Optional Supranationality: Redefining the European Security and Defense Policy

by

Laura K. Conley
Class of 2007

A thesis submitted to the faculty of Wesleyan University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts with Departmental Honors in Government

Middletown, Connecticut April, 2007
Special Thanks

To the Professors at Denmark’s International Study Program, for introducing me to the complexities and contradictions of the EU

To Professor Kelly Greenhill, for her invaluable insight and her willingness to accommodate my academic wanderings

To my family, friends, and housemates for their unflagging support and late night reassurances

Finally, to Gian, for his patience
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## SPECIAL THANKS

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

### CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1. Introduction 5
2. Background: Tracing the History of European Defense Cooperation 6
3. Initial Stirrings 6
4. Early Institutions: From Dunkirk to the Nat 8
5. Getting the Balance Right: NATO, Germany, and the European Defense Community 9
6. Defense in Name Only? The WEU, the Fouchet Plan, and EPC 12
7. Starting Again: Post-Cold War European Security and the ESDP 15
8. III. Major Areas of Inquiry and Hypothesis 18
9. IV. Methodology 18
10. V. Conclusion 21

### CHAPTER TWO: THEORY

1. Introduction 22
2. Realism 23
3. Predictions 25
4. Liberalism 35
5. Predictions 37
6. Constructivism 43
7. Predictions 44
8. V. A New Perspective 49
9. Why the ESDP? 51
10. Expected State Behaviors 53
11. VI. Conclusion 54

### CHAPTER 3: BRITAIN

1. Introduction 57
2. Realism 59
3. Liberalism 65
4. Constructivism 69
5. V. The ESDP Reconsidered 71
6. Building a Fragile Consensus 72
7. Staying Close to NATO 80
8. A National and a European Project 83
9. VI. Conclusion 84
Chapter One: Introduction

I. Introduction

At the 1991 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Rome, George Bush Sr. chastised European allies with a warning that, “If your ultimate aim is to provide independently for your own defence, the time to tell us is today.”¹ The comment took aim at one of the oldest movements in European integration: the pursuit of a collective, autonomous, security and defense capability. Whatever the disapprobation expressed by Bush though, history gave little reason for the United States to be concerned. From the first attempts to establish a supranational European military in 1954, to less integrated efforts at cooperation, such as the now defunct Western European Union (WEU), autonomous defense projects in Europe have encountered nearly impossible odds. Despite spectacular progress in economic integration, national militaries have remained inviolable ground.

Still, the final defeat of European defense cooperation has yet to materialize and the latest effort, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), now has demonstrated military capabilities in minor peacekeeping tasks. In light of decades of failed cooperation, it is certainly pertinent to ask why there was reason for Europe to try again. However, the issue at the root of such a question is the need to define the nature of the ESDP itself. Only by doing so, can one understand what drove states to create the policy, and how it is likely to develop in the future.

This work examines the existing theoretical analyses of the ESDP and proposes that the policy is best understood not as a project for external security, but as an identity building tool for the internal stability of the European Union (EU). This theory will be developed through a critical examination of the perspectives of major schools of international relations theory, and will be demonstrated using the political and security policy choices undertaken by Britain, France, and the Netherlands. Although scholars from every branch of international relations theory have weighed in on the EU’s newest security and defense project, I will ultimately demonstrate that their perspectives offer only limited explanatory power. Despite appearances, the ESDP is fundamentally a domestic policy, intended to achieve its greatest successes within the European Union.

II. Background: Tracing the History of European Defense Cooperation

In order to understand the motives behind the ESDP, it is first necessary to introduce the history of European defense cooperation. Although I will later argue that the ESDP is primarily a domestic policy, an understanding of its apparent predecessors still offers insight into its current nature. Not only are the EU’s previous attempts vital to comprehending how realist, liberalist, and constructivist theories of the ESDP’s nature have developed, but a broad perspective on the history of failed cooperation reveals the futility of investing in another similar project. Simply put, if the ESDP were purely a security and defense policy, it would have little chance of success.

Initial Stirrings
The idea of European defense cooperation was first seriously broached in the wake of WWII, when integration was increasingly considered the most effective weapon against future violence. The 1944 Declaration of the European Resistance Movements called for wide-ranging integration and the formation of a European federation. Among the cooperative efforts envisioned in the Declaration was “a European army placed under the orders of a federal government, which would exclude all other national armies.”\(^2\) Unfortunately, the proposal received little support and indeed was warmly received only by Italy and Belgium, neither of which had the political power to establish a viable federalist project. The remaining countries were too preoccupied with the end of the war and the subsequent reconstruction to consider such proposals, and the Soviet Union’s uncompromising opposition to a united Europe provided a strong incentive to retain the nation state system.\(^3\)

The idea of integration was revived by Britain after the end of WWII, a somewhat ironic development, as the British had been strong detractors of cooperation at the end of the war and would quickly reassume a nationalist position. However, Sean Greenwood argues convincingly that from 1945 to 1947, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin worked diligently to achieve “an economic, commercial and defensive combination of European states under British leadership.”\(^4\) However, it ultimately proved impossible to attain a consensus opinion on the project and French President Charles de Gaulle in particular played a large role in the failure of the British efforts. For his cooperation, De Gaulle demanded, among other

\(^3\) Aybet, 46-48.
concessions, that Britain back France in its quest “for permanent control of the Rhineland and for the creation of the region around the Ruhr industrial complex as an independent German state under international control.”\(^5\) Bevin initially considered the proposal, but quickly came to view it as an unacceptable demand. Although other factors, such as disapproval from the superpowers and internal opposition from the British Treasury and Board of Trade were influential in blocking Bevin’s proposals, a significant aspect of the failed integration efforts was the inability of the British and French to work together.\(^6\) The difficult nature of this partnership would be a central theme of European defense efforts for nearly half a century.

**Early Institutions: From Dunkirk to the NAT**

The first formal post-war European defense project was the 1947 Dunkirk Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance between Britain and France. The terms included mutual defense against any future German aggression, as well as mechanisms for economic consultation. Although the agreement was never dismantled, it was quickly overshadowed by the establishment of a larger mutual defense pact between Britain, France, and the Benelux countries. The “Treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense,” or the Brussels Treaty, provided any signatory under attack with “all the military and other aid and assistance” that other members could provide. Other terms included the

\(^5\) Greenwood, 14.
\(^6\) Greenwood, 15-16.
creation of a foreign minister’s Consultative Council and a Western Defense Committee composed of the five countries’ defense ministers.  

Ironically, it was the Brussels Treaty that made possible the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a body which quickly superseded continental defense projects and deepened Britain’s separation from its European allies. Salmon and Shepherd single out the Berlin Blockade as the event that made NATO possible. The blockade initially prompted the creation of the Western Union Defense Organization (WUDO) under the Brussels Treaty. However, WUDO was never put in place, as the actions of the Brussels Treaty group gave “the U.S. president…the evidence he needed to convince Congress of Western Europe’s determination and ability to organize itself for defense.” The U.S. moved quickly to ally itself with the group, and the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) was enacted in 1949 with the addition of Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal.

Getting the Balance Right: NATO, Germany, and the European Defense Community

The formation of the North Atlantic Treaty group was the beginning of a permanent American military presence in Europe. However, in the early 1950s, both Europeans and Americans were still wary of the United States playing too large a role in the continent’s defense. For the Americans, the beginning of the Korean War confirmed beliefs about the importance of containment on a global scale. Convinced that Europe was also at risk, the United States pushed its allies to arm themselves. However, Ruane points out that, “even if the Europeans maximized their rearmament

---

8 Salmon and Shepherd, 18.
efforts, and the United States itself made a substantial troop commitment to the European theatre, American military planners calculated that the Soviet bloc would still remain alarmingly superior to the West in conventional force terms.”

To meet this outstanding need, the United States called for the rearmament of West Germany under the auspices of a newly revised North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). If Germany was not allowed to rearm, it was made clear that the United States would reduce its future troop commitment to Europe.  

The American proposition proved controversial, and nowhere more so than in Paris. Greenwood remarks that the French did not object to German rearmament per se, but rather rejected the idea that the process happen through membership in NATO. Rearmament was inevitable, but “the Atlantic Treaty implied equality among its participants,” a designation France was unwilling to afford West Germany.  

As an alternative, French Prime Minister René Pléven announced plans for the European Defense Community (EDC).

The EDC was designed to be a European, supranational military force. The Pléven plan envisioned “a European Army with a single High Commissioner, a single organization, unified equipment and financing, and under the control of a single supranational authority.” This joint force would be made up of national force contingents, some of which would be German. However, the supranational European command would exercise executive control, thus ensuring that Germany had

---

10 Greenwood, 46.
11 Greenwood, 45.
significantly less autonomy than would be available to it in the American proposal. Additionally, the EDC would maintain official links with NATO. In times of war, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) would be formally in charge of the joint army and would use it as if it were a NATO force.  

Pléven’s proposal was not met with unanimous support, but discussions began in February 1951 and France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries eventually acceded to the plan in May 1952. However, the EDC treaty still required ratification by national parliaments. Although France had been the impetus for creation of the EDC, the French national assembly proved to be the primary obstacle to its implementation. Former French Prime Minister Robert Schuman worked diligently to build support among assembly members, even going so far as to obtain an additional security guarantee from Great Britain. Also, the United States, which had initially been reluctant to support the proposal, came to consider it the best available option and made clear its feelings with the threat that, “unless the French ratified the EDC treaty the United States might have to make an ‘agonizing reappraisal’ of its defence relations with Europe.”

The EDC treaty encountered resistance in Belgium, the Netherlands and West Germany, but all three countries, as well as Luxembourg, eventually approved the agreement. Italy had yet to reach a decision when the matter was put before the French National Assembly. Despite the efforts of the United States, Britain, and French politicians like Schuman, the Assembly voted against the treaty, effectively killing what would turn out to be one of the most ambitious initiatives in the history.

---

13 Salmon and Shepherd, 22.
14 Greenwood, 53.
of European defense integration. Salmon and Shepherd point to a plethora of factors motivating the Assembly’s ‘non’ vote, including fear of German rearmament, nationalist objections to placing the French army under international control, and concerns that France would be “accepting ties and constraints on its freedom that Britain had not.” However, in the case of rearmament, French protest proved a futile statement. The French Assembly narrowly approved West Germany’s NATO membership by a vote of 287 to 256 in December 1954.

While the defeat of the EDC was not a fatal blow to European defense cooperation, it marked the beginning of a shift away from semi-autonomous projects toward regional coordination under the direct authority of NATO. Essentially, European states would not again attempt to stretch their military ties to the United States until after the end of the Cold War. The strength of the Atlantic bond was felt particularly keenly by the very nation that made it possible. Indeed, Charles Cogan remarks that:

“The irony of the 1954 rejection of the EDC was not lost totally on French parliamentarians at the time. As Marie-Pierre Subtil noted, ‘A number of parliamentarians affirmed [after the December 30, 1954, vote] that if they had known, they would have chosen the EDC, and thus Europe. Too late.’”

Defense in Name Only? The WEU, the Fouchet Plan, and EPC

Following the defeat of the EDC, the need for German rearmament was met by both NATO and the Brussels Treaty group. West Germany was first accepted into

---

15 Salmon and Shepherd, 24-25.  
16 Ruane, 169.  
the latter as a way of mollifying French fears that it would grow too powerful. The Brussels Treaty offered less autonomy than a NATO membership, and thus provided an additional level of control when West Germany was finally brought into the larger alliance.\textsuperscript{18} In addition to Germany, Italy was accepted as a member of the Brussels Treaty group, which was renamed the Western European Union (WEU).

The WEU, much like the Brussels Treaty before it, operated in conjunction with NATO and provided little opportunity or impetus for independent European security and defense efforts. In fact, the new organization’s charter specified that it undertake “close cooperation” with NATO and “rely on the appropriate Military Authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.”\textsuperscript{19} Aybet argues that in addition to being basically dependent on NATO, the early WEU had little idea of its own functions. After the integration of West Germany into NATO, the WEU gradually evolved into “an intermediary or a talking shop, for handling grey-area matters which did not fall into the authority of any one particular organisation or issues which proved too controversial to be handled by another forum.”\textsuperscript{20} Although the WEU would later be briefly revived, in the 1950s it was all but forgotten behind NATO’s rising star.

Although the WEU fell into disuse, France was still heavily invested in the idea of European defense autonomy. In particular, de Gaulle strongly favored intergovernmental cooperation across a range of fields, including defense. In 1960, he introduced a plan for the creation of commissions on issues such as politics, economics, and defense. While these bodies would not be supranational, they would

\begin{footnotes}
\item[18] Greenwood, 54.
\item[20] Aybet, 86.
\end{footnotes}
allow for significant cooperation. This effort, later called the Fouchet Plan, also provided for a Secretariat in Paris and regular consultation among defense ministers.\footnote{Aybet, 97.}

Aybet notes that a primary purpose of the Fouchet Plan was to supplant the WEU with a new cooperative organization, which could deepen the divide between Britain and continental Europe.\footnote{Aybet, 97.} However, this motive was perceived by French allies, who were already concerned about the future relationship between the cooperative effort and NATO. Together, they forced de Gaulle to limit the scope of the project. In 1961, WEU members met to discuss political unity, and Christian Fouchet, the French Ambassador to Denmark, was charged with leading a committee to convert their sentiments into a treaty. Unfortunately de Gaulle, not to be denied, introduced a new treaty largely along the lines of his original proposal. This version “revived the original de Gaulle plan to establish a committee of defence ministers,” but the alterations proved untenable among allies concerned about maintaining NATO’s primacy.\footnote{Aybet, 98.} The Fouchet Plan was gradually abandoned, as NATO once again took precedence over strictly European projects.

The idea of tying together political and defense cooperation did not vanish with the Fouchet Plan. European Political Cooperation (EPC), a “loose, consensus-based mechanism” was the successor to de Gaulle’s efforts.\footnote{Cogan, 8.} The EPC was much more amorphous than its predecessors, in that it provided a forum for states to consult on foreign policy, but where security could only be discussed insofar as it concerned

\begin{itemize}
    \item \footnote{Aybet, 97.}
    \item \footnote{Aybet, 97.}
    \item \footnote{Aybet, 98.}
    \item \footnote{Cogan, 8.}
\end{itemize}
political matters. However, topic limits were largely in name only, as “increasingly, EPC ministers found the distinction between the ‘political’ and other aspects of security hard to maintain.”  

Prospects for the EPC were positive in the early 1970s, but the project developed slowly. In 1981, states agreed that security questions could be discussed under EPC, and early plans for a common foreign policy began to emerge.  

Although EPC was far from a substantial mechanism—it “consisted largely of statements and had few other instruments”—policymakers continued to invest in it through the early 1990s. However, a resurgent WEU proved to be more effective, and eventually overshadowed the ill-defined EPC. In 1987, France and its allies argued for the need to “set up through the WEU a European defense identity as an alternate instrument to NATO.” Indeed, this was likely the most viable project through which to pursue autonomous capabilities, as the WEU was the first mechanism under which Europe began to take an active role in its own security.

Starting Again: Post-Cold War European Security and the ESDP

From the mid 1980s to the early 1990s, the WEU grew to be the main focus of proponents of autonomous European defense efforts. It met with major success in 1994 with the introduction of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), a project to enhance Europe’s role in NATO. Although it did not provide for completely autonomous projects, the ESDI was “a technical-military arrangement that

\[\text{Salmon and Shepherd, 29.}\]
\[\text{Salmon and Shepherd, 37.}\]
\[\text{Salmon and Shepherd, 41.}\]
\[\text{Cogan, 3.}\]
\[\text{Cogan, 3.}\]
would allow the Europeans to assume a greater share of the burden for security missions...by providing the WEU with access to those NATO assets and capabilities that European member states did not possess.”

However, the WEU, and through it the ESDI, had restricted autonomy. In 1997, nine EU members proposed joining the EU and WEU “as a means of conferring upon the former some of the military attributes of the latter.” This project was far too ambitious for Atlanticist nations, and the United Kingdom ultimately vetoed the proposal. Additionally, the WEU made little headway in dealing with the Americans, who proved less enthusiastic than expected in terms of loaning out military equipment to its European allies. While it was the most active organization for European defense at the time, the WEU was clearly ineffective for the continent’s growing needs.

The successor to the WEU, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), is often seen as the result of Europe’s disappointing efforts during the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. In 1998, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac met in Saint Malo, France to lay the groundwork for Europe’s future security structure. The St. Malo Declaration, which called for “the capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces,” while still expressing the importance of Europe’s relationship with NATO, was an ambitious

31 Howorth and Keeler, 9.
32 Howorth and Keeler, 9.
proposal. Less than a year later, the European Union laid out plans for the ESDP, which was to consist of a High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), a Political and Security Committee (COPS), and a European Military Committee (EUMC) and staff. Although all states would have the option of consulting with others, none would be bound to participate in military operations. This structure was complemented only months later in Helsinki, when EU members set a “headline goal” for the creation of a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) for use in “significant humanitarian, crisis-management and even peace enforcement operations.”

The ESDP today serves as the EU’s primary project for security and defense. Under its auspices, European forces have been deployed in police and peacekeeping missions in Europe and Africa, although most were undertaken in strict cooperation with NATO. The United States has supported the project, but with reservations. Howorth and Keeler write that,

“From the perspective of Washington…the launch of the ESDP could be read as a reckless leap into the dark on the part of an EU that had totally inadequate military capacity, no significant plans to raise military budgets and that appeared obsessed with institutional engineering in Brussels rather than with the more serious business of acquiring the wherewithal to deliver genuine security in the European theater.”

Whether the ESDP can survive where many projects before it have faltered is yet unknown. However, it does represent one of the most significant advancements in European defense cooperation over the past sixty years.

---

35 Howorth and Keeler, 11.
37 Howorth and Keeler, 11.
III. Major Areas of Inquiry and Hypothesis

While the ESDP is clearly part of a long history of efforts to pursue autonomous security and defense capabilities, the impetus for its establishment is less clear than it appears. As previously mentioned, its creation is usually attributed to Europe’s embarrassment over its inability to independently resolve the conflicts in the Balkans, as well as the EU’s growing realization that the U.S. might not always be readily available for military assistance. However, these explanations and others are too quick to impose the frameworks of international relations theory on European actions.

This work will focus on the connection between defense integration and the EU’s need to consolidate the economic integration it has already undertaken. More specifically, I will demonstrate that the primary motive behind the ESDP is not to rectify the military insufficiencies of European countries, but to strengthen domestic support for the European Union at a time when integration is highly vulnerable to the vicissitudes of public opinion. The fifteen EU member states responsible for the ESDP approach questions of defense autonomy and supranational integration from a range of perspectives. However, through the ESDP, nations are able to create a visible symbol of European unity without relinquishing their national forces to a supranational entity.

IV. Methodology
The motives behind the creation of the ESDP will be examined based on current explanations drawn from all major paradigms of international relations theory. In the realist school, Barry Posen presents a security-based argument for integration, in which modern balance of power concerns have driven Europe to embrace an independent defense project. While he predicts that small states will display bandwagoning behavior, large states will likely unite in anticipation of the possibility that the United States might pull out of Europe, and will furthermore push to establish independent military capabilities.38

In the liberalist paradigm, Andrew Moravcsik’s theory of institution building allows for the accommodation of a range of state interests from security to economic advantage. Although his work is applicable mainly to economic treaties, when applied to security concerns it indicates that European defense projects will likely be undertaken in a supranational format in order to discourage nations from defecting from the agreement.39

Finally, in the constructivist school, Stephanie Anderson and Thomas Seitz offer an explanation based on Europe’s need to increase its international stature and solidify European identity by differentiating itself from the United States. NATO is still of primary importance, but states will seek to distance themselves from the foreign and security policy of the United States, both individually and collectively. Presumably, this distance will increase as autonomous European cooperation expands.40

38 Posen, 143 and 155-160.
40 Stephanie Anderson and Thomas R. Seitz, “European Security and Defense Policy Demystified:
Due to the wide range of state perspectives on defense, theoretical perspectives will be examined based on their applicability to three key nations: Britain, France, and the Netherlands. Justifications for this particular set of case studies vary: First, the group includes Europe’s most influential military powers, France and Britain, without which the ESDP could not possibly have been created. The Netherlands provides the perspective of the EU’s smaller and less powerful states. Additionally, the three represent one strongly Atlanticist state (Britain), one committed Europeanist (France), and a state which ably balances its commitments to both sides (the Netherlands).41

Second, each state came to the realization of the necessity for the ESDP in a different way. For the British, the ESDP was needed in order to confront entrenched anti-EU sentiment in its own society. France, traditionally more eager to involve itself in European affairs, also confronted anti-EU feelings, leading the government to help create the ESDP. However, the public sentiment in France was more unexpected, and the ESDP was a chance to ensure no further incidents would occur, rather than an opportunity to root out longstanding problems. Finally, the Dutch saw the ESDP as a way to guard against a first emergence of backlash against the EU. As a state that had traditionally been among the EU’s most fervent advocates, the ESDP was more an insurance policy than an immediate necessity. This spectrum of state perspectives is an essential justification for the choice of cases.

---

41 “Europeanist” and “Atlanticist” refer broadly to a state’s orientation toward either the European Union or the NATO alliance and the United States.
Finally, these three states are perhaps the most pertinent to any evaluation of the ESDP’s current status. This is the case less because of French and British military power, and more because of their positions on the EU’s Constitutional Treaty. While the British have always been reticent about the document, citizens in France and the Netherlands vetoed the proposed treaty in 2005. If the ESDP, and indeed the EU itself are to move forward, these three nations will be important actors to watch.

V. Conclusion

European defense cooperation has a long history of failed institutions. From the EDC to the WEU, none has been strong enough to overcome both internal European politics and the influence of NATO and the United States. However, against historical odds, Europeans continue to pursue the idea of autonomous defense. Although the ESDP may ultimately end like the projects before it, a better understanding of what motivated state actors to undertake the project will afford a glimpse at its prospects for future success.
Chapter Two: Theory

I. Introduction

As strictly a security project, the ESDP is limited by contradictory ends. If it seeks to be independent of NATO, and thus the United States, it will quickly run into conflict with the needs of its more Atlanticist-minded members. Alternately, if it chooses to submit itself to NATO’s authority, it will have no purpose for those states seeking an autonomous military capability. It is an impossible choice for a policy driven by unanimous decision making, and thus it is also a choice its members likely never intended to make. Certainly, there are nations within the EU, most notably France, which would rejoice over more independence in security policy. However, the EU is protected for the long-term by NATO, and has every opportunity to increase its military capabilities within the transatlantic framework. The ESDP, while it carries out limited security functions, is a different project entirely.

This chapter examines competing theories on the creation and development of the EDSP. It presents basic predictions of state motives and behaviors concerning the policy from major theoretical perspectives in international relations. The realist analysis focuses on the theories of Barry Posen, who highlights the balancing and bandwagoning of EU member states. Liberalism is discussed within the framework of Andrew Moravcsik’s theory of institution building, and finally constructivism is
addressed through the work of Stephanie Anderson and Thomas Seitz, who argue that the ESDP capitalizes on differences between American and European foreign and security policies to facilitate identity building.

Although all of these major theories are applicable in part, none sufficiently captures the nature of state behavior surrounding the EDSP, nor can any adequately account for the complexity of the ESDP itself. Consequently, the final section of the chapter introduces my supplemental explanation, namely that the ESDP need also be viewed as an identity-building project driven by and focused on domestic, that is to say intra-EU, needs. The ESDP offers European governments an opportunity to encourage citizens to identify with the EU, a task that has become necessary as states have grown dependent on the benefits it provides, while individual citizens have continued to feel alienated from the institution. The ESDP offers a visible symbol of European unity, while at the same time not forcing Europeans to forfeit their own national identity. It is this vital role that is overlooked in the application of traditional theories of international relations to the ESDP and, absent an appreciation of it, we cannot fully understand the development of this burgeoning European institution.

II. Realism

It comes as no surprise that the realist school and its most prominent subvariant, structural realism, are well represented in the analysis of European defense policy. For a theoretical perspective that emphasizes the prominence of balance of power politics, a resurgent European military structure was always a likely
development.\(^{42}\) Indeed, as the EU’s economic power has grown, and the United States has continued its dominance of NATO, such a development has likely become inevitable. While there is little chance that the EU will experience a direct threat from its American ally, structural realist Barry Posen argues that Europeans want the ability to address security issues because they “do not trust the United States to always be there to address these problems,” and in addition, “many…do not like the way the United States addresses these problems.”\(^{43}\) This potential conflict of interests is a vital impetus for the need to create an autonomous military structure.

This security-centric viewpoint has been applied to the ESDP most notably by Posen, but the paradigm he utilizes is rooted in the work of realists such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer. These theorists draw on several basic assumptions about international relations. First, the realities of the international system determine state behavior. As Waltz argues, even the transition to democracy cannot prevent states from entering into war, as external factors will always trump internal changes.\(^{44}\) Second, the international system is an anarchical environment in which states preference relative over absolute gains. Cooperative international institutions are therefore created to serve national purposes, and states do not enter into them for the promotion of the common good. Specifically, they “are based on the self-

---

\(^{42}\) For a discussion of modern balancing behavior, see: Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War,” *International Security* 25, no. 1(2000): 5-41. Waltz argues that the EU is currently much less likely than China or Japan to balance the United States effectively. However, it may eventually seek great power status, provided that it can learn to undertake effective, collective action on military and foreign policy matters (Waltz, 27-33).

\(^{43}\) Posen, 150-151.

\(^{44}\) Waltz, 10.
interested calculations of the great powers… Finally, states will seek to balance against or bandwagon with the strongest powers in the system. Stephen Walt argues convincingly that states make this calculation based on their estimation of which power is currently the most threatening. Although joining a coalition to balance the threatening state’s power is most often the strategy of choice, Walt notes that bandwagoning may occur when states are very weak, or are unable to secure allies with which to carry out balancing. For realists, these basic assumptions underlie the EU’s decision to create an autonomous security and defense policy.

Realist theory offers two key insights into the development of the ESDP: first, an estimation of what motivates state to participate, and second, a description of the nature of the policy itself. However, the latter can only be confirmed through factual proof of the former. That is to say, in order to establish that the ESDP is purely a security-based project, realism must demonstrate that state behavior is consistent with the theoretical motives it sets forth. However, in a number of cases, realism fails to accurately describe state participation in the ESDP.

Predictions

The realist perspective on international relations holds that the primary motive for state behavior is always the desire to guarantee national security, and thus survival. However, security is not simply the absence of violence. Rather, it is also the possession of military capabilities sufficient to meet potential threats, and the

---


independence to determine when and how they will be addressed.\(^{47}\) From these forces behind state behavior flow three predictions relevant to the ESDP. First, the formation of new security alliances will be prompted by events which demonstrate that a state’s current security guarantee is no longer adequate, or is likely to become inadequate in the foreseeable future. Events that suggest that a state lacks total sovereignty to decide its own security policy may also influence the formation of alliances, but as security is the primary motive for behavior, independence may be a lesser concern.

Second, individual states will choose to join the alliance or maintain the traditional structure based on their estimation of the security benefits of each course. Finally, the future development of the ESDP will follow the path outlined at St. Malo. Europe will continue to improve its military capabilities and undertake projects that create increasing autonomy from the United States. Although these behavioral predictions are borne out to some degree, realist expectations regarding European defense policy ultimately fail to explain state behavior.

For realists, Europe’s experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo were the conditions which prompted the EU to reconsider its security guarantee. In both conflicts, Europeans found themselves dependent on the United States to defuse the situation, an option they feared would no longer be available as the U.S. grew to resent its role as the region’s security provider.\(^{48}\) Additionally, the allies had significant differences of opinion on policy in Bosnia, which suggested Europe might be better served by a strictly EU defense capability. Posen highlights a few of these disagreements, noting that “the Europeans accused the Americans of grandiose talk about air strikes and

\(^{47}\) Mearsheimer, 9-12.

\(^{48}\) Posen, 173-178.
lifting the arms embargo that, in their view, would have exposed their peacekeeping
troops on the ground to vastly greater risks.”49

Frédéric Bozo argues that Bosnia actually affirmed the Atlantic alliance, while
Kosovo was a decisive factor in the EU’s dissatisfaction with the partnership. In the
latter conflict he notes that some EU member state felt that “a more assertive Europe,
and hence a more balanced Alliance, would have been in a position to promote a
strategy that was better than the American one.”50 Whichever conflict was more
decisive though, from the realist perspective, the fear of abandonment convinced
Europe that it needed to achieve the military capabilities to lessen the American
burden, while dissatisfaction with American policy suggested there would be benefits
to developing military capabilities, and thus power, independent of the United States.

If realism has correctly identified the event that prompted states to seek an
autonomous defense structure, then NATO commitments should decline in
importance as the ESDP becomes more fully developed. However, the claim that the
conflicts in Kosovo and Bosnia were the motivation for defense autonomy cannot
successfully explain the behavior of France, one of the EU’s largest military powers.
The French have long supported the development of an autonomous military
capability, a position Posen attributes to a realist understanding that Europe needs to
be able to act independently of the American superpower. However, Posen also notes

49 Posen, 173.
50 Frédéric Bozo, “The Effects of Kosovo and the Danger of Decoupling,” in Defending Europe:
The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy, eds. Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler
that the French are committed to working with NATO when possible, a situation which reveals a fundamental contradiction engendered by his approach.\textsuperscript{51}

Realism accurately predicts France’s enthusiasm for the ESDP. Historically, France has seen NATO as the arm of American power in Europe. Thus, distancing itself from NATO, a policy visibly implemented in 1966 when de Gaulle’s government withdrew from the alliance’s integrated military structures, represents an effort to balance U.S power.\textsuperscript{52} That France still keenly felt the power imbalance is clear from its reservations about NATO enlargement in the early 1990s, a process it perceived “as an expression of an American will to maintain its ascendancy over Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall.”\textsuperscript{53} For realists, this historical wariness of American power in Europe combined with the Balkan Wars, which were vital to bringing Britain onboard with the idea of a European defense structure.\textsuperscript{54} The result was the right project at the right time.

However, what realism fails to account for is that at the same time that the Bosnia crisis supposedly provided an opening for the creation of an autonomous military structure, France took action to strengthen its ties with NATO. While it did not entirely repudiate the 1966 break with the organization, in December 1995, at the tail end of Europe’s disastrous experience in Bosnia, France opted to replace its observer status with full membership in NATO’s Military Committee. In practice, the

\textsuperscript{51} Posen, 166-167.
\textsuperscript{52} Jean Klein, “France, NATO, and European Security,” International Security 1, no. 3 (1977): 24-25. Klein writes that De Gaulle believed that NATO “subjected European governments to the strategic decisions of a foreign power that at any time could be contrary to their vital interests.” It was therefore necessary to seek equality with the United States (Klein, 25).
\textsuperscript{54} Posen, 174.
decision meant that, “Paris would… participate in all discussions on defense policy, strategic policy, and general organizational questions, but not in common planning or the integrated military structure.” It was a limited step, but a large symbolic gesture, which inexplicably came at a peak of French unhappiness with the United States. It was precisely the time when a realist would suggest that France should be seeking a security guarantee independent of the global hegemon.

In addition to failing to anticipate France’s dual security dialogues, realism cannot explain the contradiction between its predicted motives for the ESDP and the actions of European Community members during and after the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In both cases, the European nations were dissatisfied with the highhandedness of the United States: Richard Holbrooke, America’s chief negotiator in Bosnia was dressed down by the Italian Foreign Minister for keeping Italy out of major negotiations, while two decades earlier the EC had resisted adopting American security policy because of “differences… fuelled by the US’s failure to consult with their allies when US forces were put on a heightened state of alert without consultation.” In the 1990s, realists pointed to growing dissatisfaction with American policy as one motive for states to support the ESDP. However, in the early 1970s, widespread resentment did not translate into an effort for autonomous defense.

---

55 Boniface, “NATO Debate.”
56 One might argue, as Boniface does, that France undertook a closer relationship with NATO only as a tactic. Specifically, France realized a European structure within NATO was the only way it was likely to draw allies to a European project (Boniface, “NATO Debate.”). This claim will be addressed in Chapter Four.
Indeed, the extant structure, European Political Cooperation (EPC), made very little progress until 1980.\textsuperscript{59}

It must be noted that drawing parallels between security choices during and after the Cold War is difficult. However, despite the vast differences between the political landscape of the 1970s and that of the late 1990s, in the realist paradigm the threat of one’s security advisor acting contrary to one’s interests or expectations is always an important issue. Additionally, given that the U.S. security guarantee was more vital during the Cold War than after, the allies should have been more upset over differences of policy in the 1970s. Disagreements over Bosnia did not put EU citizens at risk, but divergent interests and activities in the 1970s might have done so. Thus, if differences of policy and fears of abandonment motivated the EU to act after Bosnia and Kosovo, the same should have been more pronounced two decades earlier. However, this does not appear to have been the case.

The second prediction realism offers for the ESDP is that states will choose to join a new alliance, or retain their old affiliations, based on the ability of each option to provide for state security. For the EU, it is a choice between balancing the United States through an autonomous structure, the ESDP, or refusing to participate in the new project, thereby electing to bandwagon with the global hegemon. Stephen Walt offers two reasons for states to undertake balancing behavior: first, a hegemon poses a definite security threat causing states to “join with those who cannot readily dominate their allies, in order to avoid being dominated by those who can,” and second, joining the less powerful side will give the state relatively more power over its allies.\textsuperscript{60} Posen

\textsuperscript{59} Salmon and Shepherd, 35-36.
\textsuperscript{60} Walt, 5.
concurs, stating that, “Structural realism predicts both a general pattern of competitive behavior that ultimately leads to balances and deliberate balancing against particular powers, usually the most powerful states in the system.”

For both Posen and Walt, bandwagoning is a less common behavior, one typically undertaken by states with little power to resist the pressures of the international system.

If realism has accurately captured state motives to balance or bandwagon, then small states will be unlikely to risk a new alliance, while large states will tend to balance hegemons unless they can maximize security by bandwagoning as well. The latter condition is necessary in order to accommodate Great Britain, which Posen acknowledges primarily undertakes bandwagoning with the United States. Indeed, he argues that it pursues the ESDP in order to achieve greater influence with its American ally. From a realist perspective, this initially appears to be a logical choice. Through NATO, the United States offers Britain a substantial security guarantee, and the American-British relationship is significantly friendlier than that between Britain and some of its continental allies. However, realism does not account for the contradictory aspects of Britain’s choice to join the ESDP, namely the risk its membership in the ESDP poses to its alliance with the United States.

In the realist paradigm, international security is a zero-sum game. Thus, even if Posen is correct and Britain “has supported ESDP in the hope of making Europe more powerful and more influential,” joining the project was hugely

---

61 Posen, 154.
62 Walt, 16-17; Posen, 157-158.
63 Posen, 167.
64 For more information on the British-American partnership and Britain’s relationship to continental Europe see: Christoph O. Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 48-50, 59-63.
counterproductive.\textsuperscript{65} Although the United States supported the idea of its European allies bearing more of the military burden within NATO, it was by no means ready to allow the EU to develop an independent defense project.\textsuperscript{66} In a zero sum environment, the resources and support Britain offered the ESDP could only have been perceived by the United States as detracting from its commitment to NATO, an outcome that a realist Britain would have had no trouble anticipating.

Historical precedent clearly suggested that the United States would view action on European defense as a direct challenge to NATO. The George H.W. Bush administration, although initially supportive of a European identity within NATO, changed course in 1991 and produced the Bartholomew Memorandum. The document “sometimes in undiplomatic language, criticized developments within the EC as posing a challenge to the integrity of NATO and hence to the US as well.”\textsuperscript{67} However, the British disregarded this lesson of history and reversed their decades old opposition to a European defense project. If the British were truly interested in bandwagoning behavior, this change of course would likely not have occurred.

The final prediction that can be extracted from realist theory speaks to the future direction of the ESDP. The policy itself is still relatively new—as of 2000, Waltz still argued that EU nations did not have sufficient consensus on security matters to build a credible European capability—making it difficult to analyze whether its path of development meets any theoretical framework. \textsuperscript{68} However,

\textsuperscript{65} Posen, 167.
\textsuperscript{66} Salmon and Shepherd note that, “In the William Clinton administration the principle was that there could be a European pillar of a strong transatlantic alliance, but not competing entities (Salmon and Shepherd, 151).”
\textsuperscript{67} Duke, 172.
\textsuperscript{68} Waltz, 31-32.
realism offers some idea of what to expect. Posen suggests that the EU will generally progress in the direction already established. It will continue to develop the capacity for autonomous action and “within roughly ten years… the EU will collectively possess many, though not all, of the assets that were missing in the 1990s.”

Although Posen does not explicitly state that the ESDP will push Europeans to act independently of NATO, he does note that one development that would disprove the realist approach would be Europe growing increasingly dependent on the United States for security policy leadership and using NATO in order to accomplish this.

In this third prediction regarding the future path of the ESDP, the realists appear to come closest to accuracy. The EU has expanded its military capabilities since the ESDP’s inception, particularly through the Helsinki Headline Goal, a project which aimed to formulate a rapid reaction peacekeeping force of 50,000-60,000 soldiers, deployable within 60 days and sustainable in the field for up to one year. Additionally, in 2003, Germany, France, Belgium, and Luxembourg, all opponents of the American war in Iraq, began to lobby for an independent European military command center, a project the United States opposed.

However, the evidence is not entirely in realism’s favor. That the EU has developed in the initial direction it adopted proves nothing more than whatever the initial intent of the project, its members have seen fit to continue it. Additionally, the debate over the command center came to a decidedly spiritless conclusion. In order to overcome British opposition to the project, its creators had to downgrade the initiative to a European planning cell at NATO headquarters. Although the Financial Times...

---

69 Posen, 180.
70 Posen, 165.
71 Salmon and Shepherd, 71.
reported optimistically that breaking the impasse would allow the EU to get back to
some of its larger defense projects, it did acknowledge that the new planning cell
“will make very little difference in the real world.” 72 Certainly, the command center’s
planners exhibited realist dissatisfaction with the direction of American foreign policy
in Iraq, but this sentiment was evidently not widespread enough to prompt the
establishment of a separate command center, a development which would seem
necessary for nations seeking to develop autonomous military capabilities.

Although realism has perhaps predicted the trajectory of the ESDP, it does not
adequately justify the choices states make between balancing and bandwagoning, and
does not convincingly identify the event or events that precipitated the policy’s
formation. While Posen argues the EU may more visibly pursue a realist policy once
it has ascertained that the ESDP structure is viable, this seems unlikely given the
inapplicability of realist predictions to the policy. 73 Rather, the evidence that states do
not appear to be acting with realist motives in their participation in the ESDP
indicates that the policy is not primarily one of state security or growing interest in
challenging American hegemony.

There is realism at work in transatlantic relations, but it is generated by the
Americans, not the Europeans. From George H.W. Bush, under whom the Pentagon
issued a Defense Planning Guide arguing that, “we must maintain the mechanisms for
deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global

72 Charles Grant, “Europe can sell its defence plan to Washington,” Financial Times, 2 December
73 Posen, 165.
role,”74 to his son George W. Bush, whose aides commented that French proposals for an independent defense force were “a dagger pointed at NATO’s heart,”75 America has been reluctant to allow the EU any defense force which might one day threaten U.S. military supremacy. For Europe however, the ESDP is clearly not designed to be such a threat.

III. Liberalism

The liberal outlook on European politics emphasizes the importance of common institutions. While they are not necessarily helpful in every area of policy, institutions do “create the capability for states to cooperate in mutually beneficial ways by reducing the costs of making and enforcing agreements.”76 These cooperative structures are important in a liberalist system because states depend on the guarantees embedded in them to assure freedom from intervention by other actors.77 Mutual respect for norms and institutions makes international relations significantly more predictable.

The broad intersections between liberalism and security policy are elucidated by theorists such as Michael Doyle and John Owen, who discuss the formation of the democratic peace. The idea that liberal democracies will not go to war against each other due to their interdependent economic ties and their recognition that liberal nations are guided by rational public opinion gives the basic foundation for why

European nations are able to undertake a common security policy. However, Europeans have been trying to capitalize on their common characteristics in order to form a defense organization since the 1950s. Thus, the more pertinent issue is not the broad theoretical basis, but the particular conditions that make the ESDP unique. For this, Andrew Moravcsik’s theories on agreement formation in the EU are helpful.

Moravcsik sets out to understand why states have deliberately ceded economic sovereignty to international institutions, a development that he claims is largely due to a need to adapt to changing technology and economic policy. However, what is more interesting for the present study is his perspective on state choices within specific decision-making processes. In such negotiations, the policy positions of states are molded through a variety of steps. First, national preferences are formed, driven primarily by economic incentives. Moravcsik notes that geopolitical interests do play a role in preference formation, although “only where economic interests were weak, diffuse, or indeterminate could national politicians indulge the temptation to consider geopolitical goals.” Once preferences have been formed, states interested in an agreement begin to bargain for acceptable terms. For Moravcsik, the preferences and individual motives of states matter less here than their relative power. Specifically, “the governments that benefit most from the core agreement, relative to their best unilateral and coalitional alternatives to agreement, tend to offer greater compromises in order to achieve it,” a situation that leaves them with a relatively small amount of power.

---

78 Doyle, 230-231.
79 Moravcsik, 3.
80 Moravcsik, 7.
81 Moravcsik, 8.
Finally, states choose to what degree they will transfer their sovereignty to a supranational institution, a process in which their primary motive is to establish control over the behavior of others. Moravcsik predicts that states will lobby for members of an agreement to pool their sovereignty in a higher institution in cases “where governments seek to compel compliance by foreign governments (or, in some cases, future domestic governments) with a strong temptation to defect.”\textsuperscript{82} Indeed, he argues that this desire to secure a credible commitment by allies has been the primary motive for many of the EU’s recent supranational elements.\textsuperscript{83} This, then, is the process by which Moravcsik argues the major treaties in the European Community, and later the EU, were formed.

Predictions

If Moravcsik’s liberalist perspective on decision making is correct, three predictions about the ESDP should be empirically confirmable. First, as states with more to gain from an agreement will tend to offer more to achieve it, the ESDP should reflect the interests of those with less to gain and more to lose. Britain should prove to be particularly influential, as European defense cooperation may damage its special relationship with the United States. Additionally, small states should have a disproportionately large voice, as if the ESDP results in rifts in their partnerships with NATO, they will have little independent military capability until the European project advances. Second, as Moravcsik argues that states will seek to pool sovereignty or delegate it to a supranational institution in order to obtain a credible commitment

\textsuperscript{82} Moravcsik, 9.
from their allies, we should expect the ESDP to develop as a supranational, rather than an optional project.\textsuperscript{84} The history of defense cooperation in Europe should make this safeguard against defection necessary. Finally, while liberalists face the same difficulties as realists in predicting the future of a relatively new institution, the split in European government support for the American war in Iraq should eventually have repercussions for the ESDP, as it hints that Europeans nations can likely still not be trusted to put EU interests ahead of their friendships with the United States. Whether enough time has passed for such repercussions to materialize though, is doubtful. While all of these predictions are demonstrated to some degree in the constitution of the ESDP, liberalism, like realism, fails to completely explain state behavior.

If Moravcsik has correctly identified the forces driving European defense policy, states that have the most to gain “relative to their best unilateral and coalitional alternatives to agreement” should prove less influential than those for whom the ESDP is not their preferred policy.\textsuperscript{85} In particular, France should play a far smaller role than Britain, as the French have long sought an autonomous defense policy, while the British have only recently reversed a decades-old refusal to participate in such institutions, and have perhaps the strongest unilateral and coalition opportunities of any EU country. Additionally, small states should have unexpected influence. If the ESDP were to fail and the United States become alienated from its allies, small states would be unlikely to have an effective unilateral security force,

\textsuperscript{84} Moravcsik and Nicolaidis, 76.
\textsuperscript{85} Moravcsik, 8.
and would have to seek another coalition, or fall back on bilateral agreements. This is a highly unlikely occurrence, yet still an issue which must be addressed.

The relative secrecy of European Union proceedings makes it difficult to identify the actors that succeeded in best shaping the ESDP to their agendas. However, in June 1999, the European heads of state issued a call for a European security and defense policy that conformed more to the objectives of France than any other country. The statement called for “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.” Although the statement clearly indicated the EU would take note of American preferences, it offered no right of first refusal for NATO, thus opening up the possibility that the EU could strike out on its own. The most noteworthy part of the document was the use of the word “autonomous,” a holdover from the St. Malo Declaration, and also a word which made the Americans nervous. If the statement could be said to favor any nation, the clear victor was France, whose goals were most served by the agreement. However, had Moravcsik’s theory accurately described behavior, it should have been Britain or some of the smaller EU countries who ultimately left their imprint on the agreement.

The second prediction that can be extracted from Moravcsik’s liberalism is that states will seek agreements which are more binding if they perceive an increased likelihood that allies will defect from the institution. In this case, the EU members should have taken into account non-EU state loyalties, particularly the strength of

87 “Presidency Conclusions,” Cologne.
British and Danish ties to NATO, and attempted to create an institution which would ensure their loyalty. However, this is simply not the structure of the ESDP.

The history of European defense cooperation is one of failed institutions, and regardless of where one feels the preponderance of the blame should be placed, Britain and Denmark stand out as particularly troublesome. Since the time of the EDC, the British have evaded European efforts to woo them into any serious military commitment which excludes the United States. Even some of Britain’s most promising shifts toward a European military structure, such as Churchill’s 1950 speech to the Council of Europe “in favour of the immediate creation of a European Army under a unified command and in which we should all bear a worthy and honourable part,” turned out to be disappointments.  

This decidedly Atlanticist orientation does not, of course, prove that Britain would be likely to abrogate an agreement with its European partners. However, it does suggest that in cases where European interests have the potential to one day run contrary to those of the United States, British participation cannot be assured.

Denmark also presents a substantial challenge to the liberal interpretation of the formation of any European defense entity. Like the British, the Danes have invested heavily in the NATO alliance, and are traditionally labeled a highly “Eurosceptic” people for their reluctance to join common EU structures.  

In a popular referendum, the Danes rejected the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, a multifaceted

---


89 The term “Euro sceptic” (also “Euro sceptic”) refers to “sceptical or negative public attitudes towards the European Union” (Sørensen, 1). For further discussion of this concept see Catharina Sørensen, “Danish and British Popular Euroscepticism Compared.” *Danish Institute for International Studies Working Paper 2004*, http://www.diis.dk/sw8548.asp (accessed February 12, 2007).
proposal which transitioned the European Community to the European Union. Although the Danes later agreed to a modified version, they demanded opt outs in a number of areas, most pertinently the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Because Denmark exempted itself from EU security policy decision making, it exercises only observer status on matters relating to the ESDP.  

Perhaps it makes little difference whether Denmark participates in European missions. As a small country, its abstention matters significantly less than if France or Britain was to decline to participate. However, the lesson of Denmark, which has since been reinforced in the French and Dutch rejections of the EU’s Constitutional Treaty, is that government support of a project does not guarantee domestic acceptance. Indeed, the Danish government clearly proclaims that it “endeavours to remove the opt-outs from EU policy, but is restricted by the fact that this can only be achieved by one or more referenda.”

In structuring future defense agreements, the lessons of Britain and Denmark are clear. Due to its transatlantic obligations, Britain has the potential to defect from military agreements, and Denmark has already demonstrated that a Eurosceptic public can easily weaken an international agreement. As British obligations to the United State continue, and as Denmark is far from the only Eurosceptic nation, it is clear that European countries need a mechanism to ensure cooperation in defense decision making. However, the ESDP does not meet the EU’s needs in this area. Instead of binding members to act, it allows states to choose which, if any missions, they would

---

91 “Foreign and Defense Policy,” Denmark.dk.
like to join. In a crisis situation, the EU could theoretically be unable to act if nations refused to commit their troops. Additionally, states are clearly not required to be acting members in order to sit on the consultative bodies, as “Denmark participates in the relevant EU policy and planning bodies, but cannot take part in decisions and actions affecting the defence area.” Thus, the project can still be driven, in part, by those who have defected from it. Once again, liberalism has offered a prediction which EU behavior does not substantiate.

The final prediction liberalism can offer the ESDP is a description of its future direction. This too, is based on the idea that states will seek more binding agreements when they feel allies are likely to give precedence to other loyalties. This issue has become particularly pertinent to the ESDP since the split in the EU over the American war in Iraq. Although the ESDP has continued to operate, running missions in Macedonia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as taking over NATO’s role in Bosnia at the end of 2004, the uncertainty created in the EU by the Iraq War should eventually be manifested in a drive for an ESDP more likely to hold state loyalties. Although it is, of course, unlikely that the ESDP will ever be made a binding, supranational agreement, if liberalism is right the EU should at least take small steps in this direction. There is no indication yet how the ESDP may develop in the future, perhaps due to the overwhelming attention being directed at the failed Constitutional Treaty. In this case, it is much too soon to tell whether Moravcsik’s liberalism has been vindicated.

---

92 ESDP decision-making takes place within the European Council, as is not currently undertaken using majority voting procedures (Salmon and Shepherd, 92).
Moravcsik’s theories were designed largely for economic treaties, rather than defense decision making. However, his perspective on power balances in negotiations and the necessity of credible commitments also identifies important factors to consider in constructing a defense structure. Unfortunately, these concepts cannot explain the institutional choices made by EU states. The ESDP does not demand a credible commitment from its members, and policy seems to be made by the powerful states, rather than by those for whom the ESDP is a more risky commitment. Perhaps, in the long term, Moravcsik will be proven correct and the ESDP will require its members to pool their sovereignty in a common institution. For now though, the predictions of liberalism are not sufficient to establish that the theory can adequately describe the nature of the project. Although parts of the EU are certainly undertaken in order to create a mutually beneficial, institution, which can guarantee state freedoms and lower transaction costs, the ESDP is not among them. It is not one of liberalism’s ideal institutions.

IV. Constructivism

Where realism focuses on hard power and security, and liberalism on the dynamics of institution-building, constructivism approaches the ESDP with an emphasis on the influence of identity. Ted Hopf states that identities, beyond telling actors who they and others are, “strongly imply a particular set of interests or preferences with respect to choices of action in particular domains, and with respect to particular actors.”94 Thus, membership in the European Union is not only a

---

moniker identifying geography and alliances, but also a suggestion of one’s political orientation and potential behavior. Wendt feels that state interests are influenced not only by identity, which he situates in with a broad category of shared knowledge of other actors and relationships, but also by material resources and state practices. These three factors collectively constitute the “systemic structure” which determines state interests.\footnote{Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” \textit{International Security} 20, no.1 (1995): 72-74.}

Although all of the EU’s foreign relations could be relevant for a constructivist analysis of the ESDP, the relationship with the United States, by virtue of its closeness, is undoubtedly one of the most important factors to consider. Certainly, American identity, interests, and material resources have had a tremendous impact on the idea of what it means to be a citizen of Europe, thus shaping the interests of the continent through Wendt’s “systemic structure.” Additionally, at times, American actions have helped to constitute an “other” against which Europe defines itself. Starting from this premise, Stephanie Anderson and Thomas Seitz argue that the ESDP is a way of reestablishing a strong European identity. Although some aspects of the EU have popular support, skepticism is common and the pull of nationalism is strong. Anderson and Seitz postulate that ESDP will serve to integrate the EU’s new member states into a common identity, while “reinforcing a sense of shared history and establishing Europe as a major force in world affairs.”\footnote{Anderson and Seitz, 31.} Europe’s relationship to the United States is vital for accomplishing this goal.

\textbf{Predictions}
As was the case with realism and liberalism, constructivism offers several substantive predictions about the creation and operation of the ESDP, from which an understanding of the nature of the project can be derived. They are, in some ways, more difficult to delineate than those of the other paradigms, as identity is a highly intangible concept, liable to change with each new event and relationship uncovered. However, three predictions may be derived from constructivist theory and the work of Anderson and Seitz. First, states will join the ESDP in order to consolidate European identity both at home and abroad. The new identity will be created in opposition to the foreign and security policy of the United States. Second, as the ESDP will require a shift in how states and citizens identify themselves, those likely to strongly support the project are those with the most malleable identities. Finally, the ESDP should continue to serve as an identity project as long as the United States provides a sufficient “other” against which to define European identity, and may expand when interests are particularly divergent between the two sides. While Anderson and Seitz, and constructivism more broadly, come the closest to describing state behavior, their predictions fall short in a number of key areas.

In the Anderson and Seitz model, states are motivated to participate in the ESDP both because continued integration requires a sense of common identity, and because Europe seeks to develop an independent international profile. In this case, “for ‘Europe to be European,’ the EU needs a foreign and security policy to differentiate itself from U.S. foreign and security policy with which it is so intertwined [sic].”\(^7\) Anderson and Seitz offer numerous examples of unpopular American policies, such the Strategic Defense Initiative, after which Europe found

\(^7\) Anderson and Seitz, 25.
support for independent security and defense policies, thus consolidating its own identity. The lesson of history was clear: “the way to define Europe was ‘not American.’”

While it is questionable to what degree European nations really seek to share the same international identity, Anderson and Seitz do raise an important issue in the need for a common domestic identity. Certainly, integration and internal projects would be easier if the public were more supportive of the EU. However, the way in which Anderson and Seitz predict states will use the ESDP for this end is problematic. Specifically, their theory is troubling because it situates the ESDP as the conduit through which Europeans will realize their uniqueness from Americans. Historically, this effect has occurred when Europeans found themselves in opposition to American defense policies, for example, “bitter disagreements over the neutron bomb, sanctions on the USSR for Afghanistan, winnable limited nuclear wars under Reagan, Pershing missiles” and many other policies. Thus, in order for the ESDP to be used successfully to create identity, the EU would have to seek out foreign and security policy stances opposite those of the United States. This will, of course, happen naturally in some cases, but it certainly would not be purposefully pursued by the many EU nations, most notably Britain, who still feel that NATO is their most important security partnership.

The second prediction which can be derived from constructivism is that states with more easily adjustable identities will likely be the strongest proponents of the ESDP. Although Anderson and Seitz claim that Europe has long been using

---

98 Anderson and Seitz, 35; [Italics in the original.]
99 Anderson and Seitz, 29.
100 Anderson and Seitz, 35.
disagreements with the Untied States to build a common identity, the ESDP institutionalizes this relationship in a powerful organization. The European Union is far better organized than in the past decades, and significantly more capable, thus increasing the chance that its security and defense policies will be carried out thoroughly. The resulting shift in identity could be substantial. Hopf recognizes that “identities are multiple,” and in this case, nations with strong ties to NATO will have to be willing to give up that identity, or settle for significant changes.\textsuperscript{101} Thus, nations which are better able to adjust their alliances and interests should be the first and strongest supporters of the ESDP, with countries such as Britain following reluctantly.

The obvious problem with this approach is that it contradicts the prevailing power structure behind the ESDP. Britain and France were the primary forces in developing the policy, yet the former will undoubtedly be one of the last nations to accept any security project defined by its juxtaposition with American objectives. British identity is in fact so strongly influenced by its ties to the US that a 2005 poll of security and defense experts revealed that 50% of those surveyed in Britain strongly disagreed with the statement: “Europe should try to become more effective in opposing the US on foreign policy if its values and beliefs are at stake.” A further 25% chose the more qualified, but still markedly pro-United States, “disagree, but…” response.\textsuperscript{102} In some sense, this indicates that British identity is malleable, but only if directed at the needs of the United States. Clearly, the concept does not prove a good indicator of state support for the ESDP.

\textsuperscript{101} Hopf, 176.  
\textsuperscript{102} Meyer, 146.
Finally, Anderson and Seitz’s constructivist approach offers insight into the future direction of the ESDP. As long as American security policy is employable as a foil for the policy, it should continue to serve as an integrative mechanism. In addition, the EU might consolidate its identity more effectively when the ESDP diverges dramatically from American policy, thus having a greater opportunity to define the limits of what is to be considered European. However, divisions over matters like the war in Iraq will likely have little effect on the ESDP, as it is a common identity project and Europe did not speak with a single voice on the conflict. Like liberalism, the constructivist vision for the ESDP’s future must wait to see how events develop.

Although Anderson and Seitz offer a new perspective on state building, the inclusion of the United States as a key figure in identity formation makes it nearly impossible to apply it to state actions in the EU. Certainly, some European nations might embrace the concept, but the ESDP was the common creation of Atlanticist and Europeanist states, a fact which makes it difficult to believe the constructivist characterization of the nature of the project. The predictions offered by constructivism, that states with more malleable identities will tend to support the ESDP more strongly, and that states will join the ESDP to consolidate identity at home and abroad, have not accurately described state behavior. Thus, the nature of the ESDP is almost certainly not that of an identity project constructed through illuminating the differences between American and EU security policy. Nonetheless though, the idea of the ESDP as an identity project will prove to be an important theoretical claim, as will be discussed in the next section.
V. A New Perspective

Three major schools of international relations have offered perspectives on the motives of states engaging in the ESDP, each of which speaks to a different conception of the nature of the project. For Posen, states seek security in an uncertain world, and the ESDP is a mechanism through which they balance or bandwagon with the United States. For Moravcsik, states place their faith in common institutions, and defense cooperation may be one way in which states can come together to regulate their behavior to the benefit of all participants. Finally, for the constructivists, Anderson and Seitz, the ESDP is a project to establish a European identity, a concept built by separating what is European, from that which is American. However, when the theories of Posen, Moravcsik, and Anderson and Seitz are applied to actual state behavior and preferences, none is able to offer a comprehensive explanation for the creation, operation, and future trajectory of the ESDP.

The fundamental contradictions of Europe’s newest security policy remain: why did EU members come together for collective security and defense at a time when NATO offered an excellent security umbrella? If the EU was acting to escape the influence of the United States, what motivated a deeply Atlanticist nation like Britain to embrace the project? Alternately, if the aim was simply to be able to undertake projects where NATO was not engaged, then why not be satisfied with NATO offers to use its equipment and planning facilities in order to do so? The
contradictions of European defense policy are more numerous than this, and it may well be that different states envision the ESDP serving very divergent interests and purposes. However, a theory which explains the behavior of a cross section of state actors can provide insight into the nature of the ESDP, and facilitate the development of predictions regarding its future direction. Additionally, such a theory could potentially be generalized to the EU as a whole.

Although their larger arguments do not hold up under scrutiny, Anderson and Seitz provide a key starting point for such a theory: European identity is weak.\(^\text{103}\) It is a problem that can well be expected in an institution comprised of established nation states. However, the problem is not so much the lack of a collective identity, as the distance identity issues place between the needs of European governments and their people. For states, the increasingly integrated European economy has been exceptionally fruitful. However, citizens view integration not only with cognizance of its economic benefits, but also with an eye to how their identity may be altered by the process. Polling data collected by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks confirms the importance of the latter factor in evaluating integration, and highlights the importance of a clear message from political elites in shaping whether the public feels integration threatens its identity.\(^\text{104}\)

For states increasingly dependent on integrated structures, public wariness of the EU is cause for serious concern. Theorist Amitai Etzioni observes this difficulty in the EC and EU, and argues that both institutions have suffered from halfway integration, a state “defined as giving the nations involved full or nearly full

\(^{103}\) Anderson and Seitz, 29-30.

\(^{104}\) Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on European Integration?,” *PS: Political Science and Politics* 37, no.3 (2004): 417.
autonomy in some important matters while providing full or nearly full control to a supranational authority on other important matters.”\textsuperscript{105} He argues that the EU is stuck between relinquishing substantial economic sovereignty, which has already occurred, and giving up political sovereignty, which has been done only in a very limited way. Unfortunately, this halfway sovereignty is inherently unstable. Economics is not independent of political factors, and even beneficial economic integration may be rejected by individuals who feel that what “benefits their pocketbook threatens their national identity.”\textsuperscript{106} The EU can no longer continue in its current form, and must either “move to a high level of supranationality or fall back to a lower one.”\textsuperscript{107}

The fact that Etzioni sees Europe as stuck in halfway integration indicates what current observations substantiate—European governments are far from ready to hand over the reigns of political power to the EU. However, states have access to other types of integration which may help to build a sense of common identity across Europe. For nations that have come to depend economically on the EU’s institutions, pursuing such an opportunity must be a priority. This is precisely the role the ESDP was designed to play.

**Why the ESDP?**

Any mechanism states employ to strengthen a sense of common identity needs several characteristics. First, it has to be a visible symbol of the unity of the EU, a project much more likely to draw attention than the drafting of trade agreements and

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{105} Etzioni, Amitai, *Political Unification Revisited: On Building Supranational Communities* (Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2001), xxv.  \\
\textsuperscript{106} Etzioni, xxvii.  \\
\textsuperscript{107} Etzioni, xxxi. 
\end{flushleft}
patent laws. That the ESDP was likely to meet such a standard is clear. After all, it paved the way for national European militaries to undertake joint humanitarian missions, under EU auspices, in Bosnia, Macedonia, and the DRC.\(^\text{108}\) In addition to creating the prospect of high profile joint actions, the ESDP involved the military, the institution Europeans rated as the most trustworthy (71% reported they would tend to trust the army) out of 16 possible domestic institutions in 2000.\(^\text{109}\) Thus a project involving the military will have a better chance of swaying public opinions about the EU than one which highlighted, for example, cooperation between national NGOs, which were on average seen as trustworthy only 43% of the time.\(^\text{110}\)

Second, a project seeking to shore up support for integration would have to carry out functions which were supranational enough to inspire a sense of shared European action, but which did not fundamentally threaten national sovereignty. Again, the military is the ideal actor. Under the current system, national governments volunteer troops to serve in EU missions, but a state may opt not to participate in any particular operation. States can thus accommodate domestic interests which oppose a particular intervention, or choose to participate in a multilateral military effort where the burden is shared by many partners. It is, in effect, a system of optional supranationality.

Finally, any institution created to strengthen common identity would have to be able to accommodate a wide range of state preferences and loyalties. For example, it would need to afford Atlanticist states evidence that it did not threaten the NATO

\(^{108}\) “EU Operations,” *Council of the European Union.*


\(^{110}\) “Eurobarometer 54,” *European Commission,* 98.
relationship, while mollifying Europeanist states with demonstrations that Europe was pursuing autonomous security. Thus, it must necessarily be an institution open to a certain degree of interpretation. Again, the ESDP shows itself to be ideal. Because states may opt out of military undertakings, the policy does ideally not threaten the non-European loyalties or alliances of its members.

**Expected State Behaviors**

The ESDP has been shown to be a sufficient candidate for an institution designed to foster a sense of a common EU identity. However, whether this is the case, and whether the ESDP is genuinely a project aimed at building the shared identity needed to resolve or preempt citizen objections to EU integration must be determined by the examination of state behaviors. Through this process, the nature of the ESDP itself can be ascertained.

If the function of the policy is truly as described above, certain key behaviors should be noticeable. First, state support for the ESDP should be tied to the occurrence of incidents that demonstrate the fragility of the integration already achieved. Presumably, the stronger a government’s impression that its domestic population is dissatisfied with the EU, the more imperative an identity building project will become. Second, as the ESDP’s functions are domestic and are not intended to alter relationships with international actors, states should be seen to make substantial efforts to maintain their traditional alliances. In particular, the relationship between the US, NATO, and Europe’s Atlanticist states should remain strong. Finally, states should publicly stress the dual nature of the ESDP, emphasizing its EU
character, but also its domestic benefits. Publicly calling attention to the policy’s national and European characteristics is vital if the ESDP is to be an effective, yet non-threatening tool for identity creation.

It must be noted that some of these predictions may also logically result from the other theories explored in this work. For example, a liberalist institution-building project might lead a government to emphasize both the value of the institution, the ESDP, and its benefit to the domestic community. However, the combination of the three predictions above suggests a distinctly different picture than any one in isolation may produce. The first prediction explains the events that drove the formation of the ESDP, while the second addresses the manner in which states with diverse ideologies and interests are accommodated. Finally, the third offers a confirmation of the identity-building perspective. Together, they build a strong case for the theory I have proposed.

**VI. Conclusion**

The European Union, for all of its economic strength, is still a young institution. Its predecessors as far back as the European Coal and Steel Community established the benefits of integration, yet there are national barriers the EU has not yet been able to overcome. From British opts outs to the euro, to the French and Danish rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, the past two decades have taught the EU the dangers inherent in operating as an international institution without a loyal constituency. However, rectifying this deficit is a delicate balancing act. If the EU appears to push too strongly for the creation of a European identity, a resurgence
of nationalism may result. Alternately, if it does not quickly address the dearth of
citizens who are willing to identify with it, future development may be severely
limited. In this situation, the ESDP has been an ideal policy tool.

Certainly, the ESDP appears to function as a military policy. The EU has
undertaken peacekeeping, policing, and observer missions under its auspices, and it
has set states on the path to acquiring necessary military assets. However, the policy
contains too many contradictions to be a serious effort at an autonomous security and
defense project. Rather, it functions as a visible symbol of European unity and
identity, without the potential to endanger national interests.

The three major schools of international relations theory—realism, liberalism,
and constructivism—all provide frameworks for understanding the nature of the
ESDP. However, of the three, only constructivism looks past its role as a defense
policy in order to see its true function: identity-building. Unfortunately, Anderson and
Seitz still focus on the international dimensions of the policy, arguing that it creates a
European identity in opposition to the foreign and security policy of the United
States. Instead, as I shall demonstrate in the chapters that follow, the ESDP is best
understood as a policy geared to a European audience, and carried out by multiple
states in order to secure the Union that serves their interests so well.

Three case studies will be presented covering the operation of the ESDP in
Britain, France, and the Netherlands. In each case, the accuracy of the predictions of
liberalism, realism, and constructivism will be examined, followed by an analysis of
the applicability of the domestic identity project thesis. In each case, I will
demonstrate that the latter theory has the most explanatory power. Although the EU
may one day find itself ready to pursue a truly autonomous, European security and
defense project, the current priority must be ensuring the stability, and thus the future,
of the European Union.
Chapter 3: Britain

I. Introduction

Britain’s public path to the ESDP began in December 1998, at a bilateral French-British summit at St. Malo, France. The meeting brought together an unlikely pairing of allies—an experienced advocate for European defense autonomy and the new leader of a traditionally Eurosceptic nation; yet, the combination was vital for the task at hand. The two had the political and military power to create a credible European defense structure, as well as the ideological diversity needed to guarantee its acceptance by the thirteen other members of the EU.\textsuperscript{111} The result of the summit, the St. Malo Declaration, drew its legitimacy from these strengths and cleared the way for the establishment of the ESDP.

The Declaration itself calls for the full implementation of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the development of intelligence and planning capabilities, and most prominently, “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.” While the continuing importance of Europe’s relationship with NATO is carefully acknowledged, the document as a whole is an unprecedented call for increased strategic independence.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{111} Of the 15 EU member states in 2002, the United Kingdom was ranked 4\textsuperscript{th} in terms of the number of “active armed forces (210, 450) and 2\textsuperscript{nd} in terms of the number deployed abroad (31,176) \textit{(See: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2002-2003 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), quoted in Salmon and Shepherd, 122.). However, these rankings are somewhat deceptive, in that they do not account for the substantial capabilities gap between the types of missions France and Britain can perform, compared to those possible for other member states. Posen recognizes this point, and writes that “Britain and France are the only two states in the world today aside from the United States with any global power projection capability whatsoever…” \textsc{(Posen, 152).}\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{112} Maartje Rutten, ed., \textit{From Saint-Malo to Nice: European Defence—Core Documents},
French, this comes as little surprise. However, Britain’s embrace of the concepts outlined at St. Malo is puzzling. For a nation where, just a few weeks before the British-French summit, 24% of the public reported they would feel “very relieved” and 46% said they would be “indifferent” if the EU were suddenly dismantled, proposing a new mechanism for European military cooperation appears to be uncharacteristic.\footnote{Eurobarometer 50, European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb50/eb50_en.pdf (accessed March 5, 2007), B24.}

If the principles set forth in the Declaration truly represented, as British Conservatives were quick to accuse, a precursor for a European army, then Britain’s role in their creation would have been genuinely surprising.\footnote{Chaillot Paper 47 (Paris:WEU-ISS, 2001), http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai47e.html (accessed December 11, 2007).} However, what Prime Minister Tony Blair sought at St. Malo was a much more subtle partnership with continental Europe—one that aimed to alter Britain’s culture of Euroscepticism, but only to the extent necessary to serve the national interest. Specifically, as I argue below, Blair helped to create the St. Malo Declaration, and through it the ESDP, because he understood both the benefits of integration and the fragility of the European project. Unless the traditionally Atlanticist British public began to identify with the EU, the stability of some of Britain’s most important economic relationships could never be assured.

In order to determine the nature of Britain’s interest in the ESDP, British political behavior will be analyzed for consistency with realist, liberalist, and constructivist approaches to European security policy. Although each of these
paradigms can shed light on certain aspects of Britain’s behavior regarding the ESDP, none provides a comprehensive explanation for its participation. Instead, as will be demonstrated, British behavior is consistent with the view that the ESDP is a project designed to safeguard European integration through the creation of a common EU identity.

II. Realism

The previous chapter identified three predictions for state behavior, all of which should be evident if the ESDP is operating according to the assumptions of the realist paradigm. First, the choice to join the ESDP should be made in reaction to events that demonstrate that a state’s current security guarantee is deteriorating, or is likely to provide insufficient protection in the future. Posen identifies Europe’s experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo as the events that convinced EU member states that they could no longer be satisfied with allowing NATO, and through it the United States, to bear the responsibility for their security. The wars highlighted the capabilities gap between American and European forces, increased fears that the United States would not always be willing to step into military situations in Europe, and brought the allies into conflict over military and diplomatic tactics.\(^{115}\) For realists, these conditions were sufficient to convince EU states to create an autonomous security organization.

The wars in Bosnia and Kosovo were certainly important political and military experiences for the entire EU. They were not sufficient, however, to convince Britain that its security guarantee was no longer adequate, and even if they

\(^{115}\) Posen, 173-178.
had been, the ESDP was not an ideal alternative from the British perspective.

Although Britain did eventually get involved in peacekeeping in Bosnia, the British initially favored staying out of the conflict entirely. In 1993, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd argued that, “NATO cannot be expected to solve all the problems on its borders, and it must not be blamed for failing to do so.”

States naturally have the prerogative to alter their stances on issues as new evidence arises, but Brendan Simms argues that even after the conflict was defused, Britain was hesitant to accept the idea of an independent Bosnia. As evidence, he cites the fact that the British waited almost two years after Bosnia gained international recognition to establish an embassy in Sarajevo, a move he sees as consistent with Hurd’s pre-war comments that Britain had “an interest in boundaries not being disturbed save by agreement.”

While it ultimately mattered little for Bosnia whether Britain wanted NATO to intervene, it is important to question how this policy changed British views on the security dynamics of the situation. It simply is not plausible that a crisis in which Britain itself favored no participation could have aggravated its fears that the United States would abandon Europe, and certainly not to the point where the British would have felt obligated to form a different security structure. Had the Americans refused to get involved, the British would have found nothing to which to object.

However, even if the British still felt the United States was no longer providing an adequate or ideal security guarantee, the ESDP was not the logical response of a realist nation. Although a European security structure would allow the EU to act where differences of policy with the United States might previously have

---

117 Simms, 12.
restrained it, Britain had no guarantee that conflicting opinions on security matters would not arise in the ESDP. Indeed, a policy dispute between Britain and France, both nuclear powers and influential military actors, could easily paralyze Europe’s ability to act. In this sense, NATO is a more known quantity and thus a more certain source of security, even if it is more likely to result in adoption of the policy choices of the United States. Although Britain has continued its memberships in both NATO and the ESDP, the following analysis of its balancing and bandwagoning activities will demonstrate that doing so is not compatible with the basic tenets of realism.

The second prediction realism offers for the ESDP is that states should demonstrate either balancing or bandwagoning behavior in relation to the United States, depending on their perception of where the greatest security benefit lies. Posen argues that Britain is engaged in “strategic bandwagoning,” meaning that it seeks to enhance European military capabilities in order to make the EU a more influential partner to the United States. In a realist system, this is the logical position for Britain to take. Its closeness with the United States is unmatched in Europe, and the relationship is so vital to its national interest that one theorist ventured that Britain’s support for the American war in Iraq had little to do with combating a threat, and was instead determined by “the overriding strategic interest in the transatlantic partnership and the need for loyalty with an ally.” However, while some type of balancing is the only reasonable prediction for Britain, the constraints of the realist paradigm make it impossible for the state to demonstrate this behavior in its actions regarding the ESDP.

---

118 Posen, 167.
119 Meyer, 62.
By the time the ESDP was created in 1998, an option already existed for strategic bandwagoning with the U.S. The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) program in NATO was proposed in 1994 to allow for the creation of *ad hoc* crisis fighting forces, which would undertake missions outside the alliance’s traditional territory. Most pertinent to Britain and the ESDP is the fact that CJTFs could be carried out under the command of the WEU, with personnel and equipment borrowed from NATO.\(^{120}\) Through this program then, Britain and the rest of the EU already had an option to develop military capabilities, with some command autonomy, thus possibly increasing their influence with the United States.

Because Britain already had access to a mechanism for strategic bandwagoning, the CJTFs, the question arises of why the ESDP was necessary. From a realist standpoint, the most salient feature in which the ESDP differs from the CJTFs is autonomy. The former is further removed from the influence of American power, which makes it much more of an opposing force than the CJTFs. In other words, it is inherently positioned as a balancing mechanism. One might argue that security autonomy does not necessarily imply balancing. Posen suggests that a state undertaking a bandwagoning policy may find it useful, as “An ability to act autonomously in the security sphere provides some bargaining leverage. It creates a tacit and credible threat to exit the relationship.”\(^{121}\) However, in the realist worldview, there is a significant difference between a state pursuing autonomous capabilities and an association of fifteen countries, two of which are nuclear powers,

\(^{120}\) Cogan, 65-67. See also: Salmon and Shepherd, 168-172.

\(^{121}\) Posen, 159.
pursuing an autonomous security policy. When the latter forgoes an option such as the CJTFs for a project like the ESDP, balancing is the only possible motivation.

Given Britain’s close relationship with the United States, it does not seem possible that the British would participate in creating a policy that was obviously functioning as a balancing mechanism.\(^\text{122}\) However, if the British were unaware that the ESDP would be perceived in this way, the American reaction to the St. Malo Declaration should have clarified their perceptions. After the French-British summit, the U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright responded that the United States welcomed the idea of a stronger Europe, but would evaluate any new project on the basis of whether it would “improve our effectiveness in working together.” Additionally, she set out three standards for any new enterprise: no decoupling of Europe from NATO, no discrimination against non-EU members of NATO, and no duplication of capabilities already possessed by NATO.\(^\text{123}\) However friendly the rebuke was phrased, America clearly felt that a European project would pull its allies away from NATO.

Had the British reversed course after St. Malo and resumed their traditional unwillingness to support autonomous European defense capabilities, then they might truly have been attempting to bandwagon with the United States. Instead, Britain continued to support the development of the ESDP, and given its relatively large political and military weight, was probably a decisive factor in bringing about its

\^\text{122}\) While it must be recognized that domestic pressure could drive Britain to behavior uncharacteristic of a realist state, previously cited polling data indicates that at least the British security and defense elite is willing to support American foreign policy even if British “values and beliefs are at stake.” See Meyer, 146.

creation. Given the nature of the ESDP, this cannot be seen as anything but balancing behavior.

When realism is applied to Britain’s behavior regarding the ESDP, it reaches an impossible paradox. In the realist paradigm, a security policy as large and as potentially capable as the ESDP must be perceived as a threat to the United States, and Britain played an essential role in its creation. Although individually, the British would always opt to bandwagon with the United States, their role in the ESDP also commits them to balancing behavior. This contradiction cannot be resolved within the confines of a realist framework, which further indicates the paradigm’s inapplicability to the ESDP.

Realism’s final prediction for the ESDP concerns its future trajectory, a path Posen predicts will encompass continued acquisition of military assets and capabilities, as well as possible increases in autonomy. These events have occurred to some degree, particularly regarding the development of assets, where significant British-French cooperation has evolved. Projects that have been undertaken bilaterally include the “Principal anti air missile system, Meteor air-to-air missile and A400M transport aircraft.” However, there are few signs that Britain is willing to acquiesce in the development of more substantial European defense autonomy. In 2002, the British held up plans for EU forces to replace 450 NATO peacekeepers in Macedonia. Although the British did not object to the EU eventually taking on the task, they wanted first to secure agreements allowing the EU to access NATO assets

124 Posen, 180.
and planning capabilities. Doubtless such access was a huge military benefit, but the larger issue was Britain’s need to cement ties between forces operating under the ESDP and NATO. Perhaps in the future, the EU will grow significantly less dependent on NATO, but for now it still shows signs of needing its transatlantic partner to be waiting in the wings. Once again, realism cannot fully account for British behavior regarding the ESDP.

### III. Liberalism

While realism offers predictions for when states will enter into the ESDP and how they will use the policy once it is formed, liberalism offers a perspective more focused on the institutional mechanisms through which the ESDP was constructed. If Moravcsik is correct in his understanding of institution building in Europe, Britain’s behavior should follow the three predictions outlined in the previous chapter: states with less to gain from an agreement should be able to exercise relatively more power in the negotiations, negotiating parties should try to obtain credible commitments from their partners, and disagreements between allies should increase the need for more supranational elements in order to ensure continued cooperation.

If states that benefit most from an agreement relative to their other options are willing to give up more in order to obtain a compromise, then Britain should not have been willing to cede any ground to its allies in negotiations over the ESDP. Its other options were perfectly serviceable, arguably even better than the arrangement it ultimately entered into with the EU. Britain is a military power in its own right, and

---

its friendship with the United States ensures it will never be without a partner in case of a true security crisis. Additionally, the British had the option of participating in out of area military operations through the CJTFs, so there was no pressing need to establish a new structure for European forces. Indeed, Britain likely had relatively less to gain, compared to what it stood to lose if the ESDP weakened its relationship with the United States.

Despite the fact that Britain had less to gain than traditionally Europeanist powers, the ESDP it negotiated was far from ideal. In particular, the persistence of the word “autonomous” is inconsistent with a situation where Britain had a large amount of negotiating power. Even after St. Malo, which prompted the Americans to issue Albright’s “3Ds,” the word continued to be used, with predictable American reactions. At the 1999 EU summit in Cologne, member states issued a declaration stating that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.”

Both the U.S. House and Senate soon passed resolutions reaffirming the spirit of Albright’s earlier warnings and indicating that NATO should be the organization of first resort. If Moravcsik were correct, Britain would have had tremendous power to shape the ESDP to its specifications. That the policy continued to be a bone of contention between the United States and the EU indicates that liberalism overestimates the degree to which Britain could impact negotiations. If the

---

127 “Presidency Conclusions,” Cologne.
128 Cogan, 117. For more information see: S.Res.208, 106th United States Congress.
129 Certainly, it must be acknowledged that, as the ESDP was the collective product of 15 member states, Britain’s ability to negotiate an outcome most favorable to itself would be limited by the
suboptimal nature of the ESDP indicates that the British had to make concessions to get an agreement, then security policy was not the primary topic at which the ESDP was aimed. Rather, one would expect the ESDP to have been founded to address areas of the EU where Britain needed to exert effort to bring itself into line with other member states.

The second prediction derived from liberalism is that states will seek to pool or delegate sovereignty when they feel that members of an agreement are likely to defect. This particular prediction is correct in its estimation of British behavior regarding the ESDP. Due to Britain’s military and economic weight within the EU, as well as its friendship with the US, it has the least to lose of any state if it chooses to withdraw from the policy. Additionally, given Britain’s historical reticence to involve itself in autonomous European security projects, its defection would be much less surprising than that of other EU states. Because Britain is the most likely candidate to defect, it logically had no reason to seek a binding agreement, and in this it conformed to the behavior liberalism would predict. The ESDP is an essential part of membership in the EU, but states are not, and likely never will be forced to participate in any missions under it. As one of the major leaders of the ESDP project, Britain was likely instrumental in approving such non-binding conditions. However, it must be noted that while a non-binding ESDP is in line with British interests in a liberal system, it is not the logical choice of the majority of Britain’s allies.

positions and power of its EU allies. However, the British have historically been willing and able to hold up EU negotiations on major treaties in order to obtain national objectives. This occurred, for example, during negotiations for the Maastricht Treaty, during which Britain was eventually permitted to opt out of the Economic and Monetary Union and the social chapter of the document. Thus, it appears likely that had Britain been in its usual position of power and authority, the countervailing forces exerted by other countries would not have been able to prevent it from achieving its desired outcomes.
Finally, liberalism offers a prediction for the future of the ESDP. If allies seek to make agreements more binding when defection from them seems likely, the American war in Iraq should have prompted states to seek a stronger commitment to a European policy. While EU member states are certainly able to disagree over security policy without threatening their loyalty to the ESDP, the issue in the war in Iraq is their support of the United States, the hegemon that still has decisive power over European security. Indeed, the number of European allies it gathered to it for the campaign in Iraq is a visible demonstration of the authority it still holds. Once again though, the British have no motive to seek a more binding agreement, and every reason to prevent one from being developed. However, for this particular prediction, it is likely too soon to determine how, or whether, EU allies will seek to change the ESDP.

Liberalism is a difficult case to apply to Britain, given that it is the ally with the strongest reasons to opt out of the ESDP. However, Britain’s apparent lack of ability to shape the ESDP to its specifications does indicate significant problems in applying Moravcsik’s theories to European security. If the ESDP is—as the name and its members suggest—a security and defense policy, then Britain’s power over the agreement should have been more substantial than that of any other state. The policy actually created suggests that something other than security was being negotiated. If the ESDP were actually a project to encourage citizens to identify with the EU, then Britain had much more to gain from an agreement than many of its more Europeanist allies, and might have been more inclined to make concessions.

---

130 See Meyer, 98-105, on the lack of European unity over the United States’ Iraq policy.
IV. Constructivism

The predictions Anderson and Seitz offer for the ESDP are based in the idea that the policy is fundamentally a tool for building a European identity and enhancing international stature. This approach comes closest to uncovering the motives behind the ESDP, but as its application to British behavior shows, there are still some significant problems.

Anderson and Seitz predict that European identity will be defined and consolidated through the differentiation of European and American foreign and security policies. In other words, the British will come to realize their European identity because the ESDP will highlight the differences between the EU’s views on security and defense, and those held by the United States. The ESDP will also increase the international visibility of this European identity. 131 Although constructivism is right to focus on the identity building aspects of the ESDP, the Anderson and Seitz model is not applicable to Britain. While Europe and the United States have had significant policy differences in the past, and likely will again in the future, there is no evidence to suggest that Britain would intentionally advocate a policy whose success depended on placing European policy in opposition to that of the United States. While Tony Blair’s embrace of the ESDP was an unexpected change of course, Britain’s willingness to join the U.S. in Iraq suggests that policy differences between the two countries are inevitably short-lived. Additionally, as Britain’s refusal to have the EU participate in Macedonia without formal links to NATO suggests, Britain simply is not interested in pursuing policies that don’t

131 Anderson and Seitz, 29-30.
already have U.S. approval.\textsuperscript{132} Certainly, the British public might respond more favorably to the Anderson and Seitz model than their government. A 2006 report by the Pew Global Attitudes Project found that only 56% of the British public had a favorable or somewhat favorable view of the United States.\textsuperscript{133} However it is ultimately the government that negotiated the ESDP and Blair is strongly tied to both the United States and NATO.

The second prediction constructivism offers is that states with more malleable identities should be at the forefront of the ESDP. Because the policy will create identity through highlighting its distinctiveness from US foreign and security policy, states will need to be willing to adjust their traditional alliances and identifications with the United States. Those that can do so most effectively will ultimately be strongest within the ESDP. As pointed out in the last chapter, however, those with the most power over policy are not necessarily the ones most able to let go of their historical identities. For Britain, the transatlantic alliance is vital factor in its conception of itself, as well as its security. Even though the United States and the EU had differences of policy in Kosovo, British faith in NATO was unshakeable. Following the intervention, the British Ministry of Defense published an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the campaign. Although at the time of its publication, June 2000, the ESDP was steadily picking up speed, the document affirms that, “NATO remains the cornerstone of our [British] security and defence policy.”\textsuperscript{134} This

\textsuperscript{132} Dempsey, “EU moves closer to Nato's role,” 6.
loyalty should be an anomaly for a state with such a strong commitment to the ESDP. The fact that Britain can maintain both its Atlanticist identity and its role as a leader in the ESDP indicates that constructivism has not yet captured the essence of European security policy.

Finally, constructivism offers a prediction for the future of the ESDP. As the policy consolidates European identity and raises the EU’s visibility internationally by drawing distinctions between American and European security and defense policies, its future growth should be more pronounced when significant transatlantic disagreements occur. As previously mentioned, because the EU did not adopt a common position on Iraq, this will likely be of very little help to the further development of the ESDP. However, Britain’s behavior regarding the war in Iraq is interesting in isolation, since by supporting the United States it restrained the ability of the ESDP to develop as an identity project. Only by having a common position in opposition to the United States, could European identity have been further developed. It seems that either Anderson and Seitz’s theory is not entirely applicable, or Britain is not interested in the type of identity building they propose.

V. The ESDP Reconsidered

The previous chapter set out the standards by which to determine the nature of the ESDP. If the policy is truly designed to influence domestic opinion, Britain’s behavior surrounding the ESDP, and particularly the St. Malo summit, should display all three elements of the previously designated criteria. First, interest in the ESDP should be tied to events which reveal the instability of European cooperation. Second,
Britain should make a strong effort to maintain its traditional alliances, and third, the government’s portrayal of the project should stress its dual European and domestic function.

Building a Fragile Consensus

Britain, perhaps more than any EU member state except Denmark, has always understood what it wanted from the European project. While it has committed to initiatives in a broad range of areas, “British rationale for membership has been and is, not surprisingly, largely economic.” Thus it is difficult to understand the agreement with France at St. Malo, or the ESDP it made possible, as predominately military projects. Within the realist paradigm, Posen argues that Britain’s experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the associated fear that the United States had lost interest in guaranteeing European security, were the causal factors in the creation of the ESDP. Such an explanation, however, has been shown to have limited explanatory power. Rather, Britain’s support for the ESDP grew out of the perception that the European project, and thus Britain’s economic and political position, were at risk.

Through the mid-1990s, British military policy was driven by the Conservative party, led by Prime Minister John Major. If the United States was becoming severely frustrated with the lack of burden sharing in NATO, or Europe’s inability to handle the Balkans conflict, it was Major who would have felt the first push to pick up the military slack. However, Conservatives were wary of involving Britain too heavily in the EU; in particular, they “resisted expanding the

---

135 Sørensen, 17.
136 Posen, 173-178.
competencies of an organization that is taking on functions previously performed only by nation-states.” Clearly, American pressure was not so strong that it overcame Major’s objections, and it is unlikely that the Americans would have opted to wait in order to deal with the new Prime Minister two years later.

Of course, there is an argument to be made that the occurrence of violence in Kosovo so soon after the war in Bosnia was a larger humiliation, and thus an impetus for Blair to pursue European defense cooperation. However, Pond notes that, although the war was not a top priority for the Americans, “tactically, the United States was the main initiator and actor and the undisputed commander-in-chief.” This is not to say that Europe felt no American displeasure, or that the EU was blind to the obvious capabilities gap between itself and the United States. However, it does appear that American pressure was insufficient to cause Blair to abandon Britain’s traditional economic approach to the EU in order to form a security and defense organization.

While Blair was strongly committed to the EU economically, a military venture had never been in his plans. In the Labour Party’s 1997 election manifesto, NATO is still cited as Britain’s primary security organization, with a passing reference to maintaining cooperation with the WEU. Even after winning the election, Blair was clearly uninterested in European defense cooperation. A month

---


138 Posen notes that “The Kosovo crisis, following so hard on the Bosnia experience, provided the primary impetus to action” (Posen, 175). See also Bozo, p. 64-66.


after his election, he attended an EU summit on the Amsterdam Treaty, at which he opposed merging the WEU with the EU. Although it was not as advanced as the ESDP, the plan did offer some independent defense capabilities. Rathbun quotes an adviser to Defense Secretary George Robertson who argues that this policy was inherited from the Conservatives, as the Amsterdam European Council meeting came only a month after the election and “they had not read the brief yet.”

Clearly, cooperative defense was not a top priority. In fact, as late as May 1998, half a year before the St. Malo Summit, Labour’s Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs stated that the government did not envision the EU becoming a “defense organization,” and was still opposed to an EU-WEU merger.

However, while a new European defense policy was clearly not a priority, solidifying Britain’s commitment to the EU was essential to Blair. The 1997 manifesto lays out Labour’s commitment to Europe through its opposition to Conservative pressure to pull out of the EU. This was clearly not an option for the incoming government, as “withdrawal would be disastrous for Britain. It would put millions of jobs at risk. It would dry up inward investment. It would destroy our clout in international trade negotiations. It would relegate Britain from the premier division of nations.”

For the party whose election prompted Brussels Eurocrats to declare that “Britain has come in from the cold,” maintaining ties to the EU was firmly a part of the agenda. Not only would a British embrace of the EU safeguard the economic benefits of membership, Britain’s original motive for participation, it would also

---

141 Rathbun, 163.
142 Rathbun, 128.
143 “New Labour because Britain deserves better,” Labour-party.org.uk.
validate the credibility of the Labour party and the identity it had created for itself with such a policy position.

For Blair and the Labour party however, it soon became clear that Britain’s ties to Europe might not be strong enough. The first issue which brought into focus the ease with which Britain could be isolated from the European economy was the Euro. In 1992, Britain had opted out of requirements to join the Euro, and six years later the new government was still dealing with uncompromising public opposition. In January 1998, public support for the Euro had risen eight points over the last year, but still only thirty percent of those surveyed indicated they would vote to adopt the currency. While Blair himself believed Britain should wait to join the Euro, he did support the idea of a common currency.145 However, the wait and see strategy which mollified the British public had substantial economic consequences. In May 1998, the International Herald Tribune reported that “In the absence of any clear timetable or exchange rate for British entry into Europe's monetary union, the pound has soared on currency markets, damaging industry's competitiveness and raising the threat of recession.”146 In addition, Britain’s opposition to the Euro resulted in a loss of control over the monetary union it might someday elect to join. Although Britain’s intentions to continue its opt out policy had been clear, Blair had expected the nation to be included as a full member of the group tasked with managing the currency. These

expectations were disappointed however, and Britain had to settle for observer status.147

Lack of support for the Euro also had political consequences for Blair when Britain began its six month rotation as the President of the European Council. The six month presidency, starting in January 1998, should have provided an opportunity for Blair to strengthen Britain’s commitment to work with Europe. In some ways, this did occur. During the British presidency the EU advanced its plans for the euro and nations gradually ratified the new Amsterdam Treaty, both actions that would aid in the EU’s future development. However, what the Presidency ultimately demonstrated for Britain were the significant internal divisions of the EU.

In early May 1998, the EU approved the first eleven nations to adopt the euro and negotiated an agreement to install the first head of the European Central Bank. As Britain still had the Presidency until the end of the month, Blair chaired the meeting. However, the lack of equality and cooperation between nations was obvious. The *International Herald Tribune* reported that France and Germany were “the real decision-makers,” while Blair was relegated to a “secondary role.” Perhaps more significantly though, at the end of the meeting, the Austrian Prime Minister, representing the next EU presidency, took control of Euro issues away from Blair.148 The British Presidency did not expire until the end of the month, more than three weeks after the summit, but as Austria was a member of the Euro and Britain was not, Blair no longer had the authority to oversee currency issues. Thus politically, as well as economically, Britain’s separation from the EU was becoming potentially costly.

---

148 Buerkle, “A Stumble at the Start.”
Public support for EU enlargement was also a troubling issue in early 1998, in the months leading up to the St. Malo summit. In 1995, the EU had admitted three relatively Eurosceptic nations, Austria, Sweden, and Finland, and three years later it was in the process of membership negotiations with the first group of applicants from Eastern Europe. Although British citizens polled in the autumn 1998 Eurobarometer generally supported the addition of new members, some nations were only approved by small margins.\textsuperscript{149} Perhaps more concerning though were British responses to the questions of whether their country would become less important in Europe once new members joined (51% indicated yes, 33% chose no) and whether the addition of more countries would result in more unemployment in Britain (38% selected yes, 35% answered no).\textsuperscript{150} Although the British public did not outright oppose the new members, they were clearly apprehensive of the way the anticipated enlargement would change their lives and country. For an organization such as the EU, where membership is voluntary, such a lack of citizen support is cause for concern.

Indeed, what made the issue of enlargement so serious was that it compounded a general trend of decreasing support for the EU in Britain. The following collected results of the standard Eurobarometer survey show British responses over a ten year period to the question of whether the respondent believed his or her country’s membership in the EU (or before 1992 the European Community) was “a good thing.”\textsuperscript{151}

\textsuperscript{149} “Eurobarometer 50,” \textit{European Commission}, B62. For example, 34% of respondents favored admitting Slovenia to the EU, while 32% opposed it.
\textsuperscript{150} “Eurobarometer 50,” \textit{European Commission}, B59.
Percent of British Public that Considers Britain’s EU Membership “a good thing.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spring</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fall</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data unavailable.

Although respondents were more positive about Britain’s EU membership in the spring 1998 survey than during the previous year, 40% is still low compared to the support witnessed in the early 1990s. For Blair, this growing dislike was indicative of a larger structural disconnect between European citizens and their governments. In a 1998 speech to the French National Assembly, he voiced his concern about this particular problem, arguing that members of the public felt their national identities were being threatened, and did not yet understand how the EU fit into their lives. However, what is most telling for purposes of understanding Britain’s perspective on the EU is the solution he proposed: “we have to explain to our people what our vision of Europe is.” In other words, Blair recognized that Britain needed to become proactive in shaping public perspectives on the European Union. It was a suggestion offered, interestingly, just a few paragraphs before he declared that Britain and France should undertake further defense cooperation. The plans were vague—general cooperation after each nation had finished its current military review and
restructuring. However, these defense suggestions foreshadowed the cooperation of the two nations nine months later at St. Malo.  

Robert Cooper, a former foreign policy advisor to Tony Blair, wrote that “International institutions need the loyalty of citizens just as state institutions do; and that can be achieved only by giving the citizen some more direct involvement in their management.” The statement was part of his book, The Breaking of Nations, rather than a policy document, but it seems to epitomize the relationship British citizens have with the EU. In the case of the Euro, their unwillingness to trust in a European project led to serious economic and political consequences in Britain’s relationship with Europe. Additionally, on the issue of enlargement, the public feared the EU might admit new members that would diminish their status in the organization. The grouping of these events, as well as declining support for EU membership at the beginning of 1998 makes clear the motives for the defense cooperation Blair undertook that December. Having learned first hand of the critical need to involve the public in the EU, thus demonstrating its benefits and potentially cultivating support, Blair sought to find a vision of the EU with which they could identify: a non-supranational, yet multinational organization, which could visibly demonstrate the importance of European cooperation. The ESDP proved the perfect project for his needs.

---

Staying Close to NATO

Given its long tenure as the premier security organization in Europe, NATO will likely always have cause to look with mild suspicion on the formation of European military projects. Thus for Britain, caught in between its EU alliances and its close relationship with the United States, any institution that seriously aims to create an autonomous European defense force will eventually force it to take sides. However, while Britain has been actively engaged in furthering the abilities of the ESDP, it has showed no signs of picking teams. In fact, the British have made every effort to indicate to the US that the ESDP’s interests are no different from those of NATO. This effort to maintain traditional alliances is the second behavior one would expect to observe if the British saw the ESDP as a tool of domestic policy.

The first way in which Britain demonstrates a desire to maintain its traditional alliances, while also promoting the ESDP, is by avoiding concrete definitions of the limits and concepts of the policy. Certainly, the ESDP is relatively new. As the EU both enlarges and matures, it is reasonable to expect that defense policy will change as well. However, the current British approach to the ESDP actively embraces this lack of definition, as it allows the government freedom to portray policies in a light favorable to its traditional allies. François Heisbourg terms this poor definition “strategic ambiguity,” but he argues that the tool is used by the EU in order to establish policies or institutions despite internal disputes over “issues of principle and of implementation.” Once the desired structure is established, ambiguity can be
gradually eliminated as areas of agreement are found.\textsuperscript{154} For Britain though, the ambiguity is likely to be longer lasting.

A prime example of an area in which the ESDP is purposefully poorly defined is the definition of the “autonomous” character of European defense capabilities. Although the use of the word has caused some nervousness in the United States, Jolyon Howorth argues that the common definition of autonomous is not the sense in which it is currently understood. Rather, he states that “even the most Europe-focused of French officials would not imagine that the EU could successfully embark on a mission condemned by the U.S.”\textsuperscript{155} While the British might have chosen to demand that the language be clarified, allowing the concept to be somewhat ambiguous allows Britain to undertake a project which can honestly be labeled European, but which poses no challenge to Britain’s ties to the United States.

A similar strategy can be seen in the development of the European Security Strategy (ESS), a document based on broad declarations, but with no demands which would preclude Britain’s special relationship with the U.S. From one perspective, the ESS appears to champion a more equal balance of power in statements such as, “In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system.” Yet the document goes on to affirm the importance of NATO.\textsuperscript{156} Meyer criticizes the ESS for its lack of clear policy prescriptions, yet he reveals that it contains a balancing system which


accommodates all parties. Although “integration-minded ambassadors” took the
document quite seriously, states which disapproved of such a commitment were not
bound to follow the same perspective. Indeed, Meyer notes that, “Interviews at the
French and British ministries revealed that the ESS is of little practical or political
relevance for framing national defence policy.” It is a document which allows
Britain to cooperate, yet maintain a defense policy acceptable to its allies.

Although Britain and the EU as a whole use deliberately ambiguous policies
to maintain traditional alliances, this method is not always effective. In the case of
language indicating independent action, the system of ambiguity has not been
adequate to convince the United States of the ESDP’s limited intentions. In such
situations, the British have been quick to publicly or privately correct their European
allies, a move which maintains their relationship with the United States. A prime
example of Britain’s efforts to maintain traditional alliances is seen in Blair’s
behavior at the EU’s Nice Summit in 2000. After Jacques Chirac stated that European
defense preparation and execution “must be independent with respect to the NATO
command,” Blair was quick to correct the impression. Cogan writes that
“immediately thereafter, Tony Blair stated to the BBC, ‘If someone claims that we
have a capability independent of NATO, that would be absolutely false.’” Such a
statement posed little threat to the ESDP, but did serve to reassure the Americans that
their traditional ties to Europe, and to Britain in particular, were intact.

157 Meyer, 133-134.
158 Le Monde, December 9, 2000, p.3, quoted in Charles G. Cogan, The Third Option: The
A National and a European Project

The final characteristic which one would expect Britain to display if it approached the ESDP as a domestic policy is a strong effort to sell the project to the public as simultaneously national and European. Stressing this dual character is the essential step in connecting the affinity British citizens feel for their armed forces with the larger European Union. Additionally, emphasizing that the ESDP is still controlled by national governments is particularly vital in Britain, given its traditional aversion to projects with the potential to usurp sovereignty.

From mid December 1998 to October 1999, a time period which encompasses the St. Malo summit and the application of the principles decided there to the larger EU, two of Blair’s speeches make clear Britain’s view of its new commitment to European defense. While the necessity of NATO, or the value placed on Britain’s friendship with the US is always a prominent feature of defense speeches, each of these stresses that European defense is a worthy project largely because of its domestic credentials. For example, on December 15th, 1998, Blair offered a clear justification for his focus on European cooperation. The speech is labeled as a general address on foreign affairs, but with the delivery coming so soon after the St. Malo summit, there is little doubt that Blair was beginning the process of shaping public opinion about the agreement. In response to criticism that he was cooperating with Brussels to Britain’s detriment, Blair responded with a commitment to “pursue this new approach in Europe not because it is in Europe's interests but because it is in Britain's interests.”159 Less than a year later, in October 1999, Blair picked up on the

same theme, declaring that strong participation in the EU was “a patriotic cause,” as it would ultimately benefit British national interest, and that cooperation with Europe on matters such as defense would only strengthen Britain’s usefulness in its relationship with the U.S.\footnote{160}{“Speech by the Prime Minister Tony Blair about Britain in Europe,” \textit{10 Downing Street}, 14 October 1999, http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1461.asp (accessed November 15, 2006).}

Of course for the British Prime Minister to point out the domestic benefits of his actions is little surprise, but in the case of defense it is a stark contrast from the Blair who, in 1997, having vetoed plans to integrate the EU and WEU, stated that “there must be no question of us being forced into an integration of the various European defence institutions.”\footnote{161}{“Q & A by the Prime Minister Tony Blair in Amsterdam,” \textit{10 Downing Street}, 17 June 1997, http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1032.asp (accessed November 15, 2006).} Having committed Britain to an organization that could help to build public faith in Europe, thus safeguarding the economic relationship with the EU, Blair moved quickly to tie domestic interests to European participation.

\section*{VI. Conclusion}

For all of its ambiguous character, the ESDP is truly a practical project for Britain. Given its NATO membership and its close relationship with the United States, Britain does not lack the capacity for territorial defense. Neither do the British find themselves unable to participate in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations through either the UN or NATO. Rather, what Britain lacks is the certainty that its domestic population will support its commitment to the European Union. While Britain will likely always be among the EU’s more Eurosceptic members, it has a
substantial interest in maintaining its influence and membership in the organization. As Tony Blair stated, “Europe is not marginal to the British economy. It is fundamental to it and each day becomes more so.”¹⁶² In 1998, low support for enlargement and overall declining citizen support for the EU combined with Britain’s economic and political embarrassment over its euro opt-out to produce the necessity for action. Several months later at St. Malo, Blair helped set in motion the ESDP, a policy which offered the best hope to restore British faith in the EU, while at the same time demonstrating to the public that national sovereignty would not be compromised.

¹⁶² Blair, “Britain in Europe.”
Chapter 4: France

I. Introduction

France’s longstanding interest in a European defense project is by now well established. However, not since the EDC in 1954 have the French proposed such an ambitious step toward autonomous military action. Then, it was predicated on the notion that a rearmed Germany had to be closely controlled, but in the intervening years a number of different motives have been imputed to the French desire for European defense cooperation. One of the most notable and frequently expressed of these is the idea that France seeks a stronger Europe to enhance its own international power and reputation, implicit in which is the assumption that a stronger Europe may one day rise to the superpower status its economic weight suggests. This diversity of perspectives on state motivation suggests that despite the magnitude of French-generated European security projects, they must be understood not as repeated manifestations of a concrete set of state interests, but rather as distinct products of their times. Thus, while the ESDP is indubitably one in a continuum of European security projects, analysis of it cannot be limited to the ground its predecessors staked out.

France’s public involvement in the ESDP process began with Britain at St. Malo, a summit which, to all appearances, represented the culmination of French security ambitions for the previous forty years. However, the Jacques Chirac who came to the Summit was not the triumphant Europeanist one might have expected to

163 In fact, Jones argues that the need to contain Germany is still one of the primary driving forces behind European military policy and the ESDP in particular. See: Seth G. Jones, “The European Union and the Security Dilemma,” *Security Studies* 12, no. 3 (2003): 114-156.
164 See Posen, 166-167.
see from a state historically considered one of the “motors” of European integration. Rather, the French President had only recently emerged from a damaging political battle against nationalist and anti-EU sentiment, which had fixated on the economic adaptations necessary to qualify France for the first group of countries converting to the euro. This growing discontent was amplified by French fears for the cultural and economic ramifications of enlarging the EU. These two factors were perhaps small challenges compared to public discontent Tony Blair sought to overcome at St. Malo, but the degree to which they had disrupted French society, and indeed their occurrence at all, were matters for serious concern. Despite their divergent views on European integration, Chirac’s position was not so different from Blair’s. Both needed a way to cement vital national ties to the EU, despite the demonstrated ambivalence of their populations. However, where Blair had to address longstanding sentiment, Chirac had to make sure that the anti-EU feelings so astonishingly displayed in the mid-1990s would never reoccur.

As in the previous case study, several elements are necessary to establish the nature of the ESDP. First, France’s relationship with the project will be tested against the predictions derived from realism, liberalism, and constructivism. Although France often appears to be a proponent of the classical realist view of international relations, I will demonstrate that none of the approaches are sufficient to explain its participation in the creation and operation of the ESDP. Finally, I will suggest that France’s interest in the project is most logically explained by a quest to create a

---

165 This term generally refers to Germany and France’s ability to use their power and coalition building abilities to push forward the development of the European Union (previously the European Community). However, the French-German motor has ceased to be as effective as in past years. See: “Europe’s Big Three,” *International Herald Tribune*, 18 February 2004, p. 6, www.lexisnexis.com (accessed March 10, 2007).
symbol of EU identity, one designed to counteract the nationalist feelings which put at risk the economic, social, and political benefits France accrues from its membership in the EU.

II. Realism

Of the members of the European Union, France appears to most strongly exemplify realist state behavior. From its historical support for a wide range of European defense policies, to its insistence that the ESDP offer the capacity for autonomous action, it appears best positioned and most eager of all of the EU states to combat American hegemony and the global power imbalance. If indeed France brings the motivations and assumptions of the realist paradigm into its cooperation with the ESDP, its behavior should satisfy the three predictions laid out in Chapter Two. First, it should seek a change in its security guarantee when the old becomes noticeably unstable. Second, it should opt for balancing or bandwagoning behavior with the United States based on how effectively its national security is guaranteed in each case. Finally, France should push the ESDP to continue in its current direction in order to acquire the capabilities it needs to provide for European security. The consistency of French behavior with each of these predictions will be analyzed in turn.

166 France is also well-suited to this role militarily. Among the 15 EU member states in 2002, France was second only to Germany in the number of active armed forces (260,400), and had more forces deployed abroad than any other nation (34,987). Although Germany had more active forces than any other state, it is worth noting that France and the United Kingdom each had more than 30,000 troops deployed abroad, while Germany, as the nearest competitor, had only 8,887. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2002-2003* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), quoted in Salmon and Shepherd, 122.
In regards to the first prediction, France is a special case in the EU. Due to its longstanding commitment to European defense structures, the realist prediction that it should seek the ESDP when its former security guarantee proves inadequate must be interpreted broadly. If the ESDP is truly a security and defense policy, there was little change in France’s preferred security guarantee, just finally the option to pursue it with Britain, and subsequently the EU as a whole. In this case, Bosnia and Kosovo would have made little difference to France’s behavior, other than strengthening its previous preferences. Thus, for France the question is not so much whether events caused it to reconsider its security provider, but whether it appears to have consistently maintained its belief in the necessity of an autonomous European security organization. To this question, the answer is a resounding no. In the years immediately before and after St. Malo, France sought a rapprochement with NATO that cannot be explained in the realist paradigm.

France’s efforts to repair its relationship with NATO were briefly discussed in Chapter Two, yet the incident bears further development and scrutiny. Although the attempt at rapprochement was significant in and of itself, a realist would doubtless present the counterargument that France sought a closer relationship to further its own state interests, and indeed always intended to give preference to a European defense project over the transatlantic alliance. This argument is presented most cogently by Rathbun, who relates a French diplomat’s remark that, “France’s partners, even within the fifteen EU countries, would never join a European project if they had not
seen that France had reconciled itself with NATO.\textsuperscript{167} If this perspective can be substantiated, France’s long-term goals could still be of realist origin.

However, if France was pursuing a more favorable relationship with NATO in order to establish its transatlantic credentials for its EU allies, it should logically have made a strong effort to cooperate with the norms of the NATO structure; instead, the opposite occurred. In December 1995, France took its place as a full member of the North Atlantic Council and the NATO Military Committee, and in less than a year it began to push the boundaries of the transatlantic alliance. For example, the French suggested that a European officer should be the next to serve as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The result was opposition not only from the United States, but also from the other NATO members, “who saw the United States as the glue holding NATO together.”\textsuperscript{168} While NATO had been trying to give its European members a higher profile, this clearly pushed the boundaries of the acceptable.

If the French were trying to impress their allies with their ability to cooperate, there was little indication of it. Indeed, they likely compounded the perception that they were not willing to be accommodating by following the SACEUR incident with a request that a European officer be given the top position at the Allied Forces South command (AFSOUTH). Again, the United States rejected the proposal, and Gallis notes that both the Americans and other NATO allies viewed with incredulity the suggestion that “Paris, not in the integrated command structure, would believe that its flag officers might quickly walk into a senior command when they had not

\textsuperscript{167} Interview by Rathbun, quoted in Rathbun, 178.
participated in key military decisions or trained their forces in the field with other allies.”\textsuperscript{169} Once again, the French angered not only the United States, but also the very countries a realist would claim they were trying to impress with their cooperation. An argument might be made that attempting to gain more power within NATO is perfectly in line with realist dictates, but in this case it was self-defeating for France’s ultimate ends.

One might grant that, even though France appeared to waver from the predictions of realism during its rapprochement with NATO, in helping to form the ESDP it eventually did pursue its national security by moving away from the influence of the United States. However, this action is also problematic from a realist perspective. If the ESDP was truly the security guarantee France sought to obtain, its actions were strongly contradictory. First, in 1996, the same year that Paris sought to install European officers in NATO’s top positions, the French also made themselves more dependent on the United States. Gallis reveals that in 1996 military budget cuts, Chirac cancelled a Future Large Aircraft (FLA) joint project with Germany, which aimed to produce planes capable of transporting heavy military machinery. Instead, the French opted for a more flexible military, but the price was substantial from a realist perspective: the new “lighter, more mobile force…was now dependent on U.S. lift.”\textsuperscript{170} A nation seriously intent on moving away from NATO to an EU force would not logically have cancelled a joint European project which would enable the EU to acquire vital force projection capabilities. Rather, a realist state would have embraced the opportunity to grow more independent.

\textsuperscript{169} Gallis, 62.
\textsuperscript{170} Gallis, 61.
Realism thus fails on two counts to explain France’s choice of a security guarantee. First, it cannot provide a sufficient explanation for the 1995 rapprochement with NATO, and second, it cannot explain the contradiction which arises from France’s participation in the ESDP after it had taken steps to make itself more dependent on the United States. In the aftermath of Bosnia and in the early years of Kosovo, a realist would expect France’s need for a European defense structure to be stronger than ever. However, if this was indeed the intent, its strategies were obviously self-defeating.

The second prediction derived from realism is that states should seek to balance or bandwagon with the United States based on their perception of which option offers the better security guarantee. In this case, Posen argues that France consistently opts for balancing behavior, as evidenced by Chirac’s oft stated belief in a multilateral balance of power.\textsuperscript{171} However, France’s behavior surrounding the ESDP does not consistently support this perspective.\textsuperscript{172}

If France joined the ESDP as a balancing mechanism in the interest of its own national security, then it should logically have drawn away from bandwagoning mechanisms, such as NATO. In part this holds true as, even during its rapprochement in 1995, France was willing to pursue its individual interests at the cost of NATO unity. However, the prediction is not borne out in a larger sense, as at the same time that France and Britain were drawing up plans at St. Malo, France was also

\textsuperscript{171} Posen, 166.
\textsuperscript{172} As a side note, Posen does not seem to provide a rationale for the occurrence of two different strategies being undertaken by Europe’s two most active military powers. He remarks that, “Considerations of autonomy and power should figure in their decisions to support ESDP,” but it seems that his predictions are based more on past state behavior than on objective calculations of how each should proceed in relation to a global hegemon (Posen, 164).
strengthening its cooperation with NATO. In November 1998, the French served as the “framework nation” for NATO’s Extraction Force (XFOR) in Kosovo, a distinction which gave it command, ultimately under the authority of SACEUR, of a multinational force from France, the UK, Germany, and Italy. It was a situation which looked strikingly similar to the type of European cooperation the French would very shortly seek through the ESDP, yet they were willing to carry it out, as Latawski and Smith note with emphasis, “within the NATO integrated command structure.”

Certainly, at the time, the EU had not yet institutionalized mechanisms for military cooperation and NATO was the best available option. However, the fact that the French ably commanded an operation under NATO calls into question the realist impulse for balancing, which should have led it further away from NATO cooperation.

Additionally, in December 1999, France again cooperated in a NATO mission, this time as part of the Eurocorps. Although EU governments were concomitantly moving toward a more autonomous ESDP, France volunteered to install the Eurocorps’ deployable command headquarters in Kosovo for six months. Again, the French showed a willingness to work within the NATO system that is uncharacteristic of a realist state. It would have been more logical for France to have concentrated its energies on the development of the ESDP, rather than on carrying out European operations still subject to the ultimate authority of the United

---

173 Latawski and Smith, 135.
174 Eurocorps was originally a project between France and West Germany, intended to create a joint brigade “that would symbolize their new postwar relationship.” In 1992, Belgium, Spain, and Luxembourg joined the force, and the following year it was officially dedicated to operate under NATO in times of military conflict (Cogan, 4-5).
175 Latawski and Smith, 136.
States. And indeed, if NATO really was the only capable security actor and one with which France could cooperate, then the creation of a balancing mechanism seems an unlikely policy choice.

Finally, realism predicts that the future direction of the ESDP will be largely along the lines it has already established. Capabilities will be gradually but inexorably increased, and the EU may seek to put some distance between itself and NATO. As has been previously noted, the ESDP has sought to bolster its security and defense capabilities, although in some sense, capabilities acquisition seems to be the normal progression for any cooperative project. In fact, if the ESDP is focused on identity-building, the members would still have to create a useful security capability in order for the policy to have any legitimacy. However, in the case of a realist policy one might expect to see nations pushing to build capabilities as quickly as possible, a result which Posen himself acknowledges has not occurred. Additionally, France has not significantly cooled its relations with NATO, and indeed participated in NATO’s mission in Afghanistan. Clearly, the French are not ready to abandon the institution just yet.

Although realism may be proven correct in its estimation of the ESDP’s future development, the behavior it predicts for France in terms of the choice to join the ESDP, as well as the selection of balancing or bandwagoning behavior is not accurate to any great degree. Indeed, realist assumptions of state pursuit of national interest seem to lead only to more contradictions in French behavior. In short, a different framework for analysis is necessary.

---

176 Posen, 165.
III. Liberalism

If France is not undertaking the ESDP for security reasons, liberalism offers predictions for the policy as an institution-building project. First, states with more to gain from the incipient organization should have relatively less power negotiating its form. Second, states should gauge the level to which the agreement must be binding based on their perception of how likely members are to defect. Finally, the future development of the ESDP will be shaped significantly by the degree to which states appear willing and able to maintain their loyalty to the institution.

If Moravcsik and liberalism have correctly accounted for the power dynamics of institutional negotiations, then France should have a relatively small amount of weight in determining the features of the ESDP. However, this has largely not been the case. As has already been explored in the case study of Britain, the French desire to retain references to autonomous action was upheld, although in some situations it made Britain’s relationships with the United States more difficult. If France had possessed only the influence it might have reasonably attained according to Moravcsik, it is unlikely this reference would have survived. At the least, it should have been heavily qualified with an explicit provision barring action unless NATO both approved and was uninterested in pursuing the project itself.

Additionally, the French were successful in implementing their desire for a more autonomous policy in subtler ways, including perhaps most notably their influence over the name of the project. Initially, the ESDP was referred to as the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), a term which more properly described the development of European capabilities within NATO. According to a

177 “Presidency Conclusions,” Cologne.
NATO official interviewed by Cogan, the changeover in name was “essentially a French invention, to give a sense of autonomy (since ESDI has always been referred to as ‘within the Alliance’) and also to make the term more congruent with the Common Foreign and Security Policy…”  

Although a name is sometimes but a small change, the switchover clearly separated the past cooperation with NATO from the EU enterprise, a move that fulfilled French objectives, but doubtless worried the British.

Another example of the French driving European defense policy in spite of liberalism’s predictions is evident in the European Union’s Constitutional Treaty. Although this document postdates the beginnings of the ESDP, it does propose some significant changes to how European defense is undertaken, and thus might be expected to follow the liberalist model as well. Most pertinent for a discussion of France’s role in the negotiations is the existence of a provision for an eventual agreement on common defense. The British, given their strong loyalties to NATO, vehemently opposed the inclusion of any suggestion that Europe would engage in mutual defense outside of the transatlantic framework. However, while the idea was watered down to the statement that a common EU defense policy “will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides,” the use of the phrase “will lead,” instead of a more qualified statement such as “may lead,” shows the strong influence of Europeanist powers like France. It must, of

178 Interview by Cogan, quoted in Cogan, 111.
course, be acknowledged, that the document recognizes and allows for states who wish to undertake mutual defense agreements only through NATO. However, France and the Europeanists still appear to have gained more of their objectives. Atlanticists, such as Britain, got a continuance of their current situation, but accompanied by a provision that “will” one day establish a mutual defense pact, presumably outside of NATO’s Article V. Europeanists, on the other hand, got a continuance of current conditions, but hope that the EU’s future development will move in their preferred direction. 181

The second prediction derived from liberalism suggests that states should seek to ensure that allies make a credible commitment to any common agreement. For Moravcsik, this should result in agreements which require states to pool or delegate their sovereignty in greater degrees according the possibility that allies will not honor their commitment to the institution or policy being created. 182 In this case, given the historical opposition between French and British perspectives on NATO, France should have been the first state calling for a defense policy that could ensure the credible commitment of its allies. However, the idea of a defense policy in which states do not retain the right to control their own actions is as much an anathema to France as it is to Britain. Despite France’s long history of seeking a European defense capability, the structure has almost always been an optional arrangement. 183 Rathbun traces this development back to De Gaulle, noting that “he and his party resisted

182 Moravcsik, 8-9.
183 The EDC is the notable exception to this rule.
supranational integration as vehemently as they did NATO domination of European security policy.”

Even in the modifications to EU security policy proposed in the Constitutional Treaty, states are never bound to act against their will. Instead, the Treaty promotes a favorite project of Chirac’s, which allows member states to come together in groups smaller than that of the Union in order to pursue mutual security interests. Given the French and Dutch vetoes in 2005, the effect this type of project might have had on transatlantic and European relationships will never be known. However, it is a strong demonstration of the fact that France has sought mechanisms for optional cooperation in security and defense, rather than agreements binding states to act.

The final prediction of liberalism concerns the future of the ESDP. Although Moravcsik is more relevant to the negotiations that create common institutions, rather than those that operate them, a vision of the ESDP’s future can be derived from his theories in which the policy will become more binding on its members as their tendency to defect increases. This is most pertinent to the Iraq War and the negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty, which were ongoing during the early months of the war. In this case, liberalism offers a somewhat correct view of events—France did seek to establish an independent planning headquarters and supported the Constitutional clause laying the foundation for a future common defense. However, while both of these developments would heighten the importance of allies’ EU

---

184 Rathbun, 180.
commitments, they were not particularly strong moves to bring Britain or other allies into a more binding structure.

IV. Constructivism

The final paradigm by which to analyze the ESDP perceives it primarily as an identity-building project, rooted in the long and sometimes antagonistic relationship between Europe and the United States. The first prediction holds that the ESDP exists to promote the EU internationally and to create a domestic European identity, defined by its uniqueness from that of the United States. In this, France at first appears to follow the constructivist approach. From the French emphasis on autonomy for the ESDP, to the actual renaming of the policy to distinguish it from one associated with NATO, and thus the United States, France has supported and constructed a policy which has given its American allies cause to worry. If one believes Hopf that identities “imply a particular set of interests,” by pushing the ESDI to become the ESDP, France was essentially advocating the adoption of a new set of interests which could not, by definition, be the same as those of the United States.186 However, even the stringently Europeanist France recognizes the importance of the US-EU relationship. Indeed, Chirac has declared that a European defense capability “strengthens NATO by affirming a partnership which will be all the stronger if better balanced.”187 Thus, although there is genuinely reason to think that France would support a European identity that on occasion clashed with the priorities of the United

---

186 Hopf, 175
States, it is difficult to believe it would build and participate in a policy which requires the EU to intentionally exploit its differences from the United States. After all, even the St. Malo declaration recognized the need to respect the relationships and commitments of EU members to NATO.188

The second prediction of constructivism holds that states with more malleable identities will be better able to adapt to the changes demanded by the ESDP, thus preparing them to take leading roles in the policy. There is no denying France’s prominence in creating and leading the ESDP, and this, combined with the fact that it has historically maintained more distance from NATO than its EU allies, suggests it may fit the constructivist model. However, France’s participation in NATO missions in the mid-1990s is problematic. While its rapprochement with the transatlantic alliance indicates that its identity may be open to change, it also suggests that the French may not be willing to preference the pursuit of European identity over their national policy preferences. In particular, their leadership in NATO’s XFOR just a month before signing the St. Malo Declaration was a type of symbolic alignment with the United States. Thus, although French identity may have the malleability needed to support the constructivist approach, there is still reason to doubt whether it would be willing to modify it in order to commit to maintaining a uniquely European identity.

Finally, constructivism suggests that events that produce conflicts of interest in the security sphere between the United States and the EU should lead to a strengthened commitment to the ESDP. In this, Iraq will prove to be a particularly important case in the long run. In the short term though, France’s participation in the NATO mission in Afghanistan suggests that it is not taking any heroic measures to

---

188 Rutten, “From St. Malo to Nice.”
oppose European and American policy. On a practical level, this is eminently reasonable. In some cases, France may genuinely share the American approach to security matters and wish to cooperate with it. However, if one accepts the idea that the ESDP is formed by its distinctiveness from American policy, the French certainly could not participate in a mission as important to the United States as that in Afghanistan. Indeed, if the constructivists are right, by cooperating with the Americans, the French have either put their own security policy on hold, or have actually done damage to the unique European identity they were seeking to create. Both eventualities would be highly unusual behavior from one of the historic motors of European military cooperation. Once again, the predictions of constructivism do not adequately explain French behavior.

V. The ESDP Reconsidered

The shortcomings of realism, liberalism, and constructivism in explaining France’s role in the ESDP illuminate the need for a more nuanced explanation. If French behavior is to conform to the identity formation theory set forth in Chapter 2, it must meet the same three element test as Britain. First, its behavior in creating and participating in the project should be linked to events demonstrating the fragility of its connection to the European Union. Second, joining the ESDP should not fundamentally alter its international alliances or allegiances. And finally, the government’s public presentation of the ESDP should stress both its national and EU character. Although these elements have unique manifestations in every country, they
prove, as in the case of Britain, to be the most compelling explanation for France’s behavior regarding the ESDP.

Preempting the Unexpected

Because France has long pursued a European military project, its enthusiasm for the ESDP does not appear to be the anomaly it clearly is in the British case. Nonetheless, to identify the project as a natural successor to the WEU and other similar endeavors masks the fact that France’s participation is strongly parallel to that of its British ally. Although the British have never sought a military role for the European Union and France has long pushed for the development of such capabilities, security and defense were not driving either leader’s actions at St. Malo. In both cases, recent events had demonstrated the need to strengthen domestic identification with the European Union. For Chirac, as for Blair, the substantial economic and political benefits of EU membership had to be assured.

Although France’s commitment to the EU had always seemed inexhaustible, two occurrences in the mid to late 1990s proved to Chirac the fickleness of history’s predictive powers. First, the French President found himself engulfed in anti-EU sentiment as the result of France’s impending adoption of the euro. This backlash against the EU was rooted in public reaction to the so-called “convergence criteria” mandated by the EU for every future member of the eurozone. In order to qualify for a place in the first group to launch the currency, France had to meet five criteria, most notable of which was the attainment of a budget deficit below 3% of national GDP.  

---

189 The complete five convergence criteria were: a budget deficit below 3% of national GDP, public debt below 60% of GDP, an inflation rate kept “within 1.5% of the three EU countries with the lowest
Although the convergence criteria were spelled out in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, France did not seriously attempt to implement them until after Jacques Chirac assumed the Presidency in 1995, at which point the budget deficit was running at 6% of GDP. With only three years before non-compliance would bar France from the first group to adopt the euro, the new Prime Minister, Alain Juppé, drafted a plan to cut the budget deficit to 3.5% within one year. However, this step toward convergence was to come at a heavy social cost. Juppé proposed a “.5-percent addition to income tax for thirteen years to pay off the accumulated Social Security debt,” as well as, among other changes, increased fees in state health care programs and changes to the pension plans of public employees. Public reaction was overwhelmingly negative: within weeks of the plan’s introduction, civil servants went on strike, followed by transportation workers, a domino effect which resulted in what the New York Times called the “worst labor unrest in France in a decade.” In addition, the plan was personally disastrous for Juppé and Chirac, both of whom experienced a sharp drop in popularity.

The results of the 1995 strikes were many and varied, among them Chirac’s decision to call for new elections in 1997 and Juppé’s ignominious departure from

---


191 Ross, 97.


193 While both leaders lost public support, Ross notes that “by the end of 1996 the prime minister was the most unpopular in the history of modern opinion polls.” (Ross, 98).
office after the defeat of the moderate right. However, the potential consequences for France’s membership in the EU were far more serious lessons for Chirac. The nation that had co-founded the European Coal and Steel Community, the progenitor of the modern EU, had just seen the willingness of its citizenry to turn against it.

That the French public blamed the EU for the domestic economic situation was clear. Shortly after the 1995 transportation strikes, the Financial Times made the connection explicit. In a strong argument to eliminate the strategy of requiring budget reform for euro membership, it noted that the linkage strategy had been self-defeating in France because “public hostility to budget cutting was deflected toward the process of monetary unification.”

Socialist Lionel Jospin picked up on the connection in his campaigning, promising to make the euro work for the people, rather than bankers. In the end though, the French people spoke most eloquently of their own dissatisfaction. In the first round of the parliamentary elections the Socialists carried the largest percent of the vote (22%), and Jospin was ultimately put into office. More interestingly though, the only other parties to increase their first round share of votes over the 1993 election were the Communists and the far-right National Front, the latter of which had its best first round performance ever, capturing 15% of the

---

194 Ross, 101-102.
196 Ross, 103.
vote. \(^{197}\) These two parties are of particular interest as they were both opposed to France joining the euro currency. \(^{198}\)

For Chirac, the anti-EU sentiment was a wake up call. In 1992, the French public had narrowly approved the Maastricht Treaty, with only 50.66% voting yes. Those voting no focused their disapproval on issues such as economic policy, unemployment, and the integration of Europe which the Treaty portended. \(^{199}\) While this near rejection was before Chirac’s tenure in office, it was visibly paralleled in the strikes and election backlash just years later, as both posed a clear threat to the strength of France’s membership in the European Union. Chirac explicitly recognized the risk of this division at the end of the 1997 parliamentary campaign, when he warned voters that taking the majority away from the center right would undermine his ability to pursue French interests in the European Union. Indeed, he remarked: “Let us not forget that [France] cannot defend its interests unless it is capable of speaking with a single voice, with a strong voice.” \(^{200}\)

Some international press coverage billed Chirac’s speech as purely an election maneuver, pointing out that it was the first time the President had brought Europe into the campaign. \(^{201}\) However, that the message was a last-ditch attempt to shore up support is highly unlikely. First, given the circumstances under which the elections

---


\(^{200}\) Lara Marlowe, “Chirac, Juppe use Kohl visit to portray the left as a threat to France's status in the EU,” The Irish Times, 22 May 1997, p.10, www.lexisnexis.com (accessed March 5, 2007).

were called, focusing on domestic policy would seem to have been a much stronger play for support. Second, Jospin and the opposition were clearly campaigning with the more popular, revisionist view of France’s role in the EU, while Chirac continued to declare that France would honor the economic commitments it had already made.\footnote{Lara Marlowe, “Chirac, Juppe use Kohl,” 10.} Thus, although Chirac doubtless hoped his message would turn out a significant amount of voters from his own party, the statement had meaning beyond his electoral prospects. What were important were not so much the divisions that might result between a President and Prime Minister of different parties, but the fundamental differences of opinion in the public from which this type of government would result. The French public could not be allowed to set the precedent of opposition to membership in the EU. If they did, the consequences could be brutal. Chirac recognized this potentiality in particular, asking, “How can we imagine that all that has been done in the past 40 years should be put into question or put on hold without our country suffering terrible damage?”\footnote{Marlowe, “Chirac, Juppe use Kohl,” 10. Indeed the damage could have been substantial had France pulled out of the EMU. Ross notes that, “Without the EMU, France's situation would become even worse. Shorter-term perturbations on financial markets could damage already hurting EU economies, that of the French included. More important, EU morale could collapse, setting the entire project of European integration back for years” (Ross, 103-104).} Clearly, a mechanism was needed to renew the EU’s appeal.

That such a mechanism was necessary was made clear by Chirac in early 1998. In preparation for an EU Council meeting at Cardiff, Wales, Chirac and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl composed a joint letter to Tony Blair, whose country was currently holding the EU Presidency. The two leaders used the letter as a platform to express their discontent with the European Union; specifically, they
“railed against the ‘excess of centralization’ and accused ‘certain European institutions’ of having become ‘remote from citizens and their everyday concerns.’”204 The tenor of the letter is, at first glance, contradictory. Chirac and Kohl were clearly interested in reassuring their citizens that Europe worked for their needs, yet they wanted to do so by having more decisions made on the non-European national and local levels. In order to reach public opinion though, this type of institutional reform would have to be a high profile development, and indeed it would be. At the end of 1998, Chirac met Blair at St. Malo and established the beginnings of the ESDP. It was a policy for common decision making, yet one in which no country would ever be bound to participate. Indeed, as Chirac recognized in a 2000 speech to the Assembly of the WEU, pursuing European security and defense was the foundation of European identity, but also the expression of national preferences:

“It is in France’s interest to have Europe and its ideas fulfil their full role in the world. Far from weakening our sovereignty with this undertaking, we will be able to assert it more fully. Unity, solidarity and defence of common values and interests are the ways in which European societies will flourish in the 21st century. They are the foundations for a common foreign and defence policy.”205

The convergence criteria and economic difficulties were not the only issues that demonstrated the need to strengthen the European identities of French citizens. Indeed, in another similarity to the British, French feelings about EU enlargement were at best lukewarm. While the French felt less strongly than the British that the addition of new members would decrease their importance in the EU, they were much

more negative about the candidacies of individual countries. Out of twelve possible candidate countries in fall 1998, the French public found only two of them acceptable: Poland (45% in favor and 38% opposed) and Malta (42% in favor and 38% opposed). Of the remaining ten, the French were split equally on membership for Hungary, and disapproved of the rest. Indeed for six countries, Slovakia, Romania, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, those French citizens who disapproved of membership beat out those who approved by 17 points or more.  

Yet, despite public ambivalence about enlargement, the French government had few doubts about its position. In September 1998, mere months before St. Malo, Chirac declared his support for “the earliest possible accession of all the applicant States satisfying the conditions laid down in the treaties.” More importantly though, he set out the reason that France could not back down: “Enlargement is both a moral duty and an opportunity for Europe.” In this particular situation the identification of enlargement as a European, rather than merely a French imperative, is telling. It was this larger perspective on EU actions that Chirac sought to cultivate at St. Malo, although the position was also in the long-term national interest. Enlargement would not be an easy or cheap project, but the eventual outcome would be an economically and politically stronger EU, from which France would certainly benefit. 

Although Chirac was not clear in 1998 on the way forward for enlargement, the basic premise of his strategy is revealed in a 2000 speech, “Our Europe,” which he gave to the German Bundestag. In his address, he warned that he would not allow

---

206 “Eurobarometer 50,” *European Commission, B59 and B62.*  
enlargement to take place if it posed a threat to the unity of the Union. Instead, he declared that, “…the pace of European construction can’t be decreed. It is to a large extent dictated by the increase in the strength of the feeling, among our peoples, of identity and of belonging to Europe, of their wish to live together in a mutually supportive community.” In 1998, however, not only public opinion on enlargement, but also public opinion on the EU in general was comparatively low.

The following offers the percent of French respondents who considered France’s membership in the EU to be “a good thing,” presented in biannual increments during the 1990s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Spring</th>
<th>Fall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* Data unavailable.

Although the British were more negative about their membership during this time period, French support fell from a higher level in the early 1990s, and indeed was only 10 percent higher than that recorded in Britain in the spring of 1998. This decidedly anti-enlargement, anti-EU atmosphere was thus the challenge to be overcome if enlargement were to proceed, and an identity-building project was Chirac’s method of choice. Just months after he declared enlargement both an opportunity and a moral duty, the process for European defense cooperation was initiated.

---


209 “Eurobarometer 50,” European Commission, B15.
The twin pressures of public reaction to the convergence criteria and the necessity of enlargement in a time of limited public support both served to indicate to Chirac that France needed to strengthen its investment in a European identity. While public ambivalence about the latter was perhaps predictable, the Chirac government was caught off guard by the ease with which anti-EU sentiment arose in regard to the euro. In both cases though, the prescription was clearly the same: France needed to increase the ability of its citizens to identify with Europe. No grand visions of supranationalism drove this policy; rather, it evolved as a necessity for safeguarding the national interest. In 1998, pressure from the convergence criteria had subsided, but enlargement was still looming in the future. St. Malo had become a necessity.

Independence and Cooperation

Traditionally, France has been considered one of the EU’s strongest integrationists, but also a typically realist power that pursues cooperation only to further its own national interest. In the theoretical portion of this chapter, it was established that the ESDP does not have the characteristics of a realist international security project. However, on the level of the state itself, concerns with power and sovereignty may still be very real. Thus, as the ESDP is not intended to fill France’s security and defense needs, the French should be seen to work both to maintain their own sovereignty and to continue the tenor of their pre-ESDP foreign relations, including their sometimes uncomfortable relationship with the United States. This effort to maintain traditional alliances, or in the case of France, alliances as well as self reliance, is the second standard indicative of the ESDP’s identity-building nature.
Although France has long been a participant and creator of European military structures, an overriding concern has always been the maintenance of its own security. In some sense, this is self-evident and requires no substantiation. After all, a state’s desire to protect itself from unwanted intrusion is a fundamental feature of the international system. However, on a continent where NATO and the United States have, in the past, assumed a large degree of responsibility for the security of individual European states, the desire to be self-sufficient in terms of security is worth noting. This dedication to autonomy was expressed in 1997, by Foreign Minister Herve de Charette, who remarked to *The Financial Times* that “no one can leave their vital interests to be defended by someone else - not even by an intimate friend.”\(^{210}\) The comment was aimed primarily at the United States, yet the broad wording and the fact that the Americans and French are far from intimate friends suggest it is a broader declaration of state sovereignty over military affairs.

This philosophy of independence has been maintained scrupulously since St. Malo. Although the French have been strong proponents of the ESDP, they have not been reticent to declare a willingness to act outside of it if necessary. Meyer recognizes this trend, noting that while the French have been very positive regarding joint capabilities, the same cannot be said for joint decision-making.\(^{211}\) This continued pursuit of national independence was embodied most starkly by Jacques Chirac in a 2001 speech to the Institute of Higher National Defense Studies in France. Although the French President praised the progress and future of European defense,

---


\(^{211}\) Meyer, 64.
he was careful also to acknowledge that “France…intends to retain her capacity to act alone if her own interests and bilateral commitments so demand.” This autonomy is clearly allowed by the ESDP, as it makes no requirements on member actions in any particular military or security conflict. In addition, the voluntary nature of the ESDP allows France to essentially select the weight it will give to collective projects. Meyer’s comment that the European Security Strategy had little actual impact on French or British national policies seems a prime example. Thus, although the French have entered into a new era of European security cooperation, their day to day functioning is still either carried out for national purposes, or clearly may revert to such loyalties at a moment’s notice.

A second area in which the ESDP has left traditional French security alliances untouched is the absence of any necessity for rapprochement between France and the United States. As was chronicled in the section of this chapter on realism, France began its own reconciliation with NATO well before the St. Malo summit. However, those attempts to find a greater role in NATO did not eliminate the coolness of the France-United States relationship, and the ESDP has not significantly improved the situation. In the preceding chapter, Heisbourg’s notion of strategic ambiguity was introduced. This concept, which has successfully allowed the British to maintain their partnership with the United States, facilitates the opposite relationship for France.

While the more Atlanticist members of the ESDP will not countenance a policy that seeks to act against American wishes, ambiguity in how the EU defines autonomous action has helped France to independently regulate the closeness of its

---

213 Meyer, 133-134.
relationship with the United States. In 1999, “French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine openly acknowledged that there was a major difference between the French approach—which interpreted ‘autonomy’ quite literally—and that of most other European states.”

Although the French clearly disagreed with the British, the EU as a whole made no move to develop a common understanding of the term. Indeed, even after the United States pushed Britain to lobby the EU to remove the references to autonomy, Howorth notes that documents produced at subsequent bilateral and EU summits retained the reference. There was little need and less reason to eliminate a concept which, due to the lack of clarity in its meaning, served to ease the external relationships of all parties involved. By defining autonomous action as the ability to act without the United States, France was not forced to strengthen its ties with the global hegemon.

In addition to allowing France to retain its ability to regulate its relationship with the United States, the ESDP also allowed it to continue policies in outright opposition to U.S. preferences. In particular, France’s 1996 request to have a European installed in the top position at AFSOUTH was echoed in the 2003 push by France and the Benelux nations for an autonomous EU military planning headquarters. The plan for AFSOUTH was soundly rejected by the United States and there was little reason to expect the United States to regard a European headquarters more favorably. However, as the ESDP created no imperative to improve relations with the United States, France was able to continue producing such proposals. The British, of course, were displeased and a compromise was eventually concluded for a

---

215 Howorth, “European Defence Initiative;” 44.
216 Cogan, 87.
European planning cell at NATO headquarters, but the salient lesson is that the ESDP structure supported the positions of parties on both sides. The St. Malo declaration did indeed call for the creation of military planning capabilities, but specified that they should not be a duplication of already existing assets.\textsuperscript{217} Thus, the French could argue the need for a purely European, and thus unique, headquarters, while the British could reassure the United States that Europe had no need for a separate facility. The subjective nature of the ESDP, because of which it was applicable to a range of policies and limited to none, was the true genius of its creation as an identity building project.

\textbf{Rhetorical Representations}

While France’s freedom to maintain its traditional alliances provides a fair indicator that the ESDP is not a security-centered project, this must be complimented with a study of how the government portrays its commitment to the policy. If the ESDP is targeted to increase the willingness of the French public to identify with Europe, then the rhetorical positioning of the policy should strongly emphasize the national benefits, as well as the larger European nature of the project. While either factor may be more prevalent, the key component is a public expression of the link between them. Only by establishing this connection could the French government hope to communicate to its citizens the national importance of a European identity.

Because France has traditionally been a strong supporter of the EU, the European benefits of the ESDP tend to be most strongly expressed in the statements of Chirac and other members of the government. However, as the ESDP serves to

\textsuperscript{217} Rutten, “From St. Malo to Nice.”
promote a European identity without provoking resurgent nationalist feelings, the
domestic benefits of the policy are also made apparent. For example, in 2005, Chirac
visited a joint German-French Helicopter Training School, and remarked that, “By
moving forward on Defence Europe, we are improving security for all French people
and are true to France's calling to serve world peace and stability.” His overall
message was one of broad EU cooperation, but he clearly singled out the national
benefits as well. More telling of French perspectives on the ESDP however, is a 2005
article in the Financial Times, authored by French Minster of Defense Michèle Alliot-
Marie. The article, entitled “Security could be Europe’s greatest rallying point,”
focused on the French rejection of the EU Constitutional Treaty earlier that year. The
no vote, which was strongly reminiscent of the near rejection of the Maastricht Treaty
and the labor unrest over the common currency, should logically have elicited
increased emphasis on European defense projects in general, and more specifically on
their benefits to the French population. Alliot-Marie’s article is largely descriptive of
the achievements and future challenges of the ESDP, but her introduction makes clear
the identity-building function of the project, and is thus worth quoting at length. She
writes:

“The European Union entered a period of uncertainty after France and
the Netherlands rejected the European constitutional treaty last spring.
The recent budgetary debates have not lessened that uncertainty.

---

218 Jacques Chirac, “Speech by M. Jacques Chirac, President of the Republic, during his visit to the
elysee.fr/anglais/speeches_and_documents/2005/speech_by_m_jacques_chirac_president_of_the_repu-
blic_during_his_visit_to_the_franco-german_tiger_helicopter_training_school.29468.html (accessed
March 15, 2007).
While the Europeans will manage to overcome these difficulties, as they always have, I believe a combined initiative in the defence and security field could help revive both confidence and action in Europe.

This, after all, is the domain that attracts most support across the EU, as demonstrated in the constitutional campaign. Not least, the EU’s citizens are aware that development of the European security and defence policy (ESDP) contributes to their daily security.”

While Alliot-Marie speaks, of course, of the aftermath of the constitutional veto in 2005, rather than of French domestic unrest leading up to 1998, the similarity of circumstances strongly suggests the ESDP may have been originally perceived in this way. Certainly, it is a clear statement that in the turmoil of anti-EU sentiment, a European security project can benefit both the EU, as well as the individual nations that gain security from their membership.

VI. Conclusion

Although France has a long history of seeking security cooperation through European institutions, the ESDP is clearly of a different character than its predecessors. Although it must perform security operations credibly and well to be an effective policy instrument, the inapplicability of the realist and liberalist approaches suggest it is not a traditional approach to state security. The constructivist approach finds the most applicability, but stumbles, at it did with Britain, over the obligation to define identity by excluding the possibility of cooperation with the United States. However, the constructivist assumption that European identity is in need of reinforcement does prove correct. For France, the ESDP has been shown to address

---

specifically this concern. National interest in the policy was prompted by low public support for the EU, resulting from currency and enlargement concerns. Subsequently, the French have designed a policy that allows all parties to maintain traditional alliances, while using the ESDP for their own national interest. While the French may, at some point, attempt to use the ESDP as purely a military policy, the preferences of its allies and its own need for an identity building project supersede this desire right now.
Chapter Five: The Netherlands

I. Introduction

Although there is no typical member state in the European Union, the Netherlands embodies the values and policies of a considerable range of nations. This pan-European perspective is strongly evident in its approach to the ESDP, as well as social and economic issues. As a small state, the Netherlands is both a particularly strong proponent of European cooperation, and a harsh critic of common policies in which the voices of powerful states eclipse the contributions of other members. Militarily, it is a proven Atlanticist with a military larger than allies many times its size, but also a keen participant in bilateral security and defense cooperation among the members of the EU. In a way, its perspectives on social and security policy fall squarely between the positions of the French and the British, making it a good indicator for the behavior and opinions of the EU’s other small and mid-level powers.

The Dutch began their involvement in building the ESDP a week after St. Malo, when a European Council meeting commenced at Vienna. The gathering, including Dutch Prime Minister Willem Kok, affirmed its support for the principles set forth during the French-British bilateral summit and emphasized the need to increase the EU’s operational capabilities. However, just as the desire to improve

---

220 As of 2002, the Netherlands had 49,580 active armed forces, compared to 39,260 for Belgium, 31,850 for Finland, and 43,600 for Portugal. Of the 15 EU member states at the time, the Netherlands was ranked 5th in terms of the number of troops deployed abroad (5,731) (International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2002-2003* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), quoted in Salmon and Shepherd, 122.). For an example of Dutch Atlanticism combined with support for European defense projects, see Salmon and Shepherd on the 1996-1997 EU Intergovernmental Conference (55-56).

military autonomy and strength exercised little influence on French and German decisions to pursue the policy, the Dutch, too, were interested in the ESDP for its national benefits and its identity-building functions. In this case though, the Netherlands’ relatively modest size and political weight, combined with its history of approval for EU integration, resulted in a different interpretation of the scope of the identity-building project. Whereas both France and Britain were concerned with shoring up domestic identification with the EU, the Dutch were not in a position to adopt such a narrow focus. Indeed, while the Willem Kok government had to overcome some domestic unhappiness with the EU, a more substantial concern was the anti-EU feeling in France and Britain, and its potential to both derail the European project and ignite similar feelings in the Netherlands.

The Dutch case study will be tested against the hypotheses of realism, liberalism and constructivism. Although there are areas of agreement between the classical paradigms of international relations and the observed behavior of the Netherlands, it will be demonstrated that none offers a comprehensive explanation for Dutch involvement in the ESDP. Finally, the Netherlands’ membership in the ESDP will be examined through the lens of a domestic identity-building project, with the caveat that its great degree of integration into the EU results in the perception that domestic identity is easily influenced by the vicissitudes of politics and public opinion in neighboring states. Thus, national ties to the EU cannot be ensured without addressing a wider spectrum of anti-EU feelings.
II. Realism

Applying the assumptions of the realist paradigm to the Netherlands involves vastly different calculations of power than in the case of France or Britain. Although the Netherlands boasts a military that appears large in comparison to that fielded by other small and medium EU powers—the Dutch maintain at least 10,000 more active troops than countries such as Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Portugal, and Sweden—it is still fundamentally a small state in the anarchical international environment. Its relative lack of power thus places it in the category of states that both Posen and Waltz indicate are susceptible to bandwagoning behavior. However, the Netherlands’ relatively weak position in the international system does not fundamentally alter the inapplicability of the realist paradigm to state membership in the ESDP. Indeed, the three hypotheses of realism introduced in Chapter Two are collectively inadequate predictors of Dutch behavior.

If realism’s perspective on the nature of the ESDP is to be proven correct, it must first be established that Dutch interest in the project was rooted in the realization that its traditional security guarantee was no longer adequate, or had the potential to become so in the foreseeable future. Posen, of course, identifies the 1990s wars in the Balkans as the events that provoked both fears of abandonment and a new perception of American high-handedness in strategizing and decision-making. In both cases, the need to develop further military capabilities makes sense in a realist international system, yet there are two separate motives here, which lead in slightly different

---

directions. In both cases, Dutch membership in the ESDP does not appear to have been the result of Europe’s experiences in the Balkans.

First, if the Dutch believed the United States might abandon Europe unless it demonstrated a willingness to engage in burden sharing, one would expect such a strong NATO ally to seek to develop assets in the manner most compatible with American interests. Undoubtedly in the mid-1990s, the CJTF option in NATO was the most appropriate venue to carry out this type of capabilities building. Indeed, the Americans were in favor of Europe carrying out missions through the use of CJTFs, as this would lead to the development of “European military units separable but not separate from the allied command structure.” The idea of European participation in such projects was embraced by the Dutch after the Americans introduced it in 1994, and in fact van Staden notes that then Foreign Minister Hans van Mierlo explicitly recognized the concept as the best way for Europe to play a larger role in the Atlantic Alliance.224

The year after the CJTF concept was proposed, in a memorandum in preparation for the 1996 EU Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), the Dutch noted that the project was “moving ahead more slowly than initially scheduled, thereby restricting the operational role of NATO and of the WEU in particular.” They suggested that further NATO reforms might be considered.225 If the CJTF initiative

224 van Staden, 97.
had truly proved inoperative, then perhaps the Netherlands’ eventual decision to join the ESDP would be more understandable. However, despite Dutch concern over the efficacy of the CJTFs, as late as May 1998, the American delegation at NATO was still enthusiastically backing the project as a way for the Europeans to take on more responsibility in the alliance.226 Thus, even though the project was moving slowly, it appears the Americans still perceived European support for the CJTFs to be proof of a legitimate desire for burden sharing. If this is the case, the Dutch had no need to undertake the ESDP in order to convince the Americans not to abandon Europe. Enthusiasm for the CJTFs would have been proof enough of their good intentions.

Alternately, one might argue from a realist perspective that differences of policy in Bosnia and Kosovo led the Dutch to seek an independent security structure. However, the same basic difficulty arises in this case as was seen in the case study on Britain, that being that it was entirely unclear that the ESDP would provide a reliable security structure in which national preferences would be accommodated. For a confirmed Atlanticist, such as the Netherlands, the power dynamics of NATO were known quantities. During the early years of the Cold War, the Netherlands was comfortable with this system, and in fact was glad to substitute its place in the European power hierarchy for a position under American hegemony. Van Staden suggests that this may have been due to a Dutch belief that if it demonstrated loyalty

---

to the United States, the Americans would in turn aid the Dutch by preventing the emergence of regional European hegemons, such as France.227

In the post Cold War era, security concerns in Europe are considerably altered; yet, from a realist perspective, the emergence of regional powers will always be a threat to the security of small states. And indeed, the ESDP was almost certainly bound to increase the regional stature of France and Britain, while putting the Dutch into a new military organization in which they did not have years of accumulated loyalty to the leadership. More importantly, given the fact that these two states had widely divergent military loyalties themselves, and indeed epitomized the Atlanticist and Europeanist poles of the EU, it seems highly unlikely that the Dutch could be confident in the consistency of the decisions which might result from the ESDP, or indeed have any faith that such a diversity of interests would not permanently deadlock the organization. Thus it seems that, even given policy disagreements with the United States, if the Dutch were truly guided by realist ideals, solidarity with NATO would have been the best option.

Although it does not appear that the outbreaks of war in the Balkans prompted Dutch desires to participate in the ESDP, realism may yet explain state behavior through its prediction that states will seek balancing or bandwagoning based on their perception of which option will provide the better security guarantee. Although Posen does not explicitly list the preferred positions of the small states of the EU, one can assume that as a traditionally Atlanticist state, the Netherlands would engage in the same type of strategic bandwagoning as Britain. The logical difficulties with suggesting that any member of the ESDP is engaged in anything but balancing

227 van Staden, 93.
behavior from a realist perspective have already been noted in the Britain case study and need not be repeated here, except to say that the same concept is applicable to this case. And indeed, as the Dutch have always valued their membership in NATO highly, it would be illogical to opt to balance the United States.

However, putting aside the basic objection that a state with strong ties to NATO would be unlikely to attempt to balance the United States, one might claim that the Netherlands was willing to risk balancing the U.S. because it found a sufficiently strong coalition with which to do so. This view is supported by Walt, who claims that “even weak states may be persuaded to balance when they are confident of allied support.” However, state behavior contradicts this hypothesis. Although the Netherlands was willing to join the ESDP, after doing so it quickly set about trying to tie the policy to NATO. In particular, at a 1999 joint press conference with U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that, in regards to the development of an ESDP, “Full transparency between the EU and NATO is vital. Therefore the Netherlands government proposes to set up a consultative or consultative arrangements between the EU and NATO and to secure the involvement of those NATO members that do not belong to the EU, such as Turkey and Norway.” If the Netherlands had been seeking to balance the United States through the ESDP, this sort of suggestion would be entirely self-defeating. Thus, it seems that once again realism does not offer an adequate explanation for Dutch behavior.

228 Walt, 17.
Finally, the third prediction of realism must be addressed. If the ESDP is a security-centered project, states should continue to acquire the capabilities found wanting during Europe’s experience in the Balkans. Additionally, states may seek progressively more independence from NATO. Although the preceding paragraph would seem to indicate strongly enough that the Dutch are unlikely to countenance policies designed to make the EU independent of NATO, it is also important to note that the Dutch joined the British in blocking the deployment of European peacekeepers to Macedonia until ties to NATO had been cemented. As has been previously explored, an increase in capabilities has occurred. However, absent accurate predictions for balancing or bandwagoning, and initial motives to join the ESDP, the prediction alone cannot establish the accuracy of the realist approach. In sum, the case of the Netherlands cannot substantiate the notion that the ESDP is primarily a security and defense policy.

III. Liberalism

A second perspective on Dutch behavior is offered by the liberalist paradigm which, although it views the ESDP as a security project, is also able to perceive it more broadly as an institution created to codify group norms and facilitate collective action. Three predictions for state behavior flow naturally from this approach, and more particularly, from Moravcsik’s theories of institution formation. In this case, none of the three have significant explanatory power.

First, states negotiating agreements within the liberalist paradigm will be bound by the rule that parties with more to gain from an agreement will inevitably

---

have less power in shaping its form than those who for whom it is not a preferred policy. In the cases of France and Britain it was easier to determine that the liberalist assumptions of negotiating power were not accurate, in large part because as larger states, their actions are chronicled more closely by media and academic observers than are the political maneuverings of a state such as the Netherlands. However, it does appear that at least in the short term Dutch interests were likely better met by creating a stronger bond to NATO, rather than by pursuing autonomous capabilities with the untested ESDP. Although the Dutch have split their loyalties between the EU and NATO, their affinity with the United States should give NATO a slight edge.  

Thus, it appears that the Netherlands should have had relatively more power to shape negotiations than Europeanist powers such as France and the other members of the Benelux group.

To some degree, it appears that the Dutch were successful in shaping the ESDP; at the least, those with the same preferences as the Netherlands were partially successful. For example, a Declaration on Defense authored at the June 1999 European Council meeting in Cologne calls for cooperation and consultation between NATO and the EU on security matters. This is the type of goal an Atlanticist power like the Netherlands would have pursued. However, whether the Netherlands exercised influence due to the structure of the negotiations or its ties to the United

---

231 Even after the European Union member states split over their opinion on the U.S. war in Iraq, the Dutch public maintained its loyalty to the transatlantic alliance. In September 2003, the International Herald Tribune reported that, “Ahead even of Britain or Poland, the Netherlands, with 57 percent, registered the top score in Europe in response this month to German Marshall Fund poll’s central question of, ‘How desirable is it that the United States exert strong leadership in world affairs.’” John Vinocur, “For NATO, a Dutchman waits in the wings,” International Herald Tribune, 22 September 2003, http://www.iht.com/articles/2003/09/22/dutch_ed3.shtml (accessed April 5, 2007).

States is unclear. Six months after Cologne, the European Council met again at Helsinki. At this conference, American fears over EU autonomy were somewhat calmed when the EU member states agreed to act only “in cases where NATO is not involved per se” and recognized NATO’s important role in peacekeeping and self-defense. What is pertinent to this analysis is the fact that the Americans found Finland and “to a lesser extent…the Netherlands” to be useful in the process of obtaining these concessions to NATO’s role, but the British were reportedly “not of much help.”

What this scenario illustrates is the degree to which American influence seems to have been more effective in shaping the agreement than the system of gaining concessions based on how much a state had to gain or lose. In the latter system, one would have expected to see Britain use its considerable power to institutionalize the primacy of NATO. This would, after all, have been a way of mitigating the fact that a European security structure was not its optimal policy. That Finland and the Netherlands acted alone suggests that a different dynamic was at work. In short, Dutch influence may have been partly or mostly due to the fact that it was communicating American preferences, rather than the power it obtained based on how much it stood to gain or lose.

The second prediction of liberalism asserts that states will seek credible commitments from their allies by asking them to pool or delegate sovereignty in cases where a member of the group is likely to attempt to abrogate the agreement. Once again, the Dutch have behaved contrary to liberalist expectations. As has already been

233 Cogan, 117. It should be noted though, that the French almost certainly did not perceive this as giving NATO a “right of first refusal” (Cogan, 118).
234 Cogan, 118.
discussed, the government strongly believed in linking the ESDP to NATO through consultative mechanisms, an act which, while it may or may not have offered the United States any additional influence over the EU, symbolically joined the ESDP to the one country with enough power to tempt Atlanticist allies to abandon the ESDP. Certainly the Netherlands itself poses a risk of defection due to its strong relationship with NATO, and one might therefore argue that, as with Britain, it had no incentive to seek a credible commitment and every reason to support making the agreement non-binding. Indeed though, one must also consider the fact that the Netherlands is a significantly smaller power than Britain, and is therefore more vulnerable to the strength or weakness of its alliances. In fact, the Dutch are particularly at risk because their military is no longer designed to be used autonomously. At the end of the Cold War, the Netherlands restructured its military in such a way that they “now only foresee taking part in military operations as part of an international alliance…” A policy that cannot require its members to participate offers little prospect for stability or security, and thus has a lower potential to be a useful alliance. In this case, it seems the Netherlands should have come down in favor of some sort of binding mechanism, albeit a relatively weak one.

Finally, if the ESDP is truly best considered from the perspective of liberalism, then the future development of the policy should oscillate between more binding when it appears allies are likely to abandon the agreement, and less binding when conflicts of interest appear lower. An interesting incident to consider in this prediction is a 2003 meeting held by France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg, at which the nation states discussed plans to “merge military know how” and raised the

---

235 Salmon and Shepherd, 118.
possibility that they “eventually could combine their armed forces...” What is pertinent in this case however, is that Britain, Italy, and the Netherlands, all nations that supported the U.S. war in Iraq, were not invited to the meeting. From the perspective of those nations that did attend, it seems a self-defeating action from a liberal standpoint, as raising the profile of their disagreements with the U.S. war allies would seem to offer an open door for their Atlanticist allies to leave the ESDP. More specifically in regards to the Netherlands, the meeting seems to demonstrate an unexpected tendency for what in this context might be considered reverse defection. Given the degree to which the Netherlands has invested military in its international commitments, this move to keep it out of the decision making process should certainly have been viewed as a betrayal. The most logical behavior for a liberalist state would seem to be to bind the others into the common EU structure, thus hoping to force them to give up on the idea of moving forward in a small group. Yet, the next year Dutch forces joined the EU’s largest military mission to date, helping to replace the NATO stabilization force in Bosnia-Herzegovina with EU and associated forces.

IV. Constructivism

The final perspective on Dutch membership in the ESDP comes from the constructivist school of international relations, and more specifically the work of Anderson and Seitz, who argue for an identity-based conception of the project. Again, three testable predictions can be evaluated for their consistency with state behavior.

---
First, the Dutch should have joined the ESDP in order to define a European identity both domestically and internationally, a process which is carried out by differentiating European from American foreign and security policies. Although the Dutch public is one of the strongest among European nations in terms of its perception of the value of a united Europe, it combines this loyalty to the EU with a strong affinity for NATO. Indeed, the Dutch have been far more efficient in terms of resolving the opposing elements of their foreign relations than either Britain or France, and the uniqueness of this balancing act makes it all the more imperative that they do not push either partner too far.

The strength of both elements of Dutch identity is evident in public opinion polling, as well as government policy positions. In the fall 1998 Eurobarometer survey, 74% of the Dutch public indicated they believed that defence policy should be decided jointly by national governments and the EU, rather than just by nations themselves. It was the highest level of support for such an arrangement among the 15 members of the EU; the next closest was Luxembourg, where 64% of respondents took a similar view. The Dutch were also the most positive on joint EU-nation state decision-making in the area of foreign policy, in which 83% of respondents felt policy should be made jointly and only 14% indicated it should be the exclusive privilege of the Dutch government.\textsuperscript{237} From such polling data, one might well believe that the Dutch would be willing to help create a foreign policy that established a concrete European identity, but could only do so by capitalizing on the differences between EU and American policies. However, the government’s commitment to NATO is rooted in an equally strong affinity for the United States. At his May 1999

\textsuperscript{237} “Eurobarometer 50,” \textit{European Commission}, B34-B36.
press conference with U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Dutch Foreign
Minister Jozias Van Aartzen remarked that “every time, again, it strikes me how our
two nations share the same principles and the same values which are deeply rooted in
our societies and how close, in fact, both our visions are in world events.” Given
the depth of commitment to both alliances, it is unlikely the Dutch would knowingly
engage in a policy intended to oppose European and American policies.

The second prediction that can be derived from constructivism suggests that
states that can most easily alter their identities will be the leading actors and
motivators of the ESDP. Although the Netherlands is unlikely to agree to a policy
that may put its European and transatlantic loyalties at odds, one must concede that
relative to a historically Atlanticist and Eurosceptic power like Great Britain, it
should be more capable of adjusting its conceptualization of itself in the direction of a
European identity. However, the Dutch seem to have made no more progress than the
British in shedding its Atlanticist orientation. Indeed, the two seem to take the same
position on objections to defense initiatives that might lead to conflict with the United
States, such as the idea of an independent EU military planning headquarters or the
deployment of EU peacekeepers to Macedonia. Thus, it appears that determining a
state’s potential role in the project based on the malleability it identity is either
inapplicable to the case of the Netherlands, or has not been given sufficient time to
develop.

Finally, constructivism predicts that the future of the ESDP will depend
largely on how often and to what degree European security and defense policies can
be distinguished from those of the United States. Large transatlantic differences will

better equip the EU to construct a European identity within its member states and raise its stature in the international community. Like the British, the Dutch have not been cooperative in this identity building venture. The Dutch participated in the U.S. war in Iraq, a key issue on which Europe might have divided itself from the United States. Although realistically, the constructivist view of the ESDP could not demand that European countries immediately alter their foreign policy choices, the war in Iraq did present a prime opportunity early in the development of the ESDP, a time when one might logically expect the EU to aggressively pursue opportunities to legitimize the nascent security policy. While there may be merit in the argument that it is simply too soon to tell how the policy will develop, early results are not promising for the applicability of this particular constructivist theory.

V. The ESDP Reconsidered

The shortcomings of the major paradigms of international relations in explaining Dutch membership in the ESDP are evident, and the necessity for a supplemental explanation is clear. As a small state with a strong attachment to the EU, and a deep faith in the need for the transatlantic alliance, the Netherlands represents the large group of member states that fall between the British and French perspectives in international relations. Thus, understanding its motives for joining the ESDP is a necessity for testing new theories of European security and defense cooperation. Once again, three predictions must be met in order to substantiate the role of the ESDP as a policy designed to strengthen domestic support for the European Union through the creation of a symbol of common identity.
Combating Euroscepticism

The first prediction, that membership in the ESDP should result from a realization of the weakness of European integration, must be qualified in the case of the Netherlands. The previous two case studies focused on the evident motors behind European defense cooperation in the 1990s. As large military and economic powers, both France and Britain have the luxury of existing as substantial actors outside of the framework of the EU. Certainly, the disruption of European cooperation would be a heavy blow to take, yet for smaller and less powerful states, such as the Netherlands, it would undoubtedly be a worse disaster. Thus, the presumed audience policy makers observe when determining the need for an identity building project must be broadened. In essence, because of its status as a lower tier power, the Netherlands must consider not only its own domestic approval of the EU, but also the potential impact on its own population of public backlash against the EU in powerful states such as France and Britain. With this broadened perspective then, it will be demonstrated that the Dutch membership in the ESDP is attributable to government considerations of the potential for anti-EU sentiment to spread to the Netherlands from states such as France and Britain, as well as concerns over domestic displeasure with the EU.

Alfred van Staden tracks the beginning of Dutch interest in European defense projects to August 1994, when Willem Kok began his first term as Prime Minister. Kok would occupy this position until 2002, thus providing a consistent factor throughout Dutch decision making on the ESDP. When Kok first took office, the Netherlands had long been a strongly Atlanticist power. However, van Staden
observes that after the 1994 election there was increasing sympathy for European
defense cooperation. Whether Dutch interest in using European security
cooperaion for identity building really began so many years before St. Malo is
unknown. However, the year 1994 was a watershed year which, if it did not establish
the groundwork for the ESDP, at least foreshadowed the conditions that would do so.
Specifically, the 1994 election cycle was important because of the parties that gained
votes that year. Although the top vote getters were all mainstream parties, The
Guardian reports that the election had a broader significance, as “Gains by the racist
and anti-immigrant Centrum Democrats, although less than forecast, mirror advances
by neo-fascist parties in France, Italy, Germany and Belgium.” Indeed, the 1994
elections appear to have been an instance of a contagion effect between EU member
states.

The idea of contagion effects among European states is developed by Cees
van der Eijk and Mark Franklin, who argue that while leaders may wish to put space
between domestic popular opinion and decisions taken on the level of the EU, this is
not always possible. Indeed, EU policies inevitably cause repercussions on national
levels, leading to the politicization of issues in pro- and anti- EU camps. However, in
the EU, such issues do not often remain national problems. Instead, they “will result
in a new alignment of political forces, either by giving support to what is now a minor
party…or by giving support to opposition forces within an existing large party. And if
this happens in one country, the contagion effect on other countries can be expected

van Staden, 96.
John Palmer, “Netherlands Deserts Traditional Parties: Hard bargaining forecast as neo-fascists
to be virtually immediate.” Although the mainstream Kok was appointed as Prime Minister in 1994, the growth of extreme right and anti-immigrant parties suggested strongly that politics in the Netherlands might be susceptible to developments elsewhere in the EU.

Fortunately for the Dutch, they have not faced the entrenched Euroscepticism of the British, nor the severe conflict of interest between labor groups and budget constraints, as seen in France in the mid-1990s. The labor conflict in particular might have been the story of the Netherlands in 1996, when Kok undertook the task of social security reform, a process that had been greeted with “mass protests” in France, Belgium, and Germany. However, in 1982, Dutch workers had agreed to limit themselves to “wage demands of 2 percent per year in exchange for shorter work weeks and more jobs.” Fortunately, this unique social compact was strong enough to hold fairly well through the contentious years in the mid-1990s, and the Dutch were able to move toward compliance with the euro convergence criteria.

The effects of the social contract however, were not absolute, and the pre-St. Malo years were not without their challenges for Dutch membership in the EU. In fact, just months after the government instituted benefit reforms, the Financial Times asserted that, “The cooling of Dutch public opinion is clear. In a recent poll, 40 per cent wanted a referendum before any further progress in European integration; only

---

46 per cent supported a single currency…”244 Although neither statistic constitutes a majority opinion, for a state as traditionally warm toward the EU as the Netherlands, relatively low levels of support are noteworthy. Although the percentage of Dutch respondents who believe the Netherlands’ EU membership is “a good thing,” is always significantly higher than the corresponding figures for France and Britain, numbers have declined in the 1990s, and in particular a slight gain in 1995 was reversed the following year. Once again, the social reforms seem to have played a role, despite generally good government-labour relations.

Percent of Dutch Public that Considers the Netherlands’ EU Membership “a good thing.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spring</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fall</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


For the Dutch, the decline in public opinion and the backlash against social reforms was relatively small. Indeed, rather than being the immediate cause of the Netherlands’ desire to join the ESDP, it appears to have been a primer for the more substantial experience—the Dutch EU Presidency in the first half of 1997. During this six month period, the Netherlands was confronted much more strongly than at home by the fact that public opinion could seriously limit a government’s ability to participate in the European Union. As interdependence progressed, such rancor in

domestic populations could spread to other nations, such as the Netherlands, and potentially derail the development of key European initiatives.

The 1997 EU Presidency was a formative experience for Dutch views on the ESDP. Although the policy itself did not yet exist, the six month Presidency demonstrated the fragility of European integration in such a way as to make clear the necessity for ensuring a sense of European identity. This came about through Dutch interactions with the French and British governments, the former as Chirac and the newly appointed Jospin jockeyed for power, and the latter as the outgoing Major demonstrated his intractable Euroscepticism.

In both the case of France, and that of Britain, the Dutch were forced to step in to maintain the steady development of European integration. In June 1997, at the very end of its EU presidency, the Dutch were confronted with the possibility that differences of policy between Chirac and Jospin would hold up both the future advance of the euro, and approval of the EU’s upcoming Amsterdam Treaty. While Chirac had committed France to sign the treaty, the Prime Minister was unwilling to give his consent without assurances that economic priorities were balanced by a commitment to the welfare of society. Fortunately, last minute negotiations by Kok headed off a damaging stand-off between the French President and Prime Minister.

What is pertinent to the origins of Dutch support for the ESDP is the fact that Jospin’s objections mirrored the platform that had brought him to power following the public backlash against the convergence criteria. The chain of events could hardly

---


have been overlooked by other member states, and as the nation responsible for mediating between the sides, it certainly had to be apparent to the Dutch. Although the Netherlands had not seen as severe a reaction from their own labour movement as the French had from theirs, the scenario of a government being forced to nationally beneficial EU policy due to domestic opposition could have played out in any state in the EU and on any issue, unless the domestic populations found a reason to believe in the good of the larger institution. On some level, the euro was probably intended to play this role, but the protests and strikes of the mid 1990s had tarnished that possibility, at least temporarily.

While the lack of policy coordination between Chirac and Jospin demonstrated the ease with which anti-EU sentiment might bring the institution to a halt, the Netherlands’ experience with John Major brought home the possibility that Euroscepticism could be a contagious phenomenon. In the beginning of the Dutch Presidency, it was clear that Major was unlikely to serve another term as Prime Minister. With British elections not due to occur until nearly the end of their Presidency, the Dutch were in the unenviable position of trying to accommodate Major’s reticence for further integration, while also pushing forward with the euro and the Amsterdam Treaty. Kok, convinced that, “It will be unforgivable if after four or five years, we have to admit that national interests prevailed over the good of Europe,” succeeded in winning Major’s tentative approval for allowing deeper integration to go forward among small groups of consenting member states.²⁴⁷

What was more significant though, than the realization that one Eurosceptic member might very well hold up an entire treaty, was the Dutch perception of how exactly anti-EU sentiment could become problematic. Although Kok was very vocal regarding his wishes to stay out of a debate about British domestic elections, his meeting with Major was not just a negotiation to win concessions on European integration. It was also an opportunity to ask that the Prime Minister to take steps to limit Eurosceptic rhetoric in the upcoming election. It seems reasonable that the Dutch would be concerned about the possibility of Major forcing opponents to the right, or the possibility of another Eurosceptic Prime Minister coming to power, but indeed this was not the issue. Instead, as Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van Mierlo expressed, the Netherlands government felt that “the tone of the British election debate could be ‘more important’ to the Union's debate on constitutional reform than the result.”

In other words, they were less concerned about how such a campaign would play out in Britain than in the effect a Eurosceptic campaign might have on the treaty negotiations among other members of the EU. Certainly, as Major had already proven, and as the French would shortly demonstrate, one country reticent about integration could stop the entire process, and euroscepticism, like other issues, had the potential to be contagious.

Although the Dutch ably defused the potential French and British problems, by mid 1997 they had a clear view of the fragile nature of European integration. Indeed, were it not for Kok’s diplomacy, either nation could easily have delayed the process. For the euro, this development would have been particularly punishing, as holding back the process or altering the requirements for participation would likely

---

“upset the financial markets,” which were anticipating a strong currency. In addition, for the Dutch, the 1997 negotiations were necessary prerequisites for enlargement, a process which promised to be economically advantageous. Kok spoke directly to this benefit in a 2001 speech on enlargement, when he argued that one reason to admit the candidate countries was that “The Netherlands, as an exporter and the second largest investor in Central Europe after Germany (€4.7 billion), is in a prime position to benefit from these developments.” Given its recent experiences with France and Germany and all it stood to lose from Eurosceptic attitudes either at home or elsewhere in the EU, it is not surprising that the Atlanticist Dutch were willing to participate in a project designed to foster a sense of common identity. Such a venture would guard against the potential contagion of popular anti-EU sentiment to the Netherlands, and reduce the chance of integration being delayed by a lack of public support.

Transatlantic Ties

Once the Dutch had committed themselves to the ESDP, the process of reconciling the policy with their existing alliances and loyalties began in earnest. While theorists of the realist school of thought would tend to argue that joining a European military project is indicative of a desire to move away from the transatlantic alliance, and thus have more freedom to balance the United States, Dutch behavior was quite the opposite. Logically, if the primary function of the ESDP is that of a tool

---

249 Swardson, “EU Leaders Deflect Quarrel,” A11.
for building domestic affinity for the EU, then the Dutch should have seen no need to alter their existing international alliances. As predicted, the Netherlands has remained deeply committed to NATO since joining the ESDP.

Although van Staden notes that the Dutch grew more interested in European security efforts after 1994, their pursuits in this area were always secondary to their obligations to NATO. In 1996, Foreign Minister Hans van Mierlo, advocated the development of a cohesive European identity within NATO while speaking at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council. Yet, even for a project within the transatlantic alliance structure, he was careful to mention that the end result he envisioned was that a growing European identity would bring NATO and the EU closer together.251 Although the Dutch seemed to be interested in a stronger European military role, it was clear that they were not willing to engage in operations autonomously.

Since the St. Malo Declaration and the Vienna European Council meeting, the Dutch have largely kept to the same path in terms of their relationship with NATO. Although they adopted a policy which did technically allow for autonomous action, they have been cautious not to stretch American patience too far. Indeed, they seem to have taken seriously Madeleine Albright’s 3Ds, particularly regarding the need for an EU military planning headquarters outside of the one maintained by NATO. Although the other Benelux states joined France to lobby for the facility, the Dutch sided with the British and opposed it as an “unnecessary duplication” of NATO assets.252 Additionally, the Dutch continued to preference NATO as the mechanism through

which to undertake missions. A month before the Helsinki European Council meeting in 1999, the Netherlands National News Agency (ANP) reported that the Dutch Minister of Defense had expressed his support for “pragmatic defense cooperation, within NATO as opposed to the European Union.”253 Thus, even though the Dutch government would shortly agree to the creation of a European Rapid Reaction Force, their priorities were still NATO first, and the EU second.

The concept of strategic ambiguity, while quite applicable to the French and British roles in the ESDP, is a less useful evaluative tool for Dutch policy preferences. This is the case simply because, as a relatively smaller power, the Netherlands’ role in shaping the language and form of the ESDP have not been as thoroughly documented as that of the larger EU member states. However, it can be said of the Dutch government that it cooperate with EU projects, such as the headline goal, which were not explicitly subordinated to NATO, yet its public rhetoric clearly presented the concept in a light most favorable to its Atlanticist orientation.

Selling ESDP at Home

A final indicator that the ESDP functions as an identity building project is seen in the manner in which states represent the policy in their official rhetoric. In particular, the ESDP should be lauded as both a European and a domestic benefit, in order to facilitate the formation of a larger European identity, without instigating nationalist or Eurosceptic reactions. In the Netherlands, where the European Union has long been viewed with a level of favor unmatched among other member states,

the necessity for nationalist rhetoric is undoubtedly somewhat diminished. Nonetheless, the potential for public sentiment to someday change course on the EU—a development unlikely in the aftermath of St. Malo, but perhaps more credible after the Dutch vote on the Constitutional Treaty—must be preempted.

The dual Dutch and European elements of the ESDP are implicitly referenced in a speech by then Prime Minister Kok. The speech, presented at the University of Lieden, offered Kok’s vision for a new, enlarged Europe as an institution in which “the search for unity and consistency…can and must be accompanied by the preservation of diversity.”254 Having thus established that new policies would pay heed to the need for national differentiation, he later commented that in the area of security and defense policy, as with other common projects like the euro, “The dividing lines between national and European policy will become increasingly blurred.”255 This appears, at first, to be an outright contradiction. However, the discordance between statements reflects perfectly the nature of the ESDP as a European project, undertaken by nations determined to maintain their individuality. Indeed, this seeming contradiction is reflected in the structure of the policy—optional involvement, but a common, European face for whatever is undertaken.

Although the Dutch consistently rank among the most eager of member state citizenries when it comes to approval for joint EU-member state decision making on foreign and security policies, this enthusiasm is in some ways deceptive.256 Certainly, the Dutch government has less to worry about than decision makers in Britain, yet it cannot afford not to emphasize the national benefits of its policies. Euroscepticism,

254 Kok, 1.  
255 Kok, 6.  
256 “Eurobarometer 50,” European Commission, 53-55.
after all, may develop without warning. This basic philosophy is indeed evident in the Dutch government’s public rhetoric following the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty. In September 2005, the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that “in security policy, European affairs and development cooperation, we must do all we can to strengthen the multilateral system which allows countries like the Netherlands to flourish.” Clearly, national interest was still assured in part by commitments to international institutions.

VI. Conclusion

As a relatively small state in the EU, the Netherlands is to some degree at the mercy of its larger neighbors. Their expansive markets and military strength provide a good deal of the EU’s hard and soft power, and the further development of the Union depends on their ability to compromise in order to drive policy forward. The year before St. Malo and the Vienna Council meeting, at which the ESDP would slowly begin to take shape, the Dutch were tasked with resolving British and French roadblocks to European development. This experience, combined with declining public support for the EU, and the perception that British Euroscepticism might be a contagious phenomenon, prompted the Dutch commitment to the ESDP.

---

Conclusion

Perhaps because of the growing economic and political power of European states, or because of the history of war and conflict from which they were formed, there is a temptation to assume that the ESDP is what it appears to be—a project to develop one of the most vital accoutrements of statehood for the European Union. This view, however, vastly overestimates both the ambitions and the cohesiveness of the EU. Although the institution has sustained an impressive history of integration and expansion, it is still very much in the early stages of its development. Indeed, it is only since the end of the Cold War that the EU has been free to determine its identity without reference to the global threats and superpower politics that characterized most of its early years of development. However, creating an identity for a union of twenty-seven states is no simple task, and given the rate at which the EU has expanded, even to begin to envision a final collective identity would be premature. It is this basic uncertainty about the nature of the EU itself that ultimately led its members to the ESDP.

As a security and defense project, the ESDP is an illogical creation. It pits Atlanticists against Europeanists, and integrationists against Eurosceptic states, with the result that its nature and intentions appear poorly defined. Perhaps most significantly, as a defense policy, it continues to run afoul of the United States, a fact that delights some members and makes others distinctly uneasy. Since its inception, the ESDP has been used effectively to carry out minor peacekeeping and policing tasks. However, even these relatively innocuous missions have encountered resistance due to incompatible perceptions of national interest, a scenario played out most
noticeably in Britain and the Netherlands’ reticence to deploy EU peacekeepers to Macedonia without first concluding an agreement to borrow NATO assets. State alliances and loyalties will only be juxtaposed more frequently as the EU continues to expand, thus increasing the ambiguity surrounding its basic philosophy and ideological orientations.

To construct an effective European security and defense policy, the EU would need a clear conceptualization of its interests. It would need to establish, from among the diverse views of its members, a concrete sense of its own loyalties and priorities in the international system. Further, it would require meaningful common standards for such issues as the use of force, the possession of nuclear weapons, and the necessity of humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. To have common interests however, the EU first needs a common identity, a task for which even some Europeanist members, notably France, have little enthusiasm. Although EU countries have gradually ceded some sovereignty to supranational decision-making in Brussels, the anti-EU sentiment apparent in Britain, France, and to a lesser degree the Netherlands in the mid-1990s speaks to the long road ahead for any project seeking to establish what it means to be European.

The classical paradigms of international relations—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—all offer perspectives on the nature of the ESDP. For realists, such as Posen, the ESDP is designed as a classic balance of power mechanism. If this were the case however, British and Dutch loyalty to the United States and NATO, and the French rapprochement with NATO would be inexplicable. For liberals, such as Moravesik, the ESDP is an institution building project through which states can make
the behavior of their neighbors and allies significantly more predictable. However, France, the country with the most cause to fear its allies would back out of the agreement, does not appear to have taken any steps to ensure they make a credible commitment to membership. Finally, Anderson and Seitz suggest a constructivist explanation for the policy, which highlights the ESDP’s role in establishing a European identity. However this identity is created through the ESDP’s ability to make visible the differences between European and American foreign and security policy, and thus encounters the same difficulties as realism when applied to Atlanticist states. Ultimately, none of these three perspectives has adequate explanatory power. It is important, though, to recognize that their inability to capture the broader nature of the ESDP does not invalidate the points on which they are correct. In an institution as diverse as the EU, no single paradigm or theory can hope to capture every aspect of state behavior. However, a theory which can be applied successfully across a sample of representative states is an important tool for understanding not only why the ESDP came about, but also how it can be expected to develop in the future.

In light of the failure of realism, liberalism, and constructivism to produce comprehensive estimation of the nature of the ESDP, I have suggested that the policy is aimed at domestic identity building, driven by the pursuit of national interest by each member state. Although the EU does not yet possess the common identity necessary for a cohesive European security and defense policy, this emphatically does not indicate that its members are uninterested in integration. Indeed, the integrated European economic and monetary union has been exceptionally beneficial to its
members, and as has been demonstrated in this work, it is for the maintenance of this common benefit that the ESDP was designed. While EU member states are not ready, and perhaps will never be willing, to build a common identity, nationalism and Euroscepticism pose a serious threat to the one area where common interests have been most effectively established.

Threats to the EU’s economic integration have unique manifestations in different member states. For Britain, Euroscepticism is a longstanding fact of life which became economically and politically costly with the introduction of the euro and the EU’s pending enlargement in the mid 1990s. For Blair, the ESDP offered a way to gradually reduce this threat without challenging Britain’s traditional alliances. In France, nationalism and anti-EU sentiment were an unexpected occurrence in response to economic austerity measures and uneasiness about expanding the EU. The ESDP is thus a policy tailored to prevent the re-emergence of such sentiment, without compromising France’s independence. Finally, the Netherlands, a state heavily integrated into the EU, saw both a muted national reaction to EU policies and the potential for a much larger backlash through issue contagion. Thus, the ESDP was a preventive measure aimed at both internal and external sources of Euroscepticism.

Despite this diversity of circumstances, the ESDP is an optimal collective solution. As a symbol of European togetherness and group achievement, it fosters a sense of a common identity among disparate nationalities, without provoking the backlash often sparked by supranational projects. Additionally, as it is designed for the pursuit of individual state interests, it carries out its functions in a completely voluntary form. Although the three case studies presented here could not cover every
aspect of the decision making process that brought other EU nations to accept the ESDP, the ability of the structure to accept a state’s pre-existing loyalties and to facilitate the pursuit of beneficial economic and political relationships through the EU suggests it has broader applicability. The three nations profiled in this work include the two nations responsible for initiating the ESDP and two of the EU’s traditionally Eurosceptic powers. Additionally, the Netherlands epitomizes the experience of a heavily integrated small state, with relatively less power to shape the ongoing debate. In sum, the three provide explanations for a wide sampling of states, as well as some of the powers whose cooperation with the ESDP was most unexpected.

Two types of states have seemingly not been well represented with this selection of cases. First, Denmark, given its opt out from European security cooperation, forms an autonomous group that must be accounted for. However, absent the introduction of a public referendum to reverse the Danish opt outs from the Maastricht Treaty, there is little value in speculating how or how well the Danes would be served by participation in the ESDP. However, were the government to introduce such a referendum, the Danish case could provide strong confirmation for the theory developed in this work. In addition to Denmark, a second group of states demands recognition. The so-called neutral states of the EU: Austria, Ireland, Sweden, and Finland, are not represented in the case studies presented here. This omission can also be justified. Although any one of the neutral states would make an interesting addition to the British, French, and Dutch narratives presented here, their behavior has been largely the same as that of the other states in the ESDP. Because

---

258 The neutral states, according to Salmon and Shepherd, were “opposed to collective or territorial defense and instead preferred the notion of ‘soft security’—prevention and crisis management” (Salmon and Shepherd, 206).
they do not object to peacekeeping operations, they all contributed to the formation of the European Rapid Reaction Force.\textsuperscript{259} Thus, although their unique perspective would be a welcome addition to this study, their neutrality is not a significant enough factor to warrant a separate case study at this time.

Having established the applicability of the domestic identity building thesis to a wide range of EU states, the question arises of how one might expect a theory grounded in such principles to develop over time. The ESDP began when the EU was still fifteen nation states, just a bit over half of its current twenty-seven member composition. While the addition of twelve new voices has certainly been challenge enough for the nascent ESDP, the last nine years have seen two events in particular whose bearing on the future of the project must be evaluated.

First, the United States’ decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003 appears to have fractured any hope of a European consensus on foreign and security policy. Most importantly, the war brought the differences of political and military thinking between France and Britain into sharp relief. The policy disagreements between these two countries, with the most substantial military capabilities of all the EU nation states, and with their high profile roles as the founders of the project, suggested publicly that there could be no shared identity between them. At first, this appears to indicate a forthcoming decline in European security cooperation. However, if one recalls the salient features of the ESDP as a domestic identity building project, the situation is less grim. Nations participating in the ESDP have all taken steps to maintain their traditional alliances. For Britain, the United States is an indispensable partner, and while going to war in Iraq was a much more significant display of loyalty

\textsuperscript{259} Salmon and Shepherd, 75.
than trying to create closer links between the ESDP and NATO, it is still the action that would have been expected of it. France, too, played the role history and its relationship with the United States suggest that it should have adopted. Thus, the cleavages of opinion in the EU, rather than portending a collapse of the ESDP, rather indicate that it is functioning normally. While there were and likely still will be political amends to be made between EU allies, the ESDP should not be significantly impacted in the long-run.

Unlike the political divisions over the American war, the French and Dutch vetoes of the EU Constitutional Treaty in 2005 do present a development to which the ESDP must eventually respond. Although EU states have previously rejected treaties, subsequently obtaining opt-outs from disliked policies or provisions, the Constitutional Treaty rejection followed almost exactly a year after the addition of ten new member states from Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, quite quickly after the EU had expanded the number of states the ESDP would have to accommodate, the French and Dutch publics demonstrated their lack of faith in the institution. The Dutch case is particularly interesting as the kind of anti-EU sentiment that arose in 2005 seems to be the same backlash against the EU which was hinted at in the run-up to St. Malo. In the days leading up to the veto, the Dutch were widely predicted to reject the document, motivated in part on domestic issues, such as anti-immigration feelings, which happened to “coincide with growing grumbling about why the Dutch have become the largest per head net contributors to the EU budget, and a feeling that
a medium-sized country in the ever-larger union will be bullied by the big states.”

The Dutch public clearly seemed to have lost faith in the European Union.

The EU has not yet recovered momentum from the Constitutional Treaty veto, yet the ESDP should be a primary recipient of renewed attention once it does so. In this case, the French and Dutch in particular should be strong advocates for a renewed commitment to ESDP actions. Alliot-Marie’s previously quoted comments seem particularly appropriate in this regard. Eurosceptic nations that, like Britain, had not yet held referenda by they time the Dutch and French voted, should also be in the forefront of a strong boost in the EU’s police and peacekeeping operations.

Additionally, with the admission of two new members in 2007, the need to find an effective way to help citizens identify with the EU is more vital than ever.

The future of the ESDP is yet to be determined. In the realist, liberalist, and constructivist systems examined in this work, such ambiguity of purpose and future development would be highly problematic. However, the ESDP is well-suited to just such uncertain circumstances. As the common creation of fifteen diverse states, each of which seeks to use the policy for select national interests, it is a veteran of the type of ideological and political conflicts the EU must confront in order to get past the failed Constitutional Treaty. Indeed, it is the ESDP’s ability to maintain a cohesive policy, without being concretely defined, that has made it such a successful identity building project. If the ESDP can continue in the same direction, it is likely to play an increasingly large role in the European Union.

---

Sources Cited


Blair, Tony. “Speech by the Prime Minister on foreign affairs.” 10 Downing Street.


De Grauwe, Paul. “Europa: Why the link should be cut- EMU should not be


Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks. “Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive
Public Opinion on European Integration?" *PS: Political Science and Politics* 37, no.3 (2004): 415-420.


Marlowe, Lara. “Chirac, Juppe use Kohl visit to portray the left as a threat to France's status in the EU.” The Irish Times, 22 May 1997, p.10. www.lexisnexis.com (accessed March 5, 2007).


van Mierlo, Hans. “Intervention.” Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in


