping mission. While there were a number of circumstances outside of MONUC’s control that hindered its success (for instance, everything from the political climate, with rebel groups still operating despite the ceasefire, to the inaccessibility of the natural terrain constituted serious obstacles), MONUC was also plagued by instances of competition and scandal within its ranks. For instance, before the Operational Framework was instituted, UNICEF, Save the Children and MONUC’s Child Protection Unit were all involved in coordinating efforts to demobilize child soldiers. However, UNICEF and Save the Children operated with opposite approaches – Save the Children opting to engage local communities to improve child protection and UNICEF working with the RCD-Goma political leadership to stop recruiting. While these different approaches could have been

\textsuperscript{56} “S/2006/389.”
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
coordinated to attack the problem from a variety of directions, instead competition created tension between the two organizations, hindering advocacy efforts.\(^{59}\)

In 2004 news broke that amid the ongoing chaos in the DRC, MONUC was also contributing to the problem, as allegations were leaked of UN peacekeepers’ involvement in the prostitution and sexual abuse of female children. There were approximately 150 cases uncovered of “severe and ongoing” sexual exploitation and abuse perpetrated by UN military and civilian personal.\(^{60}\) Most of the cases involved girls between the ages of 14-18, although some victims were as young as 11. MONUC took serious action against the perpetrators, calling in the UN Office of Internal Oversight (OIOS) to carry out investigations, and dismiss the personnel involved in the matter. In addition, the investigation resulted in new, stricter regulations in a Code of Conduct on Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse for all MONUC personnel.

The sexual abuse scandal is particularly tragic in light of the rampant use of sexual violence as a tool of the conflict in the DRC, especially against children. The irony that MONUC’s policy was specifically focused on aiding and protecting children, when in fact their presence served as a detriment to many of the children they aimed to protect, cannot be missed. While the MONUC administration dealt swiftly and harshly with the perpetrators, the incident was not isolated and can be perceived as a symptom of a failing and ineffective mission, which had lost control

\(^{59}\) Verhey, "Going Home: Demobilising and Reintegrating Child Soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo."

\(^{60}\) Amnesty International, "Struggling to Survive: Children in Armed Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo."
over a number of its team, and in turn became part of the culture of impunity it was
sent to fight against.

Coding: The international efforts in the DRC are coded as having a Low Level,
Positive Impact. The positive impact refers to the movement away from conflict as a
result of the UN intervention, demobilization, advocacy and democratization efforts.
The efforts are rated as having a low level impact, as despite the high numbers of
personnel on the ground, the programs did not entirely meet the demands of the
situation, and in some cases the negative aspects of the mission (with the cases of
sexual abuse) detracted from the overall level of positive impact.

Domestic Policy

With the UN agreeing to provide significant support operations for the
peacekeeping efforts, the transitional government took on the majority of the
responsibility in organizing and implementing the reconstruction efforts,\(^{61}\) including
the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR/DDRRR) process and the
creation of the new national forces, the Forces Armées de la République
Démocratique du Congo commonly known as FARDC. The domestic DDR process,
along with the restructuring of state institutions, such as the education and justice
systems, were crucial both in meeting the needs of the youth demographic, and in
contributing to the overall stability and future development of the country. However

\(^{61}\) The Global and All-Inclusive Agreement outlined five major objectives for the transitional
government: 1) reunification, the re-establishment of peace, reconstruction of the country, restoration
of territorial integrity and the re-establishment of the state’s authority over the whole national territory;
2) national reconciliation; 3) the formation of a restructured and integrated national army; 4) the
organization of free and transparent elections at all levels with a view to the establishment of a
democratic constitutional regime; and 5) the establishment of structures aimed at creating a new
political order. "Democratic Republic of Congo: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
due to poor coordination, lengthy delays, bureaucratic competition, corruption and mismanagement of funds, the national government was largely ineffective in implementing these programs. As a result, the ineffective programming directly and indirectly contributed as a factor in the ongoing instability.

**DDR/DDRRR**

Perhaps the most significant of these programs in the immediate reconstruction process was the DDR/DDRRR program. From the outset, the magnitude and complexity of the situation in the DRC demanded that the DDR program overcome a number of environmental and political obstacles in order to be successful. The sheer size of the conflict in the DRC, both in quantity of troops and geography, meant that the DDR process was going to require massive manpower, funding and coordination. There were estimated to be over 300,000-330,000 fighters on the DRC soil, including 150,000 troops fighting with government forces and domestic armed groups, and an estimated 30,000-33,000 children associated with the armed forces. The presence of thousands foreign troops further complicated the process, as these combatants, once demobilized, required repatriation, resettlement and reintegration, rather than simply reinsertion into the domestic society.

In order to facilitate the DDR and DDRRR processes, a governmental agency, the *Commission nationale de désarmement, demobilization et reinsertion* (CONADER) was established in December 2003 by presidential decree to manage and implement both the adult and child DDR programs. A number of other governmental ministries were established to facilitate the process, including the Inter-

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62 Ibid.
Ministerial Steering Committee on DDR and the DDR Financial Management Committee (CGFDR). The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) funded the process under a $200,000 million grant from the World Bank. By March of 2004, CONADER had published a National Plan for DDR (PN-DDR), but relied on UNDP, MONUC and NGO partners to implement interim disarmament and reinsertion programs before the official launch of the program.  

63 This plan later included as an addendum an Operational Framework on Children in Armed Conflict, outlining the specific mechanisms for the children’s DDR program.

The scheme outlined by the PN-DDR was designed to address both the demobilization of troops and the reformation of the national army under a “trone commun,” or common path of disarmament. Under this program, units of the various armed groups who volunteered to undergo disarmament would gather at regroupment centers, operated by the military, where they would be disarmed. The troops would then be transported to Orientation Centers (COs) operated by CONADER. (However the troops were often forced to wait for several weeks before the transfer). At the COs, adults and children would be separated, and adults given the choice of demobilization or entry in the FARDC. Adults choosing to continue military service would then undergo Brassage – the military reconstruction process whereby troops from government and non-government forces would combine into integrated brigades and then redeploy to provinces outside their previous base. Those adults choosing demobilization would be given information and guidance on returning to civilian life,

63 Ibid.
along with a demobilization kit, an initial monetary payment of $110 to cover transport and living expenses, along with the promise of an additional $25 per month for one year, and vocational training or other type of reintegration support.

Once identified, the children were to be taken to a separate children’s spaces in the COs, operated by child protection personnel, and transferred with in 48 hours to transit care facilities (SETs) operated by partnering child protection NGOS. At the SETs, NGOs were responsible for providing education and vocational training, along with other recreational activities. After being sheltered for approximately three months, the NGOs would arrange for family reunification. Under the Operational Framework, upon leaving the program, children were also supposed to receive a reinsertion kit consisting of “essential tools or equipment to enable them to pursue their chosen trade” – but no monetary payment – along with an official certificate of release, and the guarantee of either, one year of schooling (for those under 15 years old) or 3-9 months of vocational training in their hometowns. In addition, CONADER was supposed to finance and implement community-based reintegration projects for all of the children upon return to their communities.

While the program envisaged by the Operational Framework and the PN-DDR was developed with the specific needs of children and youth in mind, the DDR program was largely unsuccessful, especially in regards to the reintegration of children and youth. To begin, CONADER’s mishandling of the management and

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64 The demobilizations kits were to include various living essentials (clothes, shoes, etc) and other tools (such as seeds or cooking tools) in order to help facilitate the transition to civilian life. However, in reality, the composition of the kits was largely dependent on what the implementing agencies chose to include.
65 Amnesty International, "Democratic Republic of Congo: Children at War, Creating Hope for the Future."
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
coordination mechanisms, along with inter-ministerial battles with CGFDR led to enormous delays in approving and implementing programs. While CONADER was established in 2003, and the PN-DDR published in early 2004, official DDR programs and army reunification did not begin in earnest until mid-2005, and most reintegration programs did not begin until 2006. Just a few months later in July of 2006, CONADER had spent (or lost) nearly all of the $200,000 World Bank Trust, forcing the program to suspend all activity and leaving the DDR process incomplete.68 CONADER had spent nearly all of the money funding the disarmament and demobilization programs, leaving little funding available for reintegration programming, for children or adults. While the MDRP was working in 2007 to acquire additional funding for the reintegration programs, it refused to hand over the money until the DRC government agreed to abolish CONADER and reimburse the MDRP for $6.8 million in misprocured funds.69

In addition, CONADER’s poor management meant that instead of an organized and consistent program facilitated by CONADER, the majority of the DDR programs that were carried out were implemented by NGOs who were forced to negotiate directly with armed groups on an emergency and ad-hoc basis as each commander volunteered for demobilization.70 As a result, the plans outlined in the PN-DDR and Operational Framework for disarmament and demobilization existed mostly in theory, while the actual programs implemented, particularly in regards to children’s DDR, were inconsistent and incomplete. For instance, while the

69 Status of the MDRP in the Democratic Republic of the Congo – March 2007
Operational Framework established that children were supposed to be identified and housed in separate spaces, in practice, there were large inconsistencies in identifying children and physical separation from the adults was problematic at best. In addition, the Operational Framework established that children were to receive reinsertion kits rather than any monetary payments. However, it failed to specify the contents of the kits, causing the demobilized children to feel that they were not receiving equal opportunities. As a result, children often tried to play one NGO against another to obtain the different kits, or abandoned the orientation sites altogether, thinking that they could receive a better package with a different organization, and eventually many NGOs stopped the practice.\footnote{Amnesty International, "Democratic Republic of Congo: Children at War, Creating Hope for the Future."} There was also a large degree of frustration among the children in regards to the lack of a monetary stipend, which many children stated would have aided them in starting income generating projects when they returned home. This became a huge disincentive to participate in the process, and created tension among the children who did volunteer for demobilization, many of whom attempted (or were instructed by their commanders) to pass as adults in order to receive the demobilization payment.\footnote{Ibid, "Democratic Republic of Congo: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and the Reform of the Army."} Finally, the high profile arrests of a number of high-ranking officers for the recruitment of child soldiers also contributed as an obstacle to NGOs trying to negotiate with commanders to release children. Unaware of the details of the DDR process, many of the commanders feared they would be
prosecuted for war crimes if they revealed the children in their ranks, making it
difficult for NGOs to gain access to the children.73  

Despite the management issues, the DDR program did officially demobilize
over 157,583 combatants, including 31,000 children by mid-2007.74 However, it was
later revealed that at least 45% of the children demobilized were actually over the age
of 18, while many younger children remained in the armed forces.75 In addition, less
than 2% of the children demobilized were girls (of the 40% of child soldiers known to
be female) and less than 30% of these ex-combatants (45,000) had received any type
of reintegration programming.76 By 2007 not one economic-reintegration program for
children had been approved and implemented by CONADER. In fact, NGOs reported
that in eastern DRC, even general reintegration programs were entirely absent.77 As a
result of the incomplete reintegration, many of the children were subject to
harassment upon return to their home communities, and were highly vulnerable to
both forced and voluntary re-recruitment. Without any substantial reintegration
programming, the official certificate of release from the DDR program often served
as the only real protection against re-recruitment. However, the certificates were often
destroyed or simply disregarded by armed groups, who in a number of instances went
back to the homes of former soldiers to force them to return to the group.

73 Amnesty International, "Democratic Republic of Congo: Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration (DDR) and the Reform of the Army."
74 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, "Democratic Republic of the Congo: Priorities for
Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups."
75 Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, "Struggling to Survive: Children in Armed Conflict in
the Democratic Republic of Congo."
76 Amnesty International, "Democratic Republic of Congo: Children at War, Creating Hope for the
Future."
77 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, "Democratic Republic of the Congo: Priorities for
Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups."
The detriment of an incomplete and inconsistent DDR process is especially evident with the case of DDR among troops loyal to rebel leader Laurent Nkunda in eastern DRC. In this case, Nkunda’s troops were allowed to undergo a unique brassage process, where the newly formed mixed-brigades were not redeployed to different provinces, but were re-stationed in their previous locations. As a result, Nkunda was able “maintain a parallel chain of command” over many of the brigades. While these brigades were technically part of the national army, the UN and a number of NGOs reported that these mixed brigades have “contributed to rising insecurity, ethnic tension and human rights abuses in the province” and that they “certainly contributed to ongoing child soldier recruitment and use in both mixed army brigades and armed groups.” By 2007 it was estimated that between 300-500 children continued to serve in the mixed-brigades loyal to Nkunda in North Kivu, and thousands more were in imminent danger of (re)recruitment. Indeed, recruitment and re-recruitment of children had been active ongoing throughout the brassage process.

This case evidences that the incomplete and makeshift DDR process was perhaps just as detrimental as the ongoing violence. Where consistent demobilization procedures and successful reintegration programming may have been able to protect children from re-recruitment, instead, “children in the DRC remain a reservoir of potential strength” for armed forces which, trained and rearmed by the official demobilization process, continue to wage a war of terrorism and instability.

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78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
81 Coalition to Stop the use of Child Soliders, "Democratic Republic of the Congo: Priorities for Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups."
82 Amnesty International, "Democratic Republic of Congo: Children at War, Creating Hope for the Future."
Education:

In addition to taking on the responsibility of the DDR/DDRRR process, the transitional government was also responsible for the overall reconstruction of the country, including the repair and reform of educational institutions. As previously explained, the conflict took a significant toll on the education system, with close to half of the school-age population out of school in 2003. However, during the reconstruction process the government did not make rehabilitating the education system a priority, leaving schools and school children particularly vulnerable. Despite a commitment to providing free and compulsory education to all children up to the age of 14, the Congolese government has not followed through with adequate funding in order to keep schools running. Without government funding, the majority of the financial burden for education falls on families, who typically provide between 80-90% of the money spent on schools through direct fee-payments. However most Congolese families cannot afford these costs, leaving millions of children out of school. In addition, many of the children and youth who served in the armed groups destroyed schools and forced the students to join their forces as a means of “taking revenge on ‘normal’ children.” For instance, MLC and RCD-National militiamen used the slogan “wipe out the blackboard” during their attacks on

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83 Ibid.
84 In 2006 there were at 3.5 million primary-aged Congolese children are out of school, and are at least 6 million unschooled Congolese adolescents. "S/2006/389."
Mambasa (southern Ituri) in December 2002. The targeting of schools has continued throughout the reconstruction process.

The lack of educational opportunities is not only a detriment to long-term development, but is also a concrete advantage for armed groups looking to recruit child soldiers. Many children, including former combatants, have joined or returned voluntary to armed groups because of a lack of meaningful educational or economic opportunities.

Several examples illustrate this dynamic. In one case, Aimerance, a 17-year-old from North Kivu who is currently participating in one of Save the Children’s reintegration programs, told Save the Children that she was in her third year of primary school when she was forced to leave because her father did not have enough money to pay for school. After leaving school, a friend convinced Aimerance she would be better off if she joined a Congolese rebel army. Aimerance volunteered, and served in the group for two years before eventually fleeing. However, because she was not officially demobilized, she has no official papers, and rebel groups continue to come to her house and harass her and her family.

Another example is John (introduced in Chapter I.), a 15-year-old, who was demobilized in May 2006 after serving for five years with the Mayi-Mayi. In an interview with Amnesty International John commented on his experience in the demobilization process:

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86 Ibid.
87 Amnesty International, "Democratic Republic of Congo: Children at War, Creating Hope for the Future."
“Now, I have been demobilized and I am with my family. It is good to be home, but I have nothing to do. I would like to study or work, but I have no money, there is no training and there is no work. I feel sad, because I feel unhelpful to my family. I am at home but I am worthless. During the day I try not to think of my life as a fighter, because it makes me cry, but sometimes I think maybe I should go back to the armed groups…”

Aimerance and John’s stories are typical of many children’s experiences during the DDR and reconstruction process, and demonstrate how the incomplete DDR and lack of education opportunities contributed to increased vulnerability of re-recruitment into armed forces.

**Juvenile Justice System:**

Finally, the justice system has not been able to adequately deal with the issues resulting from the conflict – either in prosecuting crimes against children or in dealing with crimes committed by child soldiers. In fact a number of child soldiers have been arrested and tried before military courts for offences such as desertion, and at least nine child soldiers have been sentenced to death since 2003 for alleged crimes committed while serving in armed forces. These actions are not only in direct violation of the Convention of the Rights of the Child, but also serve as a disincentive for children to voluntarily flee armed groups for fear of persecution.

The link between the failed DDR program and increased instability is especially important for understanding the failures of the reconstruction program in the DRC and youth roles in general during post-conflict reconstruction. In this case,

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89 Amnesty International, "Democratic Republic of Congo: Children at War, Creating Hope for the Future."
90 Coalition to Stop the use of Child Soldiers, "Democratic Republic of the Congo: Priorities for Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups."
without the support provided by successful reintegration or education programming, children and youth affected by armed conflict became even more vulnerable to (re)recruitment. As such, while they may not have actively sought to destabilize the situation, they are directly linked to the ongoing instability as a resource for rebel leaders.

Coding: The domestic policy in the DRC is rated as having a High Level, Negative Impact. The coding is negative as the failed or incomplete programming contributed to the ongoing violence. The high level coding reflects the severity of the negative impact, particularly in relation to the youth demographic, as the poor policy negatively affected both the International and NGO activity, and also enabled the youth demographic to turn to a destabilizing role.

NGO Involvement

The conflict in the DRC has attracted numerous NGOs and humanitarian workers, from the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide to present day. Despite the number of NGOs actively involved in the reconstruction process, the humanitarian effort has been largely unsuccessful, particularly in addressing the needs of Congolese children and youth. The inefficacy of NGO programming is due largely to: 1) the dependency on a funding base of donors focused on emergency relief rather than medium or long-term development, and 2) the need to compensate for local government shortcomings and failures in orchestrating a successful transition, particularly in regards to the DDR and education programs.\textsuperscript{91} The combination of an emergency relief focus, the constant battle with environmental obstacles, and the

\textsuperscript{91} Amnesty International, "Democratic Republic of Congo: Children at War, Creating Hope for the Future."
obstinate transition government, stifled NGOs’ effectiveness, particularly in executing successful reintegration for demobilized child soldiers.

The humanitarian crisis in the DRC is one of top priorities for international emergency relief donors. In 2004, the DRC was receiving on average $30 million per year from ECHO and OFDA, the emergency funding wing of USAID.\textsuperscript{92} (Yet even this funding was insufficient to meet the needs, and was often unmatched by other donors.)\textsuperscript{93} The focus on emergency humanitarian relief was due in part to the continued environment of human insecurity, armed violence and absence of respect for universal human rights.\textsuperscript{94} While emergency humanitarian relief was unquestionably necessarily, the reliance on such funding dictated the nature of the relief programming. Emergency assistance is by definition short-term, and often focuses on specific categories such health, nutrition and shelter. NGOs receiving grants from these donors are thus expected to cater their programs to short-term rapid response projects that are able to show their funders immediate results.

The lack of any medium or long-term vision by donor agencies therefore represented a serious barrier to the effectiveness of NGO programming for children and youth. While children and youth represented a large percentage of the population in need of immediate humanitarian assistance, there is a distinct difference between emergency relief and development programming to facilitate the transition to peace and reconstruct the country. Children and youth also constituted a significant

\textsuperscript{92} Kassa, "Humanitarian Assistance in the DRC."
\textsuperscript{93} In addition, whereas in other crises there has been a swell in political momentum to provide relief (such as in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan), there was no real political momentum driving international relief in the DRC. As such, while the few international donors contributing money dedicated the funds to emergency operations, there were not enough international donors to sustain the humanitarian strategy as proposed. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.
portion of the population in need of medium-term development programming – such as community reintegration programs, conflict-resolution training, education and income-generating activities.

The donor community also exhibited a distinct preference for funding only a few well-known international programs, including UNDP and UNOPS, rather than local NGOS. According to Michel Kassa former head of the UN’s DRC Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), while the international donors were distrustful of local organizations because of the difficulties in monitoring their money, the tendency to only fund outside actors exacerbated tensions between the UN and local NGOs, so that,

An atmosphere of resentment, frustration and mistrust has often characterized the working relationship (if any) between local and international non-governmental or UN organizations. This also applies to local state structures, tempted or forced to see in humanitarian structures their only possible source of income to compensate for the decade-long absence of any decent and regular salary. Frequent and uneasy exchanges punctuate the daily work of relief organizations, forced to explain to frustrated civil servants and local actors that their families do not constitute the primary target groups to benefit from emergency relief...\(^95\)

As a result, while the international community donated a huge amount of money to the emergency relief effort, it has been substantially below the need level, and used less effectively. Therefore despite the “high level of engagement” from NGO and UN actors, so far, there has been a lack of “real, consistent, operational access” and impact.\(^96\) Indeed part of the reason for the inefficacy of the humanitarian program is

\(^{95}\) Ibid.

\(^{96}\) Kassa argues that the lack of impact may be a misconception of the international community due to extremely high expectations and the “lure of treating 20 million.” Ibid.
the ongoing violence that has prevented many humanitarian organizations from operating to their capacity, or progressing with more developmental programming. With the focus on emergency relief, and the high volume of funds dedicated to short-term projects funneled through international rather than local initiatives, there was little opportunity for any long to medium term projects. In addition, the influx of international funds created an environment of dependency on the emergency aid that resulted in a number of corrupt NGOs seeking to benefit from one of the only sources of money coming into the country.  

Non-governmental organizations also ran into a number of funding and logistical obstacles in trying to coordinate with CONADER in implementing the DDR program. As a result of the bureaucratic stagnation, inter-ministerial competition and alleged corruption that plagued CONADER, the agency was extremely slow in approving the NGO-based reintegration projects. By March 2006, no reintegration projects for children had received final approval from CONADER, with 14 under review. By June, CONADER had not implemented one community based economic reintegration program for children. These delays forced NGOs to fill in for the missing programming that CONADER failed to provide. Indeed, the education and vocational reintegration activities that were underway were run entirely by NGOs. However, these programs did that have the capacity or funds to completely

Indeed, it is impossible to expect that the humanitarian relief effort could cure the crisis. However, in this case, not only was the effort failing to cure the crisis, but perhaps added to the situation by heightening tensions and focusing only on emergency relief. 

97 For example, Save the Children reported that encountering a number of illegitimate NGOs including one that “sold the humanitarian assistance which they were supposed to distribute to displaced families.”

98 Verhey, "Going Home: Demobilising and Reintegrating Child Soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo."

98 Amnesty International, "Democratic Republic of Congo: Children at War, Creating Hope for the Future."
fulfill the nationwide commitments of the CONADER program. While the Secretary-General reported in June of 2006 that nine iNGOs and 35 national NGOs were implementing a range of children’s DDR activities in coordination with UNICEF and CONADER, most of this programming consisted of NGOS responding an emergency basis to identify, transport, shelter and feed children associated with armed groups. As a result, little resources were left to prepare and carry out reintegration projects.

For instance, Save the Children was one of the most active NGO’s focused on children’s issues in the DRC, and operated a number of child orientation and transit centers as a part of the national DDR program. However, the majority of Save the Children’s efforts within the DDR program were focused on advocacy and family reunification. In this case, the organization reunited many of the children with their families, but did not always have the capacity to follow up with adequate support for education or other reintegration programs.

The national Commission’s inability to effectively manage the DDR process was evident to the NGO community throughout the reconstruction process, resulting in many NGOs resistance to collaborate and share information with CONADER. For instance, CONADER began an effort to create a national database of demobilized children, containing details of each child’s background. By March 2006 only 4,200 children were registered, and CONADER officials complained that NGOs were refusing to share information for the database. The organizations responded that they

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99 Ibid., "Democratic Republic of the Congo: Priorities for Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups."
101 Amnesty International, "Democratic Republic of Congo: Children at War, Creating Hope for the Future."
were not releasing information because they did not trust that CONADER would protect the confidentiality of the records, which could pose a danger to the children.\textsuperscript{102}

Coordination between NGOs, however, was somewhat more successful. A number of successful relationships emerged between coordinating partners, for instance between Save the Children, DIVAS and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in organizing reunification programs for demobilized and separated children. However, as the work expanded (both in the quantity of children needing aid and in the number of locations), the number of actors increased, and coordination became a significant challenge.\textsuperscript{103} While a number of different networks and child protection commissions were active as of 2003,\textsuperscript{104} their effectiveness and coordination efforts were limited by competition between local organizations, and a “pattern of working with partners only as defined by funding relations.”\textsuperscript{105}

Despite the lack of funding, there were a few organizations that attempted to implement community-based reintegration programming. While most of their programming was centered in the DDR process, Save the Children did attempt to implement community oriented reintegration programs, specifically in creating Community Child Protection Networks (CCPNs). However, the CCPNs were

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{102} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{103} Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict "Struggling to Survive: Children in Armed Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo."
\item \textsuperscript{104} For example, local NGOs had access to the Network for Children in Especially Difficult Circumstances and the Network for Rural Development. In addition there were provincial “child protection commissions, which included international and governmental and civil society representatives focused on humanitarian issues, along with “child protection councils” led by DIVAS and DIVIFAM, which UNICEF and Save the Children as supporters and observers. In the Kivu provinces, Save the Children organized a Child Soldier Task Force, and the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers ran a forum of 87 organizations focused on advocacy and awareness campaigns. Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{105} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
essentially part of a community awareness campaign, rather than a reintegration program. The CCPN was designed as forum for local authorities, religious leaders, representatives from economic and service sectors, along with children themselves, to discuss and resolve child protection issues. The overall goal of each CCPNs was to improve physical security for children in their respective communities, along with boosting grassroots participation in child protection and children’s rights advocacy.

While Save the Children reported that the CCPNs were relatively successful in generating awareness, they did not see significant participation by children. As such, while Save the Children attempted to address the community reintegration and children’s security issues, their advocacy focus within the CCPNs limited their potential impact. Awareness campaigns are unquestionably important, especially in the DRC where there was little respect for children’s rights during conflict. However advocacy and reunification programs cannot serve as a substitute for social and economic reintegration programs that provide children with opportunities for active participation. Without these programs, children may be inclined to see rejoining the armed forces as their best option, or may become increasingly vulnerable to forced recruitment.

One NGO that was particularly successful in implementing reintegration and empowerment programming for children and youth in the DRC is Search for Common Ground. Search for Common Ground is an international NGO that operates in conflict zones around the world to promote conflict prevention, resolution, and transformation, with a particular emphasis on the youth demographic. The organization began working in the DRC in 2001, and has organized a variety of
different programs including participatory theater to promote conflict transformation techniques, “football for peace” soccer matches aimed at bringing together opposing groups in a spirit of peace and healthy competition, and the launch of a private radio station which included journalism training programs for youth.\(^\text{106}\) The radio program has been particularly successful in addressing youth issues, with one program, *Sisi Watoto*, entirely dedicated to discussing “issues faced by young people in the context of armed conflict.”\(^\text{107}\) Programming for the *Sisi Watoto* broadcast is developed in coordination with child protection and child DDR organizations (including Save the Children and UNICEF), includes information and discussion about the dangers of recruitment and provides up to date information on the demobilization program, encouraging child soldiers to participate in the process. The *Sisi Watoto* program successfully bridges the gap between advocacy and reintegration programming, by training youth-reporters in journalism and production techniques.\(^\text{108}\) In 2004, *Sisi Watoto* won first prize in UNICEF and OneWorld’s competition for radio programs by children for children, and there is anecdotal evidence from interviewing former child soldiers that the program helped not only to “give voice” to ex-combatants, but also provide practical information to parents and children as to where to find programs and locate family members.\(^\text{109}\)

Search for Common Ground is still working in the DRC, but is facing a number of obstacles, particularly in gathering sufficient funding, as USAID, one of its

\(^{106}\) “Search for Common Ground in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Programme Overview,” (Search for Common Ground).


\(^{108}\) Ibid.

\(^{109}\) Ibid.
major donors, suspended funding to all DRC programs in 2006. The organization was seeking alternative funding through CONADER, UNHCR, the Belgian Government and SIDA (all pending approval), and continued to sponsor activities in 2007.110 However, their struggle to maintain adequate funding is representative of the battle many NGOs are facing to implement reintegration and conflict transformation programming. While Search for Common Ground has been able to continue with its programming, many other programs, particularly local reintegration programs, such as vocational training, have been forced to shut down to lack of funding.

Coding: NGO involvement in the DRC is rated as having a Low-Level Positive Impact. The variable is coded as positive, since, on the whole, the presence of the NGO community contributed to moving the trajectory of the reconstruction process towards stability. The impact, however, was only low level, as coordination and time-frame issues limited the impact of programs, and the level of efforts, while high, were not able to completely meet the demands of the situation.

Cultural Context

As in any conflict, the environment and cultural context have a significant impact on the reconstruction process. In the case of the DRC, there are a number of extenuating factors that contributed to the continuation of the conflict and must be addressed in order to have a full understanding of transition period.

First, the type of violence that characterized the conflict in the DRC is particularly significant, as armed groups often used terror against civilians as a method of creating instability in order to oust the government. Often referred to as a

110 “DR Congo Update,” (Search for Common Ground, 2007).
“Culture of Impunity,” the level of violence against civilians and ignorance of basic human rights doctrine became a major obstacle for reconstruction and peace-building actors. As a result, much of the humanitarian effort was focused on advocacy and awareness building, particularly for children, as opposed to active and participatory programming.

One element that is considered a part of this culture of impunity, is the sexual violence which was rampant throughout the conflict and has continued to be “consciously deployed as a weapon of war… to humiliate, intimidate and tear apart families and entire communities or even force them in an alliance,” during the transition period.111 Gender motivated violence has affected the lives of thousands of Congolese women and girls, with over 30,000 survivors of sexual violence identified since 2005.112 The epidemic of sexual violence is not only a human rights concern, but deeply effects the ethos of the society, as women who have been raped or sexually assaulted are often rejected by their communities.

Second, the cultural and religious beliefs of many communities in the DRC limited the ability of many former child soldiers to successfully reintegrate back into their communities. For example, children, especially girls, are often accused of witchcraft or sorcery and forced to leave their homes. As of 2006, nearly half of the children living in shelters in Kinshasa reported that they fled their homes after being accused of sorcery.113 Upon leaving, children have very few opportunities, and many choose (or are forced) to volunteer in armed forces as a way to survive. For instance,

113 Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, "Struggling to Survive: Children in Armed Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo."
Angelique, a young girl demobilized by Save the Children, and some of her friends had refused the sexual advances of a young man in her town. Later the boy announced to the community that the girls were planning acts of sorcery against him, and the girls were forced to leave. They joined with the RCD-Goma with the goal to seek revenge.\textsuperscript{114} While Angelique was later demobilized and eventually reintegrated back into her community, her story shows how the tendency to accuse girls of witchcraft provide armed forces with new recruits to sustain their strength.

Finally, the DRC’s geography, both in size and type of terrain, also had a negative affect on the reconstruction process. In addition to the potential dangers presented by the ongoing violence, NGO’s and other implementing agencies also had to deal with navigating the DRC’s relatively inaccessible natural environment, often without appropriate transportation infrastructure. As such, the environmental factors in the DRC negatively affected the reconstruction process on a structural level.

Whereas in Mozambique the cultural environment, particularly in the form of religious practices, served as an additional form of support during the reconstruction process, cultural and environmental factors in the DRC had the extreme opposite effect, negatively affecting the reconstruction efforts on a number of different levels. While it remains unclear to the extent to which each of these extenuating environmental and cultural factors influenced the overall conflict, it is clear that each presents a significant obstacle to the peace building effort and a potential source of strength for rebel groups to continue their operations.

\textsuperscript{114} Verhey, "Going Home: Demobilising and Reintegrating Child Soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo."
Coding: The cultural and environmental factors in the DRC are codes as having a *High Level, Negative Impact*. The negative rating reflects that the factors represented obstacles to the establishment of stability and the successful operation of the reconstruction program. The high level rating reflects the extent to which the cultural and environmental factors, from the disregard of human rights to the inaccessibility of the terrain, were felt across the board by all actors involved, exerting a detrimental and systemic influence on the reconstruction process.

**Dependant Variable: Level of Stability**

Despite the local and UN efforts to control the violence in the DRC, the overall level of instability has remained relatively high in the northeastern provinces, almost to a level of a reincitation or continuation of the conflict. While the day-to-day violence in Kinshasa and other parts of the country has declined significantly since wartime, the ongoing rebellion, led primarily by former RCD general Laurent Nkunda, is a significant destabilizing factor.

It is important to note that Nkunda has been especially adept at recruiting new forces by using the large population of youth to his advantage. For example, linked to the Nkunda army is the *Association des jeunes refugais congolais* (Association of Congolese Youth Refugees) who continue to actively recruit Congoloses ethninc Tutsi children and youth from various refugee camps to join Nkunda’s forces.\(^\text{115}\)

The DRC has also experienced high levels of instability due to widespread violence and protests that flared across the country in 2005 and 2006 during the

transitional elections. While it is common for violence to reemerge during an election year, the fact that the DDR program had not been completed before the elections were held may have certainly contributed to the high level of insecurity during this time.

Similar to the experience in Mozambique, the ease of access to small arms that is symptomatic of the Great Lakes region continues to fuel the ongoing violence and regional conflict.\textsuperscript{116} There are a number of reasons that may explain why the arms trade continues to flourish, including the mismanagement of the DDR program and the lack of independent verification of the disarmament process. Without independent verification, many groups left large quantities of arms behind before going to the orientations centers, stockpiled for future use. In addition, as of 2005 nearly 70\% of the weapons collected were defective, indicating that the forces were not turning over their operational weapons.\textsuperscript{117}

Perhaps more significant is the link between the small arms trade and the illicit sales of natural resources controlled by rebel groups. The DRC’s vast supply of natural resources is widely known to have prolonged the conflict in the DRC, as rebel groups use the profit from sales of coltan, diamonds and other resources to purchase weapons for their troops and generally fund their insurgency. One of the ways that rebel groups have been so successful in exploiting the natural resources is by using child labor. With a significant proportion of youth in the population, combined with inadequate education and reintegration programming, children and youth have

\textsuperscript{116}EIU Country Reports," (Economist Intelligence Unit)., 2004.
The EIU reported that all sides were re-arming in the Kivus. While the FARDC received a arms shipments from China and Ukraine, and some of the weapons have been making their way into the hands of the FDLR and pro-government ethnic Mayi Mayi militia. Laurent Nkunda was also receiving arms supplies via Rwanda.

\textsuperscript{117} Amnesty International, "Democratic Republic of Congo: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and the Reform of the Army."
become “key component in the illicit exploitation of natural resources.”

Approximately 60,000 young men and boys work in appalling conditions in mines, often as stone-crushers or in small hard to reach mine shafts.

Finally, children and youth with very few potential income-generating activities have also contributed to the ongoing insurgency as entrepreneurs in their own illicit trade activities. For instance, the OPEC Boys are a group of unemployed youth and ex-combatants from both the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Allied Democratic Forces (AFDL) in the DRC, who make a profit off of smuggling fuel from the DRC to Uganda. While these young men have tapped into a trade that is profitable for them, their efforts actively contribute to the ongoing violence and regional conflict, as they often sell fuel to various rebel and government forces in Uganda who are also active in the DRC.

Overall, various indicators are relatively conclusive that the level of instability in the DRC remained at medium to high levels from 2003-2007.

- The DRC earned a 69.4 out of 100 on the Ibrahim Index of African Governance’s rating for Safety and Security in 2005. While this is an improvement in comparison to its score of 49.8 in 2002, only ten countries ranked lower than 69.4 in 2005. In addition, for Rule of Law the DRC received a 25/100 in both 2002 and 2005 for respect of physical human rights.

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118 Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, "Struggling to Survive: Children in Armed Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo."

119 Ibid.


121 On a scale of 0 being the least safe and secure to 100 most safe and secure.
• On the Failed States Index for 2005-2007, the DRC rated at the highest level of risk, “Alert.” In 2007 the DRC was 7th out of 177 as most as most critical, although this was an improvement from 2005 and 2006 when the country was only second to Cote d’Ivoire and Sudan, respectively. One of the main subcategories affecting the DRC’s high score is the social demographics indicator, with the DRC receiving a score of 9.4/10 for demographic pressures due to the country’s large youth bulge, high population growth, and infant mortality rate.

• RiskMap 2008 labels the DRC at medium political risk for business, and security risks as medium (in Kinshasa and Southern Katanga) to high (In eastern Ituri and North Kivu).

• The EIU country reports from 2002-2007 indicate a relatively high level of violence and instability, especially in the eastern provinces, despite the effects of the peacekeeping efforts and the increased stability in other regions.

These analyses confirm that despite the peacekeeping efforts, high-levels of instability continued to plague the DRC throughout the post-accord reconstruction phase. One of the most salient aspects of this ongoing instability is the fact that the actors in the DRC consciously and successfully manipulated the youth demographic to their advantage in perpetuating the conflict.

Coding: The DRC is coded as having an extreme level of instability. The extreme rating reflects the level of politically motivated violence and to the point of a reincitation of the conflict, particularly in the North Eastern regions. While the level
of security improved in other areas, the ongoing instability in the East took a toll on the entire peace process and its effects were felt throughout the country.

### Coding Summary of independent variables

**Figure 3.1 International Involvement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Program Specifies related to Youth</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Treaty            | • Establishes DDR program, under the UN  
• Calls for the cessation of the recruitment of child soldiers  
• However neither stipulation was largely effective | Low positive impact    |
| Foreign Government|                                                                                                   | Medium positive impact  |
| United Nations    | • Assists with DDR  
• Emergency humanitarian relief, reintegration of IDPs and refugees  
• Child Protection Unit, Advocacy  
• Worked with national government to develop operational framework for children’s DDR  
• Issue of UN personnel involvement in prostitution of young women | Overall medium positive impact, however instances where the program detracted from stability (negative impact) |

**Figure 3.2 NGO Involvement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Program Specifies</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Coordination      | • Coordination between NGOs relatively smooth, although marked by high levels of competition and donor driven programming  
• Coordination between NGOs and National government poorly executed | Medium negative impact  |
| Types of Programming | • Emergency Humanitarian Relief  
• Children’s DDR  
• Advocacy and awareness campaigns  
• Very few youth empowerment or reintegration programs | Despite high level of efforts, low positive impact |
| Level of Efforts (number of NGOs or international personnel) | • High Level  
• However, relatively unsuccessful in effectively meeting demand | Low positive impact    |
| Time Frame        | • Short-term emergency focus is a significant obstacle to instituting other development oriented programming | Medium Negative Impact |

**Overall Effectiveness**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medium-Level Positive Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low-level positive impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
### Figure 3.3
**Domestic Policy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Program Specifics</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Focus on Youth</strong></td>
<td>• Identify children’s issues, especially within the DDR/DDRRR program. However despite developing policies focused on children, the policies were not effectively implemented</td>
<td>Low positive impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Programming</strong></td>
<td>• DDR/DDRRR – lack of effective reintegration programming • Education Reform • Juvenile Justice</td>
<td>High negative impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall Effectiveness</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>High-level, Negative Impact</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Figure 3.4
**Cultural/Environmental Factors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>“Culture of Impunity”</strong></td>
<td>• Serves as significant obstacle for development programming, as actors focus on generating awareness and adherence to principals of human rights • Contributes to ongoing violence preventing NGOs from operating effectively</td>
<td>High negative impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Terrain</strong></td>
<td>• Lack of transportation infrastructure, jungle terrain and vast size of the country make the logistics of providing humanitarian aid more complicated</td>
<td>High negative impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Natural Resources</strong></td>
<td>• Rebels sell diamonds, oil, coltan, etc. in order to continue financing their movement</td>
<td>High negative impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion and Religious Practices</strong></td>
<td>• Obstacle to reintegration, many young people, especially women, are accused of sorcery and shunned from their communities</td>
<td>Low negative impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>High-level negative impact</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 3.5
Objective Variables

| Population age 10-24 | • 32% of population aged 10-24  
|• 45% of population under 15 years old  
|• Total Population (2003): 57,722,115 |
|---------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Baseline            | • Average for sub-Saharan Africa: 32% in 2003  
|                     | • Average for more developed countries  
|                     | • 20% in 2003  |
| Level of Youth Participation | • Over 30,000 of 150,000 armed combatants were under 18, comprising up to 40% of certain brigades |
| Unemployment        | • No unemployment statistics available  
|                     | Baseline  
|                     | • Average youth unemployment for sub-Saharan Africa: 18.6% in 2003 |
| GNI Per Capita      | • $120 (USD) - 2005  
|                     | Baseline  
|                     | • Average for sub-Saharan Africa (2006): 5742.9 (USD) |
| Overall Coding      | • High percentage of youth in the population  
|                     | • Extremely high level of youth involvement in the conflict |

Figure 3.6
Level of Stability

| Overall description of stability | • While violence has declined in Kinshasa and other areas, levels of violence akin to wartime persist in the eastern province  
|• Ongoing human rights violations and sexual violence as a tool too perpetuate the conflict  
|• Protests and rioting around 2005-2006 elections |
| Youth Involvement               | • Recruitment and re-recruitment into armed groups throughout the reconstruction process  
|• Young soldiers recruiting others into the armed groups  
|• Youth participation in resource extraction/black market |
| Ibrahim Index of Governance in Africa | • Safety and Security: 69.4/100 (100 most secure) |
| Failed States Index            | • "Alert Level"  
|• 7th out of 177 as most likely to fail in 2007 |
| RiskMap2008                    | • Medium political risk  
|• Medium security risk in Kinshasa, High security risk in eastern Ituri and North Kivu |
| Overall Level of Instability   | • Extreme level of instability, with violence ongoing throughout the country, and levels on instability to the point of reincitation of the conflict in the eastern provinces |

Conclusions:

Across the board in the DRC reconstruction actors were acutely aware of the importance of children’s issues and the need for distinct policies related to children and youth. However, despite the high level of international and NGO efforts focused

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on children, the situation in the DRC has remained highly unstable. While such a concentration of money and manpower for reconstruction programs should contribute to greater stability, the mismanagement of the reconstruction programs, specifically the DDR/DDRRR process, has in part facilitated the perpetuation of the violence.

Indeed the failing DDR/DDRRR process has been one of the main factors impeding the establishment of durable stability. The inability of the local government to follow through from initial demobilization to reintegration took a huge toll (figure 3.3) and forced NGOs to use their limited resources to compensate for government failings. As figures 3.1 and 3.2 suggest, despite the international community’s relatively high degree of involvement focused on children’s needs, poor coordination and programming driven by short-term emergency funding hindered their ability to have a significant and positive impact. Extenuating situational circumstances (Figure 3.4) also had a significant negative impact, inhibiting the ability of international actors to successfully administer humanitarian and development programming.

The deficient reconstruction process created an environment where serving in the armed forces was one of the few opportunities for youth, offering food, power and companionship. Many young people voluntarily returned to armed groups or were forcibly re-recruited, remaining a resource for the armed groups still operating. Where successful reintegration programs could have provided former combatants with various forms of educational or vocational training in order to ease the transition to civilian life, instead youth participation in the ongoing conflict as members of rebel groups and active contributors in the illicit trade of natural resources was fundamental
to the rebel groups’ ability to prolong the conflict and was significantly detrimental to the reconstruction efforts.

Finally, while it is clear that the DRC has been highly unstable since 2003, it is arguable, at least in the eastern regions, that the violence represents a chronic conflict rather than a reincitation of the violence. I would argue, however, that the failings of the transition and reconstruction process played a significant role in prolonging of the violence and made it easier for those elites determined to continue fighting to successfully destabilize the country. Drawing comparisons between the DRC and Mozambique helps to elucidate this issue. For instance, where in Mozambique the entire country was markedly war weary, and most elites were willing to reach a resolution, in the DRC a number of armed groups in the eastern region maintained a desire to carry on the conflict. However, in the DRC the rest of the country dedicated itself to a transition from war to peace, and embarked on a transitional plan including demobilization, institution building, and elections.

While these programs have been much less successful than in Mozambique, what would the situation have looked like if the reconstruction actors had successfully implemented the DDR process from start to finish? Had CONADER coordinated with the United Nations and NGOs to effectively facilitate the DDR programs according to the operational framework, children and youth might not have been caught in a situation where they perceived they would be better off (re)joining armed forces rather than transitioning to civilian life. If these actors had effectively provided reintegration and education opportunities, young people may not have become such an easily manipulated resource for those few elites set on prolonging the conflict. As
such, I would argue that the ineffective international, domestic and NGO efforts have not only been unable to foster stability, but have in fact enhanced instability by failing to meet these critical youth needs.

While the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo is looking up in 2008, the youth demographic remains a significant factor in determining the country’s future development. Because of the failing reconstruction program, many children remain out of school and former youth soldiers lack any real economic or educational opportunities. As a result, children and youth represent a central contributing factor in the ongoing instability. Without more effective policies and programming, as this population ages the Congolese youth may have the potential to exert increasing influence and agency in destabilizing the country.
Chapter IV.  
Kosovo: Youth as agents of change in an unstable environment

Introduction

The aftermath of the conflict in Kosovo presented the international community with a number of daunting challenges: while Kosovo is only a small republic, the civil war and intervening NATO air campaign had created a regional refugee and humanitarian crisis and destroyed the province’s physical infrastructure. To further complicate matters, with one of the largest populations of youth in the world, and an extremely high rate of youth unemployment, the situation in Kosovo spelled disaster. In order to meet these challenges, numerous international, regional and non-governmental organizations flocked to Kosovo, dominating the reconstruction scene with an unprecedented level of involvement relative to the size of the conflict. The immediate efforts paid off, as these actors were able to prevent any serious spoiling of the peace and begin the process of building a stable national infrastructure. However, because of the emergency nature of the international involvement, the reconstruction process has not laid a stable foundation for long-term peace. While the post-conflict reconstruction efforts were able to contain most of the violence and a reincitation of the level of hostilities characteristic of the conflict has been largely avoided, there remains great potential for instability, as there is an ongoing and pervasive sense of tension between Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs.
There are a number of intervening factors, both positive and negative, that contributed to this tenuous balance between hostile tension and constructive peace building that characterized both the sentiments of the youth population and the discourse of the post-conflict reconstruction process. Immediately following the NATO intervention, which ended the war and stopped the Serbian ethnic cleansing campaign, NGOs, international organizations and regional security groups flooded into Kosovo and the refugee camps in Albania. Acutely aware of the potential destabilizing power of the youth demographic, NGOs and international actors provided a broad range of programming specifically focused on the youth demographic. With the humanitarian crisis resolved relatively quickly, international actors were able to both satisfy the youth population’s immediate and critical needs, such as psycho-social support and family reunification, and also implement various types of youth development programming that covered the spectrum from political, social and (to a lesser extent) economic empowerment. As a result, these organizations were able to both defuse any destabilizing potential, and also empower the youth demographic to actively contribute to the reconstruction process.

This initial onslaught of international actors also brought with it a number of detrimental effects. While Kosovo once had a tradition of community participation and volunteerism, the flood of emergency relief allowed international actors to dominate the scene, creating dependence on the international community while inadvertently eroding existing community structures. As the international interest and funding waned, the newly established programs and reforms began to suffer. Five years following the intervention, unemployment rates remain high, and the struggling
education system and continued uncertainty over the status of independence created a situation in Kosovo where the destabilizing potential of the youth population remained a central factor in determining the country’s future.

The following analysis will explore the intervening factors that have created this precarious balance between stability and instability, youth building peace and youth participating in violence. The reconstruction process in Kosovo is particularly important for this study because it serves as an analytic foil to the previous cases. Both the DRC and Mozambique were countries grappling specifically with the issue of child and youth soldiers. While Kosovo’s large youth population was also active during the conflict, these young people were not necessarily child soldiers, allowing for the analysis of other types of youth involvement. Both of the previous cases also had a somewhat decisive outcome, either reaching a relatively stable resolution to the conflict, or falling back into the pattern of violence that characterized the war. Kosovo, on the other hand, serves as the “in between” case, where the future stability of the country remains unclear. With these factors in mind, analyzing the type, quality and effectiveness of the reconstruction programming in Kosovo may elucidate how these programs shape the nature of the youth population’s influence on the post-conflict reconstruction environment.

**Background**

While the origins of the conflicts in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo were intrinsically tied to their colonial heritage, the conflict in
Kosova/Kosovo\(^1\) is best understood through the development of competing nationalist claims. Although it is home to a majority of Albanians, both Serbs and Albanians have historic claims to Kosovo that are deeply integrated into their ethnic, national and religious identities. Serbian nationalist myths treat Kosovo as the cultural and religious heart of the historic Serbian nation, brutally lost to the Ottoman Empire in the battle of Fushe Kosove/Kosovo Polje in the 12\(^{th}\) century. Since then Kosovo represents for Serbs centuries of oppression at the hands of the Ottoman Empire (and their collaborators the Albanians). Albanians, for their part, have similar sentiments about Kosovo representing an integral part of the Albanian national and cultural state.

As the Ottoman Empire collapsed, fighting broke out across the Balkans, and Albanians fought desperately to resist Serbian nationalist forces from (re)claiming the territory of Kosovo. Integral to Albanian national myths that persist today is the story of the suffering of Albanian civilians at the hands of the Serbian-Montenegrin army during this period.

When Albania declared independence in 1912, the leaders had imagined a state that would include Kosovo. However, the claims to the territory were caught up in the battle between the Great Powers (Austria-Hungary and Russia), and in the 1913 Protocol of Florence, Kosovo was assigned to Serbia. While none of the Balkan states were satisfied with the terms of the Protocol of Florence, Albania had received one of

\(^1\) Note on language – The use of dual language markers for cities is a symbol of nationalist sentiment that is a constant reminder of claims on space and territory. In this case Kosova is the Albanian pronunciation, and Kosovo, the Serbian. For the purposes of simplicity this chapter will use Kosovo, the name used in most references by the international community, as the name of the region.
the worst lots, as the treaty drew the borders such that half of the Albanian population was living outside of the new state of Albania.²

With the death of the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Tito, in 1980, the question of Kosovo’s independence once again came to the forefront. Despite years of oppression and institutionalized prejudice against the Kosovar Albanians under Tito’s rule, during Tito’s reign Kosovo was also given a significant degree of independence and was declared under the new Yugoslav constitution to be an autonomous province of Serbia. As an autonomous province, Kosovo would have its own administration and civic structures, similar to the construction of the Yugoslav republics, but would not have the right to secede from the Federation of Yugoslavia.³ The independence allowed under Tito’s reforms were symbolically embodied in the Kosovar Albanian culture by the establishment of an independent education system in Kosovo, centered around the University of Pristina.

Tito’s death left a power vacuum in Yugoslavia, and the reforms began to unravel. Where Tito managed to keep ethnic tensions at bay for the sake of maintaining a unified republic, Slobodan Milošević began his rise to power on an agenda of Serbian nationalism, outwardly proclaimed in a speech at Kosove/Kosovo Polje. Milošević’s mission to prevent the disintegration of Yugoslavia centered on a strategy of removing minority power, including the Albanian social and cultural presence in Kosovo.⁴ In 1990, a series of policies aimed to reconstruct the ethnic composition of Kosovo culminated in Milošević’s dissolution of the Kosovo

³ Ibid.
⁴ Stephen Schwartz, Kosovo: Background to a War (London: Anthem Press, 2000).
parliament, revoking Kosovo’s autonomy, and marking the end of the 1974 constitution and the Federation of Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{5} The abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy coincided with a renewal in human rights abuses and discriminatory policies aimed to “Serbianize” the province, including discriminatory language policies and the imposition of a new curriculum for the education system. During this period, Serbian forces arbitrarily arrested, detained and tortured Kosovoar-Albanians on a regular basis, and thousands of Albanians were purged from their public office positions, as more than 180,000 teachers and staff of Albanian-language schools were dismissed.\textsuperscript{6}

The response of the Kosovar Albanian community was to organize a system of non-violent resistance. The movement soon established a “voluntary” tax system to finance the formation of a parallel structure of government for Albanians in Kosovo, and in 1991 the Kosovar government held a referendum on independence. Though Kosovar Serbs largely boycotted the election, 99% of the vote was in favor of independence. It is important to note that for many citizens, the system of parallel government was the primary form of resistance against Serbian oppression, and for most of the Albanian population that resistance was symbolically represented not only in the government structures but particularly in the maintenance of the Albanian education system. By 1993 the parallel education system comprised 20,000 teachers and administrative staff, over 317,000 pre-school and elementary school students, 65 secondary schools with 56,920 students, 20 faculties and colleges with 12,000 students, two schools for disabled children, and several other educational

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid., 41-42.
institutions. While most of the primary schools remained in their previous buildings, the rest of the 204 facilities that housed the education system were homes or garages donated by Kosovar Albanians.

Throughout the 1990s the situation in Kosovo deteriorated. When the Kosovo issue was ignored in the 1995 Dayton Agreement over Bosnia, it seemed evident to many Kosovar Albanians that the peaceful resistance had failed. In 1996, the Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerged, dedicated to using all means necessary to garner Kosovo’s independence, and began to take over the cause of resistance from the non-violent Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Denokratike Kosovës or LDK). What began as a series of terror attacks by the KLA on Serb targets in 1996 started a cycle of retaliatory massacres committed by both sides. By 1998 the situation had escalated into a state of war, with KLA militia fighting Serbian military forces.

As news of the increasing violence and mass atrocities spread in the international media, the pressure grew on international authorities to take action. While both the KLA and Serb Forces committed attacks against civilians, the Serb violations of human rights “far outstripped” those of the KLA, and the Western Media portrayed the violence as predominantly Serbian aggression against Albanian victims. For a number of political reasons, the United States and NATO took on the lead role in attempting to broker an end to the violence. Most notably, the U.S. and NATO had previously negotiated with Milošević during the Bosnian conflict, and

\[^7\text{Ibid.}, 46.\]
\[^8\text{Ibid.}\]
therefore the emergence of violence in Kosovo led by Milošević had the potential to shatter the image of NATO as an effective security force in post-Cold War Europe.

After a series of failed negotiation attempts, and widespread news broke in the Western media of the brutalities committed in the Recak/Racak massacre in January of 1999, members of Serb and Albanian leadership were convened for one last attempt at dialogue sponsored by the Contact Group in Rambouillet, France. Members of the KLA agreed to the proposal put forth at Rambouillet that would restore Kosovar autonomy, but leave the future status of full independence for reconsideration. However, the Serbian forces refused to agree, and the negotiations failed.

With its reputation on the line after the failed negotiations at Rambouillet, in March of 1999 NATO authorized an air campaign against the FRY/Serb forces. Whether NATO acted in order to prevent a humanitarian crisis or to protect its credibility remains the subject of debate. While NATO proclaimed to be protecting the Albanian population, it is clear that the bombing campaign caused as much if not more displacement and destruction than it prevented, as the bombing drove many civilians from their homes, destroyed the physical infrastructure of the region, and immediately after the bombing began the FRY military and paramilitary units began an ethnic cleansing campaign to expel the Kosovar Albanian population. However, 

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9 It is important to note that there is still debate in the international community regarding the development of ethnic cleansing campaign (the so called “Operation Horseshoe”) and whether or not the NATO air campaign actually provoked the violence and consequently created a humanitarian disaster instead of stopping it. According to “The Kosovo Report”, “The issue is still open, but it is very clear that there was a deliberate organized effort to expel a huge part of the Kosovar Albanian population and such a massive operation cannot be implemented without planning and preparation.” Whether or not NATO caused the humanitarian disaster is harder to assess, although it is clear that the campaign “created an internal environment that made such an operation feasible.” Ibid.
by proclaiming a humanitarian mission to prevent further crisis in Kosovo, NATO would become a dominant actor in the reconstruction of the republic.

The NATO bombings lasted for 78 days before the parties finally reached an agreement with Milošević for an immediate cessation of the violence, the withdrawal of FRY forces from Kosovo and the reestablishment of Kosovo’s autonomy, though still under the umbrella of the government of FRY. In reality, Kosovo turned into a de facto UN and NATO protectorate, as on the same day that the air campaign ended, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1244 which authorized the United Nations to act as the civilian administrator for the republic, through the establishment of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The UN mandate also authorized NATO-led peacekeeping forces, the Kosovo International Security Force (KFOR) to aid in facilitating the safe return of refugees and “contribute to a secure environment for the international civil implementation presence.” Despite the cessation of the violence, the issue of Kosovo’s independence remained unresolved.

The conflict in Kosovo from 1998-1999 resulted in over 10,000 deaths and displaced over 1.5 million people, predominantly Kosovar Albanians, either internally or as refugees to neighboring countries. The years of violence and the final three months of air campaigns had also led to the widespread destruction of physical infrastructure both in Kosovo and greater Serbia.

Particularly significant for the purposes of this case study is the role played by student activists throughout the conflict. Students were not only symbolic members of the resistance with their participation in the parallel system of education, but they also

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10 Ibid.
served as an active and driving force in promoting the cause of full independence. Massive student protests in 1981 and 1997 paralleled turning points in the conflict, not only reflecting sentiments throughout the community, but also drawing international attention to the cause of independence and fueling the movement. The tradition of student protests has continued throughout the transition process as a dominant symbol and mechanism for the Albanian independence movement in modern Kosovo.

Today, ethnic tensions remain a part of daily life Kosovo, and the uncertainty over the status of independence has detracted from Kosovo’s economic and social development. However, while this case was being written in February of 2008, the Kosovo Assembly officially declared its independence from Serbia. With this declaration of independence, the future of Kosovo seems open to many possibilities, with the potential for both the continued peaceful development of the state or renewed violence and conflict.

The following analysis argues that despite the dedicated international effort to rebuild the war-torn province, the impact of the post-conflict reconstruction process in Kosovo remains unclear. While international actors, including the United Nations, regional security groups, and NGOs, took on the bulk of the responsibility for governing Kosovo, and provided a wide range of programming specifically focused on youth issues, the exclusion of domestic actors in the reconstruction process inadvertently eroded the existing ethos of community involvement. In addition, dependence and competition for emergency grant funding diminished the potential for
long-term impact. As a result, the youth demographic remains a source of potential destabilization for the newly independent country.

**Analysis of Independent Variables:**

**Demographics:**

*Population:*

Kosovo has the youngest population in Europe, and one of the highest percentages of youth in the world. Approximately 60% of Kosovo’s two million people are under the age of 25, with 21% of the population between the ages of 15-25, and 65% under the age of 30.\(^\text{11}\) As a result, since 1999 Kosovar leaders have been grappling with how to include a youth perspective and cater to youth related issues in the political, economic and social policies of the province.

Children and youth were also highly affected by the conflict, comprising over half of the 600,000 internally displaced Kosovars and the 1.3 million Kosovar refugees who fled to neighboring counties during the 1999 campaign.\(^\text{12}\) In addition, an estimated 23% of the persons remaining on the International Committee of the Red Cross’s missing persons list are under the age of 25, mostly Albanian young men. It is likely that this percentage is actually much higher, as a large number of cases, especially of young women, go unreported.\(^\text{13}\)

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\(^\text{13}\)Ibid.
Youth Refugees and Soldiers:

Unlike in the previous cases examined, it is unclear exactly to what extent children and adolescents under 18 participated as soldiers or militia over the course of the conflict. While the KLA officially claimed that they did not accept “under 18s” in their ranks, it is likely that at least 10-20% of the KLA forces were under 18 (mostly 16 and 17 year olds), while other estimates are as high as 30%. Another marked difference is that the underage members of the KLA were predominantly volunteers. Many young Albanians idolized the KLA fighters, often dressing up in their uniforms, and trying to enlist. However, often these volunteers would be turned away until they were over 18. While child involvement in the militias was relatively low, this is not to say that young people did not comprise a large percentage of the KLA fighters: 38.5% of the KLA fighters were between the ages of 14-25.

Unemployment:

Unemployment is perhaps the most significant issue facing young people in Kosovo today. The unemployment rate in Kosovo, approximately 35-44% in 2005, is nearly 4.5 times higher than the average rate in EU countries, and nearly twice as high as the estimated 21% unemployment in Mozambique in 1997. While unemployment is high across all demographics, the youth population is disproportionately affected: Youth unemployment in 2004 was estimated at 63% and

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14 Ibid.
15 Dmitry Pozhidaev and Ravza Andzhelich, "Beating Swords to Ploughshares: Reintegration of Former Combatants in Kosovo," (Pristina: Center for Political and Social Research, 2005).
has remained at least 10% higher than the average unemployment rate.\textsuperscript{16} The unemployment rate for females is significantly higher, as 74\% of young women aged 15-24 are unemployed, and Kosovar Albanians are the group most predominantly affected, comprising over 91.4\% of those unemployed.\textsuperscript{17}

The high unemployment rate is the predominant concern of most young Kosovars, who believe that they do not have a chance to succeed if they remain in Kosovo. Nearly 70\% of young Kosovars surveyed in 2004 responded that were "very preoccupied" with unemployment.\textsuperscript{18} However, while many youth are searching for jobs, their frustration has not necessarily turned to protest. Instead most youth look to opportunities outside of Kosovo as their way to succeed: According to the 2007 UNDP report, because of the lack of availability of good jobs and education, nearly half of the population age 15-24 would emigrate if they could.\textsuperscript{19}

\textit{Education:}

The education system in Kosovo had a strong symbolic role throughout the conflict, with the parallel education system becoming a symbol of Albanian resistance. However, forced to operate underground, without adequate funding or space, the Albanian’s efforts could not completely compensate for the regular school system. In addition to the disruption of normal school operations, the educational infrastructure also suffered a high degree of physical damage as a result of the violence. Nearly 45\% of schools were completely destroyed or damaged by the end of

\textsuperscript{16} "Youth: A New Generation for a New Kosovo, Human Development Report 2006." Youth unemployment is defined as unemployment among those aged 15-24
\textsuperscript{17} "Youth in Kosovo," (UNICEF Kosovo, 2004).
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} Ferizi and Sad, "Youth Despair of Decent Future in Kosvo."
1999 campaign, leaving only 17% untouched. (However even the areas around many of these schools were planted with landmines, preventing children from returning to school.)\(^{20}\) Immediately following the NATO bombings, there was a strong campaign to rebuild the educational infrastructure and 1,000 school buildings were rebuilt or repaired between 1999 and 2000.\(^{21}\)

While enrolment, especially across the mandatory levels of education, has been largely restored since 2000, the quality of education, attendance and access to education at the secondary and university level remains poor for European standards (in 2003-2004 only 75.2% of the secondary-school age population was enrolled).\(^{22}\) In addition, as discussed later in this chapter, curriculum reform and the restructuring of the Kosovar education systems remains a highly contentious topic that has yet to be fully resolved.

Coding: The percentage of youth in the population in Kosovo is rated as high, as with 60% of the population under the age of 25 and 21% of the population aged 15-24, Kosovo has one of the highest proportions of youth relative to world and regional baselines.\(^{23}\) Youth participation in the conflict is also coded as high, with 38.5% of the KLA between the ages of 14-25. Finally the youth unemployment rate in Kosovo is rated as extremely high, as not only is the rate itself much higher than in


\(^{21}\) Ibid.

\(^{22}\) Ibid. This level of enrolment is distinctly high than the corresponding rate for sub-Saharan Africa (31.7 in 2005), but more than 10% lower than the average for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (89.2 in 2005)

\(^{23}\) The average percentage of youth in Eastern Europe is 34.5% (age 0-24), and 15.9% (age 15-24). The corresponding world averages are 47.6% (age 10-24) and 17.7% (age 15-24). However, these rates in Kosovo correspond with the average rates for sub-Saharan Africa, with 63.9% (age 0-24) and 20.1% (age 15-24). "International Data Base," (United States Census Bureau).
other European countries, but the proportion of unemployed youth exceeds the average unemployment rate by 10%.

**International Policy**

International and regional organizations took over the reconstruction efforts in Kosovo to a degree unparalleled in similar operations. With Kosovo’s status as an international protectorate, UNMIK took on the responsibility of governing the province, while NATO and CIVPOL/KFOR remained in the area as peacekeeping and policing forces. The international actors involved were highly aware of the large population of youth in Kosovo and the potential dangers of ignoring youth specific needs, as representatives from both the World Bank and European Union had identified young people ages 15-20 as “the greatest potential source of civil unrest in Kosovo.”24 As a result, in the aftermath of the 1999 NATO mission, there was a flood of youth-specific programming from the international community. Many of these programs were highly effective in meeting the immediate needs of youth affected by the conflict and also attempted to realize the youth potential as a positive force for peace building efforts. However, after the initial deluge of international humanitarian aid, the continued predominance of the international actors over local efforts had the indirect effect of stifling the local culture of volunteerism and community service, and in turn stifling long-term impact of the youth empowerment programming.

24 “Youth Post-Conflict Participation Project,” in *UNDP Project Summaries* (UNDP in Kosovo, 2002).
United Nations Policy

The United Nations Interim Administration Mission to Kosovo (UNMIK) was established in 1999 immediately following the NATO led campaign to stop the ongoing ethnic violence. UNMIK’s first task was to coordinate disaster relief and ensure the safe return of the thousands of refugees and displaced persons. In addition, UNMIK was authorized to take on direct control of all essential civil administrative tasks for the province, including the police and justice system. UNMIK also served as the coordinating mechanism for regional organizations to begin the process of democratization and institution building (led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)), and facilitate the reconstruction and economic development of the province (under the leadership of the European Union (EU)).

From the outset, UNMIK took the lead in providing youth-oriented programming in the refugee camps. UNMIK worked with UNICEF and their NGO partners to implement a “Child Friendly Spaces” program, where each camp dedicated a certain area for women and children to benefit from educational and health programs, participate in recreational activities, receive psychosocial support, and find out up-to-date information on protection issues specific to their needs. UNICEF also administered capacity building and empowerment programs with their “Youth-to-Youth” approach. The “Youth-to-Youth” program not only provided psychological relief resources to adolescents, but also sought to mobilize youth participation in the refugee camps through empowering young adults and adolescents to support and counsel their younger peers. Under this program, UNICEF also
worked with the Albanian Youth Council to organize weekly meetings to discuss and resolve problems in the camps, such as the lack of activities. The participants then developed and implemented various community service programs, such as organizing sports tournaments or concerts in the camps, setting up camp schools, fundraising for the poorest families, improving security in the camps, distributing information about landmines, and providing psychosocial activities for the younger kids.25

With youth-run community programs emerging throughout the refugee camps, the UN and partnering NGOs attempted to tap into the youth potential and help these young people to organize as an effective voice during the reconstruction efforts. For instance, in the months following the conflict in Kosovo, UNDP had found that Kosovar youth had “spontaneously and with institutional support,” mobilized on the “path to becoming a force for sustainable development and peace in Kosovo.”26 As a result, UNDP and the International Rescue Committee (IRC) sponsored a youth empowerment program called the Youth Post-Conflict Participation Project (YPCPP) from 2000-2001. The Youth Post-Conflict Participation Project aimed to support to the emerging, yet highly fragmented, youth civil society movement by providing the necessary resources in order to form a more cohesive youth participation system, and integrating the youth programming into the post-conflict recovery processes.27 For instance, through the YPCPP, the UNDP worked with emerging youth movements in the refugee camps to organize into five regional working groups which were then trained on how to research, prioritize, and initiate development sub-projects. In 2001

25 Lowicki and Pillsbury, "Making the Choice for a Better Life: Promoting the Protection and Capacity of Kosovo's Youth."
26 "Youth Post-Conflict Participation Project."
27 Ibid.
the program established the Kosovo Youth Congress, which would serve as a non-
governmental body, run by youth, to advocate for youth issues and advise on policies
relevant to the youth demographic.\textsuperscript{28} The first meeting of the Kosovo Youth Congress
laid the groundwork for the foundation of the Kosovo Youth Network, which has
become a highly effective network of NGOs and youth centers throughout Kosovo,
all dedicated to youth empowerment and community development. The Kosovo
Youth Congress continues to meet annually to give voice to youth concerns and
maintain an updated “Youth Action Plan,” that prioritizes and provides possible
solutions to youth issues.

The YPCPP was widely successful in channeling the initial outpouring of
youth activism. However, while the Kosovo Youth Congress has maintained its
organization, the YPCPP project was funded as an emergency program, and ended in
2001. UNDP did implement another project from 2003-2004, the Effective Youth
Empowerment Strategy (EYES), in order to build upon the previous youth
empowerment efforts, however the program received only one third of the funding as
the initial YPCPP project.\textsuperscript{29} The EYES project is representative of the trend in
Kosovo of a massive influx of initial money and programs, followed by a steady
decline in funding and interest. In order for youth participation to continue to be
effective and popular, capacity-building programs needed to remain a long-term
priority, rather than an emergency program.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{29} The YPCPP had an initial $300,000, while the EYES only received just over $100,000, "Effective
Youth Empowerment Strategy (Kos/02/005)," in \textit{UNDP Project Summaries} (United Nations
Development Program, 2004), "Youth Post-Conflict Participation Project."
While programs like the YPCPP and EYES were relatively short lived, UNMIK did recognize that youth issues needed to be prioritized as a part of the interim administration. As such, UNMIK created the Department of Youth to take the lead in coordinating the ongoing youth activities, supporting youth initiatives such as the annual Youth Week, and prioritizing policies that would benefit the youth demographic, such as education programming that would prepare youth for employment opportunities.  

International actors also participated in facilitating education programming in Kosovo, as UNICEF, in coordination with the UNIMIK Department of Education, UNESCO and the World Bank, led the rehabilitation and reform of Kosovo’s education system. As previously discussed, the conflict took a large toll on the educational infrastructure and, despite the parallel structures, education in many portions of Kosovo had ceased as the conflict had intensified. As a result, “UNMIK and the international NGOs which flooded into Kosovo inherited two debilitated education management systems.” The UNMIK Department of Education and Science, under donor pressure to achieve immediate results, acted quickly and effectively to mobilize funds and help communities rebuild school buildings and get the system up and running: within three months after the NATO campaign 80% of primary and junior secondary-school students were back in school.

Despite the recovery of the physical infrastructure, the organization of the education system and curriculum reform remained highly contentious issues.

30 Lowicki and Pillsbury, "Making the Choice for a Better Life: Promoting the Protection and Capacity of Kosovo's Youth."
32 Ibid.
throughout the reconstruction process, taking years to resolve. Due to the brutally enforced segregation of the previous decades, educational curriculum was highly politicized, lacking in overall quality, and often providing biased versions of historic events or civil structures, which served as a tool to fuel ethnic claims to nationalism. The fight for control over the new curriculum has remained a symbol of power for hard-line politicians, and served as a significant obstacle to reform, as “both Serbs and Albanians equat[e] the fate of their national education systems with the prospects for realizing their respective national visions in Kosovo.” Thus, the education system in place three months after the NATO campaign basically re-established the previous parallel system. While the international actors charged with implementing educational reforms agreed that segregation of Albanians and Serbs was unacceptable and that the new education system should be a single, inclusive organization that respected student’s language and cultural rights, the reality on the ground made it extremely difficult to combine the segregated schools. Security issues alone prevented schools from consolidating, as UNMIK protection forces were often required for buses escorting Serbian children from their villages to consolidated schools. As a result, separate schooling became the “de facto reality.”

Despite the domestic resistance, international actors remained determined to reform the system. In order to facilitate these organizational and curricular reforms, UNMIK adapted a “Lead Agency” approach, giving certain departments near-total

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34 Sommers and Buckland, "Negotiating Kosovo's Educational Minefield."
authority in reforming the education structures.\textsuperscript{35} The process allowed the UN and its partnering agencies to dominate the reform agenda. Driven by donors who required that the UNMIK Department of Education keep its structure “lean,” very few domestic actors were involved in the reform process, and without consideration for local opinion, the new system “retained little from Kosovo’s educational heritage.”\textsuperscript{36} As a result, not only did the UN miss an opportunity to involve local experts, students and teachers in a community effort to reform the system but local actors were instead marginalized from the reform process, many of whom withdrew from any direct involvement in reconstruction or looked to NGOs for the opportunity to contribute.\textsuperscript{37}

While the education reform process eventually established a new singular curriculum for Kosovo, the process was widely perceived as closed and disrespectful of local opinion, fueling distrust and tension between the international actors and local educators. The new curriculum called for 80\% of content to be the same in corresponding grade levels across Kosovo, with individual schools having autonomy over 10-20\% of content.\textsuperscript{38} However, to date the education system continues to suffer from a lack of objectivity in subjects taught, an issue that is particularly important for a province where ethnic divisions remain one of the most significant obstacles to enduring peace.

\textsuperscript{35}UNICEF, in coordination with UNESCO, and the World Bank were named the lead agencies in curriculum reform and education management, respectively.
\textsuperscript{36}Sommers and Buckland, "Negotiating Kosovo's Educational Minefield."
\textsuperscript{37}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{38}2006 Youth HDI
Foreign Government Involvement:

With NATO leading the military campaign against the Serbian forces, the group was forced to take on a substantial role in the humanitarian efforts after the crisis. The primacy of NATO’s efforts in the reconstruction process is emblematic of the various regional security groups who took an acute interest in Kosovo’s rehabilitation and were actively involved in the administration of the province.

NATO’s efforts during the post-conflict reconstruction period were initially focused on coordinating humanitarian relief for the refugee population. While NATO is a military organization, NATO was forced to take on both military and humanitarian responsibilities in order to control the situation and secure its future role as the leading European security organization. The intervention set NATO’s reputation on the line for its future significance in Western Europe: if NATO’s efforts against Milošević failed for a second time, and the humanitarian crisis was left unresolved, its preeminence as a security force in the post-cold war era was likely to fade away. In addition, NATO’s role in providing humanitarian assistance was underlined when UNHCR was caught unprepared to deal with the massive influx of refugees. Calling on NATO for support, UNHCR worked under the authority of NATO planners and engineers to set up camps for Albanian refugees.

While by many accounts the NATO campaign effectively provided emergency relief and shelter, NATO’s role as the coordinating body for emergency relief angered many of the other humanitarian organizations. These organizations

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39 The NATO-led international peacekeeping force, the Kosovo Forces (KFOR) entered Kosovo in June of 1999, with 48,000 peacekeepers on the ground by 2001. Lowicki and Pillsbury, "Making the Choice for a Better Life: Promoting the Protection and Capacity of Kosovo's Youth."

40 Huysmans 2002
argued that UNHCR and international NGO’s essentially served as “subcontractors” in the NATO humanitarian effort, and that such a role blurred the distinction between military and humanitarian intervention.\textsuperscript{41} Many humanitarian organizations felt that a NATO led humanitarian effort principally biased humanitarian support against Serbians, forcing organizations to essentially “take sides” in the conflict. As a result, agencies with the resources to function independently, such as Doctors Without Borders, attempted to distance themselves from the NATO operation.

NATO’s military campaign and role as humanitarian coordinator, while not directly related to youth, had a striking effect on the overall perception of humanitarian aid at the local level. Instead of seeing the humanitarian effort as providing equal assistance to all those in need, perceptions were decisively split along ethnic lines. There are many instances of Serbian fighters telling Albanian families driven from their homes, “You wanted NATO? Let NATO protect you,” in effect increasing tensions as a result of the NATO operations.\textsuperscript{42}

In addition to the backlash against NATO’s role as a humanitarian coordinator, as explained in depth in the section on stability, in 2004 the presence of NATO and UN personnel was linked to the growing trade of sex trafficking in Kosovo. While the United Nations and NATO operate on a zero-tolerance policy for sexual abuse and dealt with the issues internally, the news of the scandal exacerbated the perception that NATO and the UN were illegitimate as the security force for Kosovo.

\textsuperscript{41} Lischer 2007  
\textsuperscript{42} Lowicki and Pillsbury, "Making the Choice for a Better Life: Promoting the Protection and Capacity of Kosovo's Youth," 11.
While NATO’s role was largely confined to emergency humanitarian assistance and security issues, a number of other regional security groups were highly engaged in the reconstruction and development efforts, and had specific policies aimed at addressing youth issues. For instance, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Agency for Reconstruction, and the Stability Pact on South Eastern Europe, were all directly involved in youth programming. OSCE, in particular, was an integral partner in the UNMIK mission and has been on the ground in Kosovo since 1999 working closely with UNHCR, NATO/KFOR forces and the EU to support the development of democratic institutions, human rights and good governance practices, and ongoing public safety and security. As a part of this mandate, OSCE has helped to establish municipal youth assemblies throughout Kosovo through its Youth Assemblies for Community Development project. The assemblies promote youth capacity building through various educational and vocational training activities and encourage youth participation in local government. In addition OSCE partnered with UNMIK’s Department of Youth to engage the youth demographic in the ongoing elections activities. Similar to MTV’s “Rock the Vote,” “Register Now/Win Now” concerts were held throughout Kosovo to attract attention and increase awareness about the ongoing political events. In 2006, the OSCE mission established a Youth and Education Support Unit, which sponsors programs that promote institution building for higher education, youth employment, civic participation and empowerment. In addition, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe has been actively involved in
similar education programming in Kosovo through its Task Force on Education and Youth.

Western governments also paid particular attention to the humanitarian crisis facing Kosovo in the aftermath of the NATO campaign. The United States, with its leading role in advocating for NATO involvement, was one of the largest contributors of humanitarian aid in the immediate years following the bombing. Not only did the United States (and other foreign governments including Canada and the EU) donate large sums in humanitarian aid, but they also sponsored a number of youth-specific programs during the transition phase. For instance the US State Department Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration (BPRM) granted over three million dollars to programs dealing with at-risk children and youth from 1999-2000. The majority of the grants supported the IRC and IMC’s efforts to establish youth centers throughout Kosovo and provide psychosocial support to those in need. The USAID Office of Transition Initiatives was also involved in the reconstruction process, providing more than $70,000 to youth related activities and $750,000 towards establishing a Displaced Children’s and Orphan’s Fund. In addition, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) both donated between $8 and $9 million between 1999-2000 to education programs, including distributing school equipment and textbooks and facilitating the emergency rehabilitation of primary and secondary schools. However, even with the rush to assuage the immediate humanitarian crisis following the NATO intervention, after 2002 international funding, especially for education programming,

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41 Ibid. The BPRM granted an additional $10 million to the Kosovo Women’s Initiative (KWI), which supported “women’s self-reliance and economic stability,” which indirectly benefits their children.
44 Ibid.
dwindled. While USAID committed over $12 million dollars in 1999 and $8.5 million in 2000, the budget for 2006 was just $75,000, and $79,000 in 2007.

Coding: The international involvement in Kosovo is rated as having a *High Level, Positive Impact*. Overall the presence of the international community and programming helped to stabilize the situation. In addition, the degree of involvement by both foreign governments and the UN in proportion to the situation was also high, and was successfully able to meet the demands of the situation (at least in the short term). It should be noted that the level of youth programming has not been maintained to the same degree since 2004. While the level of funding has declined, the international community remains highly involved in Kosovo’s internal affairs.

**NGO Activity**

With the amount of attention that the crisis in Kosovo received in the Western media, it is not surprising that the scene was inundated with international NGOs and donors from 1999-2002. This flood of NGOs was able to tap into the already burgeoning youth civil participation, and established a wide range of successful youth programs that cut across political, social and economic needs. The relatively quick resolution to the violence and rapid return of refugees back to their homes allowed humanitarian workers to take on more development oriented programming, rather than devote most of their efforts and funds to immediate humanitarian relief in the form of food, shelter and medical assistance. However, the culture established in the NGO environment was largely driven by competition to win grants and attract

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donors. As a result, the massive influx of competing international actors unintentionally eroded the pre-existing community structures: while international actors replaced local actors in providing critical community service, as the international fundraising fervor inevitably died down, many of the newly implanted international civil society programs were unable to sustain the level of activity, leaving the local structure unable to support the needed programs.

While the eventual decline in NGO commitment served as a significant setback to the long-term impact of youth empowerment programs, the high degree of attention in the initial years was highly successful compared to other post-conflict efforts in addressing the youth population’s immediate physical and psychosocial needs and facilitating active youth participation in the reconstruction and peace building process. Despite setbacks in coordination, and competition between NGOs for financing, in the first few months of the refugee crisis, a number of successful programs emerged focused directly on addressing youth needs. Initially, many of the NGOs in the refugee camps set about establishing programs similar to UNICEF’s “Child-Friendly Spaces,” which provided educational and recreational activities, along with health and psychological care and information networks to track family members. For instance, the Red Cross (ICRC) created the Balkan Family News Network, which provided refugees with the tools to locate their lost family members, and the IRC sponsored the Child Connect and Kosovar Family Finder projects which contained databases of 20,000 families (approximately 120,000 individuals) and

47 Lowicki and Pillsbury, "Making the Choice for a Better Life: Promoting the Protection and Capacity of Kosovo’s Youth."
coordinated with Save the Children to provide satellite phone access to children and youth seeking to get in touch with their families.\textsuperscript{48} The IRC also implemented a psychosocial support program for refugee youth, which trained young people on how to assist their peers, by hosting workshops and providing information on the common reactions to crisis that so many members of their communities were experiencing.\textsuperscript{49} Save the Children also began a number of support programs for young people in the Albanian refugee camps, including creative activities such as art and drawing programs. Expositions of the artwork were then held both in the camps and in the International Center of Culture, Albania’s contemporary art museum.\textsuperscript{50}

At the same time, many of the youth in the camps were mobilizing on their own to provide support for their communities. The Albanian Youth Council, worked with the young refugees in the camps looking for an outlet from the boredom and depression that characterized the camp atmosphere in order to mobilize an emergency network of youth groups. With organizational support from the IRC, the network grew to include groups in over 45 camps and cities throughout Kosovo and Albania, and would eventually become the Kosovo Youth Council. The groups were highly active in the camps, taking on the responsibility for different projects ranging from organizing events such as concerts and sports tournaments to creating information tents, providing language courses and hygiene kits for their peers, or starting programs to provide aid to youth with special needs. In addition, the KYC worked

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
with the UN Volunteers to organize the Kosovo Youth Volunteers to encourage young people to participate in social development and reconciliation programs.\(^\text{51}\)

The KYC has continued to operate throughout Kosovo as a voice for the youth demographic and a coordinating body for youth community service, civil society and empowerment initiatives. One of the reasons that the KYC has been so successful is that it has strived to include youth representation from all ethnic backgrounds, and has become a hub for youth-led tolerance building activities by providing a space for young adults from different communities to discuss relevant issues, find solutions, and take action in their communities. The KYC is also an active advocate for youth involvement in the local decision making processes, and has worked with the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children to research and raise awareness about youth issues and the importance of youth participation and consultation in the reconstruction and development process.

There were a number of other youth-generated initiatives that emerged after the conflict and partnered with international donors or NGOS. As of 2001, there were 280 youth organizations and clubs in Kosovo with over 20,000 participants, mostly in the Albanian community.\(^\text{52}\) The activities of these organizations ranged from youth-run radio programs, to awareness campaigns and round-table forums to promote dialogue about current events, youth participation and tolerance. The IRC and IMC also established nine youth centers across Kosovo with funding from the U.S. BPRM. These youth centers strive to promote inter-ethnic contact and serve as educational

\(^{51}\) Ibid.  
\(^{52}\) Ibid.
and recreational base for many children and young adults, providing a diversity of programs including vocational education and English classes.

The range of youth programming also included a number of initiatives aimed at youth political and economic empowerment. For instance, in addition to the UN and OSCE sponsored political participation programs, such as the Youth Congress and Youth Week, the IRC implemented a Civil Participation Initiative (CPI) to address the youth social and economic recovery. The CPI sought to mobilize youth “corps” to identify problems facing young people in their communities, and then put them in contact with government officials and other community representatives who could help facilitate responses to the identified issues.

The broad range of youth programming had tremendous success in the first years following the 1999 crisis, helping to provide many of the youth refugees with both the support they needed and the opportunity to participate in projects beneficial to the entire community. However, most of these programs were funded through emergency humanitarian funds and were unable to survive when international interest and funding dried up. For instance, while 31 youth centers sprung up around the province in 1999 supported by various international donors, within a few years the international enthusiasm to fund the reconstruction efforts in Kosovo had died down, and by 2006 nearly all of these youth centers had closed due to lack of funding, or were “completely dysfunctional”.53 In addition, youth participation and interest in volunteering in their communities has declined. While youth participation was extremely high in 1999 and 2000, especially in initiating peace and community building programs, in 2006 only 6.3% of youth surveyed reported that they

participated in NGO projects or youth initiatives. However, nearly a quarter of the youth surveyed, 21.7% had participated in protests.

The decline in the ethos of volunteerism and community development that was prevalent throughout the 1990s and in the immediate aftermath of the 1999 crisis was due in part to the atmosphere created by international organizations and NGOs. The community participation that had flourished as a part of the Kosovar Albanian resistance evolved into an institutionalized culture of volunteerism that functioned with the support of only a few NGOs. However, as the 1998-1999 crisis gained attention in the international media, many NGOs saw Kosovo as an opportunity to gain in the humanitarian market share. The outpouring of international organizations and NGOs into the region created an intensely competitive atmosphere, as organizations fought each other to win grants from the dominant international donors. The donors’ preference to sponsor iNGOs or a few well-established local agencies created an imbalance in the labor market in favor of the international NGOs over the existing community networks and structures. As international agencies and NGOs take over the reigns in providing the resources that volunteer structures were previously responsible for they removed the need for grassroots efforts. As a result, the NGOs not only created tension between local and international actors, but also inadvertently eroded the social structures that had supported an ethos of community service, and “effectively ended the period of institutional volunteerism.”

A number of other factors most certainly contributed to the decline in participation. The spirit of volunteerism was primarily a solidarity movement against the discrimination suffered under Milošević’s regime. With the immediate threat

54 Ibid.
removed, it is not surprising to see a drop in volunteer activities. However, the role of NGOs in contributing to this steep decline should not be discounted. In addition to taking over the role that the volunteer community had filled during the years of conflict, a significant part of the population was discouraged by the lack of transparency of many of the NGOs or felt that their contributions were no longer valued during the reconstruction efforts. Most notably, many teachers and educators who had been highly active and considered heroes during the conflict, felt ignored by the international organizations and NGOs, as they were rarely consulted in developing the reconstruction policies and programs.  

According to the 2006 Human Development Report in Kosovo, this apparent change in the spirit of civic and community participation is especially evident in the level of participation among youth. Among many of Kosovo’s youth today there is a marked ethos of apathy, and most youth report that believe they do not have any real power to effect positive changes in their communities. While the decline in Kosovo’s youth participation corresponds with similar trends in neighboring transitional democracies, the impact of the international community is especially distinct in Kosovo.

Coding: NGO involvement in Kosovo is rated as having a Low Level, Positive Impact. The positive rating reflects that NGOs were largely helpful in establishing a secure environment and catering to youth needs. However, the low level of impact reflects the degree to which coordination and competition issues detracted from the

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55 Sommers and Buckland, "Negotiating Kosovo's Educational Minefield."
overall success of programming, and the relatively short-term nature of the funding or operation of NGOs.

**Domestic Policy**

With the ongoing transfer of power from the UNMIK operation to the Kosovar Assembly, local decision makers have been faced with the ongoing dilemma of how to address the needs of Kosovo’s disproportionate youth demographic. In particular, local politicians have emphasized the importance of solving the widespread trend of youth unemployment. Education also remains a prioritized issue for local decision-makers, but the groundswell to resolve the issues surrounding the quality of education, especially on the university level, has been caught up in efforts to use the institution as a symbol of ethnic nationalism. While international organizations are working with domestic policy makers to strengthen the education program, the reduction in international funding and the politicization of education issues continue to hamper the growth of educational institutions.

The alarming levels of unemployment in Kosovo and the stagnant economy have kept local politicians occupied, and the disproportionate number of youth affected is particularly worrisome. With increased rates in youth criminality, there is a significant fear among elites that a large population of unemployed youth could serve to derail efforts towards peace and reignite the ethnic tensions of the past decade.57

Despite the efforts of the international community to stimulate the economy in

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57 It is unclear how the unequal unemployment levels across ethnic identities contribute to the instability, as Kosovar Albanians, who comprise the majority of the population in Kosovo, and are disproportionately affected by unemployment, with 91.4% of those unemployed in 2005 identifying as Kosovar Albanian and only 3.7% identified as Kosovar Serbian. "Youth: A New Generation for a New Kosovo, Human Development Report 2006."
Kosovo, unemployment across the board has continued to rise in recent years, especially among the youth demographic. While economic growth has been lagging across the nation, there are a number of reasons why youth are particularly affected. A majority of university graduates in Kosovo aspire to work in public administration, as public-sector jobs are seen as one of few promising careers and many young Kosovars see the opportunity as a way to become involved in the process of creating a modern Kosovo.\(^{58}\) However, the current administration has demonstrated a degree of conservatism and distrust towards the youth demographic and has shown that it is not yet ready to allow the youth demographic to become a dominant force in the public administration.\(^{59}\) In addition, most of the entry-level positions require English language proficiency and computer skills, which due to the quality of the education system, most Kosovar youth do not have.\(^{60}\) As a result, many young people have withdrawn from attempts to seek employment in Kosovo, and see their futures as dependant on getting out of Kosovo, at least temporarily.\(^{61}\) (See section on Culture Context for details on the broad impact of the “exit-option”)

In order to address the chronic youth unemployment, in 2006 local policy makers collaborated with the ILO to create the Youth Employment Action Plan in Kosovo for 2007-2010. The Action Plan identifies obstacles to youth employment and prioritizes key areas for improvement including: decreasing the primary school drop out level, increasing the span of vocational education curriculum and opportunities to participate in vocational education programs, improving access to

\(^{58}\) Ibid.  
\(^{59}\) Ibid.  
\(^{60}\) Ibid.  
\(^{61}\) Ferizi and Sad, "Youth Despair of Decent Future in Kosvo."
information, education and career guidance, increasing entrepreneurship and start-up businesses, decreasing the number of youth in the informal economy and increasing the number of youth registered in public employment services.\textsuperscript{62} The total cost for priority measures of the plan require $17.1 million. While the government of Kosovo has committed to cover one third of these costs, international donations are responsible for the rest.\textsuperscript{63} The Kosovo Youth Action Plan, a similar measure intended to address a number of issues facing young also dedicates the majority of its $13.9 million budget to measures stimulating youth employment.

Kosovo’s leaders have acknowledged that improving the education system, particularly the quality and availability vocational education, is integral to improving the quality of the work force and combating the ongoing trend of youth employment. However, a drastic reduction in the level of international funding jeopardizes the prospects for continued improvements in the education system. From 2000 to 2004 international funding for education dropped by 200\%.\textsuperscript{64} While the Kosovo Assembly has tried to compensate by increasing funding from the Consolidated Budget, the percentage of total national spending for education does not meet the need of a population with the highest number of school children in the European Union.\textsuperscript{65} While leaders in Kosovo have committed to increasing the percentage of the national

\textsuperscript{62} “Youth: A New Generation for a New Kosovo, Human Development Report 2006.”
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{65} While Kosovo increased gross spending from 2000-2004, the percentage of the national budget spent on education actually decreased from 20\% to 14\%. While this proportion of spending is on par with other nations who entered the EU before 2007, the education systems in these other countries were already well established and also receive significant funding from other public and private sources. In Kosovo, the funding from the Consolidated Budget is essentially the only funding provided to reconstruct the entire education system. 2006 youth HDI
budget spent on education to 19% by 2009, funding remains a significant obstacle to the quality of education and alleviation of the unemployment crisis.

The quality and accessibility of higher education also remains a significant issue facing young Kosovars, as the university system has become central to the ongoing nationalist rivalries between Kosovar Serbs and Kosovar Albanians. Kosovo has one main university in Prishtinë/Pristina, where the official language of education is Albanian, although, legally, classes may be taught in other languages. In 2001, another university was established in the predominantly Kosovar Serb town of Mitroçië/Mitrovica, where all instruction is in Serbian. However, the draft statute of the university (seen as the university’s application for incorporation into Kosovar institutions) was rejected in 2004, and the university has not been integrated into the Kosovar education system, relying the Serbian government for most of it’s funding.

The ethnic division between the universities, not only perpetuates the tensions in the community by keeping the symbol of parallel education systems as a political battleground for ethnic and nationalist divisions, but it also reduces the possibility for successful reform to improve the quality of higher education in the near future.

The poor quality and inaccessibility to higher education is an immediate obstacle to youth employment and empowerment. The same lack of funding and resources that hinders curriculum reform on the mandatory levels of education also plagues higher education, where the quality of instruction is particularly poor for European standards. Only 12% of the population of university-age students is enrolled in higher education, a rate four times lower than the average of OECD

66 Kostovicova, Kosovo : The Politics of Identity and Space.
67 Ibid.
countries. This is largely due to the insufficient capacity of the institutions to admit students, as the University of Pristina can only admit one-third of the applicants who apply. A number local and international actors have developed plans in order to improve the capacity of higher education, with at least seven different education reform strategies introduced to for 2005-2017. However, none of these multiple efforts were coordinated in order to maximize improvements, and little is being done to measure their success.

Coding: Domestic policy in Kosovo is coded as having a Low Level, Positive Impact. Overall, the domestic policy’s orientation towards addressing youth issues such as youth unemployment and education reform has helped to create an environment more amenable to stability. However, the low level of success reflects the domestic policy’s relative impact on the reconstruction process and the overall lack of success in addressing these issues.

Cultural Context

One of the most important differences between the sub-Saharan African cases, and Kosovo is the perceived possibility to leave the country in order to find a better life. As previously discussed, because of the ongoing uncertainty over Kosovo’s status, the lack of quality in education and opportunities in the labor market, many young Kosovars have withdrawn from the political scene, expressing apathy towards

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69 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
future development in Kosovo and seeing their hope for a future as dependent on leaving home.\textsuperscript{72} In fact, 50\% of Kosovo's youth (across all ethnic groups) have stated that they would emigrate if they could.\textsuperscript{73} A majority of those responding said that they wanted to leave because of their economic situation (41\%) or in order to create a better life for themselves (38\%), while 10\% responded they would leave in order to get a better education.\textsuperscript{74} While EU visa restrictions have limited the freedom of movement, making the reality of moving abroad much more difficult for youth in Kosovo and other eastern European transition states, the possibility of moving abroad remains an option that many young people believe is available.\textsuperscript{75} This “exit-option” is especially important in understanding the rise of youth apathy towards the ongoing economic situation in Kosovo. Whereas in other conflict situations in sub-Saharan Africa or other more isolated regions the majority of youth do not necessarily have a real conception of the option to leave their country in order achieve a better life, the option to emigrate as a strategy for success is quite tangible for youth in Kosovo. The fact that the issue of Kosovo’s independence remained unresolved for so long may have also added to these feelings of stagnation and apathy, as the frustration that young people felt observing the slow progress of defining Kosovo’s status is integrally related to their frustrations in the everyday experiences of transitioning into adult life in Kosovo, such as attempting to go to university or find a job. However, with Kosovo’s recent declaration of independence in February 2008, these sentiments

\textsuperscript{72} Ferizi and Sad, "Youth Despair of Decent Future in Kosvo.", "Youth: A New Generation for a New Kosovo, Human Development Report 2006."
\textsuperscript{73} "Youth: A New Generation for a New Kosovo, Human Development Report 2006."
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
may change. Whether they change for the better or worse, however, remains unclear, as independence may increase freedom of movement allowing more young people to emigrate out of Kosovo, or may also support Kosovo’s developing economy, increasing the availability of jobs and education opportunities.

**Dependant Variable: Level of Stability**

After the 1999 NATO air campaign there was a relatively quick end to the violence in Kosovo. Refugees and internally displaced persons rapidly returned to their homes, and NATO/KFOR forces took on the responsibility of policing the international protectorate. While the level of violence that consumed Kosovo during the period leading up to the NATO bombing has not been reached in the years following the conflict, ethnic tensions remain markedly high in the region. These tensions are largely due to Kosovo’s uncertain status following the NATO campaign. By establishing Kosovo as an international protectorate temporarily under UN control, the question of independence that was at the heart of the conflict, was open for speculation. Remaining an international protectorate for longer than necessary was intolerable for both sides, as the vast majority Kosovar Albanians were unsatisfied without a declaration of full independence from Serbia, and Kosovar Serbs remained loyal to their home country, refusing to accept the possibility of Kosovo’s succession.

As a result, the dynamics between the Kosovar Albanians, Kosovar Serbs and other ethnic minorities have remained tense in the years following conflict. While there have been a number of instances of isolated violence, most of the tension has
emerged through largely peaceful protests. Despite the reported ethos of apathy that has emerged in the youth population as a result of the inability to find jobs and the political and economic stagnation, a number of these protests over Kosovo’s political status were led by university students seeking to draw attention from international actors. For instance, in 2006 students protested against plans to decentralize Kosovo, which would include forming two municipalities in the ethnically divided town of Mitrovica. In October of 2007, students at the University of Pristina gathered to protest the delays of the Kosovo’s independence. In a peaceful rally, the leader of the Student Union who organized the event stated, "We must inform the local and international opinion that Kosova cannot wait anymore, that students cannot wait anymore." 

While these protests were largely peaceful, there has been one major exception with the violent riots that broke out in March of 2004. The riots were triggered by a series of events that heightened ethnic tensions and memories of the atrocities that occurred during the war: for instance, sensational media coverage that falsely reported that Serbs were responsible for the drowning of three ethnic Albanian boys is largely claimed to be the spark that ignited the riots.

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76 Ferizi and Sad, "Youth Despair of Decent Future in Kosvo."
79 There were a number of other circumstances that contributed to the frustration. In the weeks leading up to the riots, many Kosovar Albanians were angry as Kosovar Serbs, who were protesting the murder of a Serb teenager by an unknown attacker, had blocked of the main Pristina-Skopje road, and on March 16 a demonstration was held by veterans of the KLA to protest the arrest of former KLA leaders on charges of war crimes. "Kosovo: Failure of NATO, U.N. To Protect Minorities," (Human Rights Watch, 2004).
The 2004 riots took place over a 48-hour period beginning on March 17th. At least 22 riots broke out with an estimated 51,000 protestors. Over the course of the violence, 19 people died and 900 were wounded. At least 550 homes and 27 orthodox churches, mostly in Kosovar Serb communities, were burned and 4,100 persons from minority communities were displaced from their homes. KFOR and UNMIK were unable to effectively handle the situation, and lost a great deal of credibility as a security and peacekeeping force over their weak and disorganized response to the violence. The explosiveness of the riots demonstrates the high degree of latent tension that has continued to affect daily life in Kosovo and the potential that tension has to quickly turn to mob violence.

With the exception of the 2004 riots, there has been no widespread incitation of the conflict. However, ongoing insecurity remains a significant issue, with increased levels of low-level crime and sexual trafficking. In the years directly following the 1999 campaign, the refugee and minority population were especially vulnerable to crime and kidnapping, and youth criminality, particularly in the Albanian community, has become an increasing problem. Between January to August of 2000, youth between the ages of 10-25 were responsible for 27.6% of a total of 24,338 criminal offenses ranging from rape and murder to theft and traffic violations. Many youth admit to carrying weapons for self-defensive purposes, such as protecting themselves against gangs or kidnappers.

Sexual trafficking has also become a significant security concern facing young women in Kosovo. While the market for sexual trafficking sees a majority of women

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80 Ibid.
81 Lowicki and Pillsbury, "Making the Choice for a Better Life: Promoting the Protection and Capacity of Kosovo’s Youth."
and girls brought into Kosovo from surrounding countries, increasing numbers of Kosovar women and young girls are internally trafficked, and cases have been documented of girls as young as 11 being sold into sexual slavery in Kosovo. The growth of the market in Kosovo for prostitution and sexual trafficking has been linked to the large international population, particularly NATO and UN personnel. Amnest International reported in 2004 that international personnel make up 20% of the people using trafficked women and girls, even though the international demographic comprises only 2% of Kosovo’s population. While many of the alleged perpetrators have been dismissed from their positions in UNMIK, UN personnel are immune from prosecution in Kosovo and many of escaped criminal proceedings in their home countries.

The uncertainty of the situation in Kosovo is largely reflected in the mixed ratings it receives on various stability indicators. While the level of violence is relatively low, with widespread ethnic and political tensions and increased crime, insecurity in Kosovo has remained a fact of daily life:

- On the Global Peace Index, Serbia received an overall score 2.181 on a scale of 1 (most peaceful) to 5 (least peaceful), ranking 88th out of 121 countries as most peaceful. While Serbia received a 2 for level of organized internal conflict, it earned 3s across the board for political instability, likelihood of

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84 Ibid.
85 Because Kosovo was not officially declared a country until February of 2008, most of the data examining peace and stability in Kosovo is couched within the context of Serbia.
violent demonstration, level of violent crime, potential for terrorist acts and level of distrust in other citizens.

- On the Failed States Index, Serbia is labeled at “Warning” level for 2005-2007, largely due to the situation in Kosovo. In 2007 Serbia ranked 66th out of 177 countries as most likely to fail and 55th out of 146 countries in 2006. According to the Failed States Index country profile, tensions between ethnic Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo remain high, and the tension between Albanian and Serbian political parties contributed to the high risk sub-score for “factionalized elites.” In addition, the sub-scores for corruption and unemployment along with the high risk of unrest should Kosovo declare independence were significant factors in Serbia’s “Warning” rating.

- The RiskMap 2008 labels Kosovo as a high political risk and a medium security risk.

- The Economist Intelligence Unit reports from 2000-2008 indicate high political tensions over the status of Kosovo. With the exception of the riots in 2004 and increasing levels of violence and insecurity in 2003, the insecurity is largely framed in the political context and the potential for the explosion of violence, rather than ongoing hostilities.

These analyses indicate that while violence has been kept to relatively low to medium levels in Kosovo, insecurity and ethnic tensions continue to remain a serious obstacle to long term peace. In particular, the ongoing uncertainty over the status of independence has not only perpetuated the everyday tension and security issues,
particularly facing ethnic minorities, but the riots and protests over the five years following the intervention sparked the fears of a potential reincitation of the violence should Kosovo declare independence. While many youth-led organizations are actively contributing to peace building and tolerance efforts, youth have also played a significant role in the ongoing instability, specifically in organizing and participating in both peaceful protests and violent riots.

Kosovo’s declaration of independence on February 17, 2008 further complicates security and stability issues in Kosovo. The declaration incited a number of both peaceful protests and violent riots among the Serb population. While 150,000 people gathered in non-violent protest in Belgrade, crowds later looted and set fire to the U.S. and other western government embassies, killing one person, and Serb protestors in Bosnia attempted to attack the U.S. Consulate in Banja Luka. While the initial violence was perhaps inevitable, it is unclear whether the violence will continue. The Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica commented on the peaceful protests saying that, “Above all, the youth of Serbia have sent out a message that they want law, justice and freedom, and that they reject the western policy of force.”

While the peaceful rallies on both sides are significant indicators of restraint and the potential for a non-violent resolution in Kosovo, the fate of the independent state of Kosovo remains to be seen.

Coding: Kosovo is rating has having a medium level of instability. This rating reflects the incidences of politically motivated violence, along with the ongoing

87 Much of the recent violence has been in areas surrounding Kosovo, or in Kosovar-Serbian enclaves in Kosovo, but not necessarily throughout Kosovo proper. However, the violence in Serbia and other surrounding areas is significant for Kosovo’s stability, and as this report is being written a number of protests have also taken place in the newly established country.
tensions that continue to threaten the success of the reconstruction and transition process. However, as significant progress towards peace has been made and widespread violence has not emerged, the situation does not reflect a high or extreme level of instability.

**Coding summary:**

### Figure 4.1
**International Involvement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Program Specifics</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Foreign Government** | •Humanitarian aid and development initiatives, many with programs specifically for youth  
•Regional security Groups highly involved in broad range of youth oriented activities from meeting critical needs to empowerment programming | High positive impact |
| **United Nations** | •Humanitarian + Refugee reintegration  
•Youth empowerment programming, political and social  
•Education Reform  
•Some involvement in sexual abuse or trafficking | High positive impact |
| **Time Frame**   | •Short to Medium Term  
•Highly effective during this time period  
•Potential for international community to remain in charge of Kosovo as a protectorate frustrated nationalist sentiments  | Medium positive impact |
| **Overall Effectiveness** |                                                                                  | High level, Positive Impact |

### Figure 4.2
**NGO Involvement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Program Specifics</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coordination</strong></td>
<td>•High levels of competition overpowers some coordination efforts and drives programming</td>
<td>Medium negative impact</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Types of Programming** | •Psycho-social support  
•Reunification  
•Reintegration  
•Youth empowerment – political and social  
•Humanitarian  
•Conflict Resolution | High positive effect, especially in the short term |
| **Level of Efforts** (number of NGOs or international personnel) | •High level of efforts, however the overwhelming presence of international organizations indirectly damaged existing community service structures | Medium positive impact |
| **Time Frame**   | •Short term, driven by emergency humanitarian funding  
•The drop off in funding after the first 3 years was serious obstacle for continued progress on education reform and youth empowerment | Medium negative impact |
| **Overall Effectiveness** |                                                                                  | Low-Level, Positive Impact |

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Coding summary, continued:

**Figure 4.3**  
Domestic Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Program Specifics</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus on Youth</td>
<td>• Acute awareness of importance of addressing youth issues</td>
<td>Medium Positive Impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Programming</td>
<td>• Education Reform</td>
<td>Low Positive Impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td>Low-Level, Positive Impact</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4.4**  
Cultural/Environmental Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exit Option</td>
<td>• The possibility to emigrate alters the logic of youth decision-making</td>
<td>Unclear — both positive impact on stifling youth aggression, also negative in creating sense of apathy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td></td>
<td>Low-positive impact</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4.5**  
Objective Variables

| Population age 10-24      | 60% under the age of 25                                    |                                               |
|                          | 21% of the population between the ages of 15-25            |                                               |
|                          | 65% under the age of 30                                     |                                               |
|                          | Total Population (1993): 2 million                          |                                               |
| Baseline                  | Average for Eastern Europe: 34.5 age 0-24, 15.9% age 15-24 (2000) |                                               |
| Level of Youth Participation | 10-20% of the KLA forces were under 18                      |                                               |
| Unemployment              | Youth unemployment rate (2004): 63%                         |                                               |
| Baseline                  | Average for Eastern Europe: 15.3% (2002)                    |                                               |
| GNI Per Capita            | For Serbia $3,490.0 (USD)* - 2005                           |                                               |
|                          | Kosovo is known to be one of the least developed areas of Serbia and therefore the GNI is most likely lower than that of greater Serbia |                                               |
| Baseline                  | Average for Europe & Central Asia (2005): $3,968.1 (USD)   |                                               |
| Overall Coding            | Extremely high proportion of youth in the population        |                                               |
|                          | Extremely high levels of youth unemployment                 |                                               |

**Variables Level of Stability**

| Overall description of stability | Significant drop in level of violence after the conflict, however tensions remain high due to uncertainty of independence • Isolated violent rioting • Sex trafficking • Low-level violence and crime |
| Youth Involvement               | Youth participation in both peaceful activities and violent riots/protests |
| Global Peace Index              | 2.181 on a scale of 1-5, most to least peaceful |
| Failed States Index            | “Warning Level” • 55th most likely to fail in 2006 |
| RiskMap2008                     | High political risk • Medium security risk |
| Overall Level of Instability    | Medium level of instability |
Conclusion

The staggering percentage of youth in Kosovo, combined with unemployment, a lack of quality in the education system and continued political uncertainty could have been disastrous for the reconstruction process. However, as figure 4.5 shows, while tensions remain high, widespread violence and instability has been kept at bay.

The initial successes of the international community (see figures 4.1 and 4.2) were largely responsible for curbing the potential danger of the disproportionate youth demographic. With specific programs dedicated to youth empowerment, international organizations, regional security groups and NGOs worked together to meet young people’s needs during the initial humanitarian crisis, and empower youth to become positive actors in their communities. While this high level of involvement was at once positive, helping many youth to contribute to community development, the short-term donor driven programming has been a serious detriment to the ongoing progress in education and youth programming, and had the indirect effect of damaging the existing community structures. Where rallying as a community in peaceful resistance resonated with the older population who had lived through the decades of discriminatory rule, the dominance of international actors at the expense of the local participation alienated many citizens, and the same sentiment has not developed as much within the current youth population. The absence of Serbian control removes the some of the motive for resistance and undoubtedly affects this altered sentiment. However, the fact that a majority of youth feel that they cannot
make a difference in their communities and would leave Kosovo if they could, speaks to the depth of the change.

Cultural and environmental factors in relation to the ongoing uncertainty over Kosovo’s independence status, continued unemployment, and the possibility for young people to leave Kosovo, further complicate the situation (Figures 4.3 and 4.4). While their future potential for success in Kosovo is hampered by the stagnant economy and the uncertainty over independence is a serious source of frustration, the possibility to leave Kosovo, seriously alters young people’s self-understanding as Kosovar citizens and their decision-making logic as to how to participate (or not participate) in their communities.

The recent declaration of independence in Kosovo marks a turning point in the reconstruction process. Although there were a few isolated instances of rioting and low-level criminality, Kosovo has emerged relatively successfully from the transition process. While the reconstruction actors were faced with an extremely high youth population, the high level of efforts specifically catered to the youth demographic across a wide range of key functions and was able to tap into the youth potential to serve as active peace builders. However, because of the short-term nature of the efforts, these programs may not have the long-term impact that youth empowerment programming is intended to create. As evidenced by the peaceful protests and violent riots that followed the declaration, the potential for either a peaceful resolution or reincitation of the conflict both remain distinct possibilities. While the potential of the youth demographic to derail the reconstruction process was largely avoided, youth issues such as unemployment and access to education remain largely unresolved.
Without a successful effort from the international community to help the newly established Kosovar government to address these issues, the same recipe that spelled disaster in 1999 of a large youth population facing increasing unemployment and frustration exists today and may contribute to increasing instability.

The three cases studies provide a wealth of information on how different policies and programs are related to youth roles in post-conflict reconstruction. In each case, different actors took on the responsibility for different types of programming with varying degrees of success. In exploring the different types of programming and the impact of coordination and competition in the reconstruction environment a number of comparative observations can be drawn from the similarities and differences across the cases. One of the most critical observations is the primacy of successfully and effectively fulfilling certain functions in the reconstruction process, rather than the importance of the type of actor or method of action. The following chapter will examine this observation and other cross-case inferences in-depth, and use the information provided in the case studies to develop a number of important hypotheses to be explored in future research.
Chapter V.
Cross-case analysis and implications for future research

This project’s comparative case analysis reveals new insights into youth roles in conflict. In each of these cases, the evidence suggests that the youth demographic’s role is largely contextual, based on the efficiency of reconstruction programs in meeting youth needs, how and in what sequence these programs are implemented, and the extent to which reconstruction actors take into account the situation on the ground. While the evidence strongly suggests a more complicated model of the impact of a large youth population, the observations generated from the cross-case comparisons are not absolutely conclusive. Instead these hypotheses highlight a number questions that point to potentially fertile avenues of future research about the relationships between youth and conflict.

The three cases studies of Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Kosovo all demonstrate that the youth demographic is a significant factor in the reconstruction process. While the dominant literature suggests that youth are likely to serve a negative or disruptive role in society, these cases suggest that young people’s role is not necessarily predetermined. In each case, the impact of the youth demographic, whether positive or negative, was dependent on the success of various policies and programs in addressing issues important to the youth demographic. While the situations young people faced varied from case to case, and reconstruction actors used a variety of approaches ranging across the spectrum from advocacy to socio-political empowerment in order to deal with these issues, it is evident that
resolving a few critical youth related matters, from the reintegration of child soldiers to primary education and unemployment, are key issues to address in post-conflict environments. What becomes significant, then, is evaluating why the reconstruction process in one case was more effective – or ineffective – in responding to the needs and realizing the potential of the youth demographic. In this chapter, I develop the argument that these differentiating factors are related both to the sequence in which the programs are implemented and the cultural and environmental context in which the programs must operate.

The chapter proceeds first with a cross-case analysis that examines the similarities across the variables from each case, the relationships between youth roles in post-conflict reconstruction and the effective fulfillment of certain key functions, and the sequence in which these programs are implemented. This section will also examine potential limits of the comparison. The second half of the chapter will explore a number of inferences and hypotheses generated from the individual cases and cross-case analysis in order to highlight further questions generated by the study and suggest potential future topics for research in the field.

Cross-Case Analysis

In each of the three cases, each type of actor, from the international community and domestic actors to NGOs and the local environment, were engaged in youth related policies, each exerting a significant influence on the reconstruction process. The level of influence in each case is graphically illustrated in Figure 5.1, which summarizes the findings discussed in the conclusions of each case study.
Perhaps ironically, the study suggests that the success of the youth programming is not dependent on the efforts of one actor over another (e.g. UN vs. NGO), or on the presence of specific “youth” or “children’s” policy. Instead, the effective fulfillment of certain critical transition functions appears to drive both the reconstruction success – regardless of who implements them or whether they are targeted at youth or communities as a whole – as well as the fostering of youth as positive force for stability. The research suggests that these critical functions involve psycho-social support, DDR and reintegration programming to ease the transition into peace-time or civilian life, and education programming to provide youth with the tools to tap into immediate and long-term income generating opportunities. While each actor in the reconstruction process appears to have either a positive or negative impact on the overall process, the impact is intrinsically related to how well each actor fulfilled their responsibilities as related to these critical transition functions. Gathering the efforts of individual actors together, the trend of impact across the variables tends to describe the level of success of the reconstruction process. For instance, the DRC saw two variables having a “negative” impact, and two variables having a “positive/negative” impact, reflecting the low level of success, and return to violence in DRC. In Mozambique, all the factors have a “positive” rating, with the exception of one “positive/negative,” reflecting the overall level of success in the reconstruction program.

In effect, as the individual actor’s positive or negative rating reflects the relative impact that their respective youth programs (DDR, reintegration, education, etc.) exerted on the overall reconstruction process, when evaluated together, the trend
of positive or negative impact is representative of the extent to which the total
reconstruction process effectively implemented policies and programs that satisfied
the youth demographic’s needs. The overall success in realizing youth needs
parallels, and as the data suggests is often directly related to, the level of success the
reconstruction program achieved in creating a stable post-conflict environment. As
such, the key factor in successfully realizing the potential of the youth demographic
within the post-conflict context appears to rely on how effectively the range of
programs and actors bring about the successful fulfillment of certain key functions
that are integral to the youth demographic.

This conclusion significantly extends the current conceptions of youth roles in
conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. As discussed in the first chapter, most
theories have either focused on the destabilizing power of a large youth demographic,
the structures that tend to sway youth decision-making towards conflict-causing
activity, or on the potential dual roles of youth as potential “troublemakers” or
“peacemakers.” While it may seem obvious that the effectiveness of reconstruction
operations is a critical component of any reconstruction operation, the current
literature on youth in conflict has yet to draw the connection as to how effective
programming can shape youth roles during the post-conflict period, potentially
altering the same decision-making structures that previous authors have linked to
destabilizing behavior. My conclusion also suggests an examination of “efficiency” in
the reconstruction context that has not yet been fully articulated. It is not the level of
involvement, productivity, or care with which a particular actor goes about
implementing their policies that appears to be key. Instead, it is the substantive
influence of these operations within a particular operational, environmental and cultural context that influences the success of their mission. Further, I argue that efficiency is also integrally tied to the sequencing of reconstruction programs, which has a significant impact on the outcome of both the emerging youth role and the success of the reconstruction efforts.

Figure 5.1
Impact of Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Positive/Negative</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Involvement</td>
<td>Addresses</td>
<td>Addresses Indirectly</td>
<td>Does not Address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Policy</td>
<td>Addresses</td>
<td>Addresses Indirectly</td>
<td>Does not Address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO Involvement</td>
<td>Critical and Empowerment needs</td>
<td>Meets Critical Needs Only</td>
<td>Does not meet needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural/Environmental</td>
<td>Significantly impacts process?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key
Mozambique
Kosovo
DRC
Comparative analysis of independent variables

The analysis of the individual variable categories (International Involvement, Domestic Policy, NGO Involvement and Cultural/Environmental) in each case provides further support for the emphasis on function over form, and highlights a number of important institutional characteristics that can affect the potential impact of reconstruction programming. For instance, in examining the international involvement, in each of the three countries the United Nations mission played a large role in facilitating the transition and building the country’s new institutions. However, in each case the UN took on distinctly different responsibilities with varying levels of success. For instance, in Mozambique the United Nations was the dominant manager of the DDR process and the reintegration of refugees. While this program did not include a specific policy directed at the youth demographic, the demobilization and reintegration process was widely successful, and the function of reintegration of youth was fulfilled, as young people were included in the population of soldiers and refugees who benefited from the programs. In the DRC, the United Nations mission took on a strong advocacy and protection role with an acute focus on children’s rights, while serving only as an implementing agent or aide to the DDR/DDRRR process. In this case, while the efforts of the international community and UN have had a number of positive effects in treating the symptoms of the humanitarian crisis and demobilizing soldiers, the program has so far fallen short in fulfilling its overall function to protect children and youth. The inability to fulfill this goal in the DRC, while due in large part to domestic actors’ mismanagement of the DDR program, is
significant in the overall process, not because of the failure of the international
community but because of the unfulfilled requirement of a successful DDR process.

In Kosovo, the international community, including the United Nations and
regional security groups, took on a distinctly different function of both addressing
immediate humanitarian needs and channeling youth energies into constructive
activities. These actors were extremely successful, at least in the short term, in
fulfilling these objectives and were able in many circumstances to redirect or further
promote the youth demographic’s positive influence. While often this type of
programming is associated with the NGO community, the regional actors in Kosovo
were just as effective, if not more so, in fulfilling this function which, considering the
high population of youth with little to do in the refugee camps, was integral to the
short term success of the reconstruction process.

In examining the domestic policies, each country took on some degree of
responsibility for educational reform with varying degrees of success. Across the
board reconstruction actors recognized education as an important factor in the
transition process. However, as in the case of Kosovo, it does not have to be domestic
actors who lead the cause for education reform. While the manner in which
international actors in Kosovo carried out education and curriculum reform had a
number of indirect negative consequences, they have made some significant headway
in improving the educational environment, which may not have otherwise been
achieved considering the competing interests of the domestic parties involved. While
the reforms have yet to be entirely resolved, and higher education remains a serious
point of contention, the relative success of education reforms implemented by non-
domestic actors indicate that education is the function that must be fulfilled, not necessarily the job of domestic actors.

Comparing the success of domestic actors in Mozambique and the DRC also highlights a “functional” understanding of the reconstruction process. What separates the positive impact of domestic policy in Mozambique from the negative impact in the DRC is not just the education reform, but the idiosyncratic policies unique to the domestic actors in these situations. Where in many conflicts, the justice process is delegated to international agents, such as the UN or the ICC, the government’s amnesty policy in Mozambique has a significant effect on the overall culture of reconciliation, and the indirect effect of facilitating the reintegration of former youth combatants. In the DRC the national government took on the majority of responsibility for the DDR/DDRRR process, a function usually reserved for the United Nations. However, the domestic government’s poor management of the trust for the DDR program hindered the ability of implementing agents, including the United Nations and NGOs, to carry out a successful program. In both these countries, the degree of success or failure in these particular domestic programs had a significant impact on the overall process. Just as the incomplete DDR process in DRC highly affected the domestic policy’s influence on the reconstruction process, in Mozambique the United Nations’ successful implementation also had a significant impact – pointing to the importance of a successful DDR program, not necessarily the importance of domestic as opposed to international policy

The differences in the DDR programs also highlight that whether or not the actors had a specific youth policy or acknowledge youth issues as distinct matters
within the reconstruction process is not absolutely essential to successful
programming. In the DRC, nearly every agency involved from the United Nations to
CONADER were aware of the importance of children’s issues and developed
separate strategies to deal with children as opposed to adults. This distinction between
children and adult was exemplified in the Operational Framework outlining the exact
mechanisms for children’s DDR. Yet, the child-oriented programming in the DRC
was the least effective in meeting the needs of the youth demographic, and in fact, the
incomplete children’s DDR/DDRRR contributed to the ongoing instability. By
contrast, in Mozambique, where youth were acknowledged as a vulnerable group but
youth issues were not addressed as an explicit policy objective, there was a much
higher level of success in the reintegration of youth soldiers.

Out of the three types of actors, NGOs are often the most visible in focusing
their programming specifically on key youth needs. While NGOs can be successful in
meeting the needs of the youth demographic, the evidence from the three cases
suggests that it does not follow that a high level of NGO involvement is guaranteed or
even required to bring success. Both the DRC and Kosovo were inundated with
NGOs, many of which were focused on youth and children’s issues. Yet, it was in
Mozambique where NGOs were most effective in meeting youth needs. Rather than
having a lot of NGOs involved in the process, it seems that the crucial element for
successful youth programming in the NGO community is the efficacy in fulfilling
certain functions or needs. For instance, in Mozambique a select number of NGOs
were able to dedicate their resources to a few issues that had fallen through the gaps
of the United Nations mission and domestic policy program. By contrast, in both the
DRC and Kosovo, the NGO programming was severely limited both by coordination and competition, and by the dependence on international donors favoring immediate results over long-term development. This frenzy of NGOs competing for grants limits the individual organizations’ ability to accurately assess and meet needs based on the circumstances, and contributes to a culture of distrust of the international community.

In all three cases NGOs shaped their programs based on the reliance on emergency or transition funds. The donor stipulations for these funds, where the impact must be measured in a relatively short period of time, serve to create a tunnel vision for immediate results and therefore favor programs that apply superficial solutions to problems, but do address or resolve the root cause. For instance, the NGO community in Kosovo created a number of different institutions and youth centers to provide young people with the opportunity to take classes, participate in workshops and contribute to their communities. However, the creation of youth centers did not address the broader need for better quality vocational and technical training in order to prepare youth to be constructive members of the workforce. Without long-term funding, most of these centers have shut down or become dysfunctional. This issue of meeting immediate needs as opposed to resolving the underlying issues is problematic for nearly all the actors involved in the reconstruction process. However, it is especially apparent in the NGO community, as the dependency on humanitarian donations demands that these organizations navigate a balance of responsibility to both to the donor and receiving community. As such, it is easier to institute programs that satisfy immediate needs, than to try to defend the financing for a long-term endeavor that would attempt to resolve more complicated issues.
The needs that NGOs often fulfill are also not necessarily dependant on the NGO structure as the mechanism for resolution. For instance, in Kosovo, regional security groups were just as effective in instituting youth empowerment programs as NGOs, and have maintained a level of funding beyond that of many NGOs. In Mozambique, many NGOs opted not to involve themselves in the reintegration efforts because it could have hindered the local processes. In these cases, it was not necessarily important who implemented these programs, but rather that these specific needs (dependant on the relevant circumstances) were met effectively.

Where the international, domestic and non-governmental actors all serve to fulfill certain requirements of the reconstruction process, the cultural and environmental factors are also significant. These factors exert an exogenous influence that can have an impact ranging from affecting just certain actors to influencing the entire structure of the reconstruction process. For instance, the option for emigration in Kosovo has an impact on the decision-making logic of the youth demographic, altering the potential manifestations of their frustrations. In the DRC however, the combined effects of the harsh terrain and culture of impunity affected every aspect of the reconstruction process, hindering the ability of all the actors involved to effectively carry out their programs. Given these examples, the influence of cultural and environmental factors is important not only in explaining the behavior of the youth demographic relative to the policies implemented, but also in understanding the efficacy with which actors are able to fulfill their designated responsibilities. Even where the level of efforts may not be especially high, as in Mozambique, a positive influence from cultural factors can help to ease the process and tip the scales in favor
of successful reconstruction. Where the level of efforts is extremely high, as in the DRC, negative environmental and cultural factors can offset the various actors’ ability to adequately meet the demands of the peace building process.

In examining the influence of the various actors it seems apparent that it is not the single efforts of one group, such as NGOs, to cater to the youth demographic that can make for a successful youth policy. Rather, each actor can attempt to fulfill certain functions (or can share that responsibility with other actors), taking into account the cultural and environmental context. Each actor’s success or failure in fulfilling that function has a resulting positive or negative effect on the reconstruction process and overall stability of the country. The combined results, as demonstrated in Figure 5.1, are then a relatively good indicator of the general direction of the process.

Critical transition functions and youth roles in post-conflict reconstruction

The finding that the type of role the youth demographic plays during post-conflict reconstruction is dependant on the effective implementation of certain reconstruction activities is a significant distinction from the established scholarship discussing youth in conflict. As was previously explored in Chapter 1, the dominant theories concerning the role of the youth demographic in conflict uniformly claim that a large population of young men will have a destabilizing influence. In these models, the population of youth age 10-24 then represents an independent variable that can only exert a negative influence: a large proportion of youth either increases the potential for internal conflict to erupt, or serves as a potential spoiler for the possibility of conflict resolution. In this perspective, very little can be done (or what
can be done may be too little given the pressures) to manage the youth’s potential for instability.

Unlike this view, the evidence presented from the cases of Mozambique, the DRC, and Kosovo, supports an argument, similar to Siobhán McEvoy-Levy’s, that the role of the youth demographic is more akin to a dependent variable, where the direction of impact – positive or negative – is not predetermined, but is guided by the success or failures of addressing youth needs. As McEvoy-Levy argues, youth do not have to be a destabilizing force; they also have the potential to contribute to the process of community development and conflict resolution. The spontaneous emergence of youth peace building in Kosovo is case in point evidence of how young people can contribute to community development with the help of capacity building reconstruction programs. What the analysis from this study suggests, is that the transformation from “troublemaker” to “peacemaker” during post-conflict reconstruction is largely dependent on how well policy makers are able to implement youth programming and resolve key issues that represent obstacles to the youth demographic’s successful transition from war to peace and child to adult. For instance, where effective programming in Mozambique allowed many young ex-combatants to both reintegrate into civilian life and also become agents for conflict resolution, in the DRC, ineffective programming created a situation where young people were particularly vulnerable to (re)recruitment into armed forces, contributing to the ongoing instability.

While the types programs or functions that need to be implemented were similar across all three cases, the relative success of the different methods used to
implement these programs highlights the type of needs critical to youth development in post-conflict environments and demonstrates how the potential role of the youth demographic is dependent on the efficacy of the reconstruction programming. As Yvonne Kemper demonstrates with her evaluation of rights-based, economic or socio-political approaches to youth policy, the theoretical framework for youth programming in some respects defines its potential for realizing youth development. While the type of programming – rights-based, economic or socio-political – may dictate the potential impact and realization of youth roles, the case study analysis suggests that the successful implementation of youth policy is also dependant on the institutional and environmental context, such as the level of competition among implementing organizations or the influence of exogenous cultural-environmental factors.

For instance, beyond the immediate necessitates of food and shelter, one of the most important functions emphasized in the case studies is an effective reintegration program. Either in the context of demobilizing child and youth soldiers or resolving a refugee and IDP crisis, reintegration is a critical need that, unmet, can produce serious negative consequences on the overall reconstruction process. However, reintegration for youth and children is most commonly placed within a rights-based or advocacy framework that focuses on family reunification. Children in the DRC were reunified with their families, but without effective reintegration, were still vulnerable to re-recruitment with negative results for stability.

Rather, the type of reintegration programming that is most effective goes beyond family reunification, and works with communities to facilitate children and
youth’s transition back into their communities and also provides young people with opportunities to continue to succeed, such as was pursued in Mozambique. It is not necessarily the physical reunification with family members that is important, but rather the acceptance back into their communities and the reestablishment of a youth roles within that community. In some cases this may be accomplished through vocational training to provide participants with the skills necessary to generate an income. In other cases reintegration programming can involve traditional religious practices aimed at absolving previous actions or even conflict resolution workshops and youth volunteer corps that work to reconcile issues remaining from the war, provide young people with both an outlet for frustrations and a strong sense of community involvement.

Given the influence that cultural and environment factors have on the process, the cases studies suggest that a “one-size fits all” approach will not prove effective. Yet, no matter how it is achieved, successful reintegration fulfills the need for youth to feel a sense of belonging in the community and provides young people with the skills they believe will help them to succeed in a civilian environment. In some cultures achieving successful reintegration may be easier than in others. As evidenced by the stigma of sorcery associated with young females in the DRC as opposed to youth experiences of reintegration in Mozambique. While the success of reintegration programming is dependent in part on the policy framework itself, it is also dependent on the cultural environment and the ability of domestic and international actors to effectively carry out their programming within that context. As such, the type of
programming that will be most successful in fulfilling reintegration must take into account these contextual factors.

Providing high quality education programming is another important function for the reconstruction process, especially in areas with a younger youth population. Without regular schooling (as was the case in the DRC) children not only miss out on critical learning opportunities, but are also deprived of a daily routine that represents a desired alternative from less productive ways to occupy their time. For the older adolescent and young adult population who must navigate both the transition from a child’s to an adult’s position in society and from war-time modes of activity to peacetime, opportunities for education, including regular schooling and various education programming included within reintegration support such as specialized classes in health, technology, and vocational skills, are integral for developing the skills necessary to become productive members of a society. Because the experience of war interrupted the normal processes of childhood development within society, it is especially important during the reconstruction processes to develop in the younger generation the human capital necessary for future progress. For instance, Kosovo’s continuing struggle with the quality and access to higher education and vocational schooling is evident of the value of investing in education in order to prepare the young generation to enter the labor force. However, just as with reintegration, the institutional and environmental context will affect the extent to which education programming satisfies youth needs. For instance the quality of the pre-war education system in the DRC, the use of the education system as a nationalist symbol in
Kosovo, and the level of competition between implementing agencies during the reconstruction process, all served as obstacles to educational development.

Reintegration and education, in their various forms, are both critical functions that must be fulfilled during the reconstruction process. However both types of programming predominantly serve the function of quelling the potentially negative effects of a large youth demographic. Once immediate needs have been met, reintegration and education restore a sense of normalcy and provide a mechanism to address the possible youth frustrations immediately following the conflict. Where former child soldiers held positions of relative power and were able to secure for themselves daily necessities, such as food and shelter, participation in reintegration programs allows these young people to return to a civilian life armed with new prospects for income-generation in order to take care of themselves, and often their families. These programs, however, generally serve the individual and do not take the next step to empower youth as a demographic to play a positive role in rebuilding their country.

Where successful reintegration and education programs can mitigate the potentially negative role of the youth demographic, successful socio-political youth empowerment programming can enhance youth’s positive influence. The evidence from the reconstruction processes in Kosovo and Mozambique demonstrate that where empowerment programs were instituted, they were effective in tapping into the potential of the youth demographic and providing them with the types of skills needed to play a constructive role in their communities. Where a vocational education program in carpentry may last for a few months, programs like ProPaz’s young peace
builders and the Kosovo Youth Congress continue to serve not just the youth who participate in them, but also the local communities. By building youth capacity through participatory mechanisms, these programs provide the next generation of leaders with essential skills and experience to continue the process of reconstruction and reconciliation in the future.

*Sequencing in Youth Programs*

While these empowerment programs provide a powerful testament to young people’s potential as a positive force, these programs could not have taken place without first addressing critical issues from food and medical care, to reunification and reintegration. As such, the sequencing of programs is crucial to successful implementation. The term “sequencing” here refers to the same term used in discussions of how and when it is best to implement different reconstruction and nation-building programs, from security sector reform to building democratic institutions. In the same manner, the evidence from the cases suggests that sequencing may also be important for youth programming during reconstruction. For instance, in Kosovo, where humanitarian issues were solved relatively quickly and while NATO and UNHCR dealt with security issues and the refugee crisis, other agencies were able to move on to development programming and focus on aiding the emerging youth activist groups to develop into a successful network of youth organizations. In Mozambique, with the DDR program completed, groups like ProPaz and the Rebuilding Hope Foundation were able to use their resources to fill in any gaps of the program and provide an outlet for former youth soldiers to become active proponents.
for reconciliation and rebuilding. In these cases, it did not matter who was sponsoring
the program, but that each phase was successfully completed, and actors were able to
concentrate their resources on their own initiatives, rather than attempting to remedy
broken programs.

The importance of sequencing for youth programs during reconstruction
parallels some aspects of the research exploring the importance of sequencing in
establishing “rule of law” in democratic transitions.¹ The transition to democracy can
be a tumultuous process, and some scholars have argued that pushing the process
before the necessary institutions are in place can hamper the prospects for successful
democratization. For instance, the CSIS definition of post-conflict reconstruction
examined in Chapter 1 describes a model whereby the reconstruction process must
address four essential pillars: security and public safety, justice and reconciliation,
governance and participation, and economic and social progress.² The United Nations
Post-conflict Stabilization, Peace-building and Recovery Framework’s module for
DDR and Post-Conflict Reconstruction, on the other hand, outlines a progression of
events (including these four pillars) to facilitate the transition from conflict to peace.
According to this module, the process of reconstruction will cover four stages along a
continuum from Conflict and Humanitarian Relief, to Post-Conflict Stabilization,
Transition and Transformation, and Peace and Development.³ In reality, these four
stages may overlap or take place simultaneously, yet each stage represents a critical

¹ See Francis Fukuyama et al., "The Debate On "Sequencing"", " Journal of Democracy 18, no. 3
(2007).
² The Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) Project (Center for Strategic and International Studies,
http://www.un DDR.org/iddrs/framework.php

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progression in the reconstruction process towards achieving a peaceful and stable environment (see Figure 5.2 for a visual representation of this sequence). According to the United Nations module, during the conflict phase the UN can provide humanitarian relief and help to facilitate a ceasefire and peace treaty. During the Post-Conflict Stabilization phase, usually the first few months following a peace treaty, the UN and other coordinating parties begin implementing the agreements and assessing the situation in order to stabilize the level of violence. The Transition and Transformation phase should see the bulk of DDR programming, along with the establishment of a transitional authority and the implementation of other transition oriented programming such as the development of democratic procedures and institutions. Finally, during the Peace and Development phase, the DDR program should be largely complete, and the UN and other international actors can focus on poverty reduction or development strategies.

While in reality the phases may overlap, the evidence from the cases suggests that a strong sequencing is important for both reconstruction efforts and youth programming. I argue that in the same way that general reconstruction programs build upon each other, the different types of youth programs also follow a sequence, where the success of youth empowerment programming is dependent on first establishing an environment conducive to the process (see figure 5.2). Failing to satisfy one aspect of youth programming on the reconstruction continuum (e.g. reintegration) before moving on to another (e.g. empowerment), or providing inappropriate programming to fulfill the requirements of the particular phase, may hamper the overall progression of the reconstruction efforts. For instance, in comparison to the emergence of
successful youth empowerment programming in Kosovo, in the DRC, youth empowerment for peace building was unlikely to occur without a degree of success with the reintegration program. While thousands of soldiers in the DRC were demobilized, the process was still incomplete and most actors, including the UN mission and NGOS were focused on dealing with immediate humanitarian issues.

Figure 5.2
Sequencing in Post-conflict Reconstruction and Youth Programming

UN Post-Conflict Continuum

1. Conflict and Humanitarian relief
   - Provide humanitarian relief
   - Negotiate ceasefire and peace treaty
2. Post-conflict Stabilization
   - Begin to implement agreements
   - Assess situation on the ground, and begin peacekeeping mission
   - Begin initial DDR and other recovery programming
3. Transition and Recovery
   - Implement and complete the full-scale DDR, security sector reform, reconciliation, justice and other transition programs such as return and reintegration of refugees
   - Establish transitional authority
4. Peace and Development
   - DDR Program largely complete
   - Create a national plan for development
   - Attempt to realize normal relations with international actors

Youth Programming Sequence

1. Humanitarian relief
2. Youth and Child Advocacy
   - youth conflict relief and support programming
3. Youth DDR
   - Youth Reintegration – social and economic
   - Youth Participation Programs – political, social and economic
4. Youth empowerment programs
   - Capacity building, conflict resolution, ongoing political voice and integration into labor force

These parallels between the sequencing research for democratization and the evidence from youth programming also highlight the relationship between the youth demographic and rule of law in the progression from suppressing the negative potential of the youth demographic to mobilizing youth for positive community building. Just as the UN post-conflict reconstruction continuum highlights the need to establish safety and security before implementing transition or development programs, the initial programming for children and youth may be linked to the
establishment of rule of law, or quelling the negative potential of the youth demographic. The next types of youth programs in the sequence can then focus on more long term and development oriented goals of empowerment and youth capacity building.

The success of this progression is particularly apparent in Mozambique (see Figure 5.3 for a summary of the sequencing in the three cases). Just as the reconstruction program in Mozambique sought to establish rule of law and complete the DDR program before holding national elections, the policies towards youth sought to satisfy first immediate needs, then social reintegration and finally develop youth empowerment and conflict resolution programs allowing young adults to serve as leaders in the peace building process.

In Kosovo, the same sequence occurred, although in a much shorter time frame. Immediate needs were satisfied relatively quickly, and reconstruction actors began implementing youth reintegration and empowerment programming right away. However, the progress of the region has not kept up with the pace of youth development, as the slow progress of the economy and education systems continue to serve as a significant obstacle to future youth development. Where Mozambique and Kosovo each saw a degree of sequencing, the reconstruction process in the DRC tried to do most tasks simultaneously: elections were held before the DDR process was completed, and the country is still struggling with implementing reintegration programming. In regards to youth policy, instead of a progression from protection to sociopolitical and economic reintegration, the majority of youth programs in the DRC were driven by an advocacy and children’s protection framework and most young
people have yet to benefit from reintegration programming that could help them transition into civilian life.

As this evidence demonstrates, the effective fulfillment of critical transition functions is also dependent on the sequence in which they are implemented. Similar to the sequencing of the overarching program, the progress from youth humanitarian and protection programming, to reintegration and empowerment allows for each program to build upon the successes of the last in order to successfully realize the youth demographic’s positive potential during post-conflict reconstruction.

**Figure 5.3**
Sequencing of Reconstruction and Youth Programming in the Case Studies

**Mozambique**

1. Conflict and Humanitarian relief
   - Youth Policy: Humanitarian Relief

2. Post-Conflict Stabilization Reconstruction:
   - Implement ceasefire, begin DDR
   - Youth Policy: Post-conflict relief
   - Assess situation of child soldiers
   - Youth Policy: Former child-soldier advocacy

3. Transition and Recovery Reconstruction:
   - Implement full DDR and reintegration of refugees
   - Youth Policy: Religious leader’s involvement in reintegration of ex-combatants
   - ProPaz - Community reintegration workshops

4. Peace and Development Reconstruction:
   - National Election
   - Poverty Reduction Plans
   - Youth Policy: ProPaz, former combatants as community peace builders

**Kosovo**

1. Conflict and Humanitarian relief
   - Youth Policy: Humanitarian Relief

2. Post-Conflict Stabilization Reconstruction:
   - Disarmament, Demobilization of KLA
   - Reintegration of refugees and IDPs
   - Youth Policy: Post-conflict psychosocial relief
   - Empowerment programming and capacity building for youth in refugee camps

3. Transition and Recovery Reconstruction:
   - Kosovo remains international protectorate with the UN leading institutional reform agenda
   - Youth Policy: Education and Employment reform and support
   - Ongoing youth empowerment and capacity building, however losing momentum and funding

4. Peace and Development Reconstruction:
   - Kosovo declares independence
   - Youth Policy: Ongoing attempts to address youth unemployment and access to education
Potential Limits in Cross-Case Comparison

While in each of the cases the recovering country went through a number of similar processes that facilitate the cross-case comparison, there are also a number of differences that could potentially limit their comparability. Specifically, the differences in region, conflict causation, and categorization as post-conflict could all potentially alter the weight of comparative inferences. I will consider each of these concerns in turn and suggest that their limiting effect is more apparent than real.

- **Regional Differences and Level of International Involvement**

  As both Mozambique and the DRC are in sub-Saharan Africa, their geographic similarities coincide with similar histories of colonialism that allow for a relatively smooth comparison. Kosovo, however, stands out as the only European example in this study. Kosovo’s European location did influence the reconstruction
efforts. As a result, its experience during post-conflict reconstruction was much less similar to the process in either the DRC or Mozambique in a few key areas. First, compared to Mozambique or the DRC, Kosovo’s level of development before the conflict was significantly higher. Second, Kosovo’s position in Eastern Europe is largely responsible for attracting so much attention from the international community, and as a result the reconstruction process saw a higher level of involvement from foreign governments and regional security groups than the sub-Saharan African countries. I will consider each of these factors in turn.

First, Kosovo was further developed economically and politically before the conflict than either of the two sub-Saharan African countries. Indeed, while Kosovo was the one of the poorest regions in Serbia, compared to Mozambique and the DRC, the infrastructure was more developed and many Kosovars had more experience as civic administrators. However, the conflict in Kosovo and the NATO air campaign destroyed much of the physical infrastructure, and Kosovo was forced by the international administration to overhaul its political institutions, creating a situation more similar to those in Mozambique and the DRC. While Kosovo’s more advanced development may have made the process of reconstruction easier, this factor did not predetermine the level of success, as Kosovo does not represent the most stable case within the research design. A more comprehensive study may have been able to include a number of cases from Europe along with other regions. However, due to the limits of the study only three cases could be included.

Second, while Kosovo did benefit from the international attention in ways that could have aided the processes in the DRC and Mozambique, the international
involvement was not entirely a positive development. In fact, the overwhelming international presence indirectly damaged some of the existing community structures, where a lower level of involvement may have allowed for more local participation, as was the case in Mozambique. The research design is intended to allow for a comparison between high level of international involvement in Kosovo with the level of involvement in both the DRC and Mozambique. As such, while Kosovo’s location may have caused the high-level of international involvement, it is not the presence of the international community that the study is evaluating, but the effectiveness of its programs in one country relative to another.

In line with the hypothesis generating methodology outlined by Stephen Van Evera, Kosovo’s inclusion in the study broadens the scope of comparison and adds an important level of variation across the cases. Instead of limiting the study to issues prevalent in the sub-Saharan African context, the cross-regional comparison broadens the scope of inquiry, particularly in terms of the types of youth involvement. Where in Mozambique and the DRC, the issue of youth involvement centered around child and youth soldiers, the evidence of youth involvement in Kosovo is integral in order to include the full range of youth involvement. The similarities and differences between youth empowerment programming in Europe and sub-Saharan Africa highlight the types of needs that are important independent of culture or regional development.

The cross-regional comparison also provides variability in respect to the international involvement and NGO variables. Analyzing the impact of the high-

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4 See methodology discussion in Chapter I.
level yet short-term NGO involvement in Kosovo, with the NGO involvement in the
DRC and Mozambique highlights both the limits of the NGO role and the benefits of
local participation in international programming. In addition, while Kosovo was more
easily able to overcome the humanitarian crisis than either the DRC or Mozambique,
by comparing the success of youth empowerment programming in both Kosovo and
Mozambique, the conclusions about youth programming are not thereby restricted to
a European or “developed” context. Instead the relative ease with which the programs
were implemented in Kosovo as opposed to the DRC elicits inferences about the
differences in humanitarian as opposed to development programming in general.

• Conflict Causation

No one case of intrastate conflict is exactly alike, and the same is true of the
three cases presented in this study, as the nature of each conflict was somewhat
different. For instance, the conflicts in Mozambique and the DRC trace back to
movements of independence from colonial regimes, where the conflict in Kosovo is
linked to nationalist movements associated with certain ethnic groups. In addition, in
Mozambique the parties competing for control were generally politically and
regionally divided, whereas in the DRC and Kosovo the divisions fell along ethnic
and regional lines. As such, Kosovo represents an outlier in regards to colonial
experience influencing the conflict, and Mozambique is significantly different in
regards to the degree of ethnic tension.

While these issues constitute significant differences across the cases, the
struggles for power and territorial control ring true across the cases, and the positions
that the countries found themselves in following the conflicts are sufficiently similar to facilitate comparison. While the civil conflict in Kosovo does not trace back to colonial roots, its experiences under the control of both the Federation of Yugoslavia and Serbia exhibit a degree of similarity in how the international community exercised control in the arbitrary establishment of borders without regards for existing cultural, linguistic or ethnic boundaries. While the conflict in Mozambique was not ethnically divided, the strong convictions on both sides spurred a long and drawn-out civil war that was just as divisive and saw similar trends of arbitrary violence, terrorism and youth involvement. Therefore, where the lack of ethnic divisions may have made the reconciliation process easier, Mozambique had to overcome similar issues related to the reintegration of children and youth who had been active participants in a nationally-divisive and deadly war.

While the nature of conflict causation varies from cases to case, the differences do not prevent a comparison of the reconstruction phase, as similar actors were involved in implementing demobilization, reintegration, and institution and democracy building programs in all three cases.

- **Categorization as “Post-Conflict”**

  Finally, the ongoing violence in the DRC raises questions regarding its categorization as a nation experiencing post-conflict reconstruction as opposed to ongoing conflict. All three cases represent relatively recent conflicts, and in general, as reconstruction processes take decades to evolve, the first five to ten years after the signing of a ceasefire or peace treaty may represent only a blip in the history of the
conflict. However, these first years are also extremely critical and formative for the future development of the country.

As during these first years after signing the peace accord, parties in the DRC have volunteered for disarmament, begun the transition towards establishing a new government, and the international community has implemented a number of reconstruction programs, the DRC can be understood as a case of post-conflict reconstruction. These efforts fit into former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Gahli’s description of reconstruction (discussed in Chapter I.) which defines the process as “foster[ing] economic and social cooperation with the purpose of building confidence among previously warring parties, developing the social, political and economic infrastructure to prevent future violence, and laying the foundations for a durable peace.”

In essence, the international community recognizes the process of post-conflict reconstruction to encompass the post-accord peace building process, from the implementation of a United Nations mission, through to supporting the establishment of new national institutions and fostering continued economic and political development. While the reconstruction process in the DRC has not been successful to date, the ongoing instability is partly the effect of the ineffective reconstruction program. Therefore, while the future of the conflict may be uncertain, the efforts in the period following the General-Peace Agreement in 2003 can still be understood as post-conflict reconstruction.


\[^{6}\] For instance, this is the progression is understood in the United Nations Integrated Standards for DDR as previously discussed. "United Nations Integrated DDR Standards."
The inclusion of cases with different degrees of success in establishing peace and stability during the reconstruction phase is also critical for variation within the research design. As noted in Chapter I., the case studies were selected such that there were extreme variations across the dependent variable of stability. These variations facilitate the process of drawing hypotheses about the relationships between the youth demographic, reconstruction programming and the success of the peace building process. Because this study is limited in the number of cases it can include, only the DRC was chosen as the example of extreme instability. A research design that uses a greater number of cases to represent “stable” “medium” and “unstable” outcomes would undoubtedly provide greater insight into the observations this study makes, however, this was not possible in the confines of this study.

Because the conflicts in the DRC and Kosovo are so recent, and in the case of the DRC may be ongoing, discussions of the overarching success or failure of the entire reconstruction process may not be entirely conclusive. However observations and comparisons about how effective the peace building and reconstruction policies implemented in the first years after each conflict offer significant insight the efficacy of different actors and programs.

**Implications for Further Research**

This study seeks to contribute to our knowledge about youth in post-conflict reconstruction in two ways. First, on the surface, the study contributes to the developing field of research on youth roles in conflict by providing a cross-case analysis of post-conflict situations, where previous studies had been disjointed and
had not drawn extensive comparisons across cases. The common threads traced through the reconstruction periods in Mozambique, the DRC and Kosovo, that fulfilling certain functions is the lynchpin for successful youth policy, and that youth roles during reconstruction are malleable and dependant in part on other actors, carry a broad range of implications for future developments both in the field of youth empowerment and post-conflict reconstruction and nation building. The previous sections of this chapter addressed these issues.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, as Stephen Van Evera and Harry Eckstein outline in their guides to political science research, heuristic case studies provide the framework to explore linkages within and across cases, generate hypotheses and develop questions that will direct future research in the field. From this perspective, the value-added nature of this type of research derives at least as much from the successful generation of additional questions and avenues of research as from the realization of definitive conclusions. In this vein, the following section uses the analysis of international, domestic, NGO and cultural factors during the reconstruction period to draw connections to other areas of research in post-conflict reconstruction, and pose a number of potential questions that are critical for the ongoing understanding of effective peace building mechanisms and the dynamic role of youth affected by conflict.

*Designing efficient post-conflict reconstruction programs: If reintegration, education, income-generating activities and empowerment are the progression of critical tasks that need to be fulfilled for the youth demographic during post-conflict*
reconstruction, then a number of new questions about how to best and most effectively implement these activities arise. Since knowing what functions need to be fulfilled is the first step in successful reconstruction, actors can then evaluate the situation on the ground in order to design the best way to execute programs. As long as these programs meet certain requirements – successful disarmament, reintegration, education reform, etc – then it is not necessary that one type of actor implement these programs, but instead leaders must evaluate which actor can best fulfill certain needs, and choose the implementation mechanism that best fits the circumstances. The delegation of tasks can then depend on the capacities of international, non-governmental, and domestic organizations to operate in the host country, along with the cultural and environmental factors that may affect the process.

While this may seem like a common sense method for designing a post-conflict reconstruction program, and actors and scholars are likely to agree that assessing specific circumstances is an integral component of successful reconstruction and peace building, the actions of the international community indicate this understanding is not always realized in practice. In fact, recent scholarship has emphasized that that the success of a peacekeeping mission rests solely on the money and manpower associated with the mission embodies rather than the function emphasis identified in this study.7 Where, as in Kosovo, having international, regional and non-governmental organizations flock to the scene and implement a wide range of programming can be successful – it may not be necessary for effectively fulfilling the required tasks. In fact, the overwhelming presence of the

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7 See James Dobbins, The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq (RAND Corporation, 2005).
international community can threaten the progress. Instead, it may be possible that the
success of peacekeeping and reconstruction missions is dependent on the *efficiency*
with which the resources are used relative to the demands of the situation. As the
reconstruction efforts must (at least) match the needs of the particular environment,
being able to assess needs and level of efforts would help to further develop
reconstruction programs so that they are designed to provide a level of support that
contains a balance between sufficiently meetings the demands, without overwhelming
domestic structures.

My findings on the efficiency of reconstruction processes suggests several
additional avenues of research:

- *How important is effort relative to efficiency? What is the best measure of
  "effort" during reconstruction? Is effort the per capita spending? Per capita
  spending for targeted demographics? The ratio of peacekeepers to local
  citizens? Is effort, instead, reflective of the relative value that actors place on
  the country*

  The level of efforts varied widely across the cases, with the most money
dedicated to Congo, and the most political investment in Kosovo. Yet
Mozambique realized the greatest level of stability.

- *How long must high levels of efforts be supported in order to have the most
successful reconstruction program?*

  The issue of short-term verses long-term funding arose in each of the
cases, with varying levels of impact on the reconstruction program.
Particularly in Kosovo, the time frame of international involvement
affected the degree of success and potential long-term impact achieved
with youth related programming

- *Which actors are best or least suited at efficiently carrying out which tasks?*

  In the DRC, domestic actors were responsible for the DDR program where
in Mozambique the United Nations took on most of the responsibility.
While it is clear that the DDR program is the essential aspect, is there a
degree to which some actors (for instance an unstable government) is not
as capable at carrying out certain tasks?
• What features of the reconstruction process contribute to efficiency?

The evidence suggests that sequencing, cooperation, coordination and environmental obstacles may contribute to efficiency. However, the number of cases in this study limits the potential findings, and other case studies may provide additional insight into factors that contribute to efficiency.

• Is a reconstruction mission more effective when guided by a lead organizing body, or does an overarching organization mechanism hinder the process with bureaucratic delays?

The process in Mozambique was led predominantly by the United Nations, where in Kosovo the United Nations, NATO and a number of other regional organizations shared the responsibility. However, in both cases, local actors expressed disdain for how slowly the process took to implement, or how lead agencies disregarded local actors.

• What makes youth oriented programming most efficient? Are community-based programs more efficient in creating results for the young people than demographic specific programs?

In Mozambique, the community driven programs that did not target specific populations were especially effective where in the DRC the child-specific programs were the least effective. In Kosovo, the youth oriented initiatives had a number of implications for the community, rather than just the youth population.

Domestic Capacity: The ability of domestic actors to fulfill certain responsibilities during the reconstruction process is an integral factor in the situational assessment. Where in the DRC the national government took on a function that it did not have the capacity to manage effectively, in Kosovo the international community shut out capable local actors from involvement in the reconstruction process. In both cases, the mal-assessment of domestic capabilities had a detrimental effect on the overall process. Similar to the importance of youth participation in programming, the evidence suggests that, where possible, the participation of
domestic actors in the reconstruction process is particularly beneficial, as local actors become invested in the peace process, rather than experiencing the reforms as impositions from foreign actors. The assessment of how capable the domestic actors are is essential, where in Mozambique some local actors were capable of taking on the responsibility for overcoming barriers to reintegration, they were not necessarily capable of managing the entire DDR process. As such, the selection process for which mechanism to use in implementing the various functions may need to take into account the preference for domestic actors, where possible, but not rely on a fragile government for an overwhelming burden of the responsibility.

These observations about domestic policy suggest a number of potential research questions:

- **What factors are indicative of domestic capacity? Are they institutional? Cultural? Dependent on the nature of the conflict itself?**

  In the DRC domestic capacity was related to corruption in managing the DDR program, where in Kosovo domestic actors were ignored (for instance in education reforms) as international actors felt that ethnic tensions may preclude effective policy. In Mozambique capacity was related to traditional culture.

- **What are the most efficient ways to measure domestic capacity, and when should this assessment be made?**

  Had international actors better assessed domestic capacity, for instance in the DRC, the government may have not been given such control over the DDR process. However, how and when this assessment can be made is unclear, considering the time frame and stipulations (such as permission from the host country) for the United Nations to enter a country and take the lead on reconstruction efforts.

- **How do local understandings of youth affect the ability of domestic actors to contribute to successful youth policy and programming?**

  In Mozambique cultural understands of youth played a large role in the ability for local actors to facilitate the reintegration of former youth
soldiers. In the DRC, local attitudes towards human rights, or the so-called “culture of impunity” had the opposite effect, and also hindered the international and NGO operations. Yet to what extent do these cultural factors govern the process?

*Impact of Exogenous Factors:* Cultural and environmental factors must also calculate into the design of reconstruction programs, as they can exert significant influence over who might be best suited to take on various responsibilities. For instance, difficult terrain and lack of transportation infrastructure may make NGO operations much more difficult than for United Nations peacekeepers or military personnel.

Moreover, where foreign actors can intervene and construct a negative peace, using force to prevent further outbreaks of violence, a positive peace, where the citizens work together to reconcile a country after conflict, is dependent on how much domestic actors and citizens are invested in the process of reconstruction. If, as in Mozambique, the domestic culture is such that it lends itself to facilitating reintegration projects, then excluding these actors could be significantly detrimental to the legitimacy and long-term impact of the reconstruction process.

These understandings of cultural and environmental factors suggest a number of potential research questions:

- *To what extent can cultural or logistical factors mitigate or undermine the effectiveness of reconstruction efforts? What is the best way to measure or categorize these factors?*

Where the cultural factors helped the process in Mozambique, in the DRC they were a significant burden. Yet actors may not have been able to predict the impact of these factors without experience on the ground or an accurate situational assessment.
• Which actors are better able to operate in different cultural, environmental or logistical situations?

Where local actors played a large role in reintegration in Mozambique because of cultural understandings, in Kosovo international actors took on the bulk of education reform. Yet, because the education system is so intrinsically tied to national identities, the exclusion of the domestic community created a great degree of frustration. As such the different cultural environments influenced which type of actor may have been better fit to facilitate certain programs.

NGO Efficiency: As demonstrated, the effectiveness of the international community, from UN personnel to regional security forces and NGOs, is not necessarily a one-directional continuum where increased money and manpower automatically produces a more effective mission. Rather, the issue that international actors must address is meeting the demand for aid in an effective manner. In certain cases the need for aid may be markedly high, as in the DRC, and therefore require a high level of international involvement. However, particularly in the NGO community, the presence of too few or too many actors may be detrimental to the process. The question left unanswered by these cases studies, however, is how to calculate how much NGO effort is enough and what factors, such as cooperation and coordination, contribute to an effective reconstruction program.

The results of continued research on NGO activity may point to a need to reform the current methods of coordination. The toll that grant-seeking competition and the desire to stake claims on the humanitarian market share takes on the efficacy of the reconstruction process is quite evident in these cases. As discussed in Chapter I., while the NGO, non-profit and humanitarian community operates with the goal of helping others rather than seeking their own profits, in many ways because of funding structures, they are forced to act like profit-seekers in an economic market, which can
serve as a significant detriment. How the implications of NGO competition might be remedied is not easily deduced. It seems like the efficacy of NGO programming follows a pattern similar to the laws of diminishing marginal returns in economics. In the theory of diminishing marginal returns, each unit of increase in production inputs produces a corresponding but diminishing increase in output returns up to a point at which each increase in input may actually serve to decrease the overall productivity. Similarly, because of competition between organizations and the increasing demands for cooperation, there comes a point at which fewer NGOs operating in the same area will be more effective in fulfilling certain needs, and where a large number of NGOs may actually become detrimental to the overall process. This is especially clear in case of Kosovo, where organizations such as regional security groups, who were not as encumbered by competition, were just as able if not more adept at implementing the types of youth-oriented programs often reserved for non-governmental actors.

The findings related to NGO activity suggest a number of further questions:

- **What is the best measure of the level of NGO effort in comparison to the demands of the situation?**

  Similar to the levels of international effort, it is unclear as to whether NGO effort is best measured by per capita financing or personnel, or some other measurement.

- **What are the determinants for effective coordination? In what cases has the working relationship between NGOs and other actors (international, domestic, and other NGOs) been most or least effective and why?**

  Effective coordination among NGOs was important across all three of the cases. In Mozambique a relatively smaller number of NGOs were able to cooperate relatively efficiently, where in the DRC coordination was not as evident. However, it remains unclear which different factors, from the

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effect of the international managing body to environmental aspects, affect the level of effective coordination

- How can the NGO environment be reformed to avoid behavior, such as competition, that undermines the overall efficacy of the reconstruction process?

Competition for grants, particularly in Kosovo, was a significant detriment to the reconstruction process, whereas in Mozambique, competition was less evident as an obstacle to NGO performance. However, it is unclear what remedy might be used to avoid the detrimental effects of competition.

**Humanitarian vs. Development Programs**: In all three cases studies the distinctions between humanitarian and development programming, and short-term or transition verses long-term funding, had a distinct impact on the reconstruction process. The first few years immediately following the conflict in each of these cases were marked by emergency or transition efforts to resolve the immediate crisis situations, for instance facilitating the mass return of refugees and displaced persons, providing food, shelter and medicine to those in need, and demobilizing the various armed factions. Indeed, these issues require immediate attention, and the reconstruction process cannot progress without successfully addressing these problems. However, emergency and transition programming is by definition temporary. Where humanitarian programs attempt to alleviate crisis conditions, development programs attempt to create long-term solutions to problems whose success is measured over longer periods of time, and where the end goal reaches much further into the future than is calculated in emergency or transition efforts. The progression from a humanitarian to a development focus is particularly important in the context of post-conflict reconstruction as the requirements of successful reconstruction cover the spectrum from providing emergency relief, developing
transition institutions, and facilitating long-term development. As such, the evidence from the three cases also demonstrates how the concentration on short-term or emergency relief programs dictates the limits of the reconstruction process as a whole. For instance in the DRC as violence was ongoing and the DDR/DDRRR program, particularly for children, was forced to operate within an ad-hoc or emergency structure, the reconstruction actors were constantly faced with providing short term remedies for the humanitarian crisis, and were thus largely unable to adequately address larger issues essential for longer term development. In Mozambique, while the humanitarian efforts and transition initiatives were largely successful, the post-conflict reconstruction process largely stopped short of any kind of long-term development programming.

With the balance in international aid and resources largely favoring emergency relief over long-term development, a tension arises in the reconstruction process when a reliance on short-term financing dictates the mechanisms used to achieve long-term goals or visa-versa. For instance, while the quick resolution of humanitarian issues in Kosovo allowed funding to be directed to other initiatives, the demand for immediate results and drop in funding after the first few years stifled the potential for long-term results. This trend was particularly evident with both the

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9 The progression from humanitarian to development and empowerment programming in relation to the youth demographic sees a number of parallels with existing psychological paradigms for understanding personal development. Most notably, a comparison with Abraham Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs highlights why understanding the humanitarian development dichotomy is so important in designing programs to address youth needs. While Maslow’s hierarchy is not a definitive model of psychological development, the structure he uses is helpful in elucidating the requirements for successful youth empowerment. In Maslow’s theory, a person must satisfy certain ‘deficiency’ or basic needs (such as physiological needs, safety, and belonging) before they can seek to progress towards personal growth. In the same sense, humanitarian programming for youth must first meet basic needs such as food, shelter and family reunification, in order for development programming (in this context youth empowerment programming) to be successful. For more information see: Abraham H. Maslow, *The Farther Reaches of Human Nature, An Esalen Book*; (New York: Viking Press, 1971).
proliferation of youth centers in Kosovo and the attempts at education and curriculum reform, which were funding by transition initiatives and emergency donations, respectively. By 2004, neither of these programs was receiving a sufficient level funding after the first few years, and therefore the same level of efforts could not be sustained. As a result many of the youth centers, meant to be long lasting organizations, no longer operate and the continued progress of education reform remains in jeopardy.

These observations about humanitarian and development programs suggest a number of avenues for further research:

- **To what extent can short-term humanitarian aid hinder the process of achieving long-term goals?**

  In the DRC humanitarian aid has been cited as one potential factor in causing the conflict. In Kosovo, the short-term nature of funding has stifled the potential impact of the reconstruction program. However, the extent to which funding determines impact remains unclear.

- **How is the transition from emergency relief operations (and short term funding) to development oriented operations (and long term funding) best facilitated?**

  As the reconstruction process encompasses both humanitarian and development programming, the transition to long-term development may be relevant to the sequencing of general reconstruction and youth related programs. The question of funding, however, remains a significant obstacle.

- **Do there need to be more donors willing to offer grants for long term projects, or can the United Nations better facilitate the transition with its own programs for emergency relief, humanitarian efforts (UNOCH) and development (UNDP)?**

  For instance, in Mozambique the post-conflict reconstruction program delegated development issues at the end of the ONUMOZ mission to UNDP. In Kosovo, however, regional security groups are responsible for a significant part of the financing for ongoing development programs.
**Advocacy vs. Empowerment:** Just as the balance between humanitarian and development programming serves to define the overarching limits of the post-conflict reconstruction efforts, the division of approaches in youth programming between advocacy and sociopolitical empowerment campaigns also defines the extent to which youth oriented programming can influence the role of the youth demographic. Like other humanitarian programming, rights-based initiatives are necessary, but also limited by their own structure. Programs that utilize a rights-based structure in the post-conflict reconstruction process usually respond to the need for emergency protection and support, but do not go further to address long-term reintegration or empowerment needs. In addition, the international definition of “child” and “adult” limits who can receive such support and shapes the mechanisms through which advocacy programs are carried out. For instance, the goal of children’s rights protection tends to favor an adult dominated process where youth participation is not always an integral aspect. As such, rights-based and advocacy programming does not fully address the spectrum of needs required to both quell the potential destabilizing effects of a large youth demographic and also develop the potential for a positive youth role in the reconstruction process.

Where advocacy falls short, youth empowerment programming can be more effective in both capacities. Empowerment or sociopolitical programming not only provides youth with a constructive way to occupy their time, but it also provides participants with skills they can use well into the future. Many of the youth empowerment programs examined in this study also involved some type of community participation, and therefore allowed the programs to not only serve the
youth participants but also contribute to community development. Youth empowerment programming in Kosovo, for instance, was particularly successful in preventing the emergence of the youth demographic as a destabilizing force and instead channeling youth frustrations into productive organizations that provided concrete community benefits especially in the refugee camps.

Despite the successes of youth empowerment programming in both Kosovo and Mozambique, the situations seem to have cycled back to the youth bulge scenario outlined in the greed-grievance structure for conflict causation, where youth remain a potentially destabilizing factor. It appears that while the initial youth programming effectively prevented the potential for disruption, the structural issues that affect youth have yet to be resolved: in Kosovo the youth unemployment rate has yet to fall, access to higher education is still quite limited and ethnic tensions remain high. As such, the potential for youth frustrations to surface without these issues being addressed remains a significant issue. In Mozambique, empowerment programming was successful in promoting community reconciliation; however high poverty and unemployment rates also open the door for the youth demographic to re-emerge as a destabilizing factor. As a result, while both these cases provide evidence of the positive benefits of youth empowerment programming, the return in these cases to a potentially dangerous youth bulge scenario demonstrates that these efforts to address youth issues do not take place in an isolated forum, but are a small (yet, significant) factor in the greater reconstruction context. While successful youth programming can affect the reconstruction process, preventing youth from turning to violence and also harnessing youth energies for positive community development, the impact of the
programs is in turn affected by the general trajectory of the post-conflict environment and the larger issues that remain from the war.

The struggle to address the youth demographic’s potential dual role also parallels the tension between creating a positive or negative peace. Where negative peace building establishes the absence of violence, a positive peace is much harder to achieve, and requires that parties resolve the underlying issues that fueled the conflict. Similarly, while the steps taken to prevent young people from emerging as a destabilizing factor serve to avert potential disruption of the reconstruction process, such policies do not necessary solve the causal reasons for why youth might turn to destructive or destabilizing behavior, as has been the case thus far in Kosovo. While there is little evidence that suggests that achieving an overarching positive peace after conflict is a realistic goal, the current situation in Kosovo suggests that achieving the equivalent “negative peace” with the youth demographic in the short-term, without finding solutions to issues like youth unemployment and access to education, may not be enough.

The observations about the balance between advocacy and empowerment suggest a number of important questions for future research:

- *How can the legal gaps that limit the advocacy structure be bridged in order to include the young adult and adolescent demographic?*

  Particularly in the cases involving the demobilization of child soldiers, the international legal definitions created divisions that did not necessarily enhance the reconstruction efforts.

- *What are the limits of youth empowerment programming, and how can reconstruction actors reshape programs to prevent a recycling to the “greed-grievance” or “youth bulge” structure?*
The long-term implications of empowerment programming in Kosovo remain to be seen. However, in Mozambique it seems evident that youth peace building may only go so far, when couched within greater structures of poverty and development.

- How do the parallels between advocacy and empowerment, and negative verses positive peace affect the sequence for youth oriented programming and the potential youth roles in reconstruction?

The sequencing for youth programming outlined in the previous section may relate to the transition from positive to negative peace. This potential connection carries a number of implications for understanding youth roles.

*Youth Agency vs. Manipulation:* In addition to dynamic relationship between youth programming and broader reconstruction efforts, the degree to which youth and youth programming affect the post-conflict environment requires an examination of youth roles, both as active social and political agents and subjects of manipulation by elite actors. The line between agency and manipulation is not absolutely distinct: because the conflict is a product of elites struggling for power, the role that youth play will necessarily depend on the existing structures of the conflict, and in the cases examined there is a stronger demonstration of youth being manipulated by elites to perpetuate conflict. For example, the youth involvement in destabilizing the DRC is evidence of the dangerous potential of the youth demographic, but does not necessarily fit the definition of youth “spoiling” the peace. Whereas a spoiler has agency in the situation, actively seeking to prevent a peaceful resolution, in the DRC children and youth were manipulated by elites seeking to spoil the peace. In general these young men were part of a larger structure of violence that was not youth driven.

Part of the reason for this evidence may lie in the selection of cases, as the issue of child solders is the dominant factor in two of the three cases. Specifically, in
the DRC, the absence of youth agency in perpetuating the instability may be linked to
the comparatively young youth population. Not only does the DRC have a high
proportion of youth, but nearly half of the population is under the age of 15. While
such young children were frequent participants in armed groups, it is much less likely
that they would be able to exert significant agency in the situation. In these cases
child soldiers represented a threat to the stability of the process because they were
particularly vulnerable to recruitment. As such, their destabilizing potential is in their
capacity to be manipulated as a resource for elite actors.

The evidence from the cases, however, is not limited to instances of youth
manipulated into contributing to conflict. In the DRC there are a number of instances
of youth agency in perpetuating violence, such as with the youth recruitment gangs
loyal to General Laurent Nkunda and the OPEC boys who dominated the black
market for oil between DRC and Uganda. In Kosovo, youth took on a number of
different roles that exhibited a significant degree of agency – for instance in student
protests and riots, youth networking and political involvement. As such, while the
data from these cases does not provide a conclusive demonstration that the youth
agency during post-conflict reconstruction parallels the type of role that an elite or
adult “spoiler” plays, the evidence does suggest that this potential may exist in other
cases and that there is a degree to which a large youth population has agency as both
a significant destabilizing and peace building force. Further research on youth
participation in conflict and post-conflict reconstruction may be able to clarify this
distinction between youth agency and youth manipulation in regards to their role in
conflict causation and post-conflict reconstruction.
Additional analysis of this relationship might reveal, as the evidence from the three cases appears to suggest, that when youth emerge as a significant destabilizing factor they are more often manipulated or acting within the larger structural context of the existing conflict, for instance by serving as child or youth soldiers. Because participation in the ongoing violence may require less agency on the part of the youth demographic, it may be more likely that the youth population is susceptible to becoming a negative factor for stability, as suggested by Collier, Hoeffler and Zakaria.\textsuperscript{10} On the other hand, playing a positive role in peace building process seems to require a greater degree of agency, as exemplified by the youth-led movements in the refugee camps and student movements for independence in Kosovo. However, because exerting a positive influence may require more agency, it is may also be more difficult to achieve.

This distinction between agency and manipulation helps to explain why current scholars have described the youth role as predominantly negative and may be one of the reasons why empowerment programming is not always seen to be successful or given as much attention by international donors. It is also not as easy to evaluate the success of a youth empowerment program, as these programs do not necessarily produce direct results, and the skills that participants develop are relevant for their participation in society throughout their lifetime, and not necessarily just in their adolescent and young adult years. In fact, the long term goal of youth empowerment, leadership and development programming is to help to facilitate the transition from youth to adulthood so that children and youth affected by conflict can

become productive members of their society in the future. Tracking the success of the program, similar to tracking the success of education, requires follow-up with participants in the years after the program has concluded. This is not only problematic in assessing the overall impact of the programs, but it also represents a significant obstacle to attracting donors, who often require that organizations clearly demonstrate mechanisms for evaluating the impact of the program.

The findings on the differences between manipulation and advocacy suggest a number of avenues for future research:

- **To what degree does geography and culture affect the nature – manipulated agent or active agent – of the youth role? Do differences relate to relative economic development? Cultural understandings of youth? Methods of warfare?**

  It seems that in Kosovo youth initially took more of an initiative for participating in peace building processes, although youth in Mozambique did also take an active and positive role. Because there is little explanation for this observation offered within a policy context, there may be some other explanation within the cultural or economic environment.

- **To what extent do youth exhibit agency before as opposed to after a conflict? What factors contribute to the different levels of activity and why?**

  The majority of literature on youth focuses on youth and conflict causation. However, as there appears to be a significant difference between youth manipulation and agency in the post-conflict context, there may be a similar relationship in terms of conflict causation.

- **What is the best way to measure the long-term impact of empowerment programming on youth’s future participation in society? Tracking individual participants? Examining generational trends?**

  The long-term impact of empowerment programming in Kosovo and Mozambique has yet to be explored. However, the process to go about understanding the cross-generational impact may be particularly difficult, and requires a longer period of time to study. (Northern Ireland may be a potential case the where cross-generational impact can be studied)
Gender: Finally, one factor that has been present across all three cases but not discussed at length is the role of gender and sexual violence and its effects on the youth population and reconstruction process. Particularly in the DRC and Kosovo, sexual violence has become extremely prevalent. In the DRC it is used as a weapon of war, as perpetrators terrorize villages and sexually assault the women and girls who serve in armed groups. In Kosovo, sexual trafficking has become a serious danger for young Kosovar women. It is not immediately clear how sexual violence as a tool for waging war, particularly rape and forced marriage, affects the behavior of the youth demographic in a post-conflict context, but as a significant characteristic of the conflict, it cannot be discounted. As a number of scholars have discussed the importance of women as agents of peace building, 11 there is a possibility that gender motivated violence serves as a significant obstacle to the peace building processes as a method of physically and psychologically removing women from a position of exerting independent influence. In regards to the youth demographic, sexual violence may disrupt the normal familial structures and methods of community learning that contribute to the positive growth of young women. Young women subjected to sexual violence at a young age are not only psychologically and physically affected, but in many areas, including the DRC and Kosovo, their communities shun them because of cultural stigmas. This not only makes young women more vulnerable, but also disrupts their normal course of development and transition from childhood and

adolescence to adulthood. While it is clear that girls and young women are distinctly affected by conflict, the programs for children and youth often do not provide adequate gender specific support. In fact, in both cases of demobilization of child soldiers, while girls and young women were estimated to represent up to 40% of child soldiers, they were largely left out of the reintegration process. The girls and young women that were included in the DDR programs may not received the specific tools and support they need to successfully transition back to civilian life. For example, the kits that former child soldiers receive upon demobilization are often not gender specific, leaving out sanitary items or other necessities that young women may need. While the implications of sexual violence and the unequal treatment of genders within the reconstruction process are relatively unclear from the evidence provided in this study, further investigation of the connection between women as important agents for peace and sexual violence as a deliberate tool for destabilization could reveal important findings for the field of youth development and post-conflict reconstruction.

There are a number of questions regarding gender that could serve to guide future understandings of the relationship between gender and youth roles in conflict:

- To what extent is gender motivated violence and sexual terrorism an instrument rather than symptom of modern civil war? What does the subordination and humiliation of women mean for the potential for peace?

Parties seeking to perpetuate the instability in the DRC deliberately use sexual violence. In Kosovo, sexual violence was also evident during the conflict, but the rising trend of sexual trafficking appears to be more of a symptom of the current situation. In Mozambique, where reconstruction has been relatively successful, sexual violence played a much less evident role as a part of the conflict.
• How does sexual violence disrupt the normal mother-daughter or familial structures and to what extent does this affect the process of national reconstruction and peace building? Are there any trends in how active young women who have been victims of sexual violence are during the reconstruction period as opposed to other young women and young men?

As women have been cited as important agents in the peace building process, sexual violence against young women may alter their personal understandings of conflict or desires to contribute to destabilizing or peace building efforts.

• To what extent do cultural norms regarding sexual assault determine the possibilities for successful reintegration and what types of programs have been most effective in aiding victims of sexual assault – advocacy or empowerment?

In both Kosovo and DRC, scholars have noted a cultural stigma towards young women who have been raped or sexually assaulted. In Mozambique, however, this discussion was largely absent from the analysis of youth roles in conflict.

Conclusion

The dominant scholarship on youth and conflict depicts youth as a cause of conflict such that a large proportion of youth are assumed to constitute a one-dimensional destabilizing force. From this perspective, a large youth population during post-conflict reconstruction would then be expected to exert the same negative influence. However, recent scholarship has begun to examine the possibilities that youth exhibit a more dynamic role, acting as both positive and negative agents. In line with this understanding, the evidence from the cases studies of Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Kosovo reveal that youth have the potential to act as both a constructive and destabilizing force during the post-conflict reconstruction process. This study further demonstrates how the actions of other agents in reconstruction process affect whether the youth demographic tends to exhibit
destabilizing or peace building behavior. As such, while the youth demographic is just one cog in the greater reconstruction machine, how well the international community and domestic leaders address youth issues can have a significant impact on the level of stability during the reconstruction process and the success of the peace building mission. The analysis of international, domestic and NGO policy across all three cases provides evidence for the hypothesis that the fulfillment of certain key tasks in relation to youth needs is the most crucial factor for a successful youth policy and the realization of youth potential during the reconstruction period. While certain actors may be more capable of fulfilling these functions, what matters is that each is fulfilled effectively.

The cross-case comparisons also elucidate a number of important parallels between youth issues in reconstruction and other ongoing debates in current peace research, such as the strategies for successful nation building, the limits of humanitarian and development programming, and the importance of efficiency in peace building mechanisms. The observations about the relationship between the roles of youth in post-conflict reconstruction and these greater reconstruction mechanisms in turn point to a number of key gaps in information and questions to be pursued that can guide the direction of future research in the field.

The dynamic role of youth during post-conflict reconstruction suggests that long-term youth empowerment programming has the capability to both reduce the youth demographic’s destabilizing potential, and also train the next generation in
methods of peace and conflict resolution. Just as the post-conflict reconstruction phase is a significant transition for a nation, the young adults living through this period constitute the transition generation. As a result, the fulfillment of certain critical youth functions during the reconstruction era is necessary, first, as a measure to help stabilize the nation during the transition period. Perhaps more importantly, successfully and effectively fulfilling these transition functions is also critical to future development. The way in which young people who experienced the horrors of war experience the peace making process, from undergoing a demobilization and reintegration program to participating in conflict resolution workshops or simply observing the process, will shape their conceptions about peace, community and their role as citizens. As these young men and women become the next generation of adults leading the country, their experiences may influence the nation’s trajectory on the transition from war to peace.
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