Racial and Ethnic Conflict in South Florida: Hurricane Andrew and the Housing Crisis

by

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I first developed an interest in hurricanes as an 8-year old child growing up in Palm Beach County, Florida. I distinctly remember sitting on the floor in my parent’s bedroom watching the radar images on the local news station showing Hurricane Andrew spiraling toward South Florida. My father reassured me that the storm would not hit. He had lived in Florida for nearly twenty years and every time the forecasters warned a storm was coming, it would unexpectedly curve away.

On the night of August 23rd, 1992, I went to bed not knowing whether I would be starting my first day of second grade the following morning. I slept through the night. My house never lost power. In the morning light, I saw a few tree branches on the ground and learned that school had been canceled. But as I looked around, I remember thinking, “This was a hurricane? What’s all the fuss about?”

In the coming days, however, I began to see startling images of complete destruction and utter desperation fewer than 100 miles to the south. Highways were clogged with National Guard trucks trying to make their way to South Dade County with badly needed shipments of food and water. I learned that my family had been extremely fortunate that Andrew was a relatively compact storm and that it veered to the south in the last hours before landfall.

Exactly one year later, my third grade teacher introduced herself and explained that she was new to the school. She had recently moved to the area from Homestead, a city completely devastated by Hurricane Andrew. At the same time I started to notice that many families moving into my neighborhood had also fled Andrew’s destruction. Yet, even as a 9-year old, I realized the people I was meeting who left South Dade did not look like the individuals and families I saw on television still struggling to recover. I did not understand why White families were moving away and moving on with their lives while Black families were still living in tent cities, unable to escape the wreckage.

In the years since Hurricane Andrew, my understanding of both hurricanes and race and ethnicity has expanded tremendously. At Wesleyan University, I have pursued a double major in sociology and American Studies with a concentration in race and ethnic studies. I have built an interdisciplinary curriculum that seeks to explain the dynamics of race and ethnicity in the United States through a sociological framework. This project represents the culmination of fifteen years of personal interest and four years of formal study in college. It has been a long journey of discovery and an amazing opportunity to research a topic that has intrigued me for so many years. I hope the final product gives justice to the individuals and families who struggled through Hurricane Andrew and offers a conceptual framework to understand how the human effects of natural disasters do not affect all people equally.
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INTRODUCTION
It was August 23rd, 1992, the day before Hurricane Andrew would make landfall in South Florida. There was widespread apprehension and nervousness. Nobody knew what to expect. A major hurricane had not come ashore in the greater Miami area since the 1960s – a time when the region was much less densely populated. Once considered the winter destination for wealthy socialites from the northeast, over the years Miami had transformed into a multicultural metropolitan center with a large immigrant population from the Caribbean and Latin America. With the absence of destructive hurricanes over the previous three decades, residents had been lulled into a false sense of security, believing that modern technology could protect local infrastructure and that the area was safe from the massive devastation caused by hurricanes earlier in the century. That security was destroyed, along with thousands of homes and countless lives, early on the morning of August 24th, 1992.

Initial news reports showed downtown Miami escaping with only minor damage. Trees and traffic signals were down across the city but most buildings appeared to remain structurally intact. Citizens of the city of Miami proper and much of northern Dade County thought South Florida had dodged another bullet. Local meteorologists, however, were not so confident. They knew that Andrew had wobbled to the south in the hour or two before landfall and the storm was an exceptionally compact hurricane, with the most intense winds concentrated in a small area surrounding the eye. Weather stations from cities and towns south of Miami, like Homestead, Florida City, Cutler Ridge, and Kendall, had stopped reporting information immediately before the eye of the storm made landfall. Similarly, the National Hurricane Center, which at that time was located in Homestead, had stopped
reporting data during the storm. No information had been received from a large portion of the less densely populated southern part of the Miami metropolitan area. Seasoned meteorologists feared the worst.

As the sun rose, the very first helicopters began flying over South Florida. Again, the majority of Dade County breathed a collective sigh of relief. There was damage, but nothing unmanageable. As the day progressed, however, and helicopters flew further south, unimaginable reports and images of massive destruction started to be sent back to television and news stations in Miami. While Miami and northern Dade County may have escaped relatively unscathed, the same could not be said for their neighbors to the south. This type of destruction had not been seen before. Entire neighborhoods were unrecognizable, even to residents. Homes had been ripped to shreds and there were virtually no signs of life. As politicians started hailing the great job of government employees in preparing county residents for the storm, residents of South Dade County who did not evacuate began emerging from the rubble that used to be their homes and sources of livelihood.

In the days that followed, innumerable images of families waiting in huge crowds for basic necessities such as ice and water in 90 degree heat were broadcast around the country. These days have been engrained in the minds of all South Floridians who rode through the storm as residents spent days sweating, crying, and questioning how to move on. Looting soon became a major problem and residents had to guard their property, few remaining possessions, and, most importantly, safe food and water, with guns. Help was slow to arrive, partly a result of poor planning,
partly a consequence of insufficient communication, and at least to many residents of South Dade County, largely because the government did not care about them.

It took many days for the federal government to send in troops to South Dade County to maintain order. Local agencies had been requesting a stronger response from the federal government for days, but to no avail. From the perspective of many residents, however, the presence of troops solidified their notion that they were not worthy of respect and the type of treatment accorded to other Americans. While they appreciated the return to civility, local residents could not believe that preventative action had not been taken sooner. There was a growing sense that the rest of the state and the country did not care about South Dade County. As long as the infrastructure in economically significant Miami was unscathed, policy-makers could turn a blind eye to the complete devastation facing many thousands of residents further south. Residents there were not millionaires and they did not donate huge sums of money to political campaigns, but they felt deserving of promised help from governmental agencies at all political levels.

A second frustration was expressed by many residents as well. In addition to the economic justifications stated above, many felt that there was a racial and immigrant component to the perceived discrimination in governmental response time. The demographic composition of South Florida is quite diverse. Many residents are first or second generation immigrants. Tension develops not just between native Anglos and immigrant groups of color, but also between immigrants from different countries. Thus, when analyzing why government agencies were slow to respond to the desperate pleas of South Dade County residents, it is imperative to examine who
lived in the destruction zones and who controlled the political and economic resources at the local, state, and national levels. Many residents strongly believed that help did not arrive sooner because many communities in South Dade County were inhabited by large concentrations of migrant workers from Central American countries. Others had significant populations of Haitian immigrants. There were also regions with recent Cuban immigrants, trying to tap into the Cuban network and enclave established in Miami after the Cuban Revolution. These populations believed they lacked the cultural and social capital to use the American political system to get necessary resources after Hurricane Andrew.

As days turned into weeks and weeks turned into years, South Florida slowly started returning to some sense of normalcy. In communities throughout South Dade County, efforts to clear away the massive amounts of debris and rebuild neighborhoods and lives started to take shape. Behind the scenes, important decisions had to be made. Hurricane Andrew had created a tabula rasa, nearly everything needed to be rebuilt. Yet the political, economic, and social struggles that took place, largely behind closed doors, followed the conventions and norms established before the storm. Thus, important questions often went unasked. Few examined the cost of new houses and whether the residents had adequate homeowner’s insurance coverage to afford this transition. And many residents did not question why some members of the community had the ability to pick up and move north to Broward or Palm Beach County while others did not. Were these simply personal choices made by individuals and families? Or is there a more significant trend that developed in the housing situation after Hurricane Andrew?
To answer this question, I have taken an interdisciplinary approach to the project, with each of the three chapters highlighting a particular disciplinary method. Throughout all three chapters, however, I offer an analysis that moves away from the stereotypical White/Black binary that is prevalent in the United States. While I sometimes use the Anglo category as a reference norm, I suggest that the primary struggle in South Florida is between Cubans and Blacks, two groups often conceptualized as minorities. I show how the Miami Cuban community has been able to transform the normative category of whiteness into a framework that allows Cubans to emerge with the economic, social, and cultural capital needed to reshape South Florida after Hurricane Andrew.

Chapter One, “History of Race, Ethnicity, and Housing in South Florida,” offers an historical trajectory of the South Florida landscape. I specifically focus on Cuban and Haitian immigration to the region as well as the history of the South Florida African-American community. It is important to have a complete understanding of the political, social, and economic forces at work behind the population changes in South Florida throughout the twentieth century. Only with this historical knowledge is it possible to fully comprehend the sociological and demographic changes in South Florida after Hurricane Andrew.

Chapter Two, “Before the Storm: Conceptualizing Race and Ethnicity,” is framed by theories of race and ethnicity which serve as a starting point to examine how the United States Census conflates racial and ethnic groups. I show how this error affects the collection of data in other surveys, including those I use in my study. The remainder of the chapter uses the theories of race and ethnicity to frame an
analysis of the housing situation in South Florida before Hurricane Andrew as well as
the damage inflicted to the local housing stock by the storm. Through this analysis, I
show that not everyone in South Dade County was equally affected by the storm.
Rather, clear differences exist between the damage experienced by Anglos and
Cubans on the one hand and African-Americans and Haitians on the other.

Chapter Three, “The Crisis After Andrew: Race, Ethnicity, and Housing,”
uses the discipline of sociology to synthesize the data provided in Chapters One and
Two. Starting with an explanation of economic, social, and cultural capital offered by
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, I frame this information using Mark Granovetter’s
Network Theory. From this perspective, I explain what happened to the housing
situation in South Florida after Hurricane Andrew. I show that trends in housing
relocation and rebuilding were not simply a result of personal preferences but rather
the result of limited agency for certain individuals and families.

Throughout the text, I had to make important decisions about word choice and
descriptive terminology. As I explain in depth in the beginning of Chapter Two, the
U.S. Census has a history of conflating race and ethnicity and, as a result, has added
to the confusion over proper terminology. One of the central tasks of this project is
break down these groups into meaningful categories of analysis. It is important to
note that most immigrant groups living in South Florida choose to self-identify along
nationality lines. Thus, it is relatively uncommon for Cubans to think of themselves
as “Latinos” or “Hispanics.” Similarly, Haitians refer to themselves as Haitians. For
this reason, I have carefully selected the categories I use in order to obtain the greatest
amount of useful data from the surveys while contextualizing this information within
the dynamics of South Florida’s struggles over race, ethnicity, and identity politics. To this end, I refer to the Cuban population specifically as “Cubans.” At times, however, the surveys used to collect data do not disaggregate Cubans from other nationalities from Central and South America. In these cases, I refer to the collective group as Latinos, even though this is not a category commonly used locally in South Florida.

Based on a review of the literature, I chose to use the term “Anglo” to refer to the non-Latino, non-Black population in South Florida. The unique historical dynamic between Cubans and Anglos in the area makes it important to differentiate between the two. As I explain in Chapters One and Two, Cubans have strived to define themselves as distinct from the Anglo population while still defined as “White.” The term Anglo is not a panacea, however, because it connotes individuals with Anglo-Saxon ancestry. Since the 1950s, South Florida has been home to many Jewish individuals who would not classify themselves as Anglo. Although I could have chosen to describe this population as non-Hispanic or non-Latino, I chose to use the widely accepted term and clarify its meaning in the context of this project.

Similarly, following the literature focusing on race and ethnicity in South Florida, I have been careful to differentiate between the terms African-American, Haitian, and Black. African-American refers to a native-born person of color. Haitian refers to a first or second generation immigrant from Haiti. Black refers to the collective community of African-Americans, Haitians, and individuals from other countries that consider themselves to be of color. These distinctions are important as tensions develop between both African-Americans and Haitians as well as between
Blacks and Cubans in South Florida. The problem I address in the beginning of Chapter Two is that the surveys used to collect demographic information do not always follow these same categories. Thus, one of the biggest challenges is to disaggregate the data and try to glean useful information from miscategorized data.1

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Hurricane Andrew was a natural disaster. The North Atlantic Ocean has been creating powerful storms for thousands of years. Yet, what happened in the days, weeks, and months after Hurricane Andrew struck South Florida can only be described as a human disaster. Human development got in the way of natural forces. Importantly, though, the impact of Hurricane Andrew was not felt equally among all citizens of South Dade County. A region known for its diversity, South Florida also has a long history of discrimination, segregation, and inequality between its residents. Pronounced differences in how Hurricane Andrew affected lives are apparent as early as the preparation stage in the days before the storm made landfall. Some people evacuated, but others had no place to go. Some boarded up their homes and stocked up with emergency supplies, others could not afford to do so. These differences became even more pronounced in the aftermath of the storm. Who was left to pick up the pieces and who could leave the area and rebuild their lives someplace else? Who controlled the resources necessary to facilitate the rebuilding of cities like Homestead and Florida City? The answers to these questions highlight how Hurricane Andrew was as much a human disaster as a natural one. The storm will forever define the lives

1 Throughout the text I capitalize “White” and “Black” to emphasize the social construction of these terms as categories of analysis. In direct quotations, however, I follow the format used in the original source.
of people who lived through it and reshaped the demographic composition of South Florida.
CHAPTER ONE:
HISTORY OF RACE, ETHNICITY, AND HOUSING IN SOUTH FLORIDA
In July of 1990, Nelson Mandela, recently released from prison in South Africa, toured major cities in the United States. He was greeted enthusiastically in New York, Washington D.C., and Atlanta. In Miami, however, where he was scheduled to make an appearance at the Miami Beach Convention Center, deep-rooted ethnic tensions erupted and made Mandela’s appearance controversial. His visit was preceded by protests and demonstrations centering on Mandela’s alleged ties to Cuban dictator Fidel Castro. Cubans waved signs with messages exclaiming, “I’m here because Mandela is a friend of Castro and no friend of Castro is welcome in Miami” (Portes and Stepick 1993:176). African-American Miamians and Haitian immigrants rallied to the opposite side, looking to Mandela as a symbol of Black pride. H.T. Smith, an African-American leader in South Florida said that “Miami may go down in infamy as the only city in America that denounced, criticized, castigated, and threw its ‘welcome mat’ in the face of Nelson Mandela” (Portes and Stepick 1993:177). The next day, radio stations broke the news story and the Black community rallied around the fight and the controversy surrounding Nelson Mandela’s South Florida visit. One radio announcer on a Haitian radio station declared, “We are going to make the Cubans pay for the way they treated Mandela” (Portes and Stepick 1993:177). As this example suggests, the historical trajectory of race relations in Miami shows that disaster never brings South Floridians together. Rather, it serves to further divide individuals and families along increasingly polarized lines.
Although not prominent in the imagination of most Americans, South Florida has a long history of racial and ethnic tensions. Popular discourse has emphasized racial strife in cities like Los Angeles, Chicago, and Montgomery, Alabama. Yet, through the 1980s, Miami was the most residentially segregated city in the United States (Grenier and Morrow 2000). As might be expected, alongside patterns of racial segregation came severe violence, culminating in a race riot in 1980 that proved more costly than any other race riot in United States history. The racial strife that made headlines in other cities around the country never received the same level of media coverage when it happened in Miami. It was usually represented as a localized South Florida struggle, divorced from the racial problems in the rest of the nation.

To a certain extent, it is true that the history of racial and ethnic relations in Miami is different from the rest of the country. Racial struggle in South Florida is unique because it falls along many distinct lines of division. The White/Black dichotomy imposed in the United States does not function well in Miami. As the unofficial gateway to Latin America, Miami is home to individuals and families from countries throughout the Caribbean and Latin America. Immigrants from many of these nations, such as the Dominican Republic and Brazil, have entirely different ideas about race and racial relations than most people from the United States because they have experienced vastly different racial histories in their native countries. Thus, bringing such divergent viewpoints and understandings about race and ethnicity together in one common geographical space, combined with the position of these groups relative to dominant Anglos, almost inevitably causes tension and strife.
Significant race riots occurred in Miami in 1968, concurrent with the Republican Party’s National Convention in Miami Beach, in 1970, and again in 1980 after an all-Anglo jury found an Anglo police officer not-guilty on charges of killing an African-American man. This race riot was found to be the most expensive in United States history up to that time, causing at least 18 deaths and costing an estimated $50 million (George 1996). The continuation and escalation of major race riots well after the riots during the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s highlights the unique characteristics of racial conflict in South Florida. These tensions did not start after Hurricane Andrew. Rather, Miami has a long history of racial clashes that were exacerbated by the dire circumstances surrounding the storm.

It is beyond the scope of this project to trace the history of all racial and ethnic groups in South Florida. Thus, I have selected two immigrant groups in particular to examine: Cubans and Haitians. This decision was influenced by two primary factors. First, the groups represent polar opposite stereotypes of immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean. Popular discourse has defined Cubans as the ideal immigrant group: middle-class migrants with social, economic, and cultural capital who strive to do their best and succeed in the United States. In contrast, Haitian immigrants have been labeled as poor, dirty migrants who lower property values and take advantage of the United States’ hospitality. Clearly, much of these opinions are bound up in racist sentiments. Second, significant numbers of Cubans and Haitians lived in Dade County in 1992 when Hurricane Andrew came ashore. This makes data more accessible and more reliable.
The stereotype of middle-class Cuban immigrants with values similar to those of Anglo middle-class Americans largely stems from the initial wave of immigration to the United States after the Cuban Revolution in 1959. After Fidel Castro seized power and nationalized key industries in the country, middle class professionals and government workers fled to the United States with any resources they could salvage. When they arrived, the United States welcomed the refugees, viewing them as important opponents to socialism and communism in the hemisphere. Equally important, however, is the skin color and social class of the early Cuban immigrants. In contrast to later Cuban migrants from the 1970s and 1980s, early immigrants had much lighter skin and could more easily blend in with Anglos in South Florida.

Later Cuban immigrants, however, were seen quite differently. The second big wave of immigration came in the late 1970s, culminating in the Mariel boatlift of 1980. Rumors circulated through the Miami Cuban community that Castro let many prisoners escape as long as they fled the country. These immigrants were stigmatized as “undesirables,” including political prisoners and psychiatric patients. In addition, due to economic hardships during the first twenty years of Castro’s rule, most of the immigrants were from lower socio-economic levels than the first wave of immigrants. Many had darker skin complexions as well, making integration into a society politically dominated by Anglos and light-skinned Cubans even more challenging.

Still, compared to Haitian immigrants, Mariel Cubans had a significantly easier time integrating into the Miami community. Even though some first-wave Cuban immigrants tried to ostracize later immigrants for fear they would threaten the “model immigrant” stereotype, the majority of later Cuban migrants were still able to
find their niche within the established Cuban enclave. Haitians had no such pre-established network. Fleeing economic and political persecution, Haitian immigrants faced significant obstacles immigrating to the U.S. and those who were successful generally had fewer resources than their Cuban counterparts and fewer networks to rely on in the United States. To make matters worse, Haitians were looked down upon by Cubans, other Latinos, and native-born African-Americans who all feared that Haitian immigrants would compete for scarce low-paying jobs during a time when unemployment numbers were at historically high levels.

I have integrated an analysis of historical patterns of housing segregation in South Florida into my discussion of the history of tensions between different racial and ethnic groups in Miami. Like many large cities in the United States, Miami is extremely segregated residentially and has suffered from a shortage of quality affordable housing. Although rent and cost of living was cheap in comparison to many other places in the country, Miami still had its fair share of housing deficiencies, including many structures that were not built well enough to withstand the force of a strong hurricane. But it is not enough simply to observe a lack of adequate housing. Instead, it is necessary to discern who lived in this substandard housing and why they were living there. While these data are not frequently analyzed, the information is crucial to understanding the disparity in the South Florida housing situation after Hurricane Andrew.

Each of these factors makes an important contribution to explain why Miami has been labeled the most residentially segregated city in the United States. Alejandro Portes, a prominent scholar of Miami’s racial and ethnic diversity explains:
What makes Miami distinct is not the large number of foreigners, other cities like New York and Los Angeles have many more immigrants. It is rather the rupture of an established cultural outlook and a unified social hierarchy in which every group of newcomers takes its preordained place (Portes 1992:xiii).

Portes’ statement reflects why it is absolutely imperative to understand the history of race relations in South Florida to fully grasp what happened after Hurricane Andrew. The storm may have leveled entire neighborhoods and presented the opportunity to start fresh, but the possibilities for significant change were diminished because everyone had to work within this “preordained” order.

**Cuban Immigration**

Perhaps more so than any other metropolitan region in the United States, Miami has developed the popular image of a city of immigrants. While this is somewhat of an exaggeration, it is clear that the history of South Florida, at least since 1959, has been largely shaped by the people and ideas that have migrated to the region from Latin America and the Caribbean. By the 1980s and 1990s, Miami earned the nickname “Gateway to Latin America” as the city gained prominence as an economic and cultural center. While South Florida has a large number of immigrants from many countries, including Nicaragua, Jamaica, Columbia, Guatemala, and Brazil, Cuba has a longer history of political, economic, and social ties to the region than any other country.

The connection between Cuba and the United States dates back to the nineteenth century when U.S. business interests tried to persuade government
officials to annex the island to ensure political stability and uninterrupted sources of land and labor. After the U.S.S. Maine exploded in Havana harbor and the U.S quickly won the Spanish-American War in 1898, the U.S. Congress passed the Teller Amendment, in which the United States “hereby disclaim[ed] any disposition of intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when it is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people” (Olson and Olson 1995:32).

Although the U.S. may have formally renounced any intentions to control the island, it implemented policies to ensure U.S. interests would be protected in Cuba. During and after the U.S. military occupation in Cuba from 1898 to 1902, the U.S. federal government established policies that gave American companies favorable access to the island nation’s resources. U.S. sugar and tobacco companies owned land and businesses there and exported many of the products, including Cuban cigars, to Florida to be distributed around the country. By the early 1920s, American investment in Cuba exceeded $1 billion and more than 60 percent of all rural land in Cuba was owned or leased by foreigner companies or individuals, the majority of them Americans (Olson and Olson 1995:34).

Moreover, in the early twentieth century, the culture of the middle and upper class Cuban citizenry “took on a decidedly North American flavor” (Olson and Olson 1995:34). Many Cubans were bilingual in Spanish and English. The Cuban elite sent their children to be educated in the United States and they cooperated with the U.S. economic establishment. Importantly, however, this group of elite Cubans was almost exclusively White. Although Cuba, like most Latin American and Caribbean
countries, has a history of racial mixture dating back to Spanish colonization in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the local elites tended to be individuals who appeared White, supposedly signifying a closer link to “pure-blooded Spaniards.” This legacy continued well into the twentieth century.

The relationship between Cuba and the United States, specifically South Florida, was solidified during the mid-twentieth century when Fulgencio Batista, a colonel in the Cuban military, became the dominating political figure in Cuban government from 1933 until 1959. Batista generally enacted pro-American and pro-capitalist policies and the U.S. government and business interests felt secure with Batista leading Cuba. From 1933 through 1940, Batista “emerged as the real force behind a series of relatively weak civilian administrators that served largely at his will” (Gonzalez-Pando 1998:6). Batista was officially elected president in 1940, though he lost his bid for reelection in 1944. His absence from power was only temporary. In March of 1952, Batista staged a bloodless coup, regaining control of the country. From then until 1959, many political factions, especially youth-based movements, struggled against Batista’s dictatorship that favored Cuban economic elites (Gonzalez-Pando 1998).

Fidel Castro started as just another young Cuban idealist fighting against the Batista dictatorship. But much changed in Cuba between Castro’s first attempted uprising in 1953 and his successful revolution in 1959. Middle and upper class Cubans became even wealthier as “record numbers of American tourists were visiting the capital, the price of sugar was high, and the exchange rate for the Cuban peso was often far greater than par with the American dollar” (Gonzalez-Pando 1998:12). Yet
this wealth was not reaching the majority of the Cuban population. Lower-class Cubans were becoming increasingly frustrated with Batista’s government. At the same time, stories of Castro’s struggles against the Batista regime were quickly spreading across the countryside. Cognizant of the changing sentiments in Cuba, in December 1958, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower formally withdrew American support from Batista’s government and imposed an arms embargo on the country. On New Years Eve, Batista fled from Cuba (Gonzalez-Pando 1998:13).

Once Castro took power, he immediately began to enact major reforms that had serious consequences for the Cuban economic elite as well as American companies and investors. In May of 1959, Castro implemented the First Urban and Agrarian Reform Laws to reduce rent payments and give more rural peasants access to land, respectively. In response, the U.S. significantly reduced the amount of sugar it purchased from the island nation. Cuba quickly found the Soviet Union to purchase its sugar and announced that it planned to nationalize most U.S.-owned businesses in the country.

In 1961, worried about the growing threat of a Soviet-allied Communist neighbor in its backyard, President John F. Kennedy’s administration planned and implemented the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion, authorizing over 1,000 Cuban exiles living in Miami to invade Cuba, hoping to gather popular support to oust Castro. The plan failed miserably, and the Cuban exiles were released from Cuba only after the U.S. government promised food and other supplies to the island nation (Boswell and Curtis 1984:7). Growing friction between the governments in Havana and Washington D.C. and Cuba’s increasing reliance on Soviet economic assistance led
the United States to issue a complete economic trade embargo in February of 1962 (Boswell and Curtis 1984:20-21). Within months, in October of 1962, tension between the two countries boiled over in the Cuban missile crisis, when Cuba became the center of Cold War rivalries between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. War nearly broke out after the Soviet Union installed missiles in Cuba capable of striking the United States. After the missile crisis, Castro sealed the border and restricted air and boat traffic from Cuba to the U.S (Olson and Olson 1995:58). Thus, by the early 1960s, it was clear that the United States’ long history of unquestioned influence over Cuba had come to an end. In the coming decades, the story of Cuban migration to Miami would dominate the relations between the two countries.

Cuban Migration to the U.S.

Sociologists of immigration frequently describe the decision to migrate as a combination of “push” and “pull” factors. In the case of Cuban immigrants, the “push” factors are fairly straight-forward, especially in the case of the immigrants from 1959 until 1973. Castro’s overthrow of pro-capitalist Batista encouraged many Cubans go into exile. The immigrants were concerned because “the revolution had deprived them of so much and threatened to deprive them of even more” (Olson and Olson 1995:64). They believed that Castro’s communist regime threatened not only their financial well-being but their lives as well.

The “pull” factors steering Cubans to the United States, and specifically Miami, are slightly more complex. First, the voyage across the Florida Straits from Havana to Key West is only ninety miles. This short distance combined with the
relatively calm waters of the Straits and the availability of air travel makes the journey fairly easy. Accordingly, there was no need to travel to New York, a much larger immigrant city, when Miami was so close, had an established Cuban exile community, and had a climate similar to Cuba’s. Second, South Florida had a long history of relations with Cuba. As previously discussed, critical economic, political, and social connections were already established between middle and upper class Cubans and the United States. The pre-Castro Cuban population of South Florida was approximately 20,000, many of whom were political exiles who fled when Batista came to power twenty-five years earlier (Gallagher 1980:35). Third, Cubans thought their stay would be temporary. As soon as Castro fell from power, their exile would be over. Accordingly, it made the most sense for the Cuban immigrants to settle in South Florida.

The “Golden Exiles” and other early immigrants

The very first group of immigrants to come to the United States after the Cuban Revolution of 1959 was the political and economic elite directly associated with Batista’s government. It is estimated that approximately 26,500 of these “Golden Exiles” migrated to South Florida in the first six months of 1959 (Olson and Olson 1995:53). This was not unusual given the ebb and flow of political movements in Cuba and other Caribbean and Latin American nations. Whenever a new political group came to power, it was customary for members of the opposition’s government to move into exile in South Florida. Many of the Cubans living in Miami made a similar move when Batista first rose to power in 1933.
What distinguished this movement, however, was that it did not stop at 26,500 immigrants. Rather, the pace of migration quickly intensified. During the second half of 1959, about 30,000 more Cubans immigrated. This group was largely composed of the professional class workers in Cuba who did not have extensive ties to the Batista government. As Castro began to enact reforms in Cuba, this group felt financially threatened and looked to Miami as a haven for their money and business interests. After early 1960, Cubans continued to stream across the Florida Straits in droves. In total, more than 215,000 Cubans had immigrated by October 1962, when air travel between Cuba and the United States was restricted (Boswell and Curtis 1984:43). These migrants thought of themselves as exiles, escaping the economic and political repression of Castro’s regime.

Taken as a whole, these early Cuban immigrants had significantly higher levels of education and were more likely to have white-collar jobs than the total Cuban population as measured by the 1953 Cuban census. According to a roster created by the Refugee Center in Miami, nearly 70 percent of the immigrants held white-collar positions versus less than 25 percent of the Cuban population in total. In contrast, people who listed agriculture and fishing as their occupation accounted for only three percent of the immigrant population but over 40 percent of the total Cuban population (Fagen, Brody, and O’Leary 1968:19). The Refugee Center roster also noted that over 95 percent of migrants lived in either Havana or another city or town in Cuba before coming to the United States. In contrast, barely over half of the total Cuban population lived in an urban setting (Fagen et al. 1968:23).
Thus, it is clear that the Golden Exiles and other early immigrants to Miami were not average Cubans. They tended to be wealthier and have white-collar occupations, have pre-existing ties to the United States, and live in urban environments. The large flow of Cuban elite immigrants started to slow between the missile crisis in 1962 and September of 1965, as there were few opportunities for legal migration from Cuba to the United States. While an estimated 56,000 Cubans immigrated illegally or through a third country, it is difficult to obtain demographic data on this cohort. Still, it is likely that these immigrants, at least those who reached the United States indirectly through a third country like Spain or Mexico, had significantly more resources than the average Cuban (Boswell and Curtis 1984:48).

“Freedom Flighters”

In September of 1965, Castro abruptly shifted his stance on immigration as tensions from the Cuban missile crisis cooled slightly and he declared that any Cuban wishing to leave the country was free to do so through the small fishing village of Camarioca on the northern coast of the island. At this point, with nearly unconditional support from the Soviet Union, Castro was eager to let potential “trouble-makers” in Cuba leave (Olson and Olson 1995:60). Within two months, nearly 5,000 Cubans crossed the Florida Straits by boat and immigrated to South Florida (Gallagher 1980:42). In November of 1965, the governments of the United States and Cuba reached a bilateral agreement allowing for an air lift of dissatisfied Cubans between the two nations. Still in the depths of the Cold War, the United States was happy to accept dissatisfied citizens from a communist country. The U.S. wanted to show the
world that people were fleeing from communist countries and choosing to immigrate
to countries that embraced capitalist principles.

These “Freedom Flights” lasted until 1973 and it is estimated that close to
300,000 Cubans arrived in the United States during this time, with the vast majority settling in South Florida (Boswell and Curtis 1984:48). Castro did not allow all people to leave. Males of military age and highly skilled workers and professionals were not usually granted exit visas. In contrast, elderly and sick individuals as well as people with relatives already living in the U.S. were given exit visa preference (Boswell and Curtis 1984:49). Overall, while the immigrants were still overwhelmingly urban, their socioeconomic statuses were statistically lower than their predecessors. Many immigrants were from the lower middle-class and included artisans, small businessmen, and shopkeepers. But because so many immigrants in this cohort had relatives in South Florida who had previously immigrated, they possessed a sufficient degree of social capital and resources to succeed in Miami (Boswell and Curtis 1984:49).

Marielitos

After the ending of the Freedom Flights in 1973, most Cubans were unable to leave Cuba until 1980 (Boswell and Curtis 1984:50). At the same time, the country was suffering from an economic depression. In 1979, a blue mold called *Peronospora tabacina* Adam attacked Cuba’s economically important tobacco crop and the blight quickly spread throughout the island, hitting the tobacco-growing province of Pinar del Rio especially hard. Consequently, Cuba could no longer export its world-famous
cigars, forcing factories to shut down and increasing the level of unemployment. In 1980 alone, it is reported that 90 percent of Cuba’s tobacco crop was lost and 26,000 people lost their jobs (Browning 2005).

The largest exodus of Cubans from the island nation to South Florida since the 1960s took place in 1980. Over the course of six months, approximately 125,000 Cubans migrated to South Florida (Portes and Stepick 1993:21). On April 1st of that year, a Cuban bus driver named Jose Antonio Rodriguez drove through the gates of the Peruvian embassy in Havana trying to obtain political asylum. Due to security concerns, on April 4th Fidel Castro removed Cuban police protection from the embassy and, within days, nearly ten-thousand Cubans gathered at the embassy seeking protection and asylum. This event proved to be a huge embarrassment for Castro and forced the Cuban president to open the port of Mariel, allowing any Cuban to leave the country who wished to do so (Portes and Stepick 1993:19). By April 20th, the first boat of Cubans arrived in Key West.

Castro did not simply invite Cubans to leave the island, he actively requested Cuban exiles living in the United States to pick up friends and relatives still living in Cuba. Castro wished to demonstrate to the world community that his liberal policies permitted anyone to leave the country whenever they wanted. South Florida Cubans had two main goals in supporting the exodus of thousands of new Cubans to the United States. First, Cubans living in exile had been waiting nearly twenty years to reunite with family members still in Cuba. Second, the Miami Cubans hoped that a strong exodus leaving the Communist island nation would demonstrate to the world community the unpopularity of Castro’s regime in Cuba (Stepick et al. 2003:40).
In truth, however, it was Fidel Castro who outsmarted the world community. While Cuban exiles living in South Florida sent money to Cuba in order to facilitate family members’ migration to Miami, Castro ultimately had the power to determine who could get on the boats destined for Florida. As a result, evidence suggests that Castro’s government released a significant number of prisoners from Cuban jails and placed them on boats destined for the United States. While it is difficult to ascertain exactly who left Cuba during the Mariel boatlift, two researchers associated with the Center for the Study of the Americas in Havana report that “45.25 percent of all persons that abandoned Cuba through the port of Mariel had delinquent backgrounds” (Portes and Stepick 1993:20). According to these researchers, most of these released prisoners had been charged with petty crimes such as theft. Others were in jail because of supposed crimes against the state or because they were deemed likely to commit future crimes. Smaller percentages of convicts had been imprisoned for being gay or, as the Cuban government reported, for “crimes against the normal development of sexual relations” (Portes and Stepick 1993:20). An even smaller percentage of freed criminals had been charged with serious crimes such as rape and murder.

The perception of the people leaving Cuba, however, left a strong imprint in the minds of Cuban exiles living in South Florida. The images they saw on television depicted poor immigrants, generally with darker skin, cramped together in crowded boats and making the dangerous journey across the Florida straits. This negative image of the immigrants was reinforced by Castro himself. In a May Day Speech in 1980, Castro remarked, “Those that are leaving from Mariel are the scum of the
country – anti-socials, homosexuals, drug addicts, and gamblers, who are welcome to leave Cuba if any country will have them” (Portes and Stepick 1993:21).

Thus, many members of the Cuban community were displeased by the Mariel immigrants. They feared that this new group would tarnish the image of Cuban immigrants as one of the “model minorities.” One Cuban-American remarked that, “Mariel destroyed the image of Cubans in the United States and, in passing, destroyed the image of Miami itself for tourism. The marielitos are mostly Black and mulattoes of color that I never saw or believe existed in Cuba. They don’t have social networks; they roam the streets desperate to return to Cuba” (Portes and Stepick 1993:21). The conflation of race and class by Cuban exiles demonstrates the degree to which race influenced the perception of Mariel immigrants within the Cuban enclave.

Ultimately, however, the Cuban immigrants were able to avoid a significant fractionalization of the community. This was possible for a couple of reasons. First, there was a large, established Cuban community operating in South Florida. The Mariel immigrants certainly changed the dynamics of the community but the influx was not enough to fundamentally alter or threaten the overall composition of the Cuban enclave. Second, the growing Cuban enclave, discussed in detail below, was able to absorb many of the new immigrants. In many respects, the addition of new generations of Cubans to the enclave helped to extend Cuban economic and political power. As South Florida Anglos harshly criticized the Mariel boatlift, the Cuban population unified and consolidated its power. Ultimately, they were all in South Florida to escape Fidel Castro for one reason or another. Thus, in the 1980s, for the
first time, the Miami Cuban community began to separate itself and forcefully challenge the ruling Anglo elites in South Florida (Stepick et al. 2003:40).

**The Cuban Enclave**

The Cuban community in South Florida is historically linked to the area called Little Havana. Sociologists often refer to South Florida, and Little Havana specifically, as the best example of an ethnic enclave in the United States. Defined as “a distinctive economic formation characterized by the spatial concentration of immigrants who organize a variety of enterprises to serve their own ethnic market and the general population,” the Cuban enclave in Little Havana serves as the hub of residential and economic life for the large South Florida Cuban community (Grenier and Morrow 2000:43). Cubans created a self-sufficient city within a city.

The Cuban enclave developed for two key reasons. First, the early Cuban immigrants, the Golden Exiles, brought with them high levels of economic and social capital that allowed them to start and grow small businesses to serve the Cuban community. As previously discussed, the first waves of immigrants after the Cuban Revolution in 1959 were well-educated and generally had white-collar jobs. They had connections to businesspeople in South Florida and were well-received as pro-capitalists escaping the horrors of communism. Although initially they thought of themselves only as temporary exiles, by the 1980s, the immigrants began to think of Miami as their new home. In 1979, just before the Mariel immigrants arrived, nearly half of all Cubans were employed by Cuban-owned businesses and over 20 percent of Cubans described themselves as self-employed (Portes and Stepick 1993:146). This
demonstrates a high-degree of economic self-sufficiency within the Cuban community. Second, the initial wave of Cuban immigration was followed by successive waves of immigration, filling open niches in the growing enclave. Since they generally came from lower socioeconomic backgrounds than their predecessors, the new immigrants could fill some of the lower-level positions in the enclave and “work their way up” in Cuban-owned businesses.

Despite this influx of Cubans with lower socioeconomic status, a Cuban “slum” never really developed. This is partially attributable to that fact that early Cuban immigrants arrived with the social and economic capital to develop a Cuban enclave. The first Cuban immigrants, anticipating a short exile in South Florida, rented apartments near and to the southwest of downtown Miami. As they came to the realization that their stay would be more permanent, Cubans began to congregate in what is now called Little Havana, a 30 block by 30 block square to the west of downtown (Olson and Olson 1995:95).

Instead of lowering property values, which happened when African-Americans and Haitians moved into parts of the city, the Cuban presence actually improved the neighborhoods. In fact, “the short term effect of the Cuban influx was not only to alter radically the occupancy of apartments and dwellings and stem the declining real estate values, but also to stem business stagnation in these areas” (Gallagher 1980:49). Additionally, since the early Cuban immigrants generally had economic capital, many were able to buy their own homes. A 1970 survey showed that over fifty percent of Cuban immigrants “lived in homes which they or their families owned” (Gallagher 1980:50).
Since political power often parallels economic power, as the Cuban enclave developed and matured, the Cuban community began to extend its political influence. However, the presence of the Cuban enclave often became a source of tension with other groups in Miami, especially the African-American community. A widespread perception developed that Cubans were taking jobs from African-Americans and Haitian immigrants. Although, as I show below, this was not necessarily true, enough people believed the myth that it raised tensions between Miami’s Cuban and African-American communities.

**Haitian Immigration**

Unlike Miami’s Cuban immigrants, the story of Haitian immigrants in South Florida is one bursting with friction. Not only did Haitians contend with discrimination by Anglos, they also had to deal with negative stereotypes reinforced by Latin American immigrants as well as African-Americans in South Florida. Haitian immigrants were fleeing a right-wing dictator who the United States government supported because his regime posed no threat to the United States’ capitalist hegemony in the Western hemisphere. In addition to their general lack of political, economic, and social capital, the U.S. made it significantly more difficult for Haitian immigrants to successfully immigrate compared to Cubans. But there was one other important factor differentiating the two immigrant groups. Whereas most Cuban immigrants were perceived by Anglos to be “almost” White, taking a similar racial path as the Irish and Italians of previous generations, Haitians were seen as distinctively Black immigrants who would only add to racial tension in South Florida.
Although some Haitian immigrants had migrated to the United States after the Haitian Revolution in the late eighteenth century and a second wave of immigrants arrived in the early twentieth century when the U.S. military occupied Haiti, most Haitians immigrants did not come to South Florida until the 1970s and early 1980s (Chierici 1991:100). Compared to the Cuban immigrants, even the Mariel cohort, the Haitians coming to South Florida were generally poorer and less well-educated. The middle and upper class Haitians mostly settled in New York City, creating a South Florida Haitian community with little economic or social capital.

The Duvalier Years

After years of intermittent U.S. military involvement in Haitian affairs, in 1957, Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier won the Haitian presidential election. Immediately after taking office, Papa Doc arrested or exiled all of his political opponents and began to dismantle all civil institutions that could potentially threaten his regime, including schools, churches, and labor unions (Zéphir 2004:48). From 1957 until 1964, the upper class politicians from opposing parties and professional elites fled the country and many immigrated to the United States. For the most part, however, these immigrants settled in New York City, following the last significant group of Haitian exiles who immigrated to New York City during the Harlem Renaissance after the U.S. Army took control of Haiti from 1915 until 1934. Many of these immigrants were considered the “invisible Haitians” who “spoke good English…[and] were light-skinned enough to pass for Anglos to North Americans” (Stepick 1992:70). They tried to minimize their affiliation with Haiti, especially after
the “boat people” started to arrive in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Stepick 1992:40).

By 1964, Papa Doc had completed a campaign to eliminate almost all rivals to his authority, including the murder of an entire town of political rivals, and had declared himself president for life (Zéphir 2004:49). It was becoming increasingly clear that Papa Doc would use any means to maintain complete control over the country and that nobody was safe. In response, there was a second large exodus of Haitians. This cohort included mostly middle-class professionals and small business owners who continued the trend and generally immigrated to New York City (Laguerre 1998:86).

This phase of Haitian immigration lasted until 1971, when Papa Doc died and power passed to his son, Jean Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier. Under Baby Doc, many of the human rights abuses that started with Papa Doc continued. Decades of political corruption caught up with Haiti, the poorest nation in the Western hemisphere, and forced many rural Haitians to move to large cities in search of work. This brought them one step closer to the United States. Finding few opportunities for work in the cities, many Haitians decided to make the 750-mile journey to South Florida in search of economic opportunities (Laguerre 1998:86).

While small boats of Haitian immigrants came to South Florida in 1963 and again in 1973, it was not until 1977 that Haitians began to arrive by boat on a regular basis. From 1977 to 1981, an estimated 50,000 to 70,000 Haitians arrived in Miami by boat and about 5,000 to 10,000 more arrived by plane (Stepick 1992:58). These immigrants usually arrived without any social connections to current residents in
South Florida. Many of the immigrants had only heard stories of great economic opportunities in the United States and, faced with such dismal conditions in Haiti, decided to take the risk. Often times, these immigrants did not realize that “during the 1970s and 1980s, no other immigrant group suffered more prejudice and discrimination than Haitians” (Stepick et al. 2003:116).

**Differential U.S. Response to Cuban/Haitian Immigrants**

Once they arrived, however, U.S. immigration officials made it difficult for the Haitian immigrants to stay in the country. Before 1980, official U.S. policy followed Cold War ideology, defining a refugee as someone fleeing a communist country. This clearly benefited Cuban immigrants, but worked against Haitian immigrants. Haitians were classified as economic, not political refugees, meaning the United States government believed they were fleeing from economic poverty and not political persecution (Zéphir 2004:78). To try to get around this issue, Haitian immigrants often asked for political asylum in the United States. In response, in 1978 the INS formally “established the ‘Haitian Program,’ whereby new arrivals were placed in a detention center near the Everglades and held in prison-like conditions for up to one year. The program eventually evolved into the wholesale deportation of Haitian refugees” (Laguerre 1998:80). As a result, of the 50,000 Haitians who asked for asylum from 1972 until 1980, only 25 were successful (Laguerre 1998:82).

Politicians were well aware of this differential treatment. Senator De Concini commented that “If you are a boat refugee from Cuba, INS automatically considers you a refugee. If you are a boat refugee from Baby Doc’s Haiti, INS automatically
considers you an illegal alien coming to the United States for economic purposes” (Laguerre 1998:82). In 1980, as Marielitos were making the journey across the Florida Straits, their Haitian counterparts were doing the same thing. Cubans and Haitians were often arriving in the same port in Miami. Yet each group had vastly different experiences once they arrived in South Florida.

Faced with this blatant disparity in an election year, Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980, which expanded the definition of ‘refugee’ to include immigrants from non-communist countries. Later that year, President Carter created a new program allowing for Cuban-Haitian entrant status. This provision allowed “members of both groups who arrived prior to June 20 [1980] to remain in the United States until their status [was] resolved” (Laguerre 1998:81). Carter hoped this would placate South Florida African-Americans who, in a year of extreme racial tensions in Miami, were frustrated with another example of perceived racial discrimination.

Carter’s attempt failed and, in September of 1981, recently elected President Reagan issued an executive order to:

Direct the U.S. Coast Guard to patrol the waters between Haiti and Florida and prevent boatlifts of refugees from entering the U.S. The Coast Guard was supposed to intercept the boats, interview the passengers to evaluate whether they had a justifiable claim for asylum, send those who were ineligible back to Haiti, and bring to the U.S. those who passed this first interview test (Laguerre 1998:82).

Given the government’s track record with granting asylum claims, it is no surprise that of the 24,000 Haitians that were interviewed, only 28 were given full asylum hearings in the United States (Laguerre 1998:82). Throughout the 1980s, as conditions worsened in Haiti and more Haitian immigrants tried to come to the
United States, government officials began taking an even tougher stance. In May of 1992, just three months before Hurricane Andrew, President Bush issued the Kennebunkport Order “authorizing the Coast Guard to return to Haiti – without any screening – boatlifts of Haitian refugees found on the high seas” (Laguerre 1998:83). The government was frankly saying that Haitian immigrants were not welcome in the United States.

While the government may have officially used political and economic justifications to explicate the differential treatment of Cuban and Haitian immigrants, there is evidence to suggest that racial biases may have also contributed to the disparity. Anglos and Cubans in South Florida began to imagine Haitian immigrants as dirty and diseased, just as previous generations of White Americans viewed African-Americans. In the late 1970s, these negative stereotypes of Haitians were reinforced when a “hysterical scare swept through south Florida that tuberculosis was endemic among Haitians and was likely to spread through the general population” (Stepick 1992:58). Although this was completely unfounded, the damage was done and Haitians were labeled as “disease-ridden…uneducated, unskilled peasants who could only be a burden to the community” (Stepick 1992:58). Similarly, in the early 1980s, the Center for Disease Control (CDC) reported that Haitians were one of the at-risk groups for carrying the AIDS virus. Although this again proved to be unfounded, it perpetuated the negative stereotype of Haitians in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Stepick 1992:65).

Consequences for Haitian Immigrants
As a direct result of these stereotypes, many employers fired their Haitian workers, creating a dire economic situation for many Haitians. Unlike the Cuban community which was well established and had started to develop an enclave by the time the Mariel immigrants arrived in 1980, the Haitian community did not posses these advantages. Many Mariel immigrants found jobs within the enclave in Cuban-owned businesses. But Haitian refugees rarely worked for other Haitians. One study found that “forty-five percent of all Mariel wage earners were employed by other Cubans in 1985-1986…[while] less than one percent of Haitian refugees were employed by other Haitians in [1985-1986]” (Stepick 1992:68). Even though some small Haitian-owned businesses opened in Little Haiti in the 1980s, it was nowhere near as economically powerful as Little Havana (Stepick 1992:76). Thus, without an enclave to fall back on, Haitians in South Florida were helpless to stop the effects of negative Haitian stereotypes.

These negative stereotypes of Haitians permeated not only Miami’s Anglo and Cuban populations, but the African-American community as well. While at times South Florida’s African-American population identified with many of the struggles of the Haitian immigrants, especially over issues of perceived racial discrimination in immigration policies, the two groups generally felt ambivalent toward each other. African-Americans thought of Haitians as another group of immigrants competing for scarce jobs in Miami’s tight labor market. African-Americans also believed that “Haitians were unaware and unappreciative of the particular plight of black Americans…and should be glad for what they received in Miami” (Stepick 1992:62).
Similarly, many Haitians did not want to be associated with Miami’s African-Americans. They understood how they faced common struggles against racial discrimination but did not want to conflate themselves with what they perceived as “the most downtrodden group in the United States” (Stepick 1992:63). In 1985, almost all Haitians report perceiving some type of racial discrimination by Anglos and over 50 percent report African-Americans discriminating against them. As a consequence of this perceived discrimination, 77 percent of Haitian immigrants report not having a single non-Haitian Black friend (Stepick 1992:67). These figures demonstrate the fissure between African-Americans and Haitian immigrants. Consequently, working against each other instead of with each other, neither Haitians nor African-Americans had the resources necessary to create an enclave that could viably compete against elite Anglos and the increasingly powerful Cuban community in South Florida.

In the struggle to eliminate the disparity in Haitian and Cuban immigration regulations and in the Miami Race Riot of 1980 discussed below, Miami’s Haitian and African-American communities cooperated to fight their oppressions together. However, on most local political, economic, and social issues, Haitians and African-Americans chose not to associate with each other. To some extent, then, this divide can be seen as the power of cultural difference trumping the power of racial commonality.
African-Americans and Race Riots

Since its founding in 1896, Miami has been a segregated city. African-Americans arrived in Miami before the turn of the century and “an informal color line restricted Miami blacks to living in Colored Town, and as a result, a healthy and viable black business and professional community evolved to meet black needs” (Dunn 1997:51). Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, African-American life was focused around Colored Town, which is today called Overtown. Like other southern cities, legal restrictions prohibited African-Americans from equally participating in city life until the civil rights movement of the 1960s which, theoretically, broke down legal forms of discrimination. Within Overtown, however, African-Americans had created as good of a neighborhood as possible given the severe segregation restrictions imposed by Anglo Miamians.

Post-Civil Rights Segregation and Discrimination

The development of a major highway and subsequent urban renewal programs in the early 1960s threatened whatever quality of life African-Americans enjoyed in Overtown during the first half of the twentieth century. Interstate 95 was extended south through the city of Miami proper. Officials decided on a route that bisected Overtown to “provide ample room for the future expansion of the central business district” (Dunn 1997:156). The new highway wiped out “massive amounts of housing as well as Overtown’s main business district – the business and cultural heart of the black Miami” (Dunn 1997:156-157). Whereas 40,000 African-Americans lived in Overtown before the expressway project, only 10,000 remained after it was
completed (Dunn 1997:157). The Anglo elite leaders of Miami made a deliberate choice to divide the African-American community in South Florida. Losing the unity and cohesion historically provided by Overtown was a major loss to the Miami’s African-American residents. Concomitant to the loss of Overtown, middle-class Cubans began immigrating to Miami, further decreasing the clout of Miami’s African-American community by decreasing their percentage of the city’s population.

Even after the destruction of much of Overtown and the dispersion of its inhabitants, residential segregation continued to be a problem for South Florida’s African-Americans. To show the extent to which a city or town is racially segregated, researchers have developed a residential segregation index that captures the “degree to which blacks and Anglos are evenly spread among neighborhoods in a city” (Massey and Denton 1993:20). While the index uses the traditional White/Black binary, it is still a useful tool to examine housing patterns in South Florida. The index shows that Miami was the most residentially segregated major city in the United States from 1940 until 1970, consistently earning near a 98 on a scale from 0 to 100 (with 100 equaling complete segregation) (Massey and Denton 1993:47). It continued to be one of the most residentially segregated cities through the 1970s and 1980s (Massey and Denton 1993:64).

Thus, African-Americans living in South Florida were almost guaranteed to live on blocks and in neighborhoods that were only inhabited by other non-Whites. Most often, this meant living in areas with other Blacks. Importantly, however, after the urban renewal projects of the 1960s and 1970s, African-Americans in Miami were
less likely to live in Overtown and more likely to live in segregated neighborhoods dispersed throughout Dade County:

At first, most Blacks lived in ‘Colored Town’ and later in Liberty City, north of downtown Miami, or in walled-off sections of Coconut Grove. As still other Black settlements developed, including Brownsville, Opa Locka, and in the southern part of the county, Perrine, Princeton, Goulds, and Florida City, segregation was maintained (Grenier and Morrow 2000:43).

By the 1970s, many members of the African-American middle class retreated to the few integrated neighborhoods available to them and many working class African-Americans scattered around the county as well. Thus, while still mostly living in segregated neighborhoods, the Black community was no longer centralized in one location. South Dade County, where the damage from Hurricane Andrew was particularly severe, was home to many middle-class African-Americans who left Liberty City and Overtown. In addition, a pocket of Haitian immigrants lived in the southern part of the county, especially in farming communities (Portes and Stepick 1993:184).

Accompanying the severe housing segregation in South Florida was a large disparity in housing quality. African-Americans and other racial minorities are statistically more likely to live in “inadequate and poorer quality housing” in cities throughout the United States because “race and ethnicity are still important determinants of the economic resources, such as income and credit, critical for obtaining housing” (Peacock and Girard 2000:173). This is exacerbated by the fact that Miami is the most residentially segregated city in the country. The combined effect of these two trends correlates to zones of extremely poor quality housing where
non-White minorities are segregated and walled-off from the rest of society, creating “communities of fate” (Peacock and Girard 2000:173). Thus, African-Americans were living in a precarious position. Substandard housing left them more vulnerable to storms and catastrophes like Hurricane Andrew and living in segregated neighborhoods left them with fewer resources to cope with the disaster.

The Haitian population in South Florida was largely isolated in Little Haiti, which lies three miles north of downtown Miami in a rectangular area approximately 50 blocks by 10 blocks (Stepick 1992:66). Although Little Haiti borders Liberty City, a Haitian-American community leader claimed that “Haitians rarely cross [the] locally agreed limits of Liberty City…and call the area beyond ‘Black Power’ and do not want to live close to it” (Stepick 1992:63). Typical of most neighborhoods of South Florida, Little Haiti is largely segregated. The 1980 Census reports that it is over 80 percent Black and a 1982 Miami and Dade County report found that over 40 percent of Little Haiti is composed of Haitian immigrants (Stepick 1992:66).

Housing quality was just as bad, if not worse, for Haitian immigrants compared to African-Americans. A 1981 study conducted for Metropolitan Dade County “revealed that fifty percent of Haitians lived in single-family housing with an average of 6.4 other people [and] rats and vermin were a problem for sixty-two percent of Haitians” (Miller 1984:151). As one attorney for Haitian immigrants remarked:

Substandard and overcrowded housing, at exorbitant rents, have become the norm…Absentee landlords and speculators, who care nothing about the serious sanitation and health problems that are being produced, are taking every advantage of the refugees’ lack of knowledge of their rights as tenets
and of the Haitians’ fear of involvement with the authorities (Miller 1984:151).

The history of discriminatory practices in immigration issues made Haitian immigrants especially fearful of U.S. government authorities who could potentially help their dire housing situation. Haitian immigrants did not possess the social capital and resources needed to address the problem, making this community arguably more vulnerable than African-Americans in case of misfortune.

The Black population in South Florida, then, was dispersed throughout Dade County, although Black residents mostly lived in segregated neighborhoods. There were significant consequences of this residential decentralization. Whereas the Cuban community maintained a large population base and, even more importantly, a large business/economic base in Little Havana, the Black dispersion lessened the political and economic might of the Black community. Because the Cuban enclave was so strong, it could afford to spread out around Dade County whereas the Black community was not so privileged. Divisions between the African-American and Haitian communities did not help matters and exacerbated the disparity.

Many South Florida African-Americans believed that Miami’s Cubans had achieved their relatively higher economic status by taking scarce jobs away from African-Americans. The availability of jobs thus became one of the major sources of tension and conflict in South Florida. In the 1960s, there is evidence that Cubans did displace a limited number of African-Americans. But the effects of this displacement were restricted by two key factors. First, these early Cuban migrants did not envision staying in South Florida for an extended period of time. These middle-class immigrants believed their stay in exile would last a few months, perhaps a few years.
They generally assumed that they would be returning to Cuba once Castro’s regime fell. Accordingly, the jobs they took tended to be temporary in nature and they did not enter the South Florida labor market with the intention of developing new careers (Portes and Stepick 1993:40). Second, because the early Cuban immigrants were generally well-educated and middle-class, they mostly obtained jobs that African-Americans could not legally obtain in the early 1960s. South Florida, like most southern cities, had a long history of Jim Crow laws that left a legacy of racial discrimination. It would have been difficult, if not impossible, for African-Americans to obtain the types of professional jobs obtained by the Cuban immigrants. Thus, the Cubans were actually competing against native Anglos for jobs, not African-Americans.

As Cuban exiles realized their stay in the U.S. might be more long-term, their strategies within the labor market began to shift accordingly. As discussed above, in the late 1960s and 1970s, the Cuban enclave economy started to develop. This completely transformed the South Florida economy as Cubans “moved rapidly into self-employment in such areas as garment subcontracting, landscaping, and residential construction” (Stepick et al. 2003:40). Census data from 1960, 1970, and 1980 confirm that Cuban workers displaced Anglo workers, not African-Americans in the garment, construction, hotel, and restaurant industries. The construction trade, for instance, was just over 80 percent Anglo in 1960. By 1980, that number had fallen to less than 44 percent. In contrast, the construction trade was just under 20 percent Black in 1960 and that number barely fell to less than 17 percent in 1980 (Stepick et al. 2003:40).
Thus, while it is fair to say that Cuban immigrants were often more economically successful than African-Americans, it is not true that Cubans directly took jobs away from Miami’s African-American population. Due to a long history of discrimination where African-Americans were legally prohibited from accumulating political and economic capital, South Florida African-Americans did not develop an ethnic enclave, forcing them to rely on Anglos and Cubans for economic survival. This lack of agency aggravated African-Americans and ultimately added to the racial tensions in Miami as they took out their frustrations on Anglos and Cubans alike.

*Race Riots*

Race relations between African-American and Anglo Miamians have boiled over many times, especially during the late 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s, when researchers Bruce Porter and Marvin Dunn (1984) report at least 13 significant race riots in South Florida. While the riots highlight local racial tensions, these demonstrations are best conceptualized as a manifestation of underlying issues that have been persistently present in South Florida. While a specific trigger may have caused each riot, the disturbances were only possible because of sentiments of general discontentment in the African-American community.

The first major riot occurred in 1968, a time of great political upheaval in the United States. Many other major U.S. cities experienced riots that year. The riot in Miami took place in Liberty City, one of the historically African-American sections of Miami. The events unfolded the week of August 5th, the same week as the Republican National Convention, which was being held nearby in Miami Beach. The
juxtaposition of the riot in Liberty City with the Republican National Convention just a couple of miles away in posh Miami Beach highlights some of the frustrations felt by Miami’s African-American residents. Tensions in South Florida were high because of two incidents that happened over the previous year. First, there was disappointment and anger among the city’s African-American residents over the lack of jobs available to African-American teenagers over the past two summers, despite a promise from the business community to increase the number of hires. Second, in February 1968, two Anglo police officers arrested and humiliated an African-American seventeen year-old named Robert Owens, charging him with carrying a concealed weapon. The teenager was forced to strip naked and the officers held him by the feet on a bridge above the Miami River (Dunn 1997:246-247).

The 1968 riot started on the afternoon of August 7th. That day, basketball star Wilt Chamberlain was scheduled to make an appearance at a Liberty City community center. The crowd grew progressively larger all afternoon and, unbeknownst to the crowd, the Dade County police department had placed two undercover African-American agents into the crowd in case the group turned into a mob. By mid-afternoon, hundreds of local residents had arrived at the center and the two undercover officers called for backup. As police cars began arriving, the crowd became incensed and started throwing rocks at a truck driving by with a bumper sticker in support of George Wallace for President of the United States. By nightfall, the riot was well underway. Many local businesses were looted and four people were killed. Leaders of the African-American community met with local and state officials
throughout the night. A curfew was implemented and, with the support of African-American community leaders, tensions eased by the next morning.

Two years later, a second important race riot occurred in Miami. Known as the “Rotten Meat” Riot, it took place in Brownsville, another predominantly African-American section of Miami adjacent to Liberty City. The riot began when African-American residents of Brownsville began picketing a local Anglo-owned convenience store, accusing the owners of selling spoiled meat and charging special fees for cashing welfare and social security checks. The protests started on June 12, 1970 and after three days of uneventful picketing, police fired tear gas at the picketers. Violence escalated and spread throughout African-American sections of Miami, including Brownsville, Liberty City, and parts of Coconut Grove. The rioting lasted for three days. When things started to cool down, two people had been shot and businesses were damaged. The Rotten Meat Riot was just one more event escalating racial tensions in Miami.

A series of small “miniriots” occurred in Dade County throughout the 1970s maintaining racial friction. The next major riot took place in 1980 and is often characterized as one of the most serious race riots in American history. Four sets of events in late 1979 set the stage for the 1980 riot. First, there were two cases where Miami’s police department “overreacted” to “confrontations” with African-Americans, sending over twenty police cars in each instance (Dunn and Stepick 1992:43). Second, Anglo police officers raided the wrong house while searching for drugs and attacked the African-American occupant of the home. Despite the police force’s error, the homeowner was charged with battery and obstructing a police
officer performing his duties (Dunn and Stepick 1992:43). Third, an Anglo police officer shot and killed an African-American who stopped his car and stepped outside to urinate (Dunn and Stepick 1992:43). Fourth, an 11-year old African-American girl walking home from school was picked up by an Anglo Florida highway patrolman who sexually molested her (Dunn and Stepick 1992:43).

In addition to these events, it is crucial to remember that the Mariel boatlift to Miami began in April of 1980, less than one month before the riot. The possibility of Cubans gaining even more influence in South Florida frightened the African-American community who felt largely powerless to stop racial discrimination and unable to effectively organize to counter the power held by Anglos and Cubans. Additionally, the African-American community was angered by the continued unequal treatment of Cuban and Haitian immigrants. Despite the tensions between African-Americans and Haitian immigrants, the two groups united in frustration over the ability of Cubans to come to the United States whenever they wanted while Haitians had to struggle to be accepted by the U.S. government.

The totality of these events, which took place within the course of only a few months, provided ammunition for the Miami Riot of 1980. The combined effect of these examples of discrimination supported the widespread belief among African-Americans that they remained second-class citizens in South Florida. Each event added a little more heat to the pot that was about to boil over. While the miniriots let a little bit of steam escape, the ultimate effect of these incidents was to increase the pressure on Miami’s African-American community. Seen in this light, though certainly not inevitable, the magnitude of the Miami Riot of 1980 is comprehensible.
The events that led to the riot of 1980 actually began in December of 1979, when Arthur McDuffie, a 33-year old African-American from Miami was riding a motorcycle down a deserted street. While stopped at a traffic light, an Anglo police officer claims that McDuffie “provoked” him and started a police chase that lasted over eight minutes at speeds exceeding 100 miles per hour. McDuffie eventually stopped, police officers arrested him, and more police units arrived at the scene. Police officers claim that, once handcuffed, McDuffie attempted to punch one of the arresting officers. It was at this point that six to twelve police officers started to savagely beat McDuffie. After suffering severe brain injuries, McDuffie died four days later in a hospital (Porter and Dunn 1984).

Within hours after the beating, police tried to cover-up what had happened. Initial reports claimed that McDuffie had fallen off his motorcycle, though doctors quickly realized he had been beaten with a blunt object. The story broke to the public on December 24, 1979 after McDuffie’s mother was reported to say, “They beat my son like a dog. They beat him just because he was riding a motorcycle and because he was black” (Dunn 1997:271). The African-American community in South Florida quickly adopted this sentiment and started to protest. Charges were soon brought against some of the officers, though a few were granted immunity in exchange for testifying against their fellow officers.

The trial began in late March of 1980 in Tampa. The judge ordered the trial be moved to a different part of the state because, as she said, the case was a “time bomb” and the verdict, one way or the other, would cause outrage in some Miami community. It was clear that this case had the potential to release pent-up tensions.
among Miami’s African-American population. The possibility for a major riot following the trial was increased by the fact that defense attorneys used their peremptory challenges (a technique that can be used by the defense or prosecution to remove potential jurors from the jury pool without stating a reason) to eliminate all possible African-Americans from the jury (Dunn 1997:273). The prosecution could do nothing but hope for the best.

Although analysts believe the prosecution showed enough evidence that the police officers murdered McDuffie, the all-Anglo jury saw otherwise. After less than three hours of deliberation, the jury returned non-guilty verdicts for all police officers involved in the incident. As the news broke in Miami, both African-Americans and Anglos seemed surprised by the verdict. But it was Miami’s African-American population that erupted in anger. For the African-American community, the not-guilty verdicts signified that “the fact remained that a number of Anglo police officers had beaten an unarmed black man to death for a traffic violation and had not gotten so much as a slap on the wrist from the courts” (Dunn 1997:279).

The riots that followed lasted for three days after the verdict was announced. In all, police reports show the riots caused eighteen deaths (half Anglo, half African-American), $804 million in property damage, and 1,100 arrests (Dunn and Stepick 1992:43). Peaceful protests led by the NAACP quickly evolved into violent riots, where working class and middle class African-Americans came together and young and old African-Americans combined forces. The African-American population from all around Dade County united to protest the perceived racial injustices in South Florida.
While rioting took place in African-American communities across South Florida, including Perrine and Homestead in the south and Opa-Locka and Carol City in the north, the hub of the riot was focused in Liberty City, the second-oldest African-American neighborhood in Miami. Fires were set in streets across Dade County and looting became a major problem. Many prominent African-American leaders were so incensed by the verdict that they actively chose not to participate in emergency planning meetings proposed by Miami’s governing Anglo elites to try to quell the growing riot (Porter and Dunn 1984).

Gradually, the riot ran out of steam and police officers and the National Guard gained the upper hand. The explosion was over. Importantly, however, the core issues that caused the Miami Riot of 1980 remained unresolved. There was no justice for Arthur McDuffie – the police officers who killed him remained free. The perception of racial discrimination among African-American South Floridians continued just as before. The riot did not fundamentally alter power relations in Miami. If anything, it weakened the power of African-American political officials and organizations because they were unwilling and/or unable to control the riot.

The 1980s saw two more serious racial riots in Miami, both of which were sparked by accusations of Anglo police brutality against African-American South Floridians. This fact alone demonstrates that the Riot of 1980 did not significantly change anything in the South Florida political landscape. Thus, at the close of the decade and the first few years of the 1990s, racial tension remained high in South Florida. The memories of the riot remained fresh in everyone’s minds but the underlying problems that caused the riot continued unresolved. Hurricane Andrew in
1992 would provide the next big challenge for racial relations in the area. The key question to be addressed, then, is whether the destruction caused by Hurricane Andrew would fundamentally alter racial relations in South Florida. That subject is considered in Chapter Three.

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The history of racial and ethnic tension in South Florida is dynamic and complex. The combination of Miami’s unique history of racial segregation and immigration has caused many conflicts in the region. Cuban immigrants arrived with distinct advantages. First, the U.S. government reacted favorably to the arrival of the first Cuban immigrants because they were fleeing a communist country that posed a threat to the United States’ dominant capitalist ideology. Second, the initial Cuban arrivals were mostly middle and upper class immigrants who brought important skills and capital with them to Miami. Third, because the first immigrants arrived with economic capital and important social connections in the U.S., they were able to successfully develop the Cuban enclave to further their power and influence in South Florida and provide a niche for new immigrants to fill.

In contrast, Haitian immigrants represent the complete opposite of the Cuban immigrants. The U.S. government supported the capitalist dictatorial regime in Haiti and viewed Haitian immigrants as economic refugees, making it difficult for them to legally immigrate to the United States. Similarly, the majority of Haitian immigrants who settled in South Florida were lower and working class Haitians who did not have the education, skills, or social capital to compete with Miami’s Anglo and Cuban
communities. Moreover, South Florida’s Haitian and African-American communities were generally ambivalent towards each other. They rarely presented a united front. This divisiveness reduced the clout of both groups.

Miami’s African-American population also faced many frustrations. They perceived themselves as innocent victims of a long history of racial discrimination and segregation. After the Anglo community built a highway directly through Overtown, the heart of the historical hub of African-American life, Miami’s African-Americans dispersed throughout the city and lacked the unity of Miami’s Cuban enclave. African-Americans also believed that Cuban and Haitian immigrants were taking jobs away from their community. Ultimately, many of these frustrations were expressed in Miami’s Race Riot of 1980, though the underlying causes of these conflicts were never truly addressed.

The aftermath of Hurricane Andrew expressed the culmination of years of racial and ethnic tension in South Florida. As I show in the next two chapters, Miami’s history of racial and ethnic conflict had a significant impact on the housing crisis that developed after the storm. However, without a complete understanding of the historical trajectory of racial and ethnic conflict in South Florida, it is impossible to understand how and why this crisis emerged.
CHAPTER TWO:
BEFORE THE STORM: CONCEPTUALIZING RACE AND ETHNICITY
When Hurricane Andrew barreled ashore in South Dade County, many people commented on the widespread damage caused by the storm. One public official, viewing the damage from a helicopter, exclaimed “Look…look at that…No one escaped the impact of Hurricane Andrew” (Peacock and Girard 2000:171). While this statement is fundamentally true, it greatly oversimplifies the nuanced nature of the damage; not everyone was equally affected by the storm. The public official made this statement after viewing a “million-dollar residence where the barrel-tile roof had sustained damage to a corner section, the pool had turned dark green, and a surrounding grove of trees had been flattened” (Peacock and Girard 2000:171). Minutes before, he had flown above a mobile-home park in South Dade in which every house had been completely destroyed (Peacock and Girard 2000:171).

Well before Hurricane Andrew devastated Dade County, housing quality was a topic of concern in South Florida. Despite the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s and court-mandated desegregation, African-Americans living in Dade County remained victims of de facto segregation policies. Consequently, African-Americans generally lived in smaller, older homes than other South Floridians. Many of these houses were not constructed to withstand the force of a category five hurricane.

Significant portions of the data examining damage after Hurricane Andrew was compiled by researchers at Florida International University (FIU). Sociologists, anthropologists, and other social scientists began collecting data one week after the storm came ashore and this information remains the most fully-developed set of data available on the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew. The majority of the data for this chapter come from two studies conducted at FIU: the FIU Hurricane Andrew Survey.
and the South Dade Population Impact Study. Additional data were supplied by the Homestead Housing Needs and Demographic Study and the Florida City Study. While not exhaustive, these studies present the most accurate quantitative picture of South Florida life before and after Andrew.

The FIU Hurricane Andrew Survey examined “household preparation and evacuation activities, dislocation and relocation, household damage, insurance settlements, and other sources of assistance” (Morrow 2000:13). The South Dade Population and Impact Study determined “occupancy rates, average household size…and provide[d] information on post-Andrew movement and insurance settlements” (Morrow 2000:15). Although these data were difficult to obtain because of the dislocation associated with Hurricane Andrew, the researchers used a variety of innovative techniques to assess damage in the immediate aftermath of the catastrophic natural disaster.

This chapter examines the damage and destruction to homes caused by Hurricane Andrew. Before I can analyze the damage, however, it is necessary to understand the housing situation before the hurricane. Who lived where in Dade County? Who had insurance? And what quality insurance did they have? Who rented their home and who owned their home? These important questions need to be addressed to fundamentally understand how Hurricane Andrew affected South Florida’s housing situation. The answers to these questions can be found in quantitative data, especially information provided by the U.S. Census.

Yet, the categorization and conflation of racial and ethnic groups in Census data is extremely problematic. Accordingly, this chapter begins with an analysis of
the 1990 U.S. Census, specifically examining how it treats racial and ethnic groups. Following that, I frame the rest of the chapter by exploring critical theories of race and ethnicity and how racial and ethnic groups are represented in survey data. With this understanding, I explore the South Florida housing landscape before Hurricane Andrew by examining geographical differences, communities of fate, and discrepancies in insurance coverage. Finally, I discuss the destruction inflicted on South Florida homes during Hurricane Andrew. This section begins the analysis explaining why some individuals and families suffered much more than others after the storm. It sets the stage for Chapter Three which analyzes why some groups were more likely to relocate outside of the damage zone and why others faced constraints forcing them to remain and try to rebuild.

**Census Data and Categories**

The 1990 Census reported that were 1,937,094 total residents in Dade County. The survey found that 953,407 identified as Hispanic, 614,066 identified as White/Other, and 397,993 identified as Black (U.S. Census Bureau 1990). While these data may seem fairly straightforward, it is necessary to critically explore the U.S. Census’ categorization of racial and ethnic groups because it serves as one of the main sources of data used in my research and is the basis for many other forms of quantitative data I analyze. As the most prevalent source of demographic data in the U.S., the Census Bureau collects population information every ten years and serves as the basis for many other demographic studies. Thus, while the Census does not represent all surveys and quantitative data collections, many of the issues raised by
academics and activists in reference to the Census apply to other surveys as well. For this reason, it is extremely problematic that the Census has continually been unable to correctly discern the differences between racial and ethnic groups.

*History of Conflating Racial and Ethnic Groups*

Before I analyze the current problem of conflating racial and ethnic groups, it is important to examine the history of data collection and identification procedures adopted by the U.S. Census. Over the past fifty years, the Census Bureau has changed the method by which individuals are classified. Before 1950, information on race was obtained through “enumerator observation” (Campbell and Jung 2002). In 1960 and 1970, the Census used a mixture of direct interview and self-identification. By 1980, the Bureau had switched entirely to self-identification (Campbell and Jung 2002). This progression to self-identification certainly gives agency to the individuals participating in the data collection. Prior to 1950, “a person of mixed White and other parentage was usually classified with the other [non-White] race. A person of mixed race other than White was usually classified by the race of the person's father through 1970 and by the race of the person's mother in 1980 and 1990” (Campbell and Jung 2002). Thus, self-identification does not allow the researcher, who has traditionally been White and male, to determine the race and ethnicity of others (Rodríguez 2000:135).

At the same time, the agency of individuals is severely restricted by the categories offered by the U.S. Census Bureau. Individuals are forced to select from a limited range of options. Here again, there has not been much consistency over the
decades. The Census Bureau has changed categories, especially as the United States government has conquered and incorporated new territories and people. Additionally, as different waves of immigrants have arrived and populated the United States, the Census has struggled to develop new classification systems to incorporate them. Ultimately, the Census categories serve to confine individuals, labeling them as something they might not identify as.

Part of the reason why individuals may have a difficult time identifying with the labels offered by the U.S. Census is that the Bureau has a history of conflating racial and ethnic groups, despite the fact that “the U.S. Census Bureau’s official position has been that race and ethnicity are two separate concepts” (Rodríguez 2000:6). For this reason, the Census has changed its racial and ethnic categories over the past fifty years as it claims to develop better methods of distinguishing racial and ethnic groups in an increasingly complex demographic population. At the same time, many people use the terms “race” and “ethnicity” interchangeably in everyday speech. Once the differences between the two terms are analyzed, however, it becomes clear that this conflation is a major problem, especially in the design of the U.S. Census which is often considered the standard used by other surveys to collect important demographic data.

“Ethnicity” v. “Race”

While it is difficult to develop a comprehensive definition of the term “ethnicity,” William Peterson of the Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups explains that members of an ethnic group “are at least latently aware of
common interests” (Omi and Winant 1994:14). While this is true, American social scientist Richard A. Schermerhorn elaborates further, describing an ethnic group as “a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements as the epitome of their peoplehood” (Boal 2000:5). These definitions demonstrate how ethnicity emphasizes shared cultural characteristics and traits between members.

In contrast, Michael Omi and Howard Winant assert that the term “race” implies “a concept which signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human bodies. Although…it invokes biologically based human characteristics, selection of these particular human features for purposes of racial signification is always and necessarily a social and historical process” (1994:55). Omi and Winant continue, explaining how the state plays a fundamental role in processes of racialization. Specifically, the racial state explicitly and implicitly contributes to racial formation in the United States. The Census is an explicit indication of the government’s involvement in racializing society. Omi and Winant note that “Viewed as a whole, the census’s racial classification reflects prevailing conceptions of race, establishes boundaries by which one’s racial ‘identity’ can be understood, determines allocation of resources, and frames diverse political issues and conflicts” (1994:3). Thus, Census categories serve as an explicit example of the government constructing a racialized state.

Reinforcing this view explicated by Omi and Winant, sociologist Clara Rodriguez analyzes how in the United States, “rules of hypodescent and categories
based on presumed genealogical-biological criteria generally dominate conceptions of race.” Historically, in the United States racialization has been understood along a White/Black binary, where rules of hypodescent assert that “Black blood” pollutes, meaning if an individual has any Black ancestry, he or she is racially Black (Rodríguez 2000:29).

Still, race and ethnicity share many common characteristics. Scholar P.R. Spickard claims that race and ethnicity are practically the same, asserting that:

Both are defined on the basis of social, not biological criteria...[and] both claim descent from a common set of ancestors, have a common sense of identity, share the same culture from clothing to music to food to child-rearing practices, build similar institutions like churches and fraternal organizations, and pursue common political and economic interests (Rodríguez 2000:44).

While scholars like Omi and Winant would agree that both race and ethnicity are social categories and social constructs, they would argue that fundamental differences exist between the two categories of analysis. In their investigation of the ethnicity paradigm of race, Omi and Winant illustrate the critical difference by examining the case of Blacks in the United States. A strictly racial approach would not account for differences among Blacks – national origin, religion, language, or cultural differences.

Thus, while race and ethnicity are both created by individuals and societies – they are not biologically determined - most scholars do not agree that race and ethnicity are interchangeable concepts. In addition to the differences analyzed above, most researchers claim that ethnicity does not convey the same level of historical discrimination associated with race in the United States (Rodríguez 2000:45).
historical processes causing the White/Black binary to develop also produced specific forms of racism directed toward Blacks in the United States. Accordingly, race and ethnicity are not equivalent and they not mutually exclusive categories. While they certainly share certain commonalities, the differences between the two are significant.

Despite these marked differences, the Census Bureau frequently conflates racial and ethnic groups. For example, as I analyzed in Chapter One, there are marked differences between African-Americans and Haitians. However, because the Census data do not disaggregate Haitians from all Black respondents, these critical differences are lost. This makes it difficult for individuals, even with the Census allowing for self-identification, to accurately describe themselves. In a letter to the New York Times in reference to the 1980 Census, Mr. Ko Yung Tung commented that he was:

Somewhat puzzled and disturbed by the question relating to race/national origin on [the] census form. The categories were ‘white, black, Japanese, Chinese, Korean,’ etc. If the question is intended to get statistics on race, why is there a distinction between, say, Chinese and Japanese? They are both of the same race. If it is intended to elicit answers as to national origin, why are all whites undifferentiated? Why not German, French, Irish, etc.? Moreover, if this is to be an accurate study, it should allow for ‘mixed’ people. I myself am half Manchu and half Chinese (Han). My wife is ‘white’ (part Dutch, English, German, and Irish). What does that make my children? (Omi and Winant 1994:162)

This person’s experience with the Census is not unique. Rather, it is a common frustration experienced by many individuals who do not know how to respond to Census questions.

This confusion about racial and ethnic classification on the U.S. Census is particularly high in South Florida, where a large percentage of residents are first or
second generation immigrants from Latin America. Race and ethnicity have very different meanings in Latin American countries than in the United States. As explained above, the United States has historically followed the “one-drop rule,” meaning if an individual has one trace of African ancestry, he or she is automatically classified as Black (Rodríguez 2000:29). In Latin American countries, however, there is a long history of “mestizaje” between indigenous populations, European conquerors, and African slaves. As a result, the majority of Latin Americans do not conceive of race in the dichotomous terms of “White” and “Black” like people from the United States. Instead, many Latinos have embraced their mestizaje as “a way of resisting a world in which purity and separation are emphasized and one’s identities are controlled” (Rodríguez 2000:5).

Unfortunately, this has become difficult in the United States where society has historically placed such an emphasis on racial purity. Throughout the nineteenth century, a similar debate took place around the issue of classifying American Indians in the U.S. Census. Clara Rodriguez explains how historical processes of racialization were applied to the case of indigeneity in the United States. Initially, American Indians were classified by the U.S. Census according to blood quantum (Rodríguez 2000:89). By using this strategy and not the one-drop rule used for African-Americans, “the census clearly regarded Indians as a different race and half-breeds as having both ‘superior’ (White) and ‘inferior’ (Indian) blood” (Rodríguez 2000:90).

As Terry Wilson and Annette Jaimes suggest, using blood quantum to define an American Indian “race” has had a negative effect on the American Indian community
because such definitions are “at variance with the Indians’ own definitions of themselves” (Rodríguez 2000:90).

This type of forced racialization that has historically taken place among American Indian communities is currently taking place among Latinos living in the United States. External labels, specifically the White/Black binary, are forcibly being applied to Latinos in the United States. As I explained above, race has a very different meaning in Latin America compared to the United States. Rodriguez details the relative fluidity of race in Latin America and shows how different historical processes in North and South America resulted in different conceptions of race and blackness. Specifically, she shows how the concept of blackness does not necessarily hold the same negative connotations in Latin America as in the United States (Rodríguez 2000). Because race in Latin America is a more flexible construct, sociologist Tomás Almaguer (2003:214) finds that:

[Latinos] do not choose their racial status as they please but inherit it as a product of particular histories that have shaped their individual life chances. While money may whiten in this context, it does so within certain limits that circumscribe the Latino/a population’s active engagement with both their own culturally determined racializations (in their countries of origin) and that codified by the U.S. government (Almaguer 2003:214).

Within this context, it is understandable that South Floridians who trace their ancestry to Latin American countries often prefer not to be classified in racial terms such as “Black” or “White.” As Almaguer explains, “Faced with this official classificatory scheme, significantly high percentages of Latino/as have, in census questionnaires, simply opted out of what they consider an irrelevant schema by reporting their racial status as Other” (2003:208). Rodriguez finds that over 40
percent of Latinos selected “Other” in the 1990 U.S. Census (2000:130). This selection theoretically removes the limits imposed by the binary in the Census.

Although the design of the Census allows for the problematic possibility of defining oneself as racially “Other,” the overall format continues to encourage Latinos to fit the U.S. White/Black mold suggested by the federal government. Question four in the 1990 Census was titled “Race,” and let respondents select from “White, Black/Negro, Indian (Amer.), Eskimo, Aleut, Asian or Pacific Islander (API), or Other Race” (U.S. Department of Commerce 1990). If a respondent selected “Asian or Pacific Islander,” he or she also needed to choose a subcategory from the following choices: “Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, Asian Indian, Hawaiian, Samoan, Korean, Guamanian, Vietnamese, or Other API” (U.S. Department of Commerce 1990). Interestingly, the instructions from this question reminded respondents that “the Black/Negro category also includes persons who identify as African-American, Afro-American, Haitian, Jamaican, West Indian, Nigerian, and so on” (U.S. Department of Commerce 1990). Yet this clearly conflates racial and ethnic identities. As I mentioned above, African-Americans and Haitians generally do not identify together in the South Florida. According to the Census, however, because race and ethnicity are interchangeable, African-Americans and Haitians are the same as well.2

Critically, this question forces Latinos to work within the U.S. White/Black racial binary and choose if they consider themselves White, Black, or Other. Once again, the Census conflates race and ethnicity. Tomás Almaguer notes that “in the case of the…multiethnic category of ‘Hispanic’…the state, rather than designating

2 See Appendix A for a copy of the 1990 U.S. Census.
this category as a ‘race,’ refracts it along those categories the state officially recognizes as races: white, black, and, to a lesser extent, Native American and Asian” (2003:208). In an attempt to compensate for this problem, question seven of the Census asks respondents if they are of “Spanish/Hispanic origin” (U.S. Department of Commerce 1990). The possible responses are “No (not Spanish/Hispanic), Yes – Mexican, Mexican-Am., Chicano, Yes – Puerto Rican, Yes – Cuban, Yes – Other Spanish/Hispanic” (U.S. Department of Commerce 1990). The instructions for this question tell respondents that Spanish/Hispanic origin is defined as being “Mexican, Mexican-Am., Chicano, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Argentinean, Colombian, Costa Rican, Ecuadorian, Guatemalan, Honduran, Nicaraguan, Peruvian, Salvadoran, from other Spanish-speaking countries of the Caribbean or Central or South America or from Spain” (U.S. Department of Commerce 1990). It is important to remember, though, that this question is asked only after forcing Latinos to choose a racial group of White, Black, or Other.

An analysis of these data reveals at least two fundamental problems relating to the conflation of the concepts of race and ethnicity. First, the U.S. Census is inconsistent in its definition of racial and ethnic groups. What makes “Chinese” or “Japanese” a “race,” while “Cuban” and “Nicaraguan” are both deemed ethnicities? As Mr. Ko Yung Tung argued in his comment referring to the 1980 U.S. Census, the Bureau needs to demonstrate an understanding of the complexities of racial and ethnic groups suggested by scholars of racial and ethnic studies discussed above. This includes recognizing and understanding the differences between the two and maintaining consistency when asking questions on race and ethnicity. Second,
because Latinos can not select “Cuban” or “Nicaraguan” under the “race” question, they are forced to choose either “White,” “Black,” or “Other Race.” As I previously discussed, this question is extremely difficult to answer because many Latin American counties have a different conception of race. Thus, many respondents who identify themselves as “Hispanic” on question seven choose “Other Race” in question four.

In 2000, the U.S. Census changed its format once again. In 1993, the U.S. House Subcommittee on Census, Statistics, and Postal Personnel addressed four proposed changes to the racial and ethnic categories of the U.S. Census. Each of these changes would challenge many of the assumptions made by the U.S. Census over the past century. In addition, the changes “implicitly reinforced the social constructedness of race categories and their malleability and susceptibility to political, intellectual, and social redefinition” (Rodríguez 2000:153).

Two of these four changes specifically address the problem faced by Latinos in defining themselves within the categories previously created by the Census Bureau. The first proposal was to add a multiracial category, challenging the long-held assumption that racial groups were inherently mutually exclusive entities and challenging the historical precedent of using the rule of hypodescent to determine race in the United States (Rodriguez 2000:154). This proposal was modified to allow respondents to select one or more racial categories instead of choosing a multiracial category. In theory, this would offer a more accurate way to demographically measure the population (U.S. Census Bureau 2000).
The second proposal was to include “Hispanic” as a race category. This change would challenge the assumption that race and ethnicity were separate concepts by declaring that a category formally considered an ethnicity was now a distinct racial group (Rodríguez 2000:153). Although this second proposal would have made it easier to tabulate numbers of Latino respondents, Latino communities fiercely opposed the change, arguing that they are not a “racially homogeneous ethnic group” (Rodríguez 2000:174). Thus, making “Hispanic” a race category would suggest that an individual cannot identify as both Latino and Black. This proposal was modified so that respondents could select “Some Other Race” in the self-identification process. In addition, the Census developed two new categories for ethnicity: Hispanic or Latino and Not Hispanic or Latino (U.S. Census Bureau 2000). Again, the goal of this change was to clarify the identification process while also creating a more accurate measure of the population’s racial and ethnic identities.

These changes were not made until eight years after Hurricane Andrew. Thus, for the purposes of my research, it is challenging to find accurate demographic data due to the history of the U.S. Census conflating racial and ethnic groups. As I established in Chapter One, the traditional White/Black binary does not function well in Miami. Yet, the primary data collection tools adhere to this U.S. dichotomy. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to ensure accuracy when analyzing the statistics provided by the Census and many other surveys conducted by sociologists and social scientists. Therefore, throughout this project, I am careful to be as discerning as possible when examining studies relating to racial and ethnic groups. While it is not possible to reframe all of the research that has already been conducted, it is plausible
to problematize the conflation of racial and ethnic groups and deconstruct some of the results of the data collection.

“Anglo”

As mentioned in the introduction, the term “Anglo” is widely used and accepted in the literature describing South Florida’s unique racial and ethnic diversity. Its meaning is understood as synonymous with the phrase “non-Hispanic White” or “non-Latino White” in metropolitan Miami. “Anglo” gained popularity as the Latino population in South Florida began to grow in the late twentieth century. Because some Latinos, especially Cubans, characterize themselves as White, non-Latino Whites deploy the term to differentiate themselves from their Latino counterparts. Thus, the term functions as a means of adapting the White/Black binary to South Florida.

However, the move to adopt the term Anglo was also supported by South Florida Cubans. In Miami, the established division is Anglo/Latino/Black, though as I explained earlier, few individuals in South Florida think of themselves as Latino. Rather, they conceptualize themselves along national lines as Cubans, Nicaraguans, Peruvians, etc. This is partially a result of the historical trajectory of Cuban immigration to Miami. As Cubans built their enclave in South Florida and developed the “model minority” stereotype, they wanted to distinguish themselves from other Latino groups immigrating to the region. Thus, even though Cubans have historically wanted to be racialized as White, as the enclave community has grown in size and strength, Cubans have increasingly encouraged the use of phrases outside the
White/Black binary. This allows Cubans to emphasize their distinctiveness from Anglos as well as other Latin American immigrant groups by encouraging identification along national lines as opposed to ethnic lines. While these categories of analysis make it difficult to make the Census categories fit the South Florida context, the surveys using this schema nonetheless remain the best possible way to utilize data collected.

**Pre-Andrew Analysis of South Florida Housing**

In 1990, with a population of just under two million people, Dade County was a sprawling metropolis. Although Miami was (and remains) the largest city in the county, each local neighborhood within Miami and the other cities and towns surrounding Miami each contained a distinct population demographic. The reasons for this sharp divide are twofold. First, as I explained in Chapter One, Miami is one of the most residentially segregated large cities in the country as a result of the enduring legacy of racial segregation. Second, the large Cuban exile population in South Florida developed a tight-knit community that largely isolated itself from the rest of Dade County.

It is important to recognize that, contrary to popular belief, Hurricane Andrew did not start a trend of Latinization in Dade County. Rather, it accelerated a phenomenon that began in the late 1970s and early 1980s. As increasing numbers of Latinos immigrated to Miami, Anglos felt threatened by their potential loss of economic, cultural, and social supremacy. As a result, Portes notes that “The loss of cultural hegemony has led to a massive white [Anglo] flight…between 1980 and
1990 the area lost almost a third of its native population and only the large influx of [non-Anglo] immigrants prevented a net population loss” (Portes 1992:xiv). As a result, “the number of non-Latin whites in Dade County [decreased] by 24.4 percent between 1980 and 1990” (Grenier and Stepick 1992:14). Thus, it is clear that Anglos had started to leave Dade County well before Hurricane Andrew. The storm merely accelerated this process.

_Dade County Geography_

The damage caused by Hurricane Andrew was not equally distributed around Dade County. Rather, the most extreme damage was experienced in South Dade County. More specifically, researchers have largely followed The Metropolitan Dade County Planning Department (1993) in designating Kendall Drive as the North/South divide for Hurricane damage (Smith and McCarty 1996). North of the line, while many houses were damaged, there were fewer residences that were completely destroyed. South of Kendall Drive, however, there were a much higher percentage of homes that were completely destroyed, often beyond recognition.

While this division may fit the swath of hurricane damage, it does not correspond well with natural demographic division within Dade County. To understand the demographic distribution in South Florida, it is important to consider the geography of the region. Almost the entire population of Dade County lives within ten miles of the coast. Although the western edge of the country extends into the middle of the state, the Everglades makes the region uninhabitable. Since most of

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3 See Appendix B for maps of South Florida.
the population lives in the eastern portion of the county, Dade County is often divided into North Dade, Central Dade (Miami), and South Dade.

While African-Americans, Haitians, and Cubans lived in neighborhoods scattered throughout North Dade, Central Dade, and South Dade, certain racial and ethnic groups tended to live in distinct parts of the county. Generally speaking, there was a strong racial divide between North and South Dade. Whereas North Dade, usually defined as everything north of Miami proper up to the Broward County line, including Overtown, Liberty City, Hialeah, and North Miami, had many predominantly African-American communities, South Dade, including Coral Gables, Kendall, and Homestead, was known to have many neighborhoods with few Cubans and even fewer African-Americans.

In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, FIU sociology professor Lisandro Pérez commented that “South Dade has been one of the few remaining areas of the county with an ‘Anglo’ population majority. It has also been one of the few areas within Dade with affordable suburban housing. Other areas have experienced fast suburban growth…But those are predominantly Hispanic…” (1992a). This description of South Dade as a sanctuary for non-Blacks and non-Cubans is a bit exaggerated. While it is undoubtedly true that minorities made up a smaller proportion of South Dade residents compared to North Dade residents, small Black African-American communities existed and many middle-class Cubans lived in South Dade. Data from the 1990 U.S. Census confirms this observation. Demographically, while “both regions had relatively high proportions of blacks and Hispanics…the
proportions were higher for North than for South Dade, especially for the Hispanic population” (Smith and McCarty 1996:266).4

In addition to having a relatively smaller African-American and Cuban population, South Dade also had a smaller absolute minority population. Census data show that South Dade had fewer overall residents than Central and North Dade before Hurricane Andrew. According to demographers:

Before the hurricane, South Dade had a population of about 360,000, representing 18% of the county total…The population of South Dade was younger than the population of North Dade, with higher proportions of children and lower proportions of the elderly…Income and education levels and the proportion of owner-occupied housing units were much higher in South than in North Dade (Smith and McCarty 1996:266).

Thus, it is clear that significant population differences existed between North and South Dade before Andrew.

Communities of Fate

While the Cuban community in South Florida developed an enclave in South Florida, actively insulating members from greater Dade County, the African-American and Haitian South Florida populations were relegated to a “community of fate” (Peacock and Girard 2000:173). A result of a long history of segregation and discrimination, Blacks did not have the financial resources, specifically sufficient income and credit history, needed to escape poor-quality houses in neighborhoods with low property values. Communities like Overtown and Liberty City contained houses built during the 1930s and 1940s, before stricter building codes were implemented. No category four or five hurricane made landfall in Dade County

4 See Appendix B for more information.
between 1930 and 1992, meaning prior to Hurricane Andrew, these houses never had to face the fury of 150 mile-per-hour winds.

In 1957, Dade County Commissioners adopted the South Florida Building Code, considered the toughest in the nation at the time. Over the years, however, Dade County slowly eroded away many of the toughest provisions of the Code as the population exploded and houses needed to be built quickly and inexpensively. By the 1980s, one of the strongest tenets of the Code, the prohibition of pressboard from roofs, was removed. Consequently, houses constructed during the mid-to-late 1980s had roof failure at much higher rates than houses built between the late 1950s and early 1980s (Fronstin and Holtmann 1994).

South Florida African-Americans and Haitians were largely stuck in these communities of fate. As in other cities in the South (and many in the North as well), real estate agents would steer Blacks away from White neighborhoods. This made it difficult, if not impossible, for many African-Americans and Haitians to move into neighborhoods with better-constructed homes (Girard and Peacock 2000:195). The “resulting ghettoization often results in a lack of knowledge, skill, resources, institutions, and networks that facilitate moving out of segregated areas” (Girard and Peacock 2000:195). Thus, Blacks in South Florida were relegated to “communities of fate” where it was only a matter of time before a powerful hurricane would come and destroy the fabric of the community itself.
Rent v. Own

Scholars are in general agreement that there is a positive statistical correlation between living in rental housing and residential damage and destruction during a natural disaster. A 1997 Cornell University Study of seven large cities across the United States found that “22 percent of rental housing was of inadequate quality compared with 2.5 percent of owner-occupied homes” (Kutty 1997). There is no reason to think that the situation in South Dade County before Hurricane Andrew was any different from this trend. Logically, this makes sense given that rental properties are more likely to be poorly maintained than owner-occupied units. Morrow finds that “Renters have little control over the buildings in which they live, including whether they are structurally sound, have shutters or wind protection, are insured or get repaired” (1999:7). Individuals who live in houses they own have a monetary investment in the property and an emotional investment in the home. Rental units often have absentee landlords and tenets who do not think of the unit as their own home because they do not personally own the property.

Related to the concept of communities of fate, there is clear evidence to suggest that a disproportionate number of South Florida Black households lived in rental properties and did not own their own homes. Architect Mary Comerio calculated that nearly one-third of household units in South Dade County were rentals, yet the percentage increased to over 40 percent in the southernmost communities where many predominantly Black communities were located (1998:91). Taken together with the information that rental households, especially those occupied by Black residents, are generally of poorer quality compared to owner-occupied units,
it is clear that the African-American and Haitian population living in South Dade County was particularly vulnerable to Hurricane Andrew’s destructive winds. This is confirmed by Morrow’s findings that “Virtually all of the public housing units in South Dade – over 1,600 federally funded and 5,500 state funded units – were destroyed by the hurricane, along with most subsidized (Section 8) rental housing” (2000:11).

**Insurance**

In order to fully understand the actions of individuals after Hurricane Andrew, it is important to know how much homeowner’s insurance coverage, if any, they had before the storm. As expected, an analysis of differing levels of insurance coverage shows that “Minority households – Black and Hispanic – are likely to have inadequate insurance. Policyholders in these groups often lack supplemental flood or earthquake coverage or options that include temporary housing expenses. Some simply have insufficient coverage levels” (Peacock and Girard 2000:180). According to the FIU Hurricane Andrew Survey and the South Dade Population Impact Study, only 2.7 percent and 4.1 percent of Anglo and Cuban homeowners did not have any homeowner’s insurance, respectively. In contrast, 8.7 percent of Black homeowners did not have homeowner’s insurance (Peacock and Girard 2000:181). In South Dade, the contrast was even more striking, with Black homeowners being four times as likely as Anglo homeowners to lack homeowner’s insurance (Peacock and Girard 2000:181).
In the event of a major natural disaster, the financial consequences of not having homeowner’s insurance are almost unthinkable. Homeowners who may have spent decades accumulating enough money for a home suddenly find themselves without a roof over their heads and thousands of dollars lost. According to the obtainable data, Black homeowners were statistically more likely to face such devastating losses. Yet, because African-Americans and Haitians were part of a “community of fate,” there was little recourse available to them. Whereas the Anglo community could rely on its significant political and economic capital and the Cuban community could look inward and use the networks established through its enclave, the Black community was largely left to fend for itself.

The racial and ethnic disparities in homeowner’s insurance extend beyond whether or not an individual has insurance. Equally important is the willingness and ability of the insurance company to pay for damages to the home. Here again, there is an important difference in coverage between Anglo/Cuban and Black homeowners in South Florida. Survey data indicate that 16 percent of Anglo homeowners with insurance reported that their insurance company was not providing sufficient funds to cover their rebuilding expenses, compared to 24.7 percent of Cubans and 38 percent of Blacks. In South Dade, the trend is similar, but the percentage of Blacks who did not receive enough money climbs to 45 percent (Peacock and Girard 2000:181).

In addition, it is important to analyze which insurance companies are issuing policies to which segments of the population:

The major insurance firms – representatives of the core of the United States insurance industry – are prominent in neighborhoods in which the majority of occupants are members of Dade’s dominant ethnic groups, Anglos and
Cubans. In Black neighborhoods, on the other hand, the names of smaller and less-well known firms – representatives of the insurance periphery or secondary market players – dominated. Unfortunately, many of these companies failed following the storm (Peacock and Girard 2000:181).

While this quotation provides anecdotal, qualitative information, survey data confirm these observations. The South Dade Population Impact Study found that “the percentage of homeowners indicating that their insurance settlements was insufficient was three times greater (25.2 percent versus 8.5 percent) when their insurers were not among the top three companies [State Farm, Allstate, and Prudential]” (Peacock and Girard 2000:183). In addition, over 50 percent of Black homeowners not insured by a top-three company reported not receiving sufficient payment, whereas this figure is 15 and 25 percent for Anglos and Cubans, respectively. Overall, Blacks were four times as likely as Anglos to have insufficient insurance settlements (Peacock and Girard 2000:184).

Importantly, Blacks insured with a top-three company did receive adequate payment (Peacock and Girard 2000:184). However, the same survey found that while over 60 percent of Anglos and Cubans were covered by a top-three insurance company, fewer than 50 percent of Blacks were covered by a top company (Peacock and Girard 2000:186). Even more stunning is that fact that, when analyzed by neighborhood, a house on a block where at least 75 percent of residents identified as Black was only 38 percent likely to have a top-three insurance company. In contrast, a house on a block with 25 percent or fewer Blacks had a 63 percent chance of having a top-three company (Peacock and Girard 2000:186). Once again, this is a negative consequence of Miami’s history of racial residential segregation.
Thus, when analyzed together, it is clear that South Florida Blacks had much worse insurance coverage than South Florida Anglos and Cubans. A regression analysis calculating the log-odds of a household with a top-three insurance company, controlling for income, shows that “the odds of having a policy with a top-three firm for a Black household are roughly half that of an Anglo household. In contrast, the odds of being covered by a top-three insurer are roughly the same for [Cuban] households and Anglo households” (Peacock and Girard 2000:186-187). The consequences of this disparity directly relate to why certain individuals stayed in South Dade County after Hurricane Andrew and why others left the area. This topic is further considered in Chapter Three.

**Hurricane Damage and Destruction to Housing**

Hurricane Andrew radically altered the landscape of South Florida, particularly in South Dade County where the storm made landfall. It is estimated that damage to residential structures accounted for over $15 billion of the $22 billion in damage in 1992 dollars, almost $5 billion of which was uninsured (Comerio 1998:89). Smith and McCarty (1996:265) conclude that “more than half the housing units in Dade County were damaged by Hurricane Andrew; that more than 353,000 people were forced to leave their homes, at least temporarily; and that almost 40,000 people left the county permanently as a direct result of the hurricane.” I examine exactly where displaced residents moved in Chapter Three. In this section, however, I analyze the damage associated with Hurricane Andrew and ascertain who exactly felt the most significant impact from the storm.
The available data on damage distribution in South Florida suggest that Peacock and Girard are correct in their assertion that “the relationship between social ecology and disaster-generating natural forces is interactive” (2000:174). While a natural variation in wind velocity and localized weather phenomena certainly contributed to differences in damage, housing quality was the overwhelming determinant of the severity of damage. Since, as I have shown above, housing quality was related to race and ethnicity, it is fair to say that severity of damage was dependent upon race and ethnicity.

*North v. South Dade*

It is clear that damage from Hurricane Andrew was concentrated in South Dade County. In total, 89 percent of South Dade residents reported at least some damage to their home, compared to 47 percent of North Dade residents. Similarly, South Dade residents reported more significant levels of damage than their counterparts living farther north in the county. According to internal Red Cross documents released to researchers from the University of Florida, over 90 percent of destroyed homes were located south of North Kendall Drive, the North/South line designated by researchers to divide Dade County into zones of greater and lesser destruction (Smith and McCarty 1996).

Insurance claims amounts also show how South Dade County suffered far greater damage than North Dade. University of Florida researchers found that “more than half the settlements in North Dade were for less than $5,000; only four percent were for more than $40,000. In contrast, only 11 percent of the settlements in South
Dade were for less than $5,000, and more than half were for more than $40,000” (Smith and McCarty 1996:269). When these figures are analyzed alongside the data showing that African-Americans and Haitians had less insurance coverage with less-reputable companies, it is clear that Blacks living in South Dade County had the potential to lose much more as Hurricane Andrew reduced homes to piles of rubble.

*Racial/Ethnic Differentials in Damage*

The best data source for damage analyzed according to racial/ethnic groups is the FIU Hurricane Andrew Survey. The researchers argued that they were accounting for the conflation of race and ethnicity often found in Census data by having respondents self-identify as Anglo, Black, or Hispanic. Individuals who responded as Hispanic were “recorded as such, regardless of race” (Peacock and Girard 2000:174). The survey further subdivided the pan-Hispanic category into those who identity as “Cuban” and those who identify as some other Hispanic ethnicity. Unfortunately, this survey has many of the same problems of conflating race/ethnicity/national origin as the U.S. Census. Regardless, it remains one of the few sources of data that analyze damage caused by Hurricane Andrew differentiated by racial/ethnic groups.

The data collected by the FIU Hurricane Andrew survey reveal that “when controlling for other influences, Blacks and Hispanics sustained more hurricane damage than Anglos” (Peacock and Girard 2000:176). The study controlled for important factors such as the:

Household’s proximity to the storm’s path, whether the household was located in an evacuation zone, whether the household boarded its windows, household income level, and whether the household resided in a mobile home, apartment,
duplex, or townhome (compared to a single-family dwelling as the reference category) (Peacock and Girard 2000:176).

Given the known history of racial segregation and discrimination in Miami, it comes as no surprise that Blacks faced greater damages than Anglos. However, “differentials between Black households and Anglo households disappear when location in predominantly Black areas is entered into the equation” (Peacock and Girard 2000:179). This information suggests that the higher damage rates are related to patterns of residential segregation and the presence of communities of fate.

The study also examined neighborhoods according to ZIP Code, searching for regions identified as at least 75 percent Black and 75 percent Hispanic. The researchers caution that ZIP Codes are not necessarily the most accurate means of dividing a community because they are “established for administrative purposes by the post office and consequently do not necessarily reflect socially homogeneous neighborhoods” (Peacock and Girard 2000:178). Still, as expected due to residential segregation patterns, there were a plethora of ZIP Codes containing at least 75 percent Black residents. Additionally, controlling for the variables listed above, Zip Codes with the highest percentages of Black residents suffered significantly higher levels of damage than other areas (Peacock and Girard 2000:178-179).

It was much more challenging to find ZIP Codes identified as at least 75 percent Hispanic. Moreover, in all of Dade County, there was not one ZIP Code with at least 75 percent Cuban-identified residents. This reflects lower-levels of Cuban residential segregation. However, it is a bit perplexing that an area such as Little Havana, known as a predominantly Cuban region, would not contain a large Cuban
population. This might reflect a problem in using ZIP Codes to determine residential neighborhoods. In any case, like Blacks, Hispanics reported significantly more damage than Anglos. Unlike Blacks, however, the study found that even when controlling for being located in a predominantly Hispanic area, “Hispanic households still report higher levels of damage than Anglo households” (Peacock and Girard 2000:179). Most unexpected is the finding that the Cuban ethnic subcategory reported levels of damage much higher than the pan-Hispanic category and nearly the same as Black respondents (Peacock and Girard 2000:178).

This analysis suggests that while racial segregation largely explains why Blacks suffered significantly higher damage than Anglos, it does not clarify why Hispanics had higher losses than Anglos as well. To explain why Cubans faced higher-than-expected damage, I propose that we must investigate the type of housing individuals were living in. As the FIU Hurricane Andrew Survey suggests, “the type of residence was also critical: residences located in apartments and duplexes reported lower levels of damage than single-family dwellings, whereas mobile homes fared significantly worse” (Peacock and Girard 2000:176). Many Hispanics lived in single-family homes, the category with the most amount of damage. In addition, it is important to examine the age of the dwellings where people resided. As I demonstrated earlier in this chapter, structures built in the late 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s were more structurally sound than homes built before 1957 and those constructed in the 1980s and early 1990s due to the South Florida Building Code passed in 1957 and gradually weakened in subsequent decades.
A study conducted by Paul Fronstin and Alphonse Holtmann found that controlling for proximity to the center of the hurricane, older homes seemed to incur less damage than newer homes. Quantitatively, a subdivision built five years before Hurricane Andrew would have an average of 96.65 percent of homes in it completely destroyed if it was subjected to wind speeds above 115 mph, but in a subdivision built 30 years ago, only 67.71 percent of homes would be destroyed (Fronstin and Holtmann 1994:394). Although this may seem counterintuitive, it makes sense given the history of the South Florida Building Code.

Standing alone, this information does not help explicate why Hispanics seemed to incur more damage to their homes than Anglos. However, as I discussed in Chapter One and further elaborate upon in Chapter Three, Hispanics, and Cubans in particular, gained much social, economic, and political capital in the 1980s and early 1990s. The Cuban enclave established in the 1960s and 1970s was developing and flourishing in South Florida. Middle-class Cubans, many of whom had lived in Miami for over twenty years, were able to move out of Little Havana neighborhoods which were being repopulated by Marielitos who recently arrived in the United States. Many more-established Cubans chose to move into the rapidly expanding cities and unincorporated areas in South Dade County, avoiding many of the larger concentrations of African-Americans and Haitians in Central and North Dade County.

Thus, many Cubans moved into relatively new homes and subdivisions in South Dade during the 1980s and early 1990s, the same time that the South Florida Building Code was weakened by government authorities. After decades without a major storm, South Floridians, including Cubans, were lulled into a sense of
complacency. Contractors and developers were eager to build affordable new homes for members of the economically rising Cuban enclave community. Unfortunately, these new homes were not built to face the fury of Hurricane Andrew’s powerful winds. Thus, many Anglos who had lived in older homes in wealthier neighborhoods for decades were not as severely damaged by the storm. Their homes were constructed using stronger materials under a stricter building code.

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It is clear that the racial and ethnic composition of South Florida before Hurricane Andrew was incredibly diverse. Yet the unique historical and sociological processes that produced this diversity are not adequately represented in U.S. Census data. Because Census categories are often used as a guide for other studies and surveys, these same incorrect categorizations were used in many local studies examining the South Florida housing situation before and after Hurricane Andrew. Although I tried to respect the local categories of race and ethnicity used in South Florida, ultimately I was constricted by my data sources and forced to make difficult compromises about categories of race and ethnicity. Consequently, the data collected, especially the information related to the categorization of Latinos, must be analyzed with this understanding in mind. Still, it is possible to glean useful information from the data and use it to analyze housing trends in the Miami metropolitan area.

South Dade County, the epicenter of damage from Hurricane Andrew, was historically known as one of the last regions in the county where Anglos outnumbered minority populations. While the relatively small number of non-Anglos living in
South Dade may have been exaggerated in residents’ minds, it is true that the area had a lower percentage of non-Anglos compared to other parts of the county. Importantly, this resulted in extreme geographic isolation, where those non-Anglos who did live in South Dade were destined to exist in a “community of fate,” leaving the residents with few possibilities for escape.

The tangible disparities between those living within the communities of fate and those living outside of them are significant. African-American and Haitian individuals and families forming the communities of fate were statistically less likely to have homeowner’s insurance. If they did, it was likely to be with a smaller company that was less likely to pay to cover damages after Hurricane Andrew. Thus, the presence of communities of fate made it possible for discrimination in insurance policies throughout the Miami metropolitan region.

In the next chapter I establish a sociological framework to analyze who moved where after Hurricane Andrew. I examine how many South Florida African-Americans and Haitians lacked the resources necessary to make a choice between relocation and rebuilding after Hurricane Andrew. Thus, I show how the demographic changes that occurred following the storm are not so much a result of personal preferences but rather systematic and institutional forms of inequity.
CHAPTER THREE:
THE CRISIS AFTER ANDREW: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND HOUSING
In August 1992, Steve Times and Betty Brinson, an unmarried black couple, lost their house in Princeton, Florida, to damage caused by Hurricane Andrew. They began searching almost immediately for a residence to rent, but the hurricane had created a critical shortage of residential property. Times and Brinson lived at Brinson's place of business for a short time, stayed with friends for a few days, and then moved into a hotel when they began receiving money from their insurance company for living expenses.

Shortly after Times and Brinson began looking for a home to rent, Annette and Janos Banai, a white couple residing in Lindhurst, New York, decided to place the house they owned in Hollywood, Florida, on the rental market. The Banai’s had learned that Hurricane Andrew had left many Miami-area residents without homes and hoped that they could help victims of the hurricane by renting their house. They contacted Manhattan Group Real Estate, Inc. and arranged for that company to list their house for rent. Sylvia Arias, then an employee of Manhattan, placed an advertisement for the house in a local newspaper.

Times responded to this advertisement, and Arias showed him the Banai’s house. Times told Arias that he and Brinson wanted to rent the house. Arias believed that Times and Brinson were fully qualified to rent the house. Thus, she told Times that she foresaw no problems with the rental, but needed to confirm it with the Banai’s. The prospect of an end to their housing problems was a great relief to Times and Brinson.

Unfortunately for Times and Brinson, Arias’ confirmation call to Annette Banai was not the mere formality she had expected. Banai asked Arias about Times
and Brinson's race; when told that they were black, Banai responded that she could not rent to blacks because the neighbors would disapprove. Upon learning of this conversation, Arias' supervisor at Manhattan called Banai and told her that Arias should not have responded to Banai's question about Times and Brinson's race, that a refusal to rent based on race was unlawful, and that if Banai did not change her mind, Manhattan would terminate the listing agreement. Banai responded that she believed that she could rent to whomever she pleased and would not change her mind. Manhattan terminated the agreement, and Arias told Times the bad news and recommended that he obtain a lawyer.

Times and Brinson were forced to move in with Times' mother and sister. This arrangement was...unsatisfactory because the apartment was too small for the four of them. This environment placed stress on Times and Brinson's relationship and created tension between the couple and Times' family. Some time later, Times and Brinson received enough money from the insurance company to purchase a mobile home. This arrangement was also far from ideal as strong winds would shake the home during storms, and rats lived beneath it.

Banai v. Times and Brinson

Many factors, including patterns of residential segregation, homeowner’s insurance inequities, and age of housing explain why African-Americans and Haitians suffered significantly more damage than both Cubans and Anglos during Hurricane Andrew. This is critical to understanding exactly who was affected by the storm. Yet,
it does not fully address the issue of how individuals and families reacted after the storm. As Morrow explains:

The impact of a natural event on any given community...is not random, but determined by everyday patterns of social interaction and organisation, particularly the resulting stratification paradigms which determine access to resources. The effect on any particular household, therefore, results from a complex set of interacting conditions, some having to do with geography and location, some with the dwelling, and still others with the social and economic characteristics of the people living there (Morrow 1999:2).

Understanding how these complex interactions function together is fundamental to comprehending the human disaster of Hurricane Andrew.

In this chapter, I analyze both quantitative and qualitative data explaining why certain people chose to stay in South Dade County and why others chose to leave. For those that left, I try to ascertain how they selected their new geographic location. Once this data is explained, I am able to examine differences in economic, social, and cultural capital between Anglos, Cubans, and African-Americans and Haitians. Ultimately, while it may appear that individuals and families made localized decisions based on what was best for them, it becomes clear that systemic and institutionalized forces guided some people to move and others to stay.

To better comprehend what some of these forces are, it is important to have a better understanding of the concepts of economic, social, and cultural capital. French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu coined the term “cultural capital” and made distinctions between the three types of capital in his work *The Forms of Capital* (1986). He defines economic capital as control over economic resources (Bourdieu 1986:243). Social capital is "the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu 1986:248). Finally, Bourdieu defines his theory of cultural capital as forms of knowledge, skills, education, or expectations that serve to increase an individual’s respective advantages in society (Bourdieu 1986). In practice, it is difficult to differentiate between tangible expressions of social and cultural capital as the two tend to combine. For this reason, I examine social capital from a quantitative perspective and cultural capital from a qualitative perspective, although the analyses in each section overlap significantly. By analyzing the different levels of economic, social, and cultural capital within the South Florida Anglo, Black, and Cuban communities, it is possible to better understand what resources individuals had available to them.

The sociological theory behind much of the analysis of this chapter stems from network theory. Sociologists use this theory to describe and map interpersonal relations. Individuals, often referred to as nodes, are connected to each other through a series of ties. These ties can be described as either “strong” or “weak.” A strong tie would include relationships to family members and close friends. In contrast, a weak tie is a relationship with an acquaintance or a friend of a friend (Granovetter 1973). In the 1970s, American sociologist Mark Granovetter published his seminal work “The Strength of Weak Ties.” Granovetter (1973) explains that individuals who have more weak ties are more likely to have access to resources necessary to thrive. Essentially, in Bourdieu’s terms, Granovetter suggests that having numerous weak ties increases an individual’s access to social and cultural capital.
I propose that the sociological theory associated with networks is critical to fully understand the actions of individuals and families after Hurricane Andrew. Anglos, African-Americans, Haitians, and Cubans each collectively possessed varying degrees of weak ties. The enclave, for instance, enhanced the number of weak ties within the Cuban community while the largely divided African-American and Haitian communities were unable to create equally expansive networks. Consequently, I show how social and cultural capital accumulated in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s through weak ties had a direct impact on the housing options available to different racial and ethnic groups after Hurricane Andrew.

To analyze economic capital, I utilize survey data to determine average income levels for different racial and ethnic groups as well as levels of unemployment and poverty. I also look at the number, type, and size of businesses owned by individuals from each group. While not comprehensive, I believe these factors provide an overall guide to understanding different levels of economic capital between Anglos, African-Americans, Haitians, and Cubans.

To analyze social capital, I examine different levels of political activity. Specifically, I look at the number of individuals elected to political office who self-identify as members of each racial and ethnic group. I also examine voter registration numbers and how many registered voters actually vote from each group. I am choosing to focus on the political sphere because it also encompasses questions of citizenship and enfranchisement, both of which are critical to understanding the full scope of social capital.
It is more challenging to find appropriate quantitative measures following Bourdieu’s definition of cultural capital. Thus, I focus on select narratives from Black individuals and families. Aside from the methodological challenges in acquiring quantitative data for measuring cultural capital, it is also important not to rely solely on quantitative data. Qualitative data can provide key insights into processes that are often not captured in statistical analyses. Moreover, qualitative data add a personal, human element to the story. Thus, there is a useful role for both quantitative and qualitative data in this project.

Taken together, these elements contribute to understanding the factors aiding and restricting household movement after Hurricane Andrew. It is important to realize that personal choice is only one factor in the equation explaining the motivations and actions of individuals and families. Structural forces, represented by dimensions of economic, social, and cultural capital, ultimately demand certain people to make certain choices and limit individual agency. Much like economic, social, and cultural capital helped determine where individuals and families lived in South Florida before Hurricane Andrew, these same forces helped to restructure the landscape in the aftermath of the storm.

**Forms of Capital**

It is important to understand that economic, social, and cultural capital are not completely independent of each other. Rather, they are highly interrelated and function together in a variety of ways. In South Florida, African-Americans and Haitians have historically had much lower levels of all three measures of capital.
Cuban residents have generally had relatively high levels of economic and cultural capital but have just recently started acquiring high levels of social capital. Anglos in Dade County have traditionally had high levels of economic, social, and cultural capital. A breakdown and analysis of each type of capital helps to better understand how economic, social, and cultural capital functions among South Florida’s racial and ethnic groups.

**Economic Capital**

The amount of economic capital available to any group or individual is a tangible way to gauge levels of power and influence. In a capitalist society, money translates into nearly limitless power and potential. In addition, economic capital is fundamental to understanding Bourdieu’s other forms of capital. While it may be possible to overcome some of the challenges associated with not having sufficient social and cultural capital, it is difficult to compensate for a lack of economic capital in a materialistic and capitalist society like the United States. Although one South Florida labor union leader proclaimed that “The future of labor in South Florida depends on the enfranchisement of Latins, blacks, and Haitians,” (Grenier 1992:146) the evidence suggests that future of South Florida lies solely with the growing Cuban population in Dade County.

Historically, African-Americans and Haitians living in South Florida have suffered from a lack of economic resources. Decades of racial segregation and discrimination have left Blacks with few opportunities to economically prosper. At the same time, South Florida Cubans have had fewer problems obtaining decent
paying jobs and earning money. As Chapter One detailed, this is partially due to the middle and upper class status of many of the initial Cuban immigrants in South Florida. Racial dynamics also played a role here, however. The early Cuban immigrants were mostly light-skinned and racialized as White. Thus, while distinct from the native Anglo population, the Cuban population has had much more economic success due to their physical appearance.

Before I examine some of the differentiations in real income and the types of jobs held by South Floridians, it is necessary to consider the perceptions of community members. A 1989 poll conducted by the *Miami Herald* found that over one-third of Black respondents said that either they or someone they know has faced discrimination in seeking a new job or promotion, whereas only 14 percent of Anglos and 13 percent of Hispanics claimed they faced similar discrimination (Stack and Warren 1992:167). In addition, the poll asked respondents if they believed another group would discriminate against them. Nearly one-third of Black respondents thought Hispanics would discriminate against them and 40 percent believed Anglos would discriminate against them (Stack and Warren 1992:167). Thus, South Florida African-Americans and Haitians perceived that they faced job discrimination and largely blamed Anglos and Latinos for these problems.

Examining annual income distributions clarifies the tangible effects of differential economic opportunities for South Florida Anglo, Cuban, and Black residents. In 1990, nearly 15 percent of Dade County’s Black families earned less than $5,000 per year and well over half earned less than $25,000 per year. Haitian households in particular earned a small amount. Over fifty percent of Haitian homes
earned less than $20,000 per year. In comparison, Cubans living in Dade County earned significantly more. While median Cuban incomes were only slightly higher than Black median incomes, the critical difference is in the upper income brackets. Nearly ten percent of Cubans earned over $50,000 per year whereas only six percent of Haitians earned this amount. Having a small group of individuals earning a large amount of money helps solidify the economic base of a racial or ethnic minority community.

Tourism and other service industries constitute a considerable percentage of jobs in South Florida. Historically, the majority of jobs in this sector of the economy offer low wages and few opportunities for advancement. Data collected throughout the 1980s and early 1990s demonstrate that African-Americans and Haitians were likely to work in these low-income positions. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission found that “Blacks, who make up 18 percent of the Dade work force, are overrepresented in low-skilled, low-paying jobs in the tourist industry, and despite some progress, are still underrepresented in upper-level positions” (Dunn 1997:347). Thus, not only are South Florida Blacks more likely to work in the low-paying tourism industry, but as the data show, they are also more likely to be working low-wage jobs within the low-wage field.

In May 1992, three months before Hurricane Andrew, the Miami Herald reported that 30 percent of African-Americans and Haitians residing in Dade County lived below the poverty line. In contrast, 20 percent of Cubans and other Latinos and only six percent of Anglos in Dade County lived below the poverty line (Dunn 1997:350). These statistics are partially related to high levels of unemployment and
underemployment within the Black community, specifically for Black teenagers. This issue served as one of the catalysts for the Miami riots in the 1960s and remained a largely unresolved issue in the late 1980s and early 1990s. A Dade County survey conducted in April of 1992 found that 34.6 percent of Black male teenagers and 42.5 percent of Black female teenagers were unemployed, compared to 18 percent and 17.3 percent of Anglo males and females, respectively (Dunn 1997:347).

It is not unusual for African-Americans to earn less than Whites – this trend is apparent in cities throughout the United States. Institutional racism and structural forces in the economy are well-documented and help explain the White/Black income disparity and the limited options for Blacks in the larger economy (Dash et al. 2000). What is a bit different in South Florida, however, is the addition of the Cuban community to act as a foil to the African-Americans. The unmarked normative category of whiteness, which in the South Florida context applies primarily to Anglos, becomes the standard (Winant 1997). As I analyzed in Chapter Two, South Florida Cubans were generally racialized as White, allowing Cubans to earn higher wages. At the same time, African-Americans and Haitians were racialized as Black – the racial “Other.” Consequently, South Florida Blacks earned lower wages.

Many Dade County Black residents expressed frustration toward earning significantly less than not only Anglos, but Cubans as well. African-Americans, in particular, watched throughout the 1960s and 1970s as Cubans moved “temporarily” to South Florida, gradually lengthening their stay indefinitely. During the 1980s, they observed the growth and expansion of the Cuban enclave, largely sheltering South Florida Cubans from discrimination and downturns in the larger economy. As one
analyst remarked, “Blacks continue to complain about being economically isolated because business opportunities for blacks outside their own communities remain limited” (Dunn 1997:347).

African-Americans were thus left without a significant community base to provide employment and continued to face discrimination in the larger South Florida economy. Many Blacks felt compelled to fend for themselves or rely on the government to ensure their well-being. Most African-Americans and Haitians living in Dade County found that the only route to middle-class and upper-middle class jobs were through dependency on government contracts - “set-aside” programs - specifically designed to increase the number of middle-class African-Americans in South Florida (Dunn 1997:347).

Yet, social researchers Marvin Dunn and Alex Stepick III found that South Florida Blacks have had to compete with Anglos and Cubans to benefit from these government programs. After 1980, Dunn and Stepick report that more than 90 percent of government contracts offered through the Small Business Administration (SBA), totaling more than $22 million, went to Anglos or Cubans (1992:52). Similarly, Black contractors received only 12 percent of jobs during the construction of Miami’s rapid transit system, Metrorail, during the late 1970s. In contrast, Latino contractors received over 50 percent of the jobs (Dunn and Stepick 1992:52).

A similar trend exists in South Florida businesses. Like cities throughout the United States, most large businesses in Miami are owned and operated by Anglo men. One study concluded that “the leaders of businesses with the most employees in…Dade County are 60 percent white [Anglo]” (Stepick et al. 2003:23). Yet, a
comparatively small number of wealthy Cubans in South Florida control a significant number of medium and large firms that mostly operate within the Cuban enclave community. In the years before Hurricane Andrew, many of these Cuban businesspeople began to challenge some of the Anglo establishment for economic primacy in South Florida.

The presence of the Cuban enclave supported a tight-knit Cuban-owned business community in South Florida. In 1984, Thomas Boswell and James Curtis found that the rate of business ownership among South Florida Hispanics, at 43 per 1,000 individuals, is much higher than business ownership rates in other metropolitan areas with large Latino populations such as New York and Los Angeles (Castro 1992). A 1990 study of South Florida businesses found an even higher level of business ownership among Cubans. The U.S. Department of Commerce found 34,771 Cuban-owned businesses in Dade County with a Cuban workforce of approximately 380,000 individuals. This translates into a business ownership rate of nearly 10 percent (Grenier 1992:137).

The lack of a cohesive Black economic community is verified by the small number of businesses owned by African-Americans and Haitians. The Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce reports that only 1.4 percent of Dade County’s Black population owned their own businesses in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Dunn and Stepick 1992:53). In 1991, there were approximately 5,400 Black-owned businesses in Dade County, with an average revenue of $248,000 per business (Dunn and Stepick 1992:53). These businesses were generally small, employing relatively few
workers. In total, 6,208 individuals, or four percent of Dade County’s Black population, worked in these firms, including the owner (Dunn and Stepick 1992:53).

Even in the Haitian community, which was arguably more tight-knit than the broader South Florida Black community, there remained a dearth of successful Haitian-owned businesses. Although some Haitian-owned firms existed in Dade County, most of them could be described as modest, at best. Stepick estimates that nearly 200 Haitian-owned businesses operated in Dade County in the late 1980s, mostly in Little Haiti. The majority of these firms, however, were small grocery stores, auto repair shops, and other service-related businesses. Almost 80 percent of the businesses had sales totaling less than $2,000 per month and $50,000 per year (Stepick 1992:76). In 1985, Haitian businesses employed an average of 1.5 employees, the majority had other family members working in the business, and more than 30 percent of the owners or their families also worked another job outside of the business (Stepick 1992:76).

Collectively, then, the quantitative analysis suggests that Cubans were gaining economic capital throughout the 1970s and 1980s and starting to encroach on Anglo supremacy in South Florida businesses. At the same time, African-Americans and Haitians did not share in this economic growth. Instead, Blacks in Miami continued to be economically subordinate to Anglos and Cubans. As I explain later in this chapter, the increasing difference in economic capital between Cubans and Blacks is one factor explaining why African-Americans and Haitians had limited personal agency after Hurricane Andrew.
Social Capital and Political Power

Historically, the political power structures in the city of Miami and Dade County have ensured Anglo and Cuban control of local government positions. A 1957 reform created a two-tiered metropolitan form of government that supposedly “rejected big-city machine politics with its neighborhood and partisan orientations, its reliance on the control of ethnic voters, and the perceived legacy of corruption” (Stack and Warren 1992:160-161). This movement removed power from Dade County’s 26 municipalities and gave authority to county-wide structures such as the County Commission. It also helped the South Florida business community by removing bureaucratic obstacles to economic growth in the region. Yet, as Professor Edward Sofen remarks, “Despite the good government and civic pride rhetoric of the reformers, the establishment of Dade County’s metropolitan form of government benefitted business elite at the expense of neighborhood, sectional, and ethnic/minority interests” (Stack and Warren 1992:164).

Ultimately, the effect of this reform movement was to take power away from Dade County’s African-American and Haitian communities. Until recently, Anglos have composed a significant majority of the population in Dade County. While certain cities may have been majority African-American, Anglos remained in the majority throughout the county. Accordingly, this metropolitan-area reform served to ensure the power base of Dade County’s Anglo community and the weakening of the African-American community. Only when Cubans and other Latinos migrated to South Florida in large numbers did they begin to erode the Anglo population’s stronghold on electoral politics in Dade County. Even then, the Cuban community
achieved victories because of demographics; enough voting Cubans moved to Dade County to ensure Latino representation in city and county political offices.

As a result of this “reform,” the South Florida Black community became politically disenfranchised, leading to what Stack and Warren term “Miami syndrome.” This phrase “denote[s] the futility of black attempts to alter or amend a political system that is fundamentally responsible to black needs…[and] high levels of black frustration in a stagnant political system combined with a crisis of rising expectations that is often expressed in rioting and other acts of nontraditional protest” (Stack and Warren 1992:167). However, Miami syndrome does not conceptualize the Black community’s political disenfranchisement as isolated in a static White/Black binary. Rather, Stack and Warren (1992:167) explain that:

The Miami syndrome also refers to the continuing weakening of black political strength within a dynamic environment [where] blacks find themselves pitted against Hispanics in what amounts to a zero-sum relationship with the surging political, economic, and cultural power of Hispanics as the central force transforming Dade County politics.

In this understanding of Miami syndrome, the South Florida Black community has been systematically stripped of its agency and ability to promote change in a political landscape dominated by the South Florida Anglo and Cuban elites.

This framework generally corresponds to the available evidence from South Florida political life in the second half of the twentieth century. As I delineated in Chapter One, many of the South Florida riots in the 1970s and 1980s started with perceived inequities in local political life and police forces. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s African-Americans were promised changes that never happened. By the 1970s
and 1980s, Miami syndrome developed as African-Americans and Haitians revolted against their inability to change the political status quo.

Moreover, South Florida political demographics support the notion of rising Cuban power and the stagnation of African-American and Haitian political power. From 1970 to 1990, the total Latino population of Dade County jumped from 45 percent to 63 percent of the population. In contrast, the Black population increased from 21 to 25 percent over the same time. Concurrently, the percentage of Anglos in Dade County decreased significantly (Stack and Warren 1992:172). Moreover, there is a significant discrepancy in the citizenship rates of Haitian versus Cuban immigrants to South Florida. While many Cubans did not become citizens when they initially immigrated because they envisioned a temporary relocation to the United States, eventually many Cubans did obtain United States citizenship. Haitians, in contrast, were often denied citizenship claims and were thus ineligible to vote in elections (Miller 1984).

Perhaps more important, however, are voter participation rates. Fewer African-American and Haitian citizens exercise their right to vote compared to Cuban citizens, likely a result of decades of governmental unresponsiveness to Black community needs. In an important special 1989 election to replace deceased U.S. Congressman Claude Pepper, Cuban voter participation rates approached 70 percent, nearly unprecedented in a non-presidential election year. In contrast, only one third of African-American and Haitian registered voters went to the polls to cast their ballot. As a direct result of high Cuban voter turnout, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Cuban-

Residential housing patterns are also a key component in understanding why African-Americans and Haitians did not have the political organizing strength necessary to turn out the vote. Political scientists John F. Stack, Jr. and Christopher L. Warren (1992:170) comment that “the fact that the majority of the black population resides in highly segregated yet spatially isolated neighborhoods throughout sprawling Dade County…makes it difficult for any effective grass roots political mobilization to occur.” As I demonstrated in Chapter One, this isolation is the result of a concerted effort of the county’s Anglo politicians to detach Black communities from each other. Additionally, the communities in South Florida with particularly concentrated populations of African-Americans and Haitians often contained the poorest citizens of the county, who were statistically less likely to vote.

Throughout the 1980s, the South Florida Cuban community has become increasingly involved in Dade County political life. The reasons for this are twofold. First, as Cuban immigrants realized that their relocation to South Florida would likely be permanent, many Cubans made the decision to invest time and energy into the political sphere. Second, starting in 1980, with the arrival of the Mariel immigrants, Cubans began to feel under attack by South Florida’s Anglo elite. This galvanized the Cuban community to unite and enter Dade County’s political life.

An additional factor contributed to South Florida’s Cuban residents’ decision to become more involved in local politics. In 1980, the same year as the Mariel boatlift, Anglo residents of Dade County began to feel threatened by the increasing
number and influence of Cubans in South Florida. In response, the Anglo population started an antibilingualism/English Only movement to repeal a 1973 county ordinance declaring Dade County officially bilingual and bicultural (Castro 1992:116). Anglos, especially lower and middle class workers, worried that the power granted to them by virtue of their ethnicity was eroding. In 1976, the Miami Herald began publishing a Spanish language edition called El Herald. Most pressing, however, was the Anglo fear that the new Marielitos would not want to assimilate to life in the United States and learn English. Instead, Miami would literally become “Nueva Cuba.”

In November 1980, Dade County voters overwhelmingly approved the ordinance banning bilingualism and biculturalism by prohibiting “the expenditure of any county funds for the purpose of utilizing any language other than English or any culture other than that of the United States” and provided that “all county government meetings, hearings, and publications shall be in the English language only” (Castro 1992:119). Over 70 percent of voting Anglos voted in favor of the ordinance, irrespective of age, gender, level of education, party affiliation, etc (Castro 1992:120). Only 44 percent of Black voters favored the ordinance and only 15 percent of Cuban voters favored it (Castro 1992:120). The Black vote was divided over those who viewed Cubans as competition in a tight job market and those who sympathized with Cubans as a minority group fighting against the Anglo establishment (Castro 1992:121).

In the years that followed the passage of the ordinance, South Florida Cubans greatly increased their involvement in political life, forever altering Miami’s political landscape. They no longer believed that the Anglo political establishment viewed the
Cuban community as equals and allies against communism. As a direct result of this drastic increase in political participation, “the Miami City Commission turned majority Cuban American in 1985 and has had a Cuban American mayor almost since then” (Stepick and Grenier 2003:21). Cubans were also elected to state and national offices. “In the beginning of the 1990s, there were already ten Cubans in the Florida legislature: seven in the house and three in the senate. In 1989, a Cuban reached elected office at the federal level, when Ileana Ros-Lehtinen was elected to the U.S. Congress” (Pérez 1992b:103). Moreover, four years after Hurricane Andrew, in 1996, Alex Penelas became the Dade County’s first Cuban-American mayor. Two years later, the County Commission became majority Cuban-American (Stepick and Grenier 2003:21). Undoubtedly, South Florida Cubans had gained the demographic strength and social capital necessary to play a major role in Miami’s political life.

South Florida Cubans also made significant advances in social organizations in Dade County. Throughout the 1980s, South Florida Cubans were clearly breaking through barriers imposed by the county’s Anglo elite. For instance, few Cubans joined labor unions in the 1960s and 1970s as Miami’s Anglo elite restricted their entry into these traditionally racially and ethnically divided organizations. By the 1980s, however, increasing numbers of Cubans were gaining unionized jobs outside of the Cuban enclave. Thus, even while overall union participation has decreased since the 1960s, the percentage of Cubans in the unions has increased dramatically (Grenier 1992:145).

More significant in explicating the rise of Cuban participation in South Florida labor unions is the rise of Cuban leadership within major unions in South
Florida. In May of 1988, the first Cuban-American in the history of the labor movement was elected president of an AFL-CIO central labor council in South Florida (Grenier 1992:146). Many other Cubans are active in the Labor Council for Latin American Advancement (LCLAA) (Grenier 1992:146). While still relatively small in number, it is clear that Cubans are becoming an increasingly important component of the South Florida unionized labor movement.

Yet, even with recent advances by the South Florida Cuban community, many of the elite associations and networks remain in Anglo control. The arts and media, for instance, are still very much directed by the Dade County Anglo community. One study notes that “in the county’s major arts organizations, they [Anglos] constitute 89 percent of the leadership.” In addition, “the most influential newspaper, the Miami Herald, is controlled by whites [Anglos]” (Stepick and Grenier 2003:23). Higher education largely remains Anglo territory in Dade County, where “white non-Latinos hold more than half of the positions in college and university boards and political posts” (Stepick and Grenier 2003:23).

The same is true in the political arena. Despite the advances by Dade County Cubans, Anglos maintained much control over South Florida political life. One study reports that “seventy-five percent of Dade County’s judges are white” (Stepick and Grenier 2003:23). Similarly, a 2000 Miami Herald survey found that Anglos held just over 50 percent of elected and top appointed government jobs in Miami-Dade County. In contrast, Latinos held only one-third of these positions, with Cubans holding all but five percent of the Latino percentage (Stepick and Grenier 2003:23). Still, it is clear that South Florida Cubans were in a much better position to use their
social capital to be elected to political offices compared to African-Americans and Haitians. In the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, this political power and the weak network ties associated with it would prove vital in giving Cubans the agency to decide whether to rebuild or relocate.

Cultural Capital

As explained in the introduction to this chapter, in practice, cultural capital exhibits many similarities to social capital. For this reason, I have decided to dedicate the cultural capital section to personal narratives – letting the victims of Hurricane Andrew speak for themselves. This offers an important balance to the quantitative analysis offered elsewhere in this project and suggests that there is a very human side to this story. The following narratives were collected from local newspaper articles, formal surveys and interviews, and court papers documenting the injustices people faced in the aftermath of Andrew. They represent some of the struggles experienced by South Floridians in the weeks, months, and years after Hurricane Andrew. I have focused on the plight of Black individuals and families trying to move away from the damage zone. As a whole, they seemed to have the greatest limitations placed on their agency to choose how to proceed with their lives after the storm.5

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5 My initial intent was to include narratives from a variety of sources documenting the post-Andrew lives of people from many different backgrounds. After a thorough investigation, however, I found that few such narratives exist. Because most Cubans and Anglos did not face structural barriers to relocation after the storm there are few, if any, sources documenting their experiences. Concurrently, many African-Americans and Haitians lacked the social and cultural capital to expose their stories to the public. Thus, it is likely that many individuals and families suffered explicit and/or implicit forms of discrimination that was never made public. For these reasons, I was extremely limited in the personal narratives I could choose from to analyze. The samples selected offer the greatest amount of insight given these limitations.
In October 1992, less than two months after Hurricane Andrew, the housing crisis in South Florida was already well underway. Marvis Butts, a 51-year old African-American and U.S. Air Force veteran was a victim of the storm. Andrew completely destroyed Butts’ house in Cutler Ridge, a South Dade neighborhood, leaving his family without a place to call home. In the aftermath of the storm, Butts found a house on Key Largo through a real estate agent and placed a $3,600 down payment on the property. When it came time to move in, however, Marvis Butts found that the landlord and the homeowner’s association had shut off the water and changed the locks to the house.

Butts believes he was not allowed to move into the home because he is Black. As soon as the owner and homeowner’s association learned that the Butts family was not White, they acted to prevent them from moving. Marvin Butts remarked that “I felt humiliated. I felt like some kind of leper. It was very disgusting.” In response, the lawyer representing the apartment building and the unit owners said that “race was not a factor…but instead…the broker misled them over lease terms.” Ultimately, the case was decided in court and the Butts’ won the case. He was able to move in to the house. Yet, it was a long, arduous battle requiring economic and cultural capital that few South Florida Black families possessed (Hsu 1992).

Opal Wright is a Black 24-year old pharmacy student at a local community college. Needing an apartment after Hurricane Andrew, she called the Gulf Plaza Apartments in Hollywood, Florida, in Broward County. Ms. Wright was promised a
one-bedroom apartment that was vacant. When she arrived at the apartment complex later that day, the apartment complex manager initially ignored her and then told her that no apartments were available. Ms. Wright explained that "She just blew me off on the elevator, I had to follow her, I had to beg for her attention. I couldn't believe it. I knew I had confirmed my worst fears."

Knowing that she had been denied the apartment because of her racial background, Ms. Wright requested that the Miami-based advocacy group HOPE (Housing Opportunities Project for Excellence) send out multi-racial testers to see if the apartment complex was unlawfully using race in determining who could rent there. HOPE confirmed Ms. Wright’s fears – the housing manager denied a Black applicant vacancies while showing empty apartments to an Anglo tester. Ultimately, Ms. Wright could not relocate to the apartment complex, though she did file suit in the first post-Andrew hurricane housing discrimination case in South Florida (Hsu 1992).

Jimmie Williams lived in South Dade County before Hurricane Andrew and his home was severely damaged by the storm. A few weeks after Andrew, Mike Lucas, the claims adjuster assigned to represent Totura & Company, Williams’ insurance company, visited Williams’ home to assess the damage. The excerpts below are taken directly from the court summary explaining the sequence of events:

Upon arriving at Williams’ home, Lucas met Williams’ girlfriend, who is a white female, and advised her that the house was a total loss and that he (Lucas) would be paying the claim shortly. On Lucas’ second trip to Williams’ home, apparently to deliver the check representing the damage
claims, Lucas met Williams for the first time. Williams is a black male, and in his presence, without solicitation, Lucas uttered to Williams that, ‘you (Williams) can not make a profit from the damages to your house, and you’ll have to repair the house.’

Williams then contacted Midfirst Bank in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma [the bank underwriting Totura’s homeowner’s insurance policy] by telephone, and advised Midfirst Bank’s representative that he wished to use his insurance proceeds to pay off the balance of his mortgage and obtain the deed to his home. Midfirst Bank’s representative then stated to Williams, without solicitation, that, ‘you cannot make a profit from the damages to your house and you can not pay off your house.’

Williams contends that Totura never adjusted Williams’ home, but used an ‘adjustment report’ prepared by an agent from Prudential. Williams further alleged that Totura then modified the Prudential report downward from $86,000 (the estimated loss) to $67,010.18. [They] refused to tender the entire payment of the damage loss claim, as adjusted by Totura, but instead, paid the claim in three (3) installments totaling $67,010.18 (Totura v. Williams 1999).

This case highlights the struggles faced by many Black residents who wanted to move from their damaged homes in South Dade County but faced limitations on their personal agency to make these important decisions. Mr. Williams was not looking to make a profit at the expense of his insurance company. Rather, he wanted to receive a fair insurance settlement that would allow him to sell his destroyed home and start over in a new area. Yet, because he was Black, the insurance company refused to give him a full settlement that would offer him the resources to purchase a new home.

The three personal stories described above as well as the narrative at the beginning of the chapter demonstrate the importance of social and cultural capital in determining the fate of individuals and families after a natural disaster. In each case, institutional and personal forms of racial discrimination limited the housing options available to Black families after Andrew. The fact that we hear their stories suggests that these individuals possessed relatively high degrees of capital. The voices of the
truly disadvantaged will likely never be heard. Thousands of other residents, much like Mr. Williams, experienced similar forms of discrimination but lacked the economic, social, and cultural capital necessary to bring their cases to court and to the media’s attention.

Network Theory

The discussion above provides a detailed analysis of how South Florida’s Cuban population was able to successfully gain economic, social, and cultural capital in a region previously dominated by the Anglo establishment. At the same time, it shows why the African-American and Haitian population was not able to replicate these successes. Yet, this information does not explicitly clarify how these elements combine, leading to a high degree of social mobility for some groups and social immobility for others. More specifically, these facts by themselves do not necessarily explain why, in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, Anglos left the area, Cubans moved to locations outside South Dade County, and African-Americans and Haitians were left without the resources to leave the damaged region.

The relationship between two individuals can be conceptualized as a tie that connects or bonds them to one another. Marc Granovetter defines the strength of a tie as a “combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie” (1973:1361). While many individuals think of strong ties as the most substantive, Granovetter claims that “from the individual’s point of view, weak ties are an important resource in making possible mobility opportunity” (1973:1373). In other
words, having a large number of casual relationships through work, social
organizations, etc. offers greater opportunities for social mobility than having a few
close relationships.

When weak ties disappear their importance becomes most apparent. As
Granovetter explains:

The significance of weak ties, then, would be that those which are local
bridges create more, and shorter, paths. Any given tie may, hypothetically, be
removed from a network; the number of paths broken and the changes in
average path length resulting between arbitrary pairs of points can then be
computed. The contention here is that removal of the average weak tie would
do more ‘damage’ to transmission probabilities than would that of the average
strong one...Intuitively speaking, this means that that whatever is to be
diffused can reach a larger number of people, and traverse greater social
distance (i.e. path length), when passed through weak ties rather than strong
(1973:1366).

Consequently, the presence of a large number of weak ties to an individual or
community becomes critical in the dissemination of ideas and the unification of
groups of people. What he terms “broken paths” or lost ties are extremely detrimental
to individuals and communities trying to accumulate capital to achieve social
mobility.

Granovetter argues that fragmentation serves to negatively affect the
establishment of weak ties. Any obstacle that interferes with the building of a bridge
between two individuals or groups restricts the ability for a tie to build between them.
This is particularly pertinent in the South Florida context. As I documented on
Chapter One, the Anglo establishment has systematically worked to reduce the
cohesion of the African-American and Haitian communities in Dade County.
Tangibly, this has resulted in the construction of a major highway through Overtown,
the hub of Black cultural life in Miami. Similarly, the Anglo community has tried to pit African-Americans and Haitians against Cubans, attempting to incite anger and tension between the two groups. This is especially problematic given that “weak ties are more likely to link members of different small groups than strong ones, which tend to be concentrated within particular groups” (Granovetter 1973:1376).

These tactics have largely worked. The South Florida Black community is extremely divided and unified on few fronts. Black neighborhoods remain segregated but are also spatially isolated from each other, reducing the number and frequency of interactions between members of the community. Similarly, Blacks, especially Haitians, feel a great sense of animosity toward Cuban immigrants who they feel have taken economic opportunities away from them. All of these processes restrict the number of weak ties that form by limiting positive, constructive interactions within the Black community and between the Black and Cuban communities.

In contrast, the Cuban enclave serves as a foil to the divided Black community in South Florida. The historical trajectory of Cuban immigration to Miami explained in Chapter One underscores how Cuban exiles in South Florida developed an expansive system of weak ties both within the enclave and between the Cuban community and dominant Anglo power structures. These ties stretched across political and economic lines and put South Florida Cubans in a relatively positive position in the years prior to Hurricane Andrew.

The case study of South Florida thus largely supports Granovetter’s supposition that “the more local bridges in a community and the greater their degree, the more cohesive the community and the more capable of acting in concert”
From the start, Anglos had a cohesive community with many ties binding groups and individuals together. The Cuban community developed a strong network through the growth of the Cuban enclave, the ideal setting to establish a large number of weak ties. The African-American and Haitian communities, however, have faced a history of division and fragmentation, breaking down old ties and preventing new ones from forming.

**Relocation and Rebuilding**

In the months and years following Hurricane Andrew, thousands of individuals and families left South Dade County and moved into North Dade County, Broward County, Palm Beach County, other parts of Florida, and throughout the United States. Some demographers assert that “official estimates indicated an immediate exodus of approximately 100,000 people from hurricane-ravaged South Dade. Those leaving comprised almost 28 percent of South Dade’s 1992 estimated population, with most relocating north of the impact area” (Girard and Peacock 2000:191). Overall, slightly more than half the neighbors who left the county had returned to their pre-hurricane residences by mid-1994: 75% for North Dade and 38% for South Dade. This clearly signifies an important change in the population of South Dade County. The goal of this section is to determine exactly who moved away from South Dade County, where they moved, and, by default, to ascertain who stayed.

**Demographic Data**
The most comprehensive study analyzing demographic trends in post-Andrew South Florida was compiled by two sociologists from Florida International University, Chris Gerard and Walter Gillis Peacock. In their research, Gerard and Peacock used data from three studies: the FIU Hurricane Andrew Survey, the South Dade Population Impact Study, and the Homestead Housing Needs and Demographic Study. These surveys were conducted four months, one year, and three years after the storm, respectively. Together, the results of these studies are alarming. South Dade Blacks were statistically much more likely to remain in their homes compared to South Dade Cubans or Anglos. This is even more distressing given the location of the destruction I presented in Chapter Two. As Gerard and Peacock confirm, “Approximately 90 percent of South Dade’s Blacks live[d] in the area with the greatest destruction and highest post-hurricane vacancy rates compared to the rest of South Dade. A substantially lower proportion of South Dade’s Hispanics and Anglos (61 per cent of each) are located in this heavily damaged area” (Girard and Peacock 2000:193).

A cross-tabulation of ethnicity, defined using the terms “Anglo,” “Black,” and “Hispanic” show that Anglo households were statistically most likely to leave their homes post-Andrew, controlling for level of damage experienced. At the other end of the spectrum, Black households were most likely to remain in their homes. These trends hold true for each of the three surveys, though the statistical significance of the results increases as more time passed after the storm. It is clear that African-Americans and Haitians tended to remain in damaged neighborhoods while Cubans and, to an even greater extent Anglos, fled heavily damaged areas.
These data are confirmed through longitudinal studies investigating long-term demographic trends in South Florida. A ten-year study on the effects of Hurricane Andrew on the South Dade multiethnic working class community of South Miami Heights found that while the town grew by over six percent from 1993 to 2003, the percentage of Anglo residents decreased by nearly eight percent and the percentage of Latino residents increased by over seven percent. The percentage of Black residents remained relatively unchanged (Dash et al. 2007:15). The same study examined enrollment figures from the three elementary schools in South Miami Heights from 1992 to 2000. In 1992, the schools had 42 percent Latino students, 33 percent Black students, and 20 percent Anglo students. By 2000, the composition had changed significantly: 64 percent Latino, 28 percent Black, and six percent Anglo (Dash et al. 2007:19). These findings confirm the general trend of Anglo flight from Dade County after Hurricane Andrew and the increasing percentage of Latinos in Dade County’s population.

Girard and Peacock further analyzed the information from these studies by examining whether residential segregation by ethnicity had an effect on relocation after Hurricane Andrew. In defining residential segregation, Girard and Peacock used the Hurricane Andrew Survey method I described in Chapter Two, using Zip Codes containing 75 percent or more Blacks or Hispanics as a proxy for residential segregation. They also considered factors such as residency in an apartment or multi-family building as well as the possession of homeowner’s insurance, for reasons explained in Chapter Two. Girard and Peacock found that “after holding damage and other factors constant, the odds of relocating after Andrew were significantly less for
Blacks than for Anglos…ranging from approximately one-third to slightly more than one-half the odds for Anglos” (Girard and Peacock 2000:198).

Thus, these findings support the notion that African-Americans and Haitians were largely unable to leave hurricane-ravaged neighborhoods in South Dade County. Girard and Peacock believe the evidence “suggest[s] that post-hurricane relocation was impeded for Blacks, whereas for most Hispanics…this was not a major problem” (Girard and Peacock 2000:200). They further extend their argument by asserting that “Blacks were less likely than Anglos to relocate after the hurricane not only because of possible restraints but because of barriers created by residential segregation” (Girard and Peacock 2000:201). As the narratives above suggest, African-American and Haitian hurricane victims were often excluded from relocation opportunities throughout South Florida. This supports the fact that the number of Blacks leaving South Dade was relatively small in number. Importantly, though, among African-Americans and Haitians who were surveyed, those who did relocate to North Dade “moved exclusively to ZIP Code areas that were more than half Black” (Girard and Peacock 2000:201).

This analysis suggests that the housing crisis in South Florida after Andrew was exacerbated by the existing discrepancies in housing quality and insurance coverage analyzed in Chapter Two. Since African-Americans and Haitians lived in a “community of fate,” they were destined to bear the burden of living in the most damage-susceptible housing structures and also face restrictions in relocation possibilities after the storm. Together, the historical precedent of housing segregation
in South Florida and the lower-quality houses in these areas made it much more challenging for Black residents of South Dade to recover after Hurricane Andrew.

South Dade Cuban residents did not face the same type of structural restrictions in determining where they could move. Girard and Peacock comment that “virtually all [Cuban] respondents moving north of the impact zone filled vacancies in neighborhoods that were overwhelmingly White (ZIP Code areas with less than 16 per cent Blacks)” (Girard and Peacock 2000:201). This contrast between Cuban and Black relocation possibilities supports the theory that residential segregation served as a barrier to Black residents but not to Cubans. Importantly, Girard and Peacock (2000:198) note that “in none of the equations were the odds of relocation between Anglo and Hispanic households statistically significant,” further supporting the claim that Cuban residents’ experiences in disaster recovery were much closer to Anglos’ than African-Americans’ and Haitians.’

*Florida City v. Homestead*

A comparison between the South Dade incorporated municipalities of Florida City and Homestead reinforce the differential effects of Hurricane Andrew on distinct populations.6 Florida City, a small historically Black town of 6,000 residents was consistently ranked as one of the United States’ five poorest municipalities. The average value of a Florida City single-family home in 1992 was $27,628 and the median household income in 1990 was $15,907. Few residents owned their own home and over 16 percent of residents were unemployed. With a small land area, an even smaller tax base, and few Anglo or Cuban residents, the community was

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6 See Appendix B for a geographic reference of Florida City and Homestead.
marginalized within the county and relied on state and federal funding to survive (Dash, Gillis, and Peacock 2000:209).

In contrast, the South Dade city of Homestead had a 1990 population of just under 27,000 residents. Over 40 percent of Homestead residents identified as Anglo and nearly one-third of residents were Cuban. The median home value was $32,313 and the median income of city residents was $20,594, both significantly higher than the comparable figures in Florida City (Dash et al. 2000:209). The unemployment rate was less than half that of Florida City’s (Dash et al. 2000:210). These statistics show that Florida City and Homestead were very different cities. Each municipality was directly in the path of Hurricane Andrew’s zone of destruction. The differences in each community in the months and years following Hurricane Andrew demonstrate the importance of the race and ethnicity in determining disaster recovery patterns.

In total, two years after Hurricane Andrew, South Dade lost between 67,000 and 100,000 residents, or roughly 18 to 28 percent of its pre-Andrew population, although both Florida City and Homestead lost about one-third of their respective populations. As analyzed above, Anglos were most likely to leave the area. As a result, the post-Andrew Florida City population contained an even higher percentage of Black residents than before, becoming nearly exclusively a Black community, while Homestead achieved a fairly even ratio of Anglo, Cuban, and Black residents (Dash et al. 2000:212).

The combined effects of the pre-Andrew population demographic differential and the movement of Anglos and, to a lesser extent, Cubans, to locations outside of South Dade, proved disastrous for Florida City. As the researchers of the comparison
study argue, “parallel to segregation’s deleterious economic effects, which inhibit Black efforts to escape from poverty and all of its consequences, segregation would appear to limit movement out of disaster areas and in other ways stifle disaster recovery for Blacks” (Girard and Peacock 2000:201). Florida City’s struggling economy was absolutely decimated by the storm. In 1992, the city registered 114 businesses (Dash et al. 2000:212). The following year, there were less than half that many. Nearly 90 percent of jobs disappeared from the city. Sales figures dropped over 80 percent (Dash et al. 2000:213). Florida City businesses simply did not have the resources needed to rebuild and recover after the storm.

This paints a bleak but largely accurate picture of life in Florida City after Andrew. Every home in Florida City was damaged or destroyed during Hurricane Andrew (Dash et al. 2000:210). Residents were constrained by forces out of their hands such as living in sub-standard housing, having inadequate (or non-existing) insurance policies, and living in a region with extremely segregated housing units. At the same time, many of these same forces restricted rebuilding efforts in Florida City. The result was that many residents were forced to live for months, even years, in condemned houses without air conditioning, electricity, or running water (Dash et al. 2000:211). Many of these residents did not have a choice; they did not choose to remain in these conditions. Rather, structural forces left them with no other options.

Nearly 60 percent of Florida City residents lacked homeowner’s insurance. Low-income levels among Florida City’s largely Black population, however, meant that only 5.5 percent of households qualified for Small Business Administration (SBA) loans, given to disaster victims without adequate insurance coverage.
Individual Assistance (IA) and Individual Family Grants (IFG) are offered to disaster victims who cannot qualify for SBA loans. 78 percent of those who applied for these grants received them (Dash et al. 2000:222). Yet, few Florida City households choose to apply for them. This is a reflection of the lower levels of social and cultural capital among African-Americans and Haitians living in Dade County. Many residents did not have the time or knowledge of how to work through the state and federal bureaucracies necessary to receive the funds critical for rebuilding. In addition, the government had disappointed Florida City residents so many times in the past. Many questioned why the governing elite would suddenly change their attitudes and offer rebuilding assistance (Dash et al. 2000:222).

It was a completely different story just a few miles away in Homestead. Like Florida City, Homestead received considerable damage from Hurricane Andrew. But the pre-Andrew infrastructure in Homestead was strong enough to quickly rebound after the storm, allowing residents to recover. First, many of the Homestead residents had the economic, social, and cultural capital necessary to relocate to North Dade or elsewhere after the storm. Florida City residents did not possess these same resources. Second, economic losses to businesses, vital to an area’s recovery, were much less in Homestead. The city registered nearly the same number of businesses from 1992 to 1993. In addition, Homestead actually increased its employee base and its number of business transactions in the year following the storm as workers and supplies were needed to help in the rebuilding effort (Dash et al. 2000:213).

Similarly, even though a large number of homes in Homestead were damaged or destroyed in Hurricane Andrew as well, the largely Anglo and Cuban population
had the resources necessary to help in the rebuilding process. First, over half of Homestead’s residents had homeowner’s insurance before the storm, providing additional economic support for the rebuilding process. Moreover, because Homestead residents had larger incomes and more access to economic capital than their Florida City counterparts, they were more likely to qualify for SBA loans. In total, over 20 percent of Homestead’s residents qualified for them – almost four times as many as in Florida City. Similarly, about 65 percent of Homestead households submitted requests for IA and IFG grants and almost 90 percent of these were approved (Dash et al. 2000:221).

The contrast between Florida City and Homestead cannot be more striking. Both cities were directly in the path of Hurricane Andrew and sustained substantial property damage. Whereas Florida City housed mostly African-Americans and Haitians, Homestead contained a mixture of Black, Cuban, and Anglo residents. This demographic difference, contextualized through disparities in economic, social, and cultural capital, helps explain why in Homestead many residents had the option to leave South Dade or stay and rebuild while Florida City residents were forced to live in condemned houses over extended periods of time.

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The processes of rebuilding and relocating had a significant effect on the demographic makeup of Dade County. Specifically, the population in the region changed in two important, related ways. First, middle class Anglos permanently fled the county, leaving a region mostly populated with poor African-Americans and
Haitians, lower and middle-class Cubans, and upper-middle class and upper-class Anglos. As explained above, the majority of South Florida Black residents did not have the political, social, or cultural capital necessary to relocate after the storm. Many Cubans relocated to central and northern parts of Dade County where the enclave community was strong enough to absorb the inflow. Anglos, with the highest levels of all forms of capital, generally left the area, relocating to Broward and Palm Beach counties. Some upper-class Anglos chose to remain in the county, having enough weak network ties and the capital necessary to largely avoid the problems experienced by lower and middle-class Anglos in the county. This elite group could largely function outside the racial status quo after Andrew.

The second key demographic phenomenon was the acceleration of the process of Latinization that was already well underway in Dade County before Hurricane Andrew. As successive waves of Cubans arrived in Dade County and the Cuban enclave grew in both absolute and relative size and power, middle-class Anglos had slowly been leaving the region. Hurricane Andrew accelerated the process by serving as an impetus for thousands more to leave. According to sociologists and demographers, “Anglos…used Hurricane Andrew as an opportunity to move from areas that were increasingly becoming Hispanic” (Dash et al. 2007:17). Concomitant to this out-migration was the immigration of other Latinos from Central and South American countries including Nicaragua, Colombia, Honduras, Peru, and Guatemala. Since the African-American population remained basically static and discrimination in immigration law restricted the number of new Haitians arriving in South Florida, the end result was the increasing Latinization of Dade County.

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7 See Appendix B for a visual description of this longitudinal demographic shift.
These dual processes are clearly related. The “Anglo flight” from Dade County was one of the reasons why the Latinization of the county accelerated. Yet, it is important to consider the reasons behind these demographic processes. As I demonstrated throughout the past three chapters, historical and sociological processes fostered an environment where the Cuban community was able to build a successful enclave. As the once-dominant Anglo community felt threatened by increasing Cuban power and influence, they chose to take advantage of their economic, social, and cultural capital and move elsewhere, leaving Dade County’s Black community to remain marginalized without the capital necessary to realign Dade County’s infrastructure or to relocate out of the area.
CONCLUSION
In the years after Hurricane Andrew, change came relatively slowly to South Dade County. The task of rebuilding and reconstructing entire neighborhoods is a formidable challenge. Before any new growth could happen, however, the rubble from damaged and destroyed houses needed to be cleared away to pave the way for the future reconstruction of South Florida. One of the critical questions that often went unasked, however, is who would be living in South Dade County during the reconstruction process and who could escape? Thinking even further into the future, who would live in rebuilt South Dade County after the area completely recovered?

Yet few people asked these questions in the days, weeks, and months after Hurricane Andrew. Popular opinion was that the storm was an unavoidable natural disaster; everyone was affected. This superficial understanding glosses over the nuanced nature of the damage as well as the unique historical processes of racial formation in South Florida. The evidence suggests that:

there are no really generalized opportunities and risks in nature, but instead there are sets of unequal access to opportunities and unequal exposures to risks which are a consequence of the socio-economic system . . . It is more important to discern how human systems themselves place people in relation to each other and to the environment than it is to interpret natural systems (Cannon 1994:14-15).

Accordingly, understanding Hurricane Andrew primarily as a natural disaster fails to acknowledge that Anglos and Cubans had access to economic, social, and cultural resources that most African-Americans and Haitians did not.

The quantitative data demonstrate that after Hurricane Andrew, Black residents living in South Dade County moved out of the destruction zone much less frequently than Anglos and Cubans. Moreover, the qualitative data suggest this was
not simply a matter of personal choice. Structural barriers existed preventing many African-Americans and Haitians from leaving their damaged homes. These individuals and families did not have agency; they were largely powerless to enact meaningful change that would remove these barriers of opposition.

Admittedly, this study does not analyze all barriers to relocation after Hurricane Andrew. I started from the premise that differences in race and ethnicity may have affected who could move where in the months and years after the storm. Accordingly, the conceptual framework highlights the unique racial and ethnic environment in South Florida by challenging the standard White/Black binary and posits that the Cuban enclave successfully replaced Anglos in Miami’s economic, political, and social structures. A fuller and more nuanced picture of South Florida life post-Andrew would include conceptual frameworks using gender and social class as categories of analysis. Were women and men treated differently as they tried to move after Andrew? If so, how and why did this happen? Similarly, this study fails to address the role of poor Anglos living in South Dade County before Andrew. Were they able to move after the storm? It is the intersection of these categories of analysis that ultimately offers the most comprehensive data. Specifically, how do race, ethnicity, gender, and social class work together to provide greater resources and choices for some individuals and families while limiting resources and choices for others? Hopefully more research will be done in this area to better understand these interactions.

The analysis offered here suggests a broader question: What implications can be drawn from this housing crisis to explain the future reshaping of Dade County? It
is clear that Hurricane Andrew has accelerated the process of Anglo flight from Dade County. Many Anglos are moving north into Broward and Palm Beach Counties. Others are moving to locations across the United States. Concurrently, the number of Latinos immigrating into Dade County continues to rise. Although immigration from Cuba has slowed, many immigrants are arriving from other Latin American countries including Nicaragua, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil. Haitian immigrants continue to migrate as well, though in much smaller numbers compared to the overall quantity of Latino immigrants.

Consequently, there is little reason to think that the situation would be much different if Andrew struck South Florida today. Although the Anglo population has largely ceded economic, political, and cultural power to the growing Latino majority, the African-American and Haitian population would still confront similar types of structural barriers to recovery that they faced in 1992. Blacks still lag behind Anglos and Latinos in key indicators such as income and rates of business and home ownership. Until South Florida’s society is fundamentally restructured, it is unlikely that African-Americans and Haitians will be able to avoid being disproportionately affected by the human side of natural disasters like Hurricane Andrew.

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Hurricane Andrew was a powerful storm that affected many people’s lives in South Florida. The popular media coverage emphasized the idea that nobody in South Dade County escaped the damage caused by the hurricane. This understanding completely misses the selective nature of the destruction. As I have shown, as a
consequence of the unique historical trajectory of racial and ethnic dynamics in South Florida, African-Americans and Haitians experienced the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew in significantly different ways than their Anglo and Cuban neighbors.

Thirteen years later, Hurricane Katrina slammed into Louisiana and Mississippi, completely inundating New Orleans after multiple levees failed to protect the city. Lake Pontchartrain poured into many parts of the Crescent City, submerging cars, homes, and human beings. In the days after Katrina, the media offered powerful images of human suffering in New Orleans. Thousands of residents had been unable to evacuate and climbed to their rooftops to avoid the floodwater. Other families spent days in the Superdome, the official shelter of last resort for New Orleans residents. Without adequate food, water, fresh air, or other provisions, the Superdome became a locus of disease and misery that offered little more than refuge from the rising floodwater.

Before Katrina, New Orleans was known as a predominantly African-American city that experienced a high degree of racial segregation and significant inequities in housing quality between White and Black neighborhoods. Some of the poorest African-American communities, such as the Ninth Ward, suffered the greatest amount of damage from the levee breaks because they were located in the lowest parts of the city. This is a result of the historical processes of racial formation in New Orleans that gave Black residents limited economic, social, and cultural capital. The situation was so desperate that many Black residents did not have access to transportation to flee after the mayor of the city, C. Ray Nagin, ordered a mandatory evacuation for all residents in the days before Katrina devastated the region.
The results proved disastrous for New Orleans’ Black residents and their homes. Over 1,000 individuals lost their lives in the storm and thousands of homes were flooded and destroyed. In contrast to the experience after Hurricane Andrew, however, the media representations of New Orleans post-Katrina were explicitly racialized. The people seeking shelter in the Superdome were almost exclusively Black. White New Orleans had fled the city and evacuated to hotels and family members as far away as Houston and Atlanta. The media overtly referred to the storm in racial terms and, in so doing, made the disaster a human one as well as a natural one.

It will be important to study demographic trends in the coming years to understand the implications of the explicit racialization of Katrina’s effects in the New Orleans area. Early indications suggest that, compared to Hurricane Andrew, an opposite pattern is emerging in Louisiana. Whereas in South Florida African-American and Haitian residents were forced to stay and rebuild in the zone of destruction, it appears that New Orleans is using Katrina as an opportunity to remove many Black residents from the city and rebuild a gentrified, revitalized (read: White) Crescent City.

Though a detailed study would certainly be necessary, I suspect that these differences can be traced to the distinct patterns of racial formation in Miami and New Orleans. Without a large Cuban population, New Orleans largely fits the stereotypical White/Black binary. Any study that investigates this topic will need to remember this critical difference between the two metropolitan areas. Still, this project offers some important insights into the human side of natural disasters. In all
cases, it is imperative to remember that no single disaster affects every individual or
group the same way. It is the task of social science to ascertain what these differences
are and why they exist.
REFERENCES


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APPENDIX A:
1990 U.S. CENSUS

Your Guide for the
1990
U.S. Census
Form

This guide gives helpful information on filling out your census form. If you need more help, call the local U.S. census office. The telephone number is on the cover of the questionnaire. After you have filled out your form, please return it in the envelope we have provided.

On the Inside                  Page
How to fill out your census form     2
Example                          2
Your answers are confidential    2
Instructions for the census questions 3–11
What the census is about          12
Why the census asks certain questions   12

How to Fill Out Your Census Form

Please use a black lead pencil only. Black lead pencil is better to use than ballpoint or other pens. Most questions ask you to fill in the circle, or to print the information. See Example below.

Make sure you print answers for everyone in this household. If someone in the household, such as a roomer or boarder, does not want to give you all the information for the form, print at least the person’s name and answer questions 2 and 3. A census taker will call to get the other information directly from the person.

There may be a question you cannot answer exactly. For example, you might not know the age of an elderly person or the price of which your house was sold. Ask someone else in your household; if no one knows, give your best estimate.

Instructions for individual questions begin on page 3 of this guide. They will help you understand the questions and answer them correctly.

If you have a question about filling out the census form or need assistance, call the local U.S. census office. The telephone number is given on the cover of the questionnaire.

If you do not mail back your census form, a census taker will be sent out to you. But it takes time and your taxpayer dollars if you fill out the form yourself and mail it back.

Example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Age</th>
<th>b. Year of birth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Instructions for Questions 1a through 7

1a. List everyone who lives at this address in question 1. If you are not sure if you should list a person, see the notes on page 1 of the census form. If you are still not sure, answer as best you can and fill in “Yes” for question H1a or H1b, as appropriate.

If there are more than seven people in your household, please list all the persons in question 1a, complete the form for seven people, and mail it back to the enclosed envelope. A census taker will call to obtain the information for the additional persons.

b. If everyone listed in question 1a usually lives at another address, print the address(es) in 1b.

2. Fill in circle to show how each person is related to the person in column 1.

If other relatives or the person in column 1, print the relationship such as son-in-law, daughter-in-law, grandparent, nephew, niece, mother-in-law, father-in-law, cousin, or none.

If the stepson/stepdaughter of the person in column 1 also has been legally adopted by the person in column 1, mark stepson/stepdaughter but not mark Natural-born or Adopted son/daughter. In other words, stepson/stepdaughter takes precedence over Adopted son/daughter.

3. Fill in circle for the race each person considers himself/herself to be. If you fill in the Indian (American) circle, print the name of the tribe in which the person is enrolled. If the person is not enrolled in a tribe, print the name of the principal tribe.

4. If the Other API category includes persons who identify as Chamorro, Filipi, Ilocano, Indo-Chinese, Laotian, Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Tongan, Thai, Cambodian, Sri Lankan, and so on.

If you fill in the Other race circle, be sure to print the name of the race.

If the person considers himself/herself to be White, Black or Negro, Eskimo or Aleut, fill circle only. Please do not print the race in this box.

The Black or Negro category also includes persons who identify as Asican-Americans, Afro-American, Haitian, Jamaican, West Indian, Ngikor, and so on.

All persons, regardless of citizenship status, should answer this question.

5. Print at last birthday in the space provided under “year” for those less than 1 year old. Fill in the matching circle below each box. Also, print year of birth in the space provided. Then fill in the matching circle below each box. For an illustration of how to complete question 5, see the Example on page 28 of this guide.

6. If the person’s only marriage was annulled, mark Never married.

7. A person is of Spanish/Hispanic origin if the person’s origin (ancestry) is Mexican, Mexican-American, Chicano, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Argentinian, Colombian, Costa Rican, Dominican, Ecuadorian, Guatemalan, Honduran, Nicaraguan, Panamanian, Salvadorian, from other Spanish-speaking countries of the Caribbean or Central or South America, or from Spain.

If you fill in the Yes, other Spanish language circle, print the person’s group.

A person who is of Russian (Russian) origin should answer this question.

If the “Yes, other Hispanic/Latino” circle. Note that the term “Mexican-American” refers only to persons of Mexican origin or ancestry.

All persons, regardless of citizenship status, should answer this question.

Instructions for Question H1a through H1b

H1a. Refer to the list of persons you entered in question 1a on page 1. If you left anyone out of your list because you were not sure if the person(s) should be listed, answer question H1a as Yes. Then enter the name(s) and reason(s) why you listed the person(s) on the line provided. Otherwise, answer question H1a as No.

b. If you included anyone on your list even though you were not sure if you should list the person(s), answer question H1b as Yes. Then enter the name(s) and reason(s) why you listed the person(s) on the line provided. Otherwise, answer question H1b as No.

Figure B.1 Assessing Hurricane Andrew’s Damage

Figure B.2 Hurricane Andrew Impact Zones

Figure B.3 1990 Black Population of Dade County, Florida

Figure B.4 1990 Hispanic Population of Dade County, Florida

Figure B.6 Trends in Ethnicity in Dade County, Florida