Pacifists at War:
The German Green Party’s Special Convention on the Kosovo War

by

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Introduction

On May 24, 1999, NATO governments carried out the alliance’s threat to bomb Yugoslavia. The bombing campaign was conceived as an act of coercive diplomacy to secure Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic’s consent to the Rambouillet Accords, a settlement proposed by NATO to the ongoing conflict in Kosovo that pitted the Serbian Army and paramilitaries against the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) and the majority Albanian population of the region. In a speech on the day the bombings began, President Clinton cited three goals: “to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s purpose so that the Serbian leaders understand the imperative of reversing course, [to] deter an even bloodier offensive against innocent civilians in Kosovo, and if necessary to seriously damage the Serb military’s capacity to harm the people of Kosovo.”¹

The bombings continued for days, then weeks, then months, stymieing expectations by western leaders that Milosevic would quickly capitulate.² NATO had not prepared for a long war: when operations began, the alliance had only 350 planes within range of Serbia, a force only adequate for a short operation, and a US aircraft carrier had been removed from the Adriatic in mid-March.³ Worse yet, although the war was presented to western publics by political leaders as serving humanitarian purposes, once the bombings were underway Serbian forces began carrying out a massive campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, expelling hundreds of thousands of

² Ibid.
³ Ibid., 104
ethnic Albanians, who became internally displaced or else hovelled in refugee camps in neighboring countries. Not only did the bombing of targets in the Yugoslavian regions of Vojvodina, Serbia, and Kosovo fail to produce a quick diplomatic solution to the conflict in Kosovo, the military intervention was at best helpless to prevent the expulsions of Kosovar Albanians, and at worst furnished a pretext for them. As the bombings wore on through April and May 1999, NATO would have to scramble to reorient its goals and strategies.

When the bombings began, the German Green party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, or Alliance 90/the Greens, to give it its official name) had been governing Germany for almost half a year as the junior partner to the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in what was known as the Red-Green coalition. Stemming from the vibrant alternative social movements of the 70s and 80s in Germany, the Greens were a party of pacifists, at least by tradition and reputation. The belief that all uses of military force in the international arena were illegitimate and immoral had been reaffirmed in the party’s 1998 election program: “We reject military peace enforcement and fighting deployments. [Militärische Friedenserzungung und Kampfeinsätze lehnen wir ab.]” Yet just before entering government in the Fall of 1998, the majority of Green MPs had voted to authorize NATO’s threat to use force against Yugoslavia. What is more, after the failure of the Rambouillet negotiations in Spring 1999, Germany’s Green

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5 In their account based on interviews with high-level military and political officials from several NATO governments, Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institute comment: “Remarkably, some officials appear to have ignored the basic fact that NATO airpower would simply not be physically able to stop Milosevic’s onslaught against the Kosovars.” Ibid., 106, 116.
foreign minister Joschka Fischer was an important advocate of military action as the last resort for pressuring the Yugoslavian head of state into allowing international forces to enter Kosovo. How did the pacifist Greens, of all people, become direct political agents of Germany’s first war since Hitler?

This thesis will answer that question by laying out the historical development of the party from 1980 to 1999, with special attention to changes in the Greens’ approaches to pacifism as a foreign policy. However, that chronology only sets the stage for addressing a more central problem: why did the Greens, at their May 13, 1999 special convention in Bielefeld devoted to debating the Kosovo war, pass a resolution expressing no fundamental opposition to the NATO bombings of Yugoslavia, although Greens of virtually all factional stripes described NATO’s air war as a failure, and none defended its accomplishments so far or prospects for success? No one at the convention could claim that the NATO bombing campaign had already contributed to protecting Albanians in Kosovo from persecution; furthermore, no one made the case that the bombings themselves were likely to accomplish the goal of stopping human rights abuses or of enabling the return of refugees. Given those facts, why did the majority of the convention delegates pass a resolution calling for a temporary stop to the bombings, but not opposing the military strategy more fundamentally?

Previous attempts to explain the Bielefeld convention prove helpful but not satisfactory in addressing this problem. Appreciating and critiquing in detail the secondary literature on the Bielefeld convention will have to wait until the second half of chapter two, once the run-up to
secondary literature on the Bielefeld convention will have to wait until the second half of chapter two, once the run-up to and the structure of the event have been thoroughly laid out. Still, the secondary literature’s general thrust can be summed up even at this early stage. Writers who mention Bielefeld have tended to explain the convention’s result by suggesting that for various reasons, the debate which took place there was something less, or other, than a serious moral debate about the permissibility of using military force to achieve humanitarian objectives, either in general or in the case of Kosovo specifically. The Greens’ preoccupation with details rather than fundamental principles, or their overriding desire to avoid jeopardizing their coalition government with the SPD, or the strategic obfuscations and triangulation by advocates of the two major petitions at the convention, tended to mute or supervene any direct moral debate on a question of war and peace. These types of conclusions might seem able to address the incongruity noted above between the outcome of the convention and the expressed attitudes of its participants. If the Greens’ negative assessment of the bombings did not translate into an unequivocal condemnation of them, it might be tempting to explain that discrepancy by reference to the conclusion in the secondary literature that the Bielefeld debate lacked direct engagement concerning moral principles and their application to the case in question,

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but was controlled instead by some other impulse like performing political damage control, trying to stay in power, or getting sidetracked by the equivocal language of the major petitions presented.

However, the conclusion that the Bielefeld special convention was not primarily a debate on the morality of a war has no solid foundation. If the scholarly and popular literature on Bielefeld thus far has failed to detect a moral debate at the convention, that is not because no such debate occurred, but rather because writers on the convention have drawn hasty conclusions from too narrow a base of evidence. None have elaborated the full range of opinion and argumentation at the convention; instead, each grants consideration to only a few speeches or proposed resolutions at most, usually ones by party elites. Arguments from the majority of the conventions’ delegates, the party’s grass-roots members and activists, have unfortunately been neglected. As a result, research on Bielefeld to date has not been sufficiently inclusive and attentive even to notice the existence of the problem posed above, much less to address it adequately. Having an ear primarily for a few of the most amplified voices at the convention, writers in the secondary literature have been oblivious to the apparent incongruity between the Greens’ low rating of the bombings’ achievements and their failure to oppose them unequivocally.

The main purpose of this thesis is to present and analyze the content and circumstances of the Bielefeld debate more thoroughly. Sources drawn upon in that effort included the convention’s minutes, the texts of all twelve petitions put before

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the delegates, and the nearly ten hour video recording of the proceedings at Bielefeld held by *Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis*, the Green party’s official archive in Berlin.\(^{12}\) This authoritative audiovisual record of the convention, apparently never before referenced in the secondary literature, relates the contributions of the more than fifty delegates and party officials who spoke in the debate, as well as the impact of protesters, reporters, and others who made their presences felt without rising to the podium. I have also relied on the recently-published memoir by Joschka Fischer, a Green party leader and the former Foreign Minister of Germany, who relates the story of Bielefeld and his activities during the Kosovo war.\(^{13}\) The published reflections of several other Bielefeld participants and of participants in the diplomacy surrounding the Kosovo war have also been consulted. These sources have been supplemented by press and scholarly accounts of the convention, which report on factors I otherwise could never have learned about from west of the Atlantic. This base of sources permits a detailed account of the Bielefeld convention and a more adequate explanation of its result.

An expansive treatment of the Bielefeld convention is required in order to do justice to the complexity of this unusual event. Appreciating its significance requires viewing the convention from four perspectives: first, Bielefeld was one of a long series of internal factional clashes on foreign policy ideology that have dogged and vitalized the Greens since the inception of the party, from its pacifist activism in the 1980s against nuclear missiles, military institutions, and the commission of violence by states, through its internal polemics during the 1990s on German participation in

\(^{12}\) “Bundesdelegiertenkonferenz Bielefeld 13.05.09,” Collection: Video/Film, object number: 150, *Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis*, Berlin, Germany, DVD, 5 vols., (hereafter cited as DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention).

\(^{13}\) Joschka Fischer, *Die rot-grünen Jahre* (Köln: Kiepheuer & Witsch, 2007).
Taking stock of this history, albeit summarily, is crucial for understanding the factions and tactics in play at Bielefeld, as well as the charged nature of concepts like pacifism and human rights owing to the burden of German history. This historical context will be reviewed in the first two sections of chapter one.

Second, the convention’s role in the domestic politics of German and international diplomacy in NATO must be appreciated: the convention was an event of perceived and actual significance to the fortunes of the shaky Red-Green coalition in Germany; moreover, the prospect and result of the convention seem to have figured into the calculations and actions of NATO leaders. The last section of chapter one argues that the convention cast a shadow on the NATO summit in Washington on April 23-25, 1999, making open planning for a ground invasion of Yugoslavia impossible at that meeting.

Third, with the historical, political and international contexts established, the Bielefeld convention must still be understood as a chaotic human interaction in which contingencies played a role. Chapter two will zero in on the events of May, 13, 1999 as the day unfolded for the Greens: stressfully, with high emotion, and under the marked and perhaps even decisive influence of haphazard factors like street protestors, media attention, peculiarities of the vote-counting procedures, and even confusion about the evening train schedule. On the basis of that account, chapter two goes on to discuss and critique in detail the interpretations of the convention that have already accumulated in the secondary literature.
Fourth, beyond its precedents and circumstances, the content of the debate merits a close examination. It will be seen that notwithstanding external influences and strident rhetoric from all sides, the convention was still a serious intellectual and moral debate, though not one which fits into the pat formula of pacifism and non-violence versus protecting human rights by military means. Chapter three analyzes the twelve petitions presented to delegates, noting their positions on moral questions of non-violent action and the promotion of human rights, as well as the representations of the Kosovo war and its history that were invoked to sustain them. Further, speeches by the party officials and delegates revealed the Greens’ disagreements over the desirable relationship between grass-roots and elites in the party, thus shedding light on how the Greens understood the transition from an opposition to a governing party.

Finally, chapter four assembles the findings of the foregoing chapters into an answer to the central question pursued in this thesis: at Bielefeld, what held the Greens back from disassociating themselves from what they considered such a dubious war?
Chapter 1

The German Greens from Protesting to Governing

This chapter lays out the historical background for the close analysis of the May 13, 1999 Bielefeld convention that will occupy the rest of this thesis. Its three sections have the following purposes: (1) to provide an overview of the German Green party’s history during the 80s, its first decade of existence, (2) to give an account of the party’s changing stance on pacifism and military interventions during the 1990s, and (3) to describe the machinations of German coalition politics and international diplomacy leading up to the Bielefeld convention.

The Greens’ First Decade

The German Green party was founded in 1980 as an alternative to conventional politics. Influenced by western Marxism and fearful of an impending ecological catastrophe, the founders wished to give a political face to the diverse grass-roots social movements circulating in West Germany.14 In West Germany in 1979 as many as 50,000 grass-roots citizen initiatives [Bürgerinitiativen] were organizing around environmental and social issues, and the total number of people active in these organizations rivaled the combined membership of the three established political parties, the social democrats (SPD), Christian democrats

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(CDU/CSU), and liberal free democrats (FDP). The Green party drew strength from and publicized the demands of those involved in such unconventional forms of political participation. The political scientist Horst Mewes sums up the idealism of the first Green Party program of March 1980: it envisioned a “pacifist, environmentally compatible welfare state, with totally emancipated self-governing green republics existing autonomously in a pacified world of international mutual assistance and political harmony.” Campaigning on this heady ideology, the Greens won 5.6% of the vote and 27 seats in federal parliament in the March 1983 election. On their first day in parliament, the iconoclastic Greens wore tennis shoes and jeans in parliament and brought along potted plants for their desks to make a statement on the dreary aesthetic of conventional politics. In the 1987 federal election they won 8.3% of the popular vote, showing that their success was not a one-time fluke. The Greens added a lasting new dimension of idealism and opposition to the politics of the Federal Republic.

During their first decade, the relative merits of social protests versus parliamentary work were hotly disputed among the Greens. A 1984 essay by Petra Kelly, one of the party’s leading lights, described the Greens as representing a fundamentally different kind of politics, as an “anti-party party,” which was “half

\[\text{\textsuperscript{15}}\text{Ibid., 31.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{16}}\text{Ibid., 36.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{17}}\text{Ibid., 29.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{18}}\text{Andre S. Markovits and Philip S. Gorski, }\textit{The German Left: Red, Green, and Beyond} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 275.\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{19}}\text{Mewes, }\textit{A Brief History of the German Green Party}, 41.\]
party and half local action group.” Protest and parliamentary tactics were advocated by different factions within the party. The *Fundis*, or fundamentalists, (who also tended to be more thorough-going in their critique of industrial society and the environmental catastrophe they believed it was causing) favored mass organizing and direct action to achieve radical social change, while the *Realos*, or realists, preferred to seek incremental change through parliament. The tension between factions favoring radical agitation, on the one hand, and reformist legislation, on the other, was reflected and reinforced by the party’s organizational structure. Unlike other parties, the Greens implemented a rule known as the separation of office and mandate, which forbid holders of parliamentary office on the state or federal levels from serving simultaneously on the federal executive committee or on the party’s other steering bodies; nor could the party’s official leaders serve in parliament. During the mid- to late-80s, the federal executive committee was a *Fundis* stronghold, while *Realos* tended to control the state and federal-level parliamentary delegations. *Fundis* like Jutta Ditfurth feared compromising the Greens’ long-range aims by making compromises with other parties and hence becoming part of the political system, while *Realos* such as Joschka Fischer and Hubert Kleinart believed the Greens would make no progress toward their goals unless they struck alliances with other parties. Although the Greens’ public image has often been one of almost constant internal strife and impending schism, the factions always understood that

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they needed each other: the 5% hurdle in German election law meant that neither would have a voice in the Bundestag without the collaboration of the other.23 In 1988, Antje Vollmer and 13 other Green members of parliament (MPs) founded a new centrist initiative called Aufbruch ’88 (New Beginning ’88) in an attempt to attenuate the flagrant animosity between Realos and Fundis in the party.24 This center faction had a stabilizing influence.25

Whatever their disagreements on tactics, the Greens generally shared a radically egalitarian bent which placed them far to the left of the other parties in West German politics, according to the political scientist Thomas Poguntke.26 Poguntke argues that with their anarchist-influenced utopian vision of “decentralized, autonomous models of economic and societal organizations,” the Greens won public esteem for espousing principles from “the normative canon of German politics: openness, extension of participatory rights, grass-roots democracy, financial honesty, amateur politics; basically all these points relate to an idealized vision of democracy,” and were regarded as having “a high degree of legitimacy by the broad public.”27

Non-violence was a basic value associated with the Greens since their founding, and pacifism has always been a publicly-perceived as well as self-asserted Green position. Pacifism had a special poignancy for Germans of the 1968 generation, who grew up in the wake of World War II, denounced their elders for complacency toward or complicity in the atrocities of Nazi Germany, and, living

24 Markovits and Gorski, *The German Left: Red, Green, and Beyond*, 228.
25 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
beneath the shadows of two superpowers, dreaded the Sword of Damocles of a nuclear war. To the Greens, pacifism was both a central lesson from German history as well as the only hope for the survival of life on Earth. In this vein, the Green Party’s first program, drafted in 1980, declared, “ecological foreign policy is non-violent foreign policy.”\(^{28}\) The program emphasized the extraordinary dangers posed by nuclear weapons:

> With the introduction of atomic weapons systems, war has reached a fully new dimension: through the possibility of destroying the entire Earth many times over, it [war] has become the pure murder of peoples and a crime against life generally [überhaupt]. Peace politics is directed against all forms of aggression, of militarism internal and external, of the arms race and the armament madness [Rüstungswahn], and orients itself toward the peaceful and united cohabitation of humans.\(^{29}\)

The Greens contributed during the 1980s to a broad-based peace movement throughout Western Europe which opposed NATO’s plans to station mid-range atomic missiles in Germany. For the Greens, as the German political scientist Joachim Raschke remarks, this campaign crystallized around criticism of NATO and the USA as the parties “responsible for the next round of escalation.”\(^{30}\) Aside from unilateral steps of disarmament, Raschke summarizes, the foreign policy advocacy of the German Greens included “exiting NATO, dissolution of the German army, stopping all exports of armaments, and the conversion of the armaments industry

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\(^{29}\) Ibid.

\(^{30}\) Joachim Raschke, *Die Grünen: Wie sie wurden, was sie sind* (Köln: Bund-Verlag GmbH, 1993), 114-5.
toward civil products.”31 In their 1980 program, the Greens proposed “social
defense,” a non-violent approach to national defense according to which
society in the Federal Republic should be organized and reoriented (in
the direction of civil courage, resistance, and alternative decentralized
structures), so that to an aggressive foreign power it would already be
clear that an attempt at occupation and subjugation would cause it
more difficulties and burdens than it would bring increase in power
and profit.32

This notion of decentralized, non-violent civil disobedience as a form of national
defense shows the great lengths to which the Greens went in embracing the
implications of a commitment to non-violence.

Yet the absolute rejection of all forms of violence was never quite a consensus
position within the party. During the 1980s, views differed on whether protesters who
were attacked by the police had the right to fight back violently: the Realos were
more likely than the Fundis to condemn such violent action, whereas Fundis tended
to regard it as legitimate self-defense.33 Thus, it could be argued that the Realos were
closer than the Fundis to absolute pacifism during the 80s, but the disagreement
probably had less to do with a difference in the factions’ commitment to pacifism
than with their differing attitudes toward the state.34 The Fundis tended not to accept
a state monopoly on force as legitimate, and valued maintaining strong alliances with
protest movements outside of party politics, whereas the Realos prioritized working
respectably inside parliament.35 Nevertheless, the controversy over protesters’ violent
self-defense against police during the 80s shows that pacifism was not an absolute or

31 Raschke, Die Grünen, 115.
33 Poguntke, Alternative Politics, 105.
34 Ibid., 104-5.
35 Ibid., 105.
unanimous position among the Greens then; in fact, pacifism was not even necessarily associated more closely with the party’s most radical factions. The Fundis of the 80s and the Realos of the 90s each tended to refrain from absolute pacifism, condoning violence when used by the agent of social change each faction preferred (direct action and parliament, respectively). By the end of the 1990s, once the Greens had joined their first federal coalition, it would be the Realos who more readily endorsed violent action, this time by NATO, an alliance of governments.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the reunification of Germany took the Greens, more than any other West German political party, by surprise.\(^{36}\) The Greens, who had criticized the repressiveness but accepted the existence of East Germany (the GDR), were intensely leery of German reunification because it seemed reminiscent of the nationalist expansion and aggression in German history.\(^{37}\) Prior to the fall of the Berlin wall, the Fundis (who had been ascendant in the party since the 1987 collapse of the Red-Green coalition in the state of Hesse) had already suffered from financial scandals, and lost favor at the Duisburg party conference in March 1989 due partially to the prospect for a Red-Green political alliance in Berlin.\(^{38}\) With their control of the federal executive committee lost and their party veering towards reformism, influential Fundis such as Rainer Trampert and Thomas Eberman, would soon abandon the Green party.\(^{39}\)

\(^{36}\) Raschke, *Die Grünen*, 115.


In the midst of the reunification election campaign of 1989 and 1990, the Greens perceived the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait through the lens of their apprehensions about the emergence of a unified, powerful Germany. Conventional wisdom since the 1970s had held the deployment of German forces to areas outside NATO states unconstitutional. Hence Germany did not contribute combat troops to the alliance, but participated in its trade embargo against Iraq, deployed 18 Alpha Jets and 200 soldiers to defend a Turkish base in January of 1991, and contributed 17 million DM of financial support to the international alliance. The mid-January anti-war demonstrations in 120 German cities with perhaps 250,000 participants were the peace movement’s greatest show of strength since the early 1980s. In a resolution passed at the end of August 1990, the federal Green parliamentary delegation not only opposed a deployment to Iraq, but rejected future military interventions by the German army even when mandated by the UN. However, the Greens’ opposition to the first Gulf war did not rest on their moral norm of non-violence so much as on their deep unease with what they perceived to be the remilitarization of German foreign policy. Joschka Fischer warned that the dispatch of German troops to Turkey was a “step towards a militarily-supported geopolitics [Schritt hin zu einer militärisch unterfütterten Geopolitik].” The Greens held mixed opinions on sending armaments to Israel after Iraqi missiles struck Tel Aviv and Haifa in January 1991.

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41 Ibid., 51.
42 Ibid., 50, 51, 52.
43 Ibid., 52.
44 Ibid., 53.
45 Ibid., 55.
46 Ibid., 54.
The members’ assembly of the Hesse state Green party rejected a resolution which would have supported the supply of missiles to Israel, while the Bremen state party narrowly passed a similar resolution.\textsuperscript{47} Hans-Christian Ströbele, then speaker for the federal executive committee, unleashed controversy when he was quoted as calling the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories “fundamentally a similar injustice to the occupation of Kuwait.”\textsuperscript{48} He resigned his position as speaker, although Steffen Schmuck-Soldan argues that Ströbele’s position was widely shared by the party’s core supporters.\textsuperscript{49}

The west German Green party won only 4.8% of support in the federal parliamentary elections of December 2, 1990, falling below the 5% threshold and thus losing all the seats in parliament it had formerly held (although the newly-organized East German Greens won 8 seats).\textsuperscript{50} The disastrous 1990 election had a lasting impact on the party. A wave of Fundis abandoned the party, while the remaining Greens reoriented themselves to the new political climate.\textsuperscript{51} At the Neumünster conference in April 1991, several key programmatic and organizational changes were approved: a merger with the east German Green party and with the civil rights group Bündnis 90 (Alliance 90) would take place before the next federal election in 1994, the size of the federal executive committee would be reduced from 12 to 9 members, and term limits for Green MPs were eliminated.\textsuperscript{52} However, the separation of office and mandate, a

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 58-9.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 59.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 61.
\textsuperscript{50} Markovits and Gorski, \textit{The German Left: Red, Green, and Beyond}, 233.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 232.
\textsuperscript{52} Poguntke, \textit{Alternative Politics}, 104; Schmuck-Soldan, “Der Pazifismus bei Bündnis 90/Die Grünen,” 61, 63.
rule which forbade the party leaders from serving in government and *vice versa*, remained in place.\(^{53}\) The *Fundis* leader, Jutta Ditfurth, abandoned the party in protest after the Neumünster conference, her faction having been defeated by a new alliance of *Realos*, centrists, and non-aligned Greens who held sway thereafter.\(^{54}\) The departure of *Fundis* from the party strengthened the moderate leftists lead by Ludger Volmer, as well as the *Realo* wing led by Fritz Kuhn and Joschka Fischer. The moderate leftists and *Realos* together agreed on pursuing reformist rather than protest tactics, and set sights not only on reentering parliament, but on one day governing Germany.\(^{55}\)

After the West German Greens’ merger with the East German Greens and with Alliance 90 in 1993, the new party was rechristened Alliance 90/the Greens. A document called the *Grundkonsens*, or fundamental consensus, outlined the common premises of the merging parties. Drafted by Ludger Volmer and Hans-Jürgen Fischbeck, the fundamental consensus emphasized human rights more prominently than previous Green programs had, calling them “indivisible, equally valuable [*gleichwertig*] and universal.\(^{56}\)” The party’s 1993 basic program [*Grundsatzprogramm*] also declared non-violence “a fundamental principle of our political ethic,” and stated in a passage often cited later by leftist Greens, “We aspire to a comprehensive disarmament and demilitarization of society and reject war as a

\(^{53}\) Schmuck-Soldan, “Der Pazifismus bei Bündnis 90/Die Grünen,” 63.

\(^{54}\) Ibid., 63; Poguntke, *Alternative Politics*; 104.

\(^{55}\) Schmuck-Soldan, “Der Pazifismus bei Bündnis 90/Die Grünen,” 64.

\(^{56}\) Ibid., 92.
means of solving conflicts.”57 The sentence preceding that one shows that pacifism was still closely linked with the dangers of nuclear weapons: “Military force – armed above all with highly technological weapons of mass destruction – presents a general threat. War and threats of war with such weapons is the worst illegitimate violence.”58 Thus, Alliance 90/the Greens inherited from the previous decade the west German Green party’s views on pacifism and non-violence, which had been fashioned in a context of preoccupation with the threat of nuclear war. For the rest of the 90s, members of the newly unified party Alliance 90/the Greens would argue over how to apply these normative positions on foreign policy to new crises in the 1990s, notably the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

Debating Military Interventions During the 90s

A decade of wars, successions, and strife in Yugoslavia got underway in June 1991 as the republics of Slovenia and Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia.59 Sympathizing with the Croatian nationalists, the German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher urged the EU nations to extend diplomatic recognition to Croatia, a move the French and British governments considered unwise.60 Meanwhile, US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance negotiated for the UN peace-keeping force UNPROFOR to be dispatched to Croatia and for plebiscites on

58 Ibid.
60 Ibid., 637.
independence to be introduced in the remaining republics of Yugoslavia. Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence on March 5, after which fighting intensified between ethnic Serbs and Bosnian Muslims, with atrocities by Serbs drawing international condemnation. The UN Security Council approved sanctions against Yugoslavia in July 1992. In spring 1993, the efforts of the British negotiators Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen to fashion a peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina were rejected in a referendum to the Bosnian Serb people. As the fighting escalated, UN safe areas established inside Bosnia-Herzegovina came under threat, and the German Greens, among others, faced the question of how they could be secured.

Some Greens found the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina to exemplify the tension between, on the one hand, the basic value of human rights, which implied protecting the UN Safe Areas, and on the other, the basic value of pacifism, which prohibited interference by force. In its 1993 meetings, the Green party’s States’ Council [Länderrat], the sovereign policy-setting body of the party between conventions, where each state has equal representation, took a shifting position on German military deployments to Bosnia-Herzegovina. At their March meeting in Frankfurt (prior to the fusion with the Greens from East Germany), the council passed a general declaration endorsing non-violence as a principle of foreign policy, a statement likely to have been left vague in order to avoid damaging internal

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61 Ibid., 638.
65 Volmer, Die Grünen und die Aussenpolitik, 500-1.
controversy in view of the upcoming Hesse state election. On March 21, 1993, after that election, the States’ Council held a special meeting in Hannover devoted to the topic of Yugoslavia. Again the Greens forewent a thorough debate, this time to preserve unity on foreign policy questions for the sake of appearances on the upcoming occasion of their fusion with Alliance 90 and the East German Greens.

The States Council passed two complementary resolutions, the first supported by the leftists calling for the civilizing of international politics, precluding deployments outside of NATO countries’ territories, and advocating the gradual deconstruction and dissolution of the German army. The second specifically addressed Yugoslavia, rejecting military intervention as premature and inappropriate, but asserting that atrocities there gave reason to be skeptical of pure pacifism.

After reconstituting themselves as Alliance 90/the Greens, elites in the party debated military interventions more openly. The first meeting to evidence that change, and to show the influence of newly-incorporated members from the former East Germany, was the ten hour debate on military deployments at the States’ Council conference of June 12, 1993. The prevailing resolution made a distinction between general approval for the use of military force (which it ruled out) and approval in specific cases of humanitarian interventions within a UN framework (which it held

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67 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
must be possible). Specifically, the resolution advocated deploying UN Blue Helmet peacekeeping troops to safeguard Bosnia-Herzegovina, and advocated military protection for humanitarian convoys bringing provisions into the conflict area. The resolution passed by a margin of 20 votes to 10, although the section on the defense of humanitarian convoys was an amendment to the resolution which passed by a slim margin of 16 to 14.

Three primary groups supported the States Council resolution: feminists such as Eva Quistorp, who drew attention to the mass rapes of women in the Bosnia conflict, Realos such as Ralf Fücks and Graefe zu Baringdorf, and third, representatives from the newly-incorporated East German states such as Gerd Poppe and Vera Wollenberger. In the States Council, Greens from the former East Germany had disproportionate influence, since each State was represented by an equal number of votes in that body. Critics of the resolution included the leftist Jürgen Trittin (future federal Minister for the environment) who considered it “opening the door for the fundamental legitimation of war as a means of Green politics,” as well as the leftist Bärbel Höhn, who noted that the resolution assigned a role to the German army, which the Greens supposedly wanted to abolish. The decision in the June 1993 States’ Council was portrayed in the press as representing

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73 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 14, 1993, “Militäreinsatz in Bosnien befürwortet.”  
74 Volmer, Die Grünen und die Aussenpolitik, 504.  
76 Ibid.  
77 Ibid.  
78 Ibid.
“a turn away from the previous pacifist principle of the west German Greens.”

Future declarations by the Greens would show that judgment to be premature. Nevertheless, according to the Green leftist leader Ludger Volmer (who eventually took a job in the foreign ministry under Fischer and supported his position on Kosovo) this portrayal of the Greens as struggling with incomplete success to shake off their pacifism “determined the public image of the party on foreign policy questions from then on.”

The immediate effect of the 1993 States Council resolution was to instigate and publicize the Greens’ controversy over military interventions in Bosnia. In retrospect, it highlights the almost immediate success of the east German Greens, once they were incorporated into the party, in promoting the view that human rights should be protected by force if necessary.

With the debate over military interventions begun, three groups with fairly distinct views on the topic congealed: the Realos, the political pacifists, and the radical pacifists. During the mid-90s, Realos such as Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Joschka Fischer pressed the party to consider supporting military interventions for humanitarian purposes. The political pacifists, such as Ludger Volmer and Jürgen Trittin, were quite skeptical of military interventions, though they sometimes identified types of peacekeeping deployments which their commitments to non-violence and anti-militarism did not prompt them to oppose. Many in the political pacifist camp came around to something much closer to the Realo position by the late 90s. The radical pacifists like Hans-Christian Ströbele and Ulrich Cremer were the

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79 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 14, 1993, “Militäreinsatz in Bosnien befürwortet.”
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid., 507.
most deeply and categorically skeptical of legitimating military action, and revised their views little over the next six years. The advocacy of military intervention by the Realos, as well as the disagreements on that subject among leftist Greens (a label which includes both the radical and political pacifists) shaped the evolution of Green pacifism during the mid-90s.

Briefly laying out the organization of the leftist faction can illuminate the discussion of military interventions subsequent to the June 1993 session of the States Council. The Babelsberg Circle was the main organized forum for Green leftists after the merger of Alliance 90/the Greens. The Circle formed in April of 1993 at a meeting in Potsdam-Babelsberg attended by sixty to seventy Green leftists who wanted more active discussion among themselves and with the Realos, rather than the static truce that had characterized inter-factional relations since the Neumünster conference of April 1991.82 The Babelsberg Circle embraced a spectrum of Green leftists who understood themselves as demanding radical reforms, but without fundamental opposition to the established political system.83 Members were deeply divided on military interventions, an issue which was to destroy the circle six years later at its May 12, 1999 meeting the night before the Bielefeld convention, as will be discussed in detail below. Reporting on information obtained from an interview with Ludger Volmer, the sociologist Makoto Nishida relates that

In contrast to the radical pacifists, who demanded without substitution the abolition of the German army and NATO, and also ruled out the deployment of UN-Blue Helmets in Bosnia, the majority in the Babelsberg Circle nevertheless was for the deployment of UN Blue-Helmets in Bosnia. At the same time the Blue-Helmets were not to be

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83 Ibid., 211-2.
employed by the German army, but rather specially trained and made available by the Foreign Ministry, until there was a standing multinational unit under the direct mandate of the UN Secretary General.84

The distinction between deployment of the German army versus peacekeeping troops maintained by the foreign ministry was an attempt by political pacifists to square a traditional Green position with what they perceived as the new demands of the time. While leaders of the Realo wing pulled their party toward countenancing military interventions, they also experienced some disagreement among themselves. In his recently-published memoir, Joschka Fischer recalls first hearing the argument for military intervention in the Balkans at a 25th anniversary reunion and discussion in Frankfurt in 1993 among veterans of the protest generation of 1968.85 Daniel Cohn-Bendit, his comrade from more militant days, spoke in advocacy of sending German soldiers to Bosnia.86 Fischer recalls feeling an inner conflict swelling up, a conflict between what he took to be the two essential lessons from the Nazi phase of German history: nie wieder Krieg (never again war), and nie wieder Volkermord, nie wieder Auschwitz (never again genocide, never again Auschwitz).87 In the next six years he would fight out this conflict for himself, giving priority to the second imperative, and in so doing play a large role in defining his party’s controversies over foreign policy, and its eventual exercise of foreign policy at the end of the decade.88

The Bonn special convention on the Balkan Wars on October 9, 1993 was the first direct ideological engagement between the full spectrum of views among both

84 Ibid., 214.
85 Joschka Fischer, Die rot-grünen Jahre, 211-2.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
Green party leaders as well as the party’s grass-roots activists. Provoked by the resolution passed in the States’ Council four months earlier, leftists mobilized their supporters for the Bonn convention.\textsuperscript{89} Of the 11 proposed resolutions introduced, three from the radical pacifists and four from the \textit{Realos} were defeated, receiving more “no” than “yes” votes in the first round of voting.\textsuperscript{90} One of the petitions defeated in the first round, sponsored by Daniel Cohn-Bendit, warned against the Muslim population of Bosnia being murdered or driven away by Bosnian Serb paramilitaries, compared the situation there to the Warsaw ghetto, and, invoking his own Jewish background, admonished the assembly not to line up in “a tradition of appeasement that lead to the destruction of the Jews.”\textsuperscript{91} Cohn-Bendit’s petition stated,

\begin{quote}
We, Alliance 90/the Greens, affirm the policy of active interference by the international community of states in this war [in Bosnia-Herzegovina]. Also the use of military means of compulsion [\textit{Zwangsmittel}] for rescuing of the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural Bosnia-Herzegovina can no longer be categorically rejected within a civil conflict strategy.\textsuperscript{92}
\end{quote}

In contrast to this analysis of Serbian expansionist nationalism as the culprit for the Bosnia conflict, most of the Greens, according to Volmer, emphasized that the nationalist ideology only became virulent as a result of bleak economic prospects in the region.\textsuperscript{93}

In the second round of voting at the Bonn special convention, two petitions attained a majority: one of them advocated by Ludger Volmer and the political pacifists, which approved the deployment of Blue Helmet peace keepers to Bosnia,

\textsuperscript{89} Schmuck-Soldan, “Der Pazifismus bei Bündnis 90/Die Grünen,” 100.
\textsuperscript{90} Volmer, \textit{Die Grünen und die Aussenpolitik}, 505-6.
\textsuperscript{91} Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 11 October 1993.
\textsuperscript{93} Volmer, \textit{Die Grünen und die Aussenpolitik}, 470.
and the other a radical pacifist petition from leftists of North Rhine Westphalia, including Bärbel Höhn, Roland Appel, and Ernst-Christoph Stolper.\textsuperscript{94} Volmer’s petition acknowledged that “against fascism appeals to humanitarian values do not help, neither does the call to respect human life help against genocide. Here there must be hard, effective, consequential, but not military action.”\textsuperscript{95} Instead of military means of coercion, Volmer’s petition suggested the use of economic pressures and soft power:

[T]rade embargoes, the suspension of monetary transactions, the canceling of currency convertibility, the confiscation of foreign wealth, the electronic destruction of communication networks, sabotage, and blockades. Radio and TV stations in foreign countries should counteract the nationalistic propaganda.\textsuperscript{96}

If these economic pressures proved insufficient, “as a secondary instrument, civil peacekeeping UN units should help deescalate and mediate conflicts,” but “peace-making deployments [friedensschaffende Einsätze] were not accepted” under the political pacifist position, recalls Volmer.\textsuperscript{97} The radical pacifists accepted the economic instruments, but considered UN units to fall under the category of military deployments which they rejected.\textsuperscript{98} Nonetheless the two strains of pacifism set aside their differences to make common cause against the Realos: before the final round, Volmer compromised on alterations to his petition that would win radical pacifist support so as to pass it by as large a margin as possible.\textsuperscript{99} Thus, the pacifist

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{94} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{95} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{96} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{97} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{98} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{99} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
resolution prevailed by a large majority, winning some support from Realos too according to Volmer.\textsuperscript{100}

At the time of the Bonn convention, Fischer, who was serving as Environmental Minister of Hesse, cast one of the 46 votes against the final resolution (though he also rejected Cohn-Bendit’s position at the time).\textsuperscript{101} He recalls trying to negotiate with the left-wing majority to secure a provision for military intervention in case of an impending genocide.\textsuperscript{102} Without that addition, Fischer explained in his memoir, he could not support the winning resolution, but also had “big problems” with the position of the advocates of military intervention surrounding Daniel Cohn-Bendit.\textsuperscript{103} The Bonn conference, the Greens’ first special convention on a war in the Balkans, is an important reference point for studying their special convention at Bielefeld on May 13, 1999, concerning a different Balkan war. Aside from the much greater support at Bielefeld for Fischer and Cohn-Bendit’s views, another glaring difference was the realignment of factions: at Bonn the political pacifists made concessions to the radical pacifists to ensure defeating the Realos by a wide margin; at Bielefeld, as will be seen below, many prominent political pacifists would speak in support of Fischer.

The year 1994 brought a spate of local, state, and federal elections in Germany, as well as a race for the EU parliament.\textsuperscript{104} In these elections, German

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{101} Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 11 October 1993.
\textsuperscript{102} Fischer, \textit{Die rot-grünen Jahre}, 213.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{104} Schmuck-Soldan, “Der Pazifismus bei Bündnis 90/Die Grünen,” 105.
voters focused more on domestic than international issues. The Greens attempted to appeal to moderate voters outside of their traditional constituency, while also positioning themselves as attractive coalition partners in case the outcome of the federal election warranted a Red-Green coalition. Preparing an election program for the EU parliament election at the Aachen party convention in November 1993, the Greens took a position on military deployments to Bosnia that conformed to the outcome of their recent debate at Bonn. At their Mannheim convention in February 1994 for ratifying a federal election program, the party’s position on NATO elicited more controversy: a Realo petition from Krista Sager, Marianne Birthler, Werner Schulz and others would have relaxed the party’s criticism of NATO, but was rejected by a clear majority of delegates. The election program declared the party “obligated to non-violence and the enforcement of human rights” and rejected participation by the German army in peacekeeping deployments by the UN.

In July 1994, a ruling by the German constitutional court established the constitutionality of deployments of the German army in NATO-mandated peacekeeping missions. According to the ruling, the legality of such deployments would not require a constitutional amendment (as had widely been thought), but rather the approval of the German parliament on a case-by-case basis. This ruling displaced the widespread assumption that sending the German army outside the

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105 Ibid., 105-6.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid., 109.
109 Ibid., 110.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid., 112.
112 Ibid., 113.
boundaries of the NATO alliance was unconstitutional. Thus, it removed one basis for opposing German participation in military interventions. Reaction to the rulings by the Greens was muted due to their wish to avoid rehearsing their party’s critiques of NATO during an election year, which would not have been likely to play well with the moderate voters they were courting. In the federal election, the Greens won a respectable 7.3% of the vote and regained 49 seats in parliament, where they now formed the third largest party behind the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Social Democrats (SPD). Joschka Fischer was elected spokesperson of the Green parliamentary delegation, with the leftist Kerstin Müller serving as secondary spokesperson. Upon reentry into parliament, the Green parliamentary delegation became once again a Realo stronghold, as it had been during the 1980s. Nonetheless, support for military intervention in Bosnia was by no means a prevalent opinion even among the Reals. Of the Green federal delegation, roughly a third opposed the government’s bill proposing a German presence in the NATO fast intervention troops [schnelle Eingreiftruppe] in Bosnia to protect UN peacekeepers there; half the Greens approved the German army providing only humanitarian and logistical support, and the remainder argued German troops should have license to defend themselves with weapons. After a compromise negotiated between Joschka Fischer and Ludger Volmer, the Green MPs voted against the government’s

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113 Ibid., 114.
114 Ibid., 116.
115 Ibid., 117, 116.
116 Ibid., 117.
117 Ibid., 117.
118 Ibid., 119-120.
resolution approving German participation in the NATO force, while the Greens promoted a measure urging greater humanitarian contributions by Germany.\footnote{Ibid., 120-121.}

A sea change in attitudes towards military interventions among the Greens was set off by reports in July 1995 of a massacre in Srebrenica by Serb paramilitaries against Bosnian Muslims. On July 30, Fischer grabbed the Greens’ and the media’s attention by publishing an open letter (of which he had offered but failed to work out a joint draft with Jürgen Trittin) in favor of sending military protection to the international safe areas in Sarajevo, though Fischer stopped short of calling for German participation in that mission.\footnote{Fischer, \textit{Die rot-grünen Jahre}, 215.} Steffen Schmuck-Soldan argues that in addition to sincere conviction, another of the letter’s motivations was “Fischer’s long-term efforts to make the party attractive to voting districts \textit{[Wählerkreise]} in the political middle.”\footnote{Schmuck-Soldan, “Der Pazifismus bei Bündnis 90/Die Grünen,” 126.} Fischer argued that the Greens faced the choice either to advocate the military defense of the UN safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or else to call for the UN’s withdrawal from that region, and for arming the Bosnian Muslims instead.\footnote{Fischer, \textit{Die rot-grünen Jahre}, 215-6; Schmuck-Soldan, “Der Pazifismus bei Bündnis 90/Die Grünen,” 123.} Nonetheless, citing atrocities by the German army against Serbians in World War II, Fischer ruled out a German contribution to any armed international forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina.\footnote{Nishida, \textit{Strömungen in den Grünen (1980-2003)}, 106.} Although this qualification may have stemmed at the time from sincere conviction, Fischer later explained that he ruled out German participation for “tactical reasons,” noting the risk of fracturing his party.\footnote{Fischer, \textit{Die rot-grünen Jahre}, 215-6.} In an
August 1995 interview with the *taz* newspaper, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, addressed Fischer’s reluctance to support German participation, predicting “If Fischer is foreign Minister one day, he won’t be able to retain that attitude.” Cohn-Bendit would turn out to be right.

Fischer’s letter was widely read and discussed among Greens and in the media, eliciting responses both in rebuttal and in agreement during the run-up to the December 1995 convention in Bremen. A group of prominent Green leftists in federal government positions, among them Klaus Müller, Claudia Roth, Jürgen Trittin, and Ludger Volmer, wrote a public response to Fischer outlining several counter-arguments, recounted by Volmer. They claimed that the Nazi invasion of Yugoslavia and repression of Serbia made German support of another episode of anti-Serb military interference in the Balkans impossible. In any case, they asserted, the German constitution prohibited participation in such a deployment, which would pose an unacceptable risk of escalating the conflict. They held that non-military means had not failed, but rather had not yet been consistently applied. Moreover, the escalation of an ongoing conflict into a campaign of genocide could only be established after the fact, meaning that Fischer’s advocacy of interference beforehand to prevent genocide was meaningless. The critics of Fischer’s letter asked why Fischer did not also demand a military intervention to protect Grozny from Russian

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127 Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Aussenpolitik*, 516.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
bombardment, or to protect Kabul from takeover by radical Islamists: from these examples they concluded that calls for military intervention were no more effective at resolving such conflicts than was the pacifist stance.\footnote{132} They suggested that American strategy had consented to the Serbian takeover of Srebrenica (without foreseeing that an atrocity would ensue) as a part of an exchange of territory, meaning the western powers could not act credibly as defenders of Srebrenica.\footnote{133} Finally, regarding Fischer’s comparison of military intervention in Bosnia to the allied liberation of Europe from the Nazis, the critics rebuffed that analogy since it seemed to them to justify a land invasion of Yugoslavia and the occupation of Belgrade.\footnote{134} It is remarkable that this set of arguments was produced by Greens who four years later held posts in a German government waging a war in the Balkans. Over the next four years it seems they revised their opinions as events arose, especially since waging war in the Balkans would become a condition of getting and keeping the political power their party would shortly attain.

In his open response to the critics of his letter, Fischer rejected their distinction between peacekeeping \textit{[friedenserhaltend]} and peace-making \textit{[friedensschaffend]} methods.\footnote{135} In considering a peacekeeping company a kind of military unit, he agreed with the radical pacifists and disagreed with Volmer’s position that NATO Blue Helmet units were a non-military peacekeeping force. In so doing, according to Volmer, Fischer sharpened the radical pacifist’s suspicion that approving Blue Helmet peacekeepers opened the door for an unqualified

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{132} Ibid.
\item \footnote{133} Ibid.
\item \footnote{134} Ibid.
\item \footnote{135} Volmer, \textit{Die Grünen und die Aussenpolitik}, 516-7.
\end{itemize}}
acquiescence to military measures. Furthermore, Fischer called Volmer deluded to believe that in a coalition with the Greens, the SPD would implement the political pacifists’ approach to foreign policy. Fischer too would prove to be right.

In Fall 1995, after the conclusion of the Dayton peace accords which ended the Bosnian civil war, the NATO force known as IFOR—to which Germany contributed fighter planes and 4,000 infantry—was sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina to enforce the peace agreement and oversee reconstruction and other projects. The German parliamentary vote on that deployment in December 1995 forced Green MPs to take a stand on this case of using the German military as an instrument of foreign policy, and potentially to underline its disagreement with the Green party federal executive committee, which had voted in late November to oppose the IFOR deployment. At the Green party convention in Bremen on December 1-3, 1995, shortly before the parliamentary vote on IFOR, three petitions were presented regarding military deployments: from the political pacifists around Ludger Volmer, from the radical pacifists around Ulrich Cremer, and from the Realos sponsored by Joschka Fischer, Krista Sager, Hubert Kleinart, and others. After the Realo petition (which favored IFOR) failed to pass the first round of voting—winning 37% of total votes cast—the political and radical pacifists again reached a compromise to amend Volmer’s petition so as to gain the radical pacifists’ support in the final round.

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136 Ibid.
137 Fischer, *Die rot-grünen Jahre*, 218.
139 Ibid., 132.
141 Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Aussenpolitik*, 520.
Volmer’s modified petition won by a margin of 3:1.\textsuperscript{142} That petition rejected the German army’s participation in NATO-mandated missions as a general matter and called on the Green MPs to vote against the German military’s participation in IFOR, but endorsed participation in unarmed peacekeeping missions.\textsuperscript{143}

Although the \textit{Realo} petition had failed, Fischer and others hailed the 37% support it received in the first round as a success compared to the overwhelming rejection of the interventionist position two years earlier at the Bonn special convention.\textsuperscript{144} The press interpreted the level of support for the \textit{Realo} petition to indicate a major sea change in Green opinion. However, according to Volmer’s account of the convention, in the first round each delegate could vote for any number and combination of the four petitions presented.\textsuperscript{145} As a result of that procedure, the total number of votes cast exceeded the number of delegates present by 40\%.\textsuperscript{146} Thus, although the \textit{Realo} petition received 37\% of total \textit{votes} in the first round, that figure exaggerated the portion of \textit{delegates} supporting it.\textsuperscript{147} Volmer believes the quarter of delegates who opposed his petition in the final round more accurately represented the level of support for military interventions among the Greens than does the 37\% of first-round votes favoring the \textit{Realo} petition.\textsuperscript{148} Still, even after that correction, the support of 25\% of the convention for military intervention was a watershed event.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid.  \\
\textsuperscript{143} Schmuck-Soldan, “Der Pazifismus bei Bündnis 90/Die Grünen,” 133-4.  \\
\textsuperscript{145} Volmer, \textit{Die Grünen und die Aussenpolitik}, 520.  \\
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid.  \\
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.  \\
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
Greens’ own reactions to the atrocities in the Bosnia conflict, increased some delegates’ willingness to consider military force legitimate.

Yet the support among Green MPs for German participation in a NATO-led armed peacekeeping force still far exceeded approval for such a mission among the party’s grass-roots supporters, as the parliamentary vote on IFOR showed. After a long debate in an internal meeting of their delegation, the Green MPs voted 26 to 22 to support the government’s proposal of sending 4,000 German troops on the NATO mission. Nevertheless, at the official vote in parliament, 22 Greens voted for the proposal, 22 voted against, and 5 abstained: in this manner the Green MPs tried to avoid flagrantly defying the directive of their party at the recent Bremen convention to vote against IFOR.

The next test of the Green federal MPs’ views on military deployments would come in December 1996 with the parliamentary vote on replacing the elapsed IFOR mission with a new NATO force called SFOR. During the intervening year, Green MPs and other leaders such as Joschka Fischer, Kerstin Müller, Winfried Nachtwei, Achim Schmillen, Werner Schulz, and Jürgen Trittin had traveled to Bosnia-Herzegovina to visit sites of bloodshed in the recent Bosnian war. According to Steffen Schmuck-Soldan’s report on interviews he conducted with Nachtwei and Schmillen, serious and lengthy discussions among the Greens during this trip strengthened support among them for the Realo position that protecting human rights, rather than adhering to a norm of non-violence, which was the paramount goal for

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150 Ibid., 134.
151 Ibid., 138.
Green foreign policy in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{152} Kerstin Müller especially testified to having her previous position of rejecting the use of force altered significantly, though not immediately, by the trip.\textsuperscript{153}

There was little discussion of SFOR at the November 1996 Green party convention in Suhl, though that convention took place just before the parliamentary vote on participation in that mission; the federal executive committee was concerned to maintain party unity and orchestrated the defeat of a petition calling for a debate on the Balkans, aided in that effort by a transportation problem which prevented a portion of the delegates from being present.\textsuperscript{154} With little debate, the convention passed a petition which called for IFOR troops to be replaced by a UN mission, but also stated that until that replacement could be affected, in order to avoid a security vacuum Germany should participate in the NATO force to take over from IFOR.\textsuperscript{155}

Thus, Suhl was the first Green convention to express \textit{de facto} support for German troops being deployed under a NATO mandate to a location outside the territories of countries in the alliance.

When it came time to vote in parliament, due to the lack of any provision for the UN to take over from NATO the responsibility of peacekeeping in Bosnia, 25 Green MPs voted against the SFOR bill, 16 abstained, and only two supported it.\textsuperscript{156} Although apparently signifying that the Green delegation opposed SFOR, this vote actually proved that the political pacifists no longer took a stand on principle against

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., 138-9.  
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid., 139.  
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., 142.  
\textsuperscript{155} Volmer, \textit{Die Grünen und die Aussenpolitik}, 523-4.  
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., 144.
foreign deployments of the German army. The majority of the Green delegation—
Realos and leftists alike, with only 8 negative votes from radical pacifists\textsuperscript{157}—voted for a counter-proposal crafted by the political pacifists Ludger Volmer, Angelika Beer, and Winfried Nachtwei, calling for the replacement within a few months of NATO forces by a UN mission under Chapter VI of the UN charter.\textsuperscript{158} To avoid a security vacuum, however, the political pacifists’ text approved the German army’s remaining in the conflict zone until the UN arrived.\textsuperscript{159} With this nuance, as Ludger Volmer explained in his 1998 dissertation on Green foreign policy, the Greens avoided opposing German participation in the NATO mission outright, and in fact would have advocated it had they been in power: “As participants in government, the [Green] parliamentary delegation would have agreed with lengthening the German army’s deployment, if at the same time a political attempt would have been undertaken to transform the deployment in the demanded way,” namely replacing NATO’s authority with the UN’s.\textsuperscript{160} Thus, according to Volmer, by 1996 the political pacifists, and thus a majority of the Greens in parliament, criticized and offered a counter-proposal to SFOR, but no longer held foreign military deployments impossible on principle.

Though the Greens in parliament had changed their fundamental position on foreign deployments of the German army, Green party elites soon found out that the grass-roots activists in their party did not yet consent to the use of military force to settle international disputes. At their March 1998 conference in Magdeburg, the

\textsuperscript{157} Ibid.,
\textsuperscript{158} Volmer, \textit{Die Grünen und die Aussenpolitik}, 523-4.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., 524.
Greens deliberated on the political program they hoped to carry into government in a Red-Green coalition after the 1998 election. As it happened, the parliamentary vote on renewing the SFOR mandate was to come up shortly after the Magdeburg convention. To avoid damaging internal conflict during an election year, Joschka Fischer of the Realo faction and Jürgen Tritten of the leftist faction reached a compromise prior to Magdeburg: Fischer would convince Realo MPs to abstain rather than voting yes on the proposed expansion of NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, in exchange for which Trittin would convince leftists at Magdeburg to pass a statement that on the one hand opposed militarily-imposed peace settlements in general, while on the other supporting the renewal of SFOR. That compromise was reflected in the outcome of the January meeting of the States’ Council in Erfurt.

Perhaps anticipating opposition among the delegates to renewing SFOR, party leaders met shortly before the Magdeburg conference and abbreviated the text on foreign military interventions, leaving only the phrase rejecting them. Reinhard Bütikofer was to introduce a compromise proposal calling for deployments of the German army to be assessed on a case-by-case basis according to the individual judgment of the MPs. However, to the surprise and dismay of leaders of both factions, that compromise was rejected by a vote of 275 to 274 delegates at the convention. Thus, the party’s declaration on military interventions in the 1998

162 Ibid., 165, 155.
163 Ibid., 165-166.
164 Ibid., 166.
165 Ibid., 166.
election program passed at the Magdeburg convention contained the unequivocal sentence, “We reject military peace enforcement [Friedenserzwingung] and fighting deployments.”

Several explanations have been offered for the narrow defeat at Magdeburg of adopting case-by-case treatment for German military deployments. Underestimating the risk of the compromise getting defeated, Joschka Fischer and Jürgen Trittin delegated the task of speaking in favor of the compromise to second-tier leaders in their factions, Reinhard Bütikofer and Frithjof Schmidt respectively. Moreover, apparently some delegates may have already left the convention before the compromise was put to a vote, thinking its passage was guaranteed. More fundamentally, the result of Magdeburg should be taken as proof of a widening gulf between the views among party elites versus those among leftist activists concerning foreign military deployments, among other issues. Though they all found the possibility of entering government for the first time after the 1998 election tantalizing, the party elites differed from the radical grass-roots activists in the significance they attached to that transition: for the parliamentarians, it was the culmination of years of effort in gaining respectability by moderating their party’s ideology, while for many core supporters, it represented a breakthrough for their environmental, social, and pacifist agenda after sixteen years of CDU/CSU-FDP government.

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167 Ibid., 167.
However one explains the remarkable results of the Magdeburg convention, the categorical rejection of military interventions and the promise to raise the gasoline price to 5 Deutschmarks per liter within ten years, the media’s publicizing of those positions reinforced the Greens’ radical reputation, undermining much of the efforts by power-oriented Greens from Cohn-Bendit to Trittin, and Fischer to Volmer over the past decade or longer to appeal to a wider base than the core supporters. Fischer, unsurprisingly, considered Magdeburg a debacle.

However, the result of the Magdeburg convention did not affect the decision of Green MPs on supporting SFOR. On June 19, two-thirds of the Green delegation voted in favor of extending indefinitely the duration of German participation in the NATO mission in Bosnia. Leftists such as Ludger Volmer, Angelika Beer, and Annelie Buntenbach no longer could muster the majority they had had in 1995 for their counterproposal that the UN take over the peacekeeping mission, even though they acknowledged the need for armed units to enforce peace in Bosnia. Though the Magdeburg program did not inform the votes of Green MPs, it probably did affect the outcome of the general election in the Fall of 1998: the Greens had to satisfy themselves with a less-than-hoped-for 6.7% of popular support, down from 7.3% in 1994. Nonetheless, with the SPD winning 40.9%, the CDU/CSU winning 35.1%, and the FDP winning 6.2%, a Red-Green coalition became possible.

170 Fischer, Die rot-grünen Jahre, 220.
171 Ibid., 157.
173 Ibid., 136-8.
174 Ibid., 163.
Magdeburg offers a valuable point of comparison for an analysis of the Bielefeld special convention a year later. Why did the Greens categorically (though by a narrow margin) reject military interventions for imposing peace in March 1998 at Magdeburg, but at Bielefeld in May 1999 made no demand that the government they had joined cease its participation in the NATO bombing campaign? If it were true that the Green party rank-and-file felt it necessary to compromise on ideological points in order to secure their place in government, one would have expected that tendency to be manifested at Magdeburg, when the Greens were anticipating their first chance to govern. The result of Magdeburg proved the delegates’ willingness to reject a compromise worked out by party leaders when they deemed doing so necessary. Clearly understanding the outcome of Bielefeld requires taking account of the party rank-and-file’s specific attitudes, convictions, and perceptions as expressed on May 13, 1999, a task chapter three undertakes.

By the beginning of 1997, the Balbesberg Circle, the main organized forum of Green leftists during most of the 90s, had become highly polarized on the question of military interventions, and tensions only increased over the next two years. On one side were Greens in government positions (many of whom had comprised the political pacifists) including Jürgen Trittin, Ludger Volmer, Antje Radcke (party spokeswoman), Kerstin Müller (chair of the parliamentary delegation), and others: in 1998 they formed a new bloc called the Regierungslinke, or government leftists, set on entering government and no longer differing substantially from the Realos on foreign policy questions.\textsuperscript{175} At the same time, the stalwart leftists in the Circle

continued to coalesce around Ulrich Cremer,\textsuperscript{176} whose stance would be vitalized during the Kosovo war by a new movement called \textit{Basisgrün}, or grass-roots Green.\textsuperscript{177} While the \textit{Regierungslinke} pushed through the final stages along the path toward participation in government which their party had set out on as early as the Neumünster conference in 1991, \textit{Basisgrün} in contrast presented a novel force in Green politics of the 90s, most comparable in its tactics and agenda to the \textit{Fundis} who had exited the party between 1989 and 1991. Founded in November 1996 by critics of the Red-Green coalition governing the State of Hesse, \textit{Basisgrün} opposed what members considered the increasingly hierarchical organization of the Hesse State chapter of the party.\textsuperscript{178} \textit{Basisgrün} became a hub for Greens who resisted the drift towards supporting the legitimacy of military interventions during the mid- to late-90s, as well as other perceived concessions to political-as-usual by Green elites on the road to governing. The membership of \textit{Basisgrün} swelled in 1998, when supporters like Ralf Henze joined the network out of a feeling that the Magdeburg program was being marginalized by party officers.\textsuperscript{179} The first federal meeting of \textit{Basisgrün} took place in the context of the party’s October 1998 Bonn convention for confirming the conditions of its entrance into a coalition with the SPD.\textsuperscript{180} The escalating crisis over Kosovo and the NATO bombings that began in March 1999 imparted a significant boost to \textit{Basisgrün}’s popularity. Henze, who during the NATO bombings from March
24 to June 10, 1999 spent weeks doing little else than maintaining the network’s website and E-mail list, recalls that many Greens were against [the bombing of Kosovo], and the homepage and the growing e-mail list serve [Verteiler] offered information that was not to be gotten elsewhere… Through the grassroots pressure that was built in large part on the Basisgrün list serve and the anti-war initiative by Ilka Schröder and Uli Cremer, the federal leadership of the Green party had to call a special federal convention on Kosovo.181

Thus, as Heribert Prantl remarks, whatever Bielefeld’s result, “even the coming together of the Kosovo special convention [in Bielefeld] was a success for the war’s opponents.”182 After some resigned their party membership, Basisgrün functioned as a network that included anti-war activists inside and outside the party. The Basisgrün campaign against the NATO bombings, and the instrumental role the network played in convening the Bielefeld convention, should be considered along with the 1999 anti-WTO protests in Seattle as one of the first effective uses of the internet and email as organizing tools in grass-roots left-wing organizing.

During the 1990s, a dramatic shift took place in the Green party’s stance on using military force as a tool of foreign policy. A main cause for this shift was the Greens’ reactions to atrocities in the Bosnian civil war and the apparent need for armed peacekeepers to enforce the Dayton Accords which ended the conflict. First Daniel-Cohn Bendit and other Realos (at least as early as 1993), then Joschka Fischer (beginning after the Srebrenica massacre in 1995), then the political pacifists lead by Ludger Volmer (at the latest by 1996 with their effective approval of German participation in the NATO-mandated SFOR mission in Bosnia) came to view

182 Heribert Prantl, Rot-grün: Eine erste Bilanz, 114.
deployments of the German military to non-NATO countries without a UN mandate as permissible in principle and hence to be judged on a case-by-case basis. Sincere changes of conviction, efforts to groom their party into an attractive government partner for the SPD, and the politicians’ natural desire to widen their base of support all contributed to the change of views among Green leaders. However, as the Magdeburg convention in 1998 showed, the Green party’s core activists and supporters were not convinced of a need to revise the traditionally Green positions of opposition to NATO, were concerned that the projection of German military power indicated a resurgent aggressive foreign policy, and reiterated the call for a demilitarization of international relations. The divergence between Green party leaders and grass-roots activists was enlarged by the advent of Basisgrün, which organized anti-war sentiment among the party’s supporters. Thus, by the time the Kosovo conflict caught the international spotlight in 1998, the German Green party was primed for further ideological controversy over military interventions, even while it was poised to enter a governing coalition in which the Greens would, for the first time, influence and be held responsible for German foreign policy.

Kosovo, German Politics, and NATO Diplomacy

The international diplomacy surrounding the Kosovo conflict between Kosovar Albanians and Serbs, and later between Yugoslavia and NATO, was affected by ambivalence within German Green party regarding NATO’s threat and eventual use of military force. The Yugoslavian army and Serbian paramilitaries had been carrying out an offensive against the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) and the
Albanian population in Kosovo since the spring of 1998. By autumn western
governments began clamoring to intervene, but Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov
had made clear to Madeleine Albright that Russia would block a Security Council
resolution authorizing military force. So in early October, while the Greens and
SPD hammered out their coalition contract, the possibility for NATO military
intervention without a UN mandate hung in the air. Questioned by the press about
that possibility, Green leaders expressed concern. Fischer said, “the issue [over the
intervention] would be international law as a basis for action. That requires a
particular process, and that in turn commits one to the United Nations and the
Security Council. One can’t simply ride roughshod over that, since that could be used
as a precedent by all other powerful states, with very different consequences.” Yet
Green leaders also evinced a desire to reassure all that they would not rock the boat
upon entering government, especially when it came to foreign policy. Jürgen Trittin
claimed that the Greens’ internal disputes over foreign policy had focused on
identifying “the right behavior in the opposition. Now we must govern the land
responsibly. For the future, the ability to find consensus is called for.” Trittin also
said, “the Greens know very well what it’s about now. They know that you have to
try to ride the Tiger now. And they know there is a great public pressure of
expectations.” Fischer recalls in his memoir that the possibility Washington would
demand Germany’s authorization of military force by NATO against Yugoslavia
during the coalition negotiations was the “greatest assumable disaster” [größte

185 Ibid.
186 Der Spiegel, October 12, 1998, 27.
anzunemende Unfall], and the “worry of the Green negotiating group.”187 “I talked to Schröder and Lafontaine about this approaching danger for the coalition and told them that we somehow had to avoid the situation of deciding [on authorizing NATO’s use of force]. Otherwise – catastrophe!”188

To avoid the catastrophe of the first federal Red-Green coalition collapsing before it had even taken office, Fischer hoped the vote on authorizing force would be taken in the NATO council rather than in the federal parliament, or if it had to happen in parliament, that the vote would at least be delayed until after the new parliament had been sworn in at the end of October.189 As Fischer noted in his memoir, without the pressure of participating in government, I was anything but sure about the outcome of a vote in the Green parliamentary delegation. On top of that, it was an entirely open question how our party, before authorizing the coalition contract, would react to such a far-reaching decision on German participation in the possible air war against Serbia.190

In the midst of this uncertainty, President Clinton invited Schröder and Fischer to visit the White House. Ludger Volmer, who was involved in the coalition contract negotiations, joined the trip to Washington in order to represent the leftist faction of the Greens. According to Fischer, “[h]is accompaniment was meant to strengthen their integration.”191 The German politicians’ visit to Washington included a long private conversation between Schröder and Clinton followed by a press conference. Schröder secured Clinton’s agreement to wait for the Red-Green coalition to get sworn in before the Bundestag would vote on authorizing NATO’s use of force: “with

187 Fischer, Die rot-grünen Jahre, 102-3.
188 Ibid.
189 Ibid., 103.
190 Ibid., 104.
191 Ibid.
that at least time had been won. All of us, but we Greens in the delegation most of all, felt almost audibly a weight fall from our shoulders. The trip had gone well for us, and I thanked Gerhard Schröder for this result.”

The next Monday morning, October 12th, brought a reversal of fortunes. Fischer received a call from Günter Verheugen, the soon-to-be government spokesman, with the news that Washington had cancelled permission to delay the vote. Verheugen told Fischer that Richard Holbrooke had insisted he needed NATO unity to get Milosevic to buckle: otherwise Belgrade would bank on German non-participation in military action, and other European countries might have refused also. The same day they received this news, the leaders of Germany’s exiting and entering governments met in the small cabinet room of the Chancellor’s office in Bonn. Representing the out-going government were Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Defense Minister Volker Rühe, Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, and the leaders of the CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentary delegations. Politicians in the incoming government, Gerhard Schröder, Joschka Fischer, Oskar Lafontaine, and Günter Verheugen, held a short conversation before entering the meeting in which Fischer urged making no decision that day, but was overruled by Schröder. When the representatives of the two governments met, Kohl proposed that the two governments agree to vote on the authorization of NATO’s use of force immediately. Before concurring, Schröder looked over to Fischer for approval, who recalls, “I knew in this moment that this would not be the decision over war and peace, but certainly over the

192 Ibid.
193 Ibid., 104-5.
194 Ibid.
future of the coalition.”¹⁹⁵ Fischer supported authorizing NATO’s threat to bomb on its merits, but feared the repercussions within his party of an immediate vote. Yet he feared the political fallout from contradicting Schröder even more: rumor had it that Schröder preferred the CDU/CSU to the Greens as coalition partners, and had only been blocked from forming a grand coalition by the party chairman Lafontaine.¹⁹⁶ Thus, Fischer believed objecting to an immediate vote on authorizing NATO’s threat would result in the Greens being replaced by the CDU/CSU as the SPD’s coalition partner.¹⁹⁷ The Greens’ strenuous efforts to join government would then have been in vain.¹⁹⁸ So Fischer nodded, and the German parliament approved the authorization order on October 16th, with 29 Green MPs voting yes, 9 voting no, and 8 abstentions.¹⁹⁹ But would Germany really go to war without a UN mandate? That would be “[a]bsolutely contrary to the program,” as Fischer was quoted saying on October 19.²⁰⁰ Ludger Volmer warned that a NATO war without a UN mandate would be a “fatal development” for the Red-Green coalition since “[t]hen, namely, NATO instead of the UN would establish a monopoly on violence.”²⁰¹ So even after making what modifications to Green foreign policy they considered necessary for entering government, Fischer and Volmer still considered—at least in their public statements—that NATO military action without a UN mandate would be beyond the pale.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 106.
¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 107.
¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 107.
¹⁹⁸ Ibid.
¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 111.
²⁰¹ Ibid.
Fast forward six months, to April 1999. The failure of Serbians and Albanians to agree to NATO’s terms for settling their conflict had resulted in NATO carrying out its threat. Its bombings of Serbia commenced on March 24, 1999, without a UN mandate, since both Russia’s and China’s vetoes precluded the Security Council’s approval. In domestic politics, the Red-Green coalition had performed shakily on the Green agenda points of citizenship reform and retiring atomic energy. Making the Red-Green coalition’s position even more precarious, the Greens’ fall from 11.2% to 7.2% in Hesse State elections of February 7th resulted in the federal coalition losing control of the lower house of parliament. In the upcoming Green convention at Bielefeld on May 13, the question of war and peace would once again get mixed into coalition politics, as it had the previous October.

During the month of April, as bombs fell on Serbia and Albanians fled from Serbian forces in Kosovo, the growing ambivalence toward the bombings in the German population, and the anticipation of the Greens’ upcoming convention at Bielefeld, affected NATO’s diplomatic and military discussions at their summit meeting in Washington DC on April 23-24. Recalling the conversations there, Fischer remarks,

> it goes without saying that the debate on the possible ground war was in no way off the table. Granted, it played no role in the official consultations and documents, nevertheless it was present in all informal conversation. In relation to the further course of the NATO war, the result of the Washington NATO summit can be summarized

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202 Space prohibits doing justice to the complex development of the Kosovo conflict and related diplomacy, from Racak to Rambouillet. Those events are not my central subjects, and their controversial and charged nature makes recounting them depthlessly seem worse than not recounting them at all.

in three points: a strengthened strategic air war, strengthened diplomatic initiatives, and preparation for the ground war.204

A May 1, 1999 analysis by James Kitfield in the National Journal (a magazine aimed at Washington foreign policy insiders) sheds light on how Germany and the Greens specifically influenced the NATO leaders’ calculations.205 According to Kitfield, at the NATO summit Clinton overruled publicizing discussion of Britain and France’s call for a ground invasion out of concern for that step’s unpopularity in German domestic politics.206

The Clinton administration had good cause to want the British and French rhetoric toned down. The White House was worried about keeping Germany on board. It now looks as if Germany will stand as the largest impediment to using ground troops, even if NATO officers conclude that invasion offers the best hope of winning the war.207

General Wesley Clark’s memoirs confirm this: on April 23 he “learned about the stormy discussion on ground troops between President Clinton and Prime Minister Blair, the result of which was that there would be no discussion of the ground option at the summit.”208 Clinton overruled Blair’s desire to have such a discussion seemingly out of concern that it would further endanger the already fragile German Red-Green coalition. According to Fischer, the premise that Germany would not

204 Fischer, Die rot-grünen Jahre, 201.
206 Ibid.
207 Ibid.
208 Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 268. Clark alludes to another casualty of the shakiness of the German coalition: Klaus Naumann, Chair of the NATO Military Committee, who was a proponent of the ground option. In what is surely a reference to the German Red-Green coalition Clark explains, “it was rumored that one country had threatened that if the change [i.e. Naumann’s retirement on May 6] were not made on schedule it might be viewed as such a lack of confidence that its government might fall.” Clark, Waging Modern War, 269.
support a ground invasion was entirely justified. “The opposition parties CDU/CSU and FDP had spoken out clearly against German participation [in a NATO ground war], and the coalition parties SPD and the Greens were even more decisively against it, so that there would never have been a majority for German participation in the German parliament,” whose authorization for deploying ground troops was constitutionally required.209 The National Journal analysis remarks that Clinton’s squelching of official talk of a ground invasion at the NATO summit “was an important accomplishment for Schroeder, just in time for a special conference on Kosovo scheduled by the German Greens, the party that is the junior partner in Schroeder’s center-left governing coalition that is, by tradition and inclination, pacifist.”210 Kitfield warned that German reservations over the war “could be sharply defined at next month’s Green Party conference.”211 He quoted Gerhard Wahlers, director of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, as presenting the possibility that the faction of the Green party opposed to the NATO bombings “could trigger a major crisis in the coalition next month.”212 To shore up Gerhard Schröder’s position and emphasize Germany’s importance in the alliance, President Clinton announced plans to make a surprise trip to Germany on May 4.213 According to an account of the bombing campaign by Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institute, “On May 18, in response to a reporter’s question, President Clinton said that NATO would “not take any option off the table,” implying that contrary to his

209 Fischer, Die rot-grünen Jahre, 206.
211 Ibid.
212 Ibid.
213 Ibid.
previous statements, a ground invasion was a possibility under consideration.\textsuperscript{214} Apparently, “a meeting of top-level [Clinton administration] officials on May 10 had explicitly decided that the administration’s rhetoric about the possibility of a ground invasion should be changed.”\textsuperscript{215} But if Clinton’s advisors reached that decision on May 10, why would Clinton wait over a week, until May 18, during a period of fast-paced diplomatic and military events, before changing his public stance? The delay may well have been caused by a certain meeting of around 800 environmentally-minded Germans in Bielefeld on May 13.

If Kitfeld’s article reflected thinking inside the Clinton administration and in Washington foreign policy circles, then those strategists were sensitive to the German Red-Green coalition’s fragile position and, aware of the Greens’ upcoming Bielefeld convention, enforced the delay of any official or public discussion of a ground invasion of Kosovo. Thus, the special convention on Kosovo which the Green party anti-war activists succeeded in convening got factored into the diplomatic calculations in Washington that controlled NATO’s military campaign. More unexpectedly, it seems that the Green party leadership’s decision to delay the special convention on Kosovo until May 13—a decision made for logistical reasons as well as in the hope that the bombings would have ended by then, thus allowing the Greens to dodge an anguishing internal dispute\textsuperscript{216}—had the unintended effect of leaving the Red-Green coalition in limbo throughout April, and hence ensuring that Washington

\textsuperscript{214} Daalder and O’Hanlon, \textit{Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo}, 157.
\textsuperscript{215} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{216} Fischer, \textit{Die rot-grünen Jahre}, 208; Schmuck-Soldan, “Der Pazifismus bei Bündnis 90/Die Grünen,” 197.
would quell the clamor from the British and French government, as well as from General Wesley Clark, for seriously and openly considering a ground invasion.

By the time they reached Bielefeld, the Greens had behind them two decades of alternative thinking, several years of controversy over the consistency of military interventions with their commitments to pacifism and human rights, and six shaky months in government. The composition of Green party conventions such as the one at Bielefeld guaranteed that its results could not be foreseen. Joachim Raschke estimated in his 2002 book _Die Zukunft der Grünen_ that the core of the leftward and rightward tendencies at Green conventions only made up about a third of the total delegates: 15% for the leftists, 20% for the _Realos_.

Only after mobilizing peripheral voters and sympathizers do the leftists come to around 35-40% and the _Realos_ about 40%. The camps, with their solid and mobilized portions, thus reach around 80% of the delegates. The remaining approximately 20% are the uncommitted, a disparate group of individualists. One cannot accumulate them, only mobilize them – in order to support or topple the government.

Since unaffiliated delegates could swing a majority towards one faction or another, and since the oratory at conventions and the circumstances surrounding them would have influenced those undecided delegates, the result of a convention like Bielefeld could not have been known in advance and cannot be understood in retrospect without careful attention to the content and context of that day’s debate. Two other factors compounded the unpredictability resulting from the presence of uncommitted delegates: that Bielefeld was the Greens’ first convention as a governing party, and that the problem they were to discuss required reapplying the by-then-familiar

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218 Ibid.
dilemma of pacifism versus human rights (developed from the controversies on NATO peace-enforcers in Bosnia-Herzegovina), to a different situation: NATO’s air war prompted by the failure of negotiations to settle the conflict in Kosovo.

The Greens at Bielefeld performed in various ways the collective intellectual task of framing the subject of their debate by relating their moral convictions to their perceptions of current events surrounding the NATO bombings, and to representations of the history leading up to them. As we will see, not only the party elites and the highest vote-getting petitions, but also the dozens of delegates who presented speeches and petitions at the convention, and even the chanting and sign-waving of protesters, contributed to framing the Bielefeld debate, and hence must be included in an appreciation of the meaning of its outcome. This chapter has framed the Bielefeld convention as a remarkable event in numerous respects: as a new round in the long history of controversy over the Green party’s pacifist ideology, as a deliberation whose results were unpredictable (and therefore whose intellectual and rhetorical content was possibly decisive), as a test of the viability of the Red-Green coalition, and as an important turning point in international diplomacy surrounding the Kosovo war. The next chapter’s detailed account of the mood, structure, and outcome of the convention will begin to investigate these facets, among others, of the Bielefeld convention.
Because of extraordinary interest in the Greens’ special convention on Kosovo, the original plan to hold it in Hagen was cancelled; it was relocated by the federal party leadership to Seidensticker Hall in Bielefeld, scheduled for May 13.\textsuperscript{219}

By then the bombings had been underway for seven weeks. Extreme tension and high emotion surrounded the convention. To enter the convention hall, the approximately 800 delegates – many of whom had cut their own political teeth in protest and vitriolic condemnation of military force and its political supporters – had to make their way through throngs of protestors brandishing slogans like “Greens are murderers” and “Fischer is a warmonger.”\textsuperscript{220} Party spokesperson Antje Radcke (who had the sensitivity to feel a bad conscience over entering the hall through the back door), recalls that the main entrance “was a gauntlet of protesting demonstrators chanting [\textit{skandalierende}] ‘warmonger, warmonger!’”\textsuperscript{221} On account of the disturbance caused by these protestors, the convention began an hour late, at 10:00 AM.\textsuperscript{222} Police stationed at the main entrance checked the identities of delegates before letting them in, “a procedure entirely unknown to Green party convention


\textsuperscript{221} Antje Radcke, \textit{Das Ideal und die Macht: Das Dilemma der Grünen} (Berlin: Henschel Verlag, 2001), 130.

\textsuperscript{222} Minutes, Bielefeld Special Convention, p. 1.
delegates until then,” remarks Radcke. If any of the delegates had needed a reminder that this was no ordinary Green convention they were attending, but a deep-reaching and traumatizing controversy about implementing (or abandoning) the party’s core moral stands on pacifism and human rights, they had gotten that reminder just by walking in the door.

The first section of this chapter discusses the preparations by Green party officials for the Bielefeld convention, primarily their preparation of two of the twelve petitions to be presented to the delegates (the two that received the most support, as it turned out). One of the petitions, from the party’s federal executive committee, called for a temporary interruption of the bombings (or *Feuerpause*), while the other, sponsored by the Green MP Hans-Christian Ströbele and others, demanded a permanent end to the bombings (or *Waffenstillstand*). Party spokesman Antje Radcke’s retrospective explanation of how that choice came to be the central one before the convention will be considered but found inadequate, primarily because she makes an untenable assumption that the views of a majority of convention delegates could have been known before the voting actually took place. Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer’s retrospective claim that the convention was a referendum on him and on the Red-Green coalition will be found unconvincing for related reasons. Section two goes over the organization and unfolding of events at the convention, with special attention to moments of pandemonium and to unexpected factors that influenced the proceedings. Section three offers an overview of the twelve petitions voted on at the convention, summarizing their stances on continuing or discontinuing

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223 Ibid.
the bombings, as well as discussing the results and irregularities of the convention’s three rounds of voting. Finally, section four gives an exposition and critique of the explanations offered in the secondary literature for the result of the Bielefeld convention. That critique paves the way for a detailed examination in chapter three of the content of the petitions and speeches that constituted the Bielefeld debate, and which led to the outcome of the convention.

Preparations for Bielefeld

How did the choice between a *Feuerpause* and a *Waffenstillstand*, between temporarily or permanently stopping the bombings, become the two central alternatives before the Bielefeld delegates?. According to Christian Simmert, one of the seven Green MPs who had voted against the authorization of military action the previous October, the Greens in government consulted the party’s federal executive committee prior to the convention to reach a formula compromise [Formelkompromiss] “which on the one hand comforted the disquieted soul of the party, and at the same time stabilized the government alliance.”

It is an indication of the strength of opposition to NATO’s air strikes within the Green party that the federal executive committee sponsored the call for a pause in the bombings. Fischer certainly did not support this *Feuerpause* petition out of enthusiasm for its content. His real position, according to Joachim Raschke, a noted scholar of the German Greens, was articulated by the Baden-Württemberg Realos in another petition,

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224 Simmert and Engels, *Die Lobby regiert das Land*, 87.
number 22, which called for the bombings to continue uninterrupted. Supporting the *Feuerpause* petition was for Fischer a necessary compromise “which I could live with,” as he says in his memoirs, since according to him the contents of the petitions were irrelevant: the delegates’ simple choice was either to support him, or by failing to do so, to destroy the Red-Green coalition.

Party spokeswoman Antje Radcke relates in her memoirs her attempts to arrange a joint petition supported both by the federal executive committee [{*Bundesvorstand*}] as well as by the Babelsberg Circle, the loosely organized forum of left-wing Greens. As a visible figure in the Babelsberg Circle during the 1990s who now supported the NATO bombings, she would have been an ideal person to achieve such a compromise. She and Reinhard Bütikofer, a member of the federal executive committee, were designated to finalize such a petition. Radcke reports having an understanding with leaders of the Babelsberg Circle that they would send her a draft of a resolution for her to present to the federal executive committee. “Nonetheless, I waited for this draft in vain – consequently, Reinhard Bütikofer beat me to it, and the first reading in the meeting of the federal executive committee proceeded on the basis of his draft.” But it was only a first draft, and Bütikofer agreed that Radcke would compose the second version. A week later, several leaders of the Babelsberg Circle, including Environment Minister Jürgen Trittin and Frithjof Schmidt, met Radcke in a restaurant to confront her: “I was asked accusingly why I had allowed Reinhard Bütikofer to write the first draft of the leadership’s petition – because of this they saw

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225 Raschke, *Die Zukunft der Grünen*, 351.
227 Radcke, *Das Ideal und die Macht*, 125.
228 Ibid.
no more basis for cooperation with me.”229 Radcke showed them her latest draft of the petition, but “they had clearly already decided long ago to abandon the course of acting together, and to contribute their own petition to the convention.”230 Supposedly cooperation between Radcke and the Babelsberg Circle would continue, but “that declaration of intention didn’t sound very convincing.”231 As a result of this falling out, the leftists within the party would offer alternative petitions to the executive committee’s.

Rather than unifying behind a common position regarding Kosovo, the Balbelsberg Circle destroyed itself. The last ever meeting of this group, the largest and most lively forum of active Green leftists during the 1990s,232 took place the night before the Bielefeld convention. Radcke recalls that at that meeting “personal and political friendships died, the organized left wing of the party died, hopes and illusions died.”233 Frieder O. Wolf, one of those presiding at the meeting, ignored her request to speak, and when she finally was allowed to address the assembly through the intervention of Claudia Roth, “no one listened to me, on the contrary, I was constantly interrupted by boos and whistles,” according to Radcke.234 Not only was the leadership’s resolution calling for a Feuerpause inhositably received, but the Green leftists of the Balbelsberg Circle were deeply skeptical of Ströbele’s Waffenstillstand petition, which was aimed at the party’s “wavering middle”

229 Ibid., 126.
230 Ibid.
231 Ibid.
233 Radcke, Das Ideal und die Macht, 128-9.
234 Ibid., 129.
according to Joachim Raschke. Ströbele tried to explain the tactical sense in calling for a permanent stop to the bombings while saying nothing about the Greens withdrawing from government: “with that we will complicate the lives of those who are dictating war in Bonn. [Damit werden wir denen, die in Bonn den Krieg bestimmen, ein Ei ins Nest legen.]” He believed his petition allowed the Greens to stay in government and Fischer to remain foreign minister, even while demanding a unilateral and permanent end to the NATO bombings. But according to Raschke, the Babelsberg Circle might well have chosen a more strident petition than Ströbele’s if the choice had been left up to them: Frieder O. Wolf and Claudia Roth, who presided at the Babelsberg Circle meeting, had to fight to ensure that Ströbele’s petition was not voted down by the assembly. To prevent this they left the choice between anti-war petitions over to the convention itself, rather than having the forum of leftist Greens choose which should be voted on the next day.

In Radcke’s view, the leaders of the party’s left wing wanted to present a petition they knew would fail at the convention so that they could appear as opponents of the war without causing Fischer’s resignation, risking the destruction of the Red-Green coalition, or rendering Green party conventions moot discussions that the Greens in government ignored. The leaders of the Babelsberg Circle, she felt, left her the dirty work of supporting the federal executive committee’s Feuerpause.
Radcke’s centrist criticism of the sponsors of the Waffenstillstand petition is mirrored in Christian Simmert’s critique of those same figures from the left. Simmert, an MP who cosponsored the anti-war petition 77, faults Claudia Roth and Hans-Christian Ströbele for assuring Fischer they would not resign if the federal executive committee’s petition passed. In so doing, argues Simmert, they weakened their negotiating position and the credibility of their anti-war stance. Simmert’s critique from the left of the Babelsberg Circle leaders paralleled by the more centrist Radcke’s exasperation with what she perceived as an inconsistent stance taken by Greens who opposed the NATO bombings, yet would not accept the breaking of the Red-Green coalition as the consequence of that opposition.

Despite Radcke’s accusation against the Babelsberg Circle leaders, clearly Ströbele did not draft, and Roth and Wolf did not advance, a petition they knew could not win a majority at the convention. At most, Ströbele can be accused of deceiving himself (and others) to think that Fischer would remain foreign minister if the Waffenstillstand petition prevailed. Fischer himself states emphatically in his memoir that he would have “immediately declared to the convention my withdrawal from the faction and party, and offered my resignation as foreign minister to the Chancellor” if the leadership’s Feuerpause petition had been defeated. The decision at the convention, he says, was whether the party wished to continue the coalition: “Yes or No to Red-Green.” Yet his convention speech was more ambiguous than his memoir allows: before the convention Fischer called a unilateral and permanent end

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243 Ibid.
244 Fischer, Die rot-grünen Jahre, 221.
245 Ibid., 228.
to the air strikes “the utterly wrong signal” to send to Milosevic, and declared, “I will
not enforce that if you decide for it – so that that’s clear!”\textsuperscript{246} But it was not clear
whether “I will not enforce that” meant he would resign, or would stay in office
without lifting a finger to implement the convention’s will (as he went on to do
regarding his party’s instruction to seek a \textit{Feuerpause}). Perhaps Fischer wished to
keep his options open at the unpredictable convention, and so refrained from making
an unmistakable threat to resign. Whether or not Fischer intended to leave some
ambiguity about his resignation threat, the ambiguity he did in fact leave assisted
Ströbele in credibly seeking a majority with his petition (contrary to Radcke’s
inference that he intended for it to lose) by claiming his petition would not destabilize
the Red-Green coalition.

In any case, notions such as Radcke’s that Ströbele and his cosponsors offered
a petition they knew would fail, or Fischer’s that the delegates considered the
convention a referendum on him and the Red-Green coalition, are refuted by a simple
fact acknowledged by everyone involved: before and during the convention, up until
the results of the first round of voting were announced, no one could be sure what
views the majority of delegates favored. An article in the German news magazine \textit{Der
Spiegel} of May 10 commented,

> How the sentiment of the grass roots is actually ordered no one could estimate at the end of last week. According to a moderately representative survey [\textit{Erhebung}] by the Göttingen scholar Ingo Stürmer, 26\% of the party chapters [\textit{Kreisverbände}] are for the Fischer Plan, 62\% in contrast are for an immediate armistice [\textit{Waffenstillstand}] – the usual mixture of \textit{realpolitik} and idealism. Among the \textit{Realos}, on the other hand, the rumor circulated after the G8 summit that the

\textsuperscript{246} DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 2.
convention will approve the course of the government by a ratio of 70:30.\textsuperscript{247}

During the convention, the results were still unforeseeable. Journalist Christian Schlötzer reports that “strikingly many” of the representatives of the party’s grass roots said “the sound of the speeches” could still influence their decisions, and were “very eager and tense \textit{[sehr gespannt]}” concerning the argument they were about to hear.\textsuperscript{248} Antje Radcke recalls, “No one could predict how the majority of delegates would decide during the upcoming consultation on the petitions \textit{[Antragsberatung]} and the subsequent voting –the applause was no measure, because both the advocates of intervention as well as the opponents were heavily applauded.”\textsuperscript{249} Joschka Fischer makes a similar remark recalling the reception of his speech: “Many delegates stood up and applauded for minutes. But was it the majority? In view of the chaotic circumstances, that was simply not to be determined.”\textsuperscript{250} Since throughout the entire debate participants had no way to know the outcome, one must suspend knowledge of it when trying to explain the tactics and argumentation of participants before the result was announced. Despite all their preparatory maneuvering, the day of the convention promised to be full of surprises, and it would not disappoint.

\textit{May 13, 1999}

Due to the disruption caused by protestors outside the hall, the convention began an hour behind schedule. Once underway, the proceedings did not devolve into

\textsuperscript{248} \textit{Sueddeutsche Zeitung}, May 14, 1999.
\textsuperscript{249} Radcke, \textit{Das Ideal und die Macht}, 131.
\textsuperscript{250} Fischer, \textit{Die rot-grünen Jahre}, 227.
chaos (except for the famous bit of pandemonium that broke out at 10:36 AM, to which we return), but ran rather prosaically with only minor alterations to the agenda Reinhard Bütikofer (of the convention chairmanship) laid out at 10:00AM.\(^{251}\) During the first period, five of the Greens in government capacities would address the assembly: Antje Radcke for the federal executive committee, then Angelica Beer and Annelie Buntenbach of the Green parliamentary delegation, then Martina Fischer of the federal study group \([Bündnisarbeitsgemeinschaft]\), and finally Joschka Fischer, the Green foreign minister. The first four speakers were allotted fifteen minutes, while Joschka Fischer was given thirty.\(^{252}\) During these speeches, delegates could drop a slip of paper with their names on it into a box at the front of the hall requesting the opportunity to address the convention during the subsequent general debate. Thirty speeches of five minutes each were scheduled (though many speakers, especially politicians like Ströbele and Cohn-Bendit, exceeded their time, much to the chairmanship’s annoyance). Eight speaking slots were reserved in advance for party celebrities or influential figures in the Kosovo debate.\(^{253}\) By an amendment to the procedure proposed by Susanne Hilbron (of the Lübeck \textit{Kreisverband} or district

\(^{251}\) DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 1.  
\(^{252}\) A motion by Christian Goetjes to limit Fischer’s speaking time to 15 minutes was defeated. In the event, Fischer only spoke for about 20 minutes anyway. DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 1.  
\(^{253}\) These speakers were Andreas Gebhard (speaker for the GAJB), Kerstin Müller (chair of the federal parliamentary delegation), Helmut Lippelt (MP), Barbara Steffens (representing the federal party’s women’s council), Daniel Cohn-Bendit (of Paris ’68 fame), Christian Ströbele (MP), and Ludger Volmer (employed in the foreign ministry). A motion by Rainer Landele (KV Trier-Saarburg) to strike the eight pre-set speeches and give more time to the delegates was defeated. DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 1.
party chapter), a speaker representing the protesters outside the hall (who turned out to be Joachim Schramm), was allotted speaking time too.

After all these speeches, the conventions would turn to debating the 104 proposed resolutions submitted on the Kosovo war. Bütkofer explained at the beginning that many of the petition writers had met the day before and reached a consensus (a word he heavily emphasized), selecting twelve petitions to be introduced and voted on at the convention.\footnote{Two delegates, Karl-Wilhelm Koch (KV Daun) and Frimi Dimpel (KV Erlangen), protested they had been unable to attend that meeting, and their petitions should still be taken up at the convention, but the assembly refused these appeals. DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 1.} After each petition was introduced in a five minute speech, voting was to commence. Only yes votes would be counted, and supporters of each petition would stand and hold up a yellow \textit{Stimmkarte} (voting card) to be counted by three vote-counters standing on the front stage.\footnote{Giesela Gülbaher (KV Berlin-Kreuzberg) moved to hold a secret ballot vote in case of a difference of less than forty votes between resolutions with the chance to pass into the second round. This proposal was rejected after Klaus Müller (MP) replied that the secret ballot would take too long, and the stand-and-be-counted procedure could “rather precisely guarantee” an accurate result. Vote counters would move through the aisles to count, and the writers of each petition would be present on stage to observe the voting on their resolution. Whether having to take public responsibility for their votes changed the outcome of the voting must remain an open question. DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 1.} The top four vote-getting resolutions would pass into the second round of voting, which followed the same procedure as the first. The top two vote-receiving resolutions in the second round would pass into the final round of voting, conducted by secret ballot. The winning resolution would present the Green party’s stance on the Kosovo war.

Before describing the petitions voted on by delegates, a few words must be said on the raucous atmosphere of the Seidensticker hall in order to understand the
intellectual content of the debate within its emotional context. The chairmanship committee and the various prominent figures of the party sat behind tables on a stage facing the delegates sitting in three blocks of folding chairs: left, middle, and right. The stage had a large green backdrop with four words painted in white: *Frieden und Menschenrechte vereinbaren* – uniting peace and human rights. Around the stage and convention floor, signs hung from a balcony where various people milled about.

Dress was quite casual: Fischer sported a chic blazer and black T-shirt, and some delegates wore sports jackets or dresses, but sweaters and jeans were much more common. At the beginning of the convention, press photographers knelted in the aisle between the stage and the delegates’ seats to snap pictures of Fischer. In addition to the Greens and journalists, the hall was packed with protestors standing in the back holding banners with anti-war slogans aloft and occasionally blowing whistles, chanting, or yelling accusations like “warmonger!” A handful of left-wing former-Greens who had abandoned the party years ago came back to this convention: Thomas Ebermann, Manfred Zieran, Rainer Trampert, Jutta Ditfurth, and Jürgen Reents attended according to the press, whether to watch the spectacle, or to influence it, or simply to denounce their former party for betraying its charter.\(^{256}\)

The event for which this convention is most famous, and the only one for which it is publicly known in the English-speaking world (if it is known there at all) occurred at 10:36 AM, when someone ran toward the stage and threw a bag filled with red paint [*Farbbeutel*] at Joschka Fischer, hitting the right side of his face, splashing paint across his ear, blazer, and T-shirt, and splattering the table where he

was sitting and the wall behind him. Fischer winced and held his right ear gingerly.

He recalled in his memoir,

I hadn’t noticed anything, saw no one coming, and also my security guards standing behind me very clearly hadn’t either. Protected by the assembled video cameras and photographers, the attacker had gotten into throwing position and then struck precisely. Immediately a great tumult broke out, but after the initial shock I was most of all full of anger and aggression. Earlier I would have reacted immediately and would have gone after the attacker, but on that day it wasn’t possible for me to do that anymore. So I seethed inwardly with anger. My right ear was full of colored paint and almost deaf. I felt a sharp pain there, and the red paint ran over my neck and suit. Other than that everything seemed to be in order, it was only paint. The entire situation was horrible [ätzend] and I was angry [sauer]. Angry at the guy who had hit me, angry at my party, that wasn’t able to keep a convention in order by its own efforts, and angry at those supposed pacifists who transformed the convention into an infernal spectacle. Most of these “friends of peace” seemed nonetheless not to be delegates.²⁵⁷

Fischer brooded for an hour and a half before rising to speak at 12:04. Having to sit still and endure the pain and abuse no doubt contributed to the angry, defensive tone of his speech.

As for everyone else’s reaction, the paint balloon [Farbbeutel] attack on Fischer ratcheted up the tension and emotion of the assembly. Immediately after the attack, much yelling and commotion in the aisles ensued, as delegates stood up to see what had happened and photographers rushed up to snap pictures of the bespattered Fischer. A naked young man with dreadlocks tried to approach the stage but got repelled by security and had to content himself with press interviews in the back of the hall. Someone at the podium, perhaps a representative of the Kreuzberg party chapter, who had just been called forward to speak, denied knowing the paint balloon

²⁵⁷ Fischer, Die rot-grünen Jahre, 223.
thrower, but announced that protestors outside had been arrested. Reinhard Bütikofer muffled the microphones before the man could say much. Bütikofer ordered the aisle between the assembly and the stage to be cleared, including of journalists. He received applause for stating that the will of the assembly was for the convention to proceed without provocation, and that democratic decision-making required that the security of all participants be guaranteed. At this point clearly the press, who stubbornly remained in front of the stage to take pictures and seek interviews, discombobulated the convention more than the delegates themselves (and perhaps more than the protestors too). Bütikofer pleaded (whether to the delegates or the reporters is unclear), “the better pictures are of an orderly assembly, please help us with that,” showing the Greens’ sensitivity to the media portrayal of their deliberations.

Once business resumed, the next speaker Rainer Landele (KV Trier-Saarburg) was called to the podium at 10:42 to argue for striking the eight pre-set speakers in the general debate. He began with a poignant remark: “At one time I would have done something like that myself, so maybe we should laugh instead of complaining.” At Bielefeld, the Greens found themselves on the business end of the kind of eccentric protest tactics that had once been their stock and trade. But now their sympathies lay with the establishment figure, Foreign Minister Fischer, not with the scrappy, rule-breaking, stunt-pulling protesters. Many delegates who spoke against the red-green coalition’s foreign policy also expressed shame at and

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258 DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 1.
259 Ibid.
260 Ibid.
condemnation of the paint balloon attack. At 1:43 PM, during the delegates’ speeches, it was announced that Fischer had left to go to the hospital, for treatment of his punctured right eardrum, as was later revealed. The assembly reacted with alarm. In a later interview, the MP Hans-Christian Ströbele, sponsor of the top vote-getting petition opposing the party leadership’s, said that the paint balloon attack “had the opposite effect in this situation from what he [the thrower] intended. It was bad. It caused the position of the foreign minister to be strengthened.” Angelika Beer, a Green MP who had abstained from the vote in October 1998 to authorize NATO’s threat of military action against Milosevic, and who according to Michael Schwelien intended to vote for a permanent stop to the air strikes, addressed the convention shortly after the paint balloon struck Fischer, and spontaneously reversed her position, speaking “with feeling and rare strength – for the continuation of the NATO deployment [Einsatz] against Yugoslavia, for German participation, for Joschka Fischer.” Interviewed by Schwelien, she claimed “the decision [the narrow yes to continuing the air strikes] fell with the paint balloon.”

Tension hung in the air during the preset speeches over the next ninety minutes before Fischer’s speech, which was perhaps a more dramatic climax even than the convention’s final vote. When Fischer finally rose to address the assembly,

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261 Fischer writes that Chancellor Gerhard Schröder phoned him in the hospital to “inquire about my condition and wish me good luck.” Fischer, *Die rot-grünen Jahre.*, 227.
264 Ibid.
he was greeted with shouting, chanting, whistling, yells of “resign, resign!,” and applause, which continued intermittently through his speech. At least 12 bodyguards stood on stage during his speech. Obviously angered, Fischer told protesters if they called him a warmonger they must be suggesting that Milosevic deserved a Nobel peace prize. According to a press account, most of the noise during the speech came from the back of the room, while the delegates’ section was quieter. The same journalists reported hearing yells of “murder, murder,” “Joschka Goebbels,” and “nie wieder Faschismus” (never again Fascism) from some people, and that many of those being disruptive left the hall after Fischer’s speech. The mood did seem more relaxed during the block of speeches reserved for delegates. But though some of the agitators may have left the convention, the vexing moral problem which the Greens faced—and the challenge that the war in Kosovo posed to their political identity—would not so easily dissipate.

The Delegates Vote

After the 39 speeches of the general debate concluded, the time finally came to introduce and vote on the twelve proposed resolutions selected the previous day for consideration by the convention. A detailed analysis of these twelve petitions will

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267 DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 2.
268 Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 14 May 1999. Reporter Dieter Rulff of the Tageszeitung reports that eggs were thrown at Fischer during his speech, although this is not corroborated by the video of the convention or in the accounts of others present (Taz, 14 May 1999).
269 Ibid.
have to wait until chapter three, but at this stage their basic stances on whether and how to continue the bombings must be noted. Table 1 presents the numbers and sponsors of these petitions, a distillation of their position toward continuing the bombings, and the number of votes the petitions received in all rounds of voting each was included in. The petitions are listed roughly in order of their ideological bent, with the most hard-core Realo petition (number 41) on top, and the petition most drastic in its opposition to the bombings (number 4) on the bottom. The anti-war petitions differed from each other in important ways not conveyed by this chart, but which are explored in chapter 3.

As Table 2.1 shows, the two most popular petitions turned out to be number 1, sponsored by the federal party executive committee [Bundesvorstand], and number 74, which had numerous coauthors but which seems to have been most closely associated with Hans-Christian Ströbele (MP). The federal executive committee’s petition advocated a temporary interruption of the bombings, while the petition from Ströbele and others advocated a permanent end to the bombings. The demand for a temporary interruption was termed a Feuerpause (ceasefire), and the demand for a permanent stop was called a Waffenstillstand (armistice) throughout the debate. The distinction between a Feuerpause and a Waffenstillstand may seem artificial or semantically dubious, but it stood for a real difference of views about continuing the bombings, and it was around this difference that the Greens at Bielefeld organized much of their debate. In keeping with their terminology, I will hereafter refer to petition 1 as the Feuerpause petition and petition 74 as the Waffenstillstand petition.
Table 2.1 The 12 Bielefeld Petitions, their Advocacies, and Votes Received

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Petition Number and Main Sponsor</th>
<th>Advocacy Concerning the Bombings</th>
<th>Round 1 Votes</th>
<th>Round 2 Votes</th>
<th>Round 3 Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>41 Ortmanns et al</td>
<td>Continue.</td>
<td>263</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Baden-Württemberg chapter</td>
<td>Continue.</td>
<td>301</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96 Sterzing et al</td>
<td>Stop temporarily.</td>
<td>180</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83 Niedersachsen chapter</td>
<td>Stop temporarily.</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>330</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-new Federal Executive Committee</td>
<td>Stop temporarily (the Feuerpause petition).</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>074 Ströbele, Roth et al</td>
<td>Stop permanently (the Waffenstillstand petition).</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>077 Buntenbach, Simmert et al</td>
<td>Stop permanently.</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>286</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>042 Cremer et al</td>
<td>Stop permanently.</td>
<td>242</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>085 Brandenburg chapter</td>
<td>Stop permanently.</td>
<td>227</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>089 Budich, Stratmann-Mertens et al</td>
<td>Stop permanently.</td>
<td>221</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02-new Munich chapter</td>
<td>Stop permanently.</td>
<td>187</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04 Kassel-Land chapter</td>
<td>Stop permanently or else the Greens leave government within 10 days.</td>
<td>140</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Minutes, Bielefeld Special Convention, p. 6-8.

Of the other ten petitions (hereafter called the minor petitions), some articulated more maximal views on continuing or discontinuing the bombings. While these petitions garnered fewer votes than the two major ones, they still certainly drew attention and affected the debate; moreover, some of them convey the thinking of Greens outside the party’s elites. Four were either essentially equivalent or of a more uncompromisingly Realo bent than the Feuerpause petition, while six were
equivalent to or further left than the *Waffenstillstand* petition. Sifting through the minor petitions is the task of sections three and four of the next chapter; let it suffice now to mention several of the most noteworthy. Two *Realo* petitions, number 22 from the Baden-Württemberg chapter (a *Realo* stronghold) and number 41 sponsored by Michael Ortmanns and others, do not advocate any cessation of the bombings, whether temporary or permanent, and reject categorical pacifism more or less unequivocally. Of the six minor petitions to the left of the *Waffenstillstand* petition, the most extreme was number 4 from the Kassel-Land party chapter, which demanded that the Greens leave government within ten days unless the bombings had ceased by then. The other five minor anti-war petitions differed substantially in argument and emphasis (as we will see in chapter three), but they each voiced the demand for a permanent end to the bombings without explicitly drawing the conclusion that the party should leave government if that demand went unfulfilled.

After almost eight hours of tension and boredom, the convention finally readied for voting just before 6:00 PM. However, there was one more surprise: at 5:45, before voting began, Reinhard Bütikofer of the chairmanship proposed requiring the final resolution to be passed by 6:30, since the last train going south with connections to Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, and elsewhere departed at 7:15.²⁷⁰ The final vote, argued Bütikofer, must not take place after some delegates had to leave. This 45-minute time limit meant no more time to propose amendments to the petitions (the tactic which the radical pacifists and political pacifists had used to reach consensus at the Bonn and Bremen conventions in the 1990s, see chapter 1).

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²⁷⁰ DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 4.
Opposing the chairmanship’s motion, Karin Prätori (KV Kehlheim) called the 6:30 deadline unreachable, and claimed that there was actually a later south-bound train leaving at 9:15 (a statement that received considerable applause). After she spoke, the official presiding called for yeas and neighs on the motion to institute the 6:30 deadline. His declaration that the motion passed by a clear majority was met with enough exclamations of outrage to prompt a re-do of the voting, after which he said again that the motion’s supporters were “clearly the majority” and its opponents were “clearly the minority,” and that Karin Prätori, who had spoken against the motion, agreed with his judgment. The 6:30 deadline was adopted, hence disallowing further alteration to the petitions. If a more fortuitous or less confusing train schedule had permitted delegates to propose amendments to the petitions before them, the content of the petitions and the outcome of the voting may have been different. How the result would have been affected by amendments to petitions is impossible to know, but that the result would have been affected seems almost certain.

As each petition was called off in the first and second rounds of voting, delegates who supported it would stand and raise their yellow voting cards to be tallied by vote counters standing on the podium. That the vote-counting was no exact science can be gathered from admonishments the chairmanship periodically had to issue to the assembly on behalf of the vote-counters. “Don’t applaud while votes are being counted.” “Don’t wander with your cards, that makes it hard to count.” “Hold your voting cards with the correct side towards the chairmanship, and don’t hold up

\[271\] Ibid.
\[272\] Ibid.
other pieces of paper too, that’s not especially fair.”273 After the results of the first round of voting were announced, it was clear that the leadership’s petition had the support of the majority of delegates (see Table 2.1).274

The results of the first round of voting show that Fischer had been shrewd to tolerate the call for a temporary ceasefire: as Table 1 shows, petition 77 sponsored by Buntenbach, Simmert, and others received slightly more votes than petition 22 from the Baden-Württemberg Greens, which most closely resembled Fischer’s Realo views. So slightly more Greens were quite critical of the bombings than were thoroughly supportive of them. But by a margin of 69 votes, support for the Feuerpause petition exceeded support for the Waffenstillstand petition. With approximately 800 delegates, it is difficult to tell whether the 404 votes for the Feuerpause petition represented a majority or a plurality.275 In any case, it was clear that the four petitions that received more than 300 votes (petitions 83, 01-new, 74, and 77) would pass into the second round of voting.

When the results of the second round of voting came back, a problem was evident: the tallies for resolutions 74 and 83 (they received 328 and 330 votes respectively) differed by two votes, an amount well inside the margin of error for this method of vote counting.276 Which one would pass into the final round, the Waffenstillstand petition number 74, or petition 83, which was essentially identical to the Feuerpause petition? On the video recording, Reinhard Bütikofer can be

273 Ibid., vol. 4-5.
274 Ibid.
275 Simmert and Engels, Die Lobby regiert das Land, 88.
276 DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 5.
overheard suggesting a written vote on all three petitions. Plainly Fischer’s supporters did not want to give fodder to anti-war Greens for complaining after the convention that an imprecise counting procedure had unfairly excluded their main petition from the final vote. To avoid such controversy, Rebecca Harms, a primary advocate of petition 83, withdrew it from consideration after the second round, saying its core points were represented in the executive committee’s petition. Aside from this episode, another important observation on the second round’s results is the slightly increased support for the *Feuerpause* petition—from 404 votes in the first round to 415 in the second round—and the slightly diminished support for the other three petitions: support for the Lower Saxony petition number 83 fell from 344 to 330 votes between the rounds, while the *Waffenstillstand* petition’s support fell from 335 to 328 votes and support for the Buntenbach-Simmert petition number 77 fell from 311 to 286 votes. It seems that knowing the results of the first round convinced a few Greens who had not previously supported the *Feuerpause* petition to jump on the bandwagon, and caused a few Greens who had supported other petitions not to do so again. This phenomenon reconfirms the importance of suspending knowledge of the convention’s outcome when analyzing the debate that preceded it. Once the delegates knew which petition had the most support, a small but significant number changed their minds about which petitions they favored. Apparently, knowing which petition had the most support changed some delegates’ decisions on what to vote for, so it made a real difference that they did not know the other delegates’ views until the results of the first round were reported.

277 Ibid.  
278 Ibid.
In the last round of voting, by secret ballot, the executive committee’s

*Feuerpause* petition, calling for a temporary interruption of the bombings, faced the

*Waffenstillstand* petition, which advocated that the bombings end permanently. With

the 769 ballots counted, the *Feuerpause* petition prevailed, garnering 444 votes,

versus 318 votes for the *Waffenstillstand* petition.\(^{279}\) The Green delegates had
demanded a pause in the bombings, but without expressing any fundamental moral
condemnation of the war, and without directing any disapproval at their own foreign
minister.

**Interpreting the Result**

What does the passage of the *Feuerpause* resolution indicate about the

German Green party at this stage in its history? That the party’s base had abandoned

or at least revised its commitment to pacifism? That they understood violence as a

permissible tool of international politics, but felt some reservations about this

particular bombing campaign? Perhaps a majority at the convention simply wanted

their party to stay in power, and voted for the resolution that seemed most likely to

secure that prospect. Authors taking stock of the outcome of Bielefeld have pondered

these questions. They have asked themselves: was the Greens’ debate at Bielefeld a

fundamental struggle over the party’s principles of promoting human rights, of non-
violent pacifism, and the potential contradiction between them when applied to the

Kosovo war? On the whole, the answer has been negative: commentators have

minimized the extent to which a fundamental debate on the morality of the NATO

\(^{279}\) The seven vote discrepancy between the total votes and the sum of the votes

received by each petition is presumably explained by a small number of blank or

disqualified ballots. Minutes, Bielefeld Special Convention, p. 6-8.
bombings, or of the admissibility of war as a means of politics, took place. Although these interpretations have some merit, they have relied too often on weak arguments and unsatisfactory evidence. Appreciating and critiquing four such interpretations will set the stage for the argument of this thesis that Bielefeld was undoubtedly, though not exclusively, a moral debate.

According to the first interpretation, offered by Heribert Prantl, the Bielefeld convention was preoccupied with immediate circumstances, not with general moral problems. Bielefeld was “not a fundamental debate about war and peace, international law and the forbidding of violence, but rather a point-by-point [punktuelle] debate,” i.e. a debate concerned with concrete details, not with overarching principles.\(^{280}\) The subject of the debate was “how to handle the consequences of a mistake, the decision in favor of the NATO war.”\(^{281}\) Prantl credits the Greens for wrestling with discipline, concentration, and seriousness over how to get out of the war in Yugoslavia: unlike the SPD and CDU/CSU, writes Prantl, the Greens had the courage to conduct their debate amid the dissent and accusation of anti-war protestors.\(^{282}\) Bielefeld offered the Greens an opportunity to invent a new self-definition, but because they stayed in the present moment and focused on the concrete situation before them, that opportunity went unused.\(^{283}\)

Prantl’s interpretation serves a useful point of departure once one notices the false dilemma he poses between “a fundamental debate about war and peace” and “a point-by-point [punktuelle] debate” concerning the war underway. It may seem that

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\(^{281}\) Ibid., 114.
\(^{282}\) Ibid.
\(^{283}\) Ibid., 113-115.
participants at the convention primarily disputed the merits of the NATO bombings, not the morality of war as such, but the concern with immediate circumstances that many Greens exhibited made the need to revise or defend the traditional Green principles of non-violence and pacifism all the more sharp and inescapable. The Greens drew on their values in assessing options in the current situation, and their conclusions about how to proceed led some to reassess their normative stands. In the next chapter, where I put several positions from the Bielefeld debate under the microscope, one aspect that will emerge are the ways in which various participants drew their answers to fundamental questions on the morality of war from their perceptions of how events had and were unfolding in Yugoslavia and Kosovo at that time, and how the future course of the war and its associated diplomacy would be affected by the convention’s choice.

Joachim Raschke, a political scientist and expert on the German Greens, offers a second deflationary interpretation of the convention. He points out that the two most popular positions at Bielefeld, the *Feuerpause* and *Waffenstillstand* petitions, each targeted the wavering middle of the delegates, making a clear ideological clash hard to recognize. “For tactical reasons, the conflict over basic principle [*Grundsatzkonflikt*] would be poorly recognizable by the delegates as well as the public.” Raschke accounts for the convention’s result with the observation that neither the leftist nor the *Realo* line had overwhelming support:

> without tactical softening up [*taktische Abschwächungen*] (one could also say: without attempts at deception) neither the ‘left’ nor the ‘right’ position was able to command a majority. Since Fischer had signaled he could live with the petition of the federal party leadership, the

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delegates knew that the government would not be endangered. With
the Ströbele petition they were unsure on that score despite
[Ströbele’s] assurances to the contrary.\footnote{Ibid., 351.}

Facing that uncertainty, Raschke implies, the majority of delegates chose the
resolution they knew would not endanger continued Green participation in
government. Raschke’s conclusion that triangulation maneuvers by the sponsors of
the two major petitions explain the result of the convention assumes that the Greens
during Bielefeld knew what can only be known (or to be more honest, conjectured)
with the advantage of hindsight: that the majority of the delegates wanted more than
anything else to vote for a petition which did not imperil the Red-Green coalition, a
fact—if it is a fact—which we have seen was not apparent to the participants during
the debate.

Quite apart from the influence of Greens who opposed the bombings strongly
enough to urge abandoning government (I return to their important role below),
Raschke is certainly correct in saying that tactical moderation by Ströbele and
supporters as well as by the federal executive committee obscured the contours of
whatever ideological debate the Greens underwent. Hence, a central task for
scholarship on the convention is to bring the normative debate out of the shadows and
into clear focus. Raschke himself does not go very far toward doing this. He remarks
on the variety of arguments against the NATO bombings, but only in a somewhat
dismissive way. He cannot give these arguments the credit they deserve since his
description of the Kosovo conflict is itself tendentious: “in the reality of the Serbian
policy of oppression and expulsion against the Kosovo Albanians,” he writes, “the
relationship of tension between non-violence and human rights became concrete.”

But chapter three will show that one subject of debate at Bielefeld was whether or not the situation in Kosovo presented a concrete contradiction between principles of non-violence and human rights: many Greens, especially those supporting the *Feuerpause* petition, thought it did, but others disagreed. Why a debate on that issue happened—or even *that* it happened—cannot be appreciated by Raschke if his inquiry takes for granted that the Greens found the situation in Kosovo to embody a contradiction in their principles. Those who did not find such a contradiction must be included in any adequate account of the convention.

In a third and yet more subtle interpretation of the convention, Steffen Schmuck-Soldan emphasizes even more heavily than Raschke the imperative to stay in government as an explanation of the debate’s progress and result. According to him the Greens prized retaining the foreign policy influence of their party and its leader above clarifying their principles independently and then acting consistently with them, even if that meant withdrawing from government. Thus, the contradiction between the party’s program and the actions of the government was superseded by the delegates’ desire to see Green positions implemented. Like Raschke, Schmuck-Soldan concludes that given the merely shaded difference between calls for *Feuerpause* or *Waffenstillstand*, a conflict over principle “was from outside scarcely recognizable [nach außen kaum erkennbar].” Schmuck-Soldan considers the passage of the leadership’s petition the death knell of non-violence as a Green

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286 Ibid., 348.
288 Ibid., 185.
principle, yet emphasizes that that resolution still expressed a commitment to pacifism, redefined with a new goal: “to reduce [zurückdrängen] violence in international relations through the working out of an effective monopoly on violence by the United Nations.”

Pacifism’s new goal of abolishing international anarchy was to be achieved gradually, and not by the immediate, categorical renunciation of all violent action by Germany, so that this definition of pacifism differed strikingly from the one previously associated with the Greens. Yet by holding on to the word pacifism, Schmuck-Soldan concludes, the leadership resolution created an impression of programmatic continuity which forestalled criticism within and outside the party. According to him, the institutional imperative to stay in power already precluded the convention from endorsing any position that would have required breaking the Red-Green coalition. The vigorous discussion at the convention, concludes Schmuck-Soldan, was not a truth-seeking discourse, “but rather had the consequence of determining options for action that served the interests of members of the institution.”

Schmuck-Soldan draws too strong a conclusion in saying that the convention was less a substantive debate about the war than a strategic debate about the political options of the Green party. No speaker at the convention portrayed membership in the coalition as a goal in itself. At most, several speakers did argue that though the NATO air strikes ought to be condemned, the Greens should stay in government since a negotiated settlement was more likely if they did. But this argument does not imply,

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289 Here Schmuck-Soldan is quoting the *Feuerpause* petition. Ibid., 186.
290 Ibid 188.
291 Ibid 189.
as Schmuck-Soldan claims, that the Green party’s institutional need to stay in power already excluded certain options. Questions of war and peace were so vital to the Greens that no other policy priority would have justified staying in government if that meant endorsing a war in contradiction to the Green principles of peaceful foreign policy. Rather, this argument justifies staying in government as instrumental to the goal of making peace through negotiations, a goal derived from the Greens’ fundamental commitment to a peaceful foreign policy. Antje Radcke’s justification in her memoir of why the Green party should stay in government bears this point out: “the end of the coalition would have meant for Alliance 90/the Greens not being able to exert any more influence on foreign policy, exactly the area in which we and many of those who voted for us had set high hopes.”292 The imperative to stay in government did not override the party’s moral premises, but rather had to be justified in terms of them.

Furthermore, Schmuck-Soldan’s conclusion neglects the influence of those at the convention who opposed the bombings so strongly they wanted their party to break the Red-Green government over them. As table 1 shows, in the first round of voting 140 delegates voted for resolution 4, sponsored by the Kassel-Land party chapter and spoken for at the convention by Christian Knoche. That petition delivered the ultimatum that the party must leave the coalition within 10 days unless the bombings were unconditionally and permanently stopped, with no ifs or buts.293

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Those 140 votes amounted to 45% of the support petitions ended up needing in order to pass the first round of voting, and almost a third of the support eventually received by the winning resolution. Although this hard-line anti-war position was a minority, it is worth reiterating that the entire debate at Bielefeld took place before any voting did, meaning that during the debate no one knew how many Greens opposed the war so strongly they wanted their party to abandon government. Clearly a significant contingent among the delegates (to say nothing of spectators and protesters) adhered to that position. The strength of this contingent influenced (and was influenced in turn) by the content and circumstances of the debate itself. To wit, Fischer’s speech to the convention was not primarily a response to the Ströbele-Roth petition, but far more a series of impassioned rebuttals to the arguments and accusations of the war’s sharpest critics. Fischer, his supporters, and more moderate anti-war Greens had to—and did—respond to the staunch anti-war positions. Thus, *pace* Schmuck-Soldan, there *did* transpire at Bielefeld a “truth-seeking discourse” about the morality of the NATO bombings and whether the Greens’ principles permitted remaining in a government that supported them.

A fourth hypothesis to explain the convention suggests that this purported moral debate was in fact essentially a cost-benefit analysis rather than a deliberation in which the principled rejection of violent action played any important role. Time and time again, critics at Bielefeld of the NATO bombings indicted that they were *ineffective* in achieving their stated goals of stopping human rights abuses against Kosovar Albanians and securing the return of refugees. A clear specimen of this

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294 DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 2.
argument is petition 02-new (slightly altered from the first version submitted) passed by the South Munich Greens on April 14. The South Munich Greens stated that the NATO strategy of opting for bombings to avoid a worse humanitarian catastrophe had failed and was bound to fail. That claim was supported by the fact that the NATO air strikes had been followed by a massive escalation of the expulsions of Albanians from Kosovo; thus, “The military means deployed are obviously not appropriate to fulfill the goal being striven for.” Martina Fischer’s speech challenged the Green politicians even more severely on the effectiveness of the bombings. But to argue against the bombings primarily as an ineffective means toward their stated ends is tacitly to concede that they *would* be permissible if they *did* bring about those ends. And to make that concession is already to have abandoned any categorical rejection of war as a thinkable instrument of foreign policy. So it may seem that the Bielefeld debate did not center on whether the moral case for a commitment to non-violent politics can be sustained as a response to human rights emergencies. The Greens may simply have disagreed on whether bombings happened to be the course of action most likely to ameliorate the human rights crisis in Kosovo: that is, they may not have disagreed on points of principle, but rather about what were the most likely consequences of the bombings. In that light, the debate takes the form

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296 Ibid.

297 Ibid.: “Die eingesetzten militärischen Mittel sind offensichtlich nicht geeignet, den angestrebten Zweck zu erfüllen.”

298 DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 1.
not of a clash of fundamental moral principles, but of a cost-benefit analysis: of weighing the likely good and bad effects of various means towards an agreed upon goal.

The characterization of the Bielefeld debate as a cost-benefit analysis has some truth to it—surprisingly, considering the Greens’ history of idealistic rhetoric. Yet it is vulnerable to refutation by counter-examples of cases where the principled rejection of war as a means of politics did get voiced at the convention. Annelie Buntenbach declared in her speech, “I consider military means fundamentally [grundsätzlich] unsuited for the enforcement of human rights. War too is a human rights violation.” Though she suggested alternative means of exerting pressure on Milosevic, such as an oil embargo, Buntenbach insisted “war is no alternative.”

Thomas Mohr of the South Munich chapter that submitted the petition discussed above as an example of opposing the bombings on grounds of ineffectiveness actually articulated a more principled position than Buntenbach’s. Mohr defended pacifism as a long-term project and argued that the Greens’ commitment to non-violence would be finished if they prioritized keeping Joschka Fischer in office. In her convention speech, Johanna Wirt of the Märkisch-Oderland party chapter gave another principled articulation of pacifism:

Non-violence is a mental attitude that begins with the recognition that the human has a conscience, a sparkling, divine insight that allows him to differentiate between good and evil, between truth and lies. One who wants to proceed non-violently must count on the Serbs, like other people, being able to differentiate between good and evil, therefore he appeals to conscience, to the opposition, to the religious

299 DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 1.
300 Ibid.
people in Serbia, and strengthens those powers that support justice and reconciliation.301 Wirt continued that non-violent action required credibility, which meant not selectively decrying human rights violations in Kosovo while ignoring atrocities against Kurds in Turkey, the oppression of Serbs in Croatia, the occupation of Tibet under the Chinese government, the death penalty in the United States, or hate crimes against immigrants in Germany.302 She continued, “anyone who believes he can bomb a peaceable, just attitude into someone is not an advocate of non-violence [ist kein Gewaltfreier]. He also knows little about how people react to blows.”303 Finally, Sebastian Rüttgers of the Dortmund chapter emphasized in his speech to the convention that the Greens faced a fundamental decision: do they find military power a legitimate means of solving conflicts?304

Although these voices of fundamental rejection of war as a means of politics were surprisingly seldom at the convention, their presence refutes an attempt to interpret the debate as restricted to arguing the effectiveness of war as a means to a desired ends. Moreover, though the interpretation of Bielefeld as a cost-benefit analysis might seem to account for the bulk of the debate (except for a few relatively isolated adherents to strict non-violence), that interpretation is unconvincing since it makes the outcome of the debate appear totally irrational. If the Greens were subjecting NATO’s bombing campaign to a cost-benefit analysis, and if a wide consensus which including even the staunchly Realo authors of petition 22 considered

301 Ibid., vol. 2.
302 Ibid.
303 Ibid.
304 Ibid.
the bombings to have been failed in terms of humanitarian goals, why would the Greens not have called for the bombings to end permanently? Since even Realos considered the bombings ineffective, if the debate was confined to assessing the effectiveness of the bombings, it would be difficult to understand why a majority called for them only to be interrupted, not ended.

The flaws in the four interpretations of Bielefeld just presented are revealing. Consideration of Prantl’s claim that the debate concerned details, not basic principles highlights the fact that it concerned both. Raschke’s and Schmuck-Soldan’s variations on the argument that the outcome of the debate was controlled by the Greens’ desire to stay in government neglects the role played by critics of the bombings who actually did want to leave government if they continued. The hypothesis that the debate was a cost-benefit analysis fits with much of its content but leaves its result an enigma. These four interpretations seem inadequate because in different ways each one fails to recognize that the moral, political, and instrumental dimensions of the debate were present and interacting with each other. The Greens certainly zeroed in on immediate details and considered the effectiveness of the bombings versus non-violent alternatives. In the course of the debate they repeatedly invoked, and sometimes revised, their fundamental moral stands. Moreover, it would be naïve to imagine that coalition politics was not on their minds. Interpreting Bielefeld requires acknowledging the moral, political, and instrumental aspects of the debate and

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noticing how considerations of each kind reinforced or contradicted those of the other kinds.

Appreciating each dimension of the debate requires the fulfillment of several tasks, which the next chapter undertakes. The moral dilemma many Greens considered themselves to be facing will be defined and seen as the subject of controversy concerning its applicability to the Kosovo war. The disagreements aired among the Greens on the responsibilities of political power must also be appraised. Raschke has already pointed out one way in which morality and politics intersected at Bielefeld: compromises by party elites resulted in the drafting of petitions which to some extent blurred the moral positions in the debate. To understand how broad moral and political problems related to the Greens’ perceptions of the specifics of the Kosovo war, the speeches by delegates and the stances of the ten minor petitions must be scrutinized. Thus, the next chapter studies the content of the Bielefeld debate by focusing on the intersections of moral principles with immediate circumstances, and by including grass-roots voices, both because of their role in framing the debate and in order to avoid getting mesmerized by the tactical maneuvers of party leaders. As will be shown, moral claims were dramatically aired, disagreements were sharp as to how the party should function in government, the extreme views of minorities influenced the proceedings distinctly, and appreciating these factors furnishes insight on why the Greens passed the *Feuerpause* petition.
Chapter 3

Topics and Voices in the Bielefeld Debate

This chapter examines the contents of the Greens’ debate at Bielefeld. It begins with two sections that lay out some of the central problems at stake: first, the debate surrounding the moral dilemma of a contradiction between abstaining from violence and promoting human rights, and second, the debates concerning the party’s transition from opposition to government. The subsequent four sections, the bulk of the chapter, sift through the twelve petitions voted on by delegates, analyzing their contents and their role in the debate. The third section considers the two major petitions, those proposing the *Waffenstillstand* and *Feuerpause*, as well as the main rebuttals and defenses offered for those positions. The fourth and fifth sections concern the other ten petitions, first those more of a *Realo* bent than the *Feuerpause* petition, and then those to the left of the *Waffenstillstand* petition. The intriguing question of whether the multiple anti-war petitions split the left-wing vote between them, thus assisting the passage of the federal executive committee’s resolution, receives consideration in the final section.

This chapter will show that although the Bielefeld debate undeniably had an autonomous moral component (i.e., it was not merely an effort to determine what was in the party’s political self-interest), to portray that moral component as a clash between irreconcilable principles of pacifism and human rights is inaccurate. Not only did some Greens deny that the war in Kosovo was a case where human rights could only be protected by means of violent intervention (as section one shows, noting that some Greens did not have a torn conscience on the matter), but there were
even differences on what concrete goal was asserted to follow from the abstract
imperative of protecting human rights in Kosovo (as section three shows, noting the
difference between Fischer’s professed goal of making possible the eventual return of
the Kosovar Albanian refugees, versus the Waffenstillstand petition’s professed goal
to provide immediate humanitarian assistance for internally displaced persons in
Kosovo). Thus, this chapter lays the groundwork for a central argument of this thesis
to be spelled out in chapter four: that the Greens at Bielefeld presented themselves not
with the task of prioritizing their values of pacifism and human rights, but of meeting
the challenges of operating as a morally principled governing party.

Contesting a Moral Dilemma

Large white letters on a green background behind the convention stage
conveyed the words “Frieden und Menschenrechte vereinbaren,”—uniting peace and
human rights, a central preoccupation at the convention, yet one that posed a
dilemma. That dilemma can be characterized schematically as arising for one who
holds three premises: (1) a goal whose pursuit is a moral imperative (in this case,
acting to secure human rights in all countries); (2) the categorical refusal of a certain
kind of action (in this case military deployments) as morally impermissible; and (3) a
circumstance (in this case the Kosovo conflict) where the refused means becomes
regarded as indispensable to the morally imperative end. Logically, an actor
committed to the first two principles would have to abandon or relax one or more of
them if faced with a crisis fitting the description of the third condition. Thus, a debate
on this moral dilemma would concern its applicability as well as its resolution. Points
of contention would be: (1) whether the Kosovo conflict was a situation where military intervention from the outside was the only means of defending human rights, and if that were the case, (2) how to reformulate commitments to non-violence and human rights so as to resolve the contradiction. The purpose of pointing out the separateness of these two levels of debate on the moral dilemma is not to suggest that the Greens distinguished them explicitly, since they did not. Rather, making the distinction helps one understand why such a large component of the Bielefeld debate invoked competing representations of the Kosovo crisis and its history, rather than weighing in a vacuum the importance of abstract principles. Disputing the accuracy of factual representations of the Kosovo conflict was not a substitute for, but rather a necessary component of the moral and ideological debate the Greens conducted.

Schematizing the human-rights-versus-pacifism dilemma also makes clear that those Greens who did not believe that the NATO military intervention would promote human rights in Kosovo were not trapped in the purported dilemma, which only applied to Greens who found that the Kosovo crisis fulfilled the third condition. This point can be confirmed from the rhetoric of the debate. Noticing how various Greens used one particular word—Zerrissenheit, indicating a state of division or of being torn apart—provides a marker for distinguishing those who perceived the situation in Kosovo as embodying a contradiction between principles of pacifism and human rights from those who denied that Kosovo generated such a contradiction. At the convention, Zerrissenheit was a symptom experienced by those who felt in a bind of the sort characterized by the three premises above, while Greens who did not

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306 Perhaps the best paraphrase for Zerrissenheit in this context would be the feeling of being torn apart by contrary pulls on one’s conscience.
believe the Kosovo crisis created a moral dilemma scorned professions of

Zerrissenheit by others. Tracing the invocations of Zerrissenheit throughout the day will show that in debating how to unite peace and human rights, the Greens disagreed not only on the correct resolution but also on the applicability of the dilemma which held them to be in contradiction.

Before the convention’s ground-rules had even been established, the Zerrissenheit problem was raised most provocatively by Ilona Hepp of the leftist Berlin-Kreuzberg party chapter. She moved for two resolutions that had not been among the twelve slated for consideration at the convention to be taken up immediately, since they concerned the non-violent foundations of the party:307 “I ask that before our celebrities speak about their inner Zerrissenheit, the Greens make clear that they have something other than Zerrissenheit: principles, namely.”308 The motion got defeated in a landslide, but Hepp had struck a nerve. Her memorable sentence, the first polemical remark of the day, received applause and reverberated through later speeches, as the video record of the convention shows.309 In the debate’s first official speech, Antje Radcke described her “worst day” of Zerrissenheit as she sat in on a meeting of Defense Minister Sharping with his military advisers.310 But before telling the anecdote—repeated in her memoir and probably intended to show that she shared the anti-militaristic instincts characteristic of the Greens—Radcke felt compelled to defend herself to all those

307 The petitions for whose immediate consideration she appealed were numbers 82 and 28. DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 1.
308 Ibid.
309 Ibid., vol. 1-3.
310 Ibid., vol. 1.
who clapped before when Ilona said, or accused us, that we would only present our Zerrissenheit – but I find it must be allowed that all those – and also you in the hall – who feel this Zerrissenheit have the opportunity to describe it. Nevertheless there will be a clear position afterward, and I’ll get to that.311

Joschka Fischer also felt provoked by Hepp’s accusation and replied in his speech:

“‘When the party-friend got up here before and said, the party leadership speaks about its Zerrissenheit: I don’t know how you feel when you see the pictures [from Kosovo].’”312 A moment later he added, “it’s not an inner Zerrissenheit, but an outward Zerrissenheit.”313 In the general debate, Kerstin Müller, who in parliament had voted against authorizing military force, but now spoke in support of the bombings, declared, “we have doubts, and we are really Zerrissen about what is the right way to peace in the region.”314 But seeing no alternative to bombings, she defend them as a last resort. During her address Antje Röhl of the Berlin-Neukölln chapter renewed Hepp’s scorn, saying that when the Green Ministers speak of their inner Zerrissenheit, “that complaint nauseates me, for at the same moment people are really being torn apart by their bombs, and also through their inner Zerrissenheit.”315 Nine speeches later, Reiner Priggen of the Aachen chapter retorted, I would ask the previous speaker to rethink that… I’ve been doing Green politics for 15 years…. I have never been in discussion until this point so Zerrissen as on the question that we are deciding today. And that’s the way it should be, because it is an entirely different dimension, and because we have to decide it seriously. And I find it unpleasant [unangenehm] when it is here publicly insinuated, of

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311 Ibid.
312 Ibid., vol. 2.
313 Ibid.
314 Ibid.
315 Ibid., vol. 3.
Greens whom I know torment themselves over the question, that it is repulsive [widerlich] if they present their Zerrissenheit here.  

The Greens, Priggen felt, were appropriately developing a new position, prompted by the massacres at Srebrenica. Priggen attested to having argued with many protesters against the bombings and encountering only one or two who denied experiencing Zerrissenheit.

However few they were, the Greens scornful of Zerrissenheit had a significant voice and participated in shaping the debate with their provocative derision, eliciting direct responses from party leaders such as Antje Radcke, Joschka Fischer, and Kerstin Müller. That proponents and staunch opponents of the NATO bombings disagreed on whether expressions of Zerrissenheit at the convention were an appropriate or a repulsive performance indicates their deeply different in perception of the Kosovo conflict. The bombings’ supporters experienced Zerrissenheit over a contradiction of the form above, while Hepp and Röhl called for the Greens to reaffirm their principles, not to complain about feeling torn apart inside. Each side provided interpretations of the Kosovo crisis suited to their state of Zerrissenheit or lack thereof, as will be seen. Thus, though a moral dilemma between pacifism and human rights was an integral part of the Bielefeld debate, the relevance of that dilemma was also contested in arguments which pitted competing representations of the Kosovo conflict against each other. Though the Bielefeld debate cannot be portrayed solely a clash between abstract principles of human rights versus pacifism, neither is its status as a moral debate refuted by the numerous references throughout.

316 Ibid.
317 Ibid.
the day to contemporary events, since those topics were a related and necessary component in the moral debate.

Personal expressions of anxiety came under attack at the convention from yet another angle. The purpose of the entire event, as many Greens with various positions on the bombings reiterated, was to find solutions to the current crisis, not to work off inner turmoil, or to assuage one’s conscience. This point got reiterated abundantly, especially by such supporters of the *Feuerpause* petition as Annette Smith of the Bonn party chapter and the MP Franziska Eichstaedt-Bohlig.\textsuperscript{318} Significantly, no one asserted the converse, that attempting to alleviate the suffering in Kosovo could take a back seat to the higher priority of reducing any feelings of personal guilt. The fact that an admonishment not to be primarily concerned with resolving inner turmoil was reiterated so abundantly, despite the fact that no one contradicted it (or reasonably could have) suggests not only that the Greens found moralizing for self-comfort to be a bad habit of theirs, but also that denouncing this habit served a different rhetorical purpose. Namely, it contributed to portraying those who presented themselves as standing on principle in opposition to the NATO bombings as uncaring or immature: uncaring because asserting principles without offering solutions seemed self-centered, and immature because of the responsibilities imposed by the transition from an opposition to a party in government.

*Problems of Political Responsibility*

So far this chapter’s treatment of the Bielefeld debate has not distinguished it from a moot, academic discussion on the consistency or inconsistency of certain

\textsuperscript{318} Ibid., vol. 2, 3.
principles given a certain situation. It was, of course, much more than that. At Bielefeld, the problem of reconciling the Greens’ fundamental principles intersected with their grappling with the implications of being in power. In debating their responsibilities as a governing party, the Greens faced at least three questions: (1) whether to stay in the coalition, (2) the type of demands a governing party, rather than an opposition party, should make, and (3) the correct relationship in a governing party between Ministers and the party rank-and-file. In noting opposing ideas on those questions, it becomes apparent that the speeches by the delegates are at least as helpful as those of party officials for recovering the convention’s central points of discussion.

Taking up the first question, if the NATO bombings were inconsistent with the Greens’ vision of peaceful foreign policy, the Greens had to answer (or avoid) the question of whether they found supporting such a war too high a price to pay for staying in government. When Christian Knoche introduced the petition from the Kassel-Land Greens (number 4) calling for withdrawal from the coalition within 10 days unless the bombings stopped permanently, he urged the Greens who opposed the bombings to rethink their commitment to staying in government. The coalition question “presents itself automatically. With war and peace the time for a formula compromise [Formelkompromiss] ends.” As the core of the Green party’s credibility, the principle of non-violence could not be abandoned, he maintained. In the same vein, Andreas Knoblauch of Salzgitter chapter, the 25th speaker in the

319 Ibid., vol. 4.
320 Ibid.
321 Ibid.
general debate, said he considered Fischer to have signed on to the SPD by his speech, abandoning what made Green foreign policy unique.\footnote{Ibid. vol. 3.}

Several speakers harshly rebuked the notion that the Greens must leave the coalition, or even demand a permanent end to the bombings without threatening to leave the coalition, in order to preserve the credibility of their commitment to the principle of non-violence. Daniel Cohn-Bendit inveighed that rescuing the Green party identity for the sake of being able to boast one’s anti-war credentials in the bars of Kreuzberg (a Berlin stronghold of left-wing Greens) would be to sacrifice the Kosovar Albanians by weakening Fischer.\footnote{Ibid.} Rudi Hoogvliet of the Stuttgart party chapter, 33rd speaker in the general debate, predicted that demanding an unconditional immediate stop to the bombings would endanger the coalition, and though that itself was no argument against the demand, with the Greens gone from government and Volker Rühe of the CDU or Klaus Kinkel of the FDP in Fischer’s office, Fischer’s efforts for a diplomatic solution could no longer prevail.\footnote{Ibid.} To Hoogvliet, reaching a decision that strengthened Fischer was the responsibility of the convention.\footnote{Ibid.}

Angelika Beer (MP) made the complementary point that for the future, the Greens must stay in government to search for means of averting coming crises before they impose the choice between protecting human rights or refusing to take up violence as a last resort.\footnote{Ibid., vol. 1.} These rationales for staying in government appealed to those who opposed the bombings and wanted them to stop.
Second, did the responsibility of being in government mean to the Greens at Bielefeld that they had to advocate only policies whose implementation was feasible given the realities of domestic and international politics, or should the party make demands more extreme than those whose fulfillment was considered politically possible? According to Radcke, the driving question of the day was how the Greens as a governing party could contribute to ending the war in Yugoslavia as fast as possible.\textsuperscript{327} The fifth delegate to speak in the general debate, Angelika Köster-Loßback of the Heidelberg chapter, warned that if the Greens failed to provide a robust mandate to their foreign minister, Fischer’s diplomatic initiatives would fail, the Greens would only be a voice in the wilderness, and the refugees would lack needed assistance.\textsuperscript{328} Sybille Haußmann of the Düren chapter, the 22\textsuperscript{nd} speaker in the general debate, pointed out that German foreign policy operated within a complex international system of states where the Greens could not expect their maximal demands to be fulfilled, and equated supporting Fischer’s line with participation in government, and with being grown-up and responsible.\textsuperscript{329} Andreas Braun of the Baden-Württemberg federal State chapter asserted that without the Greens in government, the Rambouillet negotiations and the peace plan recently considered by the G8 would never have transpired.\textsuperscript{330} Thus, preserving the Greens’ place in politics appeared to him critical to achieving peace.\textsuperscript{331}

\textsuperscript{327} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{328} Ibid., vol. 2
\textsuperscript{329} Ibid., vol. 3.
\textsuperscript{330} Ibid., vol. 4.
\textsuperscript{331} Ibid.
Against these visions of Green politics as improving the outcomes of government policy, the convention’s 34th speaker Halina Bendkowski of the Berlin chapter urged the Greens to use their position as a chance to publicize the demands of an anti-fascist Sonderweg, and given that the impossibility of doing so was already clear when the Greens entered government, she concluded they should not have done so.\textsuperscript{332} The very next speaker, Oliver Moldenhauer of the Potsdam chapter, emphasized that as coalition members of the second largest government in NATO, the Greens had an enormous voice in the press: different parties have different roles, said Moldenhauer, suggesting the Greens could promote peace through publicity rather than hoping to push through the watered-down call for a temporary Feuerpause.\textsuperscript{333}

Bendkowski and Moldenhauer notwithstanding, a conception of Green politics as achieving social change through protest and publicity, as Petra Kelly had conceived it, seemed isolated and meager by the time of the Bielefeld conference. Although many commentators accused the Greens of not adjusting their goals and tactics suitably for their new role in government, the Bielefeld debate contained an overwhelming chorus of voices for whom the point of Green politics was staying in government to influence policy to whatever extent possible, with only a few instances of the “politics-as-protest” oppositional mentality in evidence.

A third issue of political responsibility disputed among the Greens was the relationship between the party’s leaders in government and its grass-roots supporters. Fischer strenuously opposed a sort of division of labor where the membership would

\textsuperscript{332} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{333} Ibid.
express sublime ideals while the governing leadership had to confront tough realities. He declaimed, “what cannot be is that on the one hand, we as a party maintain our clear conscience on peace politics, and then [on the other hand] there are a few in parliament and the government who are responsible for the realities – it can’t be that way.” Cem Özdemir called such an arrangement cynical. But Bärbel Höhn held that while the Greens of course knew Fischer could not represent Green positions in their pure form to NATO or in the Red-Green coalition, nonetheless the party was not obliged to underwrite the logic of military intervention: according to her the party had a different job than the minister, and must give a clear call for de-escalation. Thomas Mohr succinctly summed up this argument for a division of labor between the party’s Ministers and its grass roots: “Neither is a foreign Minister a puppet of the convention, nor is the convention just an event for applauding [Klatschveranstaltung] the foreign minister.”

Fischer’s protest at being put between the Scylla of his party’s ideological anti-militarism and the Charybdis of NATO’s inflexible plans is understandable, but, as his memoir makes plain, the pressure he felt from being accountable to his party base was the primary motivation for his promotion of the Fischer Plan to the G8. He recalls, “with every day the bombings continued, the political pressure from parliament and [the Green] party became stronger and stronger. In domestic politics I

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334 Ibid., vol. 2.
335 For some reason Fischer left this quotation and the passage surrounding it out of the reproduction in his memoir of the Bielefeld speech. Fischer, *Die rot-grünen Jahre*, 223-227.
336 DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 4.
337 Ibid., vol. 3.
338 Ibid., vol. 2.
339 Fischer, *Die rot-grünen Jahre*, 187
urgently needed relief through the development of a persuasive political initiative. In terms of content that didn’t play an essential role in composing the new plan, but it certainly did play a role in the publicity.”340 Before the April 12 meeting of the NATO Council in Brussels (which coincidentally was also Fischer’s birthday), he leaked the five-point document to the press under the title of “Fischer Plan,” without informing Madeleine Albright or the other diplomats involved.341 His NATO colleagues were “anything but pleased,” but in his defense Fischer writes “it was not vanity that had driven me to this way of proceeding, but sheer political necessity… in domestic politics this maneuver would prove itself exceedingly helpful and important.”342 Thus, the division of labor that held party leaders accountable to an idealistic party base forced Fischer to find a way to appear to be succeeding in bringing the party base’s demands and reservations into the planning discussions of NATO and the G-8.

With an overview of major moral and political problems framing the debate completed, it is time to descend into the minutia. Determining how the contents of the petitions fit into the major moral and political dilemmas which so concerned the Greens in speeches at Bielefeld is the overarching purpose of this chapter. The petitions—being the numerous, complex, and often haphazardly organized documents they were—produced widely varying and rarely straightforward approaches to moral and political dilemmas like the ones above. The contents of each petition require careful analysis before the problems and proposals in the Bielefeld debate can be

340 Ibid., 187.
341 Ibid., 187-8.
342 Ibid., 189-90.
integrated into an adequate understanding of the convictions and motivations which
explain the outcome of the convention and the wider significance of that result. The
next section compares the two major petitions, Feuerpause and Waffenstillstand,
which advocated respectively a temporary versus a permanent halt to the bombings.
Subsequent sections will analyze the minor petitions to the right and left of those two.

Feuerpause versus Waffenstillstand

Comparison of the Feuerpause and Waffenstillstand petitions makes clear that
the debate between them was not purely a clash of abstract convictions concerning
pacifism and human rights, but rather turned around the merits of their differing
demands for a temporary or permanent halt to the bombings. The arguments in favor
of each demand extended from their authors’ understandings of the status and history
of the Kosovo crisis. Advocates of each position did indeed assert their convictions
regarding pacifism and human rights, but rather than positing them in the abstract,
they were induced from analyses and prescriptions concerning the current situation.
Yet clearly normative positions also colored the Greens’ perceptions of the Kosovo
crisis in the first place. So Prantl’s dichotomy, which implied that the Greens only
could have been concerned either with fundamental principles or with the details of
immediate circumstances surrounding their deliberations,343 must be rejected. The
Feuerpause versus Waffenstillstand debate operated on both levels, since each level
drew upon and necessitated the other. Thus, this section further illustrates the theme
of an entanglement of descriptive and normative outlooks in the debate at Bielefeld.

343 Prantl, Rot-grün, 114.
Although both positions had been carefully calibrated to appeal to undecided delegates, their differences were still apparent and hotly disputed. Starting with the Waffenstillstand petition, this section notes how the goal it set differed slightly from the one Fischer proposed, and how the petition asserted facts about the immediate needs of refugees in order to justify a Waffenstillstand. Next, the arguments and counter-arguments over whether the Waffenstillstand proposal placed undue trust in Milosevic will be aired. For the Feuerpause petition, the main problem is to understand how its authors justified only a temporary pause to the bombings given their quite negative view of the bombings’ performance up to then. Given their view that the bombings had been necessary, how the authors of the Feuerpause petition defined pacifism and delineated the role for non-violent solutions to conflicts will also be of interest. Finally, critiques of the Feuerpause petition from Greens who went further in their opposition to the bombings than did the Waffenstillstand petition will be noted.

The Ströbele-Roth Waffenstillstand petition sets a similar but importantly different goal from the one Fischer articulated in his speech.\(^{344}\) The text of the Waffenstillstand petition states “the highest and first goal for Bündnis 90/Die Grünen is the end of the expulsions and help for the refugees.”\(^{345}\) By contrast, Fischer said in his speech that the Greens must choose what policies to support based on which made

\(^{344}\) However, Fischer’s speech did not advocate a Feuerpause, a demand he only accepted out of political necessity. DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 2.

possible the return of the refugees, which he argued was a precondition for any lasting peace and stability in the region.\textsuperscript{346} Also emphasizing securing the return of refugees as an important goal, Daniel Cohn-Bendit claimed dramatically that the refugees would never return unless they did so by winter.\textsuperscript{347} Thus, Fischer and some of his supporters tended to concentrate on the longer-term geopolitics of the region, while Ströbele, Roth and their coauthors focused on the short-term humanitarian needs of the refugees. This observation seems surprising since certainly Fischer’s language emphasized the plight of the refugees, while the \textit{Waffenstillstand} petition endorsed longer-term financial and civil means for securing peace in South East Europe. However, the fact remains that in defending specific proposals, Fischer defined the ultimate goal as ensuring the return of refugees to prevent protracted strife \textit{a la} the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while the Roth-Ströbele petition appealed primarily for meeting the refugees’ immediate humanitarian needs.

According to the Roth-Ströbele petition, the \textit{Waffenstillstand} it advocated was not to be confused with a \textit{Friedensabkommen}, or peace treaty, “so that a \textit{Waffenstillstand} will not be blocked by disagreement about a peace treaty [\textit{Friedensabkommen}].”\textsuperscript{348} Perhaps this language meant to imply that the expected and desired results of a \textit{Waffenstillstand} could be achieved even without Milosevic’s becoming cooperative in negotiations. The call for a \textit{Waffenstillstand} would advance

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{346} DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 2.
\item \textsuperscript{347} Ibid., vol. 3.
\item \textsuperscript{348} “damit ein Waffenstillstand nicht durch die Uneinigkeit über ein Friedensabkommen blockiert wird.” Claudia Roth, Hans-Christian Ströbele, et al., “Die Luftangriffe sofort beenden und mit der Logik der Kriegsführung brechen,” (Petition 74). 
\end{itemize}
two purposes: first, furnishing humanitarian help to the refugees, and second, averting a larger catastrophe.

The plight of the 150,000 refugees wandering around Kosovo especially makes a fast \textit{Waffenstillstand} for initiating provisioning flights [\textit{Versorgungsflügen}] a humanitarian imperative. If help can’t be furnished quickly, a further, almost unimaginable humanitarian catastrophe will come about. Despite the bombardments, NATO would have to watch helplessly. Stopping bombardments makes possible a \textit{Waffenstillstand} for the executing [\textit{Durchführung}] of provisioning flights [\textit{Versorgungsflügen}].

Thus, the appeal for a \textit{Waffenstillstand} was justified by the perception that it was the only way to address the current humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, and prevent a more serious one.

The Roth-Ströbele petition gave a second justification for the \textit{Waffenstillstand} demand: “Only an end to the bombings also opens new political room to maneuver for negotiations about the de-escalation of the conflict and a peace treaty [\textit{Friedensabkommen}].”\textsuperscript{350} This second argument, that unilaterally and permanently stopping the bombings might renew negotiations, provoked harsh rebuttal. Ludger Volmer, the last speaker in the general debate, criticized the call for a \textit{Waffenstillstand} as premised on a no-longer-tenable assumption from the Cold War era that unilateral de-escalation was the only way to abort a confrontation neither side wanted.\textsuperscript{351} Volmer warned that no such trust in the good intentions of Milosevic was justified given his murderous nationalist politics, which Volmer denounced as

\textsuperscript{349} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{350} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{351} DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 4.
fascism. The Green Party MP Helmut Lippelt, 21st speaker in the general debate, charged that every call for a final stop to the bombings sent the wrong signal to Milosevic, giving him hope he could endure the bombardments until NATO’s political will to continue them ran out. During his speech Joschka Fischer made a similar point. Proclaiming that Milosevic had violated 73 UN resolutions and 17 of 18 Waffenstillstand agreements since 1993, Fischer exclaimed,

> I ask you dear friends, where do you get your trust in Milosevic, that without massive armed protection it won’t go exactly the same way for the people [in Kosovo] as it did for the men in Srebrenica, who are lying cold in mass graves until this very day? Where do you get that? I don’t share your trust.

This charge that those who opposed the bombings placed trust in and helped Milosevic was the main counter-argument to the Waffenstillstand petition, and to other opponents of the bombings as well.

In response to the charge of trusting Milosevic, Ströbele argued in both his speeches (the first during the general debate, the second introducing the petition he co-sponsored) that hundreds of thousands of refugees needed immediate humanitarian assistance which the Red Cross would provide only once the bombings stopped. The bombings must not continue at the cost of bringing assistance to those people, he urged. In his second speech, he admitted to seeing no guarantee that ending the bombings would secure human rights, but pointed out that the bombings had not yet

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352 Here an important difference is evident from what Johanna Wirt described as the core of pacifism: believing that everyone has a conscience to which one should make moral appeals rather than resorting to violence. See chapter 2.
353 DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 3.
354 For some reason, the words “until this very day” [bis auf den heutigen Tag] are removed from the reproduction of Fischer’s speech in his memoir. Fischer, Die rot-grünen Jahre, 225.
355 Ibid., vol. 4.
done so either. He criticized the government for not considering alternatives such as an oil embargo until 36 days into the war.

Responding to Daniel Cohn-Bendit’s accusation that Milosevic would rejoice at the efforts of the bombings’ opponents, Ströbele admonished that in a democratic society, war critics should never be impugned with “helping the enemy” as would be done to silence dissent in a dictatorship.

That remark, along with a brief suggestion that the security of refugees could be guaranteed by international troops under his petition, was as far as Ströbele went in responding to Fischer and Volmer’s accusation that his position placed unwarranted trust in the incorrigible Milosevic. Ströbele’s failure to counter effectively the argument that the *Waffenstillstand* proposal required Milosevic’s cooperation in order to succeed probably caused support for his petition to diminish.

Yet strangely, the critique by Joschka Fischer, Ludger Volmer, Daniel Cohn-Bendit and others that the *Waffenstillstand* petition put too much trust in Milosevic also applied *prima facia* to the leadership’s position as well. The *Feuerpause* petition called for a temporary stop to the NATO bombings “in order to strengthen diplomatic chances,” precisely the appeal that Fischer, Volmer, and Cohn-Bendit said was futile and would embolden Milosevic. The *Feuerpause* petition also included a bleak assessment of the current situation and the effectiveness of the bombings:

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356 Ibid.
357 Ibid.
358 Ibid.
Today it is established: the humanitarian catastrophe became accelerated, it became larger, as most had really feared, and it continues. How unprepared the international community was for this development is clear from the fact that no sufficient preparations [Vorkehrungen] for provisioning the refugees were made. The bordering countries taking them in were and are entirely over-taxed and suffer internal political tensions as a consequence. This contributed to growing doubts on the legitimacy of the bombing war, just as did the increase of human victims and the civilian damage that it caused. The military attacks of NATO from the air have indeed weakened the Milosevic regime’s apparatus of military and violence, but they have also made a bitter mockery of the illusion of a surgically precise air war, caused politically negative consequences, and demanded a reduction to military thinking (this is especially clearly seen in view of the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade [on May 8]).

In her speech to the assembly, Antje Radcke, one of the drafters of this petition, stated that the Greens were united in finding the NATO strategy a failure.

How then did Radcke and the other government Greens who had voted for the bombings justify having done so? They did so by arguing that by this stage in the conflict, it was already too late for non-violent means of conflict resolution to work.

Upon entering government, the Greens inherited (a word Volmer emphasized heavily in his speech), the necessity to grapple with the crisis in Kosovo, which according to Volmer the German government and the international community had neglected during the 90s despite the Greens’ urgent publicizing of the repression of Rugova’s non-violent resistance to Serbian oppression. Civil means of conflict resolution such as the Greens advocated only work in the long-term, and not for addressing

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360 Ibid.
361 DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol., 1.
362 Ibid., vol. 4.
363 Ibid.
urgent crises, argued Radcke. By depicting the war as the result of a catastrophic decade of failed policies which the Greens had criticized all along, Radcke, Volmer, Angelika Beer, Kerstin Müller and others could present going to war as the correct means of conflict resolution in the current situation without impugning the superiority and priority of non-violent means of conflict resolution in general. To Antje Radcke and Kerstin Müller, among others, the lesson drawn was never to ignore conflicts during their early stages, to get involved in time, before the decision is whether to bomb or not.

How did these speakers in favor of the *Feuerpause* petition formulate, or reformulate, their party’s commitment to pacifism and non-violence given their contention that, in the Kosovo situation at least, dropping bombs had become the only possible response to the expulsion of civilians? Radcke defined the Greens’ dilemma in her speech, and later in her memoir, as between on the one hand, standing up [Eintreten] for the protection of human rights, and on the other, of refusing to use military violence in pursuing political ends. Though in her memoir she calls this contradiction a conflict of goals [Zielkonflikt] it can be understood more adequately as described at the beginning of this chapter: as a conflict between a desired end and a refused means, given a situation where the refused means is necessary for achieving the desired end. Radcke continued that while the Greens aspired toward both goals in unison, civil conflict prevention only functioned as a long-term policy inapplicable to

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364 Ibid., vol. 1.
365 DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 1; Antje Radcke, *Das Ideal und die Macht*, 251.
the current crisis. Kerstin Müller took this thought a step further in her speech, saying that the Greens stand for *nie wieder Krieg* (never again war) and *nie wieder Faschismus* (never again fascism), but when they conflict, one can identify the correct course of action not by preferring one principle to the other in the abstract, but rather by analyzing the particular case at issue. Thus, the government Greens who supported the bombings, or at least who at Bielefeld opposed demanding a permanent end to them, reconciled that position with a commitment to pacifism by articulating pacifism as a long-term project which did not require that non-violent methods of conflict resolution be used in every situation.

This explanation of how it had come to the use of military force did not by itself illuminate what action the Greens should advocate moving forward from Bielefeld. Radcke defined the task to be finding a position that, while measuring up to the anti-militarist and pacifist fundamental outlook of the party, the Greens could responsibly advocate as members of government. The majority of the party wanted to stay in government, said Radcke, and the Greens should not play Russian roulette with that prospect. Hence Radcke argued the Greens should support the efforts of the Fischer peace plan, while breaking with the logic of military escalation by demanding a *Feuerpause*. The Green MP Franziska Eichstaedt-Bohlig defended Fischer’s diplomatic efforts as advancing the “fundamental Green goals” [*urgrüne Ziele*] of civilizing international politics by reforming the UN, cooperating with

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366 Ibid.
367 DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 2.
368 Ibid., vol. 1.
369 Ibid.
Russia, and building a unified European security policy.\textsuperscript{370} To call these urgrüne Ziele may be a stretch: Green foreign policy demands during 80s had included for example West Germany’s withdrawal from NATO. But Eichstaedt-Bohlig’s statement indicates that even though the Greens in government clearly did not want their party to go into the opposition over the Kosovo conflict, they did not present staying in government as an ends in itself, but justified it as instrumental to the traditional goals of Green foreign policy.

Advocates of the \textit{Waffenstillstand} petition and positions further to the left criticized the \textit{Feuerpause} proposal of a temporary stop to the bombings as no real escape from the logic of escalation. Bärbel Höhn argued, “If we decide for a temporary \textit{Feuerpause} here, then that means that if there isn’t a solution within that time, one automatically bombs again. And what does that mean? One gives the key into the hand of the opponent, into Milosevic’s hand.”\textsuperscript{371} Thus, Höhn not only argued that a temporary interruption of the bombings did not go far enough, since this policy presupposed that the bombings would commence again after a fixed period of time elapsed, but went further and attempted to extend this argument into a response to the charge that the \textit{Waffenstillstand} position put too much faith in Milosevic. Whose petition relied less on the cooperation of Milosevic was thus one of the central disagreements between advocates of the \textit{Feuerpause} and \textit{Waffenstillstand} petitions.

Based on a similar argument to Höhn’s, Annelie Buntenbach had already prophesied further escalation as the result of resumed military force after the end of the \textit{Feuerpause}:

\textsuperscript{370} Ibid., vol. 3.
\textsuperscript{371} Ibid., vol. 3.
A *Feuerpause* isn’t enough, because with that NATO puts itself under a self-chosen compulsion to act [Zugzwang]. If after the set period, all of its demands are not fulfilled, then the entry into the next level of escalation is already pre-programmed. Then the bombing will continue with doubled intensity, [or] ground troops will be deployed. From Rambouillet at the latest we should have learned that the compulsion to act [Zugzwang] in such pressure scenarios leads to a dead end.⁴⁷²

These arguments by Höhn and Buntenbach clash directly with Volmer’s claim that the call for a unilateral, permanent end to the bombings drew on a leftover assumption from the Cold War era that the enemy wanted peace too. From the way they attacked the leadership’s position, Buntenbach and Höhn’s call for a permanent stop to the bombings can be seen as not based explicitly on the assumption Volmer described. Only Johanna Wirt defended pacifism as the faith that all people have a conscience to which appeals can be made, and even she had appeals to the Serbian opposition, not to Milosevic, in mind.⁴⁷³ Nonetheless, advocates of the *Waffenstillstand* petition did little to dispute directly the notion that their position relied on trusting Milosevic.

Having noted the arguments for and against the two major petitions, it is time to analyze the ten minor petitions presented to the delegates. These views to the left and right of the *Waffenstillstand* and *Feuerpause* petitions are helpful for understanding how factions within the Greens responded to the Kosovo crisis. The two major petitions were somewhat watered-down compromises designed to appeal to the party’s ideological center, to undecided delegates, and to those without any factional affiliation, so the *Realos*’ and leftists’ reactions to the Kosovo crises cannot be detected clearly from the two major petitions alone. Yet seeing how factions inside

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⁴⁷² Ibid., vol. 1.
⁴⁷³ Ibid., vol. 2.
the party viewed the Kosovo crisis is essential for understanding how that conflict affected the Greens. Therefore, the next section will analyze the four petitions that were either equivalent to or with more of a *Realo* bent than the *Feuerpause* petition, and the subsequent section will tackle the six minor petitions to the left of the *Waffenstillstand*. Both sections provide further evidence that the Greens did not separate fundamental principles from a consideration of immediate circumstances in their deliberations at Bielefeld.

**Realo Minor Petitions**

Of the twelve petitions in the first round of voting, four may be considered roughly equivalent to or further in the *Realo* direction than the *Feuerpause* petition, while six were roughly equivalent to or to the left of the *Waffenstillstand* petition. The four petitions equivalent or to the right of the federal executive committee’s petition were: 96 sponsored by Christian Sterzing and others, 83 from the Niedersachsen State chapter, 22 from the Baden-Württemberg State chapter, and 41 sponsored by Michael Ortmanns and others. The former two demanded a temporary ceasefire by NATO, the latter two criticized that demand. Based on how similar their proposals were, it is surprising that in the first round of voting the Niedersachsen petition received 344 votes, while Sterzing’s petition received only 180. The smaller difference between vote tallies for the two petitions further to the right of the *Feuerpause* petition—301 affirmations for the Baden-Württemberg petition and 263 for Ortmanns’s petition—seems explainable by the latter’s more strident formulation.
To appreciate how sponsors of these four petitions viewed the Kosovo crises, and what implications they drew from those views, three topics will be considered in this section: (1) their presentations of the current crisis in Kosovo and the effects of the NATO bombings, (2) their attribution of who is to blame for that crisis, and (3) if applicable, the way each petition resolved (or refrained from resolving), a contradiction between principles of non-violence and human rights.

Of these four petitions, the ones which explicitly stated their authors’ perceptions of the effectiveness of the bombings up to then were surprisingly bleak. Petition 96 by Christian Sterzing and others noted that the bombings had not stopped the expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo, nor had they brought about a negotiated settlement.374 Meanwhile civilian facilities and innocent people were increasingly the victims of the bombings, which thereby became estranged from the principles of proportionality of means and avoiding civilian casualties, according to this petition.375 The Baden-Württemberg Greens’ summary of the war’s progress was also sobering: “After four weeks of continuous bombing, the goals have not been reached. The chances for a quick success were entirely wrongly estimated. Massacres, expulsions, rapings, and persecution of the Kosovar-Albanian population could not be impeded.”376 According to Ortmanns’s petition, the most hard-line Realo of the twelve, “after almost six weeks of air strikes it seems to be clear that the naïve

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375 Ibid.
imagining of NATO to be quickly able to resolve the conflict militarily is no longer tenable.”\(^{377}\) None of the petitions attempted to argue that the bombings had so far accomplished what was desired. If the petitions equivalent or to the right of the leadership’s petition could present no positive accomplishments of the bombings, and in one case acknowledged the alarming rise in civilian casualties, while in another case stating that the bombings could not have succeeded in preventing atrocities, how could these petitions fail to justify putting an end permanently to the bombings of Yugoslavia, and how could some of them not even request that the bombings be paused?

To pose the same problem in another way, if the petitions displayed no sharp disagreement between each other in their perceptions of how the crisis in Kosovo had unfolded since the bombings began, why did they differ in their advocacies? Two of the petitions—96 from Sterzing and 83 from the Lower Saxony chapter of the Greens—made demands similar to the one for a *Feuerpause* in the leadership’s petition. Sterzing called for a “temporary suspension of the bombings,”\(^ {378}\) while the Lower Saxony petition advocated an “immediate, unilateral, and temporary ceasefire


and an interruption of the NATO air strikes.”³⁷⁹ The other two petitions explicitly rejected the call for an interruption of the bombings. Looking at the rationale of the Baden-Württemberg Greens for rejecting a permanent end to the bombings helps to clarify why they did not call for a temporary stop either:

Many people moved for peace [friedensbewegte Menschen] inside and outside the Green party are demanding now that the air strikes be immediately and unconditionally ended. This would however not be interpreted by Milosevic as a sign of the strength of NATO, but rather as weakness. Such a decision would rather strengthen the Serbian war regime, motivate it to persevere, and give it room for further expulsions and hostage taking. The military action of NATO will immediately stop as soon as Milosevic is verifiably ready to stop the expulsions.³⁸⁰

The Ortmanns petition states even more emphatically that ending the conflict is within Milosevic’s ability, but not NATO’s:

Peace in the Balkans can follow from a conditioned offer from NATO. But the decision about that lies singly and alone in the hand of Slobodan Milosevic. The Serbian aggressor must stop the barbarity against the Kosovo-Albanian people and against his own people, only then can the spiral of violence be broken. Ending the NATO action without the cessation of the Serbian policy of genocide and deportations—a public acquiescence to them—would be the political and moral end of the prospects for peace in the Balkans. NATO must begin the peace, the UN and OSCE must secure it—but first of all the war against the Kosovars by the Serbians must be ended.³⁸¹

These excerpts indicate why Ortmanns and the Baden-Württemberg Greens’ petitions advocated no change to the strategy of bombing Yugoslavia until Milosevic

³⁸¹ Ibid.
acquiesced to NATO’s demand that all Serbian forces be removed from Kosovo, even though writers of these petitions avowed (or at least did not deny) that the bombings had been counter-productive or ineffective so far in achieving that result. The key for these Realo Greens in responding to the Kosovo war was maintaining that NATO had no real control over the war’s future course: NATO was swept away in the logic of battle, unable to break out of the cycle of violence, whereas only Milosevic had the agency to deescalate the conflict. As seen above, this transferal of responsibility to Milosevic for ending the conflict evidences itself in the rebuttals to the Waffenstillstand petition too. But Ortmanns and the Baden-Württemberg Greens took the argument that the ball was in Milosevic’s court to its logical conclusion by advocating no change in NATO’s military strategy, even given what they apparently considered that strategy’s failure so far.

If the petitions displayed no sharp disagreement between each other in their perceptions of how the crisis in Kosovo had unfolded since the bombings began, why did they differ in their advocacies? Two of the petitions—96 from Sterzing and 83 from the Lower Saxony chapter of the Greens—made demands similar to the one for a Feuerpause in the leadership’s petition. Sterzing called for a “temporary suspension of the bombings,” while the Lower Saxony petition advocated an “immediate, unilateral, and temporary ceasefire and an interruption of the NATO air strikes.” The other two petitions considered any interruption in the bombings unwise.

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383 Sterzing, Christian et al., “Der Krieg im Kosovo – Verpflichtung für eine zukunftsfähige Menschenrechts- und Friedenspolitik,” (Petition 96 presented at the
Beyond their analysis and demands concerning the present situation, these four petitions each attempted to re-express the Greens’ commitment to pacifism in a form suited for the future. The attempts to reaffirm or revise the Greens’ pacifism extended from an acute sense of the contradiction between principles of promoting human rights and refusing violence as a means of politics. The four petitions are shot through with the various symptoms of Zerrissenheit: confessions of inner turmoil, reminders of the possibility that well-intentioned and intelligent Greens can reach different conclusions in grappling with a difficult paradox, a spectrum from hard-headed insistence that ideological sacrifices must be made and lived with no matter how painful, to various sleight-of-hand demonstrations (surely for the author’s benefit as well as the audience’s) that the circle may be squared. Thus, the ways in which pacifism was articulated in these petitions shows a variety of resources some Greens found in reconciling the dilemma—or perhaps in reconciling themselves to its irreconcilability.

Ortmanns’s petition gives the clearest call for a revision of the principles guiding Green foreign policy. The authors stated that the Greens must be ready to accept as a matter of party program realities which they have already accepted in daily political life. To shape the new world order the Greens had to participate in it, and that meant abandoning thought-structures from an earlier time.384 The thought-

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384 Ortmanns, Michael, “BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN stimmen einer militärischen Intervention der NATO im Kosovo mit Beteiligung deutscher Soldaten zu,” (Petition 41).
structure meant here was the categorical commitment to nonviolence, which, though always the primary goal, “can come up against the limitation of powerlessness.” More generally, the petition, and Cem Özdemir in introducing it to the convention, laid out a general vision of military force used by the international community against dictators and human rights abusers, so that one day all dictators would be serving time in the Hague, as Özdemir said. According to this broad vision, “the UN must be reformed to be an organization that is capable of acting politically, but also militarily” without dictators’ being able to protect themselves from interference by asserting national sovereignty. Thus, the authors denied that Annex B of the Rambouillet accords (which would have permitted NATO forces to move and act with impunity throughout Yugoslavia, immune from its national laws) caused the talks’ failure, and approved of the notion of international forces having immunity from the laws or authorities of the nations in which they operate. The vision informing these authors’ abandonment of absolute non-violence is transcending international law’s respect for national sovereignty to create a new international military force to overthrow dictators everywhere.

The Baden-Württemberg petition, though much in the same spirit as Ortmanns’s, did not brandish a new vision for international law and politics, and instead upheld pacifism as still a valuable commitment:

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385 Ibid.
386 DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 4.
387 Ortmanns, Michael, “BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN stimmen einer militärischen Intervention der NATO im Kosovo mit Beteiligung deutscher Soldaten zu,” (Petition 41).
388 Ibid.
Pacifism means the elimination of war from international life, and includes military disarmament, the solving of international clashes on the way toward legal adjudication [Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit], and the establishment of a composite organization that encompasses the individual states.\textsuperscript{389}

The tragic lesson from Kosovo, the Baden-Württemberg Greens concluded, was that chances for a political solution during the 1990s were squandered. The Greens had to insist in the future that Germany, the OSCE, and the UN use such chances where they still exist to prevent Kosovo-like crises from emerging in other tense regions of the world. This resolution also emphasized that social and economic pressure, through independent radio broadcasts in the region and economic aid, would complement a military strategy.\textsuperscript{390} Thus, it went some distance to salvaging a commitment to pacifism by emphasizing that non-violent means of conflict resolution retain priority and effectiveness if applied at the right time, and by giving some suggestion about how they could accompany a military campaign.

Although the Lower Saxony petition admonished that the Greens’ debate should focus on finding the best recommendation for action in the current situation, rather than debating the legitimacy of the war itself, the petition did lay out a basis for coming to terms with the contradiction it posited between non-violence and human rights. That contradiction could not be resolved immediately; instead, states the petition,

\textsuperscript{389} “Pazifismus bedeutet die Ausschaltung des Krieges am internationalen Leben und beinhaltet die militärische Abrüstung, die Lösung internationaler Streitfälle auf dem Wege der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit und die Schaffung einer die einzelnen Staaten umfassenden Gesamtorganisation.” Landesverband Baden-Württemberg, “Für einen Frieden, der Seinen Namen verdient,” (Petition 22).

\textsuperscript{390} Ibid.
we demand that the Red-Green federal government improve long-term conditions for non-military crisis interventions at an early stage. We do not want NATO to be a self-mandating world-wide intervention power at the cost of the authority of the United Nations. On the other hand, international law may not become a pretext for acquiescing to expulsions and massacres…. A credible political process of consolidating peace must be flanked by middle- and long-term positive incentives on the part of the OSCE. In return for cooperation in a peace process, economic help, means for rebuilding, and support for the return of refugees should be announced to the parties of the conflict.  

Finally, Sterzing’s petition, unlike the Niedersachsen petition, did address the question of determining the legitimacy of war. This document’s somewhat complex normative position seems to be that while the situation in Kosovo shows that violence may sometimes be permissible as a last resort, the NATO bombings were not in fact such a case: “The talk of war as a last resort must nevertheless not call forth the illusion that this final means is finally effective” as the NATO bombings were not.  

Despite the hint of accepting violence as a last resort in conflict resolution, Sterzing reached the conclusion that the dilemma of pacifism and human rights implied for the Greens a duty to do everything in order to avoid this conflict of goals in the future. This will only succeed if Alliance 90/the Greens engages more tightly in cooperation with other social powers on all levels for the civil handling of conflicts and crisis prevention, in order to develop a politics of peace and human rights suitable for the future. 

This statement reads most obviously as a refusal to cut the Gordian knot, as though to say that if the world is so ordered to make action impossible without violating a basic

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393 Ibid.
value of non-violence or human rights, it is not the Greens’ ideal convictions but rather the reality in which they live that must be altered for the future. The condemnation of reality as morally inadequate and the call for its revision here mirrors the similar sentiments in the Ortmanns petition, with the difference that the Realo authors of petition 41 envisioned a world order in which a militarized UN would stand ready to topple oppressive governments, while Sterzing envisioned the cooperation of the Green party with other elements of society to prevent violent conflicts.

These divergent visions, which have in common only that their authors found the Kosovo crisis to present a contradiction between the imperatives to promoting human rights and to act without violence, show the wide range of ideological motivations within the Green party, even between those who wound up taking similar stances on the party’s immediate decisions. The sheer variety found just among these four petitions in ways for coping with the dilemma of pacifism versus human rights casts serious doubt on any attempt to sum up how the Greens collectively recalibrated their commitment to pacifism at the convention. If even Greens of similar ideological and factional allegiances handled the moral problems before them in markedly different ways, then very little stock should be put in attempts (such as, for example, Schmuck-Soldan’s) to sum up a collective stance of the Greens towards pacifism after the convention. Such attempts assume a type of collective response which an analysis of the minor petitions shows did not occur. Instead of generalizing about how the Greens redefined their pacifism, we must continue examining each minor petition in detail.
Leftist Minor Petitions

Aside from the Waffenstillstand petition, six others called for a permanent end of the bombings. Because they all voiced that central demand, they may be difficult to distinguish at first blush. However, as Table 3.1 shows, they received markedly different levels of support in the first round of voting, meaning that delegates found important differences between them. Table 3.1 lists the petitions by descending order of votes received, which yields roughly the same sequence as would listing them in the ascending order of the severity of their critique of the bombings.

Table 3.1. Votes for Petitions Calling for a Permanent Stop to the Bombings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Petition Number and Author</th>
<th>Votes Received in Round One</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>074 Roth-Ströbele (Waffenstillstand)</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>077 Buntenbach-Simmert et al</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>042 Cremer et al</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>085 Brandenburg Land chapter</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>089 Budich et al</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02-new Münich chapter</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04 Kassel-Land</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Minutes, Bielefeld Special Convention, p. 6-7.

All seven petitions advocated an immediate, permanent end to the bombings. Number 74, the Waffenstillstand petition, received more than twice as many votes as petition 4 from the Kassel-Land district chapter, a difference most likely attributable to petition 4’s advocacy of the Greens’ withdrawal from government within ten days if the bombings continued. Yet the difference in support between, say, petition 77 and petition 02-new is more difficult to explain. It is probably at least partially attributable to the prominence of the Green MPs who sponsored 77 and the comparative obscurity of the sponsors of petition 02-new. Still, it seems likely that the delegates, who had all day to read the petitions, decided which to support based largely on reading them and...
hearing them discussed in speeches, rather than based on recognizing the names of their sponsors.

To appreciate the differences between the minor petitions calling for a permanent end to the bombings, this section classifies their arguments critical of the bombings, and their proposals on how to proceed instead. Doing so contributes to the growing list of ways in which Greens reinterpreted their pacifism in view of Kosovo. Further, it will provide what is perhaps the most unequivocal evidence yet that arguments at Bielefeld entwined abstract principles with assertions about the immediate circumstances: no matter how radical their opposition to the bombings, and no matter how categorical their espousal of non-violence, critics of the NATO intervention were still expected to offer convincing alternative solutions to the Kosovo crisis.

Classifying the anti-war arguments from Bielefeld poses at least two difficulties. First, since the many independent arguments by opponents of the war were often not mutually exclusive, in classifying them one runs the risk of suggesting what need not be the case: that proponents of each argument disagreed with the others. Advocates of petitions 42 and 89 like Uli Cremer and Eckhart Stratmann-Mertens respectively, who warned against the dangerous precedent of NATO’s self-mandating the legality of its military interventions, may well have agreed with Ströbele’s argument that the bombings should cease so that the Red Cross could reach the internally displaced Albanians with needed provisions and medical care, even if Cremer and Stratmann-Mertens did not themselves emphasize that appeal. Autonomous arguments like these, when put together, might yield a position with
more (or less) force than the sum of its parts, and once separable arguments have been identified, the possibility for such combinations must not be forgotten. Second, in classifying arguments, the decision whether two different claims constitute independent bases for criticizing the war or merely differ in the articulation of a common theme can be debated. Does the critique of self-mandating by NATO fall under the umbrella argument that the bombings lack legitimacy in international law, or does Cremer and Stratmann-Mertens’s skepticism of NATO’s new world order justify considering their argument a claim of a qualitatively different, more anti-imperialistic nature? Admitting that questions like these sometimes have no objective, incontrovertible answer, assessments must be based on a judgment of the evidence. The arrangement of anti-war arguments and their sub-varieties in this section is not the only possible one, but it will have sufficed for its purpose if it elicits an appreciation of the heterogeneity of anti-war arguments as indispensable to understanding the Bielefeld debate and the meaning and significance of its outcome.

With those caveats in mind, the petitions and speeches of the Bielefeld convention can be seen to present two basic kinds of critiques of the NATO bombings: critiques of NATO as an actor and critiques of bombings as an action. To the first kind of critique belong arguments accusing NATO of hypocrisy and expressing skepticism of the disinterestedness of its intentions, opposition to the new world order for whose creation the NATO bombings seemed to set a precedent, and alarm at the intervention’s violation of the UN’s monopoly on violence. To the second kind of critique belong portrayals of the bombings as a means unsuited to achieving their stated goal of preventing or redressing human rights abuses. A brief
taxonomy of each category will suffice to show that however anti-war Greens critiqued the NATO bombings, they either did not escape or paid a price for avoiding the difficult task of explaining a compelling alternative solution to the Kosovo crisis.

The argument that NATO as an actor was unsuited for carrying out a humanitarian intervention could operate on several levels, as seen most clearly in petition 42 by Cremer and others, the most prominent petition to be closely associated with the anti-war protesters. The petition presented NATO as ineligible to launch a military intervention on several grounds concerning its history, its contemporary aims, and its ambitions for the future. It faulted the NATO powers for having ignored the Albanians’ non-violent struggle for civil rights during the 1980s and for contributing to militarizing the conflict in the 1990s by rewarding the militant UCK with attention and international legitimacy, to the exclusion of Ibrahim Rugova’s non-violent movement. According to petition 42, Richard Holbrooke’s meeting with UCK representatives in June 1998, rather than with Rugova, sent the message that “conflicts are only paid attention to and worked on if they are pursued militantly, hence with violence.” Antje Röhle of the Berlin Neukölln chapter underlined this critique in her speech during the general debate. She represented Klaus Kinkel’s

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395 Ibid.
396 Ibid.
foreign policy as aimed to splinter Yugoslavia by arming minority ethnicities.\textsuperscript{397} Moreover, she said, the number of victims of the U.S. war in Guatemala during the 80s far exceeded the victims in Kosovo, rendering the U.S.’s profession of humanitarian motives hypocritical and absurd.\textsuperscript{398} The same hypocrisy was evident to her in NATO’s tolerating Turkey’s persecution of Kurds throughout the 90s, then suddenly declaring a human rights emergency in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{399} Thus, perceptions of NATO’s complicity in escalating the Kosovo crisis and the selectivity of its humanitarian concern yielded arguments against the legitimacy of NATO’s intervention.

The Brandenburg Greens advanced a different accusation of hypocrisy: if the bombings really were motivated by a moral compulsion to assist those persecuted by Milosevic, why had the European states taken in so few refugees? “If the bombardments really are supposed to have the essential motive of a desire to provide humanitarian help, the policy of humanitarian help leads to absurdity if it fails at the refugee question.”\textsuperscript{400} Why were deserters from the Serbian army, who refused to turn Kosovar Albanians out of their homes, denied asylum by the very governments that were supposedly at war to end those expulsions?\textsuperscript{401} The authors insinuated that all states which, like Germany, require military service of their citizens have an interest

\textsuperscript{397} DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 3.
\textsuperscript{398} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{399} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{401} Ibid.
in withholding assistance from nationals of other countries who had deserted their respective armies.\textsuperscript{402}

As a stand-in or a complement to such accusations of hypocrisy, the anti-war Greens furnished arguments that NATO’s real motives were not disinterested. Petition 89 from Budich and others unmasked the bombings as a test run for

the new NATO strategy of self-mandating, tied with a dismantling \textit{[Demontage]} of the UN and the humiliation of Russia. In pursuit of this NATO strategy, a conflict settlement for Kosovo that could also be born by Russia and the UN was nearly inhibited with the dictate of Rambouillet on stationing UN troops in Kosovo and their unhindered freedom of movement throughout Yugoslavia (Annex B).\textsuperscript{403}

Petition 42 opposed NATO’s “self-mandating of military deployments” being “set over international law and thereby effectively over the UN’s monopoly on violence. Instead the non-military instruments of the UN must be strengthened and developed.”\textsuperscript{404} To these critiques of NATO, petition 42 adds a critique of Germany’s authority to launch a war of aggression, given the atrocities of the German army in Yugoslavia during World War II.\textsuperscript{405} Any comparison of Milosevic’s regime to the Nazis, said the petition’s authors, “is not only wrong, it is unbearable. It makes harmless and relativizes the worse

\textsuperscript{402} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{404} Andreas Bachman, Ulrich Cremer, et al., “Den Weg für eine friedliche und langfristige Lösung des Kosovo-Konflikts eröffnen!” (Petition 42).

\textsuperscript{405} Ibid.
crime [Verbrechen] in the history of humanity.\textsuperscript{406} In these ways the anti-war Greens deployed their skepticism of the history or intentions of NATO as arguments against the bombings of Yugoslavia.

The petitions that express general alarm at NATO’s geopolitical ambitions propose to check those ambitions using methods reaching far beyond the end of bombings in Yugoslavia. As Petition 42 states,

\begin{quote}
We demand that the German government and the German parliament, in accordance with the coalition contract, put an end to \textit{einen Riegel vorschiebt} the implementation of the new NATO strategy of self-mandating for deployments of every kind. Without that, all the Greens’ efforts on crisis preventions through civil methods, which were condensed \textit{verdichtet} in recent years into sustainable concepts and even contained in the coalition contract [with the SPD], become pointless.\textsuperscript{407}
\end{quote}

As general demands beyond ending the bombings, petition 89 encouraged strengthening the UN monopoly of violence in the face of NATO’s transgression, and warned against “EU countries participat[ing] in a new arms race, neither in the framework of NATO nor in disassociation from the United States. Instead our chosen representatives should push for the development of Europe as a civilian power.”\textsuperscript{408}

Thus, the petitions criticizing NATO as an actor ended up voicing demands of a more long-term and general nature than merely ending the bombings, yet those demands did not function to explain how ending the bombings would solve the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo.

The argument that the bombings had not and/or could not bring about their desired goal of resolving the human rights crisis was by far the most frequent

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{406} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{407} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{408} Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
criticism, and the only one virtually all critics of the war voiced. It was, moreover, a point conceded even by the Greens who did not support the call to end the bombings permanently. The lack of any attempt to defend the success of the bombings suggests that Markus Viellevoie, who introduced petition 02 from Münich, was speaking to an audience who agreed with him virtually unanimously when he called it a banality to say that the war had not stopped the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. Yet precisely because the claim that the means had not achieved their desired end was voiced by so many Greens whose arguments otherwise differed, two distinct (though not mutually exclusive) versions of that claim can be discerned: as a conclusion about how events had unfolded in Kosovo (i.e. as an observation about a specific series of events), or else as the assertion of the general conviction of war’s inherent ineffectiveness to achieve humanitarian goals. Since the anti-war Greens put so much weight on the ineffectiveness of the bombings, giving examples of the two sub-varieties of that argument (from specific observation or from general conviction) is informative.

Martina Fischer’s speech to the convention and the text of petition 02-new by the Munich Greens, as well as its introduction by Markus Viellevoie, were the purest specimens of arguing that the bombings were ineffective based on an analysis of the particular situation to which they had been applied. In their petition the Munich Greens stated that the NATO strategy of using bombings to avoid a worse humanitarian catastrophe had failed and was bound to fail: the NATO air strikes had been followed by an escalation of the expulsions, and the humanitarian situation of the Kosovo Albanians had deteriorated. Moreover, the Munich Greens found that the Serbian population was becoming a collective victim, becoming increasingly
indifferent to the lot of the Albanians, estranged from European values, and more supportive of Milosevic with each passing day.\textsuperscript{409} Viellevoie emphasized that since he considered the use of force justified in some situations he was not a pacifist, though he said he respected and had worked with pacifists in drafting the petition he introduced.\textsuperscript{410} To deflect the assertion of an imperative to take action in response to atrocities, Viellevoie pointed out the ineffectiveness of the bombings: “‘Do something,’ that isn’t enough. It is our duty to make sure that what we do also has the chance to lead to the goal.’”\textsuperscript{411} Using the same reasoning, Martina Fischer took decision-makers to task:

> What was not at all discussed is the question of whether the so-called last means, the \textit{ultima ratio}, is also the effective means. And in my opinion politicians are paid, or at least elected, and required, to verify the effectiveness of methods, and not just their morality or legality [\textit{rechtliche Vereinbarkeit}].…. If the method is not useful, then there is no purpose in sticking to it, it also makes no sense to say again and again that one is on the right side, or to draw problematic comparisons with German fascism. It is useless to reiterate this rhetoric again and again [\textit{auf dieser Rhetorik immer wieder hervorzuholen}] and play off the forbidding of violence and human rights against each other. That may serve the psychological unburdening of the political decision makers, it may possibly also serve to discredit the opposition or differing opinions, but it is no political argument.\textsuperscript{412}

As these examples suffice to make clear, the claim of the bombings’ ineffectiveness from observation relied on a conception of politics that emphasized testing the effectiveness of proposed means towards agreed-upon goals. Thus, by harping on the ineffectiveness of the NATO bombings, while agreeing that doing nothing to stop the

\textsuperscript{409} Kreisverband München-Süd, “Für ein sofortiges Ende der Luftangriffe auf Jugoslawien! Für die politische Durchsetzung der Rechte der Kosovo-Albaner!” (Petition 02).
\textsuperscript{410} DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 4.
\textsuperscript{411} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{412} DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 1.
atrocities would be morally reprehensible, the anti-war Greens ended up needing to offer purportedly more effective alternatives.

The argument that the bombings were ineffective from a general principle that going to war is *never* a correct course of action is exhibited well in Christian Knoche’s introduction of the Kassel-Land petition, and in Annelie Buntenbach’s speech to the convention. Knoche declaimed, “there is no war in the name of humanity. There is no just horror. In every war every form of humanity inevitably is abandoned [bleibt... auf der Strecke], and it has been that way for thousands of years.”\(^{413}\) Annelie Buntenbach had already made a similar statement: “I consider military means fundamentally not suited [nicht geeignet] to the enforcement of human rights. War too is a violation of human rights.”\(^{414}\) However, Buntenbach also emphasized that the bombings had only worsened the plight of the refugees in Kosovo. In introducing petition 42 (sponsored by Cremer and others) Ilka Schröder argued the ineffectiveness of the bombings in order to undermine the *Feuerpause* position: “Many other petitions which called for a *Feuerpause* have also recognized the irrationality of the war, have recognized bombs do not help people. It is all the more incomprehensible that the NATO bombings should only be deferred [ausgesetzt] but not permanently ended.”\(^{415}\) While Ilka Schröder posited the general claim that bombings do not help people, the petition she advocated focused far more on alleging the specific counterproductive effects of the NATO bombings of Yugoslavia since March 24, including strengthening Milosevic, who “used the

\(^{413}\) Ibid., vol. 4.  
\(^{414}\) Ibid., vol. 1.  
\(^{415}\) Ibid., vol. 4.
military strikes not only for settling accounts with the UCK, but also as a setting for terror and systematic expulsions. Death, hunger, diseases, homelessness, strengthened readiness to use violence by the Serbian soldiery [Soldateska], and compulsory recruiting on both sides are the further consequences to be answered for by all sides.”416 So even those Greens like Buntenbach and the supporters of petition 42, who stood on a general conviction that war never serves humanitarian goals, did not separate that potentially autonomous claim from the argument that the particular bombing campaign in question at Bielefeld had been counter-productive. They defended the general pacifist theorem that to go to war is always inhumane with little else than their assessment of the effects of bombings in the single case before them. That speakers like Knoche, Buntenbach, and Schröder focused more on the consequences of the bombings underway than on the generally deplorable nature of warfare was hardly an inappropriate rhetorical choice for addressing their audience. But as a result of that focus, they seem to have downplayed the normative justifications for their argument on the categorical immorality of war, which if made convincingly might have freed them from the expectation of offering a more effective alternative plan for resolving the human rights crisis in Kosovo.

All the anti-war petitions to the left of the Waffenstillstand petition called for the immediate, permanent end of the bombings, but each varies in the details of its rationale for that demand, in the description of its implementation, and in the alternatives proposed. Addressing the last point was necessary, not accidental, since as has been shown, the diverse criticisms of the bombings from anti-war petitions and

their advocates all saddled critics of the war with the burden of having to make their position more credible by proposing a more effective course of action—not inaction—to meet the humanitarian crisis.

Petition 89 from Martin Budich, Eckhard Stratmann-Mertens and others makes the least attempt to flesh out an alternative to the bombings or explain how voting for its demand to end them would bring about the end of conflict between Serbians and Albanians, or alleviate the suffering of those displaced from Kosovo. Instead the petition demanded of the Greens in government that they withdraw support for the bombings and oppose the use of German forces and facilities to perpetuate them.417 Beyond those demands, the petition insisted that all further attempts to alleviate the conflict in Yugoslavia required a UN mandate, and that peacekeeping troops could be stationed under Chapter VI of the UN charter.418 Further, the petition called for a South-East Europe conference on the long-term stabilizing of the region, and demanded of the EU nations that they raise their refugee quotas.419 Yet the authors did not give any explanation of how voting for the petition’s demand to stop the bombings permanently would bring about the fulfillment of its other recommendations. The Kassel-Land petition similarly demanded stopping the expulsion of Kosovar Albanians and a “multicultural pacification of the Balkans” without substantiating or even making explicit any

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418 Ibid.
419 Ibid.
mention of how adopting their petition would realize those demands. It may be no coincidence that these two petitions, which did not emphasize the likelihood of any positive humanitarian results of voting for them, were two of the three least-vote-getting anti-war petitions at the convention.

Those anti-war petitions which did try to explain how the Greens’ adoption of their demand to stop the bombings would alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, or which proposed alternative, non-violent means to do so, can be divided into two categories based on whether the intended recipient of the action advocated was Milosevic or the Serbian people. To the former category belong petition 02-new from the Munich Greens and petition 77 from Buntenbach, Simmert, and others. The South Munich Greens gave a fairly detailed explanation (for the context of a convention petition) of economic sanctions as an alternative to bombings. They proposed an economic embargo of Serbia under UN supervision, to be loosened step-by-step corresponding to each concession Milosevic granted in negotiations. Introducing the petition, Markus Viellevoie held out hope for a negotiated solution, posited that

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420 Kreisverband München-Süd, “Für ein sofortiges Ende der Luftangriffe auf Jugoslawien! Für die politische Durchsetzung der Rechte der Kosovo-Albaner!” (Petition 02).
421 It is surprising that the authors of this petition, along with so many other anti-war Greens who advocated economic sanctions or an oil embargo against Yugoslavia, did not take pause at the human suffering that the economic strangulation of an entire nation can cause; especially since, for example, Markus Viellevoie’s introduction of the Munich petition faulted the bombings for a property they would have shared with economic sanctions, that of harming primarily the Serbian populous, not their ruler. One would have expected German leftists informed about the effects of economic sanctions to have known, for example, about the deprivations suffered by Iraqis under U.S.-supported sanctions during the 1990s (especially since German leftists generally make it their business to be versed in the harmful consequences of U.S. foreign policy), and to have shown some signs of concern about a similar impact of sanctions on Serbia. But no such concerns were voiced at Bielefeld.
one could not be reached while bombs were falling, and asked who if not the Greens should be willing to advocate stopping the bombings to improve the prospects for diplomacy.\footnote{Ibid.} Petition 77 from Buntenbach, Simmert, and others also emphasized that negotiations could not succeed while the bombings continued:

> It has become equally clear that it is not possible to identify diplomatic paths that promise success and to continue the air strikes. How diametrically the bombings stand opposed to a negotiated solution became clear when the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was accidentally hit by a NATO bomb, while simultaneously the efforts on a diplomatic level should have been strengthened for China’s agreement to a UN mandate for the international supervision of a ceasefire.\footnote{Annelie Buntenbach et al., “Einberufung eines ständigen Gremiums aus Friedensfachkräften und ExpertInnen / Sachverständigenrat für Friedensfragen,” (petition 77).}

To create pressure that would facilitate diplomacy, petition 77 proposed sanctions:

> “Until the conclusion of the negotiations we demand the maintenance of economic and political pressure on the Yugoslavian government through sanctions or other civil methods.”\footnote{Ibid.}

Those were the alternatives proposed by Greens who wanted to pressure Milosevic without resorting to bombing.

Roland Vogt’s introduction of petition 85 from the Brandenburg state chapter gave a different account of how voting to end the bombings might bring about the resolution of the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. Vogt responded to Ludger Volmer’s accusations that war critics’ notion of unilateral de-escalation relied on the outdated assumption from the Cold War arms race that the Soviet leadership wanted peace and would respond favorably to de-escalation.\footnote{DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 4.} The petition of the Brandenburg Greens and the policy of calculated advanced performance [\textit{Politik der kalkulierten}...\footnote{Ibid.}
Vorleistung] which it advocated, explained Vogt, did not place hope in the good heart of Milosevic, but rather in the Serbian people.\footnote{426 Ibid.} Those who ended the bombings would be loved by the Serbian people, and ending them would undercut support for Milosevic, who had never been popular during peacetime, Vogt explained.\footnote{427 Ibid.} The petition’s text explains that in the “politics of calculated advanced performance,” one side in a conflict takes a first, unilateral de-escalatory step with the expectation of corresponding de-escalation by the other side.\footnote{428 Landesverband Brandenburg, “Beendigung des Kosovo-Krieges durch Politik der kalkulierten Vorleistungen,” (Petition 85).} The authors of the petition believed the bombings could be ended immediately from a position of strength used to express clear expectations of the Yugoslavian government that the persecution in Kosovo end, that the belligerents disarm, and that a UN-mandated force secure the return of refugees.\footnote{429 Ibid.} But the petition did not foresee the likely response of the Serbian people to these demands, and Vogt’s clarification of the argument in those terms at the convention came only in a brief statement at a late stage in the debate.

Petition 42 from Uli Cremer and others failed to suggest an immediate mechanism by which stopping the bombings would alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, implying instead that that crisis had no short-term solution: “Pacification between the ethnically antagonized population groups, the army, and the armed opposition is a middle-term task, that only can be reached through negotiations, economic pressure and the granting of incentives.”\footnote{430 Andreas Bachman, Ulrich Cremer, et al., “Den Weg für eine friedliche und langfristige Lösung des Kosovo-Konflikts eröffnen!” (Petition 42).} Although advocating many of
the same alternatives as the other anti-war petitions, this one did not attempt to give
the impression of its short-term effectiveness. The authors refrained from what
drafters of other anti-war petitions attempted: representing other approaches to
resolving the conflict as more immediately effective than bombings. They stated only
that in stopping the bombings “a precondition would be established in Kosovo and
the entire region for coming to a peaceful solution obligated to human rights [zu einer
friedlichen und den Menschenrechten verpflichteten Lösung].” Presenting stopping
the bombings as a necessary precondition is a far cry from proposing it as a sufficient
solution to the crisis. The difference may be due to petition 42’s reliance on denying
the suitedness of NATO to the role of an intervening actor, and on its general
rejection of warfare, rather than on the observed ineffectiveness of the bombings. The
later charge lost much force when its proponent could not present some more
effective alternative.

The tenor of the Bielefeld debate and its results show that the majority of the
delegates wanted to hear something about how the petition they voted for would start
a sequence of events leading to the resolution of the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo.
Although petition 42 did not rely exclusively on the ineffectiveness-from-observation
argument, whose function in a cost-benefit analysis required offering a comparatively
better alternative solution, neither did petition 42 and its advocates explain their
position as a rejection of the bombings on any basis clearly signaled as independent
from the argument that the bombings had proven ineffective. By opportunistically
mixing the ineffective-from-observation point into their rhetoric, advocates of petition

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431 Ibid.
42 muddied the status of their more general geopolitical and moral claims. Perhaps the convention was in no mood to accept those claims, even had they been crystal clear, as providing a compelling rationale for ending the bombings. If that were true (one cannot know for sure) then the anti-war Greens to the left of the *Waffenstillstand* petition could not avoid being held to the burden of producing an alternative solution to the bombings, even when, according to the logic of their arguments, they should not have had to.

**Splitting the Left Vote?**

So much for the content of the anti-war petitions. What about their impact on the outcome of convention? Did the seven petitions demanding a permanent end to the bombings split the left-wing vote at the convention, allowing the leadership’s *Feuerpause* petition to pass? That may seem unlikely, since in the first round of voting delegates could support as many petitions as they wished to. Yet it is a possibility that must be explored. In general, speakers for the anti-war petitions did not argue amongst each other at the convention, but rather attacked the notion of a temporary stop to the bombings as no substantive policy but rather a formula compromise that would not break out of the logic of war. Nonetheless, two remarks from advocates for anti-war petitions hinted at divisions in their camp. Introducing petition 42 from Cremer and others, Ilka Schröder remarked, “there are two petitions that unmistakably and clearly reintroduce the UN and the OSCE as active and legitimate actors. Those are the petition of Annie Buntenbach and Christian Simmert,
and the North-German petition, number 42. By not mentioning the Roth-Ströbele Waffenstillstand petition, Schröder may have indicated that some of the 242 Greens who voted for petition 42 found Roth-Ströbele unsupportable. Ströbele himself may in one of his speeches have alienated some leftists by identifying himself with wanting to continue the coalition: “I think the large majority, and I also, want to continue the coalition. When Joschka says here, ‘you’re making it hard for me with your decision,’ I find that just as wrong as of those [incomprehensible] who say, ‘we’re leaving the Green party, we won’t campaign any more.’ We may not debate under such pressure.”

If Ströbele presupposed wanting to stay in the coalition, and condemned those who threatened to leave the party, would supporters of the Kassel-Land petition (number 4) which threatened the party’s withdrawal from government, or of the petition advocated by Strattman-Mertens, who resigned from the Green party after his petition got defeated, withhold their support from the Waffenstillstand petition? The non-overlap between supporters of the Waffenstillstand petition and supporters of the other left-wing petitions would have to exceed 70 votes in order to cover the difference between the support received by the Feuerpause petition (404 votes) and the Waffenstillstand petition (335 votes) in the first round. The votes the two major petitions respectively received added up to 739 delegates, yet 769 written ballots were cast in the final round of voting. Moreover, some delegates may have left before the final round of voting, since delegates may have had trains to catch, and after the first round’s results were announced, the convention’s ultimate outcome seemed to be a

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432 DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 4.
433 Ibid.
It seems safe to assume that no one voted for both the *Feuerpause* and *Waffenstillstand* petitions (unless by accident), in which case at least 30 delegates voted for neither in the first round of voting. If those 30 voted for Kassel-Land or another anti-war petition rather than the *Waffenstillstand* petition, and if, of the delegates who left before the final vote, those who supported another anti-war petition rather than the *Waffenstillstand* petition outnumbered by a margin of 40 early-leavers with other views, then the sum of delegates who voted for a left petition in the first round would exceed the number of votes the *Feuerpause* petition received. This scenario, while it does not seem highly likely, could be what occurred.

Divisions between the left Greens deserve attention regardless of whether they determined which petition won the first round of voting. Beyond the differences in argumentation discussed above, the most salient disagreement concerned attitudes toward staying in the coalition. Christian Knoche’s introduction of the Kassel-Land petition (04) curiously did not emphasize its demand for withdrawal from the coalition within 10 days if the bombings did not cease, perhaps because his five minutes ran out before he had said all he wanted to (as happened to many speakers), or perhaps because he knew that that demand did not have majority support and hoped some delegates would vote for the Kassel-Land petition without realizing it.

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434 The suggestion that delegates left before the final vote is speculative. The convention video only shows a partial view of the hall, leaving out the exits. With delegates milling about between rounds of voting, one cannot tell whether or how many delegates left between the announcement of the first round’s results and the final vote. Yet the 6:30PM deadline for concluding the final vote was instituted on the premise that if voting took longer some delegates would have to choose between catching their train or participating in the final vote. If that was true, then the fact that the final vote took place at 6:40 implies that some delegates may already have had to leave. DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 4-5.

435 DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 4.
was included. But it seems more likely that the 140 delegates who voted for the Kassel-Land petition knew what they were voting for, since the petition weighed in at a succinct 113 words, and in any case, the large difference between its support and that for the other anti-war petitions is most plausibly explained by assuming that many delegates who voted for the *Waffenstillstand* petition knew of and were deterred by the out-within-ten-days demand in the Kassel-Land petition. As has already been noted, the fact that 140 delegates voted for this petition refutes the claim that the Bielefeld debate took staying in government as a given. But the level of support for this petition also refutes Fischer’s portrayal of the convention as a yes-or-no referendum on continuing the Red-Green coalition. The fact that in the first round, support for the *Feuerpause* petition (335 votes) or the further-left Buntenbach (311 votes) petition and Cremer petition (242 votes) exceeded support for the Kassel-Land petition (140 votes) so significantly indicates that a large margin of those who voted for anti-war petitions were unwilling to support a petition that made a clear threat to dissolve the coalition (even assuming, contrary to the previous paragraph, that those who voted for the Kassel-Land petition *did* vote for the other left petitions). The fact that there was such a large difference between voters for the Kassel-Land withdrawal petition and voters for the other left-wing petitions strongly suggests that those who voted for the latter did not think they were voting to end the coalition, which corroborates what was observed earlier: that notwithstanding what he writes in his memoir, Fischer certainly did not succeed—and perhaps did not intend—to give the unequivocal impression in his speech that he would resign if the Roth-Ströbele or Buntenbach petitions passed.
As for the left-wing Greens who opposed the bombings, whether or not their division on advocating staying in the coalition facilitated the passage of the leadership’s petition, it is clear that that division rendered them less able to impose on Fischer their demand for a permanent stop to the bombings. Fischer had already shown his willingness to compromise when necessary by holding his nose and living with the petition demanding a *Feuerpause*. Because the Greens who opposed the bombings had differing views on the value of being in government, they were impaired from making unified demands of Fischer. Thus, the result of the convention may represent a mandate for Fischer’s foreign policy less than (or only insofar as) it reflects the division between opponents of the bombings on questions laid out in section two concerning the responsibility and utility of being a party in government. This important conclusion will have to be integrated into the interpretation of Bielefeld offered in the next chapter.

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Chapter 4
Toward an Explanation of Bielefeld

After the previous chapter’s examination of speeches and petitions in the Bielefeld debate, it is now time to reintroduce and to answer the central question of this thesis. If at the Bielefeld convention, Greens of virtually all factions and tendencies within the party described the NATO bombings of Yugoslavia as failing, why did a resolution calling for a temporary ceasefire, but expressing no fundamental opposition to the war, prevail, and why were resolutions demanding a permanent end to the bombings defeated? It would have been extraordinary enough if at Bielefeld some die-hard dogmatic pacifists among the Greens finally came around to the view that going to war is justified when that is the only feasible means towards a morally important end like protecting human rights. However, it should by now be clear that what actually transpired was something even more complex and remarkable: complex because of the variety of views concerning whether and how the non-violence-versus-human-rights dilemma applied to the Kosovo war, and remarkable because by passing the *Feuerpause* petition the Greens effectively signed on to the military strategy they apparently believed was *failing* to achieve the humanitarian ends that were supposed to justify it. How can this result be explained?

Any explanation must include an adequate definition of the dilemma that many—though not all—of the Greens considered themselves to be faced with. The Greens who spoke of this dilemma (and who mostly seem to have supported the *Feuerpause* petition) felt on the one hand that action must be taken to protect human rights wherever they were threatened, but on the other hand, renounced war
categorically. A potential contradiction haunts anyone having both of those convictions, but until a situation came along where waging war seemed to be an effective means (or better, the only effective means) to protect human rights, the contradiction was latent. Greens who resolved their moral dilemma by supporting the NATO bombings believed the war in Kosovo to be a crisis where bombing Yugoslavia was the only means to protect human rights. And at least some who opposed the bombings (for example those who scorned professions of Zerrissenheit by party leaders) denied that Kosovo was such a case, showing that that denial was one basis for opposing the NATO war.

Understanding the interventionist’s dilemma as resting on instructions to protect human rights, to reject violence, and to act in a situation where human rights can only be protected by violence brings out this chapter’s first finding. It is a fact that no one at Bielefeld claimed that the bombings were working (not even those who would have benefited politically from doing so), and this ought to have posed a problem for those whose support of the NATO air strikes rested on a judgment that violence was the sole effective means to protect the human rights of Kosovar Albanians. Apparently their certainty that carrying out a campaign of violence was the way to secure the result they desired was not contradicted by what they had witnessed since the bombings began on March 24th. It seems, then, that the pacifists’ much-scorned a priori belief that violence never achieves moral purposes was mirrored by an equally firm conviction among interventionists that when other approaches to solving a problem are judged to have failed, a solution imposed by violence would eventually succeed.
A second finding on the interventionists’ dilemma falls out of this question: why did none who experienced that dilemma resolve it in favor of the commitment to non-violence, rather than the imperative to take action to protect human rights? The later reconciliation, which was the position of Fischer, Cohn-Bendit, and others, would have been no more tenable in the abstract than the former. On the grounds of whatever compelling argument stood behind their non-violent precept, the Greens could have passed up the chance to take violent action to protect human rights. The fact that no Greens explicitly took that stance shows that their commitment to an *a priori* pacifism that renounced war as the solution to any problem—either because war is inherently a moral transgression, or because it could never have desirable results—had already long before Bielefeld fallen from prevalence among them.

Certainly pacifism still had a pull on their consciences, but that pull was not strong enough to prevail when it conflicted with another of their values. Which is to say that by the Bielefeld conference, non-violence had the status of a dogma, or better a taboo, a proscription whose violation brought about feelings of transgression and guilt that would need to get worked off, but whose status as an absolute proscription most Greens evidently had no desire or ability to defend.

It is tempting to think of Bielefeld as the demise of Green pacifism after a long decline from its heyday, but whether there actually ever was any such heyday is questionable. The statements on pacifism in the 1980 federal election program and the 1993 merger declaration both revealed a preoccupation with the dangers of nuclear weapons, not with abstract arguments for non-violence. Jörg Frank of the Dortmund party chapter, 17th speaker in the general debate at Bielefeld, said
insightfully, “the peace movement from which we come was most of all a minimal consensus not to station atomic rockets… . [I]t was very broad, very diverse, and not a movement of rigorous pacifism.” He also reminded the delegates “that we haven’t applied such high standards to other conflicts.” There had been liberation movements, “where we were of the opinion that violence as an absolute last resort is justified… why didn’t we say then that it is not answerable to our pacifist axioms?”

Perhaps Frank refrained to name some of those conflicts since they involved siding against the United States, whose military action he now supported. Regardless of that, more detail only corroborates his point. On May 15, 1999, the taz newspaper profiled Norbert Hackbusch, a Green who abandoned the party in disgust at the position it had just taken on the Kosovo war. “I’m certainly no pacifist,” he cried in shock, explaining that during the 1980s he had gathered money to send to fighters in El Salvador “because it was about state repression there,” whereas Kosovo was a case of two contending nationalisms and a NATO war.

In addition to occasionally supporting armed struggles around the world, during the 1980s Hackbusch’s fellow Fundis also tended to consider violence by protesters to be legitimate in cases of self-defense against the police. Thus, whatever the party’s ideology, at no time in its history did the Greens renounce all forms of violence in practice. This point must be emphasized to avoid falling into one

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437 DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 3.
438 Ibid.
439 Ibid.
441 Poguntke, Alternative Politics, 105.
of the most tempting misinterpretations of the Bielefeld convention: as an event marking the demise of the Green party’s pacifism. If pacifism is the belief that all violent action is immoral, then it is incorrect to conclude that the Bielefeld convention was the occasion on which the Greens abandoned pacifism, since the notion that they ever embraced it fully is nothing more than a canard.

A steadfast commitment to non-violence did indeed get expressed at Bielefeld, for example in speeches by Thomas Mohr and Johanna Wirt. However, these two isolated exceptions underscore the general point that absolute pacifism played no sizable role in the Bielefeld debate, or in the broader German discussion of the Kosovo war. Peter Strutynski, speaker of the Kassel Friedensforum (peace forum), lamented in a speech on April 5, 1999 that the “pacifist basic truths” that “human rights cannot be protected by means of violating international law, that human life cannot be rescued by waging war… seldom get heard these days,” among the Greens or elsewhere.442

If the non-falsifiable view that violence works to protect human rights was widespread among the Greens at Bielefeld, while adherence to the pacifist absolute proscription of violence was uncommon, an additional problem looms on the horizon, namely, why did the Greens almost unanimously oppose the use of ground troops by NATO? In another of his lucid remarks, Jörg Frank posed this question in response to Peter Bartelheimer’s speech in the general debate at Bielefeld. If Bartelheimer demanded that victims of ethnic cleansing receive protection, and if he found that the NATO bombings did not furnish such protection, Frank wondered how the goal was

to be achieved, deducing that it “would mean the deployment of ground troops.”

But the Greens rejected that option vigorously, repeatedly, and almost unanimously (the exception being Daniel Cohn-Bendit, who devoted surprisingly little time in his speech to advocating the use of ground troops). If many Greens thought taking action to protect refugees, using violence if necessary, was imperative, why did they balk at military intervention in the form of an invasion by ground troops, given that bombings alone had proven ineffective? Why did Greens who denounced non-violent pressures on Milosevic as ineffective, and who held inaction in the face of human rights abuses and fascism to be abhorrent, fail to conclude that the bombings were a form of deplorable inaction, upon finding them ineffective in preventing atrocities?

The Roth-Ströbele Waffenstillstand petition pointed out how this type of logic redefined “action” as progressively more violent.

We turn our backs on the logic of escalation that claims: One who exerts political and economic pressure watches helplessly; one who bombs, acts. One who bombs without success is watching helplessly, only one who deploys ground troops acts. One who deploys ground troops watches helplessly, only one who marches into Belgrade and overthrows Milosevic acts.

Clearly not only the Waffenstandstill petition, but also those who supported the leadership’s petition, turned against that logic: by their call for a Feuerpause, the Greens if anything concluded from the bombings’ failure that less violence, not more, should be applied, at least temporarily. But it is not clear why they made that demand given the underlying premise of continuing the bombings, which regarded employing violence as the way to make one’s efforts more effective.

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443 DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 3.
It should not come as a surprise that simply drawing out implications from the dilemma many Greens found themselves facing does not fully resolve some perplexing aspects of their discussion. Their debate was not of the philosophical kind where (aspirationally, at least) sheer consistency—a willingness to accept the inferences one’s beliefs entail—would be the single controlling logic in effect. Bielefeld was a stressful and erratic debate about wielding political power, so it must have been influenced by the emotions and strategies of those involved. Either the political dimension, whose role is assessed next, will solve the accumulated riddles, or else one may have to resort to the *deus ex machina* of randomness and emotionality in order to explain the perplexing relationship between the convention’s results and its participants’ expressed views.

Fortunately, chapter three’s catalogue of the contents of the minor petitions can be of assistance. More than arguing the specific advantages of a temporary over permanent stop to the bombings, advocates of the *Feuerpause* petition emphasized advantages of staying in government over abandoning it, or else they charged that ending the bombings permanently was a policy based on trust in the good intentions of Milosevic, who would in fact only be emboldened by it to continue perpetrating ethnic cleansing. Perhaps the most critical point of contention in the entire debate boiled down to arguing over which petition relied the least on Milosevic’s cooperation in its bid to bring peace and restore human rights in Kosovo. But since the *Feuerpause* petition expected that suspending the bombings would facilitate a diplomatic solution, it is difficult to see why (except for tactical reasons) the “trusting Milosevic” criticism of a *Waffenstillstand* did not apply to a *Feuerpause* as well. To
understand that, one must consult the *Realo* minor petitions, which reveal what this faction’s stance would have been without any concessions to the war’s critics.

The four petitions that were equivalent to or more *Realo* in inclination than the federal executive committee’s petition show the differences between Greens who pushed the call for a *Feuerpause* and those who held their tongues and tolerated it to prevent a harsher condemnation of the bombings from prevailing at the convention. Especially crucial are the Ortmanns and Baden-Württemberg petitions which, as quoted in chapter three, state explicitly that the bombings were not working, but which did not call for even a temporary stop to them. How did they sustain that position? In a nutshell, by insisting that only Milosevic, not NATO, was able to end the Kosovo war, and that stopping the bombings would make him less likely to do so. That being the case, the military strategy could not be less promising than alternatives, since Milosevic, not NATO, decided the future course of the conflict: either he would climb down, or the conflict would continue, regardless of whether NATO, the Greens, or anyone else thought bombing Yugoslavia made sense. Once having posited that only NATO’s opponent had the ability and responsibility to end the war, and asserting further that he was maniacal and irrational and hence would not, these Greens could insist that NATO should stay the course of bombing Yugoslavia without needing to argue that the bombings would eventually prove successful in terms of humanitarian goals.

The rhetorical transferal to Milosevic of all ability to end the war seems to have stoked the political imagination of the *Realos*. If Milosevic had to take the first step to ending the conflict, the *Realos* were freed from any need to explain how
passing their petitions would bring about the fulfillment of their expressed wishes. Probably for that reason the Realo petitions were far more visionary and even utopian in character than any of the left-wing petitions, some of which were radically critical, but rather ho-hum in their proposals—clamoring for economic sanctions or renewed high-level diplomacy may well have been apposite, but these were hardly visionary new ideas. Freed from responsibility to advocate action likely to end the war (since, they held, only Milosevic could take such action) and from the dilemma of reconciling military intervention with the norm of non-violence (since the staunchest Realos abandoned that norm decisively), the Realos won space to voice grand aspirations. The Ortmanns petition had the vision of an international military poised to topple dictators anywhere, and Cem Özdemir introduced that petition with his hope and belief that one day all dictators would be serving time in the Hague. The vision in Sterzing’s petition was cooperation with sub-national elements in other countries in order to stop mass violence somehow and to prevent human rights abuses before they occurred. The clear difference between these two desired worlds suggests that in simultaneously demonizing and transferring agency to Milosevic, the Realos attained a degree of freedom for the political imagination. They had the significant rhetorical advantage of being in a position to indulge in painting their broad utopian visions for international politics without having to offer practical solutions to the problem immediately at hand.

In contrast to the Realo petitions, the advocates of the anti-war petitions got held (by themselves and others) to an expectation that they would say something

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445 DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 4.
convincing as to how stopping the bombings would help secure human rights and bring peace to Kosovo. The somewhat scholastic classification of anti-war arguments in chapter three makes the point that those arguments, despite their variety, all more or less saddled their exponents with that burden. Critiques of NATO’s hypocrisy or its flaunting international law were insufficient since they alone gave no explanation of how passing a petition that inveighed on those topics constituted effective peace policy for the Balkans. Observing how counter-productive the bombings had been only amounted to an argument for ceasing them if doing so seemed likely to improve the situation. The argument that war may never be used as a means in politics, that it is inherently immoral, would not necessarily require producing an alternative, but the advocates for petitions such as Buntenbach’s (77) and Cremer’s (42) never indicated clearly the severability of their categorical condemnation of war from the different type of argument that merely noted how badly the bombings of Yugoslavia had gone over the past month and a half. Perhaps citing the grim record of innocent civilians killed by the bombings, in addition to pointing out that the large-scale expulsion of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo only began after the bombings were underway, seemed so overwhelmingly important, and so rhetorically effective, that few Greens considered it a high priority to make the case for pacifism and non-violence as abstract principles. Whether or not making that case would have changed the convention’s result (we will never know), the fact remains that no kind of argument against the bombings allowed its exponents to escape from providing some kind of alternative, or explaining how stopping them in itself was sufficient to resolve the conflict between Serbians and Albanians in Kosovo.
Joachim Raschke comes close to identifying this decisive point when he states “the greatest difficulty for the intraparty alliance between the leftists and the radical pacifists around Uli Cremer consisted in their having only one option for action in the concrete situation: get out of the war! And the Kosovar Albanians? One could number off much that had gone wrong in the previous years, but had little on hand with which to help them.”\(^{446}\) Yet his formulation seems once again tendentious: supporters of Fischer believed that war critics could suggest no means of immediate help for the Kosovar Albanians, but the bombings’ critics themselves cited many alternatives: economic sanctions, rewards for negotiation and cooperation, stopping the bombings as the first step in mutual de-escalation, collaboration with the Serbian opposition, and provisioning flights from the Red Cross possible only once the bombings stopped, among others. While Raschke may have found these plans to be without prospect, the critics of the war clearly did not, a fact which Raschke overlooked. Yet equally clearly, the critics failed to offer their alternatives convincingly enough to win over a majority of delegates.

The inability of the war critics to present compelling enough alternatives to the bombings may have stemmed in large part from the simple fact that they were not themselves in power, and hence lacked an authoritative position from which to issue policy proposals. Unlike the \textit{Realos}, (whose leaders were actually in power, but whose unadulterated position at Bielefeld avoided the need to explain the implementation of its most ambitious demands), the grass-roots anti-war activists ended up offering pointers on diplomacy and state relations—an unaccustomed, non-

credible role for these Monday morning quarterbacks to have to play. Since they had no ability to test their alternatives, or even to raise them in a policy-making context, their ideas’ feasibility and advantage could only be a matter for speculation, yet had to be asserted without hesitation. The war critics’ quandary is strikingly similar to Volmer’s description of the media’s treatment of the Greens’ debate on military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the mid-90s:

The party and parliamentary delegation gave themselves over to the misunderstanding that they were political subjects, but were in fact objects of commentaries and speculations that wished to push them in a specific direction…. In actuality an opposition party without any influence on the international negotiating process, they acted as if they had to come to a decision due to the responsibility of governing. Had Greens actually been in government, they would have had—in return for the responsibility to implement internationally arranged steps—the chance to inject their civil society solution proposals into negotiations.447

The anti-war Greens at Bielefeld, especially those favoring petitions to the left of Roth and Ströbele’s call for a Waffenstillstand, no more had their leaders in decision-making governmental roles than did the entire Green Party during the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Neither could prove the effectiveness of non-military alternatives while being in no position actually to try them.

By Bielefeld, the political pacifists leaders like Volmer, Radcke, and Trittin had taken roles in the Red-Green coalition and supported Fischer, in contrast to their collaboration with the radical pacifists and against the Realos at earlier conventions in Bremen and Bonn in order to pass resolutions condemning military interventions. Volmer himself supported Fischer at two critical moments: by traveling with Fischer and Schröder to Washington in October 1998 in order to reassure Green leftists their

447 Volmer, Die Grünen und die Aussenpolitik, 582.
views would be represented in the meeting with Clinton, and by making his speech at Bielefeld, the last one in the general debate, a philippic on Milosevic as a fascist and the futility of banking on his good intentions. Whether one sees the change of sides by the political pacifist elites as an opportunistic betrayal or a responsible revision of views, it certainly left a fatal wound in the alliance between radical and political pacifisms that had until Bielefeld held advocates of military intervention in check. Although Fischer and Cohn-Bendit tend to receive the credit (or blame) for overhauling Green foreign policy during the 90s (especially from scholars writing in English who seem dimly if at all aware of the multiple roles and the range of positions relating to foreign policy within the Green party), the conversion of Trittin, Volmer, Radcke, and their like to favoring NATO military interventions was likewise crucial.

This thesis has shown that critics of the war wielded arguments which induced them to describe the mechanism by which voting for a permanent end to the bombings would resolve the conflict in Kosovo and redress abuses of human rights there. That the war critics faced such a difficult task is apparent not only from the direction in which their own positions led them, but also from discussion of another of the convention’s themes, treated in section two of chapter three: the responsibilities of being a governing party, to make a constructive proposal, not merely criticize, reject, and call for the cessation of what one opposed.

The Greens grappled with three aspects of the responsibilities of having political power, as laid out in the second section of chapter three. They were: whether

to stay in the coalition if they opposed the bombings, whether as a governing party to make realistic or extreme demands, and whether the party leadership and grass-roots should speak in unison or divide into roles of realism and idealism respectively. An overwhelming portion of delegates spoke out and voted for staying in government, despite however much they opposed the bombings. The Greens did not advocate staying in power for its own sake, or to implement Green proposals in other areas of policy, but rather as a way to make a difference in international affairs by continuing to nudge the war toward a diplomatic solution. On the second question of making realistic or extreme demands, the majority of voices seem to have favored the former.

What the Greens seem not to have realized was that they exerted more influence on international diplomacy by seeming to be an unpredictable loose cannon, beholden to radical leftists and pacifists, than by sensibly and reliably working within the confines of purported political realities. Evidence in the last section of chapter one strongly suggested that the fragility of the German Red-Green coalition blocked open preparation for a ground invasion at the Washington DC NATO summit on April 23-24, 1999. Only in late May, after the Bielefeld convention had stabilized Germany’s coalition, did high-level discussion of that option begin. So the Greens, by their efforts to pass a resolution which strengthened Joschka Fischer’s position in the hopes he could bring to fruition the much-vaunted Fischer Plan (in reality Fischer became increasingly irrelevant to international diplomacy on Kosovo as the month of May wore on), actually made the ground war option more politically feasible for NATO by stabilizing the Red-Green coalition. Granted, opposition to a ground invasion was still rife in German public opinion and in the CDU/CSU and FDP opposition, but the only
immediate threat to the Red-Green coalition came from the Greens, who scotched that threat at Bielefeld by showing that the majority of them had no desire to jeopardize the party’s place in government.

If it is correct to argue that the delegates did not see the choice between *Waffenstillstand* or *Feuerpause* as a yes/no vote on the Red-Green coalition (Fischer’s memoir notwithstanding), the choice instead may have been between making an extreme or a more moderate demand: which gave greater impetus to peace? The delegates’ choice to stay in the coalition demanding a temporary rather than permanent end to the bombings arose from the incorrect assessment that they could make more of a difference in preventing an escalation of the war through moderation rather than extreme demands. Being on board with the SPD and NATO, yet perturbed by internal anti-war and anti-coalition dissidence and a proclivity to bolt or self-destruct at any moment would have been the Greens’ best strategy, but Fischer convinced them to the contrary that their only hope to take a step promoting peace was to bolster him. His ability to do so without being convincingly contradicted on that point by those who argued for ending the bombings permanently explains why the Bielefeld convention resulted in the Greens supporting a military strategy which they considered ineffective at best.
Conclusion

By two orders of magnitude, the length of this thesis has exceeded the number of pages any other author has devoted to the Bielefeld convention. Therefore, perhaps the most fitting way to conclude is with some reflections on which factors especially made the Bielefeld convention worthy of lengthy study, and what broader conclusions on political processes such a study suggests.

First and foremost, studying the Bielefeld convention in depth has offered a priceless window into the sausage factory of grass-roots democracy. The debate which took place in the Siedensticker Hall was a grave and earnest one in which no rhetorical punches were pulled, yet the convention also contained a famous moment of pandemonium, as well as obscure yet equally characteristic moments of levity. For example, before the last, decisive round of voting, in which the Greens would define their party’s stand on the Kosovo war, the chairmanship was obliged to announce that an alternative set of ballots would be put into use, seeing as a few delegates had, during the course of a trying day, diverted themselves by folding paper ships or other playthings out of their original ballots.\footnote{DVD, Bielefeld Special Convention, vol. 5.} Another comic moment occurred after Luise Nomayo of the Neustadt-Waldnaab party chapter moved for all petitions which mentioned the Fischer plan to be withdrawn from consideration on the grounds that it was crucial to know the exact wording of such diplomatic documents, yet she had been unable to obtain the exact text of the plan from the media or any government
agency. A few moments after her motion was defeated, Joschka Fischer himself bowed sardonically as he presented her with her very own personal copy of the official diplomatic text of the Fischer plan. These antics are part and parcel of the grass-roots culture of direct democracy from which the German Green party sprang, a culture in which sharp disagreements did not get smoothed over, in which the irreverent rank-and-file would not take for granted that the party elites know what is best, and in which the personal foibles of concerned citizens sometimes overpowered the niceties of formal politics. The Greens had to air the moral and pragmatic problems posed by their involvement in the Kosovo war; they could not ignore them, and that fact does them credit.

Another reason why the Bielefeld convention was a singular event was that it required a leading political figure from a government in the process of waging war to take a day out of his schedule in order to debate obstreperous anti-war activists within his own political base. In all of history, there are probably very few other events which fit that description. In contemporary U.S. politics at least, there is simply no imaginable analogue to Joschka Fischer fighting for his political life by debating foreign policy with the likes of Hans-Christian Ströbele, Annelie Buntenbach, Ulrich Cremer, Ilka Schröder, and others. Imagine if during the Iraq war Donald Rumsfeld depended for his political survival on getting the better of a frank exchange of views at a public event with anti-war activists like Cindy Sheehan. Even that unthinkable

450 Ibid., vol. 4.
451 Ibid.
452 Of course, the point is not to equate Donald Rumsfeld to Joschka Fischer or the Kosovo war to the Iraq war, but rather to illustrate how unusual it is for a government minister to talk to and rely on the support of anti-war activists during wartime.
scenario does not quite capture how remarkable the Bielefeld convention was, since most of Fischer’s critics were not famous politicians or activists, but simply unknown, politically-engaged citizens. It was an extraordinary achievement of the Green party during the Kosovo war to provide a politically relevant forum for the most thorough-going criticism of the NATO bombings—a forum whose collective decision was nothing less than an internationally significant event.

That said, the Bielefeld convention is of interest not primarily because of the character of the discussion which took place there, but because of its potential to affect what was at stake: the war in Kosovo. On this matter, as was argued in the preceding chapter, the Greens seem to have misunderstood their political leverage. The assumption which underlay the debate between the Waffenstillstand and Feuerpause petitions, that Milosevic was entirely to blame for the war and that only he could decide whether it would continue, may have prevented the Greens from noticing how their own presence in the German coalition government affected the negotiations within NATO and of the western governments with Russia, as the last section of chapter one discussed. At a press conference on June 25, 1999, two weeks after the bombings stopped, President Clinton thought back on the war and remarked, “I was a little surprised that we had no more problems than we did in maintaining our allied unity [within NATO], given the enormous pressures that were on some of our allies. And I think that gives you some indication about the depth of conviction people had that this [the NATO military campaign] was right.”

453 Quoted in Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 164.
people he had in mind, then his attribution of alliance solidarity to a deep conviction of the rightness of the bombings is erroneous. The Greens avoided endangering the Red-Green coalition not because they full-heartedly supported NATO’s military action, but because they became convinced that any outcome of their deliberations which did not strengthen Joschka Fischer and the Red-Green coalition would make the catastrophic situation in Kosovo even worse. They were unaware (perhaps they could not have known, but they certainly could have suspected) that in stabilizing the Red-Green coalition, their decision would increase the likelihood of an event whose prospect they almost unanimously abhorred: the further escalation of the conflict by an invasion of NATO ground troops.

How did the Greens manage to overlook this consequence of their decision? An important reason seems to have been that much of the anti-war argumentation offered was rather inept. Given the ruinous consequences of the bombings of Kosovo up to that point and the rhetoric of pacifism and non-violence that was a Green party tradition, one would have expected opponents of the bombings to be in a position to make some quite compelling arguments at Bielefeld, as indeed they did, but those arguments did not prevail. Perhaps a lesson for pacifists from the Bielefeld convention is to structure anti-war arguments more carefully, distinguishing the categorical rejection of war on moral grounds from a critique of a specific war in progress. The former argument is a normative claim that requires an abstract philosophical defense, while the latter argument concerns current events. Pacifists and other critics of wars might do well to decide which kind of claim they want to make at any given moment. It is not illogical to argue on both the normative and empirical
levels in the same breath, but by separating the two explicitly one might avoid muddling the pacifist position. Another important lesson from the Bielefeld convention is that the normative component of anti-war argumentation cannot be dispensed with. The risk in doing so is to become trapped in the type of cost-benefit debate that is extremely difficult to win convincingly, especially for those who have no power to test the alternatives they propose. If the normative claims on the immorality of war cannot be jettisoned from the pacifist position, such claims require a more sophisticated defense than the shrill repetition of anti-war clichés which too often predominates in such discourse. As Alasdair MacIntyre has warned, the impoverishment of moral discourse into a shouting match between exponents of incommensurable first-principles offers no prospect for building consensus by persuading those with whom one disagrees.454 Fleshing out the abstract arguments for pacifism should be a high priority for pacifists and anti-war movements.455

Nevertheless, in the final analysis, there is no guarantee that different arguments would have led to a different result at the convention, since the fact remains that Bielefeld was a unique event that was perhaps decisively influenced by the paint hurled at Fischer, the presentation of several leftist petitions that split the vote, the peculiar vote-counting procedure, uncertainty about the train schedule, or a host of other contingencies. Such incidental factors may have been responsible for the way the convention played out, yet it is even more crucial to recognize that the

Bielefeld convention was not unpredictable just because of random effects on the proceedings, but far more because of its basic character as a democratic deliberation between people with sharply opposing views. It would be impossible to reconstruct how each of the roughly 56 speeches at the convention persuaded or put off each of the roughly 800 delegates present (even if one tracked them all down and asked, the honesty and accuracy of the answers would remain uncertain), yet only an exhaustive inquiry of that kind could have the chance of firmly establishing how the convention played out. Aspiring to give a full account of a democratic deliberation like the Bielefeld convention may be futile, but subjecting such an event to minute and sustained scrutiny is necessary in order to offer educated guesses on why it unfolded the way it did, and how it could have unfolded differently. Thus, this thesis may serve as an example of the type of microscopic study that is necessary to understand how decisions are made by grass-roots democratic bodies. As such, it corroborates Hannah Arendt’s position that democratic deliberations are an unpredictable realm of human action where generalizations about social trends in human behavior are of limited applicability. When political decisions are made with the direct participation of citizens, their deliberations assume, by virtue of the personal idiosyncrasies and intellectual creativity in play, a level of complexity that can make any outcome appear as a truly spontaneous act.

One must not fall into the trap of casting the Bielefeld convention as a watershed, an irreversible metamorphosis, or as the culmination of any inexorable process, whether it be the Green Party’s evolution from a protest-party caterpillar into

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a beautiful governing-party butterfly, or with a different bias, from a wholesome, blooming sunflower into a poisoned, rotten one.457 The Bielefeld convention was an historic event for the Greens, but not an inevitable or permanent transformation. This is already clear in view of the outcome of the Green party’s federal convention in September 2007 at Göttingen, where the party (now in the opposition again due to the SPD’s poor showing in the 2005 election) debated German participation in the NATO operations in Afghanistan. In a shocking reversal of position, the delegates defied the party leadership by voting to instruct Green MPs to vote against renewing the mandate for German military forces to remain in Afghanistan, and against the deployment of German Tornado fighter planes in that country.458 The pacifist or anti-war streak of the German Green party, it seems, has by no means been effaced. Green political conventions remain unpredictable events, and while the ideologies and perceptions debated at them impose a certain order on the discussion—an order whose appreciation is highly meaningful for understanding their results in retrospect—the results cannot be foreseen. To reconcile his own unpredictable transformations, Fischer took solace in a saying on the wall of the NATO council chamber in Brussels, a saying which is apt for his party’s deliberations too: *animus in consulendo liber*.459

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459 The human spirit, in its deliberation, is free. Fischer, *Die rot-grünen Jahre*, 188.
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